Discussion post

https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122419897348

American Sociological Review 2020, Vol. 85(1) 58 –75 © American Sociological Association 2020 DOI: 10.1177/0003122419897348 journals.sagepub.com/home/asr

Since at least the 1970s, hot spot policing, proac- tive policing, and other investigatory and puni- tive policing approaches have played a role in criminalizing poor communities of color (Alex- ander 2010; Brunson and Gau 2014; Fagan et al. 2016; Forman 2004; Soss and Weaver 2017). Such practices emphasize increased officer con- tacts with suspicious people and represent a general shift from a culture of investigating crime to investigating individuals who are believed prone to commit crime (Dubber 2000). Punitive policies focused on proactive interven- tion and police saturation extend a historical pattern of racialized criminalization in the use of

stops (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider- Markel 2014), searches (Jones-Brown, Gill, and Trone 2010), policing (Boyles 2015; Goffman 2014; Rios 2011; Stuart 2016), and force (Terrill and Reisig 2003). Stop-and-frisk is one type of

897348ASRXXX10.1177/0003122419897348American Sociological ReviewRios et al. research-article2020

aUniversity of California-Santa Barbara bUniversity of San Diego

Corresponding Author: Victor M. Rios, Department of Sociology, University of California-Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 Email: [email protected]

Mano Suave–Mano Dura: Legitimacy Policing and Latino Stop-and-Frisk

Victor M. Rios,a Greg Prieto,b and Jonathan M. Ibarraa

Abstract Stop-and-frisk and other punitive policing practices disproportionately affect marginalized communities of color. In response to calls for reform, police departments have implemented community policing programs aimed at improving relations with racialized communities. This study examines how a police unit used courtesy and respect in its engagement with a criminalized population, gang-associated Latinos, while relying on the stop-and-frisk practice. Our study reveals contextual and situational contradictions between modern police departments’ attempts to establish legitimacy and the hegemonic practice of investigatory stops. Drawing on observations and interviews conducted during a ride-along study, we find that stop-and-frisk, simultaneously used with reform practices like courtesy policing, yield a paradoxical policing approach, “the legitimacy policing continuum.” Officers regularly articulate a goal of respectfully interacting with courtesy to build community and trust— what we term “the mano suave”—while practicing a dominant logic of crime prevention through punitive measures—what we term “the mano dura.” We argue that community and courtesy policing are drawn on strategically in interaction and ultimately intertwined with and constrained by the racial bias at the heart of punitive policing practices like stop-and- frisk.

Keywords policing, criminalization, gangs, racial profiling, procedural justice, stop-and-frisk, Latinos

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investigatory stop, in which police observations of minor illicit activity provide the occasion to question and search a subject of interest about suspected criminal activity (Jones-Brown et al. 2010).

A great deal of academic inquiry focuses on stop-and-frisk as a form of racial profiling, specifically with African Americans and to a lesser extent with Latinos (Alpert, Macdon- ald, and Dunham 2005; Barlow and Barlow 2002; Durán 2009; Epp et al. 2014; Gabbidon and Greene 2012; Glaser 2014; Glover 2009; Petrocelli, Piquero, and Smith 2003; Pool 2012; Reck 2014; Rios 2017; Weitzer and Tuch 2002; Wordes and Bynum 1995). This investigatory stop finds its legal basis in the Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio (1968), which authorizes officers to pat-down sus- pects when they have “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity. Scholars have argued that stop-and-frisk represents more than increased legal latitude for police tactics; it serves as the structural precondition for a broader shift in the theory and practice of modern policing, seeking greater effectiveness by preventing crime before it can occur (Epp et al. 2014; Glover 2009; Jones-Brown et al. 2010). Stop- and-frisk, even when conducted with cour- tesy and respect, has been interpreted by researchers and courts to function as a form of racial profiling (White and Fradella 2016).

In response to widespread criticism of racial profiling and racialized police violence, police departments have attempted to imple- ment reforms and improve community–police relations (see, e.g., President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 2015; U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division 2015). This historical trend toward community and cour- tesy policing has been described as a national police accountability phenomenon, influenc- ing many local police departments across the United States (Walker and Archbold 2019). We define courtesy policing as an approach where officers engage civilians with respect, friendliness, and cordiality. The local police department in this study also expressed a commitment to police accountability, cour- tesy policing, and community policing. Even in one of the department’s most aggressive

policing units, the Gang Suppression Team (GST), officers expressed that community policing, politeness, and respect were central to their crime prevention work.

Previous research has examined the role of race in stop-and-frisk and other forms of aggressive policing, but questions remain about the day-to-day interactions that take place between officers and criminalized pop- ulations. This concern is especially pertinent in an era of police accountability (Kahn et al. 2017), wherein police relations with people of color demonstrate a pattern of racial bias and racial inequality (Brunson 2015; Epp et al. 2014; Muñiz 2015; Rios 2011, 2017; Vitale 2017), including accusations of racial profil- ing, police abuse, and unjustified police kill- ings (Cobbina 2019). Researchers have discussed a need for studies on contextual and situational cues during police stops of racial- ized civilians (Maskaly 2012). The aim of our study is to understand the contradiction between modern police departments’ attempts to establish legitimacy and the hegemonic practice of the investigatory stop.

This article utilizes police ride-alongs, community ethnography, and field interview data drawn from a predominantly Latinx community with a large gang presence. Spe- cifically, we observed a police gang unit and gang-associated individuals to gain insight on the interactional processes and conditions that create conflict between criminalized popula- tions and officers charged with policing them. This particular gang unit relied heavily on stop-and-frisk in its attempt to gather infor- mation and prevent crime among gang- associated civilians.1

We found that officers simultaneously engaged in behaviors adopted from various policing models when interacting with gang- associated Latinos. Officers maneuvered between courtesy policing and punitive polic- ing during individual police stops: a phenom- enon we call “legitimacy policing.” We define legitimacy policing as a continuum where vari- ous policing models converge during the pro- cess of police–citizen interactions. Legitimacy policing is a system of actions in which offic- ers combine punitive and courtesy strategies to

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reach a desired interactional outcome. In this study, officers typically used the language of trust-building as a rationale for, and an oppor- tunity to, engage in racialized surveillance of Latino civilians in order to collect information about them. When stopped Latinos failed to provide information or follow commands, officers responded with aggressive policing, especially when compliance was perceived to be missing, eroding what limited relational gains might have resulted from a courteous encounter. Previous scholarship has suggested a contradiction exists between officer inten- tions and institutionalized practices (Epp et al. 2014), but our data indicate that this contradic- tion runs deeper still, to competing orientations occurring within the police–civilian interac- tional process.

PoLICInG ModeLS And CRIMInALIzed CoMMunItIeS Community Policing

In response to public and political pressure to curb racial profiling and racial violence, some police departments have adopted community policing models that prioritize relationship- building with community members (Brunson et al. 2015; Forman 2004; Schafer, Huebner, and Bynum 2003). One study found that by 2013, 90 percent of all police departments in the United States, serving a population of more than 25,000 people, had adopted com- munity policing in their mission statements (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs 2015). Skogan and Hartnett (1997) describe community policing as an organiza- tional strategy that redefines the goals of local police departments to respond to community needs and requests. Key features of a commu- nity policing approach are departmental orien- tations toward problem-solving, collaboration with local community members in defining problems to be addressed by law enforcement, and active relationship cultivation with busi- ness and neighborhood leaders. In an ideal community policing environment, depart- ments are organizationally decentralized and

patrols are oriented to respond to citizen demands, thus creating two-way communica- tion between police and the public (Skogan et al. 1999).

The simultaneous use of community polic- ing and punitive techniques may be creating an environment that prevents community– police relations from improving. Researchers have found that departments implement com- munity policing in inconsistent ways (Gascón and Roussell 2019; Kearns 2017). One study showed that recent community policing efforts reproduced racial conflict between officers and citizens in the inner city (Gascón and Roussell 2019). Dubber (2000:840) argues that populations rendered a problem, such as the gang-associated individuals in this study, are not viewed as constituents of the community the police serve; instead, “the identification and incapacitation of dangerous deviants thus serves to maintain the commu- nity’s existence, not by preventing future offenses, but by redefining the community in stark contradistinction to the deviant.” Stuart (2016) provides another example of the limi- tations in community policing when com- bined with aggressive policing; he finds that officers attempt to implement therapeutic practices in their policing approach but do so through punitive techniques.

Procedural Justice

Tyler (2004) argues that enhancing commu- nity policing has the potential to improve police–community relations and reduce crime; the premise being that if people feel the system treats them with respect, they might respond more positively toward police (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2003, 2005). In this vein, procedural justice is a policing strategy aimed at improving citizen percep- tions of police legitimacy (Tyler 1988, 2003). The procedural justice approach posits that citizen perceptions of police legitimacy are influenced primarily by whether the proce- dure of a police encounter is considered fair, rather than the perceived fairness of the out- come (Tyler 1988). This approach often over- laps with community policing models where

Rios et al. 61

officers attempt to build familiarity and trust with community members to improve their legitimacy in the community. In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice and a vast number of local police departments have called for and implemented reforms aimed at improving community–police relations (Her- bert, Beckett, and Stuart 2017).2 Some schol- ars argue that trust-building techniques could help improve police–community relations and reduce crime even when combined with the practice of stop-and-frisk (White and Fradella 2016).

Armaline, Vera Sanchez, and Correia (2014) question the procedural justice model, arguing that although it encourages courtesy between citizens and police, people of color continue to perceive policing as negative and degrading. In an interview study with Black youths, Gau and Brunson (2010) found that punitive policing strategies like stop-and- frisk have negative implications for police legitimacy and crime control efforts because they compromise people’s perceptions of pro- cedural justice. This persistent negative regard for police—even after the adoption of procedural justice strategies—indicates that stopped individuals perceive a disconnect and continue to regard the practice, if not the polite officer, as racist (Epp et al. 2014).

In a study analyzing the policing of house- less populations, Stuart (2016) examined the severe lack of social services and the aggres- sive policing practices designed to rehabilitate this population. Stuart (2016) describes this form of managing the poor as “therapeutic policing,” a tactic based on the assumption that policing should address citizens as individually pathological. If utilized in tandem with punitive policing strategies, community policing strate- gies such as those noted by Stuart (2016) may actually undermine rapport and trust between law enforcement and the community.

Legitimacy Policing and Contemporary Policing Models

Herbert and colleagues (2017) identify three contemporary policing models: aggressive patrol, harm reduction, and coercive patrol.

Aggressive patrol is a dominant form of policing in the United States, as seen through the legacy programs of intense surveillance (Harcourt 1998); police violence and stop- and-frisk strategies (Kramer and Remster 2018; Rios 2011; Simmons 2014); big data policing (Brayne 2017); aggressive enforce- ment of minor crimes among the poor (Wac- quant 2009); criminalizing poverty through fines, fees, and costs (Harris 2016); and intru- sion and arrest as deterrence (Parenti 2003). Other scholars describe this aggressive patrol as the new policing model (Fagan et al. 2016), arguing that it grants law enforcement broad powers to control and intervene in the lives of marginalized populations and has had detrimental impacts on communities subju- gated on the basis of race and class (Soss and Weaver 2017).

The harm reduction model attempts to build trust, promote community ties, and mini- mize contentious relationships with community members. Procedural justice and community policing overlap with this model. The goal of the harm reduction model is to create mutual understanding and genuine coalitions with community members in order to address crime. This approach, also similar to a due process model, attempts to minimize the coer- cive power of law enforcement by focusing on protecting the dignity of civilians (Packer 1968).

The coercive patrol model, exemplified by Stuart’s (2016) notion of therapeutic policing, compels subjects to engage in personal reform through punitive treatment and the threat of arrest. The coercive nature of this type of police–citizen relationship undermines broader reparative efforts as officers often resort to force or arrest if a civilian falls short of expec- tations of personal reform. Stuart provides insight on how this coercive patrol model serves as a modern policing project aimed at rehabilitating and reforming criminalized pop- ulations through punitive measures.

Building on Stuart, we explore how this hybrid patrol model may be located in a con- tinuum where officers shift their policing approach based on specific interactions with criminalized populations. On one end of this

62 American Sociological Review 85(1)

continuum is the punitive model; in the center is a hybrid, coercive model; and at the other end is a courtesy model. The literature treats modern policing models as independent and distinct processes, varying from one police department or community to another. For example, the New York Police Department has been considered to utilize a quintessen- tially aggressive patrol model (Harcourt 1998), while the Seattle Police Department has, in recent years, exhibited a harm reduc- tion model (Beckett 2016). In Stuart’s (2016) study, the Los Angeles Police Department continued its aggressive patrol while demon- strating a desired outcome of treatment and rehabilitation. Other studies show that police officers maneuver through a myriad of decision- making processes based on their perceptions of the individuals they encounter (Ericson 1982; Stroshine, Alpert, and Dunham 2008; Stuart 2016; Worden 1989). Skolnick (1966) finds that in response to perceived danger and the occupational realities of police work, officers acquire a working personality with distinctive cognitive tendencies that make escalation of force likely.

Our legitimacy policing framework links these different policing models during the inter- actional process by identifying the logics and practices they share. We show that these mod- els combine during stop-and-frisk interactions, and we demonstrate how these courtesy-to- punitive shifts operate in contextual and situa- tional settings. We argue that policing models operate dynamically and individual officers utilize components from several models in their day-to-day interactions with gang-associated Latino civilians. We use the framework of legitimacy policing to understand this interac- tional shift between policing models. Legiti- macy policing does not define a specific policing model, but rather a continuum in which the various policing models operate under in day-to-day interactions between offic- ers and civilians. Legitimacy policing functions as a contradiction, reflecting an era in which police departments are attempting to build a positive image and trust with community mem- bers while simultaneously practicing coercive and punitive tactics to regulate and control

deviant populations. Legitimacy policing more accurately represents the complexity of modern-day policing—a punitive project at its core that gestures toward courtesy and respect in order to secure information and compliance from criminalized subjects.

The legitimacy policing continuum accounts for both law enforcement’s efforts to improve community relations and the ways officers shift into investigatory and intrusive practices that result in negative police–citizen interactions, punitive treatment, and police harassment and violence. We refer to the major segments of this continuum as mano suave–mano dura. Mano suave, in Spanish, means “soft-hand”; it can be used as a meta- phor for positive, courteous, polite, and respectful treatment. In contrast, mano dura translates to “firm-hand,” “heavy-hand,” or harsh treatment. This term has been used in various parts of Latin America by law enforce- ment as a mantra for zero-tolerance law-and- order campaigns aimed at eradicating criminal drug and gang activity, often through violence and harsh sentencing (Wolf 2017). Mano suave and mano dura as components of the legitimacy policing continuum help explain the ways policing operates in marginalized communities. Law enforcement agencies attempt to implement mano suave, or a sys- tem of practices aimed at working positively with community members, to address crime and create positive relationships with civil- ians. However, the police–civilian interac- tional process, replete with racial, contextual, emotional, and cultural dynamics, may pre- vent this reform approach from succeeding. Instead, a legitimacy policing continuum unfolds where police–citizen interactions dis- play shifting mano suave–mano dura ele- ments. Figure 1 illustrates the legitimacy policing continuum and the literature that describes the elements of this continuum.

Our study analyzes how legitimacy polic- ing operates during stop-and-frisks and asks two important questions: What is the quality of interactions during the stop-and-frisk of gang-associated Latinos? What policing prac- tices emerge as officers engage with criminal- ized community members?

Rios et al. 63

MethodS Police Ride-Alongs

The objective of our study was to observe police–citizen interactions firsthand. Follow- ing a four-year ethnographic study of gang- associated Latinos and their relationships with authority figures, we conducted ride- alongs with Gang Suppression Team (GST) police officers who were members of what we pseudonymously call the Riverland Police Department (RPD). Over the course of a five- month period, in 2012, we participated in 23 ride-alongs lasting between six and seven hours each (the first author conducted six, the second author conducted 17) with four gang suppression officers in two patrols and ana- lyzed 46 of their stop-and-frisk interactions with gang-associated Latinos. More observa- tions were made, including with a beat officer and the entertainment and nightlife patrol, but in this article we focus on observations that led to a stop-and-frisk with an actual search and discernible conversation. All 46 stop- and-frisk events occurred with Latino males suspected of gang activity by police officers.

Examining the GST was of distinct impor- tance because this division of the Riverland Police Department had recently been under scrutiny for its treatment of civilians of color,

and this particular unit was identified as a problem. This unit was attempting to improve its reputation with the community, address gang crime and violence, and adopt a com- munity policing model. We wanted to under- stand how the potential benefits of community policing, which could develop long-term trusting relationships, were undermined when grafted onto the punitive investigatory model.

In general, the department often referred to community policing when attempting to improve its public image as it related to the negative treatment of Latinx populations. In this context, the RPD used “community polic- ing” as a catchall phrase to describe its efforts to improve police legitimacy, community relations, public image, and trust. In practice, community policing functioned as an attempt to improve the treatment of gang-associated civilians, even while applying stop-and-frisk and other punitive policing approaches. All four GST officers we observed demonstrated various approaches to policing, but Officer J’s shifting approach, which we discuss in the next section, was most pronounced and there- fore serves as an example for demonstrating the legitimacy policing continuum in action.

In addition to observing this unit’s interac- tions with gang-associated Latinos, we also analyzed data from interviews with civilians

Figure 1. The Legitimacy Policing Continuum

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who described their experiences of being policed by this gang unit. These interviews supplemented our observations and provided insight into legitimacy policing by those who experienced it.

We analyzed field notes and interview transcripts by coding in Dedoose, a data analysis software program. We conducted open coding by analyzing our fieldnotes and interviews line-by-line to search for recurring patterns and themes (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). We wrote conceptual and theo- retical memos during the course of the study, during coding, and after coding as a consist- ent strategy to make sense of the themes we uncovered. We then applied focused coding, in which we analyzed specific recurring pat- terns and themes we identified during open coding and during memo writing. After we each coded the data individually, we com- pared our coding and analysis to verify and reach agreement on the specific themes we uncovered. We then linked together our anal- ysis of coded fieldnotes and interviews to produce a sustained examination, and to find patterns and themes from the variety of indi- vidual observations we had collected. After reaching saturation with specific patterns we identified, we began the writing process.

Riverland, a small California city with a population of about 100,000 people, is approx- imately 30 percent Latinx. Working-class, low-income families who work in construc- tion, service, and hospitality largely populate its communities on the city’s north and south sides, flanking an otherwise very wealthy and predominantly white enclave. The city is also home to a small number of multi-generation elite Latinx families with ties to businesses and local government. Riverland had recently experienced a few high-profile gang killings and in response, tasked the police department with cracking down on gang activity.

The first author secured access to data col- lection through the local police chief, who approved the ride-alongs. The second author was brought in to assist with the ride-alongs under the supervision of a lieutenant and a

sergeant, who introduced us to four GST officers in two patrols. Trust between the authors and the officers was always tenuous. Regardless of any reservations the officers may have had about two academics tagging along on their regular patrol, they were accommodating and forthcoming, especially after the initial ride-alongs. Officers were more hesitant with the first author because they knew him from a previous study, in which he was seen shadowing gang-associated youths on the streets and in the community; some of the officers perceived him as an advocate for the individuals they were policing. Therefore, the second author, who was unknown by the officers, conducted most of the ride-along observations. The second author was a gradu- ate student at the time and, with backpack and notebook in hand, was seen as a learner rather than an advocate. Our sense was that the sec- ond author’s perceived role as an inexperi- enced student allowed officers to engage with him as teachers of their experience rather than defenders of the same. However, it is entirely plausible that our presence on these ride- alongs caused the officers to exhibit their best behavior and restrain or conceal actions and feelings they did not want subjected to aca- demic scrutiny. Research suggests, however, that observer effects fade over time, and even when present are revelatory of the meaning individuals make of their work (Monahan and Fisher 2010). In an ethnographic study of police–citizen encounters, Spano (2006) found that observer effects actually increased officers’ use of force in encounters but had no effect on arrests. All officers discussed their intentional and enthusiastic participation in new community policing-based departmental strategies to improve police rapport with Latinx individuals. Observing this unit allowed us to examine how a criminalized population encountered policing in an era in which calls for police to reform punitive prac- tices, improve courtesy, and respect minority communities were combined with pronounced calls for a crackdown on gang crime and gangs.

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FIndInGS And AnALySIS

Different policing models surfaced during the course of interactions between GST officers and gang-associated Latinos, deepening the contradiction between officers’ reliance on stop-and-frisk and their stated desire to build trusting relationships with these young men. This tension often played out in a single police stop, showing the various elements of the legitimacy policing continuum. We describe four dominant outcomes of the police–civilian encounter: care-and-frisk, sur- veillance as tough love, punitive responses to non-compliance, and police abuse as conflict resolution.

Care-and-Frisk

During one ride-along with two GST police officers through primarily Latinx sections of town, Officer J talked about his approach to stop-and-frisk, explaining that stops were a way to care for community members. He mentioned that individuals were pushed into crime because of “the community they were born into” and that his “check-ins” (stop-and- frisks), which began as a conversation and often progressed into a detainment and search, actually prevented gang-associated Latino suspects from being “victimized” or becom- ing involved in crime. Officer J believed the neighborhood he worked in was “crimino- genic,” in that it pushed gang-associated Latinos into a life of crime. The only way to intervene, he said, was to keep a close eye on the lives of the individuals he policed, which included knowing what items were in their possession at all times. He further explained that in getting to know gang members through constant check-ins, some developed respect for officers, a respect he sought to cultivate at the outset of nearly every interaction.

During a dinner break one evening, Officer J recounted his perception of a stop-and-frisk that transpired a few hours earlier. He stated that the man he stopped was “tatted up,” so he asked him to “talk” for a moment. During the questioning and frisk, the stopped man, Robert, explained he was the director of a

gang advocacy organization working with gang-involved youth to pull them out of the street life. Officer J responded by striking up a conversation about police–civilian contact. Robert told him this kind of hassling, which he had just been subjected to, was detrimental because it caused Latinos to lose trust and respect for police. Officer J responded by stating he saw these stops as just talking or checking in. He asked Robert to explain how he made contact with gang associates. Robert responded by stating he would just walk up to them on the street and try to engage them in his programs. Officer J told him this was exactly what the GST did; they approached these young men and asked to talk to them, just like Robert did, with the goal of keeping them from engaging in criminal activity. Officer J described this community advocate as an equivalent; a civil servant helping his community. Over the years, Robert had been observed in the larger ethnographic study. His approach was quintessentially trust-building, harm reduction, restorative justice, and community-building. His role was to assist these individuals by helping them enroll in school, attain employment, and desist from criminal justice contact: a fundamentally dif- ferent strategy of crime prevention than the one adopted by the GST.

On another occasion we observed officers coaching a young Latino man on the impor- tance of documenting the time spent with his son in order to demonstrate his commitment to his family in an upcoming custody hearing:

Officer J explained: We serve the same pur- pose. You guys [the researchers] are trying to find ways to help delinquent kids. We are doing the same thing. We are with them every day trying to help them stay out of trouble. This means we have to counteract the forces that influence them to commit crime. We have to be present in their lives just as much as the negative elements that lead them to recidivate.

Officer J and other police perceived stop-and- frisk as a care and protection practice—their logic being that the more officers stop-and- frisk gang-associated Latinos, the less likely these gang-associated Latinos would be

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influenced by their environment to commit crime. These exchanges revealed one dimen- sion of officers’ self-perception, as genuinely trying to help these young men in ways simi- lar to those of community advocates. Officers had turned externally imposed reform into a technique of punitive social control.

This benign prevention orientation, how- ever, often gave way to punitive treatment, revealing that stop-and-frisk is more properly understood as surveillance and data collec- tion, as opposed to relationship-building or community policing. Carlos, one of the young men we observed during a ride-along stop, explained his perspective on policing:

Carlos: Cops, some of them . . . at first, when they try to bust you, they try to be cool with you. You know, pretend like they’re on your side, try to be your friends at first, but I learned. I’ve seen that they try to be cool, but at the same time, you can’t let them trick you like that because at the end they’re going to bust you. They’re not your friends. They’re out there to do their job. They are trying to get close to you for them to gain something, not for you to get protected.

Gang-associated Latinos understood the shift- ing nature of legitimacy policing. They believed there was an ulterior motive to any trust-building attempt an officer made, given that even encounters beginning with courtesy and respect could end in harassment or arrest. This belief made gang-associated Latinos, and other Latinx civilians we encountered, hold a deep mistrust and resentment toward law enforcement, especially when officers misper- ceived their daily routines as criminal actions.

In one such instance, as officers patrolled the city, they noticed two Latino men working on a bicycle at the end of a parking space where someone’s truck was parked in front of an apartment building. Officer J said it looked like they were “chopping a bike.” They pulled up in front of the truck. Officer J got out and then said, “Hey, I noticed you guys were working on a bike and I thought maybe you were pulling it apart, and I wondered where you all got the bike and what you were doing.” The men explained that the bike belonged to

their brother who had died recently, and they were fixing it up in their brother’s honor, as well as on their family’s behalf, since their late brother liked bikes. They chatted for a moment. The officer appeared sympathetic, telling the guys he was sorry for their loss. However, Officer J then asked if he could search them. The men shrugged their shoul- ders as if gesturing that they did not care, particularly in this moment of grief. Officer J patted them down, found nothing, returned to the car, and then drove away.

For GST officers, everyday activities in this working-class Latinx neighborhood looked like criminal acts. The officers— “hungry for information,” as they described it—began their interaction by profiling these Latino men, assuming they were gang mem- bers who had stolen a bicycle. Upon realizing their mistake, the officers shifted their approach by pretending to have stopped the men out of courtesy, to see how they were doing. “How would we know their brother passed away,” Officer J said as we drove off, “if we had not checked up on them?” In this case the legitimacy policing continuum shifted back to mano suave because of the sympathy the officers had for their brother’s death. This event demonstrated officers’ power to dictate the shifts between mano suave and mano dura in the legitimacy polic- ing continuum. Human sympathy allowed officers to begin the process of de-escalating their aggressive patrol. Moreover, because the men accepted the officers’ request to search them, the officers may have been compelled to shift further toward a mano suave approach. In this vulnerable space, the men seemed to make a concerted effort to show they were harmless and unarmed, as an interaction could quickly escalate toward mano dura.

Within the volatilities of legitimacy polic- ing, perceived suspicion authorized the shift to mano dura. The emphasis on contact and surveillance required officers to intervene with suspicious people, not merely illegal activity. Gang-associated Latinos were flagged as suspicious due to their race and their style. Officer O explained, “We don’t

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like to profile but if you have tattoos and are wearing gang clothes [baggy, urban outfits] then you must be up to something. There are lots of good Mexican kids out there but they face the danger of being influenced by gang bangers.” The GST policed “Mexican” popu- lations as an at-risk population. Any male in the community could be a good person but might eventually be influenced by the gang world. Therefore, anyone who was brown and personified an urban style was at risk of being profiled and stop-and-frisked by the GST. Although we did not study the entire RPD and its relationship to the larger Latinx com- munity, we found that even Latinx civilians who had not been profiled by police felt the RPD unfairly targeted the entire Latinx com- munity. On various occasions, local commu- nity advocates and community organizers told us that the GST unjustly policed Latinx individuals, especially young Latino males, by treating them all as suspects and forcing them to prove their innocence during unwar- ranted stops. GST officers regularly referred to the Latinos they policed as “gang bangers” even if they were not gang associated. “Gang banger” was a euphemism for Latino: any Latino suspect was reduced to a “gang banger” by the GST until they proved they were indeed not gang involved or did not have a criminal record.

The necessarily racialized calculus of the stop-and-frisk undermined officers’ purported attempts to build trust and legitimacy with community members from the very beginning. Indeed, these ends of the legitimacy contin- uum, mano suave and mano dura, served a similar purpose. As Jorge, a Latino gang- associated young man in the study said, “They will do anything to feel legit. Arrest us when we are a threat, pretend to be nice when they are approaching us or they will threaten to arrest us when we don’t give them respect.” Here, Jorge voices a key finding in this study: GST officers appeared to adjust their policing tactics to create an appearance of legitimacy for the public—by showing they cared—but they continued to racialize and repress the criminalized population they supervised.

Legitimacy policing is a shifting continuum by which officers deploy strategies to appear car- ing and legitimate in the public eye while continuing the legacy programs of racialized punitive social control and surveillance in mar- ginalized communities.

GST officers used courtesy and punitive strategies during stops. Although officers often voiced or conveyed a positive intention during the initial contact with gang-associated Latinos, the final outcome of these encounters was often negative. We define a negative encounter with police as any kind of interac- tion that includes the use of arbitrary searches, harsh language, verbal insults, handcuffing, arrest, or physical force by police.

Day-to-day policing practices and interac- tions demonstrated a contradiction wherein civilian contact was simultaneously punitive and cordial. The process of utilizing mano dura tactics like the stop-and-frisk, along with reform practices like community polic- ing, led to a policing approach that was at once problem-solving and punitive, caring and cruel, harm-reducing and traumatizing. The GST appeared to practice a form of pub- lic impression management that shifted the burden of the aggressiveness of the encounter to the stopped individual. These efforts ensured the continuity of punitive policing in a historical moment when the police depart- ment’s public image was in question.

Surveillance as Tough Love

The tension between the courteous and aggressive elements of the legitimacy polic- ing continuum was apparent in the paternalis- tic attitude the GST adopted as a rationale for their daily surveillance of gang-associated Latinos. Surveillance, stop-and-frisk, and various forms of punitive tactics were but- tressed by officers’ ideological commitment to prevention, through courtesy, as a central motivation for their gang suppression work. Furthermore, officers cited the largely immea- surable preventative quality of these practices as a justification for their approach to gang- associated Latinos, what officers described as

68 American Sociological Review 85(1)

“tough love.” In most tough love interactions with suspected gang members, GST officers’ motives were to gain as much information on the subject as possible in order to probe for gang activity and prevent future criminal activity. Surveillance, according to officers, helped keep track of this negative influence in the community. It was tough and intrusive but loving because it allowed officers to play a paternalistic role, making officers feel that close supervision and arbitrary rule enforce- ment equated to crime prevention.

The following ride-along encounter exem- plified this tough love approach to surveil- lance. At approximately 10:00 p.m. one night, officers were parked in an empty parking lot directly across from a main intersection on the predominantly Latinx south side of town when they saw a white Cadillac Escalade travel quickly down an alley. They pulled out of the parking lot to follow it. As they pulled the car over, one officer stated he thought he saw the man “blew through a red light,” thereby establishing a justification for the stop. Upon being stopped, the man told the officers that he was rushing home because he had just been “jumped” (beaten by a group of people). Officer J later recounted that this man was a gang member in Tijuana, but here he was “just a paisa” (paisa is a derogatory, shortened version of paisano, or someone from the home country, connoting a certain rural Mexicanness). The man was com- manded to step out of the vehicle. Officer H searched the car and the man. Officer J made small talk as Officer H searched the car. The man asked the officers how they became police officers. Officer J explained that both he and Officer H were in the military, and upon returning they wanted to give back to their community “by becoming peace officers and enforcing the law.” The man replied, “I’d like to live like you and be honest all the time, but I can’t. I live over here.” He waved toward his feet, seeming to gesture toward the neighborhood as a whole. “Where you can’t live an honest life,” he said. Officer H replied by telling him they would keep an eye on him to help him stay “honest.” The man was then

commanded to take off his shirt while officers photographed his tattoos.

The officers consistently described their surveillance strategies as techniques for mak- ing suspects behave. Some gang-associated Latinos related this tough love approach to being treated like animals. Francisco, a young gang-associated man who took part in the four-year study explained:

Francisco: Oh, si? Ay fool, serio [seriously], but like the pigs [derogatory term for cops] right here, like if they see any homies or anything you know like riding their bikes on the sidewalk . . . like I got pulled over just for riding my bike on the sidewalk. And then, they see like other fuckin’ people, they see white people riding on the fucking side- walk. But they only stop us. Because they wanna get shit on us. At least a fuckin’ ticket or something. They just wanna get us pulled over, just to get info on us and get us caught up . . . they have us tracked like dogs with dog collars.

In addition to feelings of indignity and viola- tion, individuals expressed an awareness of police using courtesy approaches in pretext stops as a means of tracking them and, possibly, uncovering criminal activity. The use of pretext stops undermined broader trust-building efforts, because individuals developed an understand- ing of police as adversaries after officers’ ulte- rior motives became apparent. For criminalized individuals, there was no difference between mano suave or mano dura policing: both extended from the same system of policing intended to further criminalize, control, and adjudicate them by closely scrutinizing and regulating their daily routines and behaviors.

Although officers themselves readily rec- ognized the degrading quality of the tough love stops they made, they never described them in those terms. Instead, they understood pretexts as a necessary intervention by which a stop-and-frisk became an opportunity for them to help gang associates. During this pro- cess of controlling a criminalized population through tough love, GST officers developed techniques to gain intimate familiarity with some of the gang-associated Latinos they

Rios et al. 69

policed. These encounters were typically char- acterized by a fleeting and, for the most part, cordial interaction between the police and the civilians they sought to build rapport with. They regularly told gang-associated Latinos that they were checking up on how they were doing. This informal monitoring was sup- ported by formal surveillance technologies. In the above example, the photographs they took were incorporated into the stopped man’s digi- tal profile once they were uploaded from the dash-mounted laptop in their patrol car. Geo- graphic tags were included with the photos, allowing the officers to track concentrations of stopped individuals and their potential gang relations to one another. The officers recorded nicknames and monikers as well. They treated fresh tagging in the same way, uploading the information to CalGang, the online database that tracked gang members and gang activity. Officers regularly tracked social media accounts. They asked questions like, “What’s your Twitter handle?” or “What’s your Face- book ID? You don’t have anything to hide, do you?” Their justification was typically, “I want to see what you are up to.” Civilians appeared obligated to provide officers with their social media information to demonstrate innocence. These social media accounts were later scanned by officers, during down time or criminal investigations, and were used as tools to track gang-associated Latinos’ activities, routines, conflicts, and whereabouts. Informa- tion from these accounts was regularly col- lected to use as evidence in potential criminal cases (for an in-depth account of how social media is used to criminalize marginalized youths, see Lane 2016).

Stop-and-frisk also illustrates the racial dynamics of this surveillance: it not only tar- gets brown men, but it codifies their differ- ence—the gang aesthetic—as data in the course of this public ritual of racialized sub- ordination. The men were reminded of their racialized vulnerability to police scrutiny, and the physical markers of that vulnerability were transformed into data points that con- solidated their status as gang members or as a threat group to be tracked. In this sense, data collected from stop-and-frisk encounters

served to expand racialized punitive social control.

The stop was executed against these men and the broader gang because these data were designed to track not just individuals but the groups of which they were a part. Police assumed membership in these groups based on the specificities of individuals’ racialized self- presentation. Under tough love surveillance, police used mano suave approaches as a means to conduct mano dura business. This served to subjugate the bodies, day-to-day activities, and social networks of criminalized Latinos. This process also conflated “criminal gang mem- ber” with “Latino,” further stigmatizing an already racially criminalized population.

Punitive Responses to Non-compliance

In Riverland, maintaining control and power was a key determinant to whether an officer chose to utilize a courteous or punitive approach. Officers’ perceptions of coopera- tion, submissiveness, and evidence of good behavior typically led to a mano suave approach. Conversely, when officers believed detained individuals challenged them, they moved to a mano dura approach, revealing a fundamental concern with compliance, not trust. Police determined their subsequent interaction style based on civilian levels of submissiveness. We observed a shift toward punitive policing when a civilian displayed any form of resistance to an officer’s demands and when officers sensed a loss of control.

David, another gang-associated male we observed being searched by police, explained his perspective after being pulled over:

David: Yeah. Like when I got pulled over down the street. When the cops pulled me over they were all being nice then when I tried not to talk to them. I was like, “Don’t touch me.” I’m not on probation and they grabbed me and stuff all random. They just got me and threw me up against the car and threw my face and shoulder into the car. He was like, “Oh you wanna act like a fuckin badass?” He was like, “Don’t act tough in front of me. I’ll put you in your place.”

70 American Sociological Review 85(1)

David’s unwillingness to submit to the demands of the officer resulted in aggressive retaliation. Like David, most gang-associated Latinos in our study were not afforded the opportunity to decline police searches. Any resistance to submit to the power-dynamics at play in officer–civilian relationships, whether justified or not, led to more intrusive and aggressive police behavior.

One late afternoon on a ride-along, Offic- ers J and B turned a corner on the south side of Riverland and drove past a young Latino man riding a skateboard. They noticed him and turned their patrol car around to follow him. They stopped him as he walked by a small shopping center. Officer J stated, “I want to talk to you for just one minute.” As he pulled up behind this young man, he said, “I don’t think he’s on probation but I want to verify.” The young man reacted immediately: “What did I do? Why do you want to know my name?” He refused to confirm his name for the officers. Officer J approached him, ordering him to turn around. The young man responded by stating his name. However, the officers seemed to believe he had not cooper- ated soon enough. Officer J pinned the youth’s thumbs together behind his back while he searched him with his free hand. The young man told Officer J, “I saw you right there!” Officer J replied, “Yea, I know. I’m just ask- ing for your respect. I just want to ask you a couple of questions.” Officer J explained this was the first time he had stopped him. He wanted to know what tattoos he had. The young man lifted up his shirt and showed him a tattoo placed in the upper middle part of his back. Eventually, Officer J broke off the inter- action and the young man went on his way.

In this exchange, the mano suave approach gave way to a mano dura detainment. Spurred by the stopped individual’s non-cooperation, the officers asked for the youth’s respect in the course of executing a search to learn more about him. In doing so, the officers practiced a language of mutuality to secure compliance. Rather than as a long-term relationship-building tool, the language of respect was used as a call for compliance in a manner the officers

expected. This exchange was typical of the investigatory stops we observed, especially in its orientation to data collection and the offic- ers use of the language of mutuality as a strategy for enhancing compliance and sub- missiveness. When compliance failed, offic- ers resorted to aggression and abuse.

Police Abuse as Conflict Resolution

Verbal and physical abuse were regularly reported and observed, especially when conflict arose between GST officers and gang-associated Latinos. Another interaction we observed showed officers taking an abusive approach with gang-associated Latinos during a moment of conflict. As Officer J approached three young men seated on a street curb, he asked, “How are you doing?” He attempted to make small talk with the guys for about 15 seconds. They ignored him, giving him dirty looks. One of the boys chuckled, as if mocking the offi- cers. Officer J, looking upset, enunciated clearly and aggressively, “How are you fucking doing, I said!” At this point Officer H moved behind the young men onto the sidewalk where they were seated. He stood just a few inches from them. The youths appeared intimidated by the officer’s encroachment. At this point, one of them, sounding nervous, said, “We are good officer, sir, officer.” Officer H stepped back a few feet as if indicating he was willing to play nice now that the youths had paid deference. Officer H asked if any of them were on proba- tion. They each said no. Officer R followed up by asking if they were “between probations,” insinuating that they were already convicted criminals and would inevitably commit crime again. Laughter followed from the officers while the youths looked to the ground. Officers H and J gestured with dismissive head nods in the direction of Officer R. He then told the young men, “Well, I guess we’re all good. You’re free to go.” The three young men stood up, and then slowly started to walk away. Offi- cer J later said he was glad he did not have to “escalate the situation” and that sometimes they needed to put pressure on gang associates to “calm things down.”

Rios et al. 71

Most of the gang-associated Latinos we interviewed reported various experiences with abuse by the GST. Jaime, for example, discussed how officers repeatedly brutalized him on various occasions following his first experience of resistance to officer harass- ment. While hanging out on the side of a local convenience store frequented by Latinx youth of Riverland around 10:15 p.m., Jaime noticed police officers driving by, staring at him and “a homie.” Given that Jaime and his friend were underage, they were violating a citywide curfew on minors. They realized they were breaking the law, and they began to head home in different directions. Jaime recalled, “I’m like fuck, it’s curfew. So I start walking fast and I get to the corner and I dip [leave]. Not even two houses away and I hid and the narcs [police] are looking for me for like 15 minutes and then someone said, ‘Hey that fool’s right here, that fool’s right here’ point- ing fingers at me.” Once confronted by the officer, Jaime mentioned that his back was seriously injured in a car accident and pleaded for the officer to handle him gently. The officer ignored Jaime and proceeded to grab him by the neck before slamming him to the concrete. Once on his feet, Jaime demanded the officer call his sergeant so he could report this abuse. Jaime’s claim against the depart- ment was taken to court. Jaime reported expe- riencing even more harassment as his claim against the department progressed.

Shortly after the initial claim was filed, officers arrested Jaime on a charge that he was causing a disturbance at a local high school’s football game and gestured gang signs toward the officers. Jaime refuted these claims and noted that in the police report, the signs officers reported seeing were those of a rival gang and they knew he was not from that gang. Jaime eventually lost his claim, which he believed was due to the officers using his criminal background against him in court. A final interaction would end any hope for jus- tice, as Jaime recalled:

Jaime: One day before court . . . I was busted. Drunk in public, supposedly . . . I was already walking home . . . and they grabbed me from my hand and I was like what the

fuck, and BOOM they fucking slam me and scrape my face and my chin. “I told you motherfucker, not to try to fucking run away from me again,” the same narc [officer]. “I told you, you fucking little bitch, I told you I’m a bust you. You thought you was look- ing good,” this and that. “You’re gonna lose this shit, I guarantee that,” and then he pre- sented at court. “We’re gonna fight this case and you can’t fight this one no more,” cuz you got this and that. And they ended up fucking me over.

Jaime’s account shows how civilians perceived officers as resolving conflict through abuse. Police brutality and misconduct appeared to escalate based on civilian resistance, even if that resistance was enacted through formal pro- tocol, such as demanding due process rights or filing formal complaints.

The initial courteousness of officers’ over- tures could not overcome civilians’ percep- tions of being abused. The consistent threat of force to resolve conflict allowed officers a sense of control yet fueled resentment in the Latinos they policed. As officers encountered cynical, unresponsive, or non-compliant civil- ians, they turned to aggression and abuse as methods for improving the outcome of the interactions. These slippages revealed the mano suave as yet another technique of con- trol, setting the stage for resentment toward police and, subsequently, a mano dura response to this resentment. Under legitimacy policing, the techniques of trust-building become folded into the exercise of submission to police authority and conflict resolution. In the legiti- macy policing continuum, conflict resolution strategies shift to the mano dura side, where officers utilize abuse and force to prevent fur- ther escalation when conflict emerges.

dISCuSSIon This study shows that gang unit officers in Riverland shifted between various forms of policing models during their interactions with gang-associated civilians. The police gang unit in this study held on to its racialized puni- tive authority by practicing punitive policing as trust and courtesy. A tension between polic- ing models manifested in the interactions

72 American Sociological Review 85(1)

between police and gang-associated Latinos. On the one hand, officers expressed an interest in developing trust to gather intelligence about gang activity and support these men in desist- ing from crime. On the other hand, officers relied on the racialized and institutionalized practice of stop-and-frisk to initiate contact with these individuals, which ultimately undermined their stated goals of relationship- building and community policing. The blend- ing of tactics characteristic of legitimacy policing often facilitates the shifting of blame for harassment and excessive force from the police to the policed individual. The process of maneuvering from mano suave to mano dura allows officers to point to stopped indi- viduals’ rejections of polite overtures to justify further punitive treatment.

Our findings reveal the limits of commu- nity policing and courtesy policing, which are powerfully intertwined and constrained by the racial bias at the heart of investigatory stops and other punitive policing models. In these interactions, a tension between police as civil servants and protectors and police as front-line enforcers of racial subordination plays out on a day-to-day basis. The contra- dictory continuum of mano suave–mano dura produces an environment in which the prac- tice of trust and relationship-building plays a subordinate role, while stop-and-frisk, sur- veillance, and information-gathering become a dominant outcome.

This study provides an example of how modern policing generates a contradictory con- tinuum of reform and punitive treatment in criminalized communities. Officers are influ- enced by models that simultaneously allow them to be respectful and courteous and puni- tive and aggressive. This case may also speak to how racially criminalized populations are gov- erned in modern society, through a humanitar- ian approach that responds to insubordination through punishment, aggression, and violence.

We suggest that police reforms related to improving race relations between law enforce- ment departments and criminalized commu- nities have to move beyond community policing and procedural justice approaches. As was the case in Riverland, California,

these models operate in tandem with racial- ized, punitive policing approaches like the stop-and-frisk. To be effective, community policing, due process, harm reduction, and trust-building policing approaches must oper- ate independently from such punitive strate- gies. Departments committed to community policing might consider de-emphasizing the stop-and-frisk and other investigatory stops as significant crime prevention strategies, and instead promote and reward a dignity policing model that allows criminalized civilians to feel safe and protected by officers and depart- mental culture. Additionally, departments should reevaluate any of their efforts that seem to encourage paternalistic approaches, wherein officers see themselves as a domi- neering authority interacting with subjects in a manner that racializes and dehumanizes them. Legitimacy policing must shift from an approach where courtesy justifies punitive treatment to an approach where courtesy, respect, and dignity enhancement are the ulti- mate goal.

In recent years, community, courtesy, and procedural justice policing have been intro- duced as modern solutions to the problem of racism and excessive force among the police. And yet, in this study, a policing strategy aimed at improving community relations was undermined by officers’ reliance on stop-and- frisk, racialized surveillance, and excessive and forceful detainment. To address racial disparities in policing work and to prevent racialized police violence, policy-makers and police departments must develop trust, rela- tionships, and community-building strategies that operate independently from punitive policing practices. Otherwise, in spite of reform efforts, criminalized civilians will continue to lack faith and trust in law enforce- ment because the mano suave approach to policing, in the end, may itself be a thin pre- text: a velvet glove sheathing an iron fist.

Acknowledgments We thank ASR editors Rory M. McVeigh, Omar Lizardo, Sara Mustillo, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback and guidance. We also thank Rebeca Mireles-Rios, Cid Martinez, Forrest Stuart, and Joshua

Rios et al. 73

Escobar for their generous input. We also thank Rebeca Mireles-Rios, Cid Martinez, Forrest Stuart, and Joshua Escobar for their generous input. We are grateful for the support provided by The Center for Publicly Engaged Scholarship at UCSB.

Funding Portions of this material are based upon work supported by the William T. Grant Foundation Grant No. 180476.

oRCId id Victor M. Rios https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1098-6726

notes 1. We use the phrase “gang-associated” to describe

individuals who have been labeled or who self- describe as gang members. These people have been “associated” by individuals or institutions as “gang members” and, in the community we stud- ied, are therefore treated and policed as criminals and potential threats. In this sense, gang-associated individuals are a criminalized population (Durán 2009; Rios 2017).

2. See, for instance, the Department of Justice’s Com- munity Oriented Policing Office (https://cops.us doj.gov).

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Victor M. Rios is Associate Dean of Social Science and Professor of Sociology at The University of California- Santa Barbara.

Greg Prieto is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of San Diego and the author of Immigrants Under Threat: Risk and Resistance in the Deportation Nation (NYU Press 2018).

Jonathan M. Ibarra is a graduate student in the Depart- ment of Sociology at the University of California-Santa Barbara.