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19%, vå. 73, No. 4, 258-302

ALTRUISM—AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPT AND A

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE I

DENNIS L. KREBS

Harvard University

Literature relating to altruism is reviewed. It is suggested that the study of altruism is important at three levels: as it relates to the main goal of socialization, to a core attribute of personality, and to theories concerned with human nature. The concept of altruism is examined. Independent variables associated with altruism are organized in a 2 X 4 framework on the basis of the source of experimental measurement and level of generality. Characteristics of the benefactor and characteristics of the recipient are categorized as state variables, trait variables, social roles and demographic attributes, and characteristics influenccd by social norms. Research at each level is critically reviewed. Positive and negative affective states, and states induced by the observation of models are found to influence the altruism of benefactors; and dependency and interpersonal attractiveness are found to influence the altruism-eliciting capacity of recipients. Research relevant to personality traits is criticized. Effects are found for sex, age, ordinal position, social class, and nationality in relation to benefactors, and for friendship status, ingroup affiliation, and social class in relation to recipients. The normative level of analysis is criticized.

278 DENNIS L. KREBS

ALTRUISM 259

In 1956 Louis J. Budd reviewed the history of a "forgotten aspect of social thought" in America. He concluded that although concern with altruism had "threatened to become a fad" in the 1890's, it had quickly died away. Of late, though, there has been a renewed interest in altruism—less, however, as a social panacea or religious ideal, and more as an aspect of behavior worthy of scientific investigation.

It is not difficult to see why altruism has captured the interest of social scientists. In view of its practical and theoretical importance, it may well be wondered why the study of altruism has only recently gained popularity. As the anthropologist Bohannan (1963) pointed out, the most basic tenet of all major religions of the world is that "unselfishness is the primary virtue and that selfishness lies at the root of the world's ills [p. 336] But altruism is of interest for reasons other than its status as a virtue or its role in the main-

1 The author appreciatively acknowledges the help and inspiration supplied by Judith Anne Krebs and Robert Rosenthal, both of whom worked overtime in his behalf. The critical comments of Terence D. Creighton at' the University of British Columbia are also acknowledged.

Requests for reprints should be addressed to Dennis L. Krel)S, Department of Social Relations, William James Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusctts 02138.

tenance of the social system. The study of altruism is important at at least three distinct (yet interrelated) levels.

At the first level, it supplies information about a set of behavior that constitutes the central goal of early socialization. As pointed out by Anna Freud (1963) :

We know that the child acts throughout the period of development above described [from birth to age five] as if there was nothing more important than the gratifying of his own pleasures and fulfilling of his powerful instincts, whereas education proceeds as if the prevention of these objects was its most important task [p. 101].

At the second level, altruism is important as a personality attribute. People who are considered altruistic are reacted to differently from those who are considered selfish. Because the way people act is not always a veridical representation of the way they feel, the attribution of altruism poses a particularly difficult problem for self-theory and the study of person-perception.

Finally, the study of altruism raises important questions about the ability of several influential theories to account for the apparently altruistic aspects of general human behavior. Reinforcement theory, psychoanalytic theory, and the theory of evolution seem to suggest that human behavior is essentially egoistic. Yet, behavior that seems quite altruistic is apparent in everyday life.

The bulk of research on altruism has not attempted to establish the existence of altruism. The problems associated with the identification of altruism, however, have not escaped researchers. An examination of the contribution of the study of altruism to the understanding of social behavior, personality, and human nature must orient itself around the ways investigators have dealt with the specification of the phenomenon.

Altruism as a Social Behavior

Most behavioral research has skirted the problem associated with the specification of altruism by employing operational definitions. It has examined antecedents of behavior that seemed altruistic, and assumed that motivations were congruent. Although the antecedents of operations with undefined motivational bases can be elucidated, it is important to make sure that the conclusions that are drawn about them do not relate back to the motivation implied by the category of behavior in question. Motivational specification is particularly important in relation to a moral behavior such as altruism. As Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1964), and others have demonstrated, it is more the intention behind an act than its consequences that determines its moral value.

Fortunately, due to the constraints of experimental situations, the range of ulterior motives in laboratory studies is usually limited and the motivation behind the behavior in question quite apparent. It must be realized, however, that although terms such as prosocial behavior (Bandura & Walters, 1963), helping behavior (Berkowitz, 1967), volunteering (Rosenbaum, 1956), gift-giving (Blake & Rosenbaum, 1955), sharing (Staub & Sherk, in press), and aiding (Midlarsky, 1968b) all imply self-sacrificial other-directed behavior, they do not establish it.

Altruism as a Personality Attribute

While researchers concerned with the antecedents of altruistic behavior have generally chosen to define altruism operationally, investigators concerned with altruism as a personality attribute have usually sought a definition in the attributional processes of average people. It could, of course, be argued that the layman's implicit definition of altruism is of little concern to the social scientist. It must be realized, though, that whatever errors the layman may make in his attribution of altruism in specific situations, the category of altruism is what he thinks it is—it has no existence outside of the consensual agreements of people (cf. Bruner, 1958) ; and it is the layman's definition that determines his reactions.

Although new research may supply a more meaningful and precise definition of altruism, it is interesting to note that social scientists have generally employed everyday definitions. Leeds (1963), for example, defined altruism on the basis of the same three criteria that Heider (1958) identified as determinants of the attributions of laymen. According to Leeds (1963), an altruistic act (a) is an end in itself; it is not directed at gain, (b) is emitted voluntarily, and (c) does good. Heider's (1958) treatment of the determinants of gratitude (where gratitude is the result of the attribution of altruism) mirrors Leeds' (1963) definitional outline:

We do not feel grateful to a person who helps us [Leeds' point c] fortuitously [a] or because he was forced to do so [b], or because he was obliged to do so [b]. Gratitude is determined by the will, the intention of the benefactor [p. 265].

Several recent studies have supported Heider's (1958) propositions and Leeds' (1963) assumptions. Tesser, Gatewood, and Driver (1968), for example, found that undergraduates thought they would feel more gratitude when the benefit they received was intentional, when it was valuable, and when it cost the benefactor a great deal. Goranson and Berkowitz (1966), Frisch and Greenberg (1968), Lerner and Lichtman (1968), and Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes (1968) found that help was most liable to be reciprocated (and, by implication, considered altruistic) when it was perceived as voluntary and intentional. Brehm and Cole (1966), Kiesler (1966), and Schopler and Thompson (1968) demonstrated that inappropriate favors (favors whose intentions were in doubt) elicited less help than appropriate favors. When the legitimacy of apparent altruism is questioned, reciprocity is less likely to prevail.

Although research on attribution of altruism has elucidated some common principles of judgment, it has not supplied any information about the validity of common attributions. It has classically been the problems associated with the validity of judgments of altruism, and the existence of altruism itself, that have concerned thinkers—it has seemed less important to know why judgments are made than whether they are correct.

Altruism as a Part of Human Nature—its Challenge to Grand Theories

In relation to the theory of reinforcement, psychoanalysis, and the theory of evolution, the existence of behavior that seems altruistic has created problems, Critics have asked, for example, how behavior that sacrifices rewards can be consistent with the principle of reinforcement. Intrinsic to the challenge that the existence of altruism presents to antithetical theoretical positions is the challenge that such positions present to the existence of altruism itself.

Altruism in the theory of reinforcement. The problem of the place of reinforcement in altruistic behavior really involves two often confused questions. The first asks whether self-sacrificial behavior can continue in the absence of positive reinforcement. The second asks whether the average person includes behavior that benefits another yet gains rewards in his category of altruism. The first question cannot be answered in the form in which it stands—it requires proof of the null hypothesis. The second question is a matter of attribution.

Although no research has been reported which is directly relevant to the attribution of altruism in situations of varying rewards, some research on moral judgment seems relevant. Kohlberg (in press) outlined three great stages in the development of moral judgment. At the least mature stage (Stage 1) judgments are made on the basis of the hedonic consequences of an act (whether it elicits reward or punishment from external sources) . At the second stage, morality is seen as a function of the approval and disapproval of others. And at the third stage it is judged in relation to internal standards. Inasmuch as altruistic behavior is moral behavior, the attribution of altruism should pass through the three qualitatively different stages of moral development, and mature judgments of altruism should be based on internal standards of reciprocity and justice.

Reinforcement theorists have not generally concerned themselves with the attribution of altruism. They have, rather, attempted to demonstrate that although specific rewards do not always follow altruistic responses, altruistic behavior can still be a function of reinforcement.

In a study with Paskel (reported by Aronfreed, 1968), Aronfreed found that children who were exposed to expressions of joy (conditioned stimulus) at the same time as they were hugged (unconditioned stimulus) and experienced positive affect (unconditioned response) sacrificed candy in order to elicit expressions of joy (which in turn evoked reinforcing positive affect). Once learned, it was expected that internal representation of expressive signs in the recipient would be enough to reinforce altruistic responses. Aronfreed's position implies that altruism involves a Cyrano de Bergerac type of sacrifice.

Goldiamond (1968) identified three ways by which behavior that seems to receive no immediate gains can be perpetuated. In the first place, even though particular responses are not rewarded, the net gains of the behavioral strategy may ultimately be maximal. Second, the reinforcer, as in the case of masochism, may be subtle. And finally, the behavior may endure in the absence of reinforcement because the original program of reinforcement rendered it resistant to extinction.

Altruism in Psychoanalytic theory. Although the challenge that altruism has presented to reinforcement theory is more serious than its challenge to psychoanalysis, Freud's contention that children are basically selfish, iddriven animals has had repercussions. As early as 1929, Wodehouse objected to

a certain doctrine which, ostensibly connected with [Freud I, does seem to be bringing real danger into educational psychology. It comes often in a broad and vague form which needs a broad and vague name, and I will call it the doctrine of Natural Selfishness [p. 39].

Partially as a result of psychoanalytic theory's inability to explain altruistic behavior and other adaptive undefensive behavior (Maddi, 1968), new developments tended to stress adaptations of the ego (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Murray, 1938; Sullivan, 1953; White, 1963). Deemphasis on id-driven behavior served to soften the theory's insistence on natural egoism.

Altruism in the theory of evolution—theoretical arguments and animal research. While the reaction to the egoistic assumptions of psychoanalysis was largely theoretical, the reaction to the apparent egoism of the theory of evolution came from both theoretical and empirical sources. Theoreticians attempted to show that the theory of evolution did not propose, or even imply, the existence of innate egoism; and empiricists attempted to demonstrate that infrahumans are capable of altruism.

Holmes (1945) argued against the popular egoistic interpretation of Darwinian theory and insisted that altruistic instincts were as basic as egoistic instincts. Derived from "instincts subsidiary to the basic function of reproduction [p. 111]," he saw the function of altruism as the preservation of the species, even at the cost of individual lives.

Campbell (1965) argued against the prevalence of "skin-surface hedonism" and, on the basis of research demonstrating ingroup solidarity and sacrifice in the face of outgroup threat, suggested that altruistic motives are not only a function of sociocultural evolution (are acquired), but also have a basis in biological evolution (are innate). Altruism, he suggested, is likely to have genetic determinants because of the survival value of ingroup identification and outgroup hostility: "The tremendous survival value of being social makes innate social motives as likely on a priori grounds as self-centered ones [p. 3011 ." Both Holmes (1945) and Campbell (1965) suggested that egoism, whose aim is the survival of the individual, and altruism, whose aim is the survival of the group, are in conflict, and that the conflict offers the optimal evolutionary compromise.

While the arguments of theoreticians seem cogent (and, in fact, are supported by a close reading of Darwin) the arguments of empiricists have not fared so well. Empiricists have argued that the demonstration of a phylogenetic increase in altruism would implicitly support the likelihood of innate altruism in man. With this in mind, researchers attempted to demonstrate the existence of altruism in infrahumans.

Starting low on the phylogenetic scale, Rice and Gainer (1962) found that albino rats were more likely to press a bar when it lowered a struggling rat than when it lowered a styrofoam block. Rice (1965) also found that rats (but not guinea pigs) would press a bar to remove a companion from a tank of water. The attribution of altruism in these cases, though, can be questioned. It is posSible that the rat's reaction was a function of the presence of another rat or the noxiousness of the screams of the distressed rats. The latter suggestion received support from a study by Lavery and Foley (1963), who found that rats which were exposed to white noise made more noise-terminating bar-presses than rats exposed to the recorded squeals of other rats. The fact that more bar-presses were elicited in the white-noise condition suggests that the white noise was more noxious than recorded squeals, and that the "altruism" of the Rice and Gainer (1962) and Rice (1965) studies was simply a reaction to a noxious stimulus.

More doubt was placed on the existence of altruism in the albino rat by another study by Rice (1964). Rats pressed a bar less when it served to terminate a companion's shock than when it did not. Rats which were exposed to a shocked companion crouched in fear at the other side of their cages. A further finding showed that rats failed to press a bar to terminate the recorded squeals of other rats, as reported by Lavery and Foley (1963). All considered then, no real support for the existence of altruism in rats has been supplied.

More support for the existence of altruism in infrahumans, though, has appeared in relation to higher forms of animals. Summarizing research on primates, Hebb and Thompson (1954) suggested that "there is definite evidence in other animals of a phylogenetic development of something we call altruism, defined as intrinsically motivated concern for others [p. 744] ." Unfortunately, though, evidence for altruism came from mainly anecdotal sources. In one of the only studies on altruism in primates, Nissen and Crawford (1936) found that two of six preadolescent chimpanzees sometimes gave food, and tokens which could be exchanged for food, to chimps in adjoining cages. The chimpanzees tended, though, to give only their least preferred food, and to give only when food was solicited. Although solicited giving (and prostitution) in wild chimps is common (Yerkes & Yerkes, 1935), it is possible that the small amount of unsolicited giving was an experimenter effect —a result of modeling. Nissen and Crawford (1936) reported, in fact, that experimenters were able to facilitate unsolicited food passing.

It is very difficult to draw any conclusions from comparative research. Infrahuman animals do perform acts which benefit other animals, but the reasons behind these acts are almost as ambiguous as those behind the behavior of humans. Although the existence of genetic or biochemical determinants of altruism is a fascinating possibility, it must remain only that until further evidence appears.

In summary, the study of altruism is important at three conceptually distinct levels, relating to behavior, personality, and human nature. These levels are interrelated—judgments about human nature are made on the basis of representative personalities, and personalities are determined by samples of behavior. The study of altruism is particularly important to the understanding and implementation of socialization practices. It is also significant to person-perception and selftheory as a core personality attribute. And finally, it is important because it has stimulated examination and change in several important theoretical positions.

The question of the definition of altruism, and the related question of whether altruism exists, have posed difficult problems. Behavioral researchers have generally avoided the definitional issue, which involves establishing the intention behind apparently selfsacrificial other-oriented acts, by employing operational definitions. Investigators concerned with altruism as a personality characteristic have generally dealt with the definitional issue by attempting to determine the principles which underlie the attribution of altruism. They have not, though, attempted to determine whether the altruism that was attributed actually met the criteria of attribution. Finally, research has been conducted and theoretical positions amended in order to accommodate altruistic behavior. Positions which seemed to pose challenges to the existence of altruism have come to accept the fact that altruistic behavior occurs (within the definitional constraints of the theory in question), and have set out to explain it.

All in all, though, the definitional problem, which involves the status of altruism as a dependent variable, has attracted very little attention from recent researchers. They have generally been content to assume that behavior that seems altruistic is altruistic, and to concern themselves with its determinants. It is to determinants and correlates of apparent altruism, then, that a review of the literature must turn.

AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH ALTRUISM

In the past few years researchers on altruism have studied so many variables that an integrated perspective is already difficult. It seems possible, however, to attain some integrative clarity by ordering the variables along two dimensions. To begin with, the prototypical altruistic situation involves someone who gives (a benefactor), and someone who receives (a recipient). In some cases, characteristics of the benefactor affect altruism, and in other cases it is characteristics of the recipient. Independent variables, then, can be divided into those which relate to characteristics of the benefactor, and those which relate to characteristics of the recipient. It is, of course, true that all variables have an ultimate effect on the benefactor, but the effect is often achieved by varying characteristics of recipients. The first dimension of classification, then, separates variables which relate to the characteristics of benefactors that cause or correlate with altruism from the altruism-eliciting characteristics of recipients.

Independent variables can also be classified according to their level of generality. Research on altruism has manipulated independent vari-

ables at four more or less distinct levels of generality. The first level involves temporary psychological states, such as those that accompany experiences of success, failure, dependency, interpersonal attraction, and the observation of models. Most of the research on altruism relates to state variables, probably because they are the easiest to manipulate in laboratory experiments. Independent variables of the state type are largely situational. They have an immediate, temporary, and relatively limited effect, and they usually say little about the nature of the people whom they affect.

The second level of generality involves personality traits. Although states and traits may well interrelate, trait variables such as cyclothymia, need for approval, and conservatism refer to more general and lasting attributes of people. In some cases, traits seem to correspond to the characteristic states of people. Studies which examine trait variables are usually less manipulatively experimental than studies which examine state variables. They generally correlate rating-scale or questionnaire-derived measures of personality traits with an index of altruism.

At the third level—that which involves social roles and demographic variables such as social class, age, and sex—the level of generality is even greater. Social roles and demographic variables differ from trait variables because they are more general, permanent, and basically characteristic. Social roles, of course, often relate to personality traits and psychological states. Women and children, for example, are expected to react differently from men and adults.

The final level, which deals with social norms, is the most general of the four. Norms such as the norm of social responsibility and the norm of reciprocity, if not universal (Gouldner, 1960), affect most people in most cultures. In fact, it could be argued that internalized social norms are so general that they supply no information about the variance in incidences of altruism. Their effect may only be of interest as it relates to temporary states, personality traits, and general social roles. Several researchers, however, have attributed variations in altruism to the effect of social norms. The problems presented by the normative approach will be examined more closely when related research is reviewed.

A classificatory framework that involves the interaction between two sets of criteria has been outlined. Table 1 presents the resulting eight categories and an outline of the variables within the categories that have been examined.

ALTRUISM AS A FUNCTION OF TEMPORARY

STATES OF THE BENEFACTOR

The preponderance of research on altruism has manipulated situational variables which induce states in benefactors that mediate altruistic responses. The state may be a simple affective state, or a cognitive state which relates to particular response dispositions.

Research which has manipulated situational variables and their corresponding psychological states can be divided into three categories. The first two relate to affective states, and the third relates to cognitive states induced by the observation of models. Positive states have been created by supplying experiences which involve success and the perception of competence. Negative states have been created by supplying experiences which involve failure, unintentional harm to another, and acts of transgression. Finally, states have been induced by the presentation of altruistic models. Table 2 contains an outline of research which has manipulated positive and negative affective states.

Positive States of the Benefactor

Four studies have tested the effect of experiences of success and competence on altruism. Berkowitz and Conner (1966) tested the hypothesis that success increases the salience of the social responsibility norm, which leads to altruism toward dependent others. They found that success on a simple task resulted in greater effort on behalf of a highly dependent peer than did failure or no experience at all. Success did not result in more helping for others of low dependency.

The Berkowitz and Conner (1966) study used undergraduates. A later study by Staub ( 1968) suggested that there may be developmental differences in reactions to success and failure. Although fifth-grade children tended to leave more candy for a hypothetical other after they succeeded (versus failed or did average) on a bowling game task, fourth-grade children left more after they failed. The author suggested that a "norm of deserving" motivated the fourth graders, but that the fifth graders were motivated by "norms or standards or values directly related to sharing." No reason was given, though, why the two norms should differentially affect the two particular age groups in question. The additional finding that children who saw themselves as having internal control over their environment shared more after success than those who felt externally controlled suggests that perceived competence is related to sharing.

A relationship between competence and altruism was found by Midlarsky (1968a) . Subjects who were told that they adapted well to electric shock (high competence) took more shocks for another than those who were told they adapted poorly. Unfortunately, the shocks were not of equal intensity across conditions. A later study by Kazdin and Bryan,[footnoteRef:1]though, which controlled for the cost of helping, found essentially the same thing. Subjects who were told they were highly competent on tasks which were both relevant and irrelevant to the dependent variable offered to donate more blood than those who were told they were incompetent. The notion that a temporary state mediated the altruism was supported by the fact that very few volunteers followed through with their commitment to give blood. Once they had a chance to recover from the positive experience, it would appear, their altruistic inclinations decreased. (It is, of course, possible that some subjects generalized their perceived competence to getting rid of the solicitor, with no intention of ever giving blood.) [1: Kazdin, A. E., & Bryan, J. H. Competence and volunteering. Unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University, 1968.]

Some naturalistic reports relating to reactions to disasters (e.g., Form & Nosow, 1958; Torrance & Ziller, 1957) suggest that observers who perceive themselves as competent in emergency situations help more than

TABLE 2

STUDIES WHICH EXAMINED THE EFFECT or AFFECTIVE STATES OE THE BENEFACTOR ON ALTRUISM

Positive states of the benefactor

Negative states of the benefactor

Note.—Abbreviations are : HS = high school student; CS — college student. 8 Age of first-grade children estimated at 6, etc. b Sex constituted a variable.

those who do not. Competence in disasters, though, is different from most experimentally manipulated competence. In experiments, the experience of success seems to increase selfesteem, which leads to increased positive affect and altruism. In disaster situations, however, it would seem that it is the implicit role requirements associated with competence, especially when the competence is the result of special training, that mediate helping behavior.

In summary, although none of the relevant experiments supplied unequivocal evidence, they all found indications that altruistic responses on behalf of dependent others are more probable after success than after failure, or after a neutral experience.

Negative States of the Benefactor

Of the studies that compared the effects of success and failure on altruism, only one (Staub, 1968) found a positive relationship between failure and altruism, for fourth-grade children, and that relationship reversed itself in the fifth grade. Other studies, though, have found that failure which has a particular consequence—harm to another—leads to altruistic responses. Darlington and Macker (1966), for example, found that failure to complete a pencil-and-paper task correctly resulted in more agreement to give blood when the failure hurt a helpful other than when it did not. The findings were interpreted as evidence for displacement of guilt-produced altruism. Because it was only after the third of three appeals for blood that any difference was found, and because 13 subjects were discarded, the results of the study must be viewed with caution. Moreover, a later study (Rawlings, 1968) found that the observation of a person receiving harm is enough in itself to induce altruism. Although subjects whose errors on a task caused their partners to receive shocks delivered reciprocal shocks of short duration to a third person (and, therefore longer duration to themselves), reciprocal shocks of short duration were also given when they only observed their partners getting shocked.

A study by Krebs and Baer [footnoteRef:2] compared [2: Krebs, D. L., & Baer, R. The effect of perceived competence and unintentional help and harm to]

the effect that experiences of success, failure, and helping and harming another had on charitable behavior. Altruism was greatest after failure which harmed another, and least after success which benefited another. There was no difference between the straight success and failure conditions. The findings were interpreted as support for a self-concept equilibrium model which suggests that people whose self-images are unrepresentatively low are likely to seize an opportunity to behaviorally reassert a more favorable selfdefinition. Unrepresentatively high self-images, on the other hand, are not maximized.

In the Krebs and Baer (see Footnote 3) study, the success and failure of the potential benefactor had a corresponding effect on his partner, and the altruism was directed to a charitable cause. Studies by Lerner and his associates demonstrated that partner-oriented altruism occurs in situations where success for self results in failure for another. Subjects who drew a slip of paper that assigned them to a control condition and their partner to a shock condition (fates interdependent) were more prone to comfort the other and volunteer to take his place than subjects who determined only their own fate (fates independent; Lerner and Matthews, 1967) or subjects whose fates were determined by the experimenter (Lerner 4 ).

Other studies that did not involve success and failure have supplied further support for the notion of reparative altruism. Two studies investigated the effect of compliant and unintentional harm-doing on altruism. Carlsmith and Gross (1969) found that subjects in a Milgram (1963) type of situation who delivered shocks to another were more likely to volunteer to support a humanitarian project than those who did not shock another. Freedman, Wallington, and Bless (1967, Experiment 2) found that subjects who knocked over a pile of index cards were more willing to volunteer for an experiment to help another than those who did not, providing that the solicitor was not the owner

another on altruism. Paper submitted for publication.

4 Lerner, M. S. The effect of a negative outcome on cognitions of responsibility and attraction. Unpublished manuscript, University of Kentucky, 1968,.

of the index cards. In a similar situation (Experiment 3), subjects who harmed another were more likely to volunteer to help him if they did not expect to meet him than if they did. Although harm-doing elicited altruism, it was not oriented directly toward its victim.

The Darlington and Macker (1966), Krebs and Baer (see Footnote 3), Carlsmith and Gross (1969), and Freedman et al. (1967) studies suggest that reparative altruistic behavior relieves an unpleasant negative state associated with lowered self-esteem by supplying a situation in which a wrong can be righted and self-esteem elevated. The Rawlings (1968) and Lerner and Matthews (1967) studies, though, lend themselves to a slightly different interpretation. It may be that harming another creates a feeling of guilt, which results in expiative self-punitive responses. In cases where altruism was directed toward the expiation of guilt it would be expected that (a) private transgressions would lead to expiative responses, and (b) self-punitive expiation would be preferred to nonpunitive reparation. These predictions do not follow from a reparative self-esteem model because the function of altruism is to reassert a new self-definition, with no necessity for pain.

Although it is possible that transgression elicits reparative responses in some situations by some people, and expiative responses in other situations by other people, it seems that the altruistic responses in most of the relevant studies were of the reparative nature. Freedman et al. (1967, Experiment 1), for example, failed to find, as expected, that subjects who lied about their knowledge of an experiment chose the more unpleasant of two other experiments. And Berscheid and Walster (1967) found that harm-doers were most likely to compensate their victims when they could make exact reparation. Female members of church auxiliaries who caused their partners to lose needed books of green stamps subsequently awarded bonuses to them if the bonuses were neither insufficient nor excessive relative to the original loss. The behavior of the church ladies, in the experiment at least, hardly seemed self-punitively expiative.

There is one study, though, that lends itself to an expiation interpretation. If guilt is relieved by punishment, then it can be predicted that punished responses are less likely to extinguish than responses that are not punished. This prediction was partially supported by Epstein and Hornstein (1969). They found that selfish behavior toward a disliked other (pressing a lever which maximized chances of gaining ten cents, while delivering an electric shock to another) increased, and altruistic behavior decreased, when selfish behavior was punished by a third person. Due to the fact that selfish behavior toward a liked other decreased after punishment, the generality of the findings is limited.

Two final studies suggest that private transgressions are not as likely to lead to altruistic reparation as public transgressions. Wallace and Sadalla (1966) found that subjects who broke an expensive machine were more likely to volunteer for a painful experiment than those who did not, but only if their transgression was discovered. Silverman (1967) failed to find a higher incidence of volunteering from children who cheated on a task but did not consider themselves caught than from those who did not cheat.

In summary, many studies have supported the notion that public transgression, whether intentional or unintentional, whether immoral or only situationally unfortunate, leads to reparative altruism. Reparative altruism would seem to alleviate a negative state associated with lowered self-esteem. When amends cannot be made to the victim, reparative responses are generalized to others; in fact, in some situations reparative responses are made only if they can be directed toward a third party.

States Induced by the Observation of Altruistic Models

The observation of models, according to Bandura and Walters (1963), affects behavior in two distinct ways: by inducing the acquisition of long-term behavioral dispositions, and by inducing the performance of imitative behavior. The acquisition of response dispositions, which, in relation to moral behavior, is referred to as internalization, forms the basis of behavioral analogues in which models correspond to parents, and modeling effects are thought to lead to long-range changes in personality. Performance, on the other hand, refers to situation-specific behavior that occurs as the result of the induction of temporary states. Although most of the research on modeling relates to the performance of altruistic behavior, much of it is interpreted as evidence for the internalization of altruistic dispositions. It is, of course, difficult to sort out acquisition and performance effects in one-shot laboratory experiments, but to draw conclusions about the development of personality traits on the basis of situational conformity is clearly unwarranted. Before conclusions can be drawn about the acquisition of behavioral dispositions, two criteria should be met: (a) The behavior in question should be general to situations other than that in which it was elicited, and (b) it should be relatively enduring. Because the preponderance of studies on modeling have failed to meet the two criteria of internalization, they seem best interpreted in relation to parameters of performance, as a function of temporary states. This is not to say that they should be considered irrelevant to socialization, but only to suggest that they have not established that modeling produces longterm personality changes; or even that it would, on a prolonged basis.

Although the modeling approach has encouraged research efforts, it has generally failed to supply explanations for modeling effects. The label modeling has been used to explain modeling effects, but modeling, like imitation, merely describes a sequence of congruent actions—it does not explain it. Before any real explanatory power is achieved, the reasons why models induce imitative behavior must be elucidated; and these reasons may well vary across situations.

A survey of the studies on modeling suggests that the performance of altruistic behavior may be based on one of several conceptually distinct aspects of modeling. An attempt will be made to sort out the aspects of modeling situations that elicit modeling effects by organizing the relevant studies in terms of what seems to be their most appropriate explanatory base.

At the most elementary level, models make behavioral alternatives salient: They draw attention to particular courses of action, and increase the salience of social norms. Second, they supply information about what is appropriate in various situations by setting an example, by helping to create a normative standard, and by helping to supply a definition of the situation. Third, models supply information about the consequences of courses of action. Although the three aspects of the modeling situation are conceptually distinct, they are not, in most cases, unrelated. A rough hierarchical relationship, in fact, seems to exist between them, with the third subsuming the second, and the second subsuming the first. Although models who make behavioral alternatives salient need not supply information about what is appropriate, nor need they supply information about behavioral consequences, models who supply information about behavioral consequences usually supply information about what is appropriate, and they usually make a course of action salient. Studies which do not unequivocally supply information about appropriateness seem most properly reviewed in the first category, and studies in which the perception of consequences is in doubt are reviewed in the second. Table 3 contains an outline of studies on modeling which fall in the three categories.

Modeling as a Function of the Increased Salience of Behavioral Alternatives and Social

Norms

A series of three naturalistic experiments by Bryan and Test (1967) demonstrated that observation of helpful and charitable models elicits congruent altruistic behavior. In the first experiment, motorists were more likely to stop to help a lady fix a flat tire if they drove past a model helping a confederate fix a flat than if they did not. Two other experiments found that shoppers contributed more to a Salvation Army kettle in the 20 seconds or half minute after a model gave than in the 20 seconds or half minute before he gave. Although the most parsimonious interpretation for these findings would seem to relate to the increased salinence of the altruistic behavioral alternative, Bryan and Test (1967) offered two other interpretations. The first suggested that the effects were due to the information that was supplied about the pleasant consequences of helping, and the second suggested that they were due to a comparison between observer and model, which resulted in shame. The first interpretation does not seem tenable in the flat-tire situation, where the consequence of helping was hard work (unless of course those who stopped had a pick-up in mind). The second interpretation runs into some difficulty in all three experiments due to the fact that most of the shoppers and motorists did not act altruistically. Moreover, the sight of the Salvation Army solicitor in itself would seem to be enough to elicit shame in those who were prone to react with shame. The more conservative interpretation, therefore, seems justified.

In another study, Test and Bryan (in press) compared the effect of three modeling situations on helping behavior. They found that potential benefactors helped a stooge more after they observed a generous model, and after they were helped themselves than after they were exposed to an indifferent model or to no model at all. There were no differences between the observation of help and receipt of help conditions, nor between the indifferent-model and no-model conditions. Although Test and Bryan (in press) stated that their failure to find a difference between the indifferent-model and no-model conditions was not in accord with the results of studies by Rosenbaum and Blake (1955) and Rosenbaum (1956), this may not be the case. The studies are not strictly comparable because the Test and Bryan study employed a model who failed to help, whereas the latter studies employed models who actively refused to help. Although the Test and Bryan indifferent-model condition did involve constraints against helping, they were not as strong as those in the Rosenbaum studies.

In an effort to obtain an effect for both altruistic and selfish models, Wheeler and Wagner (1968) exposed enlisted men and navy recruits to a situation in which they overheard a solicitor request a twenty-fivedollar donation for one of two causes: to help fly the family of a dying serviceman to his bedside, or to build up the monetary reserve of a local serviceman's fund. As expected, most money was given in the altruistic model condition, least was given in the selfish model condition, and the amount given in the control condition fell in between. Although the responses of the models may have supplied some hints about the appropriateness of various responses, there was nothing about the models that legitimized their responses. Their main function seems to have been to increase the salience of behavioral alternatives.

The three studies reviewed above used adult subjects. When children are exposed to adult models, however, the behavior of adults is likely to serve as a standard of appropriateness. The performances of authoritative or prestigious adults not only indicate what can be done, but also what should be done.

Modeling as a Function of Information about the Appropriateness of Behavioral Alternatives

Appropriateness as a function of prestige. Several studies have exposed children to altruistic adult models. Rosenhan and White (1967) found that 63% of a sample of elementary school children donated gift certificates to charity during a game that they played with a charitable model. Forty-eight percent also gave when they subsequently played alone. Although the authors interpreted the second finding as evidence for internalization, the temporal contiguity between tasks and the similarity of situations suggests that the children simply behaved in what seemed to be an appropriate way.

A study by White (1967), which satisfied the endurance (but not generality) criterion, suggested possible limitations on the modeling of altruistic responses. Fourth- and fifth-grade children were exposed to one of four conditions: enforced rehearsal (ER), in which they practiced charitable behavior; observation plus voluntary rehearsal (OVR), in which they practiced charity with a generous model; observation of a generous model alone (O); and a no-model control condition (C). After performing the experimental task, half the children were left alone to win some gift certificates and to donate, and half were sent back to class without playing the game. All subjects returned for a second testing after several days. Both groups of children reacted

TABLE 3

STUDIES WHICH EXAMINED THE EFFECT OF MODELS ON ALTRUISM

Increased salience of behavioral alternatives and social norms

Information about appropriateness : prestige of models

Note.—Models for Blake et al. (1955) were symbolic. Abbreviations are: CS — college student.

• during measure of altruism. b sex constituted a variable.

Table 3—(Continued)

Information about appropriateness : group standards

Information about appropriateness: groups standard and diffusion of responsibility and blame

Information about consequences

similarly in the delayed session. The effect of time, however, served to reduce the number of altruistic responses, especially in the ER condition. A noteworthy finding was that there was little reduction in giving for the girls in the OVR condition. It suggests that for girls observation of models may have only temporary effects on performance, whereas observation plus rehearsal may result in the acquisition of behavioral dispositions. Although other research has not supported this suggestion (e.g., Rosenhan & White, 1967), it serves to emphasize the importance of differentiating situational performance effects from internalized behavioral dispositions.

A study by M. Harris (1968) demonstrated that modeling effects sometimes have little generality. She found that children who were exposed to a model who gave tokens to them returned the favor, but children who were exposed to a model who donated to charity also donated to charity. The children imitated the specific behavior of the models, probably because it seemed appropriate, but failed to internalize a general altruistic disposition.

A study by Bryan and Walbek (1969) tested the relative strengths of behavioral and verbal indications of appropriate behavior. Groups of elementary school children were exposed to one of six situations. They observed models who practiced charity and preached either charity, greed, or gave a neutral statement; or they observed models who practiced greed and preached either charity, greed, or gave a neutral statement. A series of three experiments indicated that although verbalizations affected the attractiveness of models, it was what models did that affected the responses of the children. No effect was found for hypocrisy (discrepancy between word and deed).

Grusec and Skubiski (in press) supported the findings of Bryan and Walbek (1969). They found that third- and fifth-grade children were more prone to donate marbles after observing a model donate than after hearing him verbalize the appropriate behavior. Only girls who had had a prior interaction with a nurturant model donated as much in the preach charity as the practice charity condition. It seems likely that more was supplied by the model than information about appropriateness. As suggested earlier, actions which indicate appropriateness also increase the salience of behavioral alternatives. Showing children what to do, however subtly, clearly supplies more information than telling them what to do.

It has been argued that although children see most adults as authorities, adults generally do not. In some situations, though, adults do supply standards of appropriateness, especially when they are in groups. Studies which explored the effect of groups of models on altruism have used two types of models: those who are actively altruistic, and those who are passively selfish. A series of early studies of the first type demonstrates the effect of group standards on gift-giving and volunteering.

Appropriateness as a function of group standards—the modeling of action. Blake et al. (1955) found that the amount which graduate students donated toward a gift for a retiring secretary depended on the amount they thought others had donated. Although no model was physically present, a list containing prior donations" supplied information about the behavior of the reference group.

Schachter and Hall (1952) examined the effect of group influence on volunteering behavior. Students who observed half of a class appear to volunteer (low restraint) were more likely to sign up for an experiment than those in high restraint conditions. Subjects in low restraint conditions, though, were not more likely than subjects in high restraint conditions to fulfill their commitment. Another study (Blake, Berkowitz, Bellamy, & Mouton, 1956) found that students who were asked to raise their hands in class (without half the class appearing to volunteer) were less likely to volunteer than students who were asked to sign their names in private. The failure of other class members to volunteer seemed to establish a group standard of noncompliance.

Field studies have supported the findings of the classroom studies. Rosenbaum and Blake (1955) found that students were more liable to volunteer for an experiment if they observed another student volunteer than if they did not. Interpretation of the finding, though, is difficult due to the fact that it was only the subjects who observed another person volunteer (and return to his studies) who gained information concerning the (short) duration of the experiment. A later study by Rosenbaum (1956) controlled for perceived duration of commitment and attained comparable results. Unfortunately the latter study contained a further confound: Subjects, who were exposed to a model who volunteered, anticipated participating in the experiment with the model, whereas subjects in the other condition expected to take part in the experiment alone. The added information may well have influenced the volunteering behavior.

It should be apparent that the behavior reviewed above is interpretable in a Sherif (1947) and Asch (1956) type of conformity paradigm. People behave altruistically in order to conform to group standards.

In the same way that students model the noncompliance of their fellow students, bystanders may model the failure of other bystanders to respond to pleas for help. In both cases the reaction (or lack of reaction) of the group serves as a standard of behavior. A series of studies by Darley and Latané demonstrated that the presence of others inhibits altruistic responses in emergency situations.

Appropriateness as a function of group standards—the modeling of inaction. Puzzled by the shockingly irresponsible behavior of the 38 witnesses who remained behind their apartment doors while Kitty Genovese was being murdered (A. Rosenthal, 1964), Darley and Latané ran a number of experiments on bystander intervention in emergencies. In the first study, Darley and Latané (1968) plaed college undergraduates alone in a room with an intercom and told them that it was posSible for only one person in their group (of either two, three, or six) to be on the air at a time. After a short conversation, the subjects heard a confederate appear to have an epileptic fit. It was the subjects who thought that they were the only other ones present who responded most consistently and rapidly; and subjects who thought they were in threeperson groups responded more consistently and rapidly than those who thought they were in six-person groups. The investigators interpreted these results as support for the hypothesis that people in groups fail to respond because responsibility and blame are diffused among group members. The diffusion of responsibility and blame explanation, though, was cast in doubt by the further finding that females in three-person groups did not respond any slower when the other bystander was a male or a premed student— people who would be expected to take responsibility in emergencies.

Even though there seems to be more in effect than diffusion of responsibility and blame, studies by Allen (1968) and Korte (1969) suggest that diffusion does influence helping behavior in some situations. In a situation similar to that of Darley and Latané (1968), Korte (1969) found a greater incidence of helping for subjects who believed that the other members of their three-person group were strapped down to a table than for subjects who did not. In the Allen (1968) study, commuters in New York subways were given a chance to correct a stooge who gave incorrect directions. The communters were least likely to correct a stooge when the request for directions was directed to the stooge. They were most likely to correct the stooge when they were asked for directions; and moderately likely to correct him when the request for directions was directed at a group of bystanders.

In a second series of experiments (Latané & Darley, 1968), bystanders were placed in emergency situations that contained a personal threat to their safety. Male col]ege students who found themselves in a room that began to fill with smoke were more likely to report the emergency when they were alone in the room than when they were in the presence of two other subjects or two passive stooges. These findings do not fit well with the diffusion of responsibility and blame interpretation, due to the fact that it was the safety of the subjects themselves that was in question. It would seem that part of the inhibiting effect of passive bystanders occurs because they supply, by their lack of concern, an innocuous definition of the situation. Their passivity may, as a study by Latané (1967) suggests, even help to validate defensively distorted perceptions of the situation. Subjects whose tasks were interrupted by the tape-recorded sounds of a "bully" assaulting a young child accounted for their failure to help by saying that they did not believe that the fight was real. The obvious inference— that the tape-recorded sounds of the fight were unconvincing—was cast in doubt by the further finding that subjects who were freed from responsibility believed the fight was real. Detracting responsibility, though, may have changed the situation in other ways. The group which was freed from responsibility had no reason to doubt the reality of the fight— what purpose could it serve? A faked emergency would make more sense to subjects who were on the spot.

A further study (Latané & Rodin, 1969) extended the generality of prior findings. Male undergraduates who heard a female "market research representative" appear to fall from a chair and hurt her ankle were more likely to help her when they were alone than when they were in the presence of a stranger or an unconcerned stooge. Subjects who were paired with a stranger were more likely to help the "representative" than subjects who were paired with a passive stooge.

Both Latané and Rodin (1969) and Darley (1967) found that subjects who were paired with friends were more likely to help than those who were paired with strangers. However, subjects who were paired with friends were not as likely to help as subjects who were exposed to the emergency alone. In view of the fact that the passivity of subjects to emergency situations is probably more apparent than real (they are upset but they do not show it), the greater incidence of helping with friends might be due to the fact that they are able to anticipate each other's true reactions. Acting together, they also have consensual support for their definition of the situation.

Surveying all the studies in the bystander intervention series, it would appear that both a diffusion of responsibility and blame, and a group influence explanation are needed (cf. Latané & Rodin, 1969). In the seizure situation, where subjects were isolated from one another, no information about group reaction was supplied. Yet in the smoke-filled room situation, little good could come from diffusing responsibility and blame when the welfare of the subject himself was in question.

Although most of the bystander-intervention studies found that bystanders were prone to help when they were alone, one study (Latané, 1967) found that virtually all undergraduates failed to intervene in behalf of an assaulted child, even when they were alone. Similar results were obtained in a study by Kaufmann (1968). Only 11%0 of subjects who were asked to observe a "teacher" deliver what seemed to be increasingly severe and dangerous shocks to a "learner' (cf. Milgram, 1963) responded to the learner's pleas for help. No differences were found among conditions in which the bystander was given a position of high status, was led to believe he would later be the "teacher," or had reason to doubt the legitimacy of the teacher's authority. People fail to help in some situations, it would appear, on the slightest excuse.

A developmental study by Staub and Feagans (1969) found that children also failed to help in emergency situations. Unlike their adult counterparts, though, they were less prone to help when they were alone than when they were with another child. Nursery school, first- and second-grade children tended to help another child who appeared to fall and hurt himself more when they were in pairs than when they were alone. At the fourth and sixth grade the trend tended to reverse itself and the children behaved more like their adult counterparts. It is possible that the presence of a partner reduced the fear associated with doing something wrong in the younger children, but served as a source of potential negative evaluation for the older children.

Whatever the precise reasons, it seems likely that the behavior of bystanders is predicted on their ignorance concerning the consequences of helping. If they were assured that no harm would come to them, their apparently heartless inaction would seem less likely. And if they were assured that they would be rewarded, helping behavior would seem virtually certain. It is surprising, therefore, that none of the studies which manipulated perception of consequences has achieved a clear effect.

Modeling as a Function of Perception of Consequences

Models who supply information about the consequences of altruistic behavior almost always supply other information. Information about the consequences of particular choices of action usually supplies an indication of its appropriateness. The observation of the act also, of course, increases the salience of related behavioral alternatives.

Of the experiments which tested for the influence of perception of consequences, one used adult subjects and two used children. In the study on adults, Hornstein et al., ( 1968) presented passersby with a wallet that had apparently been found by a model and then relost. Passersby who were led to believe they were similar to the model were more likely to return the wallet when an attached note indicated that the model felt good or neutral about returning the wallet than when the note indicated he felt bad.

In the first of the studies on children, Midlarsky and Bryan (1967) failed to find any difference between the number of self-sacrificial and charitable responses of elementary school girls who observed a model who emitted expressive signs of joy after making self-sacrificial choices, and models who did not. M. Harris (1968), using an age group similar to that of Midlarsky and Bryan (1967), failed to find a difference between the altruistic behavior of children who were exposed to models who were praised for their altruism, and those who were not. Because the praising agent was absent when the children performed, however, they had reason not to expect similar consequences.

None of the studies that examined the effect of perception of consequences found a significant difference between positive and neutral consequence conditions. The Hornstein et al. (1968) study, though, found that the perception of negative consequences had an inhibiting effect on altruism. It is possible that the lack of similarity between observer and model in the studies which used children made the consequences of the model's actions irrelevant.

Although situations in which consequences can be observed were analyzed according to their effect on the performance of altruistic behavior, some investigators (e.g., M. Harris, 1968; Midlarsky & Bryan, 1967) analyzed them in relation to the internalization of relatively permanent behavioral dispositions. None of the studies, however, met the two criteria of internalization—situational generality and longitudinal stability.

Several studies, though, have set out to examine the antecedents of modeling effects. Instead of explaining imitative behavior with what is essentially a descriptive rubric, they have attempted to find out what it is about observing a model that results in the acquisition of congruent behavioral dispositionse Three general approaches have been taken. The first examined modeling effects in terms of identification, the second examined them in terms of secondary reinforcement, and the third examined them in terms of empathy.

Modeling and the Internalization of

Altruistic Dispositions

Although several investigators have viewed modeling in terms of identification (see Bandura & Walters, 1963), there has been only one study which examined the relationship between identification and altruism. Rutherford and Mussen (1968) found that generous nursery school boys saw their fathers as more warm and nurturant than less generous boys. These findings were interpreted as support for the hypothesis that generosity results from identification with warm and nurturant samesexed parents. Although the findings indicated that the generous boys saw their fathers as warm and nurturant, no information was supplied about the generosity of the fathers, nor was the assumption that the boys were identified with their fathers substantiated. Moreover, the hypothesis that identification caused the boy's generosity was supported by only correlational data.

Mowrer (1960) suggested that rewarding models are imitated because stimuli that are associated with the performance of imitative responses, especially proprioceptive feedback, are secondarily reinforcing. Hartup and Coates (1967) tested Mowrer's suggestion by exposing nursery children who had histories of frequent and infrequent peer reinforcement to rewarding and nonrewarding peer models. Both history of reinforcement and rewardingness of model were determined by time-sampled observations of a nursery school class. The altruism of rewarding peer models was imitated more by children with histories of frequent peer reinforcement, and the altruism of nonrewarding peer models was imitated more by children with histories of infrequent peer reinforcement. No differences in attractiveness of model or social acceptance of subjects were found among groups. The results suggested that Mowrer's (1960) theory applies only to subjects with histories of frequent reinforcement. However, on the basis of the positive correlation between giving and receiving reinforcement from peers (Charlesworth & Hartup, 1967) the results can also be interpreted as support for the notion that subjects modeled the responses of those who were similar to them. The latter interpretation is consistent with the Hornstein et al. (1968) findings. However, several other studies, which did not control for history of reinforcement (e.g., Grusec & Skubiski, in press; Rosenhan & White, 1967), failed to support the notion that rewarding models are imitated more than nonrewarding models.

The results of a study by Aronfreed and Paskel (1968) on first- to third-grade girls can be interpreted in accord with a secondary reinforcement position. Aronfreed and Paskel ( 1968) found that children who were exposed to a female model, who emitted both expressive signs of joy and hugs (EH) after she made self-sacrificial responses, evidenced more imitation than children who were exposed to expressive cues (E) or hugs (H) alone. If the model who emitted expressive cues and affection responses is seen as the most rewarding of the three models (and the fact that she was the only one who displayed pretask nurturance makes this likely) , then the modeling effect can be interpreted as a function of the secondary reinforcement effects of imitation.

Aronfreed and Paskel (1968) interpreted their results differently—as support for the notion that the self-sacrificial responses of the girls were reinforced by empathically experienced positive affect. Because the girls who were exposed to both affective responses and expressive cues were exposed to the most warmth, and because they were given the most indication of what was desired of them, interpretation of the results is difficult.

A later study by Midlarsky and Bryan ( 1967) controlled for pretask warmth and added a condition in which the model failed to emit expressive cues in the test situation. It also took a second measure of altruism in a different situation. Although the investigators did not interpret the results as support for the position of Aronfreed and Paskel, their results were very similar. Both studies found that exposure to the EH condition resulted in more self-sacrificial responses than exposure to E or H alone. Moreover, as Aronfreed and Paskel would have predicted, more self-sacrificial responses were made when the model emitted expressive cues during testing than when she did not. The findings, though, that self-sacrificial responses occurred in conditions other than the HE and EH conditions, and that most of the girls who sacrificed candy also donated to charity in the absence of the model, suggest that more was involved than the empathic transmission of positive affect.

There has been no concrete support for positions that view modeling as a function of identification, secondary reinforcement, or empathy. Studies which appear to support each position have alternative interpretations. Moreover, although all of the studies were concerned with the internalization of altruistic dispositions, none established the situational generality and longitudinal stability of the effects. Some researchers would argue that the two criteria are beyond the range of laboratory studies. What is needed, perhaps, is supplementary evidence from naturalistic studies. If, for example, correlates of altruism could be found in the behavior of parents or friends, relevant experimental analogues would receive support. Such correlates have been reported in three studies. Rosenhan (1967) found that a group of active civil rights workers had a close relationship with at least one altruistic parent; Tomkins (1965) reported that prominent abolitionists were influenced by altruistic friends; and Rettig (1956) found that altruism in parents was positively correlated with scores made by college students on an altruism scale. Some evidence was found in the Rettig (1956) study for the notion that the effects of direct reinforcement of altruistic behavior by parents dissipates over time, whereas modeling effects are more enduring.

Although more precise studies are needed, the results of studies which have found a relationship between attributes of parents and altruism in children are encouraging, especially in view of the failure of most studies to find a relationship between moral behavior in parents and personality correlates in children (cf. Kohlberg, in press).

Experimenter Effects

An appropriate way of ending the review of modeling and altruism is to draw attention to the relationship between modeling and experimenter effects. R. Rosenthal (1966) and others have demonstrated that experimenters unintentionally effect the responses of their subjects, even when they do not perform the tasks in question. Modeling can be considered a type of experimenter effect—it causes subjects to act in ways congruent with the behavior (and, usually, expectations) of models. The similarity between modeling and experimenter effects has three implications. The first emphasizes the suggestion that modeling effects are temporary and situationspecific. The second emphasizes the subtlety of modeling effects—a decade of research has been unable to isolate the means by which expectations are communicated in experiments. And finally, the necessity for methodological caution in modeling studies becomes obvious. Most studies attribute modeling effects to more than experimenter bias. In spite of this, few studies have controlled for expectations of the model.

ALTRUISM AS A FUNCTION OF TEMPORARY

STATES OF THE RECIPIENT

When it is the temporary states of recipients of altruistic responses that are studied, the question that becomes relevant is what kinds of states, and what situations associated with these states, elicit altruistic responses. The range of recipient state variables that has been studied is small. Only two variables —dependency and interpersonal attractiveness—have been studied in any detail.

A close consideration of the effect of interpersonal attractiveness on altruism suggests that many altruistic responses result not from characteristics of benefactors or recipients alone, but rather from an interaction between the characteristics of benefactors and recipients. Recipients, for example, may be attractive to different benefactors for different reasons, and benefactors may differ in attractability. In the modeling studies, almost all recipients were dependent, and their dependency probably interacted with the modeling effects to elicit altruism. Even though characteristics of both recipients and benefactors influence altruism, they can be separated for classification due to the fact that most experiments vary one set of characteristics and hold the other constant.

Dependency of the Recipient

The essential attribute of a recipient of altruism is his perceived need for aid. In almost all of the reported studies on altruism, altruistic behavior was elicited by a dependent other. Most studies held dependency constant, or allowed it to vary randomly. Some studies, however, gave specific attention to the effect of dependency.

A set of ten studies (see Table 4) by Berkowitz and his colleagues found a consistent effect for dependency. All studies used the same basic experimental design. In the standard situation, subjects were recruited for an experiment on supervisory ability. A "worker" was required to construct paper boxes or envelopes for a "supervisor." In the high dependency condition, the worker was told that the supervisor's chance of winning a prize depended on the worker's productivity. In the low dependency condition, the worker was told that it was the quality of the supervisor's instructions that would determine his reward. The measure of altruism was either the number of boxes constructed in the experimental session, or the difference between the number constructed in the experimental session and the number in a practice session. Berkowitz and his colleagues (see Table 4) consistently found that more boxes were

4

STUDIES WHICH DEMONSTRATED THE EFFECT OF DEPENDENCY OF THE RECIPIENT ON ALTRUISM

278 DENNIS L. KREBS

TABLE

284 DENNIS L. KREBS

TABLE

ALTRUISM 279

Note.—Abbreviations are: CS — college student.

built by workers in the high dependency condition than workers in the low dependency condition. One study (Berkowitz & Conner, 1966) created three levels of dependency— the supervisor was dependent on the worker for 20%, 50%, or 80% of the points that could earn him a cash prize. Workers whose supervisors were 80% dependent made more paper envelopes than those whose supervisors were 20% dependent.

It might be argued that the altruism shown by the workers was a function of expectations of approval or fear of disapproval. To test these possibilities, Berkowitz and Daniels (1963) and Daniels and Berkowitz (1963) added an "awareness" condition. Workers in the high awareness condition were told that their supervisors would be informed of their productivity during the experiment, and those in the low awareness condition were told that their work would not be examined until after a month. In no case was a main effect found for awareness. However, a combination of (low) dependency and (low) awareness was associated with low production. Moreover, production also failed to increase when the experimenter's awareness was manipulated (Berkowitz, Klanderman, & Harris, 1964). Berkowitz interpreted the lack of difference between the productivity of the high and low awareness groups in the high dependency condition as support for the assumption that his workers were not motivated toward the attainment of approval or avoidance of punishment. It is also possible that the low awareness manipulation was ineffective. Subjects may have found it difficult to believe that their output would remain unexamined for a month.

The notion that dependency elicits helping behavior in the Berkowitz type of situation has not received full support from other studies (outlined in Table 4). Schopler and Bateson (1965, Experiment 2 and 3) and Schopler (1967) found that females yielded more money to a partner when he was in a state of high (versus low) dependency, but only if the cost of yielding was low. Males in the low cost of yielding condition, on the other hand, yielded more money when their partner was in a state of low dependency. In a different situation, Schopler and Bateson (1965, Experiment 1) found that although females were more inclined to volunteer to help a student finish his thesis when he was "desperate," males were more inclined to help when he had a year to work on it (p < .10). The measure of altruism in the Schopler studies seems more powerful than that in the Berkowitz studies because of the material sacrifice involved. The more the benefactor yielded, the less he kept for himself.

Other studies which involved a variety of situations, though, have supplied support for the notion that dependency in the recipient elicits altruism. Wheeler and Wagner (1968), for example, found that Navy men were more likely to donate money when they were exposed to a personal appeal which involved a highly dependent family than one which involved a condition of low dependency (p < .10). A study by Test and Bryan (in press) failed to find an effect for dependency. A posttest questionnaire, however, revealed that the dependency manipulation had failed. In a situation similar to that of Test and Bryan, Midlarsky (1968a) found that more help was given to a partner with broken eyeglasses than to a less dependent recipient, even though helping involved the receipt of electric shocks.

It should be pointed out that the dependency manipulations in the Schopler and Bateson (1965), Wheeler and Wagner (1968), Test and Bryan (in press), and Midlarsky (1968a) studies differed from those in the Berkowitz studies. In the Berkowitz studies the supervisor was specifically dependent on the worker—if the worker did not work hard, the supervisor did not get rewarded. In the Schopler and Bateson (1965, Experiment 1) and Wheeler and Wagner (1968) studies, on the other hand, the dependency of the other was general—each subject could have told himself that if he did not help, someone else would. The Midlarsky (1968a) and Test and Bryan (in press) studies fall in between. Subjects were not asked to help the dependent other, but they were the only ones who could help him.

Before turning to studies which manipulated interpersonal attractiveness of the recipient, it should be mentioned that dependency need not be viewed as a unitary variable. Studies by Schopler and Matthews (1965) and Horowitz (1968) demonstrated that internally caused dependency (dependency caused by the subject) tended to elicit less altruism than externally caused dependency. Locus of dependency, though, seems best examined as a trait variable.

Interpersonal Attractiveness of the Recipient Common sense would predict that more is given to liked others than disliked others. Because the prediction seems so obvious, perhaps, only three studies on altruism (Daniels & Berkowitz, 1963; Epstein & Hornstein, 1969; Staub & Sherk, in press) have manipulated interpersonal attractiveness as a main independent variable. The apparent paucity of research, however, may be misleading. It is possible that interpersonal attractiveness has exerted an unrecognized in-

fluence in other studies. Studies that manipulate characteristics of the recipient usually affect the attractiveness of the recipient. Table 5 contains an outline of studies which investigated the effect of interpersonal attractiveness on altruism.

Interpersonal attractiveness as an independent variable. Only three studies have focused on the altruism-eliciting effect of attractiveness of the recipient. Daniels and Berkowitz (1963) told "workers" that a questionnaire revealed they would either like or dislike their "supervisors." As expected, the workers made more boxes for highly dependent supervisors when they thought they would like them than when they thought they would not. Staub and Sherk (in press) found that fourthgrade children shared a crayon longer with liked than with disliked partners.

In the third study, Epstein and Hornstein (1969) found a more complex relationship between liking and altruism. Subjects who liked their partners made fewer selfish responses than subjects who disliked their partners when they were punished for their selfishness by a third person. When they were not punished, however, they made fewer selfish responses for a disliked partner. Although the results are difficult to interpret, it is possible that punishment from a liked other served to remind the subjects of the harm their acts did. Punishment from a disliked other, on the other hand, may have antagonized them into more selfish behavior.

Interpersonal attractiveness as a mediating variable. It seems likely that most studies which manipulated characteristics of the recipient incidentally varied his interpersonal attractiveness. Recipients are usually more or less attractive depending on their association with moral transgression or need for psychological help (Bryan & Davenport 6 ; Nunnally, 1961), their race and nationality (Bryan & Test, 1967; Feldman, 1968), the legitimacy of their need (Frisch & Greenberg, 1968; Horowitz, 1968; Schopler & Matthews, 1965), and the amount of prior help attributed to them (Pruitt, 1968). Several of the Berkowitz studies (e.g., Berkowitz & Friedman, 1967) found incidental relationships between the amount of help given to supervisors and their rated attractiveness. Other studies, though (e.g., Berkowitz & Daniels , 1963), found a negative relationship between helping and attractiveness.

Research on the effect of inappropriate favors on altruism demonstrates that although recipients who are helped tend to be seen as more attractive than those who are not, the reverse is sometimes true. Kiesler (1966) found that partners who did appropriate favors were rated as more attractive than those who did inappropriate favors, but no measure of altruism was taken. Brehm and Cole (1966), Lerner and Lichtman (1968), and Schopler and Thompson (1968) found that inappropriate favors elicited less altruism than appropriate favors. They also found that recipients who had done appropriate favors tended to be rated more positively. But in every case, the recipients failed to be rated as better liked. Lerner and Lichtman ( 1968), however, found a positive relationship between selfishness and unattractiveness—recipients who seemed "illicitly gracious" were rated as unattractive and were helped little.

A final study, which set out to examine a dissonance effect, supplied some information

5 Bryan, J. H., & Davenport, M. Donations to the needy: correlates of financial contributions to the destitute. (Research Bulletin No. 68-1) Princeton, N. J.: Educational Testing Service, 1968.

about attractiveness. Walster and Prestholdt (1966) found that subjects who increased their attractiveness ratings of targets in order to compensate for an unfair rating or justify a high rating tended to be more likely to volunteer to help the target person. Unfortunately, though, the imminence of summer vacation and final exams truncated their sample to the point that statistical analysis of the relationship between attractiveness and volunteering was not feasible.

Although there are suggestive indications that attractiveness mediates altruism, the relationship is surprisingly weak. Several studies, in fact, have found a negative relationship between helping and attractiveness. Lerner and Matthews (1967) and Lerner (see Footnote 4), for example, found that subjects who perceived themselves (versus their partner or an experimenter) as responsible for the suffering of another tended to devalue the other in order to preserve their belief in a just world. In spite of the devaluation, though, they were more willing than those who did not devalue their partners to take his place in a shock condition. It is possible that in cases where altruism is reparative or part of a role requirement, it is not given as much in behalf of the recipient as in spite of him.

PERSONALITY TRAITS OF THE BENEFACTOR

—CORRELATIONAL STUDIES

Research which has dealt with personality traits of benefactors differs from most of the research reviewed thus far because it is concerned with natural correlations rather than experimentally induced relationships. Traitoriented correlational studies (see Table 6) have used three different criteria of altruism. Some have defined altruism according to the ratings of others. Some have used scores on pencil-and-paper tests; and some have used behavioral measures. Personality variables in each of the three categories have been drawn from several different sources. Trait-oriented correlational studies attempt to find out what personality traits and syndromes are typical of altruists, and, in general, what kind of people altruists are.

6

STUDIES WHICH EXAMINED 'I'llE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONALITY TRAITS OF 'I'llE

BENEFACTOR AND ALTRUISM

Studies which used rating-scale measures of altruism

Studies which used pencil-and-paper test measures of altruism

Studies which used behavioral measures of altruism

< .10.

Rating-Scale Measures of Altruism

Four studies have defined altruism according to the ratings of acquaintances. Turner (1948), using boys from the CambridgeSomerville Youth Study, found that altruism ratings of parents, teachers, and social workers correlated most highly with ethical goodness, emotional stability, and social adjustments. Cattell and Horowitz (1952) found that the factor cyclothymia (social extraversion) was most highly correlated with altruism in college females. Friedrichs (1960) found that fraternity members who were rated as most "attractive as a friend" were considered most altruistic. Factors which related to altruism were conservatism, socioeconomic security, and social acceptability. And finally, a group of Radcliffe girls who were rated as altruistic by their dormmates (McDonald [footnoteRef:3] ) scored high on social and religious values (and low on economic and political values) as measured by the AllportVernon Study of Values (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960) . [3: MacDonald, S. L. Altruism: A study in means and ends. Unpublished honors thesis, Harvard University, April 1966.]

There are problems with each study which used a rating-scale measure of altruism. The content of Turner's (1948) Altruism Scale indicated that it was actually more a measure of ethical goodness than altruism. A direct rating of ethical goodness was more highly correlated with the scale than a direct measure of altruism. In the Cattell and Horowitz (1952) study, different dormmates rated different girls, which allowed for an unequal distribution of response sets. In the Friedrichs (1960) study, the author himself pointed out that "most of the surface correlations [were] so small that they must be viewed as no more than suggestive [p. 507] ." Because of her small sample, most of McDonald's (see Footnote 6) findings were also only suggestive. Moreover, none of the studies controlled for favorability sets and halo effects. The fact that altruism seemed to correlate most highly with sociability may mean little more than that people gratuitiously rate others as altruistic because they are friendly.

Pencil-and-Paper Measures of Altruism

Three studies defined altruism according to scores on pencil-and-paper tests. Friedrichs (1960) found low positive correlations between a "Likert-type questionnaire" measure of altruism and measures of theism and church attendance; and low negative correlations for ethnocentrism and neurotic symptomology. Ribal (1963) found that altruistic females had high needs for affiliation and intraception, and low needs for achievement and dominance, as defined by the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (Edwards, 1954). Altruistic males scored high on need for endurance. Finally, Sawyer (1966) found that YMCA students were more altruistic than social science students or business school students, and that altruism did not relate to authoritarianism.

The results of all three of the studies that used pencil-and-paper measures of altruism can be questioned. Friedrichs' (1960) Likerttype questionnaire failed to correlate highly with dormmates' and self-ratings of altruism. In the Ribal (1963) study, subjects who scored in the upper quartile of nurturance and the lower quartile of succorance on the Edwards Personal Preference schedule were called altruistic. McDonald (see Footnote 6), though, found that while the girls who were judged altruistic by their dormmates scored high on need for nurturance, they did not score low on need for succorance. Ribal's (1963) measure of altruism, then, did not correspond to McDonald's rating-scale measure. (It is interesting to note that in accord with Ribal's findings, McDonald's females scored low on needs for achievement and dominance. They failed, however, to score high on needs for affiliation and intraception.) Finally, the Sawyer (1966) study can be criticized due to the fact that it defined altruism as behavior which maximized gain for self and other—behavior that seems more adequately defined as cooperative.

In most cases, pencil-and-paper tests are thinly disguised self-rating measures with no check for validity. The general dangers associated with pencil-and-paper measures Of altruism can, perhaps, be exemplified by mentioning a controversy associated with the So-

cial Responsibility Scale (SRS) (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964)—a scale that was meant as a measure of altruism. Stone (1965a) found that the SRS correlated highly with three measures of social desirability. The finding that people who give socially desirable answers receive high altruism scores casts doubt on the validity of the scale. Although it is entirely possible that altruists are the type of people who do what is socially desirable (Berkowitz, 1965), the SRS scale does not establish the relationship (Stone, 1965b). Scales such as those of D. Harris (1957) for children and Gough, McClosky, and Meehl (1952) for adolescents are subject to the same criticism.

Behavioral Measures of Altruism

Studies which correlated personality traits with rating-scale and pencil-and-paper measures of altruism have generally found a large number of relationships. Studies which correlated personality traits with behavioral measures of altruism, on the other hand, have generally been less productive. The difficulties associated with studies which use behavioral measures arise largely because of the uncontrolled effect of situational variables. As was demonstrated in the review of modeling studies (and pointed out in relation to other moral behaviors by, for example, Hartshorne and May, 1928), behavioral indexes of altruism are largely situation-specific. It would seem that the more unusual the situation, the less the effect of personality variables. Such, at least, seemed the case in the study by Darley and Latané (1968). Subjects who responded to emergency pleas for help did not differ from those who failed to respond on measures of Machiavellianism—anomie—authoritarianism, need for approval, or social responsibility. In a similar situation, Korte (1969) failed to find a relationship between helping in an emergency and deference, autonomy, or submissiveness.

Other studies which have employed less unusual situations have found relationships between personality traits and behavioral measures of altruism. Rutherford and Mussen (1968), for example, differentiated high and low generous nursery school boys on the basis of the number of candles they left for their two favorite classmates. Teachers rated the generous boys as more generous, less gregarious, and less competitive than the others. A racing-game measure of competitiveness supported the final rating. Generous boys were also rated as less quarrelsome and aggressive, and more kind (p < .10). The authors interpreted their findings as support for the notion that generosity is part of a pattern of moral characteristics that includes altruism, kindness, and cooperation. The fact that the investigator was present while all behavioral measures were taken (the child in fact played the racing game against the investigator) raises the possibility that the altruism of the generous children was due to conformity, or need for approval.

A study by Staub and Sherk (in press) supplied a behavioral measure of altruism which was less amenable than that of Rutherford and Mussen (1968) to alternate interpretation. Children in the Staub and Sherk (in press) study were not asked to give, and the experimenter was absent when they gave. Children who scored high on an adapted Crowne-Marlowe need for approval scale (Crandall, Crandall, & Patkovsky, 1965) tended to give less than those who scored low. Because high need-for-approval children also tended to eat fewer candies themselves, though, their "selfishness" was uncertain.

Other studies have found a relationship between behavioral measures of altruism and locus of control (as defined by Rotter, 1966). Gore and Rotter (1963) found that students from a Southern college were more willing to help in a civil rights project if they thought they had internal control over their fates than if they thought their fate was externally controlled. Midlarsky (1968a) found a positive correlation between helping (at the cost of receiving shocks) and internal locus of control. Staub (1968) found that fourth-grade children who were characterized by high internal control shared more after an experience of success, and less after a neutral experience or experience of failure than those characterized by low internal control.

Although more faith can generally be put in behavioral measures of altruism than rating-scale or pencil-and-paper measures, they also have problems. Difficulties associated with operational measures of altruism have already been reviewed. The problem, basically, is that the intent behind apparently altruistic acts is not easily determined.

Considered as a whole, no general conclusions can be drawn about personality traits of benefactors. The variations in subject samples, independent variables, and measures of altruism make interstudy comparison difficult. Yet, in spite of the fact that trends must be considered only suggestive, there is some consistency among findings. On the basis of the available evidence, altruistic children seem to be better adjusted socially than others—they are less aggressive, quarrelsome, and competitive, and they are more emotionally stable. They are not, however, more intelligent than others, nor do they achieve more. They tend to be relatively shy and unassertive.

College-age female altruists are socially oriented—they are cyclothymic and have social (versus political or economic) values. They are nurturant people with low needs for achievement and dominance. College-age male altruists also tend to be socially oriented; they are free from neuroticism, and tend to think they control their fates. They are well liked by others, slightly on the conservative side, and may tend to be authoritarian. Although they are not more liable to be in the social sciences than business or engineering, they are more likely to train for the YMCA.

ALTRUISM-ELICITING TRAITS OF RECIPIENTS

There has been little research on altruismeliciting traits of recipients. Variables categorized as temporary states of recipients often relate to personality traits. Situational dependency and interpersonal attractiveness of the recipient, for example, may be indicative of more stable personality characteristics.

Locus of Dependency

The characteristics of recipients that have been found to influence altruism most are those which relate to the legitimacy of their need for help. Although situational dependency generally elicits altruism, dependency that is perceived as illegitimate often has the reverse effect. Lerner (see Footnote 4), for example, found that subjects who were judged as deserving of undesirable fates failed to elicit as much help as those who were not. In a different context, Schopler and Matthews (1965) and Berkowitz (1967) found that dependency that was thought to have been caused by external forces (forces beyond the control of the recipient) elicited more altruism than internally caused dependency. Externally caused dependency was also seen as more legitimate than internally caused dependency. Bryan and Davenport (see Footnote 5), though, failed to find a difference between contributions to needy cases that were seen as internally caused and those that were seen as externally caused.

Although a study by Horowitz (1968) offered some additional support for the notion that externally caused dependency elicits more altruism than internally caused dependency, it also found that the reverse is sometimes true. Undergraduates who were given little choice but to help a graduate student with his PhD thesis, gave more help when the graduate student's need was perceived as externally caused. Because the internal locus of dependency manipulation described the solicitor as "characteristically dependent and weak " it is likely that his dependency was seen as a personality trait. It was also found that subjects who had a lot of choice about helping volunteered more time to the internally dependent other. It is possible that people who are seen as characteristically dependent do not threaten the status of others, and, therefore, elicit more help. A study by Schopler (1967) found that male undergraduates (the same subject sample used by Horowitz, 1968) failed to help a highly dependent other when he was threatening to their status. Female undergraduates, on the other hand, helped the dependent other.

Other Characteristics

Attributes that affect the interpersonal attractiveness of recipients may also relate to their personality traits. Subjects in the Lerner and Lichtman (1968) study who perceived others as making illicitly gracious responses, for example, probably attributed different personality traits to them than to the "genuinely gracious" others. Information about the needy cases in the Bryan and Davenport study (see Footnote 5), the race of the solicitors in the Bryan and Test study (1967), and the nationality of those who asked for help in the Feldman study (1968) also probably affected judgments about the personality traits of recipients, which, in turn, probably influenced their ability to elicit altruism.

SOCIAL ROLES AND DEMOGRAPHIC

ATTRIBUTES OF THE BENEFACTOR

Social roles and demographic attributes such as sex, age, ordinal position, social class, and nationality have usually been studied as incidental correlates of altruism. Although relationships between demographic variables and altruism supply hints concerning the antecedents of altruism, the relationships are usually difficult to interpret. The fact that people of different sex, ordinal position, social class, and nationality share a large number of traits makes specification of precise antecedents difficult.

Sex Differences in Altruism

Sex differences in the altruism of children. Of the 17 studies that examined children of both sexes, 11 found no sex differences. Of the studies which found sex differences, only 2 (Grusec & Skubiski, in press; White, 1967) reported main effects that approached significance (p < .10). The remaining studies reported only interaction effects. Although the common notion that females are more altruistic than males was supported more often than the reverse, support was by no means consistent (see Table 7).

No studies found sex differences in altruism for nursery school children (Fischer, 1963; Gewirtz, 1948; Hartup & Keller, 1960; Murphy, 1937). Of the studies which used elementary school children of both sexes, those of Handlon and Gross (1959), L. Harris (1967), M. Harris (1968), Shure (1968), Staub (1968), Ugurel-Semin (1952), and Wright (1942) failed to find sex differences in altruism.

In the other studies which used elementary school children, some found a greater incidence of altruism in boys than girls, and some found the reverse. Rosenhan and White ( 1967) found a suggestive tendency for fourth- and fifth-grade boys to give more than girls after prior contact with a female model when the model was absent during the giving period. White (1967), however, found that fourthand fifth-grade girls gave more than boys after a few days delay, especially when they both observed an altruistic model and rehearsed altruistic responses. Bryan and Walbek (1969, Experiment 2, 3) found that third- and fourth-grade boys (but not girls) gave more after they were exposed to a charitable (versus nondonating) same-sexed peer model. Grusec and Skubiski (in press), however, found that girls donated more than boys after exposure to a charitable model, especially when the model was nurturant, and preached charity. Finally, Staub and Sherk (in press) found that fourth-grade boys shared more candy than fourth-grade girls. The boys, however, also tended to eat more candy in front of their partners. It is apparent that there are no clear trends in the conditions which affect sex differences in altruism in children.

Contradictory findings also occur when reciprocity is the measure of altruism. Floyd (1964) found that more first- and third-grade girls than boys increased the amount given to a partner after receiving a lot from him. Staub and Sherk (in press), however, failed to find a difference in reciprocity between fourth-grade boys and girls, although the boys were more liable to reciprocate selfishness than girls.

Sex differences in the altruism of adults. As was the case with studies on children, most studies on adults have failed to find sex differences in altruism (e.g., Berkowitz et al., 1964; Blake et al., 1955; Bryan & Test, 1967; Hornstein et al., 1968; Rosenbaum & Blake, 1955). A series of studies by Schopler and his colleagues, though (Schopler, 1967; Schopler & Bateson, 1965; Schopler & Mat* thews, 1965) found consistent sex differences in low-cost dependency-elicited helping. Schopler and Bateson (1965, Experiment 1) found that although females were most likely to volunteer for an unpleasant experiment when the solicitor was highly dependent, males were most likely to volunteer when he was of low dependency. Two further experiments

260 DENNIS L. KREBS

306 DENNIS L. KREBS

ALTRUISM 305

(Schopler & Bateson, 1965, Experiments 2, A final study (Schopler, 1967) tested the hy3) supported the findings in situations similar pothesis that males were reluctant to help a to those used by Berkowitz and his colleagues. highly dependent male because he threatened

TABLE 7

STUDIES WHICH FOUND SEX DIFFERENCES IN ALTRUISM

Studies in which sex differences occurred that favored males

Studies in which sex differences occurred that favored females

• Difference found between conditions for males but not for females; no difference between males and females within each condition.

d Difference found between conditions for females but not for males.

their status. It found that although males and females helped their partners about the same amount on an unequal outcomes task, males (but not females) helped less after receiving a note from their "partner" saying, "1 think you should give me more money." The effect did not occur when the note came from the experimenter.

Although the influence of sex seemed pronounced in the Schopler studies, Berkowitz et al., (1964) failed to obtain a sex effect. In an attempt to explain the discrepancy between findings, Berkowitz and his colleagues (1967) ran a series of experiments. Although the first three experiments failed to find sex differences, a final study achieved the desired effect. Undergraduates were exposed to a brief autobiographical statement by a same-sex peer, then to a neutral or unfavorable evaluation of it. They were then asked to rate its author. The males reacted in a manner similar to that of the males in the Schopler studies: They failed to evidence the customary increase in productivity for the dependent supervisor. And, in agreement with Schopler, the females did. Berkowitz (1967) accounted for the results by suggesting that the males acted egocentrically as a result of their pretest personality evaluation. He went on to suggest that the emphasis on personality testing in Schopler's university (versus that of Berkowitz) caused the males in the Schopler studies to be concerned with themselves.

Age Differences in Altruism

Relatively few studies have compared the incidence of altruism in children of different ages on the same task (see Table 8). Comparison of altruism across studies with different age groups is difficult for two reasons. In the first place, most experimental situations differ in the extent to which they elicit altruism. Second, the dependent measure in some studies is the amount given, while in others it is the number of altruistic subjects.

Table 8, indicates that in spite of the differences among situations, some consistency can be found. To begin with, although there are exceptions, few nursery school children give, and those who do generally give little. As the children get older, incidence and amount of altruism tends to increase.

Examining altruism in the first three grades, three studies found evidence for a developmental increase. Midlarsky and Bryan (1967) found that first graders who were exposed to expressive cues gave less than second, third, and fourth graders. (They gave more, however, when they received expressive cues and hugs.) In a control condition, first and second graders gave less than third and fourth graders. Staub and Feagens (1969) found an increase in helping in an emergency situation from kindergarten to the second grade. Ugurel-Semin (1952) found an increase in generosity from age 6 to 8. One study (Floyd, 1964) failed to find an increase in sharing from the first to third grades. The bulk of the evidence, however, suggests a developmental increase.

Advancing to the third, fourth, and fifth grades, more support for a developmental advance in altruism is received. Ugurel-Semin (1952) found that the number of children who demonstrated selfish responses virtually ceased after age 8. There was also a tendency at this time for equalitarian responses to outweigh generous responses. In a study patterned after that of Ugurel-Semin (1952), Handlon and Gross (1959) found that the number of pennies or seals given to a partner increased from kindergarten to the fourth grade. A further increase occurred at the fifth grade, and leveled off at the sixth. Midlarsky and Bryan (1967) found that the number of self-sacrificial responses made by third and fourth graders in a control condition exceeded that made by first and second graders. This pattern prevailed (and was in fact more pronounced) for the number of M&Ms donated in the absence of a model. M. Harris (1968) found that fifth-grade children gave more to charity in a control condition than fourth-grade children. Staub (1968) found a tendency (p < .10) toward an increase in sharing from the fourth to the fifth grade after an experience of success, but a decrease in sharing after an experience of failure. In an emergency situation, however, helping responses decreased in fourth and sixth grades (Staub & Feagans, 1969).

Although the evidence from most studies supports a developmental increase in altruism, studies which have employed generous models

TABLE 8

STUDIES WHICH EXAMINED AGE DIFFERENCES IN ALTRUISM FOR CHILDREN

• No difference between age groups in altruistic responses. b Across all conditiono.

have usually failed to find the age-dependent increase in altruism. No consistent age-dependent increases in altruism were found in the modeling conditions in the Midlarsky and Bryan (1967), Aronfreed and Paskel (1968) or M. Harris (1968) studies. Models may influence younger children more than older children and thereby counter the effect of a developmental increase in altruism.

Three final studies which measured verbal indications of altruistic predispositions, found that altruistic responses increased with age. L. Harris (1967) extracted a group of most altruistic and least altruistic children from a sample of 406 elementary school children on the basis of their responses to three incomplete stories. He found that the ratio of children categorized as most and least altruistic was about two to one for third and fourth graders and five to one for fifth and sixth graders. Durkin (1961) found that more fifth-grade children gave altruistic responses to make-believe situations than second graders. Detailed questioning, however, suggested that their altruism was designed to build credit. And finally, Shure (1968) found that the judgments of fairness, generosity, and selfishness of 8-year-olds were similar to those of both 10-year-olds and adults, but different from those of 4-year-olds and 6-year-olds (which were similar). Although a clear relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior has not been established (Kohlberg, 1964), verbal indications of altruism support the developmental trend suggested by studies on altruistic behavior.

In summary, although the findings are not entirely consistent, there is support for the notion that altruism increases with age. Altruism in nursery school children was consistently low. Verbal reports of altruism showed clear age differences. And finally, several studies found a developmental increase in altruism in conditions that did not contain models.

Ordinal Position and Altruism

Although they are not entirely consistent, findings relevant to the relationship between ordinal position and altruism suggest that children from large families are more altruistic than children from small families, but that other-than-only children are not more altruistic than only children. Friedrichs (1960) and Handlon and Gross (1959) found no difference between the altruism evidenced by only and other-than-only children. Ribal (1963) found that altruistic college students (those who scored high on need for nurturance and low on need for succorance) tended to come from large families, and to be oldest children. Ugurel-Semin (1952) found that Istanbul children from small families were more selfish than those from large families. And Sawyer (1966) found that altruism was correlated with number of older sisters. Finally, L. Harris (1967) failed to find an effect for ordinal position in elementary school children.

Social Class and Group Affliation

Muir and Weinstein (1962) compared upper middle- and lower-class norms of social obligation. They found that although housewives from high and low socioeconomic strata (SES) reacted similarly in most situations, upper middle-class women were more likely than lower-class women to cut off the credit of dilatory debtors and to feel obliged to extrafamilial creditors. They viewed favordoing in an economic idiom: They were harsh creditors, and they tended to avoid the role of debtor. Members of low SES, on the other hand, tended to give when they were able. In general, women from high SES seemed most influenced by norms of reciprocity and exchange, while women from low SES seemed most influenced by considerations of "mutual aid" and the norm of social responsibility (as defined by Daniels and Berkowitz, 1963) .

Berkowitz and Friedman (1967) disagreed with the implications of the findings of Muir and Weinstein (1962). Categorizing members of the middle class as entrepreneurs or bureaucrats, Berkowitz and Friedman (1967) suggested that entrepreneurs are influenced by the norm of reciprocity (and tend, therefore, away from altruism) and that bureaucrats are influenced by the more altruistic prescriptions of the norm of social responsibility. Findings for entrepreneurs and bureaucrats were in accord with predictions: Entrepreneurial middle-class boys were most likely to think that "supervisors" would expect them to work hard after they (the subjects) received prior help. They were also most likely to help less after receiving a small (versus large) amount of prior help. Members of the bureaucratic middle class and members of the working class produced the same amount after receiving a little help and a lot of help. The findings relating to the working class, though, are not in strict accord with the findings of other studies. Two investigations suggested that members of the working class are not oriented to social responsibility. Almond and Verba (1963) found that the positive value of generosity and considerateness increased with education; and Kohn (1959) suggested that the working class is more concerned with immediate consequences of their children's behavior than the inculcation of abstract moral principles.

More in accord with the Almond and Verba (1963) and Kohn (1959) studies are the results of a study by Berkowitz (1966 1968). Working-class boys from Oxford, England worked hardest for those who had previously helped them, especially when their helpers came from a different social class. Bureaucratic middle-class boys acted in accord with the norm of social responsibility. (It is interesting to note that Berkowitz was unable to get enough "entrepreneurial" boys for the experiment even though he offered to pay them for participating.)

In contrast to the suggestions of Almond and Verba (1963), however, Ugurel-Semin ( 1952) found that poor children from Istanbul were less selfish than children from middleclass or rich families. The middle-class children were least generous, and the children from rich families shared evenly least often. Sawyer (1966) also found that YMCA students of the lower middle-class (versus business school or social science students) indicated the greatest willingness to react generously to friends, strangers, and antagonists. Business school students indicated they were most prone to help themselves while hindering antagonists; and social science students were most oriented towards helping their friends.

International Differences in Altruism

Only two investigators (Berkowitz, 1966; Feldman, 1968) tested for international differences in altruism. Establishing international differences, of course, is a very large and general task—one which few investigators have been willing to tackle. Berkowitz (1966), while recognizing the difficulty of creating comparable international experimental situations, found some evidence that low SES boys from Oxford, England are more reciprocity oriented than their Madison, Wisconsin counterparts. No general differences in altruism, however, were found between countries.

Feldman (1968) found differences among the reactions of Bostonians, Parisians, and Athenians to requests for aid. Bostonians were the most likely to give directions to, and mail a stamped letter for, a compatriot. Although it made little difference to Athenians whether the letter contained a stamp or not (their rate of refusal was so high), Parisians and Bostonians were much less likely to mail a letter when it was unstamped.

The findings of Feldman (1968) are noteworthy because they contain the only convincing indication of large scale differences in altruism among international cities. The fact that no real trend appeared across experiments seems to indicate that altruism is largely a function of the specific situations, with people from different countries reacting more or less altruistically according to the circumstances surrounding requests for help.

Although the results of the Berkowitz (1966) and Feldman (1968) studies suggested international differences in altruism, it should be noted that a more conservative (and precise) interpretation would limit them to a comparison among cities. It is not known whether residents of most cities within England, France, Greece, and America would react to the experimental manipulations in the same way as residents of Oxford, Paris, Athens, Madison, and Boston.

In summary, the findings relating to social roles and demographic attributes of benefactors demonstrated that sex, age, ordinal position, social class, and nationality sometimes affect altruism. Although no clear sex differences were found for children, adult males were less prone to help highly dependent others (versus others of low dependency), especially when their status was threatened. Females, on the other hand, were more prone to help others when they were highly dependent. A fairly consistent increase in altruism was found with age. Some evidence suggested that although only children are not less altruistic than other-than-only children, children from large families are more altruistic than those from small families. Evidence was supplied which suggested that members of the bureaucratic middle class are oriented towards social responsibility, and members of entrepreneurial middle class to reciprocity. Working-class boys from Oxford, England also evidenced a reciprocity orientation.

In view of the fact that different situations tend to elicit different amounts of altruism and that people who share social roles differ along other dimensions, it is not surprising that general trends are not frequent. The trends that are found are usually difficult to interpret, and further, more precise, research is usually demanded.

SOCIAL ROLES AND DEMOGRAPHIC

ATTRIBUTES OF THE RECIPIENT

It is difficult to separate social roles of the recipient from interaction variables. Social roles such as foreigner and compatriot, ingrouper and outgrouper, friend and enemy imply a dual classification—the attributes of both benefactor and recipient are assigned. To say that the recipient is a friend, in other words, implies that the benefactor is also a friend. Once again the criterion relating to the experimental source of variation is evoked. The present section reviews studies which manipulated and measured social roles and demographic attributes of recipients.

Although it is likely that social roles and demographic attributes of the recipient such as age, sex, and ordinal position help elicit altruistic behavior, such attributes have not, as yet, been examined. Most studies have held them constant, or allowed them to vary randomly. The four social roles that have been studied are friendship status, ingroup affiliation, social class, and nationality.

Friendship as an Elicitor of Altruism

It would seem that a simple relationship between friendship and altruism should exist. As suggested by Daniels and Berkowitz (1963), "We learn that we can usually expect help from our friends if we need their aid but, similarly, we also know that we should help our friends if they are dependent upon us [p. 142] ." The relationship between friendship and altruism seemed so obvious to Sawyer (1966), in fact, that he validated his altruism scale by examining differences among altruism directed to friends, strangers, and antagonists. He found, as expected, that all groups in all experimental situations exhibited most altruism toward friends and least toward antagonists. Other studies, however, have found more complex relationships between altruism and friendship.

In one of the earliest experimental studies on altruism, Wright (1942) reported a somewhat counterintuitive finding. Third graders were more likely to give the more desirable of two toys to a stranger than to a friend. They were also more likely to favor a stranger when they were asked to serve as "umpires" and assign two toys of unequal attractiveness. Although the first finding was not replicated in a subsequent test, two experiments by Floyd (1964) also found a tendency for children to give less to friends than nonfriends in some situations. The Floyd (1964) experiments are not strictly comparable to those of Wright (1942), however, because Floyd's nonfriend groups consisted of sociometrically neutral and disliked peers, and Wright's nonfriend groups consisted of strangers. In the first experiment by Floyd (1964), friends were compared with ignored others; in the second experiment nonfriends were divided into neutral and disliked groups. It was found that nursery school children (Experiment 1) and first- to third-grade children (Experiment 2) gave more trinkets to friends than nonfriends. They tended, however, to decrease the amount given to friends after receiving many trinkets from them (statistically significant in Experiment 1, not significant in Experiment 2), and to increase the number given after receiving few (not significant in Experiment 1; p < .10 in Experiment 2) . The reverse occurred with neutral and disliked others: An increase occurred after receiving many trinkets (significant in Experiment 1, and for disliked others in Experiment 2), and a decrease occurred after receiving few trinkets (p < .10 in Experiment 1 and significant in the neutral groups in Experiment 2). Floyd (1964) interpreted his findings as support for a gain. loss model which was based on findings relating to level of adaptation. The model predicts that people act in ways that increase gains, and minimize losses, of interpersonal reward. In the two situations where expectations were met (a lot from a friend and little from a nonfriend) no gain was made in interpersonal rewards, so the amount reciprocated was reduced. When a little was received from a friend, it was interpreted as punishment for prior selfishness, and a lot was returned; when a lot was received from a nonfriend, it was interpreted as an invitation to friendship (and interpersonal gain), and a lot was given in return. This interpretation is consistent with the finding that some of the children in Wright's (1942) study who gave to strangers explained their behavior by saying that they wanted to gain a friend.

A study by Epstein and Hornstein (1969) on undergraduates is of interest in this connection. Subjects who liked their partners made more self-sacrificial helping choices when they anticipated punishment (by a third party) for selfish responses than when they did not anticipate punishment. Subjects who disliked their partners, however, reversed this trend—they helped more when they did not anticipate punishment and less when they did. If the reciprocation of a few trinkets by friends is equated with punishment by a liked other, and the reciprocation of many trinkets by nonfriends with lack of punishment by a disliked other, the results of the Floyd (1964) and Epstein and Hornstein (1969) studies are comparable. Examination of the trend across trials in the Epstein and Hornstein study indicates that increments and decrements in giving were similar to those in the Floyd (1964) study.

Epstein and Hornstein (1969) offered several interpretations for their data, none of which explained it all. It is possible that different principles were in effect in different conditions. The finding that punishment (and loss of trinkets) elicited increments in altruism from friends was probably the result of the negative reinforcement of one choice in a two-choice situation. Punishment (and a few trinkets) indicates a potential loss of friendship. Punishment from an enemy, however, may have created a situation of antagonism in which the subject had the last word—he, in effect, got even. Reward (or lack of punishment) in relation to a nonfriend was probably interpreted as a gesture of friendship (much like a person extending his hand) and was, therefore, reciprocated. The reaction to reward from a friend, though, is difficult to interpret. It would seem that when friends behave generously they are taken for granted and their partners benefit themselves. Whether these interpretations are correct or not, it is interesting to note that the behavior displayed in these studies seems most easily explained from a reinforcement perspective.

IngrouP Affliation as an Elicitor of Altruism

Common experience demonstrates that people are more prone to give to people who are close to them than to people who are not. The sacrifices of one family member for another, or of a lover for his mate, for example, are expected to exceed those in other relationships. Some studies have examined the effect of ingroup affiliation on altruism. Friedrichs (1960) found that more altruism was directed toward ingroup recipients than outgroup recipients, especially when the benefactors were authoritarian. Campbell (1965) demonstrated that ingroup sacrifice was common in the face of outgroup threat.

The series of experiments by Feldman (1968) is relevant to the effect of ingroup affiliation on altruism. Foreigners can be considered outgroup members, and compatriots ingroup members. Feldman (1968) found that Parisians and Athenians were more willing to give directions to compatriots than foreigners, but that Bostonians treated them the same. Bostonians, however, were less likely to mail an unstamped letter for a foreigner than a compatriot. Hornstein et al. (1968), with American subjects, found that fewer wallets were returned to their owners when the finders were led to believe that a foreigner had found and relost the wallet than when they thought the previous finder was not foreign (i.e., was similar to them). In some situations, then, compatriots are helped more, but in others (especially in Athens) foreigners are given most help.

Social Class as an Elicitor of Altruism

Although most of the research on class differences focused on the social class of benefactors, some research suggests that recipients from the working class tend to elicit less help than middle-class recipients. Questionnaire responses in the Berkowitz and Friedman ( 1967) study indicated that middle-class boys were more attractive than working-class boys to peers of both classes. Entrepreneurial middle-class boys who received little prior help from a working-class partner worked less hard for a working-class (versus middle-class) supervisor. In general, though, most help was given to partners of the same social class. In Oxford, England (Berkowitz, 1966, 1968) working-class boys tended to work hardest for middle-class supervisors. Middle-class partners, on the other hand, worked least hard for working-class partners. The trends, however, were not consistent throughout conditions.

In summary, several studies suggest that potential recipients are sometimes more likely to elicit benefits when they are friends, ingroupers, and members of the same social class and nationality as benefactors. Other studies, though, suggest that nonfriends, outgroupers, foreigners, and members of higher social classes elicit more altruism. It is posSible that the seemingly contradictory findings support the same general principle. Studies on interpersonal attraction may offer a clue. Daniels and Berkowitz (1963) and Epstein and Hornstein (1969) manipulated interpersonal attractiveness by varying similarity between potential benefactor and recipient. Other studies (e.g., Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1956; Novak & Lerner, 1968) have found that similarity results in attraction. Friendship and ingroup affiliation imply a sharing of roles, a similarity, as does congruity between social class. The evidence suggests that the more similar the potential recipient is to his benefactor, the more likely he is to elicit altruism, unless the benefactor is in a position of prestige. When more was given to nonfriends, outgroupers, and members of different social classes, it may have been because the recipients were of high prestige, and, therefore, also attractive. Whether because of similarity or prestige, then, the attractiveness of the recipient may have elicited altruism.

NORMS THAT AFFECT BENEFACTORS

Some investigators have suggested that people act altruistically because of the prescriptions of social norms. It has been suggested that altruism is regulated by two social norms—the norm of social responsibility, and the norm of giving. The level of analysis at which normative explanations occur is thought to be appropriate to sociological theory, but its contribution to psychological research is questioned.

The Norm of Social Responsibility

Research has been reviewed which demonstrated that people tend to help those who are dependent on them. Berkowitz and his colleagues (e.g., Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963) attributed such helping to the influence of the 'norm of social responsibility," which prescribes that people should help those who need help. Normative analysis suggests that people act altruistically in particular situations because it is the proper thing to do.

The notion that people act in accord with normative standards of conduct seems quite sound as far as it goes. It would seem, though, that it does not go far enough. Although normative analysts (e.g., Berkowitz [footnoteRef:4] ) have criticized the explanatory circularity of reinforcement theory, the postulation of social norms can also end in tautology. A particular response, for example, can be predicted on the basis of a norm. If it occurs, the norm is said to have had an effect. If it does not occur, the situation is said to fall outside the range of the norm. In cases where the norm is established on the basis of the behavior it is supposed to predict, it is in the same position as Skinner's (1953) reinforcer—its existence is established by the effect it produces. The danger with normative analysis is that norms can be invented post hoc to explain almost anything. Although Berkowitz has taken steps toward the specification of eliciting situations—dependency is said to evoke the norm of social responsibility—the increase in understanding supplied by the postulation of norms can still be questioned. Because it is assumed that the norm is internalized, and that it gains its power from its ability to evoke positive and negative affect, normative analysis ultimately contains a cognitive-affective base. Understanding of the effects of norms, it would seem, awaits elucidation of their cognitive-affective representations. At any rate, the methods used to study social norms should be different from the operations used to establish their effects. And once norms are identified, focus should shift to the dynamics of their internalization and the conditions of their effect. [4: Berkowitz, L. Beyond exchange: ideals and other factors affecting helping and altruism. Unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin, 1968.]

The Norm of Giving

When Gouldner (1960) outlined the range of what he called the norm of reciprocity, he mentioned some situations in which it did not apply. The situations contained one essential characteristic: They all involved dependent recipients such as the very young, the very old, and the sick. Leeds (1963) suggested that another norm applies in situations which are beyond the range of the norm of reciprocity. She called this norm the norm of giving, and suggested that situations in which the norm of giving was influential involved "role vacuums" or "social vacuums." Role vacuums consist of nonprescribed opportunities for altruism. The "whore with a heart" is an example. Social vacuums occur in situations where institutionalized means of action are not available. Emergency situations are cases in point. In short, the norm of giving applies in situations where help is needed, but no institutionalized means of help is available.

Leeds' (1963) concern, like that of Gouldner (1960), was with the sociological function of norms. Little psychological research has examined the norm of giving, even though it may have been antecedent to many altruistic situations.

NORMS WHICH AFFECT THE ALTRUISMELICITING CAPACITY OF RECIPIENTS The Generation of Debt and the Norm of Reciprocity

The norm of reciprocity, as postulated by Gouldner ( 1960) , prescribes that people should help those who have helped them, and that people should not injure those who have helped them. Research pertaining to the effect of the norm of reciprocity is thought to relate to the altruism-eliciting capacity of recipients because in the prototypical experimental situation it is the generosity of the potential recipient that is varied. The fact that the generosity of the recipient is an attribute that he acquired in the role of benefactor does not alter the fact that the altruism-eliciting variable lies with the recipient. The characteristic of the recipient of importance here relates to his role as creditor. Implicit in the examination of research relevant to the norm of reciprocity is the notion of a less general level of analysis—one which identifies eliciting characteristics of recipients within the normative framework of their culture. The state variable reference of reciprocity, therefore, should be kept in mind.

It might, of course, be wondered whether the payment of debt constitutes altruism. According to the definition employed here (and, it is thought, the results of common attribution) strict reciprocity falls outside the range of altruistic behavior. Behavior which repays more than it owes, or repays favors that did not generate expectation of return, on the other hand, seems altruistic. A relatively undiscriminating examination of the research on reciprocity will be made, though, in the hope of elucidating general determinants of altruism, and, if nothing else, clarifying the distinction between reciprocity and altruism,

Research on the effects of reciprocity and altruism has examined two distinct relationships. The first is straightforward—it involves a recipient to whom something is owed. In the second situation, the owed recipient is not available for repayment, and payment is generalized to someone else.

As described by Gouldner (1960), the sociological purpose of the norm of reciprocity is to prevent exploitation of the weak by the powerful and to insure that people pay their debts. The force of the norm of reciprocity is variable according to (a) the need state of the original recipient (who becomes the benefactor), (b) the resources of the original donor (who becomes the recipient), (c) the motives imputed to the original donor, and (d) the extent to which the original donor gave of his own free will (p. 171). Gouldner ( 1960) recognized the fact that reciprocal behavior is usually expedient—the building of credit increases security. Research has demonstrated that all four factors influence reciprocity.

In the only sociological study relevant to Gouldner's (1960) discussion, Muir and Weinstein (1962) tested the applicability of Gouldner's (1960) model to the exchange of small favors. "Intensive interviews" showed that females from high and low SES thought that the magnitude of a debt was related to the original recipient's need or desire (Gouldner's point a) and to the resources of the original donor (Gouldner's b). Females from the high SES thought debts were greater when the original favors were given freely (Gouldner's d).

Other investigators, who used laboratory manipulations, supplied further support for Gouldner's contentions. Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) found that undergraduate females did more work for supervisors after they received voluntary (but not compulsory) help from them, even though they did not expect to see them again (Gouldner's d). Frisch and Greenberg (1968) found that undergraduate males who competed with a partner for two dollars were more likely to help him accumulate "proficiency credits" when they thought they had received a lot (versus a little) prior help, especially when the help was perceived as intentional (Gouldner's d).

Pruitt (1968) offered further support for the effect of reciprocity, and for Gouldner's point b. Male undergraduates gave more to a partner during a mixed-motive game when they had previously received a lot (versus a little) from him. They also gave more when they had received 80% of one dollar than 20% of four dollars. Strictly expedient expectations (using reciprocity as a tactic to get future favors) did not seem to be operative—subjects did not give any more to those who had large (versus small) future resources.

Studies on inappropriate favors (e.g., Brehm & Cole, 1966; Schopler & Thompson, 1968) supported Gouldner's point c. Reciprocity was inhibited when the motives of the original benefactors were questioned.

Two studies extended the generality of the findings on reciprocity to children. Staub and Sherk (in press) found that fourth-grade children shared a crayon longer with children who had previously shared a lot (versus a little) candy with them. M. Harris (1968) found that fourth- and fifth-grade children gave to models who gave to them.

Limitations on the occurrence of reciprocal help-giving were revealed in several studies. Berkowitz and Friedman (1967), for example, found that although the norm of reciprocity seemed to influence the helping behavior of sons of middle-class entrepreneurs and workers, sons of middle-class bureaucratics were influenced by the norm of social responsibility. Floyd (1964) found that although children tended to increase the number of trinkets given to nonfriends after receiving a lot from them, they tended to decrease the number after receiving a lot from friends. Moreover, although selfish nonfriends elicited a decrease in giving, selfish friends elicited an increase. It would seem that the history of reciprocal exchanges between friends alters the set of expectations that governs the norm of reciprocity. It is also possible, of course, that friends planned to even up after the experiment.

Different Recipients—Generalized Reciprocity

Reciprocity refers to an obligatory bond between two people. In some cases, though, a third person is involved. When one person helps another person, then leaves the field, the recipient of the benefits may be more likely to help a third person. This behavior does not, as some investigators have assumed, constitute reciprocity, at least in the sense that Gouldner (1960) meant it. It is possible that the dynamics of owing are not operative at all. The norm of reciprocity prescribes that people should help those who help them—it says nothing about third parties. To remain consistent with the language of relevant investigators, the term generalized reciprocity is employed. It is meant as a descriptive, not an explanatory title.

Berkowitz and Daniels (1964) found that workers who received help from a confederate helped a highly dependent supervisor more than those who did not. The investigators interpreted these results as support for the hypothesis that the observation of helping increases the salience of the social responsibility norm, which results in further helping. It is also possible that those who were helped felt better, and the resulting positive affect mediated altruism. A further study (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966) found some differences among voluntary-, compulsory-, and refused-help conditions. Workers in the voluntary-help (same person) condition produced more for their supervisors than workers in the other two conditions. Workers in the refused-help condition indicated that they did not think that people would expect them to work hard for their supervisors. A later study (Berkowitz & Friedman, 1967) found social class differences in generalized reciprocity. Boys from the entrepreneurial middle class (but not from the bureaucratic middle class or working class) worked hard for their supervisors after they received a lot of help— whether they thought they had received it from their supervisor or a different supervisor.

A study by Test and Bryan (in press) compared the effects of modeling, dependency, and generalized reciprocity on helping behavior in female undergraduates. Experimental conditions in which a model helped a third person, and in which the subject himself was helped, resulted in more subsequent helping than no-model and negative-model conditions. The investigators concluded that generalized reciprocity had little effect beyond that of modeling. The fact that situations which involve reciprocity also involve models suggests an overlap in determinants of altruism.

Although there may be limitations in certain social classes and with long range acquaintances, the bulk of the evidence supports Gouldner's (1960) suggestion that people tend to return favors. They are most likely to reciprocate when the original benefactor gave something he needed, when he had little, when he was sincere, and when he gave voluntarily. Moreover, several studies found that when people are unable to contact their original benefactors, they are prone to give to others.

CONCLUSIONS

Although large segments of the research on altruism failed to supply consistent findings, several trends have appeared. New developments in reinforcement theory, and the rise of concern with the process of attribution have begun to supply new ways of looking at altruism. The concept, however, is still unclear and no way has been found to measure its motivational base.

Elucidation of antecedents of altruistic behavior has not awaited the specification of the phenomenon; operational definitions have supplied a way of bypassing the issue. Research projects have appraised the correlates and determinants of altruism from several different perspectives. Most research examined the effect of temporary states of the benefactor. Both positive affective states associated with success and competence, and negative affective states associated with harming another resulted in altruistic behavior. States associated with the observation of altruistic models also mediated altruistic responses. Although the bulk of studies on modeling seem best analyzed in relation to the temporary effect of models, some studies suggested that the observation of models leads to the acquisition of behavioral dispositions and personality traits.

Research which examined the effect of temporary states of the recipient suggested that the basic altruism-eliciting attribute of recipients is their dependency. The trait as well as the state of dependency was found to elicit altruism. In most cases externally caused dependency elicited more altruism than internally caused dependency, but in cases where the status of the recipient was seen as a potential threat, internally caused dependency elicited the greater amount of altruism. Besides dependency, interpersonal attractiveness of the recipient was found to relate to altruism. Although few studies purposefully manipulated the variable, it seems likely that interpersonal attractiveness incidentally influenced the responses of benefactors in many studies. Some studies, however, indicated that attractiveness and altruism do not always go together.

Studies which examined trait variables were plagued with difficulties. Because altruism is a positive trait, it is difficult to separate it from other positive characteristics. Although trait studies generally found that altruists were well adjusted, sociable, and unassuming people, the validity of their measures of altruism was usually in doubt. Studies which used behavioral measures of altruism were less likely than studies which used rating-scale and pencil-and-paper test measures to find trait correlates.

In relation to social roles and demographic attributes of benefactors, several trends appeared. Although altruism did not consistently relate to sex in children, adult males were found to act less altruistically toward highly (versus lowly) dependent others, especially if they seemed threatening. Altruistic females acted more altruistically toward highly dependent others. A fairly consistent increase in altruism with age was found in children. There was some indication that people from large families are more altruistic than people from small families. Social-class differences were also found. Members of the working class and entrepreneurial middle class tended to behave in accord with the norm of reciprocity. Bureaucratic middle classers, on the other hand, were more socially responsible. Finally, although some international differences were found, they did not form a general pattern. When it came to social roles of recipients, an examination of the effects of friendship status, ingroup affiliation, and social class suggested that people give to those who are similar to them, to those who are prestigious, and to those from whom they stand to gain.

The level of normative analysis was rejected as it related to benefactors, and variables associated with social norms were analyzed according to their state reference.

In relation to recipients, research was reviewed which supported Gouldner's (1960) notions relating to the norm of reciprocity. An examination of what has been called generalized reciprocity demonstrated that the receipt of favors results in a general disposition toward altruism, in some situations. Although research was analyzed in the category of social norms, a state variable reference was assumed.

Considered as a whole, research on altruism has begun to identify general correlates and antecedents of particular beneficial behaviors. It has helped supply hints concerning socialization and the effect of judgments of altruism on everyday behavior. It has also cast light on important theoretical issues such as the viability of the psychoanalytic and reinforcement perspectives.

Philosophers were originally concerned with altruism because it related in an essential way to the nature of man. Although the methodology of current researchers is different, and their focus more specific, they are, in the final analysis, also trying to understand human nature. Many have welcomed the new research on the positive aspects of man, but it should be realized that the study of beneficial behaviors does not establish the existence of altruism. Elucidation of the phenomenon of altruism is, in fact, as capable of shaking the foundation of man's self-conception as elucidation of such things as aggression and anxiety. Unfortunately, the fact that man acts altruistically does not mean that he is altruistic. The hopeful thing about research, however, is that at the same time as it sorts out antecedents, it identifies mechanisms that can lead to change.

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(Received April 21, 1969)