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RL34112.pdf
Gangs in Central America
Updated August 29, 2016
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL34112
Gangs in Central America
Congressional Research Service
Summary The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the “18th Street” gang, continue to undermine
citizen security and subvert government authority in parts of Central America. Gang-related
violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, and urban areas in Guatemala,
contributing to some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Congress has maintained an
interest in the effects of gang-related crime and violence on governance, citizen security, and
investment in Central America. Congress has examined the role that gang-related violence has
played in fueling mixed migration flows, which have included asylum seekers, by families and
unaccompanied alien children (UAC) to the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has
appropriated funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America.
Central American governments have struggled to address the gang problem. From 2012 to 2014,
the government of El Salvador facilitated a historic—and risky—truce involving the country’s
largest gangs. The truce contributed to a temporary reduction in homicides but strengthened the
gangs. Since taking office in June 2014, President Salvador Sanchez Cerén has adopted
repression-oriented anti-gang policies similar those implemented in the mid-2000s, including
relying on the military to support anti-gang efforts. El Salvador’s attorney general is investigating
allegations of extrajudicial killings committed by police engaged in anti-gang efforts. Successive
Honduran governments have generally relied on suppression-oriented policies toward the gangs
as well, with some funding provided in recent years to support community-level prevention
programs. The Guatemalan government has generally relied on periodic law-enforcement
operations to round up suspected gang members.
U.S. agencies have engaged with Central American governments on gang issues for more than a
decade. In July 2007, an interagency committee announced the U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal
Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which emphasized diplomacy, repatriation, law
enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress
appropriated roughly $38 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) funds through a special line item for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Since
FY2013, approximately $10 million in Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)
funding has been assigned to continue those anti-gang initiatives. Significant additional support
has been provided through CARSI for violence-prevention efforts in communities affected by
gang violence, as well as for vetted police units working on transnational gang cases with U.S.
law enforcement. Recently, U.S. and Salvadoran officials have also targeted the financing of MS-
13, which the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated as a
Transnational Criminal Organization subject to U.S. sanctions in October 2012, pursuant to
Executive Order (E.O.) 13581.
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal
with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Congressional
oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction
between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the potential impact of U.S.
sanctions on law-enforcement efforts. See also CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional
Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R43702,
Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations.
Gangs in Central America
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America .............................................................................. 2
Defining Gangs ......................................................................................................................... 2 Transnational Gangs in Central America .................................................................................. 3 Gang Activities in Central America .......................................................................................... 5 Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America .................................................... 7
Legacies of War and Authoritarian Rule: Arms and Violence ............................................ 7 Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities .................................. 8 Societal Stigmas .................................................................................................................. 8 Prisons in Need of Reform .................................................................................................. 8
U.S. Removals (Deportations) to Central America and the Gang Problem .............................. 9
Country Anti-gang Efforts ............................................................................................................. 10
Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-gang Policies .................................................................... 10 El Salvador’s 2012 Gang Truce and Dissolution ..................................................................... 11 Military Involvement in Public Security and Human Rights .................................................. 12 Approaches in Other Central American Countries .................................................................. 13 Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts ................................................. 13
U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Congressional Interest and Appropriations ............................................................................. 14 Evolution of U.S. International Anti-gang Efforts .................................................................. 15
State Department ............................................................................................................... 16 U.S. Agency for International Development ..................................................................... 17 Department of Justice ....................................................................................................... 17 Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................... 18 U.S. Treasury Department ................................................................................................. 18
Possible Questions for Oversight ............................................................................................ 19
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Central America ................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Estimated Gang Membership in the Northern Triangle of
Central America, 2012 ................................................................................................................ 4
Figure 3. Homicide Rates in the Northern Triangle: 2004-2015 ..................................................... 6
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Deportations to Top Receiving Countries: FY2013-FY2015 .................................... 9
Table 2. Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) Funding:
FY2008-FY2017 ........................................................................................................................ 15
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................................... 20
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Introduction Congress has expressed ongoing concern about the high rate of violent crimes committed by drug
traffickers, organized criminal groups, and gangs in Central America, particularly in the “northern
triangle” countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (see Figure 1).1 Central American
governments, the media, and some analysts have attributed a significant proportion of homicides
to maras (gangs), many of which have ties to the United States. U.S. concerns about gangs are
due in part to the role gangs have played in the violence, extortion, and forced recruitment that
has fueled internal displacement, as well as the record-level emigration of unaccompanied alien
children (UAC) and families to the United States.2 The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has asserted that gang violence is contributing to a “refugee-like” situation in the
northern triangle.3 Governments maintain that recent migration has been due to a number of
factors and that their efforts are reducing violence and illegal emigration.4
In recent years, Congress has considered what level of U.S. assistance is most appropriate to help
Central American countries combat gang activity and what types of programs are most effective
in that effort. Members of Congress have also taken an interest in the impact on the gang problem
of U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records to Central America, as well as the
evolving relationship between Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and the
gangs. Congress is currently examining the degree to which governments in the region are taking
steps to address gangs in a way that does not cause human rights abuses, as required by
conditions included in the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113).5
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal
with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. It concludes
with possible questions for oversight that Congress may consider.
1 The Central American countries include Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama. This report focuses on the “northern triangle” countries of Central America, where the gang problem has been
most acute: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The report refers to the other countries and governments in the
region periodically for comparative purposes. For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America
Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
2 Sarnata Reynolds, “It’s a Suicide Act to Leave or Stay”: Internal Displacement in El Salvador,” Refugees
International, July 30, 2015; Muzaffar Chishti and Faye Hipsman, Increased Central American Migration to the United
States May Prove an Enduring Phenomenon, Migration Policy Institute (MPI), February 18, 2016.
3 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “U.S. Announcement on Central America Refugees Highlights
Seriousness of Situation,” press release, January 14, 2016; UNHCR, Children on the Run, March 2014; UNHCR,
Women on the Run, October 2015. In 2014, the U.S. government established an in-country processing program for
individuals in each of the northern triangle countries seeking asylum or parole who have parents lawfully present in the
United States; the program was expanded in July 2016. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “U.S.
Expands Initiatives to Address Migration Challenges,” July 26, 2016.
4 In some communities in Honduras, violence has been reduced with support from U.S.-funded programs. See Sonia
Nazario, “How the Most Dangerous Place on Earth got a Little bit Safer,” New York Times, August 11, 2016. At a
national level, the extent and reasons behind violence reduction are debatable. Mimi Yagoub, “What’s Behind
Honduras’ 30% Drop in Murder Rates?” Insight Crime, February 19, 2016; E. Eduardo Castillo and Marcos Aleman,
“El Salvador, Deadliest Nation in 2015, Sees Lull in Violence,” AP, July 3, 2016.
5 CRS In Focus IF10371, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Background and FY2017 Budget Request,
by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
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Figure 1. Map of Central America
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Note: The “northern triangle” countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) are pictured in orange.
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America
Defining Gangs
Experts have long debated the formal definition of the term gang and the types of individuals that
should be considered gang members. Generally, experts agree that most gangs have a name and
some sense of identity, which can sometimes be indicated by symbols such as clothing, graffiti,
colors, and hand signs that are unique to the group. Gangs are thought to be composed of
members ranging in age from 12 to 24, but some gang members are older adults and others are
younger, often forcibly recruited.6 These definitions are evolving. According to the U.S. National
Gang Center, group criminality is the most important factor used to identify gang-related activity
6 Frank de Waegh, Unwilling Participants: The Coercion of Youth into Violent Criminal Groups in Central America’s
Northern Triangle, Jesuit Conference of Canada and the United States, 2015. Hereinafter de Waegh, 2015.
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in the United States, followed by displaying gang symbols.7 Gangs may be involved in criminal
activities ranging from graffiti, vandalism, petty theft, robbery, extortion, and assaults to more
serious criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, rape, and murder.
When referring to gangs in Central America, some studies use the terms pandillas and maras
interchangeably, whereas others distinguish between the two.8 Studies that distinguish between
the two types of Central American gangs generally define pandillas as localized groups that have
long been present in the region and maras as a more recent phenomenon with transnational roots.
For a variety of reasons discussed below, pandillas are more prevalent in Nicaragua, whereas
maras are dominant in the northern triangle.9
Transnational Gangs in Central America
The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United States are the “18th Street”
gang (also known as M-18), and its main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).10 The 18th Street
gang was formed in the 1960s by Mexican youth who were not accepted into existing Hispanic
gangs in the Rampart section of Los Angeles. It was the first Hispanic gang to accept members
from all races and to recruit members from other states. MS-13 was created during the 1980s by
Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had fled the country’s civil conflict. Both gangs later expanded
their operations to Central America but remain active in the United States. According to U.S.
estimates by the Department of Justice in 2015, the 18th Street gang is reportedly active in 20
states, whereas the MS-13 is present in 46 states and the District of Columbia.11
The expansion of MS-13 and 18th Street presence in Central America accelerated after the United
States began deporting illegal immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the northern
triangle region after the passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-208) of 1996.12 Many contend that gang deportees “exported” a Los
Angeles gang culture to Central America (where local gangs were already present). Gangs have
recruited new members from among vulnerable youth in poor neighborhoods and in prisons;
forcible recruitment is common.13 Studies have shown that, as happened in the United States,
gang leaders in Central America have used prisons to increase discipline and cohesion among
their ranks.
Estimates of gang membership in Central America vary, with several widely cited estimates
published in 2012. At that time, State Department officials estimated that there were roughly
85,000 MS-13 and 18th Street gang members in northern triangle countries.14 In contrast, the U.N.
7 See U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), National Gang Center, National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, at
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis/Defining-Gangs.
8 See, for example, Demoscopia S.A., Maras y Pandillas: Comunidad y Policía en Centroamérica, October 2007, as
opposed to Dennis Rodgers et al., “Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions,” Small Arms Survey
Occasional Paper 23, May 2009.
9 Roberto Valencia, “Barrio Jorge Dimitrov,” El Faro, October 10, 2011.
10 James C. Howell, The History of Street Gangs in the United States: Their Origins and Transformations, (Lanham,
MD.: Lexington Books, 2015); Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucía
Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011).
11 DOJ, Organized Crime and Gang Section, About Violent Gangs, Criminal Street Gangs, May 12, 2015; DOJ, U.S.
Attorney’s Office, District of Massachusetts, “Fifty-Six MS-13 Members Indicted,” press release, January 29, 2016.
12 The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IRIRA; P.L. 104-208) expanded the categories of
illegal immigrants subject to deportation and made it more difficult for immigrants to get relief from removal.
13 de Waegh, 2015.
14 U.S. Department of State, “Gangs, Youth, and Drugs–Breaking the Cycle of Violence,” Remarks by William R.
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Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated total MS-13 and M-18 membership in the region
at 54,000 (see Figure 2 below).15 According to UNODC, there were roughly 20,000 gang
members in El Salvador; 22,000 in Guatemala; and 12,000 in Honduras. El Salvador had the
highest concentration of gang members, with some 323 gang members for every 100,000 citizens,
double the level of Guatemala and Honduras. In comparison, in 2007, UNODC cited total gang
membership of some 64,500, with country membership totals of 10,500 in El Salvador; 14,000 in
Guatemala; and 36,000 in Honduras.16
Figure 2. Estimated Gang Membership in the Northern Triangle of
Central America, 2012
Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the
Caribbean: a Threat Assessment, September 2012.
Nicaragua has a significant presence of local gangs, but comparatively few MS-13 and M-18
members. Many attribute this in part to the strength of social networks and community policing
programs established by the Sandinistas during the 1980s.17 Nicaragua also has received far fewer
deportees from the United States than the northern triangle countries. Costa Rica, Panama, and
Belize also have gangs, although most of the gangs in those countries are more often described as
pandillas than maras.
In recent years, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama have reported some MS-13 and M-18
presence in their countries.18 The increased presence in these countries could be occurring
because of deliberate expansion efforts made by the gangs or because of gang members fleeing
from rival gangs, or it could be a result of tough gang policies in countries such as El Salvador
Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, at the Institute of the
Americas, press release, October 1, 2012.
15 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean:
a Threat Assessment, September 2012.
16 UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, May 2007.
17 Rodgers et al., 2009, op. cit; Valencia, op. cit.
18 Mike LaSusa, “Are Mara Salvatrucha Gangs Expanding in Costa Rica?,” Insight Crime, April 8, 2016; Martha Celia
Hernandez, “How MS13 and Barrio 18 are Extending Their Reach to Nicaragua,” Insight Crime, August 28, 2014.
17,000
5,000 8,000
5,000
7,000
12,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
Guatemala Honduras El Salvador
M-18 MS-13
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driving gang members into neighboring countries. In April 2016, Panamanian police captured
MS-13 members and deported them to El Salvador.19
Gang Activities in Central America
Although MS-13 and M-18 began as loosely structured street gangs, some evidence suggests that
they have become more organized and sophisticated in some countries and that some clicas
(cliques) may coordinate with cliques in other countries.20 By 2008, U.S. law enforcement had
found evidence suggesting that some MS-13 leaders jailed in El Salvador were ordering
retaliatory assassinations of individuals in the Washington, DC, metro area, as well as designing
plans to unify their cliques with those in the United States.21 More recent investigations have
shown evidence of MS-13 leaders seeking to buy high-powered firearms in Mexico and
Guatemala.22 Still, the term transnational criminal organization, or TCO, might be misleading
when used to describe the maras across the region. Some researchers contend that the Central
American gangs’ primary focus continues to be on local issues, such as dominating a particular
extortion racket or drug distribution area.23
The northern triangle countries have among the highest homicide rates in the world (see Figure
3). Some Central American officials have blamed gangs for most of the homicides committed in
their countries. Gang-related murders occur when gangs discipline their members or punish those
who attempt to leave, dispute territory, confront law enforcement and their families, and punish
those who fail to comply with their orders. Gangs have also targeted witnesses to crimes.24
Gang experts have argued that, although gang members may be more visible than other criminals,
violence perpetrated by gangs is part of a broader spectrum of violence in Central America. Child
abuse and spousal rape are major problems in the three northern triangle countries. All three
countries have among the highest rates of femicide (killing of women) in the world.25 El Salvador
and Guatemala also have the highest proportion of homicide victims under the age of 20.26
Moreover, transnational criminal organizations, smugglers, and other violent groups are also
prevalent.27
The decline in homicides that occurred after the Salvadoran government facilitated a gang truce
in March 2012 lends evidence to the assertion that gangs are responsible for a significant
19 Antonio Pérez, “Director de la Policía Confirma Presencia de Maras en Panamá,” Panamá América, April 4, 2016.
20 Douglas Farah and Pamela Phillips Lum, Central American Gangs and Transnational Criminal Organizations: the
Changing Relationships in a Time of Turmoil, International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2013. Hereinafter Farah
and Lum, 2013.
21 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative:
Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008.
22 Mike LaSusa, “El Salvador’s MS13 Gang Sought Big Guns in Mexico, Guatemala,” Insight Crime, August 12, 2016.
23 Insight Crime and Associación para una Sociedad Más Justa, Gangs in Honduras, November 20, 2015.
24 See, for example, Sarah Kinosian, Angelika Albaladejo, and Lisa Haugaard, El Salvador’s Violence: No Easy Way
Out, Center for International Policy and Latin America Working Group, August 2016.
25 Small Arms Survey, Femicide: A Global Problem, Research Note 14, February 2012.
26 U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Hidden in Plain Sight: a Statistical Analysis of Violence Against Children,
September 2014.
27 Steve Dudley, Briefing on Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Violence in Central America’s Northern
Triangle, Washington DC, July 6, 2016; International Crisis Group (ICG), Easy Prey: Criminal Violence and Central
American Migration, Latin America Report No. 57, July 28, 2016. Hereinafter ICG, July 2016.
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percentage of violence in that country.28 Some also maintain that recent reductions in homicides
in El Salvador may be due more to a nonaggression pact among the gangs than to the
“extraordinary measures” adopted by the government in March 2016.29 Although gangs appear to
be responsible for a significant percentage of murders in urban areas of Honduras and Guatemala,
homicide rates also have been elevated in border regions and places where varying combinations
of local groups transporting drugs, Mexican crime groups, and crime families are active.30
Figure 3. Homicide Rates in the Northern Triangle: 2004-2015
(homicides per 100,000 inhabitants)
Source: Washington Office on Latin America, Five Facts About Migration From Central America’s Northern Triangle,
January 15, 2016.
Women and children are often targets of gang violence in Central America. Gang initiations for
men and women differ. Whereas men are subject to a beating, women are often forced to have sex
with various members of the gang.31 After joining a gang, women are expected to commit crimes
(such as serving as drug mules or carrying contraband into prisons), sometimes dressed like men,
but also to perform household duties, such as cooking and cleaning for the group. Female gang
members are expected to tolerate infidelity from their partners, but women may be murdered if
they are unfaithful.32 Non-gang affiliated women and girls have been murdered as a result of turf
battles, jealousy, and revenge. Those who have refused to help a gang or reported a crime are
particularly vulnerable, as are those who are related to or have collaborated with the police.33
28 José Miguel Cruz, The Political Workings of the Funes Administration’s Gang Truce in El Salvador, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2013.
29 Since March 2016, the Salvadoran government has sent mid-level gang leaders to more secure facilities, blocked
phone signals near jails, deployed military reservists, and secured legislative approval of loans for public security.
Carlos Martinez, “Pandillas Caminan Hacia una Frente Común Ante Medidas Extraordinarias,” El Faro, July 5, 2016.
30 Dudley, op cit. International Crisis Group, Corridor of Violence: The Guatemala-Honduras Border, June 4, 2014.
31Interpeace Regional Office for Latin America, Violentas y Violentadas Relaciones de Género en las Maras
Salvatrucha y Barrio 18 del Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica, Guatemala, May 15, 2013.
32 Ibid.
33 Kelly McEvers and Jasmine Garsd, “The Surreal Reasons Girls Are Disappearing In El Salvador: #15Girls,” NPR,
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Gangs also engage in sex trafficking involving women and children, particularly in Honduras and
in Guatemala City.34 Threats and harassment by gangs have led thousands of youth to abandon
school, including some 39,000 in El Salvador in 2015.35
Gangs have been involved in a broad array of other criminal activities, as well. Those activities
include extortion; money laundering; and drug, auto, and weapons smuggling. Gangs have
increasingly been involved in extortions of residents, bus drivers, and business owners in major
cities throughout the region. Failure to pay often results in harassment or violent reprisals. In
2014, some 179 bus, minibus, and taxi drivers were assassinated in Guatemala.36 In July 2015, the
MS-13 and 18th Street gangs in El Salvador threatened public transportation operators to go on
strike or face reprisals. The operators complied with the gangs’ threats, and the country’s
transport system remained paralyzed for three days. The Honduran government cracked down on
the MS-13 gang’s finances in February 2016 in an operation that seized more than $1 million and
several properties and businesses operated by the gang. In July 2016, the Salvadoran government
arrested more than 70 people who had allegedly laundered the gang’s money through motels,
brothels, and other businesses.37
Although some studies maintain that ties between Central American gangs and other organized
criminal groups have increased, other studies have downplayed the connections.38 Some gangs
engage in local drug distribution, but gangs generally do not have a role in transnational drug
trafficking.39 A gang’s role in the drug trade depends on the country and area in which it operates.
Some clicas act as facilitators by, for example, allowing a transnational criminal organization to
land drug shipments on a clandestine airstrip in their territory in exchange for payment. MS-13
members reportedly have been contracted on an ad-hoc basis by Mexico’s warring criminal
organizations to carry out revenge killings.40
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America
Legacies of War and Authoritarian Rule: Arms and Violence
The northern triangle countries have long histories of armed conflict and political repression. A
legacy of conflict and authoritarian rule has inhibited the development of democratic institutions
and the rule of law. Protracted armed conflicts also contributed to widespread proliferation of
illicit firearms, as well as a tendency to resort to violence as a means of settling disputes.41 Some
October 5, 2015; Óscar Martinez, “El Salvador es un buen lugar para matar,” El Faro, May 9, 2016; Christopher
Sherman, “Gangs Declare War on Police as El Salvador Violence Rages,” AP, April 13, 2016.
34 “Niñas y Niños en Honduras son Sometidos a una Esclavitud Moderna,” El Heraldo, October 11, 2015; UNICEF and
the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation
Purposes in Guatemala, 2016.
35 Jaimi López, “Deserción Escolar por Violencia se ha Triplicado en Últimos Dos Años,” ElSalvador.com, July 19,
2016.
36 Fred Rivera, “Persisten Acosos Contra Transportistas,” El Quetzalteco, February 17, 2015.
37 Sarah Esther Maslin, “El Salvador says a Brutal Gang Laundered Money Through Motels, Brothels, and Taxis,”
Washington Post, July 29, 2016.
38 Farah and Lum, 2013, asserts that linkages are increasing. For a contrasting view, see Juan Carlos Garzon,
“Rethinking the El Salvador Mara- Drug Trafficking Relationship,” Insight Crime, April 3, 2014.
39 Efren Lemus, “From Extortion to Investment: The Making of Barrio 18, Inc.,” Insight Crime, October 2, 2015;
Carlos Garcia, “6 Common Misconceptions About the MS13 Street Gang,” Insight Crime, February 25, 2016.
40 “MS-13,” Insight Crime, November 21, 2013.
41 UNODC, Firearms Within Central America, 2012; Tani Marilena Adams, Chronic Violence and its Reproduction:
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80% of homicides in Honduras between 2008 and 2015 involved the use of a firearm, the vast
majority of which were unlicensed.42 Many current gang leaders grew up witnessing extreme
violence in their homes and communities. Some were displaced to cities in the United States or
neighboring countries (such as Costa Rica), whereas others were left behind by parents who died
or fled during the conflict.
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities
In addition to war, authoritarian rule, and emigration, the social fabric in the northern triangle
countries has been stressed by economic factors such as poverty, inequality, and unemployment,
with few opportunities for growing youth populations. According to the World Bank, poverty is
acute in Honduras, where 63% of people live in poverty, and in Guatemala, where 59% of people
live in poverty. All three northern triangle countries are also characterized by inequality, with
income disparities exacerbating the social exclusion of ethnic minorities and gender
discrimination.
Poverty and inequality are reinforced by the lack of social mobility and persistent youth
unemployment and underemployment.43 In 2010, more than 25% of youth aged 15-24 in El
Salvador and Honduras neither worked nor studied.44 According to data from the Inter-American
Development Bank, fewer than 45% of youth outside the highest income quintile graduate high
school in those countries. High-school graduation rates are even lower in Guatemala, particularly
among indigenous groups. Gangs target unemployed youth and, in the absence of family or
community support, many of these youth have turned to gangs for social support, a source of
livelihood, and protection.45
Societal Stigmas
Societal stigmas against gangs and gang deportees from the United States have made the process
of leaving a gang extremely difficult. Many organizations that work with former gang members,
particularly those with criminal records, say that offender reentry is a major problem. Ex-gang
members report that employers are often unwilling to hire them. Tattooed former gang members,
especially returning deportees from the United States who are often native English speakers, have
had the most difficulty finding gainful employment. Some gang members have gone through
complete tattoo removal, a long and expensive process, to better integrate into society.
Prisons in Need of Reform
The implementation of aggressive anti-gang roundups has overwhelmed prisons in Central
America. Prison conditions in the region are generally harsh, with severe overcrowding,
inadequate sanitation, and staffing shortages. Many facilities that were already overpopulated
have been filled with thousands of suspected gang members, many of whom have yet to be
convicted of any crimes. In El Salvador, some 31,148 inmates (including 13,868 current or
Perverse Trends in Social Relations, Citizenship, and Democracy in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, March 2012.
42 David Gagne, “80% of Homicides in Honduras Result of Gun Violence: Report,” Insight Crime, July 7, 2016.
43 Marc Hanson, Migration, U.S. Assistance, and Youth Opportunities in Central America, Washington Office on Latin
America (WOLA), February 2016.
44 Rafael de Hoyos, Halsey Rogers, and Miguel Székely, Out of School and Out of Work Risk and Opportunities for
Latin America’s Ninis, World Bank, Washington DC, 2016.
45 Douglas Farah, “Central America’s Gangs Are All Grown Up,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2016.
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former gang members) were being held in prisons designed to hold a maximum of 10,035 people
in late 2015. In Guatemala at about the same time, 19,972 people were being held in facilities
with a capacity of 6,742.46
Gangs are often able to carry out criminal activities from behind bars, sometimes with assistance
from corrupt prison officials. As discussed above, some assess that prison conditions have helped
gangs to become larger, better organized, and more cohesive. Some observers have described
prisons as “finishing schools” where, rather than being rehabilitated, first-time offenders often
deepen their involvement in illicit gang activities.47
U.S. Removals (Deportations) to Central America and the
Gang Problem
Policymakers in Central America have expressed ongoing concerns that U.S. deportations of
individuals with criminal records are exacerbating the gang and gang-related citizen security
problems in the region. For more than a decade, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have
received the highest numbers of U.S. deportees (after Mexico). Obama Administration officials
have repeatedly asserted that a larger proportion of recent deportees were removed on criminal
grounds, but a breakdown of criminal versus noncriminal deportations is not publicly available at
a country level.
Table 1. U.S. Deportations to Top Receiving Countries: FY2013-FY2015
Country FY2013 FY2014 FY2015
Mexico 241,493 176,968 146,132
Honduras 37,049 40,695 20,309
Guatemala 47,769 54,423 33,249
El Salvador 21,602 27,180 21,920
Dominican Republic 2,462 2,130 1,946
Source: Prepared by CRS with information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Office of Enforcement and Removal. Figures include “removals” (deportations) but not
voluntary departures (returns).
Notes: Criminal deportees have been convicted of a crime in the United States that makes one removable (i.e.,
eligible for deportation) under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-236). Not all individuals who
have been deported on criminal grounds are gang members or violent criminals. Low-level drug convictions and
some nonviolent offenses may result in a removal on criminal grounds. Noncriminal deportees have been
removed because of a status violation (e.g., being in the country illegally or working without authorization).
Since the mid-2000s, Central American officials had been asking the U.S. government to consider
providing a complete criminal history for each individual who has been deported on criminal
grounds, including whether or not he or she is a member of a gang. Although U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not provide a complete criminal record for deportees, it
may provide some information regarding an individual’s criminal history when specifying why
the individual was removed from the United States. ICE does not indicate gang affiliation unless
gang affiliation is the primary reason why the individual is being deported. However, in January
2014, the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) signed an
46 U.S. Department of State, 2015 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, April 2016.
47 T. W. Ward, Gangsters Without Borders: An Ethnography of A Salvadoran Street Gang (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012).
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agreement to expand a Criminal History Information Sharing (CHIS) program. Honduras,
Guatemala, El Salvador participate in CHIS.
The types of support services provided to deportees returning from the United States and Mexico
to northern triangle countries vary but are generally limited in size and scope.48 Until recently, the
few shelters and programs that existed to receive and reintegrate deportees in Central America
tended to be funded and administered by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the Catholic
Church, or the International Organization for Migration. Guatemala appears to provide the most
deportee assistance upon arrival, but all three countries have limited resources for reintegration
services and for tracking deportees once they return.49
Country Anti-gang Efforts Country efforts to deal with gangs vary. In general, governments in the northern triangle have
adopted more aggressive law-enforcement approaches than other Central American countries.
Tough anti-gang approaches carried out in the mid-2000s failed to stave off rising crime rates in
the region and resulted in negative unintended consequences. El Salvador’s ill-managed truce
(see “El Salvador’s 2012 Gang Truce and Dissolution,” below) has discouraged governments
from negotiating with the gangs. Experts have urged governments to move away from
enforcement-only policies toward “second-generation” anti-gang programs similar to the types of
efforts that have been employed in U.S. cities such as Boston and Los Angeles. These approaches
involve prevention of violence, intervention to prevent retaliatory violence, enforcement, and
reentry of rehabilitated gang members.
Regional cooperation to address gang challenges is occurring among security and defense
ministers, as well as attorney generals.50 Prosecutors from the three northern triangle countries
have signed an agreement pledging to work together to prosecute gangs. The three presidents
have signed an agreement to create a regional task force to address the gangs that will facilitate
intelligence sharing and extraditions among the three countries, among other aims.51
Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-gang Policies
Mano dura is a term used to describe the type of anti-gang policies initially put in place in El
Salvador, Honduras, and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala in response to popular demands and media
pressure for these governments to “do something” about an escalation in gang-related crime.
Mano dura approaches have typically involved incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those
with visible tattoos) for illicit association and increasing sentences for gang membership and
gang-related crimes. A Mano dura law passed by El Salvador’s Congress in 2003 was
subsequently declared unconstitutional but was followed by a super mano dura package of anti-
gang reforms in July 2004. These reforms enhanced police power to search and arrest suspected
gang members and stiffened penalties for convicted gang members. Similarly, in July 2003,
Honduras enacted a penal code amendment that made maras illegal and established sentences of
up to 12 years in prison for gang membership. Changes in legislation were accompanied by the
48 Victoria Rietig and Rodrigo Dominguez Villegas, Stopping the Revolving Door: Reception and Reintegration
Services for Central American Deportees, MPI, December 2015.
49 ICG, July 2016.
50 “‘Northern Triangle’ Countries Boost Security Cooperation,” Latin News Daily, August 15, 2016.
51 “Central America Leaders Agree on Joint Force to Fight Gangs,” AP, August 23, 2016.
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increasing use of joint military and police patrols to arrest gang suspects. Guatemala introduced
similar legislation in 2003, but the legislation was not enacted.52
Mano dura reforms initially proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they
were getting tough on gangs and crime, despite objections from human rights groups about the
leaders’ infringements on civil liberties and human rights abuses (including cases of torture and
extrajudicial killings of gang suspects). Early public reactions to the tough anti-gang reforms
were positive, supported by media coverage demonizing the activities of tattooed youth gang
members. Mano dura policies enabled police to arrest large numbers of suspected gang members,
including some 14,000 youth in El Salvador between mid-2004 and late 2005. In addition,
according to Salvadoran officials, even though many suspects were eventually released, gang
detainees provided law-enforcement officials with intelligence information.53
Despite the early results of mano dura policies, long-term reduction of gangs and related crime
proved to be fleeting. Most youth arrested under mano dura provisions were subsequently
released for lack of evidence that they committed any crime. Some youth who were wrongly
arrested for gang involvement joined gangs while in prison. Gang roundups exacerbated prison
overcrowding, and intergang violence within the prisons resulted in inmate deaths. Credible
reports assert that extrajudicial youth killings by vigilante groups have continued since mano
dura was implemented. In response to mano dura, gangs have also changed their behavior to
avoid detection.
El Salvador’s 2012 Gang Truce and Dissolution
Upon taking office in 2009, then-Salvadoran president Mauricio Funes initially sought to move
away from mano dura and toward a focus on crime prevention. Two years into his term, crime
rates remained at elevated levels and people became frustrated. Funes moved his minister of
defense, David Munguía Payés, a retired general, to head the Ministry of Justice and Public
Security. With Munguía Payés’s backing, a Catholic bishop and a former legislator (who was the
minister’s aid in the Defense Ministry) brokered a secret truce between the MS-13 and 18th Street
gangs. In March 2012, Munguía Payés agreed to transfer high-ranking gang leaders serving time
in maximum-security prison to less secure prisons to facilitate negotiations. Munguía Payés
denied his role in facilitating the truce until September 2012.54
Between the time the prison transfers took place and May 2013 (when Munguía Payés was
removed from his post for unrelated reasons), the Salvadoran government reported that homicide
rates dramatically declined. Gang leaders pledged not to forcibly recruit children into their ranks
or to perpetrate violence against women. Gang leaders also turned in small amounts of weapons
and offered to engage in broader negotiations. The initial apparent success of the Salvadoran truce
led the Honduran government to consider a similar initiative.
Although some, including officials from the Organization of American States, praised the truce,
many others expressed skepticism, maintaining that disappearances increased after the truce took
effect and gangs garnered media attention and political power.55 Gangs continued to conduct
52 Instead, the Guatemalan government has launched periodic law-enforcement operations to round up suspected gang
members.
53 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Regional Gang
Initiative Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008.
54 Carlos Martínez and Jose Luis Sanz, “The New Truth About the Gang Truce,” Insight Crime, September 14, 2012.
55 Organization of American States (OAS), “OAS Secretary General Highlights Results from the First Year of Gang
Truce in El Salvador,” press release, March 11, 2013; Douglas Farah, “Central America’s Gangs Are All Grown Up,”
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illicit activities using cell phones in the prisons and refused to give up control over their territories
or to stop extortion. El Salvador’s attorney general is investigating several officials who were
involved in facilitating the truce for allegedly providing as much as $25 million to gang leaders
and their affiliates.56
The truce began to unravel after then-president Funes withdrew support for the truce mediators
and reduced communication between imprisoned gang leaders and gang members in the streets in
mid-2013. By April 2014, average murder rates had risen to some nine murders per day; gang
attacks on police also occurred with increasing frequency. These trends worsened considerably in
2015, as El Salvador posted the world’s highest homicide rate.
Church leaders have voiced support for renewed dialogue with gang members; however, the
Sánchez Cerén administration opposes negotiating with the gangs—directly or indirectly. Gang-
police confrontations escalated after the government returned gang leaders involved in the truce
to maximum-security prisons in early 2015. El Salvador’s attorney general has recently begun
investigating allegations of police involvement in extrajudicial killings that took place during an
apparent massacre in March 2015.57 Until mid-2016, the Salvadoran government had struggled to
quell violence among the gangs, which became more fragmented and powerful after the truce.58
Military Involvement in Public Security and Human Rights
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have deployed thousands of military troops to help their
often underpaid and poorly equipped police forces carry out public security functions, without
clearly defining when those deployments might end. Upon taking office in January 2014,
Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández ordered the military to conduct intensive patrols of
high-crime neighborhoods in the capital with the police.59 Among the units involved in the
ongoing operation are two hybrid forces that Hernández helped to establish while he was the head
of the Honduran Congress: the military police force, or PMOP (Policía Militar de Orden
Público), which is under the control of the Ministry of Defense, and a military-trained police unit
under the control of the police, the TIGRES (Tropa de Inteligencia y Grupos de Respuesta
Especial de Seguridad). In May 2015, the Salvadoran government created three battalions to help
police in anti-gang efforts; at that time, some 7,000 soldiers were already involved in public
security efforts.60 In March 2016, Salvadoran President Sánchez Cerén deployed hundreds of
military reservists.61 Since taking office in January, Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales has
extended the mandate of some 4,500 soldiers organized in nine groups that were involved in
domestic security efforts during the previous government.62
Foreign Policy, January 19, 2016.
56 Munguía Payés has denied any involvement in illicit payments to the gangs and remains in his post as El Salvador’s
minister of defense even though he has been interrogated by the attorney general’s office. Héctor Silva Ávalos and
Bryan Avelar, “Case Against El Salvador’s MS13 Reveals State Role in Gang’s Growth,” Insight Crime, August 3,
2016.
57 Other recent cases of extrajudicial killings allegedly committed by police have been documented but not yet
investigated. Adriana Beltrán and Carolyn Scorpio, “Turning a Blind Eye to Police Abuse and Extrajudicial
Executions?” WOLA, August 16, 2016.
58 “El Salvador, Deadliest Nation in 2015, Sees Lull in Violence,” AP, July 3, 2016.
59 CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer.
60 Loren Riesenfeld, “El Salvador to Deploy Special Forces to Combat Gangs,” Insight Crime, May 8, 2015.
61 Evan Ellis, “The New Offensive Against Gangs in El Salvador,” Latin America Goes Global, May 2, 2016.
62 “Guatemala: Military to Continue Civilian Security Tasks,” Latin News Security & Strategy Review, July 2016.
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The involvement of the military in domestic security has raised concerns regarding human rights
in these countries. As in other parts of Latin America, deploying the military into the streets can
be politically popular, but doing so usually fails to produce sustainable improvements in security
conditions and often leads to human rights violations. According to the State Department’s
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, there were credible reports of security forces’
involvement in unlawful killings in all three countries in 2015. The Office of the Ombudsman for
Human Rights in El Salvador reported that from June 2014 to May 2015 it received 2,202
complaints of human rights violations, 92% of which were allegedly committed by the police
and/or the military.
Approaches in Other Central American Countries
Although their efforts have received considerably less international attention than those of El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, other Central American countries have developed a variety
of programs to deal with their gang problems. In Panama, President Juan Carlos Varela started an
initiative in 2014 called Barrios Seguros (Safe Streets), where gang members willing to abandon
criminality and be reintegrated into society are offered amnesty and job training to reduce gang
violence.63 The initiative is currently active in seven provinces and has served more than 4,100
people.64
Nicaragua has adopted a national youth crime prevention strategy that, at least on an official
level, includes the active involvement of the police in preventive and rehabilitative efforts and
focuses on family, school, and community interventions. With support from other countries and
NGOs, the Nicaraguan National Police’s Juvenile Affairs Division runs at least two anti-gang
activities a month. The Ministry of the Interior is administering a five-year program, which is
supported by the Inter-American Development Bank, to target at-risk youth in 11 different
municipalities.
Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts
Central American leaders, including those from the northern triangle countries, appear to have
moved, at least on a rhetorical level, toward more comprehensive anti-gang approaches than
during the mano dura era of the mid-2000s. All of the Central American countries have created
institutional bodies to design and coordinate crime-prevention strategies and have units within
their national police forces engaged in prevention efforts. Prevention is also a key component of
the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle plan launched in 2014 by all three countries
for which the governments are seeking donor support to complement their budget outlays.65
Despite this rhetorical shift, government-sponsored gang prevention programs in the northern
triangle have thus far tended to be relatively small scale, ad hoc, and underfunded. Of the $318.2
million collected through Honduras’ security tax between 2012 and July 2016, just 6% was
allocated to prevention programs. El Salvador’s security plan, El Salvador Seguro (Secure El
Salvador), prioritizes prevention, but the government lacks the funding to implement the
programs the plan proposes and must obtain legislative approval for multilateral loans to support
63 David Gagne, “Panamá Ofrece Capacitación Laboral y Amnistía a Pandilleros,” InSight Crime, November 29, at
http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-del-dia/panama-ofrece-capacitacion-laboral-amnistia-pandilleros.
64 Erika Edith Quiñones, “Someterán a Revisión el Programa Barrios Seguros,” Panamá América, January 24, 2016.
65 For more information on the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, see the text of the plan at
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=39224238.
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the plan. The Salvadoran Congress has been reluctant to approve additional debt unless the debt is
primarily aimed at supporting the military and police.
Governments have been even less involved in sponsoring rehabilitation programs for individuals
seeking to leave gangs, with most reintegration programs funded by church groups or NGOs.
Resource constraints and a reluctance to work with gang members have thus far limited such anti-
gang programs. Nevertheless, pilot projects based on experiences in cities in the United States,
Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia have had some nascent success in Honduras.66 Those projects have
involved individual and family therapy for youth deemed most at risk for joining gangs,
intervention efforts to prevent retaliatory violence, and rehabilitation programs for those seeking
to leave gangs and for nonviolent offenders in prisons. 67
U.S. Policy In the mid-2000s, U.S. officials and Members of Congress expressed serious concerns about
gangs and violence in Central America and their spillover effects on the United States. For several
years, however, concerns about gang-related violence were overshadowed by broader concerns
about drug trafficking and organized crime in Central America, particularly after Mexico’s
aggressive anticrime efforts pushed Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) deeper
into the sub-region. The failed truce in El Salvador and the escalating gang-related violence that
has fueled illegal emigration from that country and parts of Honduras since 2014 has refocused
attention on gangs in Central America.
Congressional Interest and Appropriations
Congress has expressed concern about the problem of transnational gangs and interest in the
effectiveness of U.S. international anti-gang efforts. Since the 110th Congress, interest in the topic
of gangs and violence in Central America has included concerns about the domestic and
international criminal activities of the gangs, as well as the relationship between gangs and
Mexican TCOs. Members of Congress have also expressed interest in the effects of U.S.
deportation policy and mano dura approaches in the region on Central American gangs. As
Congress has appropriated significant funding for anti-gang efforts, it has also conducted
oversight of the efficacy of U.S. programs that affect Central American gangs.
Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in global International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America.
A regional gang adviser based in El Salvador has coordinated Central American gang programs
since that time. The INCLE line item for Central American gang programs ended in FY2013.
Since FY2013, approximately $10 million in Central American Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI) funding has been assigned to continue specific anti-gang initiatives. Hundreds of
millions more has supported broader law-enforcement and prevention efforts that have impacted
the gang phenomenon.
66 Sonia Nazario, “How the Most Dangerous Place on Earth got a Little bit Safer,” New York Times, August 11, 2016.
67 Thomas Abt, Christopher Winship, and Democracy International, Inc., What Works in Reducing Community
Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study for the Northern Triangle, United States Agency for International
Development, February 2016.
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Table 2. Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) Funding:
FY2008-FY2017
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Fiscal Year ESF INCLE NADR FMF Total
FY2008 25.0 24.8 6.2 4.0 60.0
FY2009 18.0 70.0 0.0 17.0 105.0
FY2010 23.0 141.0 0.0 7.0 171.0
FY2011 30.0 71.5 0.0 0.0 101.5
FY2012 50.0 85.0 0.0 0.0 135.0
FY2013 50.6 95.6 0.0 0.0 146.2
FY2014 61.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 161.5
FY2015 100.0 170.0 0.0 0.0 270.0
FY2016 126.5 222.0 0.0 0.0 348.5
Total 484.6 979.9 6.2 28.0 1,498.7
FY2017 (req.) 100.3 205.0 0.0 0.0 305.3
Source: U.S. Department of State.
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement;
NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs; and FMF = Foreign Military
Financing.
Evolution of U.S. International Anti-gang Efforts
U.S. agencies have been engaged on both the law-enforcement and the preventive side of dealing
with Central American gangs for more than a decade. In 2004, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) created an MS-13 Task Force to improve information sharing and intelligence
gathering among U.S. and Central American law-enforcement officials. In 2005, the Bureau of
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS created a national anti-gang initiative
called “Operation Community Shield”; ICE also has a National Gang Unit. Also in 2005, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) undertook a comprehensive assessment of the
gang problem in Central America and Mexico. USAID found that although a few U.S. programs
addressed some aspects of the gang phenomenon, several new initiatives would be needed in the
areas of prevention, law enforcement, and rehabilitation and reintegration.
Throughout 2005 and 2006, an interagency committee worked to develop a U.S. Strategy to
Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which was announced at a July 2007
U.S.-Central America Integration System summit on security issues.68 The strategy acknowledged
that, based on previous U.S. and regional experiences, future anti-gang efforts should be holistic,
comprehensive, and regional in scope. It called for active engagement with governments and
institutions in the region. The strategy stated that the U.S. government would pursue coordinated
anti-gang activities in five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity
68 The Central American Integration System (SICA), a regional organization with a Secretariat in El Salvador, is
composed of the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. The Security
Commission was created in 1995 to develop and carry out regional security efforts. U.S. Department of State, Office of
the Spokesman, “Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico,” July 18, 2007.
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enhancement, and prevention. In January 2008, the State Department sent a regional gang adviser
to El Salvador to coordinate the State Department’s Central American gang programs. Those
programs have included training and technical assistance to law-enforcement and corrections
officials, anti-gang workshops and training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in San
Salvador, and regional coordination efforts.69
In April 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report concluding that
the U.S. government had developed and implemented an interagency anti-gang strategy that
outlines the threats posed by Central American gangs and the activities each agency is doing to
respond to those threats. However, GAO recommended that the strategy be revised to include
better coordination mechanisms between the agencies and performance measures.
The U.S. government has expanded its citizen-security and law-enforcement programs in Central
America beyond anti-gang efforts and antidrug programs through CARSI, a regional security
initiative for which Congress appropriated roughly $1.5 billion from FY2008 to FY2016. CARSI
has five primary goals: (1) create safe streets for the citizens in the region; (2) disrupt the
movement of criminals and contraband within and between the nations of Central America; (3)
support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American governments; (4)
reestablish effective state presence and security in communities at risk; and (5) foster enhanced
levels of security and rule-of-law coordination and cooperation between the nations.70
In 2015, the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars published a comprehensive
assessment of CARSI that raised concerns about the organization’s lack of a comprehensive
strategy to improve citizen security in the region, tendency to focus on combating drug trafficking
with vetted units rather than on broader law-enforcement reform and professionalization, and
weak program evaluation (aside from USAID’s community-based prevention programs).71
State Department
The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) manages CARSI funding,
with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) implementing
most State Department programs. INL has sponsored trainings and technical exchanges for
police, prison officers, and justice-sector operators from across the region. INL has also provided
training and equipment to vetted police units and intelligence analysts and established more than
50 community policing/model police precinct locations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras.72 INL has trained hundreds of police officers, who have provided training to more than
200,000 youth through the Gang Resistance Education and Training program.73 INL has
embedded U.S. law-enforcement advisers and prosecutors with investigative units that are
conducting money-laundering investigations targeting the leadership of MS-13 in El Salvador.
INL is supporting gang-related research as well, including a study under way by Florida
69 The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) is based in San Salvador, El Salvador is one of four regional
law-enforcement training academies funded by the State Department’s INL Bureau. The ILEA in San Salvador offers
training and technical assistance to law-enforcement officials from throughout Latin America, including courses in how
to address gang-related crimes and prosecutions.
70 For background, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy
Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
71 Eric Olson et.al. Crime and Violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policies are Helping,
Hurting, and Can be Improved, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Latin American Program, 2015.
72 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Efforts to Advance Civilian Security in Central America’s Northern Triangle,” press
release, June 2016, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/258635.htm.
73 Ibid.
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International University to examine whether and how gang members in El Salvador can leave a
gang without putting their lives at risk.
Additionally, WHA has transferred resources to the Department of Justice; the Department of
Homeland Security, particularly ICE; and USAID to enable those agencies to counter the impact
of gangs in the region. State Department funding is also supporting a regional corrections adviser,
who is assisting with prison-reform programs in the region.
U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID has implemented a variety of country and regional gang-prevention programs. Under
CARSI, USAID supports an approach to crime and violence prevention that directly targets at-
risk individuals and communities while simultaneously helping municipalities to develop and
implement crime-prevention plans. In Honduras, municipalities have received support in
rehabilitating public spaces, installing street lighting, and procuring materials for schools and
recreational facilities. National-level security and justice-sector reform efforts are designed to
strengthen the institutions charged with enforcing and administering justice, including programs
aimed at improving victims assistance, juvenile justice, and respect for human rights. USAID also
produces and disseminates research on what works in crime and violence prevention.
USAID uses geographic and demographic risk factors to provide population-based interventions
to individuals and communities at high risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of crime and
violence. The creation of more than 200 youth outreach centers in high-violence communities has
provided youth with safe places where they can study, participate in recreational activities, and
receive job training and job placement assistance. USAID has built prominent public-private
partnerships with local and multinational companies. For example, mobile phone providers Claro
and Tigo deliver free Internet access to outreach centers in El Salvador and Honduras, and in El
Salvador, Microsoft trains thousands of youth on software and information technology.
Governments also support some programs. The Honduran government has provided $3 million
from its security tax to support USAID’s violence-prevention programming.
Through Vanderbilt University, USAID concluded a rigorous three-year impact evaluation of its
CARSI-funded community-based crime and violence-prevention programs in 120 high-crime
urban treatment and control communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama.
Final results demonstrated that crime victimization is lower and public perception of security is
higher in USAID’s CARSI treatment communities. Until recently, however, USAID and INL
were working in separate municipalities and were not closely coordinating their efforts.
USAID and INL are now working to implement a “place-based” model in which prevention and
policing programs are co-located and closely coordinated. USAID is providing community-
resiliency programs in communities where INL is training law enforcement in community-based
policing. The model is active in selected sites in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador and is
based on evidence from Los Angeles, Ciudad Juárez, and Medellin that integrated prevention and
law-enforcement efforts can have significant impacts in even the most violent communities.
USAID and the State Department are in the process of obtaining a waiver from the Office of
Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) to ensure that programming they have planned to support the
rehabilitation of former gang members does not violate sanctions on MS-13 members. USAID
and INL aim to expand the place-based model to more locations in the coming year.
Department of Justice
Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI is implementing several programs to improve
the capacity of law enforcement in Central America to carry out investigations and share
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intelligence on gang suspects. The FBI also focuses on developing and protecting witnesses who
will testify in gang cases. The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and
Training (OPDAT) has provided training on prosecuting gang-related cases to judicial officials in
the region. The deployment of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
regional adviser to San Salvador is enabling ATF to support transnational gang investigations
involving U.S.-origin firearms. FBI, OPDAT, and ATF programs are supported by CARSI or
other State Department funding and are carried out in collaboration with INL. The programs
include the following:
Central American Fingerprinting Exchange (CAFÉ): A criminal file and fingerprint retrieval initiative that has incorporated thousands of fingerprints of
gang members from Mexico, El Salvador, Belize, Honduras, and Guatemala into
the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System since 2006.
The data are accessible to Central American police officials.
Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Units: A program that began in El Salvador in October 2007 involving the creation of vetted police units that work with FBI
agents stationed in San Salvador to investigate gang-related cases that have a
nexus with the United States. TAG activities have been expanded into Guatemala
and Honduras and have contributed to successful indictments of MS-13 members
in major cities across the United States.
Central American Law Enforcement Exchange (CALEE): A joint FBI-INL program that brings law-enforcement officials from Central America together
with their counterparts from several large U.S. cities to share information and
intelligence.
Department of Homeland Security
Since 2005, ICE’s Operation Community Shield has led to the arrest of more than 32,200 gang
members in the United States, including thousands of MS-13 and 18th Street gang members. In
addition to Operation Community Shield, ICE formed an anti-gang task force in Honduras to
gather intelligence to support gang investigations in Honduras and the United States. ICE special
agents are also based at other U.S. embassies in the region, including in Guatemala and El
Salvador. ICE supports Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs) in El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama. The TCIUs focus on transnational investigations and border
crimes, some of which have a nexus with gangs. As previously mentioned, the State Department
and DHS signed an agreement in 2014 to expand the Criminal History Information Sharing
(CHIS) program, which has been used to share information on criminal deportees with Mexican
law-enforcement officials, to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
U.S. Treasury Department
On October 11, 2012, the Treasury Department designated the MS-13 as a significant TCO whose
assets will be targeted for economic sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581.74 Issued
in July 2011 as part of the Obama Administration’s National Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime, E.O. 13581 enables the Treasury Department to block the assets of members
74 The criteria established for declaring a transnational criminal organization (TCO) pursuant to Executive Order 13581
are available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/executive-order-blocking-property-
transnational-criminal-organizations. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal
Organization,” press release, October 11, 2012.
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and associates of designated criminal organizations and prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in
transactions with these individuals.75 The Treasury Department worked with ICE to build
evidence to support the designation of the MS-13 based on the gang’s involvement in “drug
trafficking, kidnapping, human smuggling, sex trafficking, murder,” and other serious criminal
offenses that threaten U.S. and Central American citizens. As of July 2016, eight individuals
appear to have been designated as subject to U.S. sanctions.
Although evidence suggests that some MS-13 cliques collaborate with groups based in El
Salvador, some analysts maintain that transnational collaboration is not the norm for the MS-13.76
Salvadoran officials seemed surprised by the designation, with then-president Funes asserting that
U.S. officials may be “overestimating the economic risk or financial risk resulting from the
criminal actions of the MS.”77 OFAC officials have confirmed that the amount of money
transferred out of the United States from MS-13 gang members or their families or affiliates is
very limited.78 Nevertheless, U.S. law enforcement is working with special police and prosecutors
to investigate some of the designated MS-13 leadership for money-laundering offenses
committed under Salvadoran law.
Possible Questions for Oversight
Evolving Gang Threat. To what degree are the gangs in Central America becoming more organized and sophisticated? Are their concerns primarily local
or transnational? What types of ties do these gangs have with other criminal
organizations based in Central America and with Mexican TCOs? To what extent
are cliques in the region communicating with groups in the United States?
U.S. Strategy. Nine years after the adoption of an interagency strategy to combat the gangs, what have been the results of U.S. efforts? How is the success or
failure of the strategy being measured? How are domestic and international
efforts in support of the strategy being coordinated?
CARSI. Analysts have criticized CARSI for lacking a comprehensive strategy and rigorous monitoring and evaluation. To what extent, if at all, does CARSI
have a guiding strategy behind its programs? How has that strategy evolved over
time? How are the successes or gaps in the implementation of that strategy being
measured and adjusted?
Leveraging U.S. Assistance. To what extent are U.S. anti-gang efforts being coordinated with those of other donors? Has the private sector stepped forward to
complement any donor-led initiatives? Have any recipient countries been able to
take over responsibility for programs that began with U.S. funding? How
effective are regional anti-gang efforts?
New Tools. To what extent are countries in the region using new tools—such as asset forfeiture and wiretapping—to go after the gangs? How has the Treasury
designation of MS-13 as a TCO affected U.S. and Salvadoran efforts against that
gang?
75 The first four criminal organizations that received TCO designations were the Brother’s Circle, the Camorra, Los
Zetas, and the Yakuza. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Executive Order 13581—Blocking
Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations,” July 25, 2011.
76 Geoffrey Ramsey, “Tracking El Salvador’s Mara Salvatrucha in Washington, DC,” Insight Crime, October 12, 2012.
77 Geoffrey Ramsey, “El Salvador President: US ‘Overestimating’ MS-13,” Insight Crime, October 11, 2012.
78 Phone interview with officials from the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control, July 5, 2016.
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Congressional Research Service RL34112 · VERSION 25 · UPDATED 20
Gangs as Terrorist Groups. What are the implications of the government of El Salvador designating gangs as terrorists?
Author Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Acknowledgments
Thais A. Ramo, a former CRS research associate, provided background research and updated sections of
this product.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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