HLSS3

RESEARCH ARTICLE

The failure of police ‘fusion’ centers and the concept of a national intelligence sharing plan

Robert W. Taylor* and Amanda L. Russell

The University of Texas at Dallas, 800 West Campbell Rd., GR 31, Richardson, TX 75080, USA

The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) originated primarily in response to the September 11 attacks with the intended goal of improving the coordi- nation of law enforcement agencies through better mechanisms of intelligence sharing. These mechanisms have taken form as fusion centers whereby information is col- lected, stored, analyzed, converted into intelligence, and subsequently disseminated to other agencies. According to the NCISP, local fusion centers report to state fusion cen- ters that ultimately report to the National Counter Terrorism Center for a coordinated response to potential criminal and terrorist threats. Though well-intentioned, there is very little evidence to suggest that the goals of improved communication and coordi- nation have been accomplished through the NCISP or fusion centers. The authors argue that the structure and mission of law enforcement agencies undermines the very essence of fusion centers and what they are intended to do. In particular, agencies still possess a number of traits (e.g., autonomy and interagency ego) that hinder the effec- tive and efficient sharing of information and intelligence. Moreover, local agencies operating fusion centers are required to assume roles, strategies, and techniques inher- ent to the military and federal law enforcement operations. These issues are reviewed and recommendations are discussed for future applications of fusion centers.

Keywords: fusion centers; intelligence; homeland security; terrorism

Introduction

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 have undoubtedly left a lasting impression on national homeland security policies and law enforcement strategies at the federal, state, and local levels. A recent report indicates that there are now 1271 government organizations and 1931 private organizations involved in homeland security, intelligence- gathering, and counterterrorism issues (Priest & Arkin, 2010b). The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) alone has contributed more than $340 million between 2004 and 2009 (DHS, 2009) toward the development of new agencies centered on the goal of improving the coordination of policing agencies through intelligence sharing (Jackson & Brown, 2007). If we learned anything from 9/11 it was that the proper coordination of police and security agencies as well as the sharing of intelligence information in this country was almost non-existent prior to the attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

Today, local police departments are implementing their own brand of intelligence gathering and analysis through the planned networking of large databases that seek to contribute to the national process of intelligence gathering and sharing. This new strategy,

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

Police Practice and Research Vol. 13, No. 2, April 2012, 184–200

ISSN 1561-4263 print/ISSN 1477-271X online � 2011 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2011.581448 http://www.tandfonline.com

the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan – NCISP (2003), combines the public partnership concepts of community policing with problem-solving tactics that aim to enhance police efficiency and draw attention to the primary concern of intelligence-led policing: preventing crime and terrorist attacks through effective communication and coordination. The strategic integration of intelligence, with an emphasis on predictive analysis derived from the discovery of hard facts, information, patterns, and good crime analysis defines intelligence-led policing (ILP). An important hallmark of ILP is the reli- ance on sophisticated computers and software programs to assist police decision-makers in their daily duties. Ultimately, the goal of ILP is to provide an expansive intelligence system that not only helps coordinate agency responses, but also informs objective deci- sion-making on how to prevent and combat crime and terrorism (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008).

However, modern technology and sophisticated analysis programs cannot replace the need to foster and maintain ‘human’ relationships with members of the public at large (RAND Corporation, 2004). The information gathered by police through undercover operations, the use of informants, and positive contacts with the general citizenry are important elements in reducing crime through preventative techniques, and assisting law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism. The housing of this information (as well as other information) into large data ‘clearinghouses’, or fusion centers, can be observed in police departments throughout the country. Ideally, these fusion centers serve as hubs for information on crime and terrorist operations in a specific region focusing on the recogni- tion of patterns, indications and warnings, source development, interdiction, and coordi- nation of critical criminal justice resources. Fusion centers are supposed to be the ‘brains’ within police agencies (and the wider law enforcement community) and a necessary addi- tion in the era of ILP, post 9/11 (Taylor & Davis, 2010). Ideally, fusion centers collect, store, and provide local, state, and federal agencies with critical information regarding potential terrorist plots before they occur so that effective prevention can take place. Essentially, fusion centers are supposed to collect intelligence, or data and information that has been evaluated, analyzed, and produced with careful conclusions and recommen- dations, and share that intelligence with other agencies. According to the neat and well- scripted plan of the NCISP, local fusion centers report to state fusion centers that ulti- mately report to the National Counter Terrorism Center in Washington, DC for a coordi- nated response to potential threats. Unfortunately, the best laid plans of ‘mice and men’ may not work as well as scripted! Throwing millions of dollars at local agencies toward building fusion centers to share information simply has not solved traditional problems between federal, state, and local agencies. Furthermore, there are significant problems with fusion centers that threaten our democratic foundation and the coordination of police resources at various levels continues to plague American law enforcement.

This paper argues that the structure and mission of law enforcement agencies under- mines the very essence of fusion centers as well as what they are intended to do and who they are intended to protect. For example, under the framework of ILP, fusion cen- ters force state, local, and tribal police departments, in particular, to assume roles, strate- gies, and techniques inherent to the military and to the operations of federal law enforcement agencies. This ‘militarization’ of police confuses the distinction between external security and intelligence collection/analysis focused on foreign threats vs. inter- nal law enforcement and policing, and has the potential to trigger civil liberty abuses through invasions of privacy and racial profiling – despite Carter’s reference to ILP as a ‘new dimension of community policing’ (2004, p. 5). Furthermore, though there appears to be movements toward more centralized and coordinated intelligence operations, agen-

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cies still possess a number of traits (e.g., autonomy and interagency ego) which hinder the effective and efficient sharing of information and intelligence. Lastly, police are likely to return to their traditional roles as the demands and constraints of fusion centers out- weigh the benefits of their products. In consideration of these issues, fusion centers are proving to be unsuccessful in achieving their intended objectives.

Defining intelligence

The term ‘intelligence’ often refers to information that is significant or relevant to an impending event and that will be a contribution to the positive outcome of that specific incident. It is paramount that one understands the monumental differences between infor- mation and intelligence. Information is nothing more than data that has yet to be screened and interpreted through professional analysis. Once information has been analyzed, then it becomes legitimate intelligence (Taylor & Davis, 2010).

The analytical step towards processing gathered information into intelligence is often a misunderstood concept as well. Technology has offered analysts the comfort of reduc- ing the number of people that can be responsible for categorizing and storing data. How- ever, complete analysis of gathered information requires critical thinking that results in conclusions and recommendations stemming from the analyzed information. It is through effective analysis that law enforcement officials make informed decisions and base impor- tant deployment actions (Taylor & Davis, 2010).

Historically the missing dimension in quality intelligence has been analysis. The transformation of raw data, whether acquired through human, technical, or open sources, must be collated, scrutinized, and processed accurately and timely. The ultimate goal of this analytic process is a finished product more intelligible, accurate, and usable than the data and information drawn upon to prepare it. Intelligence, then, is a product derived from systematic and thoughtful examination, placed in context, and provided to law enforcement executives with facts and alternatives that can inform critical decisions (Peterson, 2005).

The development and proliferation of fusion centers

Today, there are over 70 state and regional intelligence centers, or fusion centers as they are commonly known, working in a ‘collaborative’ effort to provide law enforcement with analytic support; in turn, the information originating from these centers is intended to maximize law enforcement’s ‘ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity’ (Fusion Center Guidelines, 2006, p. 3).

Much of the appeal of fusion centers originates from the involvement of numerous agencies at varying levels. Most include representatives from state and local law enforce- ment agencies, public health organizations, and federal organizations, such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI, 2009) (Johnson, 2007). The New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) typifies this type of multiagency approach. For example, the NYSIC includes representatives from the New York Department of Corrections, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the US Attorney’s Office, and the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement all based in a cen- tralized location to aid other agencies at all times (Johnson & Dorn, 2008). By integrating a number of agencies, in theory, the end result is expected to provide officials with both a micro- and macro-level view of criminal and terrorist threats in a ‘timely and efficient manner’ (Johnston, 2007).

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Although the concept of fusion centers is relatively new, state and regional intelli- gence centers have been around for several decades and were, most notably, a staple in the counterdrug initiatives of the 1980s (Carter, 2004); the novelty of fusion centers, however, resides in the emphasis of permanently incorporating a variety of agencies that have traditionally operated as separate entities (Rollins & Connors, 2007). This detail proved to be especially important given the timing of the emergence of fusion centers and the numerous events that contributed to their proliferation. Specifically, the circum- stances of September 11 gave rise to significant legislative developments and changes in policing philosophies. Greater attention shifted to homeland security and the war on ter- rorism as pressing national issues to be addressed by all levels of government (Stewart & Morris, 2009), including those not traditionally charged with such duties (e.g., municipal police agencies). To help bolster this new concept of homeland security, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, for example, amended laws which significantly increased the authority of police (Deflem, 2002). Most notably, it provided them with enhanced surveil- lance capabilities and with the means necessary to improve communications between fed- eral and local agencies (Oliver, 2009).

Three years later, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission substantiated the need for a more cooperative effort between law enforcement agencies in maintaining domestic security (see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). As a result, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was enacted (Jonas & Harper, 2006), which not only created the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counter Terrorism Center, but also established the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to ‘facilitate the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, tribal and private sector entities, through the use of policy guidelines and technologies’ (Summary of Intelligence Reform and Terror- ism Prevention Act of 2004, 2004, para. 29).

Additionally, the emergence and proliferation of fusion centers occurred in tandem with the emergence of ILP and other data-driven policing philosophies, both of which easily subsume the mission of these centers. In particular, the link between ILP and fusion centers lies in the use of technology, intelligence, and interagency collaboration in counterterrorism efforts. Like fusion centers, the popularity of ILP in the USA grew as a byproduct of the September 11 attacks. Used as a strategic law enforcement tool, ILP promotes the gathering of intelligence and sharing of information that ‘can be employed through the identification of threats and the development of responses to meet those threats’ (Oliver, 2009, p. 256). One of the defining characteristics of ILP is that it shifts the focus onto the offender (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008) and criminal enterprises (Carter, 2004) and away from reported crime; in addition, it emphasizes prevention and requires law enforcement to ‘think globally and act locally’ in response to the threat of terrorism (Carter, 2004, p. 4). Whereas ILP stresses the strategic role of police, data-driven policing operates as a tactical method that provides officers with real-time data. This type of infor- mation, theoretically, allows police to uncover the nexus between terrorism and low-level crime (Johnson, 2007). Compstat, an arguable form of data-driven policing, complements the basic tenets of ILP – with both functions mirroring what fusion centers are intended to do, with an added benefit of attention to police accountability.

Fusion gone awry

Although fusion centers, and the many variations thereof (e.g., command centers, emergency management operations centers, and information clearinghouses, etc.), are

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flourishing, evidence suggests they are perhaps another illustration of a criminal justice response which is good in theory but bad in practice. For instance, in several fusion cen- ters, analytic software was purchased without training, forcing analysts to have rudimen- tary knowledge of sophisticated software. In other cases, the actual collection of intelligence information is very limited, with analysts working on strategies developed from information derived from one officer’s report or confidential informant. There is very little oversight as to ‘what’ is being collected and even less on ‘how and why’ some individuals and groups become targets of an investigation while others remain hidden to the police; an issue that directly confronts our democratic ideal of being innocent until proven guilty. There are few written guidelines instructing fusion centers as to what is important information and should be forwarded to the state fusion center; those decisions are left to individual analysts and supervising officers. Yet in other cases, supervising officers are rotated in and out of police fusion centers as part of a normal rotation, again without training in the intelligence process. However, the most important observation regarding fusion centers is that they are usually much more focused on crime than on ter- rorism; they are tactical and not strategic. Indeed, while they were developed on federal funds primarily aimed at preventing terrorism, they have evolved into very large (and sophisticated) crime analysis and emergency response centers aimed at tactically reducing crime in a specific jurisdiction or providing internal statistical data for the chief. Most of the time for an analyst in a police fusion center is devoted to providing advanced crime analysis products, such as the development of complex link analysis charts of a large drug trafficking network, tracing stolen property relating to an inter-state fencing opera- tion, or tracking victims in a human trafficking case. While this is certainly not all bad, and does indeed assist in multiple agency coordination, it does belie the question of ‘who’ is focused on anti-terrorism in any specific jurisdiction. The truth be known, most police agencies simply do not focus on terrorism and/or anti-terrorism issues unless a specific threat is uncovered. Most of the resources of a police department continue (and rightfully so) to be focused on the prevention, detection, and reduction of crime. Indeed, this sentiment is well presented in a statement made by a chief in a large metropolitan city interviewed for this paper, ‘No chief ever lost their job for a terrorist strike, but they lose their jobs everyday for a spike in the crime rate’.

Lastly, one of the touted benefits of fusion centers is that they allow smaller agencies to access information and resources that would otherwise not be readily available to them (Stewart & Morris, 2009). For example, the New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelli- gence Center supports the efforts of cooperating agencies within the region with the col- lection, analysis, and sharing of intelligence and information from a variety of sources (Rollins & Connors, 2007). However, as will be later discussed, researchers have shown that the size of a jurisdiction is not related to agency preparedness for terrorist attacks; but rather is predicted by perceived risk (RAND Corporation, 2004; Stewart & Morris, 2009).

Structure and culture of police organizations

The organizational schema of law enforcement in the USA is not particularly conducive to counterterrorism efforts and a homeland policing model; in other words, American law enforcement agencies are not collectively oriented toward a global perspective. Instead, the system of US policing is one that is situated toward distinct local strategies, ‘deflect [s] systematic national control or regulation’, and ‘weaken[s] claims of any universal approach’ (Stewart & Morris, 2009, p. 291). One of the strengths of this fragmented and

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decentralized structure is that police are cognizant of the needs of their communities and are therefore better apt to deal with them . . . hence the success of the community polic- ing model initiated during the 1980s. Although a localized approach is the preferred method from an effective policing standpoint, it also makes information sharing difficult (Rollins & Connors, 2007). More specifically, the differences in interagency staffing, size, objectives, and needs of their respective communities contribute to this problem (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). Variation in information collection and retention serves as an additional barrier (Carter & Carter, 2009). While this lack of centralized focus is prob- lematic from a federal perspective, from a state and local perspective, it allows law enforcement to create a fusion center that is tailored to their needs. For instance, the Dal- las Police Department Fusion Center was specifically developed as a ‘tactical fusion cen- ter’, focused on all hazards and all crimes, providing near real-time information to officers on the street in an attempt to prevent crime (and terrorist attacks) and vastly improve the potential for arresting offenders. The success of the Dallas center is that it is indeed focused on crime and has been instrumental in helping solve complex cases including arsons, ATM thefts and robberies, and various murders. Empirically, trying to assess the center’s involvement in preventing terrorist attacks is much more daunting. For instance, in the September 2009 Fountain Place bombing attempt by Hosam Smadi, the fusion center was completely left out of the investigative process due to the ‘need for security’. Their involvement was limited to tracking agents and officers during the arrest. Indeed, in almost all of the infamous ‘homegrown terrorist’ attacks garnering national attention in 2009, there is scant evidence that any regional fusion or intelligence center was even involved in the investigative process (Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, forthcoming 2012). To the contrary, most of these cases stemmed from internal FBI or FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force efforts with very limited involvement from local and state police agencies.

Despite the creation of numerous new agencies (e.g., ISE) and initiatives (e.g., Joint Regional Information Exchange System [JRIES]) to improve information sharing, effec- tive practices are often inhibited by a resistance or inability to do so. According to Carter and Carter (2009), one reason for this occurrence is because an agency loses control of that information once it has been distributed. Upon dissemination, agencies are vulnerable to the liability associated with such information and can become exposed to the critique and censure of other agencies. Similarly, loss of control also reduces the likelihood that the originating agency will receive credit for the success of any case. In other words, par- ticipation in information sharing can be hindered by agency ego; a problem that has been long recognized nationally by local agencies trying to collaborate with the FBI. While some improvement has been noted, the coordination of intelligence and investigative functions between the FBI and state/local agencies is still dismally poor. Finally, and on the opposite end of the spectrum, it may be logistical purposes that preclude an agency from being involved in the information sharing process (e.g., technological deficiencies). Although the alternative in this case is for agencies to work alone, it is argued that this approach handicaps them in detecting and preventing terrorism (Johnson & Dorn, 2008).

Although information sharing among law enforcement agencies has been problematic throughout the history of American policing, the reactive nature of law enforcement also poses significant challenges to fusion center operations. As previously discussed, fusion centers are rooted in the basic tenets of the ILP model which stress intelligence gathering; however, intelligence gathering is not a customary strategy used in state and local polic- ing (Taylor & Davis, 2010). Instead, traditional police activities are ‘oriented at suspects of criminal cases’, whereas intelligence gathering ‘involves the routinized collection of

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information without the necessity of a criminal event’ (Deflem, 2004, p. 77). As a result, the emphasis on intelligence gathering elicits the need for law enforcement to make sev- eral adjustments to their existing structure and organization. According to scholars, these modifications mandate that the agency does the following: (1) changes the structure or creates a new intelligence unit; (2) mandates and promotes the participation of other indi- viduals and organizations as ‘contributors and consumers’ of intelligence; (3) modifies attitudes and functions of police employees; and (4) creates new information sharing pro- cedures across the various law enforcement partnerships (Carter & Carter, 2009).

In short, an emphasis on homeland security, terrorism, and emergency response in today’s law enforcement operations has complicated traditionally defined policing roles and processes. In one regard, policing has reverted back to a crime control model which stresses long-established policing tactics (e.g., criminal code and traffic enforcements) that will arguably force police departments to return to a more centralized operation (Stewart & Morris, 2009). Furthermore, the restructuring of counterterrorism efforts to include state and local agencies has triggered the need for police to significantly modify their operations to accommodate this latest shift in ideology. While improved collaborations between law enforcement agencies have been essential in this new era of homeland secu- rity, the need for improved technology has been almost as significant . . . and trouble- some. Unfortunately, there is very little evidence to suggest that the goals of improved communication and coordination in an effort to thwart terrorism have been accomplished. The authors suggest that most fusion centers within police departments have simply opted to take a much more ‘tactical’ approach to using these sophisticated intelligence hubs as advanced crime analysis centers focused on reducing crime in their specific jurisdiction.

The federalization and militarization of state and local law enforcement

With an ever-increasing emphasis on counterterrorism as the responsibility of all levels of government, law enforcement is now expected to become more federalized as the pres- sures to participate in these types of efforts continue. This is particularly evident by rea- son of ILP as the designated strategy framing the operations of fusion centers: ILP itself is ‘conceptually militaristic’ based on the notoriety of the military’s intelligence-gathering techniques. The concept was bolstered by General David Petraeus’s perspective that the USA must work ‘smarter’ to prevent and deter terrorism both domestically and abroad (2010). This of course raises concerns since military strategies are not intended for domestic policing (Jackson & Brown, 2007). Despite the influence of the military model in the development of American policing (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997), a counterinsurgency, militaristic paradigm in counterterrorism efforts confuses the distinction between the two entities. Such proactive policing can interfere in due process and rule of law (Crelinsten, 1998). And because local police are involved in these types of activities, estimates indi- cate that there are now approximately 800,000 operatives associated with the intimate workings of fusion centers (German & Stanley, 2008), thereby illustrating the expansion of a nationalized police organization and the increase of military-like operations.

The events of September 11 have compelled law enforcement agents at all ranks to be vigilant in the detection and prevention of terrorism. Officials are expected to report suspicious activity, participate in the strategic process of preventing such acts, and serve as emergency responders. The Department of Homeland Security, the USA PATRIOT Act, and Congress have all provided law enforcement and police agencies within the USA with the authority to participate in such activities. A controversial mandate sup- ported by the US Department of Justice, now requires that officers monitor and report

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suspicious behaviors back to fusion centers. Such suspicious activity reports (SARs) create a ‘stream of intelligence’ about a number of routine activities that may be deemed of a criminal or non-criminal nature (German & Stanley, 2008). Recent legislation has also allowed police the right of mandatory detention and deportation of noncitizens given their political affiliations and actions (Jackson & Brown, 2007).

Due to this increased power allotted to federal, state, and local law enforcement agen- cies – and even select private corporations – these entities have access to more informa- tion than ever before. Through the increased issuance of secret and top-secret security clearances and loopholes across state privacy laws, fusion center personnel have greater access to more privately and publicly owned resources storing vast amounts of personal data. Civil rights advocates worry that the increase in federal security clearances serves as further proof of the federalization of fusion centers and participating agencies (Carter & Carter, 2009).

Although the federalization of state and local law enforcement agencies has produced a number of concerns, it is perhaps the trend towards a militarization of the police that is most troubling. Since intelligence is a nontraditional policing strategy, it requires state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to learn skills and a dialect that has been lar- gely affiliated with military and federal agencies (Jackson & Brown, 2007). For instance, terrorism is a federal crime – though states have laws against terrorist acts, they are gen- erally prosecuted by federal entities (Masse & Rollins, 2007). Even the concept of a fusion center symbolizes a militaristic expression (Sheridan & Hsu, 2006). Militaristic vernacular is also exhibited in policing whereby the military model focuses on warlike strategies and tactics to crime problems (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997; see also Deflem, 2002) – terrorism, in and of itself, is perceived as a ‘warlike’ behavior that must be addressed by military-like behavior (Deflem, 2004). Overall, these strategies attempt to ‘control rather than eliminate threats and social problems’ (Monahan & Palmer, 2009, p. 633). Moreover, ‘warlike developments’ have the potential to strengthen the role of police during times of national crisis. However, even when the war is over, it is unlikely that law enforcement agencies will ever return that power (Deflem, 2004).

In addition, recent collaboration between the law enforcement and the military provide police with the opportunity to access military technology in surveillance and data mining (Jackson & Brown, 2007). With emphases on surveillance, intelligence gathering, and other covert methods, policing appears to be shifting away from the traditional ‘crime- fighting and peace-keeping’ and reactive paradigm. What was once characterized as policing internal security has now become suggestive of military operations, whereas external security is now reminiscent of proactive policing. In other words, some scholars have suggested a reversal of roles as the military’s agenda evolves toward a ‘civilianiza- tion of the military’, acting as peacekeepers and international police agents (see Crelinsten, 1998; Sievert, 2003), while police take on a militaristic approach in address- ing domestic issues. Such changes contribute further to a blurring of the lines between police and the military. As Deflem (2004) states, ‘research has brought out that counter- terrorist policing always involves a rethinking of the connection/disconnection between police and military institutions’ (p. 77). No place is the line more blurred than in fusion centers, where police and military often sit side-by-side in the analysis of specific data. The problem is even more acute in some fusion centers, such as the one in El Paso, Texas where legitimate national interests and border security converge with organized crime cartels and sophisticated drug trafficking families.

The current militarization of police by way of fusion centers and ILP closely resem- bles the circumstances and issues related to the rise in police paramilitary units (PPU) in

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the 1980s and 1990s. At that time, Kraska and Cubellis (1997) observed the evolving appearance of policing into one which emphasized militaristic tactics despite their ques- tionable need. In this case, they noted the disparity between the extensive training under- gone by highly trained specialists in the military and the minimal training of PPU personnel. They also found an intensification of this militaristic mentality through the heavy promotion of weaponry, equipment, and training in police-related periodicals (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997). Of this they write:

Scholars have theorized on what they view as an unpromising, fundamental shift in formal social control: an acceleration of criminal law agencies’ uncritical of implementation of prac- tices consistent with the tenets of ‘high modernity’ – accentuated standardization, routiniza- tion, technical efficiency, scientificazation, risk minimization, technologicalization, actuarial thinking, the ‘what works’ fetish, moral indifference, and a focus on aggregate populations – in a quest to more efficiently manage those who threaten state order. (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997, p. 625)

In particular, Kraska and Cubellis (1997) took notice of the significant changes occurring in American policing at that time. Today, such changes are arguably occurring once again as formal methods of social control are being cloaked under the rubric of counterterror- ism efforts. Federalized and military intelligence-gathering and surveillance strategies uti- lized by fusion centers supersede civil rights protections despite what little is known about their effectiveness.

Civil liberties

While fusion centers have received significant support from government agencies, there has been a growing movement in opposition of what they do and the ramifications of these activities. In particular, many civil rights advocates have noted the extent to which they impede upon a person’s civil liberties. In fact, it is believed that fusion centers oper- ate as a pre-emptive type of law enforcement whereby intelligence is collected without the presence of a criminal suspicion; consequently, such intelligence is ‘unlawfully gath- ered intelligence’ (Masse & Rollins, 2007). For example, officials employ data mining techniques and surveillance reports to identify previously unknown patterns to predict future occurrences (Jonas & Harper, 2006). Although there are guidelines issued by the US Department of Justice requiring a level of reasonable suspicion to justify intelligence gathering, they are not closely adhered to at the local or state level (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). Moreover, the potential of abuses is likely to increase simply by reason of the ambiguous differences between how fusion centers deal with terrorism and traditional crimes (i.e., there are few clear laws and standards governing the operations of intelli- gence centers in regard to terrorist threats). Several news stories have already documented these issues in relation to racial profiling and privacy invasions, thus heightening the fear of fusion centers, intelligence gathering, and surveillance.

Much attention has been paid to the incredible amounts of personal data to which fusion centers have access. Monahan and Palmer (2009) noted, ‘A greater and more likely threat is the systematic generation, integration, and sharing of vast quantities of personal data that can be harnessed to sort, control, and discriminate against people or groups’ (p. 618). Not only is there a problem related to the extensiveness of data being collected and disseminated, there is also concern regarding the wide range of people who have access to such information. Today, there are more people than ever before, espe- cially at the state and local levels, with security clearances (Monahan & Palmer, 2009):

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estimates suggest 6000 officers at the state and local level possess federal level security clearances (Monahan & Palmer, 2009), while up to 854,000 civil servants, military per- sonnel, and private contractors have top-secret security clearances (Priest & Arkin, 2010b). Such clearances provide these individuals with access to an array of data.

Perhaps of greater concern are the number of private contractors and third parties with access to these types of data. These individuals, in particular, are held to a lower standard of accountability compared to officers or other law enforcement officials (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). The collaboration between law enforcement agencies and private third par- ties is troubling to citizens for two reasons. First, it is questionable as to whether or not the government has the right to view, analyze, and disseminate the personal data collected by these organizations. For example, fusion centers are affiliated with banks, universities, hotels, healthcare providers, and private security firms (Electronic Privacy Information Center [EPIC], 2008). ‘Each time a person makes a telephone call, uses a credit card, pays taxes, or takes a trip, he or she leave digital tracks’ (‘All Counterterrorism Pro- grams’, 2008). This type of digital tracking is also growing as online advertisers are using more sophisticated methods to collect data on the browsing habits of Internet users. In fact, the collection of data is so extensive that even some in the government admit to not knowing what companies do with it (Clifford, 2008). Second, the ethicality of private companies being paid to share private data with law enforcement agencies is of additional concern (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). As previously stated, private contractors are not sub- jected to the same level of privacy protection laws as are government agencies – which makes it easier for fusion centers to circumvent the law by going through a private orga- nization (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). Such actions pave the way for corruption and the misuse of information (German & Stanley, 2008).

In addition to information sharing, SARs also threaten civil liberties and open the door to racial profiling and other abuses (German & Stanley, 2008). In proactive policing, police agents are focused on determining whether targeted individuals are planning to commit a crime. This is in direct contrast to more traditional policing which gathers information to build a case against a person accused of committing a crime (Crelinsten, 1998). The problem is that there is no standard for determining what constitutes ‘danger- ous behavior’. In fact, it could be argued that today’s obsession with homeland security reflects the experiences after the cold war. Crelinsten (1998) states:

the post-Cold War redefinition of security threats has led to a widening of the counter-terror- ism mandate to include illegal immigration as a potential source of terrorism. This has resulted in a pernicious kind of selective targeting of foreigners or outsiders. (p. 404)

Counterterrorism efforts of this nature are likely to elicit tensions between these classes of individuals and the police (Deflem, 2004). Furthermore, policing that focuses on the identification of ‘dangerous classes’ violates the rights of many people (Crelinsten, 1998). This is particularly true in the case of various Muslim clerics and groups that are com- pletely misunderstood by federal, state, and local police agencies. Indeed, most law enforcement personnel have a very weak, if any, understanding of Islam. The average officer on the street could not discuss the five pillars of Islam or accurately describe the difference between a Shiite and a Sunni Muslim. Certainly, not all of the 1.2 billion Mus- lims in the world are terrorists, yet many that live within the USA may fall under the sus- picious eye of law enforcement simply because of their affiliation to a specific mosque or their electronic visit via the Internet to a site hosted by a more radical cleric.

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Although concerns about intelligence gathering and sharing have increased in recent years, Kurlander (2005) states that legal restrictions have slowed these types of initiatives. However, a report by the US Department of Homeland Security’s Privacy Office reveals that the multijurisdictional nature of fusion centers allows personnel to easily sort through and select policies that suit their needs (Hylton, 2009). Moreover, German and Stanley (2008) argue that the federal government appears to be making attempts to ‘coerce states into exempting their fusion centers from state open government laws’ (p. 7). To address some of these issues, it is suggested that fusion centers need to employ an independent authority to ensure that the fusion center is operating within its constitutional and legal bounds and that there is a system of accountability for abuses (Rollins & Connors, 2007). Additionally, restrictions should be placed on the types of information fusion cen- ters are able to access to prevent unauthorized use or surveillance (‘All Counterterrorism Programs’, 2008).

Mission creep

The federal government has issued hundreds of millions of dollars toward the develop- ment of fusion centers, primarily through the US Department of Homeland Security, Metropolitan Urban Area Security Initiative (MUASI) program; however, these federal funds are being spent in a manner which strays from their intended purpose, to which some say fusion centers are more useful for securing grant money than for preventing crime (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). In reality, fusion centers are easily susceptible to mis- sion creep – a term which refers to when federal dollars are used for activities other than those related to counterterrorism. Initially, many fusion centers attempted to focus on counterterrorism exclusively; however, most centers have now expanded their mission to include all crimes and all hazards. In particular, Masse and Rollins (2007) found that less than 15% of the agencies they interviewed stated that their center’s mission was restricted to counterterrorism only; most had modified their objectives to include an all-crimes approach. Again, most agencies simply do not have enough information or direction on the development of work focused solely on terrorist activity. In order to justify the signif- icant personnel and monetary resources dedicated to a fusion center, agencies must re- direct fusion activities to more traditional roles involving crime analysis and assistance for complex criminal investigations involving conspiracies.

It is suggested this expansion came as the result of several other realizations. First, law enforcement recognized that there is often a nexus between terrorism and other crimes (Monahan & Palmer, 2009; see also Shelley & Melzer, 2008). Second, officials recognized that trans-jurisdictional crimes (e.g., fraud, computer hacking, gang-related crimes, etc.) could also benefit from the fusion process (Carter & Carter, 2009). Though officials have made this connection between terrorism and other crimes, it is likely that the modification to include all crimes in the mission of fusion centers occurred informally as opposed to an official change in ideology (Masse & Rollins, 2007). Though most cen- ters have now expanded their mission, Ratcliffe and Guidetti (2008) state intelligence gathering and analysis will still be used as a guiding force in everyday policing activities. While this would suggest that fusion centers are still working toward their intended pur- pose, there are no initiatives in place that define the standards, or baseline capabilities, for these types of activities (Carter & Carter, 2009). In other words, there is a lack of consensus as to how agencies are to gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence related to other types of crime. Consequently, agencies are likely to continue to put their individ- ual community needs (like solving a string of burglaries or robberies) above that of the interagency, counterterrorism community (Monahan & Palmer, 2009).

194 R.W. Taylor and A.L. Russell

Lastly, due to the numerous constraints and demands placed on fusion centers, as well as the individual needs of each intelligence community, many agencies have realized it is less complicated to simply return to their traditional roles (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). As will be discussed in the proceeding section, agency buy-in in counterterrorism efforts is largely predicted by their perceived risk of a terrorist attack (RAND Corporation, 2004); that is, agencies with a lower perceived risk of a terrorist attack are less likely to engage in preparedness efforts.

Effectiveness in fusion center intelligence gathering and information sharing

The overall goal of fusion centers is suppose to be to integrate information from a variety of sources and to provide pertinent information to cooperating agencies in a timely (real- time) manner for the purposes of suppressing terrorism. Though fusion centers have been in operation for nearly a decade, there is a noticeable absence of information as to their effectiveness. Virtually no empirical evaluations have been conducted on them. However, several government-issued reports have revealed that many agencies still encounter diffi- culty in drawing upon and integrating information from numerous sources. For example, a 2009 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that agencies were still experiencing problems in accessing multiple databases. A qualitative document analysis by Monahan and Palmer (2009) revealed similar findings, although they deemed fusion centers to be ineffective based on a number of issues. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these problems have plagued law enforcement agencies for years and are not unique to fusion centers (e.g., lack of interagency cooperation, agency interests and ego, mission creep, and technological disparities).

Lack of interagency collaboration is the basis from which fusion centers were created and is therefore of primary concern in determining the effectiveness of fusion centers. This type of problem can occur for a number of reasons, such as the lack of uniform standards pertaining to coordination efforts; it can also be the result of lack of training, personnel, resources, or agency buy-in. Poor interagency collaboration, of course, is not a new phenomenon. Scholars and practitioners have long been aware of the issues in form- ing multijurisdictional law enforcement organizations (see McGarrell & Schlegel, 1993). In fact, these same problems can occur within the different units of any one police department. For example, Webb and Katz (2003) found a significant lack of coordination between patrol and gang units in the same agency (as cited in Jackson & Brown, 2007). Additionally, lack of interagency cooperation can also happen given that personnel are more committed to the needs of their own agency as opposed to the interagency commu- nity. This is because individual agency cultures, rather than a common culture, dominate interagency communities. This, unfortunately, results in the lack of interagency coopera- tion in times of serious terrorist or criminal threats against the USA (Jackson & Brown, 2007).

These well-documented turf wars illustrate the ongoing issue facing a collaborative strategy – stemming primarily from parochial interests (Kurlander, 2005), federal agencies (e.g., FBI) often have competing missions and are simply reluctant to share information with the local police (Deflem, 2002; Hall, 2007). Moreover, rather than streamline the intelligence community’s operations, DHS has actually further crowded the field and exacerbated the interagency community problems. The lack of an effective central author- ity makes those in other agencies reluctant to work with one another (Monahan & Palmer, 2009; see also Priest & Arkin, 2010a). This unwillingness can be overcome, but the type of cooperation among law enforcement agencies must open themselves up for

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review and scrutiny; that is, along with sharing concepts, agencies must also share their data and information. This can essentially lead to internal and, possibly, external criticism about the shortcomings and mismanagement of their own data and analysis (Jackson & Brown, 2007).

Effective information sharing also requires a common technical standard that supports the different computer systems of various agencies (Johnson, 2007). Because of the prob- lems associated with linking computer systems and databases, the Counter Collaboration Interoperability Project (CCIP) was formed to amend these issues. According to Modaffe- ri and Bouche (2005), CCIP incorporates the best attributes of each of the member’s sys- tems ‘to form a new connectivity and information sharing environment’ to improve interagency communications and responses (para. 1). Although efforts were made in this regard, not all information in each CCIP member’s system is accessible to other mem- bers. In this case, agencies are able to decide for themselves as to what information will be released. Furthermore, they also determine user requirements and protocols (Modafferi & Bouche, 2005). Then too, a complicating factor is that the primary agency charged with combating terrorism, the FBI, still does not have its ‘next generation’ elec- tronic information management system focused on preventing terrorism. In 2005, the FBI was severely criticized as a new $170 million computerized case management system – Virtual Case File (VCF) – developed by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) was scrapped due to ‘inoperability’. Much of the criticism was laid at the door of Director Robert Mueller, who took full responsibility for the debacle. The FBI has now begun development on yet another information management system called Sentinel. The primary contractor for this system is Lockheed Martin (a well-known Department of Defense and military contractor) and the final product, including the FBI’s updated coun- terterrorism database is being implemented in four phases. The now $451 million system has been once again, delayed, but expected to be completed and operational in late 2011 (Romm, 2010). On reflection, it has been nearly 10 years since the attacks of September 11. The primary agency (FBI) responsible for preventing and investigating acts of terror- ism and maintaining accurate intelligence about terrorist activities in the USA still does not have a case management system. Further, the new Sentinel system will be limited to FBI personnel only. How can the US law enforcement community share information about potential terrorist threats and respond accordingly, when the principle agency (FBI) assigned to maintaining a national ‘real-time’ intelligence information system on terrorist activity will not or cannot make it available to local and state police agencies? Again, the best laid plans of ‘mice and men’ do not interpret into reality.

Further, technological advances have their limitations if they do not sustain the agen- cies’ needs or the capabilities of those operating the systems. Unfortunately, there has been a trend toward acquiring technology prior to considering the needs and culture of the organization and the needs of various end users (Rollins & Connors, 2007). For example, Kerlikowske (2008) argues that DHS has frequently looked for and instituted complicated and untested methods in spite of the fact that other cheaper and simpler solu- tions may have been available. As a result, many agencies have been left with equipment that is difficult to maintain or to even replace. Though technology is undoubtedly an important component in fusion centers and the intelligence process, decision-makers must consider, first and foremost, the end user’s ability and the operational procedures of the organization (Rollins & Connors, 2007).

In a summary report to Congress on fusion centers, Masse and Rollins (2007) con- cluded that there is little indication that fusion centers are effective in predicting terrorist plans or foiling prospective attacks; in fact, many agencies continue to purchase proprietary

196 R.W. Taylor and A.L. Russell

technology that conflicts with their ability to interact with other systems (Masse & Rollins, 2007). In short, it does not appear that fusion centers work as intended by DHS, the FBI, or other fusion center supporters. Of course, the problems with fusion centers are the likely result of difficulties with implementation. In fact, the Congressional Research Service reported that the intelligence cycle has not been fully adopted by state and local agencies. Instead, agencies struggle with understanding, developing, and implementing a true repre- sentation of the fusion process (Masse & Rollins, 2007). Furthermore, the lack of guidance at the federal level leaves state and local agencies to develop fusion centers with varying objectives and different frameworks (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). This absence of a central- ized mission and directives is reflected at the state and local level through minimal training (Sheridan & Hsu, 2006). Lastly, agencies do not possess a shared definition of intelligence (Carter, 2004), nor do they possess a shared definition of terrorism (Jackson & Brown, 2007). Instead, terrorism is viewed in different manners across the country. For example, domestic terrorism from right-wing hate groups may be of more concern to fusion centers and agencies in smaller metropolitan areas, whereas international terrorism and foreign threats may be of more concern to those in border states with ports of entry (Deflem, 2004). Even still, there is significant variation as to how states, regions, and cities perceive their level of risk in experiencing a terrorist attack. For instance, New York City and Los Angeles have clearly perceived their risk of being targets for terrorism as extremely high and have taken significant steps to reorganize their respective police departments with a considerable focus on terrorism prevention and detection. Both of these cities have sophisti- cated, well-resourced fusion centers supported at the local level. Indeed, both cities are tou- ted as having ‘state of the art’ fusion centers. However, in other locations, such as in Iowa, Montana, and South Dakota, only state fusion centers have been developed and resourced within each state’s appropriate department of public safety or homeland security. There is very little, if any, sharing of information between the complex entities in New York and Los Angeles, and the state fusion centers of Iowa, Montana, and South Dakota. Interest- ingly, much of the financial resources to build the centers in New York and LAwere devel- oped locally, while the federal government paid for almost all of the state fusion centers in our country. Some states have multiple fusion centers, such as Texas, wherein they are located in almost all of the major cities (Dallas, Houston, Austin, San Antonio, El Paso, and Fort Worth). Even within one state, there is very little sharing of intelligence and infor- mation between these centers.

Conclusion

Wolfendale (2007) argues that terrorism does not present as significant a threat to warrant the counterterrorism legislation that has been enacted in the last decade. This is particu- larly relevant given the questionable efficacy of these laws (e.g., USA PATRIOT Act) and the agencies which have been created as a result of September 11. It is likely that policymakers have failed to consider what is known about the motives and behavior of terrorists. For instance, several studies show that terrorists seek to inspire fear, terror, and ‘to coerce governments through attacks and by attacks on targets that are symbolic of a nation’s power’ (Wolfendale, 2007, p. 78). In effect, hundreds of millions of dollars and valuable resources are being used toward futile counterterrorism efforts. Many scholars have suggested that the post-September 11 counterterrorism measures have exceeded what is necessary to address the issue (e.g., Jonas & Harper, 2006; Priest & Arkin, 2010a). Indeed, in an earlier work, we indicate that ‘terrorism plays to emotion, not intel- lect’ (Taylor & Vanden, 1982, p. 109). Unfortunately, US policymakers may well have

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fallen into the trap of spending millions of dollars in an emotional and political ploy to ‘make us feel safe’, without much evidence to support their rampant spending.

Even still, the structure and framework of American policing does not provide for what is necessary to sustain a national collaborative effort such as the one currently in place. In addition to the decentralized structure, agencies are oftentimes preoccupied with addressing the needs of their community and responding to crime trends and patterns spe- cific to their jurisdictions. Consequently, they are likely to adopt technologies, strategies, and tactics that accommodate these issues. Though this is a mere reflection pertaining to the uniqueness of each fusion center (Carter, 2004), it significantly inhibits interagency cooperation, which was the basis for these types of organizations.

Finally, today’s fusion centers provide several challenges to the legality of their strate- gies and methods of data collection, mining, and analysis. Civil rights advocates present valid concerns as to how the information is used and distributed given the pre-emptive nature of intelligence-led and proactive policing. Then too, ‘who’ becomes the target of such proactive police scrutiny also remains a critical issue. Such operations reflect the covert and clandestine processes of the military and federal law enforcement agencies. Perhaps for fusion centers to work, a fundamental shift would need to occur whereby the focus moves from strategic analysis and counterterrorism to more tactical procedures addressing crime. Fusion centers can certainly be beneficial and can be valuable resources in combating crime in local jurisdictions.

Notes on contributors Dr Robert W. Taylor is currently Professor and Program Head for the Public Affairs Program at The University of Texas at Dallas. Previous to this position, Dr Taylor was the founding Executive Director of the W.W. Caruth Jr. Police Institute at Dallas (CPI). He has acted as a consultant to numerous federal, state and local agencies, as well as the countries of Turkey, Thailand, Cambodia, Russia, and Venezuela. Dr Taylor has authored or co-authored over two hundred articles, books, and manuscripts. In 2003, Dr Taylor was awarded the University of North Texas, Regent’s Lecture Award for his work in the Middle East. In March 2008, the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences presented Dr Taylor with the prestigious O.W. Wilson Award ‘in recognition of his outstanding contribution to police education, research and practice’. Dr Taylor is a graduate of Michigan State University (Master of Science, 1973) and Portland State University (Doctor of Philosophy, 1981).

Amanda L. Russell is currently a Criminology doctoral student at the University of Texas at Dallas and a research assistant at the W.W. Caruth Jr. Police Institute. Before returning to school to pursue her doctorate, she worked as a crime analyst for a municipal police agency in California. Amanda earned her Master’s degree in Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati in 2006. Her research interests include police administration, misconduct, and decision making.

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