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China's “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?

Nadège Rolland

To cite this article: Nadège Rolland (2017) China's “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?, The Washington Quarterly, 40:1, 127-142, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302743

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302743

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Nadège Rolland

China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?

Since its unveiling at the end of 2013, China’s “One Belt One Road” initiative, or BRI for Belt and Road Initiative, as it is now officially known

1 —an

awkward label that does not do justice to the poetry of its Chinese name, yidai yilu —has clearly emerged as one of President Xi Jinping’s top priorities. The sheer size

and ambition of the project, to which the regime has already committed substan-

tial financial, diplomatic, and intellectual resources, gives it the potential to

become one of the defining economic and political constructs of the first half of

the 21st century. Designed to stimulate economic development by dramatically

enhancing regional interconnectivity, the BRI aims to integrate the world’s

largest landmass—from Vladivostok to Lisbon, from Moscow to Singapore—

through a dense network of both “hard” and “soft” infrastructure all linked to

China (from transportation, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure to

financial integration and political coordination). If the project succeeds as

Beijing hopes, it will transform Eurasia’s geopolitical landscape and cement

China’s position as the preponderant regional power.

Despite its evident importance, the BRI has thus far received comparatively little

attention from the United States. 2 This is due in part to the fact that tensions in the

South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula continue to occupy the attention of

Asia watchers in America. But it also reflects a lack of understanding of the strategic

motivations that underpin the Belt and Road Initiative and a serious underestima-

tion of its potential implications for the entire Eurasian continent.

Nadège Rolland is Senior Fellow for Political and Security Affairs at the National Bureau of

Asian Research (NBR). Her monograph, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Impli- cations of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, is forthcoming in spring of 2017. She can be reached at [email protected] or on Twitter @RollandNadege.

Copyright © 2017 The Elliott School of International Affairs

The Washington Quarterly • 40:1 pp. 127–142 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302743

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 127

Unveiling the Belt and Road

Xi Jinping unveiled the BRI’s overland component, the so-called “Silk Road Econ-

omic Belt,” in a September 2013 speech at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University. 3

One month later, Xi proposed a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” in an address

to the Indonesian Parliament. 4 At that time, he also announced the establishment

of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and proclaimed China’s inten-

tion to unite the nations of Asia in a “community of common destiny.”

The proposed trans-continental “Belt” bears a resemblance to the ancient land-

based Silk Road trade routes from antiquity to the beginning of the modern era that

linked China to Europe through Central Asia and Mesopotamia. As described in

official Chinese publications, the new “Belt” will branch out to Southeast and

South Asia and expand across the Eurasian landmass. This part of China’s

massive scheme is supposed to take shape around a network of roads and railways

that will stretch across the 11,000-kilometer-long Eurasian continent, connecting

several cities in western China all the way to Western Europe via Central Asia,

Iran, Turkey, Russia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Together with a parallel

network of pipelines, fiber optic cables, and telecommunication links, Chinese auth-

orities view this transportation infrastructure as the first step in creating an economic

corridor that will integrate the landlocked economies of the Eurasian hinterland and

tie them more tightly to China. While the “Belt” links Eurasia by land, the “21st

Century Maritime Silk Road” will comprise a string of ports connecting China

with Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe through

the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean.

In the past two years, the Chinese government has invested tremendous politi-

cal, financial, and intellectual resources in the BRI, suggesting that the initiative is

now one of Beijing’s highest priorities. Accord-

ing to Chinese sources, Xi Jinping personally

supervised the development of plans for an

infrastructure initiative with a small group of

close advisers before his elevation to the post

of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary

General at the November 2012 18th Party

Congress. 5 Since then, all major statements

related to the BRI have been made by Xi himself. His personal identification

with the BRI, similar to his association with the “Dream of the great rejuvenation

of the Chinese nation” and the anti-corruption campaign, indicates its top-level

importance.

The BRI concept was formally endorsed at the Third Plenum of the 18th CCP

Congress in November 2013, and has featured prominently in State Council’s

Reports on the work of the government since 2015. 6 A Central Leading Small

The initiative is now one of Beijing’s highest priorities.

Nadège Rolland

128 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

Group on “Advancing the Development of the OBOR” was announced in Febru-

ary 2015, indicating the central leadership’s determination to coordinate all

aspects of the BRI initiative at the very highest levels. 7 Chaired by Vice-

Premier Zhang Gaoli, this new body includes four vice-chairmen: Wang

Huning, a key policy advisor to Xi Jinping and one of the fathers of the Belt

and Road idea; Vice-Premier Wang Yang, whose portfolio includes trade, agricul-

ture, and tourism; former minister of Foreign Affairs and State Counsellor Yang

Jiechi; and Yang Jing, who serves at key coordinating positions both within the

Party Central Committee and the State Council. 8 The backgrounds, rank, and

experience of these four men and their ties to Xi Jinping provide further evidence

of the Belt and Road’s importance as well as its diverse facets and orientations:

domestic and international, diplomatic and strategic, as well as economic.

The promise of considerable financial resources back the BRI: the AIIB is

widely expected to provide $100 billion in lending. An additional $40 billion

will come from the Silk Road Fund announced in November 2014, together

with portions of the $100 billion to be disbursed by the BRICS’s New Develop-

ment Bank, and $900 billion earmarked for infrastructure projects by the China

Development Bank (CDB) in May 2015, 9 as well as loans pledged by other

state-backed banking institutions such as the Eximbank. According to a report

by the London-based investment bank Grison’s Peak, the majority of 67 overseas

loans committed by CDB and Eximbank since 2013, with a total value of more

than $49 billion, have gone to projects and countries along the Belt and Road. 10

The Belt and Road saturates Chinese official statements and speech: the head of

China’s Cyberspace Administration has called for a joint project with the EU to

build a “digital Silk Road” 11

while a consortium of Chinese companies has

announced its intent to build a space-based “Silk Road of satellites.” 12

The BRI

has also found its way into Chinese popular culture, inspiring a song depicting

it as “a new worldwide tide, mankind’s beautiful quest” 13

and a poem dedicated

to Xi Jinping, which rhapsodizes about “following the camel bell on ‘One Belt,

One Road’ and the warm bliss from mighty ships and high-speed trains.” 14

Whether in Tehran or Prague, President Xi has called for greater cooperation

with China under the Belt and Road umbrella, and countries as diverse as

Nepal, Georgia, Romania, or Oman have officially welcomed the initiative.

In addition to China’s generous financial commitment, significant human and

intellectual resources have been deployed in order to provide sustained intellectual

support for the Belt and Road Initiative. 15

Since Xi Jinping’s 2013 declarations,

multiple Silk Road events and forums have been organized in China and

around the world to gain support for the initiative and reduce potential suspicions

about it. 16

Several dedicated Belt and Road research institutes and centers have

been founded in Chinese universities and think tanks, including an “International

Silk Road Think Tank Association” launched in February 2016 in Shenzhen. 17

China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 129

With strong direction from the top, Chinese scholars and academics have taken

their new mission to heart: according to the China Academic Journals Full-text

Database, more than 8,400 Belt and Road-related articles were published by

Chinese scholars in 2015, as compared to 492 in 2014.

Western Assessments

China’s top leaders clearly regard the BRI as

being of the highest possible importance. But

what is its purpose? The available Western lit-

erature sheds little light on this crucial ques-

tion. With a few partial exceptions, the great

bulk of non-Chinese commentary on the Belt

and Road has focused on its economic aspects

and failed to pay sufficient attention to its stra-

tegic purpose.

Since 2013, business consultants and invest-

ment banks have issued a flurry of reports asses-

sing the potential opportunities for their clients

from China’s plans. 18

Meanwhile, many policy analysts seeking the rationale for

the BRI argue that its main purpose is to generate material gains for China. 19

As global demand and China’s domestic economic activity slow down, there is

a vital need for China to spur growth, including in its laggard inner provinces.

The BRI has been described as a “mercantilist endeavor” 20

designed to recycle

some of China’s accumulated capital and utilize its overcapacity in construction

materials to boost the exports of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in

new markets and to increase the speed of the renminbi’s internationalization. In

this view, the Belt and Road Initiative is merely an extension of China’s

“Going Out” policy launched at the turn of the century to increase outbound

foreign direct investment and enhance Chinese companies’ international foot-

print. Whether it can succeed in this regard is another question. Even if Asia

needs trillions of dollars in new investment in infrastructure, 21

some experts

doubt that BRI-related projects will create enough demand to absorb China’s enor-

mous excess capacity. 22

When it’s not reduced to economic tactics, the Belt and Road Initiative is often

dismissed as a “Christmas tree,” 23

loosely knitting together under a single label a

series of decade-old Chinese diplomatic and economic initiatives in Asia. The

lack of an authoritative official map and the absence of clarity, especially about

exact details on each of the proposed economic corridors’ projects, has prompted

some commentators to conclude that the BRI is nothing more than an “ill-defined

The bulk of non- Chinese commen- tary has paid insuffi- cient attention to the BRI’s strategic purpose.

Nadège Rolland

130 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

mirage,” or a hollow shell, that has generated much noise but will yield few con-

crete results. 24

Whatever its perceived motivations and drivers, many Western commentators

calculate that the BRI will most probably not come to fruition in any event. Its

sheer size and ambition multiply the number of vexing challenges, ranging from

standardization of rail gauges, to the potential weakening of China’s ability to

finance projects due to its own economic difficulties. 25

One oft-cited obstacle to

the realization of Beijing’s plans is the prospect of regional instability caused by

local insurgent groups or popular opposition to Chinese-backed infrastructure pro-

jects. Indian and Russian resistance to a growing Chinese influence in their back-

yards is yet another potential check on Beijing’s plans and ambitions. 26

The Belt and Road Initiative Through Chinese Eyes

These Western assessments capture part of the BRI’s reality. But to better under-

stand China’s motivations and purposes, it is instructive to better understand how

it is described by the Chinese official and expert community. Here, a different BRI

emerges.

The BRI was born out of two concomitant events: one economic and one stra-

tegic. Not long after Xi Jinping rose to the position of Vice-President of the PRC

in March 2008, China began to feel the aftershocks of the global financial crisis.

Shortly after he became Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission in

the fall of 2010, the Obama administration announced its intention to “pivot”

toward the Asia–Pacific. These two events caused Chinese elites to reassess

their country’s economic development prospects and its external strategic environ-

ment. The BRI can best be understood as an attempt to respond to mounting chal-

lenges in both of these domains.

For the Chinese regime, maintaining economic growth is essential to preserving

social stability and regime security. Even before the global crisis of 2008–09,

China’s leaders had begun to worry that their long-standing development

model, with its heavy emphasis on investment, exports, and state-owned enter-

prises, had outlived its usefulness and that a new approach was needed, one that

would give a greater role to consumption and competition. Despite this awareness,

the regime’s response to the slump in global demand that followed the onset of the

financial crisis was to unleash a massive stimulus program, with yet more state-

directed investment in infrastructure and basic industries. Although it served its

immediate purpose of boosting growth, this program only delayed the day of reck-

oning. By the time Xi Jinping assumed the top posts in the Party and government

at the end of 2012, growth rates had fallen again to well below pre-crisis levels and

appeared to be on a steep downward trajectory. 27

China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 131

Xi’s response to this troubling reality took two forms: on one hand, at the Third

Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, he announced a package of

wide-ranging reforms designed to reduce state intervention and elevate the market

to the “decisive” role in allocating national resources. At the same time, however,

Xi was also unveiling his “One Belt, One Road” initiative. According to Chinese

analysts, even if demand in the developed world slackens, the BRI will help open

up promising new markets across Eurasia. 28 Moreover, building the transcontinen-

tal “Belt” will enable China to continue to use its traditional tools of central gov-

ernment investment in infrastructure executed by state-owned companies, this

time outside already saturated Chinese territory. Asia’s large appetite for infrastruc-

ture will give China an opportunity to sustain activity in sectors in which its SOEs

have long experience, high skills, and a competitive advantage such as high-speed

rail, hydroelectric dams, and pipeline construction. 29

In short, as some Western

observers pointed out, the BRI has an economic motivation: it is another stimulus

package that is intended to permit continued growth of state-owned enterprises

and the national economy whether or not far-reaching reforms are ever

implemented. But there is much more to it than that.

Steady improvements in economic well-being are necessary not only to preserve

social stability at home, 30

but to strengthen it in the countries along China’s con-

tinental periphery, especially in Central Asia. Chinese analysts believe that

poverty and underdevelopment are the root causes of unrest and extremism. 31

Improving living standards through economic development is therefore seen as

a way to alleviate the problems associated with the “three evils” (to use the

common Chinese phrase) of separatism, terrorism, and extremism—both in

China and beyond. By bringing infrastructure connectivity and economic devel-

opment to China’s neighbors, the BRI will help reduce the likelihood of terrorism

or insurgencies that might spill across its borders. 32

More generally, Beijing hopes that roads, railways, industrial hubs, and

increased trade will strengthen and preserve the authoritarian governments that

now rule the states to China’s west and south.

These regimes are seen as friendlier, 33

more

predictable, and more susceptible to Chinese

influence than democratic governments,

which might question agreements previously

reached with Beijing 34

or allow themselves to

be manipulated by unnamed “third countries”

who seek to encircle China and thwart its

rise. Neo-authoritarian regimes share the

Chinese Communist Party’s concerns about

possible popular discontent and social unrest that could be exploited by “foreign

hostile forces” in order to stage “color revolutions.” Beijing believes that

Beijing hopes the BRI will strengthen authoritarian gov- ernments to China’s west and south.

Nadège Rolland

132 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

helping its authoritarian neighbors to deliver economic growth will discourage

popular unrest and strengthen their grip on power, thereby stabilizing China’s per-

iphery and reducing one of its top security concerns.

In 2014, Xi Jinping made the case that security is a “holistic concept” encom-

passing domestic and international aspects, traditional and non-traditional threats,

domestic and overseas interests. Economy and security are interwoven, inter-

related, and inseparable. Energy security stands at the nexus of both priorities.

The vast and growing quantities of oil and natural gas necessary to sustain econ-

omic development today travel from the Middle East, East Africa, and maritime

Southeast Asia along sea lines of communication that China has, as yet, virtually

no capacity to defend. Chinese strategists have been worried about the so-called

“Malacca Dilemma”—80 percent of China’s energy imports and trade moves

through the Malacca Strait, and the leadership worries over potential threats to

Chinese energy and economic security if other powers try to control navigation

through the Strait. 35

In the last five years, fears of a possible U.S. naval blockade,

discussed in Washington as part of the ongoing debate over U.S. military strategy

in Asia, have prompted a renewed discussion about supply diversification and

alternative transportation routes. The Central Asian, Russian, and Pakistani over-

land pipelines that are an essential feature of the BRI may not fully compensate for

the interruption of shipments by sea. But they could ease some of China’s strategic

vulnerability by providing at least a portion of the country’s essential needs in the

event of disruptions due to conflict or piracy. 36

Broader strategic concerns also underlie the BRI vision. Since at least the end of

the Cold War, Chinese planners have viewed the United States as an oppressive

global hegemon, determined to prevent the rise of any potential challenger.

Together with its command of the world’s oceans, America’s forward military pres-

ence and its enduring alliance system have long been seen as posing the most

direct and serious challenge to China’s security. Not surprisingly, when Washing-

ton declared its intention to “pivot” toward the Asia–Pacific in 2011, Chinese

observers concluded that a new and more intense phase in their competition

with the United States was at hand. China needed to find ways to respond.

The solution, as leading expert Wang Jisi argued in late 2012, was to “march west-

wards,” avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States and its maritime

allies by directing China’s own strategic energies toward its interior frontiers. 37

This is not an entirely new idea. In a way that would please the British geopo-

litician Sir Halford Mackinder, a number of noted Chinese experts have argued for

some time that, in response to an increased American push in East Asia, China

should seek to preserve a favorable balance of power by enhancing its position

in continental Eurasia. 38

As early as 2001, PLA General Liu Yazhou, one of

China’s most prominent strategic writers, asserted that advancing westward was

“a historical necessity for the Chinese nation, and it is also our destiny.” The

China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 133

general proposed selecting “appropriate locations in the border regions” to set up

Shenzhen-like trading hubs that would serve as the basis for a future Central Asian

“common market.” With the clear goal of “dismantl[ing] the U.S. encirclement of

China,” General Liu argued that a more unified Eurasian core would provide “the

anchor of our western strategy and break U.S. attempts to drive wedges” between

China and its western neighbors. 39

How to secure China’s continental backyard? Attempting to use force or to

exert direct physical control would be costly and counterproductive. 40

Instead

of coercion, Beijing’s preference is to use the

considerable leverage offered by its growing

economic power in order to advance its diplo-

matic and strategic objectives. 41

The hope is

that, eventually, the increasingly dense and

intricate web of regional economic intercon-

nections created by the BRI will help alleviate

any remaining “contradictions” between China

and its neighbors. As more countries benefit

from Beijing’s largesse, they will come to

realize that common development is more

urgent and important than disputing China’s

interests or challenging its views. Pulled ever more closely into China’s economic

orbit, BRI countries—which may eventually encompass the entire Eurasian con-

tinent including much of Europe and the Middle East—will find it increasingly

difficult to challenge Beijing on political issues.

Indeed, this has already begun to happen, and not only in the poorer countries

along China’s borders. Eager for Chinese capital, and fearful of provoking a back-

lash, several comparatively wealthy West European nations have recently scaled

back criticism on issues such as human rights, even as their own citizens have

been the victims of Beijing’s latest crackdown. One can cite as examples the

weak French government’s response to the expulsion from China of journalist

Ursula Gauthier in December 2015 or the more recent December 2016 joint state-

ment the Norwegian government signed with China, promising not to support

future actions undermining China’s interests. 42

In the long run, Chinese strategists hope that they will be able to achieve some

degree of regional consensus, deference, and acceptance across the breadth of

Eurasia, and that this in turn will translate into increased influence and the

ability to induce favorable outcomes on a range of issues. Some of them even

characterize the BRI as a strategy the purpose of which is to reconstruct a Sino-

centric regional order: “In essence, the BRI is not an economic, but a political

strategy. Its objective is to reconstruct the international order within a specific

region that is intimately related to China.” 43

The United States, meanwhile,

Beijing’s prefer- ence is to use its growing economic power to advance its strategic objectives.

Nadège Rolland

134 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

will be ever more isolated and will find it increasingly difficult to gather coalitions

of like-minded powers to defend its leading position in the international order.

Eventually, to paraphrase Henry Kissinger, it will be reduced to the status of a

distant island off the shores of Eurasia. 44

Beyond concrete calculations of economic gain and strategic advantage, the

BRI is a central part of Xi Jinping’s program for reclaiming Chinese greatness

or, as he puts it, for realizing “the China dream of the great rejuvenation of the

nation.” 45

According to official documents, the BRI is not driven by mere self-

interest, it is China’s global gift, “a great undertaking that will benefit people

around the world.” 46

And it has a normative dimension as well. Official discourse

has sought to conjure up a vaguely defined “Silk Road Spirit” that is both uniquely

Chinese and part of an “historic and cultural heritage shared by all countries

around the world.” 47

Although there is no official definition of the “Silk Road

Spirit,” it is generally associated with values such as “mutual benefit,” “inclusive-

ness,” and more importantly, respect for the socio-political development path

chosen by each country—in contrast with the Western liberal peace model that

emphasizes political reforms, human rights, and good governance.

Despite the pretense of universality, the BRI is colored throughout by Chinese

exceptionalism: it is presented as a peaceful alternative to American hegemony,

where diversity and plurality are respected so that there exists “harmony with

difference” (he er butong). This revamped Confucian concept is framed as a prin- ciple according to which countries should conduct harmonious relations with one

another while maintaining their distinctive viewpoints and, above all, avoiding

criticism or interference in one another’s internal affairs. China’s leaders

promise that the BRI will knit together a “community of common destiny.” As

in the past, when China was Asia’s “Middle Kingdom,” the interconnected area

created by the Belt and Road will bask in its cultural and civilizational glow. 48

Chinese analysts are aware that the path ahead may not be smooth, and they

acknowledge the existence of potential risks and challenges. For the most part,

however, Chinese specialists do not appear to view these challenges in the same

light as their skeptical Western counterparts. 49

The possibility of instability and

terrorism in some of the countries along the Belt and Road has received attention,

but it is generally assumed that investment and development will help to reduce

these dangers. As for the possibility of friction with other great powers, Russia is

not seen as problematic because the Russo–Chinese partnership is assumed to

be solid, based on common interests and deep trust. Here, as with the problem

of local entanglements, Chinese planners appear to assume, at least in their

public discussions, that the BRI will conveniently solve any problems it may

create. 50

Ultimately, Chinese strategists seem to believe that the greatest challenge they

face is how to avoid being perceived as a neocolonial power, one that seeks to

China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 135

increase its political influence over Asia, or even to establish a modern version of

the tributary system. 51

Their conclusion is that China can avoid misperception

and international suspicion through image management and careful public com-

munication—in other words, through propaganda. The leadership clearly had

this dimension in mind when it crafted the Belt and Road strategy: the public nar-

rative and extensive messaging surrounding the BRI have been carefully formu-

lated to be reassuring. Official documents now refer to the “Belt and Road

Initiative,” as opposed to “Belt and Road Strategy,” apparently because the word “strategy” was felt to have conspiratorial connotations.

52 China is presented as

“giving, not taking,” and portrayed in official discourse as a generous country

that provides public goods for its neighbors. “Communication and dialogue” are

described as essential if the Belt and Road plan is to succeed. This guidance

applies not only to Chinese diplomats and leaders in their daily work with

foreign representatives, but also to the media—Xinhua news agency launched a

dedicated “Silk Road Information center” in July 2015 53 —as well as to the aca-

demics and think tankers who are instructed to convey soothing political messages

in their dialogues with foreign counterparts. 54

China’s Grand Strategy

In sum, the Belt and Road Initiative is an essential component in China’s larger

effort to solve the fundamental geopolitical challenge that it faces, something

its strategic thinkers have been considering

since at least the turn of the 21st Century:

how can China “rise”—assert its influence

and reshape at least its own neighborhood—

in ways that reduce the risk of a countervailing

response? The Belt and Road Initiative

attempts to combine all of the elements of

Chinese power and to use all the nation’s

strengths and advantages in order to achieve

these ends. China’s banks, SOEs, diplomats, security specialists, intellectuals,

and media have all been summoned to join in this effort. In other words, the

BRI is now one of the main instruments of China’s grand strategy, coordinating

and giving direction to an extensive array of national resources in pursuit of an

overarching political objective.

Focusing only on specific components or dimensions of the BRI, as most Western

studies currently do, risks missing the point that all of these aspects are part of a com-

prehensive vision with a potentially global reach. To those who feel “under-

whelmed” by its concrete achievements to date, 55

it is important to keep in mind

The BRI is now one of the main instru- ments of China’s grand strategy.

Nadège Rolland

136 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

that the BRI goes well beyond the simple pursuit of economic gain through a series

of ambitious engineering projects. It is intended to take a large step toward the realiz-

ation of the “China Dream,” restoring the nation to its rightful place as the para-

mount power in Asia in time for the PRC’s 100th anniversary in 2049.

It remains to be seen how far the Belt and Road can go. If it unfolds as Beijing

envisions, the implications would certainly be far reaching: an integrated and

interconnected Eurasian continent with enduring authoritarian political

systems, where China’s influence has grown to the point it has muted any opposi-

tion and gained acquiescence and deference; a new regional order with its own

political and economic institutions, whose rules and norms reflect China’s

values and serve its interests; and a continental stronghold insulated to some

degree from American sea power.

Of course there are many obstacles along the way, as China’s leaders are well

aware. Some of these can no doubt be overcome, but the BRI will also produce

effects that are unexpected and unintended. The tremendous effort and massive

resources China has committed to the Belt and Road should at a minimum gen-

erate greater international Western attention to its development, underlying

motives, and possible strategic implications. This is an endeavor that the

Chinese leadership takes very seriously. Others should do the same.

Notes

1. The official standardized English translation of 一带一路 ‘yidai yilu’ became “Belt and

Road Initiative” in 2015, after the publication of a joint statement by the National Devel-

opment and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Com-

merce, specifically demanding that “initiative” should be in the singular instead of the

plural form, and that the words “strategy”, “project”, “program” or “agenda” should not

be used. See Xie Tao, “Is China’s ‘Belt and Road’ a Strategy?” The Diplomat, December

16, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/is-chinas-belt-and-road-a-strategy/.

2. With the notable exception of the following: Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and

Commentary on the ‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative,” China Leadership Monitor, 47 (Summer 2015), Hoover Institution, http://www.hoover.org/research/chinese-views-and-

commentary-one-belt-one-road; Christopher K. Johnson, “President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt

and Road’ Initiative,” Report, CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies, March 2016,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/president-xi-jinping%E2%80%99s-belt-and-road-initiative;

Simeon Djankov, eds., “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Motives, Scope and Chal-

lenges,” PIIE Briefings 16-2 (March 2016), Peterson Institute for International Economics, https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-motives-scope-

and-challenges.

European think-tanks have been watching the BRI closely: Jikkie Verlare, “A New Oppor-

tunity in EU-China Security Ties: The One Belt One Road Initiative,” Clingendael (December 2015); Nadine Godehardt, “Chinas Vision einer globalen Seidenstraße”

[China’s Vision of a Global Silk Road] in Volker Perthes, eds., Ausblick 2016: Begriffe

China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 137

und Realitäten internationaler Politik [2016 Outlook: Concepts and Realities of International Politics], SWP, Berlin (2016) 33-36; Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, “’One Belt, One Road’:

Mapping China’s New Diplomatic Strategy,” The Polish Institute of International Affairs Bul- letin, 67 (July 2, 2015); Alice Ekman, “China in Asia: What is Behind the New Silk Roads?” Note de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales (July 2015).

3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Deli-

vers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central

Asian Countries,” September 7, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/

xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml.

4. “Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament,” ASEAN-China-

Centre, October 2, 2013, http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_

133062675.htm.

5. Author’s interviews, Beijing, November 2015.

6. “Chronology of China’s “Belt and Road” Initiatives,” Xinhua, February 2, 2015, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-02/05/c_133972101.htm.

7. Zhang Yunbi, “Initiative for Eurasia Trade Gains Momentum,” China Daily, March 2, 2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-02/03/content_19476441.htm.

8. “一带一路领导班子“一正四副”名单首曝光” [List of Team Leader and Four Deputies for

OBOR Leading Group Revealed], April 5, 2015, http://finance.china.com.cn/news/gnjj/

20150405/3041455.shtml.

9. He Yini, “China to Invest $900 bn in Belt and Road Initiative,” China Daily, May 28, 2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-05/28/content_20845687.htm.

10. James Kynge, “Chinese Overseas Lending Dominated by One Belt, One Road Strategy,”

Financial Times, June 18, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3/e9dcd674-15d8-11e5- be54-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4540diizH.

11. Liu Jia, Gao Shuang, “China, EU to Promote Digital Silk Road,” China Daily, July 7, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-07/07/content_21202745.htm.

12. Jiang Jie, “Nation Considers Space-Based ‘Silk Road of Satellites’ to Provide Data Ser-

vices,” Global Times, May 31, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/924600.shtml. 13. 周艷泓 [Zhou Yanhong], “One Belt One Road,” YouTube, August 13, 2015, https://www.

youtube.com/watch?v=4ULQk-sM9H0.

14. Hannah Beech, “Ode to Autocracy: Viral Poem Highlights Cult of China’s Leader,” Time, February 19, 2016, http://time.com/4230280/china-xi-jinping-poem-media/.

15. “王树国代表: 大学要为一带一路战略提供供给侧服务” [Wang Shuguo: Universities

Must Serve One Belt One Road Strategy], 中国经济网 [China Economic Network],

March 6, 2016, http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201603/06/t20160306_9307346.shtml.

Wang Shuguo is the President of Xi’an Jiaotong University, one of China’s top academic

institutions.

16. The first Silk Road Forum was held in Istanbul, Turkey, in December 2014. Development

Research Center of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “The Belt and

Road Initiative: Inspirations and Opportunities International Conference,” China Daily, December 4, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/drc/2014-12/04/content_19024447.

htm. It was followed in 2015 by Madrid, Spain: “Silk Road Forum 2015 Held in

Madrid,” Xinhua, October 29, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/29/c_ 134760269.htm; and Tbilisi, Georgia: Tbilisi Silk Road Forum, http://www.

tbilisisilkroad.ge/en/home.

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138 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

17. He Na, “Think Tank to Support Belt and Road Initiative,” China Daily, February 24, 2016, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-02/24/content_23617083.htm.

18. For example, “The Potential of One Belt, One Road,” Global Capital, November 30,

2015, http://www.globalcapital.com/article/vf5bsfykt1tj/the-potential-of-one-belt-one-

road; “China’s New Silk Road: New Funding for Overseas Infrastructure Investment,”

HSBC Global Banking and Markets, November 18, 2014, http://www.gbm.hsbc.com/

insights/infrastructure/china-new-silk-road; “GII Beijing: Navigating One Belt One

Road,” Global Infrastructure Initiative, May 2015, http://www.

globalinfrastructureinitiative.com/article/gii-beijing-navigating-one-belt-one-road; Chris-

topher O’Dea, “Logistics Asia: Respinning the Silk Road,” IPE & Real Estate, Novem-

ber-December 2015, http://realestate.ipe.com/markets-/sectors/industrial/logistics-asia-

respinning-the-silk-road/10010677.fullarticle.

19. Christopher K. Johnson, “President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: A Practical

Assessment of the Chinese Roadmap for China’s Global Resurgence,” Report, CSIS

Freeman Chair in China Studies, March 2016, http://csis.org/files/publication/160328_

Johnson_PresidentXiJinping_Web.pdf.

20. Simeon Djankov and Sean Miner, eds., “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Motives, Scope,

and Challenges,” PIIE Briefing 16-2, Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2016, https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-2_1.pdf.

21. According to: “Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia,” Asian Development Bank, report, Sep-

tember 2009, http://www.adb.org/publications/infrastructure-seamless-asia.

22. David Dollar, “China’s Rise as a Regional and Global Power: The AIIB and the ‘One Belt,

One Road’,” Brookings Paper, Summer 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/

2015/07/china-regional-global-power-dollar; Bert Hofman, “China’s One Belt One Road

Initiative: What We Know Thus Far,” The World Bank, April 12, 2015, http://blogs. worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/china-one-belt-one-road-initiative-what-we-know-thus-far.

23. Charles Clover and Lucy Hornby, “China’s Great Game: Road to a New Empire,” Financial Times, October 12, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/6e098274-587a-11e5-a28b- 50226830d644.html#axzz3oTDW37mz.

24. Jacob L. Shapiro, “One Belt, One Road, No Dice,” Geopolitical Futures, January 12, 2017,

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/one-belt-one-road-no-dice/; Vassilis Ntousas, “Back to the

Future: China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative,” FEPS Policy Brief, Foundation for Euro- pean Progressive Studies, March 2016, http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/6b12aa95-9d47-

466f-a791-fa02a5d5c7d3/backtothefuture-feps-policybriefpdf.pdf; Jiafeng Chen, “Camel

Bells and Smoky Deserts,” Harvard Political Review, March 13, 2016, http:// harvardpolitics.com/world/camel-bells-and-smoky-deserts/.

25. Harry G. Broadman, “Will China’s One Belt, One Road’ Become a ‘Bridge to Nowhere’?”

Forbes, January 6, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/harrybroadman/2016/01/06/will- chinas-one-belt-one-road-become-a-bridge-to-nowhere/#40e1504d1de8.

26. Alexandre Cooley, “New Silk Route or Classic Developmental Cul-de-Sac? The Prospects

and Challenges of China’s OBOR Initiative,” PONARS Eurasia, Policy Memo 372, July 2015, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm372_

Cooley_July2015.pdf.

27. In 2012, China’s GDP growth fell to 7.6 percent, its lowest rate since the depths of the

global financial crisis in 2009. “China GDP Annual Growth Rate,” Trading Economics,

http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual.

China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?

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28. As described by Wang Wen, Executive Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial

Studies (Renmin University) during a CSIS conference on “Asian Development, the

OBOR Initiative, and US-China Relations,” Washington, DC, April 18, 2016. See also

冯 宗 宪 [Feng Zongxian], 欧 亚 地 区 经 济 发 展 形 势 分 析 和 展 望 [Eurasia’s Econ-

omic Development Trends, Analysis and Outlook], 2013 欧亚经济论坛发展报告 [2013

Eurasia Economic Forum Report], 西安交通大学出版社 [Jiaotong University Press],

Xi’An (2013), 55-63. (Feng Zongxian is professor of international trade at the Xi’an Jiao-

tong University). 甘钧先 [Gan Junxian], “丝绸之路”复兴计划与中国外交” [Planning

for a Revival of the “Silk Road” and China’s Diplomacy], 东北亚论坛 [Northeast Asia

Forum] 19, no 5, (September 2010) 65-73 (Gan Junxian is professor of political science

at Zhejiang University). 杨眉, 郭芳, 姚冬琴 [Yang Mei, Guo Fang, Yao Dongqin], “新

丝路战略的经济支点” [The New Silk Road Strategy’s Economic Fulcrum], 中国经济

周刊 [China Economic Weekly] 26, July 2014, http://paper.people.com.cn/zgjjzk/html/

2014-07/07/content_1450774.htm.

29. As defined by State Council in 2006, “Strategic industries,” where the State will keep

absolute control, are: defense, electricity, petroleum, telecommunication, aviation, coal,

shipping. There are also “pillar industries,” where the State will maintain a “strong influ-

ence”: machinery, electronic, information technologies, automobiles, steel, non-ferrous

metals, chemicals and construction. The lists of strategic and pillar industries match

with the ones that the BRI intends to boost.

30. Nadège Rolland, “China’s National Power: A Colossus With Iron or Clay Feet?” in Ashley

Tellis, ed., Strategic Asia 2015-16, National Bureau of Asian Research (2015), 23-54. 31. 朱显平 [Zhu Xianping], 邹向阳 [Zou Xiangyang], “中国—中亚新丝绸之路经济发展带

构想” [The China-Central Asia New Silk Road Economic Development Corridor

Concept], 东北亚论坛 [Northeast Asia Forum] (September 2006).

32. 孙志远 [Sun Zhiyuan] “一带一路”战略构想的三重内涵” [The Three Contents of

OBOR Strategy Concept], 中国经济时报 [China Economic Times], August 12, 2014,

http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2014/0812/304996.shtml. (Sun Zhiyuan teaches at the Chinese

Academy of Governance, former National School of Administration); 姜志达 [Jiang

Zhida], “一带一路”:以“空间”换“时间”的发展战略 [‘OBOR’, the Development Strategy

That Will Turn ‘Space’ Into ‘Time’], 和平与发展 [Peace and Development] 4 (2015)

(Jiang Zhida is a research fellow with CIIS); 甘钧先 [Gan Junxian], “丝绸之路”复兴计

划与中国外交” [Planning for a revival of the “Silk Road” and China’s Diplomacy], 2010.

33. Gao Junxian and Mao Yan, “China’s New Silk Road: Where Does it Lead?,” Asian Perspec- tive 40 (2016), 105-130.

34. For example, Myanmar’s political reforms initiated in 2011 triggered protests against

China-backed infrastructure projects, which led to the suspension of the Myitsone dam

and the Leptadaung copper mine projects by the Thein Sein government. In December

2015, Sri Lanka’s government chose to go ahead with sixteen infrastructure projects

signed with China, a year after declaring it would cancel them because of corruption

and overpricing.

35. Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Maritime Security and the ‘Malacca Dilemma’,” Asian Security 4, no 2 (2008), 143-161; 刘江平 [Liu Jiangping], 冯先辉 [Feng Xianhui], “走出去: 跨越

600年的对话” [Going out, a dialogue across 600 years], 瞭望 [Liaowang] 28, (2005),

14-19.

36. 韩景宽 [Han Jingkuan] “抓住国家建设“一带一路”重要战略机遇” [Seizing the Opportu-

nity of ‘OBOR’ Important Strategy’s National Construction], 石油观察 [Oil Observer],

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140 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

July 11, 2015, http://www.oborr.com/Index/datail/id/1628 (Han Jingkuan is Vice-President

of CNPC’s China Petroleum Planning and Engineering Institute).

37. Wang Jisi, “’Marching Westwards’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy,” in Shao

Binhong, eds., The World in 2020 According to China: Chinese Foreign Policy Elites Discuss Emerging Trends in International Politics (Brill: Boston, 2014), 129-136.

38. For example, 叶自成 [Ye Zicheng], “中国的和平发展 : 陆权的回归与发展” [China’s

Peaceful Development and the Return to Land Power], 世界经济与政治 [World Econ-

omics and Politics] 2 (2007); 李小华 [Li Xiaohua], “欧亚大陆地缘政治新格局与中国

的选择”[New geopolitical setting in Eurasia, and China’s choice], 现代国际关系 [Con-

temporary International Relations] 4 (1999).

39. 刘亚洲 [Liu Yazhou], “大国策” [The Grand National Strategy] (2001) http://www.

aisixiang.com/data/2884.html. An English translation can be found in Chinese Law and Government, 40, no 2, (March-April 2007), 13-36.

40. 牛新春 [Niu Xinchun], “中国外交需要战略转型” [China’s Diplomacy Requires a Stra-

tegic Transformation], 现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations] 1 (2013).

At the time of his writing, Niu Xinchun was Deputy Director of CICIR’s Institute of Amer-

ican Studies).

41. Shi Yinhong, “China’s Complicated Foreign Policy,” ECFR Commentary, European

Council on Foreign Relations, March 31, 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_

chinas_complicated_foreign_policy311562.

42. Nadège Rolland, “Europe’s Cooperation with China Under “Belt and Road” is not

Business as Usual,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, March 7, 2016, http://www. lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/03/07/Europes-cooperation-with-China-under-Belt-and-

Road-is-not-business-as-usual.aspx; “The Expulsion From China of Our Colleague Ursula

Gauthier is Unjustifiable”, Le Monde, December 30, 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/ article/2015/12/30/the-expulsion-from-china-of-our-colleague-ursula-gauthier-is-

unjustifiable_4839571_3232.html; Kenji Kawase, “Norway Tones Down Its China Criti-

cism to Boost Business,” Nikkei Asian Review, December 29, 2016, http://asia.nikkei. com/magazine/Agents-of-Change-in-2017/Business/Norway-tones-down-its-China-

criticism-to-boost-business?page=2.

43. 储殷 [Chu Yin], “一路一带战略的实现需要更冷静的思考” [Achieving One Belt One

Road Strategy Needs Soberer Considerations], 中国网 [China Network], January 18,

2015, http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_92_119792.html. (Chu Yin is an associate

professor of public administration at the University of International Relations, which

trains Chinese diplomats).

44. Henry Kissinger, Does America need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 52.

45. 李兴 [Li Xing], “丝绸之路经济带: 支撑“中国梦”的战略, 还是策略” [Silk Road Econ-

omic Belt: Tactics or Strategy to Achieve the ‘China Dream’?], 东北亚论坛 [Northeast

Asia Forum], 2 (2015). (Li Xing is professor of Russian and Asian affairs, School of Gov-

ernment, Beijing Normal University.) 霍建国 [Huo Jianguo], “一带一路”是战略构想不

是“工程项目” [‘One Belt One Road’ is a Strategic Conception, not an Engineering

Project], 中国经济网 [China Economic Network], March 19, 2015, http://www.ce.cn/

xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201503/19/t20150319_4869701.shtml. (Huo Jianguo is Dean of the Min-

istry of Commerce’s Research Institute).

46. “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Mar-

itime Silk Road,” issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry

China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 141

of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, March 28,

2015, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html

47. Ibid. 48. 李希光 [Li Xiguang], “建设一带一路上的文化强国” [Building a Strong Cultural Power

on the Belt and Road], 人民论坛网 [People’s Forum Network], November 6, 2015,

http://news.hsw.cn/system/2015/1106/322963_3.shtml. (Li Xiguang is President of Tsin-

ghua University’s International Center for Communication Studies.) 门洪华 [Men

Honghua], “全球化与中国国家认同” [Globalization and China’s Identity], 中国社会科

学报 [China Social Sciences News] 780, July 26, 2013, http://www.csstoday.net/

xueshuzixun/guoneixinwen/82940.html. (Men Honghua teaches at the Party School of

the CCP Central Committee and is Director of the World Thoughts Program, CIISS).

49. 薛力 [Xue Li], “中国“一带一路”战略面对的外交风险” [Diplomatic Risks Facing China’s

One Belt One Road Strategy], 国际经济评论 [International Economic Review] 2 (2015)

68-79. (Xue Li is director, Department of International Strategy, CASS.) See also François

Godement, “’One Belt, One Road’: China’s Great Leap Outward,” China Analysis, ECFR, June 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_analysis_belt_road.pdf.

50. Author’s interviews with CIIS, CASS, CICIR representatives and Tsinghua University

professors, Beijing, November 2015; and with Academy of Social Sciences and Fudan Uni-

versity professors, Shanghai, November 2015.

51. Gan Junxian, Mao Yan, “China’ New Silk Road: Where Does it Lead?”

52. 薛力 [Xue Li], “一带一路”战略是大国阳谋” [One Belt One Road Strategy is a Positive

Plan for Great Power-ness], Chinese Financial Times, December 14, 2015, http://www. ftchinese.com/story/001065182?full=y.

53. “China Creates Information Bank Serving Belt and Road,” Xinhua, July 16, 2015, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-07/16/c_134418978.htm; “Xinhua Asia-Pacific

Regional Bureau Promotes ‘Xinhua Silk Road’ Information Products at ‘One Belt, One

Road’ Forum,” Xinhua, December 7, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/ 07/c_134893836.htm.

54. Nicola Casarini, “The Role of Think Tanks in China,” Europe-China Research and

Advice Network Policy Brief 33, 2010, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/

division_ecran/ecran_is37_paper_33_the_role_of_think_tanks_in_china_nicola_

casarini_en.pdf.

55. Ben Simpfendorfer, “How China’s Silk Road Policy is Shaping Up in Neighboring

Countries,” Forbes, November 24, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/bensimpfendorfer/ 2015/11/24/kazakhstan_china_onebeltoneroad/#c0b3bdb1a23b

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