COURSE MATERIAL REVIEW

1 The Need for Theory

It is sheer craziness to dare to understand world affairs. There are so many collective actors-states, international organizations, transna- tional associations, social movements, and subnational groups-and billions of individuals, each with different histories, capabilities, and goals, interacting to create historical patterns that are at all times sus- ceptible to change. Put more simply, world affairs are pervaded with endless details-far more than one can hope to comprehend in their entirety.

And if these myriad details seem overwhelming during relatively sta- ble periods, they seem that much more confounding at those times when dynamism and change become predominant. Such is the case as the twentieth century draws to a close. In all parts of the world, long- established traditions, institutions, and relationships are undergoing profound and bewildering transformations. Indeed, the pace of change has been so rapid, with the collapse of the Soviet Union follow- ing so soon after the end of the Cold War-to mention only the most dramatic of the changes that have cascaded across the global land- scape-that it becomes reasonable to assert that change is the only constant in world affairs.

And we dare to think we can make sense of this complex, swift-mov- ing world, with its welter of details, intricate relationships, mushroom- ing conflicts, and moments of cooperation! How nervy! How utterly absurd! What sheer craziness!

But the alternatives to seeking comprehension are too noxious to contemplate, ranging as they do from resorting to simplistic and ideo- logical interpretations to being propelled by forces we can neither dis- cern nor influence. So dare we must! However far-fetched and arrogant it may seem, we have no choice as concerned persons but to seek to

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2 The Need for Theory

fathom the meaning and implications of the events and stunning changes that bombard us from every corner of the world.

Happily, there are at least two handy mechanisms available for eas- ing the task. One involves a sense of humility. If we can remain in awe of the complexities and changes at work in the world, ever ready to concede confusion and always reminding ourselves that our conclu- sions must perforce be tentative, then it should be possible to avoid ex- cessive simplicity and intellectual paralysis. Second, and much more important, we can self-consciously rely on the core practices of theory to assist us in bringing a measure of order out of the seeming chaos that confronts us. For it is through theorizing that we can hope to tease meaningful patterns out of the endless details and inordinate com- plexities that sustain world politics.

Moving Up the Ladder of Abstraction

Being self-consciously theoretical is not nearly as difficult as it may seem at first glance. For inevitably we engage in a form of theorizing whenever we observe world affairs. It is impossible to perceive and de- scribe all that has occurred (or is occurring), and there is just too much detail to depict every aspect of any situation, much less numerous overlapping situations. Put more forcefully, asking a student of world affairs to account for all the dimensions of an event is like asking geog- raphers to draw a life-sized map of the world. Clearly, such a map could not be drawn (where would they store it?); thus, one is compelled to make choices among all the possible details that could be described, to select some as important and dismiss others as trivial for the purposes at hand (much as geographers might select mountains and rivers as sa- lient and treat hills and streams as irrelevant). And it is at the very point when one starts selecting the relevant details that one begins to theorize. For we do not make the selections at random, for no reason, capriciously. Rather, crude and imprecise as they may be, our observa- tions derive from some notion of what is significant and what is not- distinctions that amount to a form of theory, a sorting mechanism that enables us to move on to the next observation.

To acknowledge that the selection process always accompanies ef- fort to develop understanding is not, however, to insure a self-con- sciousness about theory. It is all too tempting to lapse into thinking that the aspects of a situation selected form an objective reality that

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any observer would perceive. From the perspective of our unrecog- nized theories, everything can seem so self-evident that we may be in- clined to equate our-understanding of events with the "truth" about them, a practice that can lead to all kinds of problems once we try to share our understandings with others.

To avoid or overcome these difficulties, and thereby heighten our theoretical sensitivities, it is useful to conceive of raw observations- the endless details noted above-as located at the lowest rung on a huge ladder of abstraction. One then ascends the ladder each time one clusters details at a given level into a more encompassing pattern. The broader the generalizations one makes, of course, the higher one goes on the ladder, stopping the ascent at that rung where one is satisfied that the kind of understanding one seeks has been achieved. In a like manner, one descends the ladder when one perceives that more detail is needed to clarify the understanding developed at higher rungs.

The notion of understanding arrayed at different levels of abstrac- tion promotes theoretical self-consciousness because it constantly re- minds us that we are inescapably involved in a process of selecting some details as important and dismissing others as trivial. Aware that, perforce, we must teeter precariously on a rung of delicately balanced interpretations whenever we move beyond raw facts, we are continu- ously impelled to treat any observation we make as partly a product of our premises about the way things work in world politics.

Another way of developing a keen sensitivity to the imperatives of theorizing is to evolve a habit of always asking about any phenome- non we observe, ,;Of what is this an instance?" Though brief, the ques- tion is powerful because it forces us to move up the ladder of abstrac- tion in order to identify a more encompassing class of phenomena of which the observed event is an instance. Suppose, for example, one is investigating the Soviet Union and observes that in 1991 it underwent a coup d'etat that failed, and further suppose that one then asks of what is this failure an instance. Immediately one comes upon a num- ber of possible answers at different rungs on the ladder. At the next highest rung the coup attempt may loom as a botched power grab by a small clique of politicians frustrated by their progressive loss of influ- ence. At a higher rung it can be seen as an instance of factional and ideological tension among an elite accustomed to unquestioned lead- ership. At a still higher rung it might be interpreted as an instance of the kind of political tensions that follow when an economy enters a

4 The Need for Theory

period of steep decline. Near the top rung the failed coup can readily be viewed as an instance of profound change in a long-stagnant soci- ety. At the very top it might be seen as the final stage in a long process of systemic collapse.

In the sense that they are broadly explanatory, each of these inter- pretations is profoundly theoretical. None of them is more correct than any other-since they offer explanations at different levels of ag- gregation-but all of them select certain aspects of the failed coup as relevant and impute meaning to them. And, in so doing, they nicely demonstrate how the of-what-is-this-an-instance question impels us to use theory as a means of enlarging our understanding. More than that, the several interpretations of the coup highlight the satisfactions inherent in the theoretical enterprise. For there is little to get excited about at the lowest rungs on the ladder of abstraction. To be sure, the raw facts and historical details are important-one could hardly theo- rize without them-but it is only as one moves up the ladder that the interesting questions begin to arise and allow one's mind to come alive, to probe and ponder, to delve and discard, to roam and revise. Taken by itself, the failed coup in August 1991 was no more than nine men imprisoning a president and issuing orders; but as an instance of more encompassing processes, it was one of the most dynamic mo- ments of recent history.

The Refinements of Theory

It follows that at least crude forms of theorizing are at work whenever we undertake observation. The facts of history or current events do not speak to us. They do not cry out for attention and impose themselves upon us. Rather, it is we who make the facts speak, accord them sa- lience, give them meaning, and in so doing endlessly engage in the theoretical enterprise. Since this is the case irrespective of whether we are aware of ourselves as theoreticians, it is obviously preferable to move consciously up and down the ladder of abstraction. Indeed, since theorizing is the surest and most expeditious route to under- standing, there is much to be said for making a habit out of the of- what-is-this-an-instance question, of training oneself to ask it con- stantly in order to insure that one proceeds explicitly from observation to inference to explanation. By being habitual about the question, that

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is, one assures always seeing larger meanings even as one focuses on particular events. And by being explicit, one can identify where one may have erred if it turns out that an interpretation proves unwar- ranted in the light of subsequent developments.

Explicitness, in other words, is a crucial refinement of the theoretical enterprise. It is what allows us to test and revise our theories. By being explicit we can not only check our reasoning against further observa- tions but also submit our theories to the scrutiny of those who doubt the soundness of our theorizing. In this way knowledge cumulates and both specific events and broad trends come into focus and pave the way for ever more enriched understanding. Thus is a task that may seem like sheer craziness transformed by the theorist into a challeng- ing and rewarding endeavor.

There are, of course, many other rules and procedures that underlie the theoretical enterprise. Theory is not a means of giving vent to one's intuitions, of randomly asserting whatever pops to mind as a response to the of-what-is-this-an-instance question. A hunch or impression may serve as an initial stimulus to theory building, but no observation acquires a theoretical context until such time as it is integrated into a coherent and more encompassing framework and then subjected to the rigors of systematic analysis. Like any other intellectual enterprise, in other words, theorizing is founded on rules-in this case, rules for transforming raw observations into refined hypotheses and meaning- ful understandings. In themselves, the rules are neutral; they allow for weak theory as well as powerful theory, for narrow theory that explains a limited set of observations as well as broad theory that purports to ac- count for a wide array of phenomena. Whatever the strength and scope of any theory, however, it is unlikely to advance understanding if it strays far from the core rules that underlie the enterprise.

Toward the Higher Rungs

Although this is not the place to elaborate the rules to which theoreti- cians adhere, it is useful to note that the higher one moves up the lad- der of abstraction, the less one worries about anomalous situations and the more one focuses on patterns that reflect central tendencies. At the top of the ladder sit comprehensive perspectives that organize our overall understanding of cause and effect. We all have such theories,

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even if we are not consciously aware of them. Pluralists, for example, understand social life to be moved by a variety of groups with differing agendas that may nevertheless intersect. Any such broad perspective is consistent with several more specific theories; pluralism implies inter- est-group liberalism or "world society" approaches. Even though such theories require somewhat different testable hypotheses, they are fun- damentally related in that they share basic axioms about social and po- litical life.

Consequently, as one approaches the rungs at the top of the ladder, one's theories subsume diverse details and become all-encompassing, ranging across the full gamut of human affairs. At the highest rung, a theory may also be called a paradigm or a model, terms that refer to an integrated set of propositions that account for any development within the purview of the theory.' Virtually by definition, therefore, paradigmatic formulations rest on simple propositions that subsume many diverse forms of activity and thus cannot be readily overturned or embarrassed by exceptions to the central tendencies they depict. Put differently, paradigms tend to be closed systems of thought that cannot be broken by the recitation of specific examples that run coun- ter to their premises. A thoroughgoing paradigm closes off the anoma- lies by resort to deeper explanations that bring the exceptions within the scope of its central tendencies. Marxists, for example, were long able to preserve their paradigm by treating any challenge to their theo- retical perspective as conditioned by class consciousness and thus as explicable within the context of their core premises. It follows that the only way one can break free of an entrapping paradigm is by rejecting its core premises and framing new ones that account in a different way for both the central tendencies and the anomalies. Once one develops a new formulation out of the new premises, of course, one acquires a new paradigm that, in turn, is both all-encompassing and all-entrap- ping.

In short, we inevitably bring to world politics a broad paradigmatic perspective that enables us to infuse meaning into the latest develop- ment. And inescapably, too, we are bound to feel quarrelsome with re- spect to those who rely on different paradigms to explain the same events.

Notwithstanding the combative impulses induced by paradigmatic commitments and the occasional moments of insecurity over being

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entrapped in a conceptual jail of one's own making, the higher rungs of the ladder serve the valuable purpose of infusing coherence into all that we observe in global politics. The paradigm of our choice may be excessively simple and it may be closed to all challenges, but it does guide us through the complexities of an ever more interdependent world. Our perch high on the ladder of abstraction enables us to iden- tify key questions and develop a perspective on how to answer them. Without a self-conscious paradigmatic commitment, one is destined for endless confusion, for seeing everything as relevant and thus being unable to tease meaning out of the welter of events, situations, trends, and circumstances that make up international affairs at any and every moment in time. Without a readiness to rely on the interlocking pre- mises of a particular paradigm, our efforts at understanding would be, at best, transitory, and at worst they would be arbitrary, filled with gap- ing holes and glaring contradictions.

In order to demonstrate the virtues of climbing to the highest rungs on the ladder of abstraction, as well as to show how thoroughly the substance of the field is a product of the broad theories we employ, in the following chapters we present two very different paradigms and then contrast them through a series of case studies. There are, of course, more than two well-developed theories available for use by stu- dents of the subject. Rather than attempting to be exhaustive, how- ever, we have chosen to be intensive, to show how a theory founded on continuity and stability (the realism paradigm) yields a very differ- ent picture of global politics than one organized around change and fluidity (the turbulence or postinternational paradigm). In the next two chapters we present, respectively, these two paradigmatic perspec- tives in broad outline, and in Chapter 4 we compare the points at which they overlap and diverge. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 carry the compar- isons into the empirical realm with several very different case studies- one on the Antarctic Treaty, a second on the United Nations, and others on major crises that mark recent history. The final chapter offers some suggestions for readers who would like to improve their capaci- ties as theorists.

It must be emphasized that in both the presentations and the com- parisons we have sought to be fair and to avoid loading the analysis in the direction of our own preferences. Paradigms are not superior or in- ferior to each other, and we do not wish to imply that they are. Their

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purpose is to clarify and explain phenomena in the context of underly- ing premises. Hence they are not either right or wrong; rather, they are either useful or not useful depending on what one wishes to emphasize and accomplish through systematic inquiry. We hope that the ensuing pages will help readers to develop paradigmatic commitments appro- priate to their substantive interests and philosophic orientations.

2 The Realist Paradigm

In 1948 Hans Morgenthau published a remarkable book, Power Among Nations. His aim was nothing less than to expound a theory of interna- tional relations designed to explain past and current events and sug- gest the likely direction and shape of future relations. He explicitly at- tached a label-"political realism" -to his theory. Some of the ideas he offered bore a resemblance to earlier writings on world politics; others have been radically changed by newer members of the realism school. The older writers did not, however, share Morgenthau's belief in the value of theory. In contrast, the new writers on realism most certainly do. In this chapter we offer an overview of the major claims that mod- ern realists make about the nature of world politics.

Realism hopes to explain why states behave the way they do. Since states engage in a number of behaviors with considerable regularity, something must underlie that regularity. What, for instance, accounts for war and peace? Why do states survive or fail? These are the ques- tions central to realist theory.

Realism, Neoreallsm, and Idealism

The realist approach to world politics can be traced back as far as Thucydides, the chronicler of the ancient Peloponnesian War, who wrote, "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."' During this great ancient war, which dragged on for more than a quarter century, Athens and Sparta fought each other on land and sea. They tried to make peace, but their agree- ments failed to hold. They sought, lost, coerced, and destroyed allies; allies and neutrals made their own calculations of power and chose sides.

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