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Survival Global Politics and Strategy

ISSN: 0039-6338 (Print) 1468-2699 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsur20

Right-wing Extremism and the Terrorist Threat

Jonathan Stevenson

To cite this article: Jonathan Stevenson (2019) Right-wing Extremism and the Terrorist Threat, Survival, 61:1, 233-244, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1568059

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1568059

Published online: 29 Jan 2019.

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I Right-wing extremism has been a major threat in the United States for at least a decade. According to the FBI, hate crimes, the majority of which target a person’s race or ethnicity, rose 17% in 2017, while anti-Semitic crimes in particular rose 37%.1 The Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism indicates that far-right or white-supremacist movements were responsible for 387 extremist-related fatalities, or 71%, in the US between 2008 and 2017, compared with 100 fatalities, or 26%, for Islamist extrem- ists. This data contravenes US President Donald Trump’s claim that most extremists committing terrorist acts in the US are ‘foreign-born’.2 Given the excited reaction of right-wing extremists to presidential rhetoric, and the angry political polarisation that appears to be both a cause and an effect of the Trump presidency, it is logical to expect right-wing extremism in the United States to rise further.3

Were it not for 9/11, right-wing terrorism might have become a central US-government concern years ago. In the 1990s, terrorism was at a crossroads. The ethno-nationalist type in Europe was on the wane, as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque nationalist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) wound down their armed campaigns and moved towards predominantly non-violent political approaches. Far-left ideological outfits such as the Red Brigades in Italy and Greece’s

Closing Argument

Right-wing Extremism and the Terrorist Threat

Jonathan Stevenson

Jonathan Stevenson is Managing Editor of Survival and IISS Senior Fellow for US Defence.

Survival | vol. 61 no. 1 | February–March 2019 | pp. 233–244 DOI 10.1080/00396338.2019.1568059

234 | Jonathan Stevenson

17 November Group were enervated. In the United States, Timothy McVeigh’s 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, in itself constituted a dramatic spike in right-wing terrorism. But, though he did enlist several accomplices, the FBI assessed McVeigh to be essentially a lone-wolf operator. The bureau increased surveillance and infiltration of right-wing militias that had already been spurred by the Aryan Nations’ violent campaigns in the 1980s, and by the end of the decade considered the phenomenon to be contained.

During this period, while incidents such as the Ruby Ridge and Waco stand-offs, together with the growth of the internet, were quietly galva- nising right-wing extremists in the United States, transnational jihadist terrorism steadily intensified. The failed 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, al-Qaeda’s 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es- Salaam, and its attack on the USS Cole in Yemen are just a few examples. The 9/11 attacks were and have remained aberrationally catastrophic, but they stimulated concerns about jihadism in the United States and Europe – sustained by the 2004 attacks in Madrid, the 2005 attacks in London and many others – that almost completely crowded out residual worries about right-wing terrorism. In 2005, the US Department of Homeland Security had only one analyst working on non-Islamist terrorist threats.4

Present US political tensions are conducive to right-wing extrem- ism. Racial and anti-immigrant anxieties, stoked beforehand by Barack Obama’s two-term presidency, appear to have motivated a significant minority of American voters and given rise to a broader white national- ism. According to economist Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, right after Obama was elected in 2008, one in 100 Google searches for ‘Obama’ also included the initials ‘KKK’ or the word ‘nigger’.5 Stormfront.org, America’s most popular online hate site for white nationalists, founded in 1995 by a former Ku Klux Klan leader, saw by far its largest single increase in membership on 5 November 2008 – the day after Obama was elected.6 Trump used xenophobic and racially charged rhetoric in his election campaign; right- wing violence has surged since he became president.7

Meanwhile, in the first two years of his presidency, Trump has falsely claimed, among other things, that Latin American immigrants are more

Right-wing Extremism and the Terrorist Threat | 235

likely to commit crimes than American citizens, and that large numbers of jihadists are infiltrating the US–Mexico border. He has appeared toler- ant of white supremacism, drawing moral equivalence between those protesting Confederate memorials and ‘Unite the Right’ demonstrators – including self-identified neo-Nazis, neo-Confederates, neo-fascists and white nationalists, as well as various militias – who killed one of the pro- testers in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017.8 He has derided black professional football players for protesting police violence against African Americans by kneeling during the national anthem, and routinely insults African American journalists and politicians. Indeed, in advance of his campaign to become president, his main political platform was the promo- tion of ‘birtherism’ – the allegation that Obama was born in Africa and not the United States – a conspiracy fantasy that can only be understood in racial terms.

In the run-up to the recent midterm elections, Trump characterised a group of several thousand economic migrants making their way to the Mexican border as an ‘invasion’ of the United States. He deployed thou- sands of active-service US troops to the border to repel them, arguably in violation of the federal Posse Comitatus Act, in a pre-election stunt to rally his voting base. In late October, Cesar Sayoc, a fanatical Trump sup- porter, sent 16 pipe bombs to the president’s critics, and Robert Bowers, an anti-immigration extremist, shot dead 11 worshippers at a Pittsburgh synagogue. Although he was apparently sour on Trump, casting him as a loathed ‘globalist’, Bowers had also disparaged online a Jewish charity for helping Latin American immigrants enter the United States.9 The attack was the deadliest act of anti-Semitic violence in US history.

II As recently reported in the New York Times, a decade ago, in 2009, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis warned of a rise in right-wing extremism. Janet Napolitano, Obama’s secretary of homeland security, recognised the threat and the potential synergies between far-right movements and a rising number of unhappy US veterans with weapons training, and the need to ramp up domestic

236 | Jonathan Stevenson

counter-terrorism. Until Eric Holder, the attorney general under Obama, reconvened the Department of Justice’s Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee in 2014, it had not met for 13 years and had no budget or staff. But congressional Republicans objected to the Obama administra- tion’s nascent domestic counter-terrorism mobilisation, casting it as a partisan effort to demonise those whose views diverged from the liberal mainstream that Obama represented.10 At the same time, continuing high- profile jihadist-terrorist operations such as the Boston Marathon attacks tended to obscure concerns about right-wing terrorism.

The Justice Department concedes that it has a ‘blind spot’ as to domes- tic terrorism and hate crimes, and that both state and local authorities are lax about reporting them.11 The FBI has about 1,000 open cases of domestic terrorism – about the same size as its file on the Islamic State (ISIS). In sum, American law-enforcement and intelligence agencies remain unprepared to address right-wing terrorism. So far, operatives have seemed ama- teurish and incompetent, and more inclined towards loose bluster and hooliganism than focused action. But military and paramilitary connec- tions suggest a potentially dangerous trajectory, and it is a hallmark of terrorism that relatively few committed individuals are required to make a serious impact.

Europe is hardly immune to right-wing extremism. The Axis powers were defeated, but Nazi and fascist ideology was never fully extinguished. Italy’s ‘Years of Lead’ between 1969 and 1982 began not with an attack by the Red Brigades, the dominant player of the period, but rather with the Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan executed by Ordine Nuovo, a neo-fascist group, which killed 17 people and injured 88. An offshoot of the group perpetrated the era’s most lethal attack, the 1980 bombing at the Bologna railroad station, in which 85 people died and 200 were hurt.

Since the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998, loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland have developed more pronounced right-wing attitudes, some committing racist and anti-immigrant attacks. Over the past 20 years, several former British National Party (BNP) members have committed terrorist attacks or been convicted of terrorism- related charges in the United Kingdom. Far-right extremist Thomas Mair

Right-wing Extremism and the Terrorist Threat | 237

brutally murdered Member of Parliament Jo Cox in 2016, and since then UK authorities have interdicted several right-wing terrorist plots. The xenophobic National Socialist Underground operated in Germany from 2000 to at least 2007, killing ten. In 2014, a 30-member racist, anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim group known as the ‘Oldschool Society’ arose in Munich, accumulating weapons and planning to attack a refugee shelter before the group’s leaders were arrested in 2017 and the operation aborted.12 There has been right-wing terrorist activity in France and Sweden as well, and its precursors are arising in Poland.

On 22 July 2011, Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik killed a total of 77 people and injured more than 300 in two attacks: a van bomb in Oslo followed by a far more lethal gun attack on a Workers’ Youth League summer camp on Utøya Island, 38 kilometres northwest of Oslo. The operation demonstrated just how much carnage one competent and determined terrorist can wreak on an unsuspecting population. Islamist terrorist threats may still be the most salient ones in Europe, and Breivik himself was assessed to be mentally disturbed (though legally sane) and to have acted alone despite his claims of networked support. But his militantly anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant agenda appeared to underline a right-wing, neo-fascist disposition that would become an influential political trend in Europe, due partly to the accelerating influx of mainly Muslim refugees on account of persistent turmoil in the Middle East.

There is a transatlantic dimension to countering right-wing terrorism, as there is to thwarting Islamist terrorism. Although the right-wing variety is more localised, and is unlikely to engender a transnational powerhouse similar to al-Qaeda or ISIS, the dynamics of each phenomenon appear to be broadly convergent. Before and immediately after 9/11, al-Qaeda contemplated Europe as a kind of staging area for attacks on the United States. But as the group was forced to decentralise, it increasingly regarded Europe as a target in its own right, and encouraged self-initiated, home- grown terrorism on both sides of the ocean; ISIS has broadly followed this pattern. Thus, jihadism has become more localised, and more like right- wing terrorism.

238 | Jonathan Stevenson

III Transatlantic cooperation on jihadist terrorism became robust after 9/11, and has since evolved and adjusted quite nimbly to changes in threat perceptions and patterns. While the UK’s exit from the European Union may initially compromise Europe’s transnational counter-terrorism capabilities, the negative effects can probably be mitigated.13 Accordingly, there are no major institutional, bureaucratic or operational reasons that transatlantic partnerships and modes of cooperation, painstakingly developed since 9/11 to deal with jihadist terrorism, could not be readily applied to structurally comparable right-wing terrorism. The resurgence and, to varying degrees, political mainstreaming of xenophobic nationalism on both sides of the Atlantic, however, could constitute formidable political impediments.

Trump’s rhetoric, in demonising certain groups by publicly and per- sistently alleging that they are working against the common good, has encouraged and emboldened American right-wing extremists to commit violent acts. Sociologists call violent behaviour of this provenance ‘scripted violence’.14 So far, perhaps the most flagrant example is Sayoc’s unsuccess- ful pipe-bomb operation. A number of similarly inspired extremists, of course, have actually murdered or hurt people.15 The president has been doubling down on securing his far-right base via populist appeals to a mainly white and often rural demographic. At a political rally in Indiana last November, he both exaggerated the threat posed by left-wing activ- ists and belittled their strength, calling on presumptively more muscular Trump supporters – bikers, the police, the military – to confront them and surreptitiously giving the ‘Q’ sign associated with white supremacy.16

Furthermore, former US Department of Homeland Security officials have described a pattern of neglect of right-wing extremism in the Trump administration, decried Trump’s use of racially loaded terms and perceived a president who is ‘actively supporting and amplifying’ far- right hatred.17 And by overtly dismissing the US intelligence community’s assessments of Russian election-meddling and Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s complicity in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the president has demonstrated his willingness to cast

Right-wing Extremism and the Terrorist Threat | 239

government agencies as the nefarious elements of a ‘deep state’, and to ignore and even impede them when their direction or findings do not align with his political agenda.18

In Europe, the British government has warned that right-wing extremism is on the rise.19 Synergistic relationships have arisen between right-wing groups and elements of law-enforcement and intelligence agencies in Germany.20 Violent xenophobic offences there rose from 316 in 2014 to 612 in 2015, and the trend is expected to continue.21 Last June, French authorities rolled up Operational Forces Action, a far-right, anti- Muslim group headed by a former policeman, for conspiring to commit acts of terrorism and on weapons charges.22 Yet counter-terrorism priorities in Europe have paralleled those in the United States, heavily privileging Islamist threats over right-wing ones.23 Populist leaders tolerant of right- wing, extra-legal violence have also emerged in Southeast Asia in the form of Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, and in South America in that of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. Like Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin is inclined towards ethnic nationalism and xenophobia.24

The evolution of jihadist terrorism reflects the power of the internet to build transnational networks of disparate local groups, Russia’s hacking of the US electoral process and the ability of determined state actors (and potentially non-state actors) to manipulate such groups. Scholars in both the US and Europe have for some time recognised the potential for nationalist far-right groups, empowered by the internet, to forge strong transnational links.25 One study notes that transnational right-wing, anti-immigrant propaganda is considerably more effective than opposed left-wing efforts.26 National leaders who appear even tacitly sympathetic with the far right reinforce its determination and validate its extremism.27 They too are proliferating. It would appear that the second new global ter- rorism challenge in 20 years is now plausible.

Notes

1 Devin Barrett, ‘Hate Crimes Rose 17 Percent Last Year, According to New FBI Data’, Washington

Post, 13 November 2018, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/

240 | Jonathan Stevenson

hate-crimes-rose-17-percent-last-year- according-to-new-fbi-data/2018/11/13/ e0dcf13e-e754-11e8-b8dc-66cca409c180_ story.html?utm_term=.612b127aaa63.

2 Janet Reitman, ‘U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism. Now They Don’t Know How to Stop It.’, New York Times Magazine, 3 November 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/ magazine/FBI-charlottesville-white- nationalism-far-right.html. The US government’s baseline claim was that 73% of those convicted of international terrorism-related charges were ‘foreign-born’, which excludes from consideration those convicted of or charged with domestic terrorism-related offences. US Department of Homeland Security and US Department of Justice, ‘Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Initial Section 11 Report’, January 2018, p. 2, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ files/publications/Executive%20 Order%2013780%20Section%2011%20 Report%20-%20Final.pdf. Under pressure from lawsuits brought by watchdog and civil-liberties groups, the Justice Department has admitted that the report is erroneous and misleading, but refused to retract or correct it. Ellen Nakashima, ‘Justice Dept. Admits Error but Won’t Correct Report Linking Terrorism to Immigration’, Washington Post, 3 January 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/justice-dept-admits- error-but-wont-correct-report-linking- terrorism-to-immigration/2019/01/03/

cd29997a-0f69-11e9-831f- 3aa2c2be4cbd_story. html?utm_term=.8a1c0ec3142a. Amplifying the distortion, Trump falsely tweeted that the report ‘shows that nearly 3 in 4 individuals convicted of terrorism-related charges are foreign-born’. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Tweet, 16 January 2018, https:// twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/953406423177859073. Regarding the misleadingly bloated nature of the statistics even on foreign-born terrorists, see, for example, Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Ron Nixon, ‘White House Fuels Immigration Debate with Terrorism Statistics’, New York Times, 16 January 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/us/ politics/trump-immigration-terror- convictions.html. On the report’s pointed exclusion of domestic terrorism, see Salvador Rizzo, ‘Fact Checker: President Trump’s Claim that “Nearly 3 in 4” Convicted of Terrorism Are Foreign-Born’, Washington Post, 22 January 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/fact-checker/wp/2018/01/22/ president-trumps-claim-that-nearly- 3-in-4-convicted-of-terrorism-are- foreign-born/?noredirect=on&utm_ term=.f904449283b9.

3 See generally J.M. Berger, ‘Trump Is the Glue That Binds the Far Right’, Atlantic, 29 October 2018, https://www. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/ trump-alt-right-twitter/574219/.

4 Reitman, ‘U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism.’

5 Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Everybody

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Lies: Big Data, New Data, and What the Internet Can Tell Us About Who We Really Are (New York: HarperCollins, 2017).

6 Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, ‘The Data of Hate’, New York Times, 12 July 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/ opinion/sunday/seth-stephens- davidowitz-the-data-of-hate.html.

7 Wesley Lowery, Kimberly Kindy and Andrew Ba Tran, ‘In the United States, Right-wing Violence Is on the Rise’, Washington Post, 25 November 2018, https://www. washingtonpost.com/national/in-the- united-states-right-wing-violence- is-on-the-rise/2018/11/25/61f7f24a- deb4-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story. html?utm_term=.2210eeaacbfc.

8 See Dana H. Allin, ‘Charlottesville’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 5, October– November 2017, pp. 201–12.

9 See, for example, Julie Turkewitz and Kevin Roose, ‘Who Is Robert Bowers, the Suspect in the Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting?’, New York Times, 27 October 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/ robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue- shooter.html.

10 See Reitman, ‘U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism.’

11 Ibid. 12 ‘Four Jailed in Germany for Forming

Far-right Terror Group’, Guardian, 15 March 2017, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2017/mar/15/germany-far- right-terrorist-group-four-jailed.

13 See Nigel Inkster, ‘Brexit and Security’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 6, December 2018–January 2019, pp. 27–34.

14 See David Neiwert, ‘Right-wing Extremists Are Already Threatening Violence Over a Democratic House’, Washington Post, 16 November 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/outlook/2018/11/16/ right-wing-extremists-are-already- threatening-violence-over- democratic-house/?utm_term=. ba56d44fd5fb. See also Michelle Chen, ‘Donald Trump’s Rise Has Coincided with an Explosion of Hate Groups’, Nation, 24 March 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/ donald-trumps-rise-has-coincided- with-an-explosion-of-hate-groups/; and Chip Berlet, ‘Heroes Know Which Villains to Kill: How Coded Rhetoric Incites Scripted Violence’, in Mathew Feldman and Paul Jackson (eds), Doublespeak: The Rhetoric of the Far Right Since 1945 (Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 2014).

15 See Spencer Sunshine, ‘Expect More Murders: Why the Radical Right Kills’, Truthout, 2 June 2017, https://truthout. org/articles/expect-more-murders- why-the-radical-right-kills/.

16 See Jonathan Chait, ‘Trump Isn’t Inciting Violence by Mistake, but on Purpose. He Just Told Us.’, New York Magazine, 5 November 2018, http:// nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/ trump-isnt-inciting-violence-by- mistake-he-just-told-us.html; and ‘Trump Gives Q Sign at Indiana Rally’, YouTube, 5 November 2018, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=HAVzHVqFVws.

17 See Abigail Tracy, ‘“We Are at a Turning Point”: Counterterrorism Experts Say Trump Is Inspiring a Terrifying New Era of Right-

242 | Jonathan Stevenson

wing Violence’, Vanity Fair, 2 November 2018, https://www. vanityfair.com/news/2018/11/ trump-administration-tree-of- life-shooting-domestic-terrorism. Katharine Gorka, an advocate of de-emphasising the right-wing terrorist threat, whose husband Sebastian Gorka was forced out as a White House counter-terrorism adviser, remains an influential full-time adviser to Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen. See also William Saletan, ‘Radical Right-wing Terrorism’, Slate, 31 October 2018, https://slate.com/ news-and-politics/2018/10/trump- rhetoric-extremist-violence-response. html.

18 See, for example, Natasha Bertrand, ‘The Chilling Effect of Trump’s War on the FBI’, Atlantic, 25 May 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ archive/2018/05/the-chilling-effect-of- trumps-war-on-the-fbi/561218/.

19 See, for example, Vikram Dodd, ‘MI5 to Take over in Fight Against Rise of UK Rightwing Extremism’, Guardian, 28 October 2018, https:// www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/ oct/28/mi5-lead-battle-against-uk- rightwing-extremists-police-action.

20 Thomas Meaney and Saskia Schäfer, ‘The Right-Wing Rot at the Heart of the German State’, New York Times, 3 October 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/10/03/opinion/chemnitz- maassen-afd-far-right.html.

21 Carla Bleiker, ‘Sharp Rise in Right- Wing Crime in Germany Just “The Tip of the Iceberg”’, Deutsche Welle, 11 February 2016, https://www. dw.com/en/sharp-rise-in-right-wing-

crime-in-germany-just-the-tip-of-the- iceberg/a-19041652.

22 Adam Nossiter and Aurelien Breeden, ‘Shadowy Cell in France Planned to Kill Muslim Civilians, Authorities Say’, New York Times, 28 June 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/ world/europe/france-far-right-plots- muslims.html.

23 See, for example, David Bond and Guy Chazan, ‘Rightwing Terror in Europe Draws Fuel from Populism and Xenophobia’, Financial Times, 9 October 2018, https://www.ft.com/ content/86f2645a-c7a2-11e8-ba8f- ee390057b8c9.

24 See, for example, David Atkins, ‘Putin, Trump, and the New Cold War Between Liberalism and White Supremacy’, Washington Monthly, 21 July 2018, https:// washingtonmonthly.com/2018/07/21/ the-putin-trump-alliance-is-part- of-a-new-cold-war-between- liberalism-and-white-supremacy/. See also Spencer Ackerman, ‘Russia Is Exploiting American White Supremacy Over and Over Again’, Daily Beast, 9 October 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/ how-russia-exploits-american-white- supremacy-over-and-over-again; Ronald Brownstein, ‘Putin and the Populists’, Atlantic, 6 January 2017, https://www.theatlantic. com/international/archive/2017/01/ putin-trump-le-pen-hungary-france- populist-bannon/512303/; and Chauncey DeVega, ‘Donald Trump, King of the White People, Bends His Knee to a Foreign Tyrant’, Salon, 17 July 2018, https://www.salon. com/2018/07/17/donald-trump-king-

Right-wing Extremism and the Terrorist Threat | 243

of-the-white-people-bends-the-knee- to-a-foreign-tyrant/.

25 See, for example, Clifford Bob, The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Manuela Caiani, ‘The Transnationalization of the Extreme Right and the Use of the Internet’, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, vol. 39, no. 4, November 2014, pp. 331–51.

26 See Nicole Doerr, ‘Bridging Language Barriers, Bonding Against Immigrants: A Visual Case Study of Transnational

Networks Publicly Created by Far- Right Activists in Europe’, Discourse & Society, vol. 28, no. 1, January 2017, pp. 3–23; and Nicole Doerr, ‘How Right- wing Versus Cosmopolitan Political Actors Mobilize and Translate Images of Immigrants in Transnational Contexts’, Visual Communication, vol. 16, no. 3, August 2017, pp. 315–36.

27 Kevin Roose and Ali Winston, ‘Far-right Internet Groups Listen for Trump’s Approval, and Often Hear It’, New York Times, 4 November 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/politics/far- right-internet-trump.html.

244 | Jonathan Stevenson