Literature Review

1 The N eed for Theory

It is sheer craziness to dare to understand w

orld affairs. T here are so

m any collective actors-states,

international organizations,

transna- tional

associations, social m ovem

ents, and subnational

groups-and billions of individuals, each w

ith different histories, capabilities, and goals, interacting

to create historical patterns that are at all tim es sus-

ceptible to change. Put m ore sim

ply, w orld affairs are pervaded w

ith endless details-far

m ore than one can hope to com

prehend in their

entirety. A

nd if these m yriad details seem

overw helm

ing during relatively sta- ble periods, they seem

that m uch m

ore confounding at those tim

es w

hen dynam ism

and change becom e predom

inant. Such is the case as

the tw entieth

century draw s to a close. In all parts of the w

orld, long- established

traditions, institutions,

and relationships are undergoing

profound and

bew ildering

transform ations.

Indeed, the

pace of

change has been so rapid, w ith the collapse of the Soviet U

nion follow -

ing so soon after the end of the C old W

ar-to m

ention only the m ost

dram atic

of the changes that have cascaded across the global land- scape-that

it becom es reasonable

to assert that change is the only constant in w

orld affairs. A

nd w e dare to think w

e can m ake sense of this com

plex, sw ift-m

ov- ing w

orld, w ith its w

elter of details, intricate relationships, m ushroom

- ing conflicts, and m

om ents of cooperation!

H ow

nervy! H ow

utterly absurd! W

hat sheer craziness! B

ut the alternatives to seeking com

prehension are too noxious

to contem

plate, ranging as they do from

resorting to sim plistic and ideo-

logical interpretations to being propelled by forces w

e can neither dis- cern nor influence. So dare w

e m ust! H

ow ever far-fetched and arrogant

it m ay seem

, w e have no choice as concerned

persons but to seek to 1

2 The N

eed for Theory

fathom

the m eaning

and im

plications of the

events and

stunning changes that bom

bard us from every corner of the w

orld. H

appily, there are at least tw o handy m

echanism s

available for eas- ing the task. O

ne involves a sense of hum ility. If w

e can rem ain in aw

e of the com

plexities and changes at w

ork in the w orld, ever ready to

concede confusion and alw

ays rem inding

ourselves that our conclu- sions m

ust perforce be tentative, then it should be possible to avoid ex- cessive sim

plicity and intellectual paralysis. Second, and m

uch m ore

im portant,

w e can self-consciously rely on the core practices of theory

to assist us in bringing a m

easure of order out of the seem ing chaos

that confronts us. For it is through theorizing that w e can hope to tease

m eaningful

patterns out of the endless details and inordinate

com -

plexities that sustain w orld politics.

M oving U

p the L adder of A

bstraction

B eing self-consciously

theoretical is not nearly as difficult as it m

ay seem

at first glance. For inevitably w e engage in a form

of theorizing w

henever w e observe w

orld affairs. It is im possible to perceive and de-

scribe all that has occurred (or is occurring), and there is just too m uch

detail to depict every aspect of any situation,

m uch

less num erous

overlapping situations.

Put m ore forcefully, asking a student of w

orld affairs to account for all the dim

ensions of an event is like asking geog- raphers to draw

a life-sized m ap of the w

orld. C learly, such a m

ap could not be draw

n (w here w

ould they store it?); thus, one is com pelled to

m ake choices am

ong all the possible details that could be described, to select som

e as im portant

and dism iss others as trivial for the purposes

at hand (m uch as geographers m

ight select m ountains

and rivers as sa- lient and treat hills and stream

s as irrelevant). A nd it is at the very

point w hen one starts selecting the relevant details that one begins to

theorize. For w e do not m

ake the selections at random ,

for no reason, capriciously. R

ather, crude and im precise as they m

ay be, our observa- tions derive from

som e notion

of w hat is significant and w

hat is not- distinctions that am

ount to a form

of theory, a sorting m echanism

that enables us to m

ove on to the next observation. T

o acknow ledge that

the selection process alw ays accom

panies ef-

fort to develop understanding is not, how

ever, to insure a self-con- sciousness about theory.

It is all too tem pting

to lapse into thinking that the aspects of a situation

selected form an objective reality that

The N eed for Theory

3

any observer w ould perceive. From

the perspective of our unrecog-

nized theories, everything can seem so self-evident that w

e m ay be in-

clined to equate our-understanding of events w

ith the "truth" about

them , a practice that can lead to all kinds of problem

s once w e try to

share our understandings w

ith others. T

o avoid or overcom e these difficulties, and thereby heighten

our theoretical

sensitivities, it is useful to conceive of raw observations-

the endless details noted above-as

located at the low est rung on a

huge ladder of abstraction. O

ne then ascends the ladder each tim e one

clusters details at a given level into a m ore encom

passing pattern. T he

broader the generalizations one m

akes, of course, the higher one goes on the ladder, stopping the ascent at that rung w

here one is satisfied that the kind of understanding

one seeks has been achieved. In a like m

anner, one descends the ladder w hen one perceives that m

ore detail is needed to clarify the understanding

developed at higher rungs. T

he notion of understanding

arrayed at different levels of abstrac- tion prom

otes theoretical self-consciousness because it constantly re- m

inds us that w e are inescapably

involved in a process of selecting som

e details as im portant

and dism issing others as trivial. A

w are that,

perforce, w e m

ust teeter precariously on a rung of delicately balanced interpretations

w henever w

e m ove beyond raw

facts, w e are continu-

ously im pelled to treat any observation w

e m ake as partly a product of

our prem ises about the w

ay things w ork in w

orld politics. A

nother w ay of developing a keen sensitivity to the im

peratives of theorizing is to evolve a habit of alw

ays asking about any phenom e-

non w e observe, ,;O

f w hat is this an instance?" T

hough brief, the ques- tion is pow

erful because it forces us to m ove up the ladder of abstrac-

tion in order to identify a m ore encom

passing class of phenom ena

of w

hich the observed event is an instance. Suppose, for exam ple, one is

investigating the Soviet U nion and observes that in 1991 it underw

ent a coup d'etat

that failed, and further suppose that one then asks of

w hat is this failure an instance. Im

m ediately one com

es upon a num -

ber of possible answ ers at different rungs on the ladder. A

t the next highest rung the coup attem

pt m ay loom

as a botched pow er grab by a

sm all clique of politicians frustrated by their progressive loss of influ-

ence. A t a higher rung it can be seen as an instance

of factional and ideological tension am

ong an elite accustom ed to unquestioned

lead- ership. A

t a still higher rung it m ight be interpreted

as an instance of the kind of political tensions that follow

w hen an econom

y enters a

4 The N

eed for Theory

period of steep decline. N ear the top rung the failed coup can readily

be view ed as an instance of profound

change in a long-stagnant soci-

ety. A t the very top it m

ight be seen as the final stage in a long process of system

ic collapse. In the sense that they are broadly explanatory, each of these inter-

pretations is profoundly

theoretical. N

one of them

is m ore

correct than any other-since

they offer explanations at different levels of ag-

gregation-but all of them

select certain aspects of the failed coup as relevant

and im pute

m eaning to them

. A

nd, in so doing, they nicely dem

onstrate how

the of-w hat-is-this-an-instance

question im

pels us to use theory

as a m eans of enlarging

our understanding. M

ore than that, the several interpretations

of the coup highlight the satisfactions inherent

in the theoretical enterprise.

For there is little to get excited about at the low

est rungs on the ladder of abstraction. T o be sure, the

raw facts and historical details are im

portant-one could hardly theo-

rize w ithout

them -but

it is only as one m oves up the ladder that the

interesting questions

begin to arise and allow one's m

ind to com

e alive, to probe and ponder, to delve and discard, to roam

and revise. T

aken by itself, the failed coup in A ugust 1991 w

as no m ore than nine

m en im

prisoning a president and issuing orders; but as an instance of

m ore encom

passing processes, it w

as one of the m ost dynam

ic m

o- m

ents of recent history.

The R efinem

ents of Theory

It follow s that at least crude form

s of theorizing are at w ork w

henever w

e undertake observation. T

he facts of history or current events do not speak to us. T

hey do not cry out for attention and im

pose them selves

upon us. R

ather, it is w e w

ho m ake the facts speak, accord them

sa-

lience, give them m

eaning, and in so doing endlessly engage in the

theoretical enterprise. Since this is the case irrespective of w hether w

e are aw

are of ourselves as theoreticians, it is obviously preferable to

m ove consciously

up and dow

n the

ladder of abstraction. Indeed,

since theorizing is the surest and m

ost expeditious route

to under- standing,

there is m uch to be said for m

aking a habit out of the of- w

hat-is-this-an-instance question,

of training oneself to ask it con-

stantly in order to insure that one proceeds explicitly from observation

to inference to explanation. B

y being habitual about the question, that

The N eed for Theory

5

is, one assures alw ays seeing larger m

eanings even as one focuses on particular

events. A nd by being explicit, one can identify w

here one m

ay have erred if it turns out that an interpretation proves unw

ar- ranted in the light of subsequent developm

ents. E

xplicitness, in other w ords, is a crucial refinem

ent of the theoretical enterprise.

It is w hat allow

s us to test and revise our theories. B y being

explicit w e can not only check our reasoning against further observa-

tions but also subm it our theories to the scrutiny of those w

ho doubt the soundness of our theorizing. In this w

ay know ledge cum

ulates and both

specific events and broad trends com e into focus and pave the

w ay for ever m

ore enriched understanding.

T hus is a task that m

ay seem

like sheer craziness transform ed

by the theorist into a challeng- ing and rew

arding endeavor. T

here are, of course, m any other rules and procedures that underlie

the theoretical enterprise. T heory is not a m

eans of giving vent to one's intuitions,

of random ly asserting w

hatever pops to m ind as a response

to the of-w

hat-is-this-an-instance question.

A hunch

or im pression

m ay serve as an initial stim

ulus to theory building, but no observation acquires a theoretical context until such tim

e as it is integrated into a coherent

and m ore encom

passing fram

ew ork and then

subjected to the rigors of system

atic analysis. L ike any other intellectual enterprise,

in other w ords, theorizing is founded on rules-in

this case, rules for transform

ing raw

observations into refined hypotheses and m eaning-

ful understandings. In them

selves, the rules are neutral; they allow for

w eak theory as w

ell as pow erful theory, for narrow

theory that explains a lim

ited set of observations as w ell as broad theory that purports to ac-

count for a w

ide array of phenom ena.

W hatever

the strength

and scope of any theory, how

ever, it is unlikely to advance understanding if it strays far from

the core rules that underlie the enterprise.

Tow ard the H

igher R ungs

A lthough this is not the place to elaborate the rules to w

hich theoreti- cians adhere, it is useful to note that the higher one m

oves up the lad- der of abstraction, the less one w

orries about anom alous situations and

the m ore one focuses on patterns that reflect central tendencies. A

t the top of the

ladder sit com prehensive

perspectives that organize our

overall understanding of cause and effect. W

e all have such theories,

6 The N

eed for Theory

even if w e are not consciously aw

are of them . Pluralists, for exam

ple, understand

social life to be m oved by a variety of groups w

ith differing agendas that m

ay nevertheless intersect. A ny such broad perspective is

consistent w ith several m

ore specific theories; pluralism im

plies inter- est-group liberalism

or "w orld society" approaches. E

ven though such theories require som

ew hat

different testable hypotheses, they are fun-

dam entally related in that they share basic axiom

s about social and po- litical life.

C onsequently,

as one approaches the rungs at the top of the ladder, one's theories

subsum e diverse details and becom

e all-encom passing,

ranging across the full gam ut of hum

an affairs. A

t the highest rung, a theory m

ay also be called a paradigm or a m

odel, term s that refer to an

integrated set

of propositions that

account for

any developm

ent w

ithin the purview

of the theory.' V

irtually by definition, therefore,

paradigm atic

form ulations

rest on sim ple propositions

that subsum e

m any diverse form

s of activity and thus cannot be readily overturned or em

barrassed by exceptions

to the central tendencies they depict.

Put differently, paradigm s

tend to be closed system s of thought

that cannot be broken by the recitation of specific exam

ples that run coun- ter to their prem

ises. A thoroughgoing

paradigm closes off the anom

a- lies by resort to deeper explanations

that bring the exceptions w ithin

the scope of its central tendencies.

M arxists, for exam

ple, w ere long

able to preserve their paradigm by treating any challenge to their theo-

retical perspective as conditioned

by class consciousness and thus as

explicable w ithin the context of their core prem

ises. It follow s that the

only w ay one can break free of an entrapping

paradigm is by rejecting

its core prem ises and fram

ing new ones that account in a different w

ay for both the central tendencies and the anom

alies. O nce one develops

a new form

ulation out of the new

prem ises, of course, one acquires a

new paradigm

that, in turn, is both all-encom passing

and all-entrap- ping.

In short, w e inevitably bring to w

orld politics a broad paradigm atic

perspective that enables us to infuse m eaning into the latest develop-

m ent. A

nd inescapably, too, w e are bound to feel quarrelsom

e w ith re-

spect to those w ho rely on different paradigm

s to explain the sam

e events.

N otw

ithstanding the com

bative im pulses induced by paradigm

atic com

m itm

ents and the occasional m

om ents

of insecurity over being

The N eed for Theory

7

entrapped in a conceptual jail of one's ow

n m aking, the higher rungs

of the ladder serve the valuable purpose of infusing coherence into all that w

e observe in global politics. T he paradigm

of our choice m ay be

excessively sim ple and it m

ay be closed to all challenges, but it does guide us through

the com plexities

of an ever m ore interdependent

w orld. O

ur perch high on the ladder of abstraction enables us to iden- tify key questions

and develop a perspective on how to answ

er them .

W ithout

a self-conscious paradigm atic

com m

itm ent,

one is destined for endless confusion, for seeing everything as relevant and thus being unable to tease m

eaning out of the w elter of events, situations, trends,

and circum stances that m

ake up international affairs at any and every

m om

ent in tim

e. W ithout a readiness to rely on the interlocking pre-

m ises of a particular paradigm

, our efforts at understanding w

ould be, at best, transitory, and at w

orst they w ould be arbitrary, filled w

ith gap- ing holes and glaring contradictions.

In order to dem onstrate

the virtues of clim bing to the highest rungs

on the ladder of abstraction, as w ell as to show

how thoroughly

the substance of the field is a product of the broad theories w

e em ploy, in

the follow ing chapters w

e present tw o very different paradigm

s and then

contrast them

through

a series of case studies. T here are, of

course, m ore than tw

o w ell-developed theories available for use by stu-

dents of the subject. R ather than

attem pting

to be exhaustive, how -

ever, w e have chosen to be intensive, to show

how a theory founded

on continuity and stability (the realism

paradigm ) yields a very differ-

ent picture of global politics than one organized around change and fluidity (the turbulence

or postinternational paradigm

). In the next

tw o chapters w

e present, respectively, these tw o paradigm

atic perspec- tives in broad

outline, and in C

hapter 4 w

e com pare

the points at

w hich they overlap and diverge. C

hapters 5, 6, and 7 carry the com par-

isons into the em pirical realm

w ith several very different case studies-

one on the A ntarctic T

reaty, a second on the U nited

N ations, and

others on m ajor crises that m

ark recent history. T he final chapter offers

som e suggestions for readers w

ho w ould like to im

prove their capaci- ties as theorists.

It m ust be em

phasized that in both the presentations and the com

- parisons w

e have sought to be fair and to avoid loading the analysis in the direction of our ow

n preferences. Paradigm s are not superior or in-

ferior to each other, and w e do not w

ish to im ply that they are. T

heir

8 The N

eed for Theory

purpose is to clarify and explain phenom ena

in the context of underly- ing prem

ises. H ence they are not either right or w

rong; rather, they are either useful or not useful depending on w

hat one w ishes to em

phasize and accom

plish through system

atic inquiry. W e hope that the ensuing

pages w ill help readers to develop paradigm

atic com

m itm

ents appro-

priate to their substantive interests and philosophic orientations.

2 The R ealist P

aradigm

In 1948 H ans M

orgenthau published a rem arkable book, P

ow er Am

ong N

ations. H is aim

w as nothing less than to expound a theory of interna-

tional relations designed to explain past and current events and sug- gest the likely direction and shape of future relations. H

e explicitly at- tached a label-"political

realism " -to

his theory. Som e of the ideas he

offered bore a resem blance to earlier w

ritings on w orld politics; others

have been radically changed by new er m

em bers of the realism

school. T

he older w riters did not, how

ever, share M orgenthau's

belief in the value of theory. In contrast, the new

w riters on realism

m ost certainly

do. In this chapter w e offer an overview

of the m ajor claim

s that m od-

ern realists m ake about the nature of w

orld politics. R

ealism hopes to explain w

hy states behave the w ay they do. Since

states engage in a num ber

of behaviors w ith considerable

regularity, som

ething m

ust underlie that regularity. W hat, for instance, accounts

for w ar and peace? W

hy do states survive or fail? T hese are the ques-

tions central to realist theory.

R ealism

, N eoreallsm

, and Idealism

T he realist approach

to w orld politics can be traced

back as far as T

hucydides, the chronicler

of the ancient Peloponnesian

W ar, w

ho w

rote, "T he strong do w

hat they have the pow er to do, the w

eak accept w

hat they

have to accept."'

D uring

this great ancient w

ar, w hich

dragged on for m ore than a quarter century, A

thens and Sparta fought each other on land and sea. T

hey tried to m ake peace, but their agree-

m ents failed to hold. T

hey sought, lost, coerced, and destroyed allies; allies and neutrals

m ade their

ow n calculations

of pow er and chose

sides.

9