Minority Group

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, RacejEthnicity, and Social Mobility 441

The Changing Complexion of the United States:

Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration

34

THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERICA Immigration, Race/Ethnicity,

and Social Mobility

MinZhou

Questions to Consider

A century ago, immigrants were overwhelmingly white and from Europe. Since the 1980s, most immigrants have been coming to the United States from Asia and the Americas (excluding Canada). How have these new waves ofimmigrants shaped U.S. culture? How have these newcomers transformed urban areas? Which models discussed earlier-assimilation, ethnic plural- ism, and melting pot-might best describe the current and future experi- ences of recent arrivals to the United States? Why do some groups in the United States feel threatened about current trends in immigration?

C ontemporary immigration refers to the period of large-scale, non- European immigration to the United

States that has begun to accelerate since the

Mia Zhou, "The Changing Face of America: Immigration, Race/Ethnicity, and Social Mobil- ity" from Mass Migration to the United States, edited by Pyong Gap Min, pp. 65-93. Copyright © 2002 by Altamira. Reprinted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

late 1960s after a long hiatus of restricted immigration (Massey 1995). Between 1971 and 1995, the United States admitted approx- imately 17.1 million immigrants, including 1.6 million formerly unauthorized aliens and 1.1 million "special agricultural work- ers" (SAWs) who were granted permanent resident status under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA:). The scale of contemporary immigration almost matched that during

442 Min Zhou

the first quarter of the century (17.2 million admissions between 1901 and 1925), when immigration to the United States was at its peak. Although similar in numbers, the annual admission trends in these two peak periods looked quite different. During the first twenty-five years of the century, annual admission numbers fluctuated drastically with several noticeable ebbs and flows. In contrast, during the twenty-five years near the end of the millennium, the inflows were fairly steady, which had been kept under the half-million mark until 1978 and then gradually increased from 1978 to 1988. The year 1989 witnessed a sudden surge beyond the one-million mark that lasted for the next three consecutive years. This surge was almost entirely represented by the legaliza- tion of the formerly undocumented popula- tion permitted by IRCA. Clearly, had it not been for IRCA, immigration trends would have been stable, though heading in a grad- ual, upward direction.!

Just as the turn-of-the-century immi- gration dramatically transformed America, contemporary immigration has repeated history, changing the face of America in ways that are unique and challenging the traditional views of immigrant incorpora- tion. In this chapter, I specifically examine the following issues: 1) the historical trends of immigration to the United States, 2) the settlement patterns of contemporary immigrants in America's largest metropoli- tan regions, 3) the nature of racial and eth- nic relations in areas of high immigration, and 4) the key determinants of social mo- bility for new immigrants and their off- spring. The chapter aims at understanding how contemporary immigration differs from turn-of-the-century immigration and how such differences may affect our ap- proach to the issues and concerns over the changing face of America in the new millennium.

Distinctive Features of Contemporary Immigration

Trends

Several distinctive features of contemporary immigration are noteworthy in historical perspective. First, despite a similarity in the absolute numbers, the rate of contemporary immigration relative to the total U.S. popu- lation is much lower than that of the earlier period since the us. population has more than tripled during the course of the twenti- eth century (3.9 vs. 11.7 per thousand) (Smith and Edmonston 1997). The compara- tively low rate of contemporary immigra- tion implies a more modest overall impact on the U.S. population today than in the past. However, such an impact is dispropor- tionately localized in areas of high immigra- tion, not only in historic gateway cities but also in smaller urban or suburban areas in which few immigrants had settled in the past. Second, the rate of contemporary emi- gration is considerably lower today than in the past. It was estimated that, for everyone hundred immigrants during the first two decades of high immigration, thirty-six had returned to their homelands. In contrast, between 1971 and 1990, less than a quarter had returned (US. Immigration and Natu- ralization Service 1997; Warren and Kraly 1985). This trend suggests a more steady growth today than in the past, indicating that contemporary immigrants are more likely than their earlier counterparts to stay in the United States permanently. Third, unlike immigration then, contemporary immigration is accompanied by a much larger number of undocumented immi- grants because of historical patterns of reliance on Mexican labor migration, espe- cially in agriculture, as well as the operation of migration networks that has facilitated undocumented immigration through back-

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, RacejEthnicity, and Social Mobility 443

door channels (Massey 1995; Massey et al. 1987). Fourth, compared to immigration then, today's inflows are made up of a much more visible proportion of refugees and asylees. 2 During past thirty-five years (1961- 1995), annual admission of refugees aver- aged 68,150, compared to the average annual admission of 47,000 over the fifteen- year span immediately after World War II. The admission of refugees today implies a much enlarged base for later immigration through family reunification.

Last but not least, the all-time high pres- ence of nonimmigrants arriving in the United States temporarily each year also bears a broad implication for potential im- migration, both legal and illegal. Statistics from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) showed that 22.6 million non- immigrant visas were issued in 1995: 17.6 million (78 percent) were tourists who came for short visits for business or pleasure; the rest were on long-term nonimmigrant visas, including 395,000 foreign students (along with their spouses and children), 243,000 temporary workers or trainees (along with their immediate relatives), and a smaller number of traders and investors. These lat- ter groups of nonimmigrants contain a sig- nificant pool of potential immigrants. The majority of those who initially entered as students can freely seek employment in the United States after the completion of their studies, which in turn increases the proba- bility of later adjusting to permanent resi- dent status. Among those who entered as tourists, the great majority will depart on time. However, a relatively small propor- tion, but a quantitatively large number, of those who might qualify for family- sponsored immigration may overstay their visas and wait in the United States to have their status adjusted. In 1995, almost half the legal immigrants admitted had their nonim- migrant visas adjusted in the United States.

About 40 percent of the total undocumented immigrant population was "nonimmigrant overstays" (U.S. Immigration and Natural- ization Service 1997).

In sum, a lower rate of emigration, greater numbers of undocumented immi- grants and refugees or asylees, and the larger pool of potential immigrants among nonimmigrants imply the complexity of contemporary immigration. Another signif- icant implication for immigrant America is that it is a more challenging task than ever before to accurately measure the scale and impact of immigration and to manage or control the inflows.

Diversity

Compared with the turn-of-the-century immigrants, contemporary immigrants are markedly different in national origins, types of admission, spatial distribution, and socio- economic characteristics. The newcomers are predominantly from non-European countries. Since the 1980s, more than 85 per- cent of the immigrants admitted to the United States come from Asia and the Amer- icas (excluding Canada) and only 10 percent from Europe compared to more than 90 per- cent at the earlier peak. In particular, the share of immigrants from the Americas as a proportion of total legal immigrant admis- sions has risen substantially from 25 percent in the 1950s, moving to 39 percent in the 1960s, and jumping up to 50 percent since the 1980s. Similarly, the share of inunigrants from Asia as a proportion of the total admis- sions grewfrom a tiny 5 percent in the 1950s, to 11 percent in the 1960s and 33 percent in the 1970s, and stayed at 35 percent since 1980, except for 1991, when the Asian share dropped to 18 percent because of the sud- den increase in the legalizees under IRCA, most of whom were of Latin origins (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service

444 Min Zhou

1997). The top five sending countries during the period between 1981 and 1995 were Mexico, the Philippines, China/Taiwan, the Dominican Republic, and India, compared to Italy, Austria-Hungary, the Soviet Union, Canada, and the United Kingdom during the first two decades of the century. Mexico alone accounted for more than one-fifth of the total legal admissions since the 1980s. In fact, Mexico was on the INS list of the top five countries of last residence between 1921 and 1960 and was number one after 1960 (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser- vice 1997).

The composition of contemporary immi- gration has a lasting effect on the growth and composition of the general U.S. population. During the past thirty years, immigration accounted for more than a third of the total population growth. Asian- and Latin-origin populations grew particularly fast in both absolute and relative sizes. Some groups- Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Dominicans, Haitians, Jamaicans, Asian Indians, Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians- grew at spectacular rates, mainly as a result of immigration. It is estimated that, at the cur- rent levels of net immigration, intermarriage, and ethnic affiliation, the size of the Asian population will grow from nine million in 1995 to thirty-four million in 2050 (growing from 3 to 8 percent of the total U.S. popula- tion) and that the Hispanic population will grow from twenty-seven million in 1995 (about 9 percent of the population) to ninety- five million (or 25 percent of the population) in 2050 (Smith and Edmonston 1997).

Spatially, the turn-of-the-century immi- grants were highly concentrated along the northeastern seaboard and the Midwest. For them, the top five most-preferred state desti- nations were New York, Pennsylvania, Illi- nois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, and the top most-preferred immigrant urban destinations were New York, Chicago, Phila-

delphia, St. Louis, and Boston (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). In contrast, today's newcomers are highly concentrated, not simply in states or urban areas traditionally attracting most immigrants, but also in states or urban areas that had few immi- grants in the past. Since 1971, the top five states of immigrant-intended residence have been California, New York, Florida, Texas, and New Jersey, accounting for almost two out of every three newly admitted immi- grants. California was the leading state of immigrant destination since 1976. In 1995, the five leading urban areas of high immi- grant concentration were New York, Los An- geles-Long Beach, Chicago, Miami-Hialeah, and Orange County (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997).

The new immigrants also differ from the turn-of-the-century inflows in their diverse socioeconomic backgrounds. The image of the poor, uneducated, and unskilled "hud- dIed masses," used to depict the turn-of-the- century European immigrants, no longer applies to today's newcomers. The 1990 U.S. census attests to the vast differences in lev- els of education, occupation, and income by national origins. For example, more than 60 percent of foreign-born persons (aged twenty-five years or older) from India re- ported having attained college degrees, three times the proportion of average Amer- icans, but less than 5 percent of those from EI Salvador and Mexico so reported. Among employed workers (aged sixteen years or older), more than 45 percent of the foreign- born persons from India held managerial or professional occupations, more than twice the proportion of average American work- ers, but less than 7 percent of those from EI Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico so re- ported. Moreover, immigrants from India reported a median household income of $48,000, compared to $30,000 for average American households; those from the Do-

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, RacejEthnicity, and Social Mobility 445

minican Republic and the Soviet Union re- ported a median household income below $20,000. Poverty rates varied, ranging from a low of 5 percent for Indians and Filipinos to a high of 33 percent for Dominicans and an extreme high of more than 40 percent for Cambodians and 60 percent for Hmongs, compared to about 10 percent for average American families.

The New Second Generation

Spatial concentration, diverse origins, and socioeconomic status of new immigrants hinge not only on the fate of immigrants but also on their children. Because of the recen- scy of contemporary immigration, a new generation of immigrant children and chil- dren of immigrant parentage is just coming of age. This new second generation is not only disproportionately young but also eth- nically diverse. The Current Population Sur- vey (CPS) for the period 1994-1998 shows that almost 40 percent of the second genera- tion are under eighteen years of age, in con- trast to 28 percent of the U.S. population. In the second generation, more than a third are of Latin American ancestry and 7 percent of Asian ancestry, compared with 12 and 4 per- cent, respectively, in the total U.S. popula- tion reported in the 2000 census. If it were distributed randomly across America's urban landscape, the new second generation would not be of great interest since it is rela- tively small in absolute numbers. However, historical and contemporary patterns of immigrant settlement suggest that immi- grants and their children are highly concen- trated in just a handful of metropolitan regions. For example, California alone ac- counted for some 45 percent of the nation's immigrant student population, more than one out of ten school-aged children in the state were foreign born, and more than a third of the state's school-aged children

spoke a language other than English at home (Cornelius 1995). In Los Angeles County, two-thirds of the public schools have a numerical majority of nonwhite stu- dents, and 39 percent are represented by more than three-quarters of U.5.- or foreign- born minority students. In major immi- grant-receiving cities, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and Miami, more than a third of the students in the entire school system speak a language other than English at home.

These changes, impacted by a massive immigration during the past three decades, along with the changes in local cultures, economies, and neighborhoods, have cre- ated diverse receiving contexts quite differ- ent from the ones in which European immigrants entered a century ago. The chal- lenge for the adaptation of immigrant offspring into postindustrial America is pro- found. Differing from their immigrant par- ents, immigrant children lack meaningful connections to their" old" world. Thus, they are unlikely to consider a foreign country as a place to return to or as a point of reference. Instead, they are prone to evaluate them- selves or to be evaluated by others by the standards of their new country (Gans 1992; Portes 1995; Portes and Zhou 1993). None- theless, the encounter in any metropolitan context is likely to invoke one of two, if not more, scenarios: The child either succeeds in school and moves ahead or falls behind (or remains the same as) the modest, often low status of the parents' generation. The latter scenario is labeled by the sociologist Herbert Gans (1992) as "second-generation decline." Thus, a more pressing issue is whether the new second generation will be able to incorporate into middle-class America, fol- lowing the path taken by the" old" second generation arriving at the turn of the cen- tury, and to advance beyond their parents' generation.

446 MinZhou

Transforming Urban America: Old and New Immigrant Metropolises

Like earlier waves of European immigrants, contemporary immigrants are overwhel~­ ingly urban bound, but they differ from theIr earlier counterparts in geographic distribu- tion. While about 94 percent of immigrants from Asia and close to 90 percent of Latin American immigrants live in urban areas (compared to just over 70 percent of the native-born U.S. population), they are con- centrated not only in metropolitan areas in the West and Northeast but also in the South- east and the Southwest. New immigrants, like their fellow Americans, are spatially dis- tributed not only by social class and race but also by social networks and family or kin- ship ties. The settlement patterns of contem- porary immigrants are characteris.tic ~f dispersion and concentration. New ImmI- grants are more spread out than ever before, yet they continue to be highly concentrated within the metropolitan region of settlement. Next, I focus on describing the particular patterns of spatial concentrations in selected metropolitan areas-New York, Los Ange- les, Miami, San Francisco, and Chicago3- and examine how different national origin groups converge on particular urban centers and how these urban centers are in turn impacted by the arrival of newcomers.

The Old and New "Ellis Islands"

Ellis Island, where the Statue of Liberty stands, has been the historic gateway to immigrant America. Seeking a better life or an alternative means of livelihood in a new land, millions of European immigrants entered the United States through this gate- way in the late nineteenth and early twenti- eth centuries. Many made New York City their new home, even though thousands returned to their homelands after a lengthy period of sojourning (Moch 1992; Morawska

1990). Since the 1970s, immigration has trans- formed the" old" Ellis Island and given rise to new ones. While New York remains the most popular immigrant-receiving center, Los Angeles has surpassed it as the largest immigrant metropolis in absolute and rela- tive terms. In absolute numbers, Los Angeles metropolitan region had 600,000 more for- eign-born persons than New York as of 1990. Relatively, a third of Los Angeles' residents are immigrants, compared to 27 percent in New York, whose immigrant share was as high as 40 percent at the turn of the cen~ur~ (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). MIar:1.l and San Francisco, though much smaller In size, have become more densely populated by new immigrants than any other us. met- ropolitan area, with a share of 34 and 27 per- cent, respectively. In contrast, Chicago, the second-largest immigrant metropolis in 1910, dropped a few places down the list in 1990 when measured by the immigrant share of the total population (13 percent).

Compared to the old urban centers, new immigrant-receiving centers take a much larger share of the country's foreign-born population. In 1910, the foreign-born shared 15 percent of the U.S. total population. About a quarter of them lived in the top five largest metropolises-New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Boston (Wal- dinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). The foreign stock's (immigrants and their children's) share of the total population in 1990 was much smaller, less than 9 percent. However, a much higher proportion (37 percent) of the immigrants were concentrated in the top five largest metropolitan areas-Los Ange,.. les, New York, San Francisco, Miami, and Chicago. In addition, the majority of urban immigrants lived in the central city.

Preferred Destinations

Different immigrant urban centers today attract immigrants from different countries.

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, RacejEthnicity, and Social Mobility 447

Table 1 displays the top ten national origin groups in each of the selected metropolitan areas. As shown, immigrants of different national origins are not evenly distributed across the urban landscape. New York, an urban center that received primarily Euro- pean immigrants across the Atlantic Ocean at the turn of the century, has become the center for Caribbean immigrants. The three main Caribbean groups comprise almost a fifth of the area immigrant population. What is more striking is that none of these groups outnumbered others by an over- whelming margin and that none, except for the Chinese, appeared on the national top ten list, an indicator of extremely high con- centration in just one area. In fact, 66 percent of Dominican immigrants, 36 percent of Haitian immigrants, and 39 percent of Jamaican immigrants in the United States lived in New York alone.

The picture in Los Angeles is drastically different. Mexican immigrants are the larg- est national origin group, comprising 40 per- cent of the area's foreign stock, 5.5 times larger than the second-largest group on the metropolis' top ten list and on the national top ten list. Also noticeable are immigrants from EI Salvador and Guatemala, making up 11 percent of the area's immigrant popu- lation. Although these two Central Ameri- can groups are not on the national top list, they are disproportionately concentrated in Los Angeles, which is home to 48 percent of Guatemalan immigrants and 46 percent of Salvadoran immigrants in the United States. Compared to immigrant New York, Los An- geles appears to be less diverse ethnically, though it may have as many national ori- gins groups as one can count. It is also less diverse in class status because of the strong correlation between national origins and the skill levels of the newcomers.

The dominance of Cubans in Miami is a different story. Though Miami is a much smaller metropolitan area, not only does it

have the highest proportion of immigrants, but it is also a metropolis with the largest presence of Cuban Americans. More than half of Miami's foreign stock is of Cuban ori- gin, and the group is 6.5 times larger than the second-largest group on the metropoli- tan top ten list. Unlike Mexicans in Los An- geles, Cubans in Miami are not simply the largest group in size, but also socioeconomi- cally diverse with a significantly large mid- dle class and strong influence in the areas' political and economic matters.

Like Miami, San Francisco is also a much smaller metropolis. Though no single national origin group is dominant, the Asian presence is impressive, making up more than 40 percent of the foreign stock. In con- trast, Chicago is a much larger metropolis, but its foreign-born stock is only 13 percent. Interestingly, Mexican immigrants form the largest national origin group, three times larger than the second group on the metro- politan top ten list. However, their visibility is blurred by the area's relatively large native-born population.

Demographic Transformation in Immigrant-Receiving Urban Centers

The diversity of contemporary immigrants and their geographic concentration, com- bined with recent trends of deindustrializa- tion and suburbanization, have reshaped the demographic profiles of both old and new immigrant-receiving centers. Figure 1 illustrates the racial composition of the three largest metropolitan areas between 1980 and 2000. During the last two decades of the twentieth century, demographic transforma- tion is drastic: The proportions of the" col- ored" components other than "black" in the general population increased corresponding to the decreasing dominance of the "white" component. In both New York and Los Angeles, non-Hispanic white populations

TABLE 1 Top-Ten Foreign-Born, National Origin Groups by Selected PMSAs, 1990 (in l,OOOs)

United San Number States N New York N Los Angeles N Miami N Francisco N Chicago N

1 Mexico 4,298 Dominican 232 Mexico 1,167 Cuba 429 Chinal 95 Mexico 238 Republic

2 Philippines 913 Chinal 166 EI Salvador 213 Nicaragua 67 Philippines 60 Poland 76 3 Chinal 774 Jamaica 129 Philippines 161 Haiti 45 Mexico 48 Philippines 43 4 Canada 745 Italy 122 Chinal 136 Columbia 43 EI Salvador 26 India 34 5 Cuba 737 Soviet Union 84 Korea 114 Jamaica 31 Vietnam 17 Italy 28 6 Germany 712 Haiti 80 Guatemala 108 Dominican 16 Nicaragua 14 Germany 28

Republic 7 United 640 Guyana 77 Vietnam 76 Honduras 16 United 11 Korea 25

Kingdom Kingdom 8 Italy 580 Columbia 71 Iran 67 Peru 15 Germany 11 Chinal 24 9 Korea 568 Poland 66 Soviet Union 51 Mexico 10 Soviet Union 9 Greece 18

10 Vietnam 543 Ecuador 64 Japan 40 Spain 10 Canada 9 Yugoslavia 18 Top Ten 10,510 1,092 2,102 682 300 532 Total 19,767 2,286 2,895 875 441 797

lInc1udes Hong Kong and Taiwan. Source: U.s. Census Bureau (1993).

~

S:: S·

~ l::

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, RacejEthnicity, and Social Mobility 449

1980

80...,....----------------------

60-+-...,....--r-------1

.., c ~ 40

&.

20

0-'--'--- New York Chicago Los Angeles

D White _ Black _ Hispanic ••1111 Asian

2000

80

60

C III

40:::! &.

20

0 New York Chicago Los Angeles

DWhite _Black _Hispanic Asian

FIGURE 1 Population Growth by RacejEthnicity, Selected Metropolitan Areas, 1980-2000 (PMSAS) Source: u.s. Census of Population (2000).

had become a numerical minority by the year 2000. Even in Chicago, the diminishing dominance of the white population is signif- icant. What have altered the racial composi- tion in these metropolises are the obvious influxes of Asians and Latinos. Past research on internal migration patterns in the United States has also shown consistent findings that, in high-immigration metropolitan areas, there is a significantly large out-migration and that out-migrants are predominantly

non-Hispanic whites (Frey 1995). At the metropolitan level, therefore, the demo- graphic impact of immigrant influx is singu- larly on whites. But whether whites are pushed out by new immigrants or by other economic forces is debatable and may be a topic for yet another chapter.

Just thirty years ago, America's urban landscape, including the areas with high immigrant density, was predominantly white. The racial hierarchy was dictated by

450 MinZhou

a black-white dichotomy with an unques- tionable, all-encompassing white domi- nance. Although there were various immigrant groups coexisting within the urban social structure, these immigrants were expected to eventually become assimi- lated into the dominant white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) culture. Immigrant en- claves or ghettos did exist, mostly in the central city, but they did not constitute a permanent problem because they were con- sidered transitional stops or springboards and would eventually die down with time. Indeed, with the span of only two or three generations and a long hiatus of low immi- gration, the white ethnics, such as the Irish, Jews, and Italians, who were once desig- nated as inferior "races," have now become indistinguishably "white" (Alba and Nee 1997). Meanwhile, the majority of second- and third-generation Asian and Latin Amer- icans also quietly dispersed into the white middle class without much public notice be- cause they represented only a tiny fraction of the population.

In the first generation, the racial compo- sition in major immigrant-receiving centers reflects the patterns of contemporary immi- grant settlement I have just discussed: Amer- ican cities have now become less "white" (but no less "black") and more" colored" than ever before. Los Angeles and Miami have turned into "Latin-dominant" cities. The middle chart displays racial/ ethnic composition of the children of immi- grants. Only Los Angeles contains a "Latin- dominant" second generation, with the same shift in Miami slowed down by its large concentration of white second-generation retirees, making Miami's second-generation population an ethnically diverse group. New York and Chicago contain a second- generation population that can only be described as "white dominant," a reflection of the impact of these regions' earlier immi- gration histories. San Francisco, the singu-

larly " Asian-dominant" region, stands out as different, boasting the greatest variety in the ethnic composition of its second gen- eration as well as the most pronounced Asian tilt.

It should be noted that changes in racial composition that were impacted by immi- gration have occurred also in areas histori- cally receiving relatively few immigrants. The U.S. census data shows that, between 1990 and 2000, Hispanic and Asian popula- tions grew at 631 and 172 percent, respec- tively, in Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill; 388 and 197 percent in Atlanta; and 189 and 111 percent in Minneapolis-St. Paul. These re- cent demographic trends suggest that new immigrants are more dispersed across America than earlier waves.

The Changing Dynamics of Race and Ethnicity

What is more striking about these demo- graphic changes is that the arrival of new immigrants and the concurrent trend of rapid out-migration of non-Hispanic whites in immigrant metropolitan areas signifi- cantly alter the dynamics of race and ethnic- ity. They make ethnicity more salient and pose new challenges to all Americans- native-born whites, blacks, Asian and Latin A:!nericans alike, as well as the newcomers themselves.

Non-Hispanic Whites

The non-Hispanic white population com- prises primarily of the grandchildren or great-grandchildren of European immigrants. Decreasing numbers notwithstanding, non- Hispanic whites still hold dominant politi- cal .and economic power in immigrant- receiving centers, and the shift of the black- white paradigm does not change this dominance. How, then, have non-Hispanic

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, RacejEthnicity, and Social Mobility 451

whites been affected by immigration? Per- haps the most significant impact has in- volved the notion of American identity, as many fear that newcomers would overtake America and that Americans would be un- Americanized by them. The hotly contested issues of multiculturalism, bilingualism, and immigration reform in the political arena reflect some of these deeply rooted fears. In areas of immigrant concentration, many whites are confronted with a new dilemma of becoming a minority with a majority men- tality in a multiethnic society (Horton 1995). In affluent suburban communities with"a large and sudden influx of middle-class newcomers, such fears are more pro- nounced. For example, in Monterey Park, California, whites used to be able to drop their hyphens as unqualified Americans. But in the wave of a large influx of affluent Asian immigrants, they find themselves on the defensive without an ethnic culture of resis- tance and empowerment to express their fears (Horton 1995). However, nativist fears manifest themselves differently in different metropolitan settings. For example, in Mexi- can Los Angeles, the Spanish language is stigmatized and is being banned from instruction in schools, whereas in Cuban Miami, the same language is considered an important marketable skill, and bilingual- ism is celebrated as the American way.

Non-Hispanic Blacks

The foreign-born component of non- Hispanic blacks is relatively small, though migration from the Afro-Caribbean region has been on the rise, and Afro-Caribbean immigrants tend to concentrate in New York and Miami. As essentially a native-born population and the most American of the Americans, non-Hispanic blacks have been socially affected by the influx of other" col- ored" immigrants in different ways. In the wake of immigration's surge, non-Hispanic

blacks have experienced increasing differ- entiation in socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level and bifurcation between the middle class and the poor (Grant et al. 1996; Oliver and Shapiro 1995). These pat- terns of differentiation and bifurcation are caused primarily by the drastic economic restructuring of America's urban labor mar- kets that is simultaneous with rapid growth in immigration. Uneducated and poor blacks have been trapped in the inner city, where ladders of social mobility have disappeared and where the entry to low-skilled jobs is barred by employer discrimination and immigrant employment networks (Wal- dinger 1996; Wilson 1996). Middle-class blacks have experienced unprecedented social mobility, yet many have continued to face racial discrimination, especially in the housing market that constrains their resi- dential mobility (Clark 1996; Massey and Denton 1987).

The arrival of large numbers of non- white immigrants has significantly changed the racial composition of the urban popula- tion, rendering the black-white paradigm outdated. However, such a change has not moved blacks up the racial hierarchy. In- stead, blacks' racial caste status has been pushed down further by the internalization of other colored immigrants into, unfortu- nately, the "moral problem in the hearts and minds of Americans" (Myrdal1962). For ex- ample, the widely publicized black-Korean conflicts in America's inner cities and the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest were not caused by economic competition but rather by the realignment of race relations, mani- fested in the tension over" turf," which has continued to constrain blacks in virtually every aspect of their lives (Min 1996; Morri- son and Lowry 1994). In their struggle for racial equality, many native-born blacks are confronted with a daunting dilemma: how to deal with being a minority competing with other new minorities whose members

452 MinZhou

have come from different backgrounds and headed for many directions.

Native Americans of Asian and Latin Origin

The children and grandchildren of Asian and Latin immigrants have also felt the powerful social impact of contemporary immigration. Almost overnight, native-born Americans of Asian and Latin origin, es- pecially those already "assimilated" or "melted" into white middle-class suburban communities, are confronted with the renewed image of "foreigners." Their Amer- ican identity is constantly questioned because they look like the newcomers who do not fit the old characterization of an American as "either an European or the descendant of an European" (De Creve- coeur 1904) or as an "immaculate, well- dressed, accent-free Anglo" (Zangwill1914). These phenotypical definitions of "Ameri- can," widely and often unconsciously held, make it harder for some native-born people to feel fully American if they happen to be Native Americans or Mexican Americans, whose ancestors settled on this land long before the Mayflower reached shore.

Stereotyping images of an " American" create special problems for native-born Americans of non-European ancestry whose national origin groups contain a dispropor- tionately large number of recent arrivals. In- cidents of harassing a native-born Mexican American suspected of being an undocu- mented immigrant or comments about a third-generation Japanese American's"good English" are frequently heard. The children, U.S.-born and similar to other American children, have found to suffer from persis- tent disadvantages merely because they look "foreign" (U.5. Commission on Civil Rights 1988, 1992).

While they are infuriated by the unfair treatment as foreigners, native-born His-

panic and Asian Americans are also caught in a dilemma of inclusion versus exclusion in their struggle for racial equality. Similar to other Americans in speech, thought, and behavior, native-born Hispanic and Asian Americans and their foreign-born counter- parts often hold contradictory values and standards over labor rights, individualism, civil liberty, and ultimately the ideology of assimilation. These differences, intertwined with the acculturation gap between immi- grant and native-born generations, have impeded ethnic coalition and ideological consensus. For example, the picketing of restaurants in New York's Chinatown in 1994 and Los Angeles' Koreatown in 1998 was a conscious effort mostly by second- generation Asian Americans fighting for im- migrant rights. But it was perceived by the ethnic community as a group of "whitened" kids trying to "destroy their parents' busi- nesses" and the ethnic community. Ironi- cally, the parent generation consciously struggles to push children to become "white" by moving their families into white neighborhoods, sending their children to white schools, and discouraging their chil- dren to play basketball and mimic hip-hop culture. For Afro-Caribbean immigrants, the parents even push their children to adopt certain strategies, such as invoking their ac- cents or other references to French or British colonial culture to differentiate themselves from native-born blacks and to avoid the stigma of "blackness" (Portes and Stepick 1993; Waters 1994, 1996). But becoming "white" is politically incorrect and thus un- acceptable for the native-born generation.

The Newcomers

The social impact of contemporary immi- gration is perhaps most intense on the new- comers themselves. Earlier labor migrants of Asian or Latin American origin were mostly sojourners with an intention of even-

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, RacejEthnicity, and Social Mobility 453

tually returning to their homelands. In con- trast, most new immigrants are permanent settlers, even though there is a significantly visible presence of transnationals who have maintained their homes or led their regular lives simultaneously in their countries of origin and destination. Most permanent set- tlers have made concerted efforts to assimi- late first economically and then culturally. No matter how much they want to be like other Americans, however, the newcomers often find themselves facing an ambivalent public that questions their willingness to assimilate and doubts their assimilability. They also face the unrealistically high expectation that they should assimilate quickly. It took earlier European immigrants two or three generations to assimilate into the middle class, and such a pace was facili- tated by economic expansion, industrial- ization, and a long hiatus of restricted immigration (Alba 1985; Alba and Nee 1997; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997). Today, the second generation of contemporary immi- grants is just coming of age, and predictions about their future outcome of assimilation are only estimates.

Today's immigrants also encounter var- ious structural constraints that limit their chances of integration. On the one hand, the continuous high volume of immigration has affected new arrivals in ways similar to their native-born coethnics. However assimilated they may have become, they are still likely to be viewed as foreigners "fresh off the boat." On the other hand, many newcomers, especially the low-skilled poor, lack contact with and exposure to the segment of Ameri- can society into which they aspire to assimi- late. In this case, they may either allow themselves and their children to assimilate into the inner city or build ethnic communi- ties to help shield coethnic members from being trapped in the inner city (Portes and Zhou 1993). Either way, the process is viewed as a rejection to assimilation.

In real life, immigrants must first deal with the issue of economic survival. New immigrants arrived in cities where eco- nomic restructuring and globalization have created bifurcated labor markets with nu- merous labor-intensive and low-paying jobs on the one end and a growing sector of knowledge-intensive and well-paying jobs on the other. This bifurcated labor market renders many immigrants underemployed with substandard wages or occupational overqualification (Zhou 1997a). The 1990 census data reveal that immigrant men of all groups displayed fairly low rates of labor force nonparticipation (below 8 percent), ex- cept for Southeast Asians (16 percent) (Rum- baut 1995; Zhou and Bankston 1998).4 In particular, Mexican men, who were most handicapped of all immigrant groups by the lack of skills and English proficiency, showed the lowest labor force nonparticipation rate, probably because of the fact that most of Mexican immigrant workers arrived through extensive employment and migrant net- works (Massey 1996). Among those who were in the labor force, all male immigrants, except for the Europeans, were more likely than native white workers to be underem- ployed, with over half the immigrants-more than 60 percent of the Asians among them- experiencing underemployment measured by partial employment, low-wage employ- ment, and overqualified employment. Mex- icans were almost twice as likely as other groups to be underemployed by low wages. By contrast, Africans, Asians, and Euro- peans were more likely to be underem- ployed by being educationally overqualified for the jobs they held. It is clear that disad- vantages in labor market status do not necessarily affect immigrant groups in the same manner. For those who are not able to obtain adequate employment, Mexican im- migrants are more likely to be absorbed in partial or low-wage employment, while African and Asian immigrants are more

454 MinZhou

likely to be occupationally overqualified in occupations.

The underemployment patterns among employed men were similar to those among employed women. Overall, however, gen- der expectations about employment are dif- ferent. For example, male workers who are discouraged to seek work may be viewed as being forced to detach themselves from the labor market. But the same view may not be applicable to unemployed women because they may voluntarily withdraw from the labor force because of marriage or childbearing. By the same token, partial em- ployment among men may be viewed as an imposed disadvantage, but partial employ- ment among women may be voluntary or a strategy for supplementing husbands' un- derpaid family wages. Whether all forms of underemployment accrue to economic dis- advantages remains a matter of debate. I would argue that unemployment is an ab- solute disadvantage. Partial employment or low-wage employment does not help much because their jobs are usually inadequate for sustaining a decent living, much less for moving up the socioeconomic ladder. This disadvantage affects Mexican immigrants disproportionately. Although Mexican im- migrants have relatively easy access to the U.s. labor market, their employment stabil- ity is heavily affected by the uncertain de- mands of the highly competitive, volatile industries in which they work. These condi- tions in turn constrain Mexican immigrants' ability to achieve economic success com- mensurate with their high rate of labor force participation.

While many immigrant workers start out as low-wage workers and gradually move up in the labor market, others may be "stuck" in dead-end jobs. Of course, whether one can successfully move out of their underemployment depends not simply on individual human capital or incentive be- cause the effects of human capital may be in-

tervened by factors beyond the control of in- dividual group members. Immigration se- lectivity is one such factor. Immigrants who have arrived with strong human capital may be able to overcome labor market dis- advantages by overqualification. Those who have arrived with little human capital are likely to be employed in low-wage and "bad" jobs. They usually have few economic resources and cannot afford the time for the kind of reeducation and retraining that can· possibly move them up in the labor market. However, it would be premature to con- clude that those who initially hold entry-level, low-wage jobs are necessarily "trapped" at the bottom of the labor market. In fact, as immigrants gain labor market ex- perience, many are able to advance within and across industries to better-paying posi- tions and even to self-employment (Portes and Zhou 1992, 1996; Zhou 1992). Thus, the long-term outcomes of underemployment as an alternative means to upward social mobility or as a dead-end street trapping immigrants in their starting point or push- ing them further down toward the bottom are speculative but not mutually exclusive scenarios.

The Impact of Race/Ethnicity on Immigrant Incorporation

Classical sociological theories about immi- grant adaptation predict a linear trajectory in which immigrants, starting their Ameri- can life at disadvantaged positions, eventu- ally converge toward the mean and become indistinguishable Americans (Alba 1985; Gordon 1964; Park 1928; Warner and Srole 1945). This conclusion is based on two assumptions. One is that there is a natural process by which diverse and initially dis- advantaged ethnic groups come to share a common culture and to gradually gain equal access to the opportunity structure of

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, Race/Ethnicity, and Social Mobility 455

the host society. The other is that this process consists of gradually deserting old cultural and behavioral patterns in favor of new ones and that, once set in motion, this process moves inevitably and irreversibly toward assimilation (Warner and Srole 1945).

Immigrants' intergenerational mobility has been empirically measured by the extent to which immigrant groups achieve parity with the society's dominant group in educa- tion, occupation, income and wealth, and political power, which is, in Gordon's (1964) term, "secondary structural assimilation." Looking back in history from the present standpoint, the experiences of the children and grandchildren of earlier European im- migrants appear to confirm the assimilation- ist prediction about structural assimilation. Between the 1920s and the 1950s, when America experienced a long hiatus of re- stricted immigration, the host country seemed to have absorbed the great waves of immigrants who had experienced signifi- cant upward mobility across immigrant generations, as determined by the length of stay since immigration, the mastery of the English language, the acquisition of human capital, and increasing exposure to Ameri- can culture (Alba 1985; Chiswick 1977; Gree- ley 1976; Sandberg 1974; WytrwaI1961).

However, it remains an open question whether new immigrants and their off- spring will follow the path of their Euro- pean predecessors. In terms of the direction of intergeneration mobility, the distinctions between yesterday's European immigrants and today's newcomers may not be as sharp as they appear to be. However, with regard to the rate of structural assimilation-the degree to which immigrant groups achieve parity with the dominant group-the classi- cal assimilationist paradigm shows its constraints. The historiography of the turn- of-the-century European immigrants reveals divergent rather than convergent outcomes among different national origin groups

(Perlmann 1988). Past studies on intergener- ational mobility have found persistent interethnic differences in the rate of progress even after controlling for measurable human capital characteristics and contex- tual factors. In a study of the Irish, Italian, Jewish, and African Americans in Provi- dence, Rhode Island, Perlmann (1988) found that, with family background factors held constant, ethnic differences in levels of schooling and economic attainment per- sisted in the second and later generations. He also found that schooling did not equally commensurate with occupational advance- ment for African Americans as for other European Americans across generations. Recent studies have also indicated that the distance between immigrant offspring and the native-born population in key socio- economic measures varies among different national origin groups and that for some it continues to remain substantial (Model 1991; Tang 1993; Tienda and Lii 1987; Zhou and Kamo 1994). Even the direction of inter- generational mobility does not appear to be linear, and research has found both general and group-specific trends of second- or third-generation decline (Gans 1992; Lan- dale and Oropesa 1995). These findings about past and present immigrant experi- ences have suggested that the direction and the rate of social mobility are two distinct di- mensions of the adaptational outcomes and that what determines the direction may not necessarily be what determines the rate. Next, I highlight the ways in which race and ethnicity impact the prospects of immigrant incorporation.

Ethnicity and Class

Ethnicity, which is intrinsically linked to national origin, has been found to be one of the most salient factors influencing soc- ial mobility of new immigrants. Classical assimilationist theories often treat ethnicity

456 Min Zhou

as a measure of old-country ways and con- sider it an impediment to structural assimi- lation, but acknowledge that ethnicity does more in predicting the rate than in predict- ing the direction of mobility (Park 1928; Warner and Srole 1945). Yet empirical research indicates significant differences in the magnitude of progress across different ethnic or national origin groups. Steinberg (1996) revealed a surprisingly prominent and strong role that ethnicity played in structuring the lives of adolescents, both in and outside of school. He found that students of Asian origin outperformed non- Hispanic white students, who in turn out- performed black and Hispanic students by significantly large margins. He also found that the ethnic differences remained marked and consistent across nine different high schools under study after controlling for social class, family structure, and place of birth of parents. He also found similar eth- nic effects on other important predictors of school success, such as the belief in the pay- off of schooling, attribution styles, and peer groups. A study reported in Ethnic Los Ange- les, conducted by a research team at the Uni- versity of California, Los Angeles, and headed by Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr, showed significant intergroup differences in the rate of intergenerational progress while revealing trends of upward mobility for all immigrant groups. This study found that native-born Mexicans and Central Americans experienced greater earnings and educational disparities with non-Hispanic whites relative to their Asian and Middle Eastern counterparts (Bozorg- mehr et al. 1996; Cheng and Yang 1996; Lopez et al. 1996; Ortiz 1996). Portes and Rumbaut (1996) attributed these differences to the interplay of premigration conditions, individual characteristics, host reception, and group adaptational patterns. They argue that the diverse socioeconomic char- acteristics on arrival among new immi-

grants give rise to varied modes of incorpo- ration that in turn affect the rate as well as the direction of progress among second and later generations.

Ethnicity and the Ethnic Hierarchy

While ethnicity is intrinsically intertwined with national origin, it is deeply rooted in America's ethnic stratification system, exert- . ing positive as well as negative effects on adaptational outcomes. What makes ethnic- ity favor some groups while penalizing oth- ers? One way to interpret the varied effects of ethnicity is to examine its interaction with class. Socioeconomic status has an indepen- dent effect on mobility outcomes because it influences where people live, where they go to school, with whom they are in close con- tact, and what kind of family and commu- nity resources are available. Wealthier and skilled immigrants are able to integrate into better sectors of the host economy with rela- tive ease and settle directly in suburban middle-class communities, albeit with tem- porary downward mobility. Poorer and unskilled immigrants have few options but take up low-wage jobs and settle in declin- ing urban areas, starting their American life either in poverty or on welfare. Becker (1963) found that early and insignificant differentials in class status can result in sub- stantial differences in educational and occu- pational mobility in later years. The strong correlation between national origins and skill levels of contemporary immigrants also has a significant bearing on the varied effects of ethnicity. For example, the chil- dren of Mexican immigrants lag far behind their peers of Asian origins in academic performance and educational attainment, partly because of socioeconomic differences (Perlmann and Waldinger 1997) and partly because of differential resources generated in the family and the ethnic community

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, Race/Ethnicity, and Social Mobility 457

(Caplan et al. 1989; Gibson 1989; Rumbaut and Ima 1988).

However, controlling for the interactive effect between class and national origin does not seem to reduce the significance of eth- nicity. Recent studies on the new second generation are a case in point. Using lan- guage proficiency as a proxy for the nativity or immigration status in a large-scale study in the San Diego School District during the 1986-1987 and 1989-1990 school years, Rumbaut found that first-generation Chi- nese, Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Fil- ipino students had the highest grade-point averages of all students in the district. More remarkable, even the Hmong, who came from preliterate peasant background, and the more recently arrived Cambodians out- performed all native-born English-only American students (Rumbaut 1995). Given the drastic differences in socioeconomic backgrounds of these Asian national origin groups, this finding complicates the effect of class. Portes and his associates reported findings from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey (CILS) showing that parents' socioeconomic status, length of U.S. residence, and homework hours signifi- cantly affected academic performance but that controlling for these factors did not eliminate the effect of ethnicity. More sys- tematic analyses of the educational progress of children of immigrants using the CILS data generally confirmed these findings (Rumbaut and Portes 2001).

The fact that ethnicity continues to shape the American experience of immi- grant groups implies that ethnicity also in- teracts with broader structural factors that produce and reinforce specific advantages or disadvantages in ethnic group member- ship and that the outcomes of adaptation may be segmented with potential and real risks of downward mobility (Portes and Zhou 1993). Portes and MacLeod (1996), using the National Educational Longitud-

inal Survey, reported that the negative ef- fect of disadvantaged group memberships among immigrant children was reinforced rather than reduced in suburban schools but that the positive effect of advantaged group memberships remained significant even in inner-city schools. Using the same data set but employing a two-stage least-squares method, Hao and Bonstead-Bruns (1998) found that immigrant status increases edu- cational expectations for Chinese, Koreans, and Filipino families more than for Mexican families. They also found that Chinese back- ground consistently exerted positive effects on educational achievement, while Mexican background showed significantly negative effects, and that the ethnic effects persisted after controlling for important individual and contextual factors.

Why is it that ethnicity exerts opposite effects on the same outcome measures for dif- ferent national origin groups? Existing litera- ture has suggested that the advantages and disadvantages of ethnic group membership lie not merely in the class status and the cor- responding modes of incorporation from which the first generation start life in Amer- ica, but also in different levels of the social structures in which individuals and groups participate. At the macro level, the system of ethnic stratification functions to provide dif- ferent ethnic groups with unequal access to economic resources and political power. At the micro level, the networks of social ties, which are often ethnically based, prescribe different strategies to cope with structural disadvantages and mobilize different types of social capital to provide support for group members. Either the members of disadvan- taged ethnic groups accept an inferior status and a sense of basic inferiority as part of their collective self-definition or they create a posi- tive view of their heritage on the basis of cultural and ethnic distinction, thereby estab- lishing a sense of collective dignity (Ogbu 1974). If a socially defined ethnic group

458 Min Zhou

wishes to assimilate but finds that normal paths of integration are blocked on the basis of ethnicity, the group may be forced to take alternative survival strategies that enable its members to cope psychologically with struc- tural barriers but that do not necessarily en- courage structural assimilation. The group may also react to structural disadvantages by constructing resistance to assimilation (Ford- ham 1996; Kohl 1994). In this case, symbolic expressions of ethnicity and ethnic empow- erment hinder rather than facilitate social mobility among group members.

As immigrants and their children are absorbed into different segments of Ameri- can society, becoming American may not al- ways be an advantage. When immigrants enter middle-class communities directly or after a short transition, they may find it ad- vantageous to acculturate and assimilate. If the social environment surrounding immi- grant children is rich in resources and if its goals are consistent with those of the immi- grant family, then ethnic resources may be relatively less important, but those ethnic resources may still count. For example, many middle-class immigrant parents move into affluent white neighborhoods and send their children to schools attended mainly by white students from similar or more afflu- ent socioeconomic backgrounds. But they still insist on enrolling their children in eth- nic institutions during after-school hours and weekends or involving them in reli- gious or cultural activities. The children then benefit both from privileged socio- economic contacts with members of the dominant group in mainstream American society and from the group-specific expec- tations of and opportunities for intellectual development.

Thus, when immigrant children enter the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy, where the forces of assimilation come mainly from the underprivileged, acculturation and as-

similation are likely to result in distinct dis- advantages, viewed as maladjustment by both mainstream society and the ethnic com- munity. Immigrant children from less fortu- nate socioeconomic backgrounds have a much harder time than middle-class children succeeding in school. A significant number of the children of poor, especially dark-skinned, immigrants can be trapped in permanent poverty in the era of stagnant economic growth, for in the process of Americaniza- tion, these immigrant children" will either not be asked, or will be reluctant, to work at immigrant wages and hours as their parents did but will lack job opportunities, skills and connections to do better" (Gans 1992: 173- 174). The prospects facing children of the less fortunate may be high rates of unemploy- ment, crime, alcoholism, drug use, and other pathologies associated with poverty and the frustration of rising expectation.

This new reality defines the world that confronts the children of new immigrants. Children growing up in households headed by poor, low-skilled immigrants face uncer- tain prospects for moving ahead through school success. The parents, of course, have few of the economic resources that can help children do well in school. The environment does not help when neighborhoods are poor and beset by violence and drugs and local schools do not function well. To add to this difficulty, immigrant children receive con- flicting signals, hearing at home that they should achieve at school while learning a different lesson on the street-that of rebel- lion against authority and rejection of goals of achievement. At the same time, both real life and television expose children to the wage and consumption standards of u.s. society, and children come to expect more than their parents ever had. As a result, chil- dren of the foreign born are unwilling to work the low-paying, low-status jobs of their parents, but they do not have the edu-

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, RacejEthnicity, and Social Mobility 459

cation, skills, or opportunities to do better (Gans 1992). This mismatch between rising aspirations and shrinking opportunities will either lead to second-generation decline or provoke " second-generation revolt" (Perlmann and Waldinger 1997). However, young immigrants or children of immi- grants may benefit from cultivating social ties within ethnic communities to develop forms of behavior likely to break the cycle of disadvantage and to lead to upward mo- bility. The extent to which young people are integrated into this community also becomes a major determinant of school adaptation, especially when the social envi- ronment otherwise places children at risk (Zhou and Bankston 1998).

Conclusion

The significant differences between contem- porary and turn-of-the-century European immigration necessitate a reconceptualiza- tion of the phenomenon and the develop- ment of alternative theories. Because of the diverse socioeconomic backgrounds of new immigrants, the pathways toward integra- tion into American society may be as rugged as they are segmented. Many new immi- grants continue to follow the traditional rugged route, starting from the bottom rungs of the socioeconomic ladder and gradually working their way up. A visible proportion of them, however, manage to bypass the bottom starting line, incorporat- ing directly into mainstream professional occupations and dispersing into suburban middle-class communities. Still, a signifi- cant number may be permanently "trap- ped" at the bottom, either unable to find work or working at "dead-end" jobs with little hope for social mobility.

Increasing diversity also poses chal- lenges for Americans as they experience the

drastic changes in the dynamics of race and ethnicity in an era of rapid social and economic transformations. Again, the old framework of assimilation has become out- moded. In multiethnic metropolises today, all native-born racialj ethnic groups are fac- ing the challenge of adjustment to the new reality. Growing tensions are arising from an urgent need to negotiate the culture of di- versity and to redefine oneself in the new racialj ethnic stratification system.

Finally, the future of new immigrants and their children is intrinsically linked to the diversity of immigration and to the cur- rent social stratification system into which today's immigrant children are assimilating. The American public still seems to allude to the idea that all immigrant children should move up and melt into the middle class. Be- cause there are poor whites who have never assimilated into the white middle class, it is natural that some immigrant children may not make it, either, as immigrants are incor- porating into a highly stratified society that accords individuals with varied life chances. Gans (1992) questions the Ameri- can faith that mystifies an eventual immi- grant success, particularly in regards to the new second generation. While children of the middle class have a better chance for success, the poor, especially the darker skinned, may not fare equally well. Conse- quently, assimilation as a widespread out- come for contemporary immigrant groups is possible for some but questionable for others. Indeed, for most Europeans, assimi- lation did not take place until the third or even the fourth generation. Thus, while the new second-generation immigrants may not assimilate, their children or grand- children may. But with scenarios of second- generation decline still a matter of specula- tion, it seems clear that assimilation no longer means that everyone will eventually succeed.

460 MinZhou

NOTES

The original version of this chapter was pre- sented at the Research Conference on Racial Trends in the United States, National Research Council, Washington, DC, October 15-16, 1998. Some of the main ideas were drawn from my pre- viously published work (Zhou 1997b, 2001). I thank Roger Waldinger and Mary Waters for their helpful comments and Vincent Fu and Diana Lee for their research assistance.

1. In theory, all the IRCA legalizees should have been residing in the country for a considerable period of time prior to 1989, though a substantial portion of those legal- ized under the SAW program turned out to be relatively recent arrivals.

2. Refugees and asylees can be anyone with a well-founded fear of prosecution on the basis of race, religion, membership in a social group, political opinion, or national origin. Refugees are those seeking protec- tion outside the United States, while asylees are those seeking protection once already in the United States.

3. These are Census Bureau-designated principal metropolitan statistical areas rather than cities proper.

4. African immigrants also include a significant component of refugees from Ethiopia who had a higher labor force par- ticipation rate than Southeast Asian refu- gees. African refugees, as well as European refugees, tend to have higher educational attainment, more fluent English proficiency, and better access to community-based employment networks than Southeast Asian refugees.

REFERENCES

ALBA, RICHARD D. 1985. Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

ALBA, RICHARD D., and VICTOR NEE. 1997. "Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration." International Migration Review 31 (4): 826-874.

BECKER, HOWARD S. 1963. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: The Free Press.

BOZORGMEHR, MEHDI, CLAUDIA DER-MARTIROSIAN, and GEORGES SABAGH. 1996. "Middle Eastern- ers: A New Kind of Immigrant." In Ethnic Los Angeles, edited by Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. New York: Russell Sage Founda- tion.

CAPLAN, NATHAN, MARCELLA H. CHOY, and JOHN K. WHITMORE. 1989. The Boat People and Achieve- ment in America: A Study of Family Life, Hard Work, and Cultural Values. Ann Arbor: Univer~ sity of Michigan Press.

CHENG, LUCIE, and PHILIP Q. YANG. 1996. "Asian: The 'Model Minority' Deconstructed." In Eth- nic Los Angeles, edited by Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

CHISWICK, BARRY R. 1977. "Sons of Immigrants: Are They at an Earnings Disadvantage?" American Economic Review 67 (February): 376-380.

CLARK, WILLIAM A. V 1996. "Residential Patterns: Avoidance, Assimilation, and Succession." In Ethnic Los Angeles, edited by Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

CORNELIUS, WAYNE A. 1995. "Educating Califor- nia's Immigrant Children: Introduction and Overview." In California's Immigrant Children: Theory, Research, and Implications for Educational Policy, edited by Ruben Rumbaut and Wayne A. Cornelius. La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.- Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.

DE CREVECOEUR, J. HECTOR ST. JOHN. 1904 [1782]. Letters from an American Farmer. New York: Fox, Duffield.

FORDHAM, SIGNITHIA. 1996. Blacked Out: Dilemmas of Race, Identity, and Success at Capital High. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

FREY,WILLIAM H. 1995. "Immigration and Inter- nal Migration 'Flight' from U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Toward a New Demographic Balka- nization." Urban Studies 32 (4-5): 733-757.

GANS, HERBERT J. 1992. "Second-Generation Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and Eth- nic Futures of the Post-1965 American Immi- grants." Ethnic and Racial Studies 15 (2): 173-192.

GIBSON, MARGARET A. 1989. Accommodation with- out Assimilation: Sikh Immigrants in an American High School. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

The Changing Face ofAmerica: Immigration, RacejEthnicity, and Social Mobility 461

GORDON, MILTON M. 1964. Assimilation in Ameri- can Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press.

GRANT, DAVID M., MELVIN L. OLIVER, and ANGELA D. JAMES. 1996. "African Americans: Social and Economic Bifurcation." In Ethnic Los Angeles, edited by Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

GREELEY, ANDREW M. 1976. "The Ethnic Miracle." The Public Interest 45: 20-36.

HAO, LINGXIN, AND MELISSA BONSTEAD-BRUNS. 1998. "Parent-Child Differences in Educational Expectations and the Academic Achievement of Immigrant and Native Students." Sociology of Education 71: 175-198.

HORTON, JOHN. 1995. The Politics of Diversity: Immigration, Resistance, and Change in Monterey Park, California. Philadelphia: Temple Univer- sity Press.

KOHL, HERBERT. 1994. "I Won't Learn from You" and Other Thoughts on Creative Maladjustment. New York: The New Press.

LANDALE, NANCY S., and R. S. OROPESA. 1995. "Immigrant Children and the Children of Immigrants: Inter- and Intra-Group Differ- ences in the United States." Research Paper. Population Research Group, Michigan State University.

LOPEZ, DAVID E., ERIC POPKIN, and EDWARD TELLS. 1996. "Central Americans: At the Bottom, Struggling to Get Ahead." In Ethnic Los Angeles, edited' by Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

MASSEY, DOUGLAS S. 1995. "The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States." Population and Development Review 21 (3): 631-652.

---. 1996. "The Age of Extremes: Concen- trated Affluence and Poverty in the Twenty- First Century." Demography 33 (4): 395-412.

MASSEY, DOUGLAS S., RAFAEL ALARCON, JORGE DURAND, and HUMBERTO GONZALEZ. 1987. Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of Interna- tional Migration from Western Mexico. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

MAsSEY, DOUGLAS S., and NANCY A. DENTON. 1987. "Trends in Residential Segregation of Black, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970-1980." American Sociological Review 52: 802-825.

MIN, PYONG GAP. 1996. Caught in the Middle: Korean Communities in New York and Los Ange- les. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

MOCH, LESLIE PAGE. 1992. Moving Europeans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

MODEL, SUZANNE. 1991. "Caribbean Immigrants: A Black Success Story?" International Migration Review 25: 248-276.

MORAWSKA, EWA T. 1990. "The Sociology and His- toriography of Immigration." In Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics, edited by Virginia Yans-McLaughlin. New York: Oxford University Press.

MORRISON, PETER A., and IRA S. LOWRY. 1994. "A Riot of Color: The Demographic Setting." In The Los Angeles Riot, edited by Mark Baldas- sare. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

MYRDAL, GUNNAR. 1962 [1944]. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democ- racy. New York: Harper & Row.

OGBU, JOHN U. 1974. The Next Generation: An Ethnography of Education in an Urban Neighbor- hood. New York: Academic Press.

OLIVER, MELVIN L., and THOMAS M. SHAPIRO. 1995. Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality. New York: Routledge.

ORTIZ, VILMA. 1996. "The Mexican-Origin Popu- lation: Permanent Working Class or Emerging Middle Class?" In Ethnic Los Angeles, edited by Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

PARK, ROBERT E. 1928. "Human Migration and the Marginal Man." American Journal of Sociology 33: 881-893.

PERLMANN, JOEL. 1988. Ethnic Differences: School- ing and Social Structure among the Irish, Jews, and Blacks in an American City, 1988-1935. New York: Cambridge University Press.

PERLMANN, JOEL, and ROGER WALDINGER. 1997. "Second Generation Decline? Immigrant Children Past and Present-A Reconsidera- tion." International Migration Review 31 (4): 893-922.

PORTES, ALEJANDRO. 1995. "Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration: A Concep- tual Overview." In The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship, edited by Alejandro Portes. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

PORTES, ALEJANDRO, and DAG MACLEOD. 1996. "The Educational Progress of Children of Immigrants: The Roles of Class, Ethnicity, and School Context." Sociology of Education 69 (4): 255-275.

PORTES, ALEJANDRO, and RUBEN G. RUMBAUT. 1996. Immigrant America: A Portrait. 2nd ed. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

462 Min Zhou

PORTES, ALEJANDRO, and ALEX STEPICK. 1993. City on the Edge: The Transformation ofMiami. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

PORTES, ALEJANDRO, and MIN ZHOU. 1992. "Gain- ing the Upper Hand: Economic Mobility among Immigrant and Domestic Minorities." Ethnic and Racial Studies 15: 491-522.

---. 1993. "The New Second Generation: Seg- mented Assimilation and Its Variants among Post-1965 Immigrant Youth." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530 (November): 74-98.

---. 1996. "Self-Employment and the Earn- ings of Immigrants." American Sociological Review 61: 219-230.

RUMBAUT, RUBEN G. 1995. "Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian Americans." In Asian Ameri- cans: Contemporary Trends and Issues, edited by Pyong Gap Min. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

RUMBAUT, RUBEN G., and KENJI IMA. 1988. The Adaptation of Southeast Asian Refugee Youth: A Comparative Study. Washington, DC: US. Office of Refugee Resettlement.

RUMBAUT, RUBEN G., and ALEJANDRO PORTES, eds. 2001. Ethnicities: Coming of Age in Immigrant America. Berkeley and Los Angeles and New York: University of California Press and Rus- sell Sage Foundation.

SANDBERG, N. C. 1974. Ethnic Identity and Assimi- lation: The Polish-American Community. New York: Praeger.

SMITH, JAMES P., and BARRY EDMONSTON, eds. 1997. The New Americans: Economic, Demographic and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

STEINBERG, LAURENCE. 1996. Beyond the Classroom. New York: Simon & Schuster.

TANG, JOYCE. 1993. "The Career Attainment of Caucasian and Asian Engineers." Sociological Quarterly 34: 467-496.

TIENDA, MARTA, and D. T. Ln. 1987. "Minority Concentration and Earnings Inequality: Blacks, Hispanics and Asians Compared." American Journal of Sociology 2: 141-165.

U.s. Census Bureau. 1993. 1990 Census of the Pop- ulation: The Foreign Born Population in the United States. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office.

U.s. Commission on Civil Rights. 1988. The Eco- nomic Status of Americans of Asian Descent: An Exploratory Investigation. Washington, DC: Clearinghouse Publications.

---. 1992. Civil Rights Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s: A Report. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1997. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1995. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office.

WALDINGER, ROGER. 1996. Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Postindustrial New York. Cambridge, MA: Har- vard University Press.

WALDINGER, ROGER, and MEHDI BOZORGMEHR. 1996. "The Making of a Multicultural Metrop- olis." In Ethnic Los Angeles. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

WARNER, W. LLOYD, and LEO SROLE. 1945. The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

WARREN, ROBERT, and ELLEN PERCY KRALY. 1985. "The Elusive Exodus: Emigration from the United States." Population Trends and Public Policy Occasional Paper No.8 (March). Wash- ington, DC: Population Reference Bureau.

WATERS, MARY C. 1994. "Ethnic and Racial Identi- ties of Second-Generation Black Immigrants in New York City." International Migration Review 28 (4): 795-820.

---. 1996. "Immigrant Families at Risk: Fac- tors That Undermine Chances of Success." In Immigration and the Family: Research and Policy on U.S. Immigrants, edited by Alan Booth, Ann C. Crouter, and Nancy Landale. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

WILSON, WILLIAMJ. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. New York: Knopf.

WYTRWAL, J. A. 1961. America's Polish Heritage: A Social History of Poles in America. Detroit: Endurance Press.

ZANGWILL, ISRAEL. 1914. The Melting Pot: Drama in Four Acts. New York: Macmillan.

ZHOU, MIN. 1992. Chinatown: The Socioeconomic Potential of an Urban Enclave. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

---. 1997a. "Employment Patterns of Immi- grants in the U.S. Economy." Paper presented at the Conference on International Migration at Century's End: Trends and Issues, Interna- tional Union for Scientific Study of the Popu- lation, Barcelona, Spain, May 7-10.

--. 1997b. "Growing up American: The Chal- lenge Confronting Immigrant Children and Children of Immigrants." Annual Review of Sociology 23: 63-95.

---.2001. "Contemporary Immigration and the Dynamics of Race and Ethnicity." In Amer- ica Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Conse- quences, edited by Neil Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Why Irish Became Domestics and Italians and Jews Did Not 463

ZHOU, MIN, and CARL L. BANKSTON III. 1998. Growing up American: The Adaptation of Viet- namese Adolescents in the United States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

ZHOU, MIN, and YOSHINORI KAMo. 1994. " An Analy- sis of Earnings Patterns for Chinese, Japanese and Non-Hispanic Whites in the United States." Sociological Quarterly 35 (4): 581-602.

RETHINKING THE COLOR LINE Readings in Race and Ethnicity

Second Edition

Charles A. Gallagher Georgia State University

Boston Burr Ridge, IL Dubuque, IA Madison, WI New York San Francisco St. Louis Bangkok Bogota Caracas Kuala Lumpur Lisbon London Madrid Mexico City Milan Montreal New Delhi Santiago Seoul Singapore Sydney Taipei Toronto