6-8 page research paper base on the topic and the abstract

741

Asian Survey

, Vol. 46, Issue 5, pp. 741–760, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2006 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.

Kyungja Jung is the policy officer for Immigrant Women’s Speakout New South Wales (NSW) Association, an advocacy and research organization representing immi- grant and refugee women in NSW, Australia. Bronwen Dalton is a professor in the Community Management Program at the University of Technology, Sydney. The authors wish to thank Cho Young-ju of the Korean Women’s Institute at Ehwa Women’s University for her valuable assis- tance in data collection and an anonymous reviewer for help in preparing this article. An earlier version under the same title appeared at the Center for Australian Community Organizations and Management, Working Paper, no. 71 (December 2005).

RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY FOR THE WOMEN OF NORTH KOREA

Mothers of the Revolution

Kyungja Jung and Bronwen Dalton

Abstract

The role and status of women in North Korea have changed in recent years. Reports suggest that women, more than men, have become active players in emerging capitalist processes, particularly those centered on local markets, thus creating new opportunities for themselves and new challenges for the regime.

Keywords: North Korea, women, informal economy, market forces, gender

Introduction

The North Korean economy steadily declined during most of the 1990s. The cumulative and interrelated effects of the sudden demise of Soviet aid, the collapse of the socialist world market, structural problems of the command economy, and the massive amount of resources diverted to maintain a huge military and glorify the Dear Leader, plus the droughts and floods of the 1990s, caused the country’s economy to contract by about 30% in 1991–96.

1

1. Chung Min Lee and Jonathan D. Pollack,

Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications

(Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1999), p. xi. Note: Regarding the romanization of Korean in this article, for most Korean names we follow local practice and place the surname first.

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Economic decline coincided with a widespread and devastating famine. Food shortages have been relatively common in recent times, but it was not until a major flood in 1995 that North Korea solicited assistance from the international community. Since that time, it is estimated that up to two million people have died from famine related causes.

2

Evidence suggests that children have been the most deeply affected sector of the population. According to a 2002 report by two United Nations (U.N.) agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP), North Korea has one of the high- est rates of acute malnutrition in the world with 42% of children found to be chronically malnourished.

3

In response to the food shortage and subsequent economic crisis, the num- ber of North Korean refugees entering China increased dramatically. According to estimates prepared in late 2004, some 300,000 North Koreans were living illegally in northeastern China; other research puts the figures between 100,000 and 200,000.

4

A small proportion of refugees have entered South Korea:

5

2. Figures for mortality rates during the famine vary widely in different research. Andrew Natsios weighs up different evidence to support the argument that the famine is likely to have cost at least 2.5 million lives. Andrew Natsios,

The Great North Korean Famine

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, 2001), pp. 201–05.

3. The U.N. FAO and WFP,

Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mis- sion to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(Rome: FAO and WFP, October 25, 2002). The latest nutrition figures suggest some improvement. A nutritional survey carried out in October 2004 by the Central Bureau of Statistics and North Korea’s Institute of Child Nutrition (ICN), with the assistance of UNICEF and the WFP, found that malnutrition among children in North Korea declined between 2002 and 2004, evidenced by lower rates of stunting and wasting. However, pro- portions of stunted and underweight children, at 37% and 23%, respectively, remain “high,” ac- cording to World Health Organization (WHO) criteria. Moreover, the assessment found that the nutritional status of mothers has not improved, with almost one in three women with young chil- dren remaining malnourished and anemic. See UNICEF,

DPRK 2004 Nutrition Assessment Report of Survey Results

(New York, February 2005), p. 72, at

�

http://www.unicef.org/dprk/dprk_ national_nutrition_assessment_2004_final_report_07_03_05.pdf

�

. 4. The 300,000 figure appears on the South Korean Ministry of Unification website,

�

http:// www.unikorea.go.kr/kr/uninews_policyfocus.php

�

, accessed February 2005, as well as regularly in the South Korean press (see, for example,

ChungAng Ilbo

[Central Daily], September 1, 2000, p. 6). However, according to field research sponsored by the South Korean non-governmental organization (NGO) Choohunpos (Good Friends), between 143,000 and 195,000 were resident in Northeast China in 1999 (see Good Friends,

Tumangang-ul Konnoon Saramdul

(People who crossed the Tumen river) [Seoul: Chongdo Ch’ulp’an, 1999]), p. 1. In 2002, So Tong-man esti- mated that the figure was closer to 100,000. So Tong-man, “Kwajangteon Puk Ch’eje Wigron” [Ex- aggerated views of a system crisis in North Korea],

Taehan Maeil

(Great Korea Daily), March 19, 2002.

5. In addition to these “push” factors, Lankov notes that there are various “pull” factors driving this migration. Increasingly, Chinese authorities are less able and perhaps less willing to hunt down and extradite the rapidly growing numbers of North Korean refugees. Also, economic conditions have improved along the Chinese side of the border partly due to South Korean ventures employing

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approximately 6,000 North Koreans are registered with the Ministry of Unification.

6

This exodus has created a valuable new source of data on North Korea. Now it is possible to base research on the testimonies of North Korean refu- gees or those who support and advocate on their behalf. This development has stimulated significant research activity, principally in South Korea where since the early 1990s the Korean-language literature on North Korean society has grown noticeably.

Some more recent literature deals with the subject of North Korean women. Various studies focus on women in general,

7

the experiences of refugee women,

8

representation of women in the North Korean media,

9

changes in women’s roles since the famine,

10

studies of family life,

11

and the methodological challenges facing those who wish to conduct women-centered research.

12

Most of these

ethnic Koreans. Andrei Lankov, “North Korean Refugees in Northeast China,”

Asian Survey

44:6 (November/December 2004), pp. 857–58. Also see, David Wall, “No Witch Hunt for North Koreans in China,”

Japan Times

, December 6, 2004. 6. Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU),

Whitepaper on Human Rights in North Korea

(Seoul: KINU, 2003). 7. Kim Kui-ok, Kim Su-nim, Lee Kyung-ha, and Hwang Eun-joo,

Bukhan Yeoseongdeulen Eotteoke Salko Isseulkka

[How North Korean women live] (Seoul: Dang-Dae, 2000); Koo Soo-mi and Oh You-seok, “Bukhan Dosi Yeoseongeu Samgwa Euisik” [Life and self-consciousness of urban women in North Korea: Focused on women in the towns of Chung-Jin, Sin-Yi-Juh, and Hye-San), in Korean Social History Studies Association,

Hankuk Sahoe sahoesahakhoe

65 (2004), pp. 308–58; Sohn Bong-sook, ed.,

Bukhaneui Yeoseong Saenghwal

[Lives of women in North Korea] (Seoul: Nanam, 1991); Sonia Ryang, “Gender in Oblivion: Women in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea),”

Journal of African and Asian Studies

35:3 (August 2000), pp. 323–49.

8. Kim Tae-hyun and No Chi-young,

Jaejung Bukhan Ital Yeoseongdeui Sam

[Life experiences of North Korean refugee women in China] (Seoul: Ha-U, 2003); Choi Myung-sook, “90yeon Daeihu Choseon Yeoseongdeuleui Kajeongeseoeui Same Kwanhayeo” [North Korean women’s life in the household since the 1990s], in Korean Women’s Institute, ed.,

Nambukhan Yeoseong Keuliko Jungkuk Choseonjok Yeoseongeui sam

[Lives of South and North Korean women and Chi- nese Korean women] (Seoul: Korean Women’s Institute, Ehwa Women’s University, 1999).

9. Lim Sun-hee,

Choseon Yeoseong Bunseok

[Analysis of Choson Yosong] (Seoul: KINU, 2003). 10. Lim Sun-hee,

Siklyangnankwa Bukhan Yeoseongeui Yeokhal Mit Euisik Byeonhwa

[Change in the role and consciousness of North Korean women after the food crisis] (Seoul: KINU, 2004); Lee Mi-kyung, “Kyeojenan Ihueui Bukhan Yeoseongeul Samkwa Euisik Byeonhwa” [A change in lives and consciousness of North Korean women after the economic crisis],

Asea Yeonku

(Asian Studies) 47:2 (2004), pp. 183–212.

11. Lee On-juk, “Yeoseongkwa Gajeong Saenghwal” [North Korea women’s life at home], in Sohn,

Bukhaneui Yeoseong Saenghwal

, pp. 37–93; Park Hyun-sun,

Hyeondae Bukhaneui Gajok- jedoe Kwanhan Yeonku

[A study on contemporary family in North Korea focused on family repro- duction and family structure], Ehwa Women’s University, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (1999).

12. Choi Jin-yee, “Bukhan Yeoseong Munje Yeonkueui Jeong danghan bangbeobe Daehan Yeonku” [A study on relevant methodology for research on North Korean women],

Euihak Haeng- dong Kwahak

(Behavioral Science in Medicine) 3:1 (2004), pp. 3–13.

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ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

studies are based on interviews with female defectors living in South Korea or China; one study was written by a defector.

13

The effects of the famine on North Korean children and women have also been the subject of South Korean and international media reports and publications by international aid organizations.

14

Questions arise, however, on whether the testimonies of North Korean refu- gees are reliable or representative. A disproportionate number of refugees come from a single province, North Hamgyong, and inevitably present the views of those disenchanted enough to leave their country. Many accounts in the South Korean media have been given in return for payment, which may have led some refugees to embellish their reports to ensure continued demand.

15

In China, North Koreans are considered illegal immigrants, and testimonies may be in- fluenced by a desire to avoid attracting the attention of the authorities. The biggest hurdle for researchers is substantiating some of the claims of defectors given the absence of other reliable data sources. Nevertheless, the breadth and quality of much of the new research published in Korean highlights the value of having access to first-hand accounts of life under this repressive political system from a reasonably large and diverse set of people.

To bring some of the newly released Korean-language research to an English- speaking audience while attempting to overcome the limitations of exclusive reliance on refugee testimonials, this paper critically analyzes and synthesizes a range of material. Our goal is to provide a more comprehensive understand- ing of the context and current issues facing North Korean women. The article utilizes existing studies on North Korean society based on interviews with ref- ugees and workers supporting these refugees, some of whom have visited the country. It also relies on analysis of official documents such as the North Korean Constitution, the writings of Kim Il Sung, and various legislation and policies relating to women, in order to build a more nuanced, up-to-date picture of the role and status of North Korean women.

The following discussion is in two parts. Part 1 provides an overview of the current situation in North Korea, an analysis of discourse regarding women

13. Ibid., p. 13. 14. Amnesty International,

Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Dem- ocratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

(Al Index: ASA 24/00302004, 2004),

�

http:// web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa240032004

�

; Citizen’s Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, “Women’s Human Rights in North Korea,” presented at the 3rd International Conference on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees, Tokyo (2002); WFP, “Crop and Food Supply As- sessment Missions to DPRK” (annual reports, 1999–2003, Rome),

�

http://www.fao.org/docrep/ 004/x2437e/x2437e00.htm

�

. 15. Barbara Demick, “The Hidden Stories of North Korea,” Nieman Reports (Fall 2004),

pp. 113–14, at

�

www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/04–3NRfall/113–114V58N3.pdf

�

. On more general methodological issues relating to payment for interviews, see M. Berk, N. Mathiowetz, E. Ward, and A. White, “The Effect of Prepaid and Promised Incentives: Results of a Controlled Experiment,”

Journal of Official Statistics

3:4 (1987), pp. 449–57.

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based on official documents, and a historical overview of policy on women from 1945 to the present. In Part 2, the overall position and role of women in the social arena are assessed in relation to three aspects: work, family and mar- riage, and sexuality. In each of these sub-sections, particular attention is paid to the impact of the famine. Part 2 then discusses the recent spread of capitalist relations and the role of women in this process.

The article concludes by comparing the position of women in North Korea to that of women in other communist states prior to and during systemic tran- sition. A key conclusion is that recent hardship has created both crisis and opportunity for North Korean women. While many are occupied in a daily struggle to survive, others have become actively involved in small-scale eco- nomic activities that are a key feature of a broader economic transition in the country. It is impossible to predict the long-term effects this involvement will have on the status and role of women in North Korea, but given the potential consequences—not only for gender relations but for the regime’s future—further research is warranted.

I. The Current Situation and Law and Policy on Women

North Korea Today

In response to continuing food and economic crises, the regime in 2002 intro- duced new micro- and macro-economic policies, experimenting with marketi- zation and inflationary measures to stimulate economic activity. Analysts have pointed out that these initiatives are unlikely to improve matters and instead contributed to hyperinflation.

16

Moreover, these “reforms” have led to a grow- ing disparity of wealth and with this the possibility of social unrest,

17

although to date there have been no confirmed reports of local disturbances. Noland de- scribes the measures as creating “a form of apparatchik capitalism similar to Romania’s, in which officials channel resources to favored groups.”

18

16. Marcus Noland,

Famine and Reform in North Korea

(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Inter- national Economics, 2003); Marcus Noland, “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,”

Foreign Affairs

65:4 (July/August 1997), pp. 105–18. Inflation has soared as shown by the rising price of the U.S. dollar in the black markets of Pyongyang, from 950 won

�

$1 in November 2003 to more than 2,900 won

�

$1 in July 2006. The first rate appears in “Inflation Creates a North Korean Dollar Economy,”

One Free Korea

, July 7, 2005,

�

http://freekorea.blogspot.com/2005/07/inflation-creates- north-korean-dollar.html?

�

. The second figure appears in Kathi Zellweger, “Caritas-Hong Kong 51st DPRK Trip Report July 18–29, 2006,” Hong Kong, August 8, 2006.

17. Noland notes how the gap may widen between those with access to foreign exchange (such as senior officials) and agricultural workers (who may benefit from rises in the price of grain) and salaried workers without access to foreign exchange. Marcus Noland, “Life in North Korea,” Testi- mony on Life Inside North Korea, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Senate, Wash- ington, D.C., June 5, 2003,

�

http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID

�

253

�

. 18. Noland, “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,” p. 13.

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A related development has been the dramatic growth in farmers’ markets and other black markets. According to several reports, the government has wound down the rationing system, known as the Public Distribution System (PDS), under which citizens used state-issued coupons to procure food and other necessities. In the absence of a functioning PDS, there has been a signif- icant increase in trading at local markets. These farmers’ markets are relatively common and officially tolerated.

19

There also has been a significant increase in the volume of Sino-North Korean border trade with an inflow of products made in China and South Korea. One report quotes a trader in the border town of Hoeryong as saying, “You can buy anything and everything in the market.”

20

Items include Japanese televisions, South Korean cosmetics, videotapes of South Korean television soap operas, and even sex videotapes from Western countries.

21

Another by-product of the food and economic crises has been an increase in mobility for North Koreans despite official prohibitions on free movement. Since the famine, there have been widespread population movements as hun- gry people migrate in search of food. Some of those that travel have managed to cross the Chinese border. Of the North Koreans now living permanently outside the country, recent data show that most are women. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, in 2004 over three-quarters of North Korean refugees living in China were female. Of 4,952 North Korean refugees living in South Korea between 2000 and 2004, 59.5% were women.

22

Discourses: Women as Equals in

Juche In 1955 the founding leader of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, proclaimed

juche

(self-reliance) as the national ideology. In 1967 at the first session of the Fourth

19. In 1950 the present market system was established as an Agricultural Market under the management of the People’s Council in each province, city, and county. In 1958 the new name of Farmers’ Market was given, and the approved tradable items were restricted to vegetables and lim- ited amounts of grain, mainly produced on individual small farming gardens. In 2002 the govern- ment renamed the Farmers’ Market as Market Place and allowed previously prohibited industrial products to be traded. See Good Friends,

Human Rights in North Korea and the Food Crisis

(Seoul: Good Friends, 2004).

20. Donald Macintyre, “Cracks in Kim’s World,”

Time

, February 21, 2005, p. 24. 21. Ibid., p. 24;

Hankyureh

(Seoul), February 27, 2005; Andrei Lankov, “Cracks in North Ko- rean ‘Stalinism’,”

Asian Times Online

, December 7, 2005,

�

http://atimes.com/atimes/Korea/ FL07Dg01.html

�

. 22. South Korean Ministry of Unification website,

�

http://www.unikorea.go.kr/kr/uninews_ policyfocus.php

�

, accessed November 2005. According to Kwak Hae-ryong, women may ac- count for nearly 80% of all North Korean refugees in China. Kwak Hae-ryong, “A Study of the Human Rights Situation of the Refugees Who Fled North Korea,”

Study of Peace Problems

, no. 1 (2000), p. 261. This and other research regarding the number of women in China is discussed in Lankov, “North Korean Refugees in Northeast China,” p. 860.

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Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Il Sung said that “our

juche

ideology refers to the most correct Marxist-Leninist-oriented guiding philosophy designed to carry out our revolution and construction.”

23

Unlike other former communist regimes, the North Korean

juche

system defines the role of all aspects of so- cial and political life in terms of their relationship to the regime’s founder and long-serving leader, Kim Il Sung. In this way, the

juche

system has generated a pervasive leadership cult, and its discourse has affected the construction of a range of social phenomena including shaping the role and status of women.

In general, in official North Korean documents, women are described as equals with men. This is evident even in early documents. For example, Article 62 of the 1972 Constitution states the following:

Women are accorded an equal social status and rights with men. The State shall af- ford special protection to mothers and children by providing maternity leave, re- duced working hours for mothers with many children, a wide network of maternity hospitals, crèches and kindergartens, and other measures. The State shall provide all conditions for women to play a full role in society.

24

Kim Il Sung also claimed to be concerned with women’s liberation. In par- ticular, he made special mention of his plans to relieve women from the heavy load of housework. In his speech to the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party in 1972, Kim declared that women would be “liberated” from heavy household chores. However, this liberation was based not so much on any rad- ical change in social or cultural norms but was to be achieved through a tech- nological revolution, one of the three revolutions (ideological, technological, and cultural) that Kim outlined as the basis for the country’s transformation. Kim promised that more refrigerators, cookers, and other household appli- ances would be manufactured and the pre-packaged food industry developed to make home life easier for women.

25

In this way, Kim claimed to guarantee women equal participation in all state-run operations including work in facto- ries and agricultural cooperatives.

Similarly, in the North Korean media, there have been numerous accounts of Kim Il Sung’s role as the major driving force behind the advancement of the North Korean women’s movement. Invariably, these accounts stress that women’s improved status can be attributed to the benevolence of their leader. For example, an article in the women’s magazine

Choseon Yoseong

(North Korean Women) states, “Wherever Dear Leader [Kim Il Sung] has visited, he

23.

Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(December 27, 1972), in

Selected Works

6 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1974), p. 364. 24. Ibid. 25. Kim Il Sung,

Report to the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee

(November 1970), in

Selected Works

5 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1972), p. 451.

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748 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

is deeply concerned with how to relieve the heavy burden from women. He takes care of women with great love and mercy.”26

Despite such rhetoric, it is unlikely that Kim was genuinely committed to gender equality and was instead preoccupied with mobilizing women for nation- building in the context of a chronic labor shortage. His “progressive” inter- pretation was not consistent with other pronouncements such as his view that mothers’ primary role was to instruct their children. In various works, Kim made reference to the importance of women as “revolutionized mothers” and asserted that it is the mother who has to bear responsibility for home educa- tion. The embodiment of this ideal was his own mother Kang Ban Sok, who is eulogized as a passionate revolutionary fighter and a leader of the Korean women’s liberation movement. In keeping with this view, Kim Il Sung argued that in situations where children were not adequately educated (that is, incul- cated with the tenets of juche and thus completely loyal to him), it was the mother’s fault—a view that has serious implications in a system that often pun- ished family members of offenders. In 1974, Kim pronounced: “There are some delinquent children nowadays. . . . [T]hey are mostly the children of mothers who are not revolutionized.”27

In her study on the treatment of women in juche ideology, Ryang argues that unlike in other communist systems such as the former Soviet Union, in North Korea the question of women’s rights has not been widely and publicly debated among the country’s leadership. In essence, the official interpretation of the roles of women in North Korea is “producer, reproducer, and child- rearer.”28 Ryang argues that this interpretation of women was so strong that while “the category ‘mother’ exists in North Korea, the category ‘women’ is hardly recognized, thereby effacing the notion of gender altogether from the surface of the state politics.”29

Historical Overview of Women’s Policy from 1945 Onward

Women’s policy in North Korea can be divided into and examined in four pe- riods. During the first period, 1945–57, various laws promoting sexual equal- ity were introduced. The second period, 1958–82, was characterized by the introduction of measures to increase female participation rates in the work force. In the third phase (1983–95), a range of trends suggests that there was a return to more traditional female roles. The fourth period takes us from 1996 to the present, a time dominated by the impact of the famine.

26. Lim, Analysis of Choseon Yeoseong, p. 31. 27. Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, p. 108. 28. Ryang, “Gender in Oblivion,” p. 343. 29. Ibid., p. 325.

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KYUNGJA JUNG AND BRONWEN DALTON 749

1945–1957. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was es- tablished in 1948 when the governments of the north and south claimed to be the legitimate government of all of the Korean Peninsula. In the subsequent decade, the North Korean government took steps toward institutionalizing for- mal gender equality through legislation. In 1945 the traditional household reg- istration system, which recognized the oldest male as the head of the household, had been abolished. This system was further reformed in 1955 with the intro- duction of an individual ID system.30

Soon after the new government in North Korea began a major land reform, gender equality legislation was introduced. On July 30, 1946, the Gender Equal- ity Law was passed, awarding women equal rights with men in all areas such as politics, economy, culture, and suffrage. This law gave women equal rights in marriage, divorce, and child support claims and banned polygamy, concubi- nage, and prostitution. Women’s inheritance and property rights were also le- gally secured and the protection of custody rights to children was guaranteed.31

In 1946, the statute on the Labor of Manual and Clerical Workers was passed. It set the basic foundation for securing women equal rights with regard to labor by guaranteeing equal pay for equal work.32 In addition, women were entitled to free education. During this period, women’s policy was still con- cerned with educating women to be “modern” mothers who could successfully combine traditional motherhood expectations with active participation in revo- lutionary campaigns and nationbuilding. For example, through the Minju Yeo- seong Dongmaing (Democratic Women’s League) women became extensively involved in one of the major campaigns during this period, against illiteracy.

1958–82. The second period was characterized by the mobilization of women as workers. During this time, the state became focused on the worsening labor shortage, and in 1958 the Cheollima movement was used to mobilize the work force and organize it to increase productivity in both agriculture and indus- try.33 The state also developed policies designed to maximize women’s partic- ipation in economic activities. In 1958, the Pyongyang government announced Cabinet Decision No. 84 aimed at increasing female participation in all areas of the people’s economy. Specifically, the decision sought to raise the ratio of

30. South Korea did not abolish this system until 2005. The system granted priority to men over women in heading a family as recorded on the family registry. The new system in South Korea al- lows either parent’s surname to be used.

31. Shin En-young, “Ideology and Gender Equality: Women’s Policies of North Korea and China,” East Asian Review (Seoul) 13:3 (2001), pp. 81–104.

32. Ibid., p. 84. 33. Inspired by Mao’s Great Leap Forward, the Cheollima movement was started by Kim Il

Sung in 1958 and focused on the collectivization of agriculture. It takes its name from a mythical winged horse that could leap 1,000 ri (about 250 kilometers).

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750 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2006

women working in the education and healthcare sectors to an average of 60% and in other sectors to an average of 30% by 1961.34

To support this move and encourage population growth, various social wel- fare reforms were introduced such as the establishment of child care centers and the granting of maternity leave. By 1976, paid maternity leave of 35 days before the birth and 42 days after birth was guaranteed by law. From 1986, paid maternity leave of 60 days before the birth and 90 days after delivery was introduced.35 Mothers were also given time off for breastfeeding. Women with more children were extended other benefits. For example, by 1966, women with three or more children under 13 were permitted to work six hours each day while receiving a full eight-hour-day salary.36

Child care was seen as a state responsibility, a standpoint that allowed women to be economically active. The North Korean state provides optional day care in nurseries for children from the ages of three months to four years. Children between five and seven years of age attend kindergartens, for which registra- tion is compulsory. By 1960, 65% of children under five were sent to child care centers, and by 1970, the vast majority of children were in state-provided child care.37 Each provincial capital also built children’s centers to house orphans and other children who could not be looked after by their families.

In 1965, around 55% of the work force was female. By 1970, women ac- counted for 70% of the work force in light industry and 60% of those employed in the agricultural sector.38 The degree of female participation in politics is not low in North Korea, but most of these women hold parliamentary posts that have no real power. According to figures released in 1972, the provincial People’s Com- mittees altogether had 729 women out of the total 3,185 members (22.9%).39

1983–95. During this third phase, increasing numbers of women left the work force after marriage to assume more traditional domestic roles. Because the economy was stagnant, more married women became full-time housewives, and increasingly in official pronouncements the traditional role of women was emphasized. The influence of the Minju Yeoseong Dongmaing was weakened.

1996–present. The current period has been dominated by the effects of the famine; there has been no systematic collection of data on women’s policy. The information presented below focuses on the daily life of women and is drawn largely from testimonies of North Korean refugees. We examine women

34. Shin, “Ideology and Gender Equality,” p. 85. 35. Kim Kui-ok et al., How North Korean Women Live, pp. 24–25. 36. Ibid., p. 25. 37. Koo and Oh, “Life and self-consciousness,” p. 324. All figures cited apply only to the dates

stipulated. Current figures for the percentage of children in child care, for example, are not available. 38. Ryang, “Gender in Oblivion,” p. 332. 39. Ibid., p. 337.

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in the context of work, family and marriage, and the social construction of female sexuality.

II. Women in the Social Arena: Work, Family and Marriage, and Sexuality Women and Work

The North Korean Constitution states that citizens have the right to work. All able-bodied citizens choose occupations in accordance with their wishes and skills and are provided with stable jobs and working conditions. Citizens work according to their abilities and are paid in accordance with the quantity and quality of their work.40

Until recently, all North Korean women have been expected to participate fully in the labor force. Apart from its ideological commitment to equality of the sexes, the government has viewed women’s employment as essential be- cause of the country’s labor shortage. It is said that women in North Korea are supposed to devote eight hours a day to work, eight hours to study (i.e., of juche and Kim Il Sungism), and eight hours to rest and sleep (although work- ing conditions are different for women with three or more children). Accord- ing to one defector, failing to secure employment within six months of high school graduation is a punishable offense.41

Despite the rhetoric, recent reports suggest that equity in the workplace has not materialized.42 Several issues highlight various inequities, particularly with regard to types of work, rates of pay, access to promotion, and the status of working women. Since 1972 legislation has existed on equal employment and equal pay, but women still earn significantly less than men in most indus- tries.43 There remains significant occupational segregation between the sexes. Women are concentrated in low-skilled labor and/or unpopular work. For in- stance, in the early 1970s, 70% of women’s employment was concentrated in light industries. According to Koo and Oh’s study on the lives of 27 female refugees, eight were low-skilled laborers employed in light industry, sales, or the service industry.44

40. Article 70, Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Pyong- yang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1998).

41. Choi Jin-yee, “A Study on Relevant Methodology,” p. 9. 42. A lack of females in managerial positions has been noted in some international aid agency

reports. The Catholic relief and development organization Caritas has recently called for improved representation of women at managerial levels in Caritas-funded programs, see Caritas, “Emer- gency Appeal for the Ongoing Food and Health Crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) for the Period April 2005 to March 2006,” Caritas Emergency Appeal Document (November 2005), Hong Kong, p. 9.

43. Shin, “Ideology and Gender Equality,” p. 94. 44. Koo and Oh, “Life and Self-consciousness,” pp. 311–13.

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Another factor affecting income has been access to and equity in promo- tion. In general, promotion is based on an examination system; the exams are administered at most workplaces every three years. Promotion and higher pay go to those that pass the exam. Compared to women, a much higher propor- tion of men sit for the exam.45 This suggests that a “glass ceiling” exists for many of the female workers of North Korea.

Married women and the return to the home. Since the 1980s, the gap between work force participation rates of single and married women has widened. It should be noted that, unlike other socialist countries, North Korea always had an unusually high percentage of housewives among its married women (for example, in the northern border city of Sinuiju, up to 70% of married women were estimated to be housewives).46 Various reasons have been suggested for this trend. Tradition still dictates that once married, a woman should stay at home to serve her husband and take care of her children.47 A related reason is that North Korean managers of enterprises continued to be reluctant to employ married women.48 Finally, while in most other communist countries women were encouraged to continue work after marriage, in North Korea the govern- ment did not appear to take issue with women who decided to quit their jobs to become full-time housewives after getting married.

From the mid-1980s, the shift from work to home became even more pro- nounced, with 60%–70% of married women quitting their jobs after marriage. Shin argues, however, that nearly half of these women are married and work in neighborhood work units where their participation in the work force is not of- ficially measured.49

Koo and Oh argue that the trend to leave formal employment at this time occurred because some women who married men holding senior positions found that they could manage economically to stay at home to look after the children. They cite one defector who says the following:

After the mid-1980s, there were increased numbers of women staying home after marriage. More and more women believed that there was no point graduating from university. Instead, many hoped to marry a well-qualified husband. Equality between women and men is applied only in the socialist revolutionary rhetoric—it bears no resemblance to practices in daily life.50

Since the famine, this trend has continued and women account for the ma- jority of those who have withdrawn from the official workforce to pursue other

45. Choi Jin-yee, “A Study on Relevant Methodology,” p. 10. 46. Koo and Oh, “Life and Self-consciousness,” p. 340. 47. Shin, “Ideology and Gender Equality,” p. 100. 48. Koo and Oh, “Life and Self-consciousness,” p. 338. 49. Shin, “Ideology and Gender Equality,” p. 90. 50. Koo and Oh, “Life and Self-consciousness,” p. 346.

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ways of securing food and money for survival. In particular, many women have decided to work from home or operate small businesses selling bread or home- grown vegetables in the local farmers’ markets. (The role of women in the informal economy is discussed in more detail below.)

Women and Family and Marriage Women as homemakers. As noted, North Korean women are officially equal in terms of work, education, and political representation; state authorities pro- vided women a range of social services (such as the child care measures noted above). The extent to which women have secured real equality in these areas is questionable. Moreover, women have remained subject to traditional gender role expectations.

Because of the persistence of the traditional domestic division of labor, North Korean women have remained the main performers of domestic tasks. Sharing housework between husband and wife is very uncommon. Moreover, Kim Il Sung’s promise of a technological revolution failed to materialize: mod- ern conveniences such as washing machines remain the property of a privi- leged few. Thus, many women suffer from the double burden of holding external employment and being responsible for the bulk of household chores. One female refugee said:

After marriage, women are slaves. Women have to obey their husbands and feed their families. While women are eating barley, they provide their husbands with white rice. Women wear their husbands’ old clothes, while they provide the husband with new clothes.51

It is interesting to note that some refugees make reference to the tradition- ally oppressive relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. Still, refugees have noted that on rare occasions an overly demanding mother-in- law might be criticized by a local branch of a women’s organization such as the Korean Democratic Women’s Union, in some cases leading to the mother- in-law’s permanent removal from the home.52

Family. Both in urban areas and in socialist cooperatives the nuclear family remains the norm. Park’s study of 165 defectors found that 77% of them were from nuclear families. Lee reports that extended families account for only 20% of all North Korean households; in these larger households, females tend to share the work.53

51. Ibid., p. 351. 52. Kim Kui-ok et al., How North Korean Women Live, p. 127. 53. Lee On-juk, “North Korea Women’s Life at Home,” p. 69; Park Hyun-sun, A Study on Con-

temporary Family, p. 208.

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No data are extant on family planning policy in North Korea. However, in 1974 Kim Il Sung gave a speech in which he declared that women should not have more than three children. Because or irrespective of this pronouncement, family size tends to be small, with most households consisting of between four and five people. By the 1980s, the fertility rate was in decline. The aver- age number of children born to women decreased from 6.5 in 1966 to 2.5 in 1988.54 The tendency to marry relatively late may be one factor affecting fer- tility rates. The legal age to marry is 18 for males and 17 for females. How- ever, marrying in one’s late twenties or early thirties has become increasingly common because of work and military service obligations.

Preference for sons is a cultural trait common to both South and North Korea. In addition, sons are more desired than daughters because they are ex- pected to provide for the parents in old age and because they continue the fam- ily line. In this context, in the early 1980s a wife’s inability to bear a son gave a husband grounds for divorce. According to one refugee: “Until the mid- 1970s, married women without sons did not even have the right to speak their opinion.”55 But the immense hardship associated with the recent famine has affected family size, and since the mid-1990s, many women have tended to prefer only one child. One North Korean woman claimed that, in this context of deprivation, daughters are easier to care for:

After our economic situation deteriorated, there were more families wanting to have only one child. There was even a saying: “If you only have one son, you will end up an orphan in your later life.” . . . A son is more burdensome for parents because they need to prepare a house for their son. Facing a famine, sons need more food than daughters do.56

Marriage and divorce. Most marriages seem to take place between people in the same rural cooperative or urban enterprise. Traditional arranged marriages, by and large, have disappeared in favor of “love matches”; nevertheless, chil- dren still seek their parents’ permission before getting married.57

Divorce by mutual consent has been prohibited since 1956. However, di- vorce from those spouses branded “reactionaries” or “bad elements” is granted comparatively easily to either gender and, in fact, is often strongly encouraged by the authorities. Overall, however, officials seem to discourage divorce. More- over, since court fees are quite expensive and courts are reluctant to accept lawsuits, it is extremely difficult to get a divorce.58 According to statistics pro-

54. Lee On-juk, “North Korea Women’s Life at Home,” p. 69. 55. Choi Jin-yee, “A Study on Relevant Methodology,” p. 11. 56. Ibid. 57. According to a book edited by the South Korean writers’ club MinJok 21, about 70% of mar-

riages are so-called “love” marriages (i.e., not arranged). MinJok, Bukhan Saramdeuleun Eoddeoke Salko Isseulkka? [How do North Koreans live?] (Seoul: Sen-In, 2004), p. 199.

58. Choi Myung-sook, “North Korean Women’s Life in the Household,” p. 12.

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vided by the North Korean Central Statistics Bureau (1990), the number of di- vorces granted annually between 1949 and 1987 ranged between a low of 3,021 in 1965 and a high of 4,763 in 1949.59 Some research indicates that a so- cial stigma is still attached to divorced women and unmarried women who have children, as shown in one defector’s testimony: “Once women are damaged [divorced], there is no future for them in North Korea.”60

After the famine, incidences of family breakdowns increased as family mem- bers separated to search for food or ways to earn money. Park’s study shows that among defectors reaching South Korea, 6.9% experienced a family breakdown prior to 1994. After 1994, 20% of defectors had left their husbands.61 The testi- monies of female defectors show that a considerable number of women have married and divorced more than once in order to survive, as this example shows:

Facing starvation, Choi crossed the muddy Tumen River to China. . . . She had little choice but to marry a Chinese man, as do thousands of North Korean women fleeing to China. . . . She left him [her second husband] but became involved with other men—again for survival. Her third husband was the most brutal of all, and when he started beating Choi’s three-year-old son, she took the child and fled.62

Women and Sexuality Published literature and personal testimonies offer differing interpretations of women and sexuality in North Korea. According to a report by KINU, women in the North have been denied sexual autonomy. Premarital and extra- marital relations are discouraged while sexual abstinence is encouraged. In this context, unmarried pregnant women generally seek abortions secretly, while some seek the financial assistance of the unborn child’s father.63 On the other hand, in a separate study, Choi argues that North Korean women do not have a particularly conservative view of their sexuality.64 One defector said that this is in part because of the “sexually depraved” behavior of the political leader- ship, particularly the use of so-called “pleasure groups” by Kim Jong Il.65

59. Ibid. 60. Kim and No, Life Experiences of North Korean Refugee Women in China, p. 73; Park Hyun-

sun, A Study on Contemporary Family; and Lim Sun-hee, Change in the Role and Consciousness, p. 12.

61. Park Hyun-sun, A Study on Contemporary Family, p. 210. 62. Cathy Hong, “North Korea: One Refugee’s Story: Poet Makes Hard Journey from Tragic

North to South,” Ms. Magazine (Summer 2004). 63. KINU, Whitepaper on Human Rights in North Korea, p. 174. 64. Choi Jin-yee, “A Study on Relevant Methodology,” p. 10. 65. There are various author accounts of how Kim Jong Il maintains so-called “pleasure

groups” consisting of teams of women that perform a range of services including sexual services and singing and dancing performances. See Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 15–20.

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In terms of sexual violence and harassment, no relevant legislation has been developed. Indeed, there has been no official acknowledgement that sexual harassment exists in North Korea.66 Because of the cultural value placed on women’s “purity,” most women who have been victims of sexual assault are reluctant to report it. Choi argues that notwithstanding the official stance, sex- ual violence and harassment against women have been widespread.67 A KINU report released in 2003 found that sexual harassment is widespread, and sex is regularly demanded in return for privileges such as party membership. This account describes how sex is sometimes demanded as a bribe: “Lee was caught on a train without a ticket but could not pay the penalty. She was taken to the railroad inspector’s home and sexually assaulted.”68

KINU also reports, however, that since the famine, strict sexual norms for women appear to have weakened. There are more unmarried pregnant women and higher rates of divorce and extramarital relations. Beginning in 2000, abor- tions for unmarried women have been carried out at city and university hospi- tals with the tacit approval of the authorities.69

Evidence also suggests that in recent years more women are engaged in street prostitution and have become the targets of sexual trafficking.70 Various testimonies of North Korean defectors note the rise of prostitution as many women in desperate circumstances proffer their bodies in return for food or money:

There are women who wear a lot of make-up and sell their bodies at market places or train stations. . . . North Korean women do not wear make-up, or they do so very lightly. So the make-up is like the tag of a sex worker. The women lure people who pass by.”71

Although the North Korean government does not officially tolerate the traf- ficking of women, since the food crisis, trafficking has significantly increased, particularly to China. This has involved kidnapping, violence, and luring women through intermediaries. Women are sold and re-sold as farm hands, res-

66. Lim Sun-hee, Change in the Role and Consciousness, pp. 53–54. 67. Choi Jin-yee, “A Study on Relevant Methodology,” p. 11. 68. KINU, Whitepaper on Human Rights in North Korea, p. 173. Also see Lankov, “North Ko-

rean Refugees in Northeast China.” 69. KINU, ibid., p. 174. 70. Many North Korean women are sold to Chinese husbands through Chinese and China-

based ethnic Korean brokers for prices estimated between 1,000 to 10,000 yuan ($120–$1,200). The entire amount goes only to these intermediaries. Yim Ul-ch’ul, “Yurit’ang Hanun T’albuk Yeiseong” [North Korean female refugees subjected to mistreatment], in Hangyere 21 (Korean Nation), September 9, 1999, (Seoul), �http://www.kinds.or.kr�. Also see testimonies in Cho Hyong-rae, “T’albuk Yoin Insin Maemae Kuksong” [The growth of the trade in North Korean women], Choseon Ilbo, January 12, 1999, p. 27.

71. Good Friends, Bukhan Saramdeuli Ryakihaneun Bukhan Ryaki [North Korean people speak out] (Seoul: Jungto Press, 2000), p. 132.

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taurant workers, servants of Chinese senior citizens, brides of bachelor farmers, or workers in the sex industry.72 One refugee shared the following experience:

I was helpless: I had no money, I didn’t speak Chinese, and I had my daughter to support. If you are a North Korean woman crossing the border, it’s almost impossible to survive without being abused or sold. It happens to almost all of us because they know we are vulnerable.73

Thus, sex is often the only way for women to manage to leave the country:

It is easier for women to get out of North Korea than men because at least they have their own bodies to sell. . . . They figure it is better to find a man, any man, than starve to death in North Korea.74

Women and Recent Economic Change A key question relates to how the opportunities and limitations created by state-provisioned child care and welfare services and the official promotion of female education and employment have affected women’s perception of them- selves. Have such state initiatives had a positive or negative impact on women’s perception of work and career? Some scholars argue that North Korean women are motivated to work both by economic necessity and by self-esteem because homemakers are not highly valued in North Korean society.75 One refugee reported that “it is much better to do paid work; otherwise I have to partici- pate in organizational activities. In the 1970s and 1980s, women thought that having a job was necessary for a woman to be a ‘good mother and wife’ by actively contributing to the revolution.”76

However, by the end of the 1980s a new trend had emerged with a signifi- cant increase in the number of married women leaving formal employment. By the 1990s, it appears that many of these “housewives” had begun to branch out into other private economic activities.77 The recent failure of the PDS sys- tem has affected the capacity of many men to support their families. Accord- ing to one female refugee, “In 1997–98, men became useless. They went to their jobs, but there was nothing to be done there, so they came back [home]. Meanwhile their wives went to distant places to trade and kept families going.”78

72. KINU, Whitepaper on Human Rights in North Korea, p. 173. 73. Young, a female defector cited in A. Faiola, “North Korean Women Find Life of Abuse

Waiting in China,” Washington Post, March 3, 2004, p. A20. 74. Barbara Demick, “Desperate North Korean Women Marry to Stay in China, but They Often

Enter a Life of Violence, Slavery,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 26, 2003, p. A10. 75. Koo and Oh, “Life and Self-consciousness,” p. 340. 76. Ibid., p. 346. 77. Lim Sun-hee, Change in the Role and Consciousness, p. 15; Andrei Lankov, “North Korea:

Market Forces Have Female Faces,” Asia Times Online, April 6, 2005, �http://www.atimes.com/ atimes/Korea/GD06Dg01.html�.

78. Lim Sun-hee, Change in the Role and Consciousness, p. 15.

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Thus, in many cases women have been left with the responsibility of feeding the family. In this context, compared to men, women have been more actively seeking ways to survive in the new environment, creating self-employment opportunities by working increasingly in the non-state economy. After visiting North Korea in 2004, Lankov observed that “men are left behind and capitalism is left to women.” He noted that:

The new North Korean capitalism of dirty marketplaces, charcoal trucks and badly dressed vendors with huge sacks of merchandise on their backs demonstrates one surprising feature: It has a distinctly female face. Women are overrepresented among the leaders of the growing post-Stalinist economy—at least on the lower level, among the market traders and small-time entrepreneurs.79

The central role of women in the current economy, both in urban and rural areas, has been acknowledged in reports by international aid development agencies. Various documents note the high female participation rates in the formal economy in industries such as sericulture, weaving, and textile mills, and also in a range of small cooperatives producing clothing, soft toys, and the like.80 However, it is in the informal economy, described variously as “sideline activities,” “micro-enterprises,” or “off-farm activities,” that reports suggest women have assumed a significant role. An International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) report notes how women have built on skills acquired in their traditional role as managers of household finances to increasingly take charge of a variety of credit-financed household income-earning activities. In response, IFAD developed household-oriented credit services to support these “off-farm activities,” with about 60% of loans going to female-headed house- holds. A recent IFAD report notes that loan recovery is near 100%, adding that the female recipients of loans have demonstrated considerable acumen in developing relatively complex, financially successful sideline businesses.81

Conclusion: Women in North Korea and in Other Communist States

It appears that the treatment of women by the North Korean leadership is consistent with the construction of gender in many other socialist systems. Of- ficially, socialist systems support gender equality: all socialist country consti- tutions state that men and women are equal and that it is illegal to discriminate based on sex, age, and so on. However, in reality, throughout the communist

79. Lankov, “North Korea: Market Forces Have Female Faces.” 80. U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Rationalizing of the Cottage Industry in

Pyongyang (February 1994). 81. IFAD, D.P.R.K. Crop and Livestock Rehabilitation Project (December 2001), �http://www.

ifad.org/lrkm/region/pi/kp_469.htm�, accessed March 5, 2006.

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world, progressive laws, policies, and political pronouncements mask the per- sistence of traditional patriarchal social values. These continue to inform em- ployment practices and attitudes toward the role of women in the home, long after the establishment of communism.82 In North Korea, women have also achieved some formal equality, while in practice gender inequality has been prevalent in both the workplace and family. However, the North Korean case differs from that in other socialist systems in two major respects.

First, in Eastern European socialist states, as Fodor claims, “Patriarchy was not altered or eliminated: it was merely forced underground (or into the private sphere of the family) by the communist rhetoric on women’s emancipation.”83

But in North Korea, patriarchy remained at the surface while the leadership cult gave patriarchal relations a significant boost, recasting the whole nation in line with traditional family structures. The analogy of the father has been used consistently to personalize the role of the leader and the analogy of children to personify the people. Women’s dependence on the state for food and social ser- vices reinforced this patriarchal system. For example, it is frequently reported that prior to eating meals, children are expected to look upon a portrait of “Father” Kim Il Sung and give thanks. The political system thus directly per- petuates gender subordination.

This phenomenon is related to the degree to which the citizenry was iso- lated and subjected to rigid social control policies. These controls effectively stamped out the possibility of life independent of the state. As Cotton points out, in East Asian countries with Confucian cultures, and in North Korea in particular, the state has dominated the private sphere. Thus, this sphere has not been so much separated from the state as an extension of its domain, albeit a domain likely to generate space where anti-regime contestation can take place.84

Indeed, in the North Korean context where the state’s power is exceptionally pervasive, it is debatable whether the term “private” can be applied to any social phenomena.

A second feature distinguishing the North Korean case from Eastern Euro- pean communist states has emerged since the famine and economic crisis. Some researchers who studied the transition of communist regimes to market econ- omies in Central and Eastern Europe have argued that women tend to become

82. See, for example, Marian Adnanes, “Youth and Gender in Post-Communist Bulgaria,” Journal of Youth Studies 4:1 (2000), pp. 25–40; Jacqueline Heinen, “Public/Private: Gender-social and Political Citizenship in Eastern Europe,” Theory and Society 26:4 (1997), pp. 577–97; Jacqui True, “Expanding Markets and Marketing Gender: The Integration of the Post-socialist Czech Re- public,” Review of International Political Economy 6:3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 360–89.

83. Eva Fodor, “The State Socialist Emancipation Project: Gender Inequality in Workplace Authority in Hungary and Austria,” Signs 29:3 (2004), p. 787.

84. James Cotton, “Civil Society in the Political Transition of North Korea,” Korea and World Affairs 16:2 (Summer 1992), pp. 319–37.

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more marginalized during such transitions. Scholars have also asserted that gender inequalities are being reproduced under the new regimes.85 Although women in North Korea have suffered immeasurably from hunger and sexual violence and abuse, many of them—unlike in other communist systems—have become empowered in the current process of transition. In a situation where the PDS has collapsed and many men are not able to provide for their families, women have managed to initiate small-scale entrepreneurial activities such as producing, procuring, and selling food and goods through an ever-expanding network of local markets.

Some scholars argue that the new entrepreneurialism of North Korean women has translated into a notable improvement in the economic strength and status of women over the past 10 years.86 It is likely that while the work of many housewives was confined to the home, their domestic status remained subordi- nate to that of the household head. New ventures outside the home may have translated into improved social standing. Moreover, evidence suggests that at the very least this new role in the informal economy has effected a change in women’s economic power. Compared to the 1960s and 1970s, separation and divorce rates are now relatively high; increasingly, women are reported to be reluctant to marry or have children. Lim argues that greater economic inde- pendence has allowed many women to leave violent or unfaithful husbands.87

It is not yet clear whether this is a sign of a deeper, more permanent shift in the role and status of women.

North Korea is still in the throes of economic and social, if not political, transition. Such transition has perceptibly changed the role and status of women. In particular, women have become active players in emerging market pro- cesses centered on local markets; this has created new opportunities for them and new challenges for those who seek to protect traditional gender role expec- tations, including the state. How the spread of capitalist relations and changes in the social position of women in the long run will affect social relations—and potentially the legitimacy of the regime—warrants significant further research.

85. Chris Corrin, ed., Superwomen and the Double Burden: Women’s Experience of Change in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (London: Scarlet Press, 1992); Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds., Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (London: Routledge, 1993); Barbara Einhorn, ed., Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender, and Women’s Movements in East Central Europe (London: Verso, 1993).

86. Lim Sun-hee, Change in the Role and Consciousness, pp. 94–95. 87. Ibid., p. 95.

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