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SEVEN | National myths and the creation of heroes

J A M I E M U N N

How are national identities (re)constituted in postconflict societies? How

does gender work in this (re)constitution? A number of curiosities inform

the writing of this chapter. One involves an interest in the effectiveness

of R. W. Connell’s thesis on hegemonic masculinity, particularly in light

of criticisms that suggest this thesis implies a natural inevitable domi

nance (Demetriou 2001). Other critics claim that, despite its popularity,

the implementation of the concept of hegemonic masculinity has not

engendered any real social change (Beynon 2002; Dyer 2002; Morton

2001). I began more seriously thinking about Connell’s thesis after read

ing over my interview notes from Kosovo.1 These conversations led me to

ponder the benefit of the concept of hegemonic masculinity in relation

to reconstructions of masculine subjectivities in postconflict Kosovo.

The interview material suggested that Connell’s framework potentially

misses the ways gender works in postconflict societies, overlooking the

complex ways in which masculinity is discursively manipulated so that

even those who are perceived to be less masculine within the local social

hierarchy can maintain or construct a sense of self that is recognizably

masculine. In order to make this argument, I use Judith Butler’s idea

of insurrectionary speech in the context of performativity which can

powerfully assist in revealing hegemonic forms of identity (in this case

masculinity) as constructed fiction rather than settled norms (Butler

1997: 16, 50, 121).

Thus, the chapter builds on work by Connell’s critics, who have

identified problems with the concept of hegemony and categorization

of masculinities (Whitehead 2002; Beynon 2002: 125; Munn 2006: 291,

296) and explores the relevance of national heroic myths as they have

materialized in postconflict Kosovo. I utilize this work alongside But

ler’s notion of performativity as my entry points for critically thinking

about the relevance of Connell’s framework for understanding gender

and masculinities in postconflict nonWestern societies. The chapter

interrogates the latent insurrectionary power of nationalist myths and

Rethinking the Man Question : Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations, edited by Jane L. Parpart, and Doctor Marysia Zalewski, Zed Books, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/westminster/detail.action?docID=368677. Created from westminster on 2020-11-16 11:48:50.

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practices as narrative performances of hegemonic masculinity. I return

to some of these concerns later, but for the moment I will suggest why

postconflict Kosovo is an interesting example in this context. To be clear

from the outset, the scaffold for my arguments comes from a position

which posits a direct link between the theorization of the reconstructions

of nations in postconflict and the relationship this (re)construction has

with masculine identity/ies.

Why Kosovo?

Kosovo is a society (nation) in the midst of creating a selfgoverned

state in a postconflict environment, which inevitably involves ideas,

expressions about and performances of ‘national identity’. In order to

shed light on the changing narratives of manliness and what is/becomes

masculine in Kosovo, I will explore three common trends within the

discourse on masculinities: (1) hegemonic masculinity and multiple mas

culinities; (2) national mythological processes associated with creating

and defining ‘manliness’; and (3) embodied performances of masculinity

as they are represented in Kosovo.

Contemporary writers, across a spectrum of disciplines, have argued

for recognition of multiple masculinities (Beynon 2002; Best and Wil

liams 1997; Connell 1995, 2000; Carver 2002; Whitehead 2002; Zalewski

1995). They suggest that multiple masculinities are not disconnected

entities without interaction and change, but interact and work in unison

as well as in conflict with one another. Connell describes some masculini

ties as dominant, while others are subordinated or marginalized (2000:

10). Thus, according to Connell, there is one hegemonic masculinity

defined as ‘the masculinity that occupies the hegemonic position in a

given pattern of gender relations, a position that is always contestable’

(1995: 76). In the case of Kosovo, multiple masculinities play out in day

today civil affairs. Men from different backgrounds engage with what

I will suggest is the embodiment of the most hegemonically masculine

figure – the foreign soldier. The foreign soldier holds this role owing

simply to status of occupier, protector and, to a certain extent, as pro

vider.2 Yet the interviews analysed below demonstrate that this interaction

does not diminish the sense of masculinity felt by ‘less masculine’ men,

particularly gay men.3 These struggles have often led to violence that is

frequently explained and legitimized by commentators on Kosovo in

gendered language, particularly by redefining the meanings of gendered

identity and group membership. I will work with my interview material

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National myths 145

to explore the idea that Connell’s framework neglects an important way

in which gender works in postconflict societies and consequently has

difficulty theorizing the paradoxical ways in which masculinity is dis

cursively manipulated.

Nationalist histories have been identified as a medium through which

myths are circulated. Moreover, Tosh has suggested that the narrative

structure of the nation itself may be instrumental in setting up the binary

story of manliness, womanliness and heterosexual subjectivity as cultur

ally primordial (2004: 38). Others argue that some nations, such as post

communist and twentiethcentury new states, are more preoccupied with

narrating masculinity than others; and these nations are not dissimilar to

Kosovo (Drulak 2001; Enloe 1993; Sokolewicz 1999). As such, a discussion

of any nationalist struggle necessarily includes a discussion of the con

nection between masculinities and the mythical narratives circulating in

national religious, secular or popular cultures. Whitehead suggests that

national identity and formations of hegemonic masculinity are reinvigor

ated through ‘mythical narratives that turn on recounting as heromyth,

the actions, trials and triumphs of certain (possibly fictional) men’ (2002:

98, 127,176). The ritual of storytelling around dominant men is at the

foreground of Kosovo’s ongoing nation and statebuilding project. In the

case of Kosovo, it must be noted that it is not so much the nation which is

under construction but external recognition of Kosovo as a state.4 Kosovar

stories of heroic men have become a means through which the community

has constructed a sense of manliness and masculinity (see Parpart, this

volume).5 At the same time as exalting manly warriors, the narratives

also marginalize less masculine men as outsiders, non Albanian men,

homosexuals and women.6 It is worth noting, however, that these nar

rative myths of feats and courage are not limited to a particular type of

man and are in fact utilized to redefine masculinities or manliness across

subcultures; the dominant masculinity, at times, can be the poet, the

warrior, the despot or the benevolent prince.

Connell attempts to address the power of narratives by claiming that

it is a concept of gender drawing bodies into history, since bodies are

arenas for the making of gender patterns (2000: 12). Gender is material

ized through ‘a range of “body practices”, which address, sort and modify

bodies’ (ibid.: 58). With regard to masculinity, the warrior becomes a key

site through which masculine heromyths meet ritualized structuring of

men’s relationships to their bodies. When analysing the role of mascu

linity in provoking or perpetuating violence in Kosovo, it is necessary

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to make a distinction between men’s embodied performances of their

own masculinities, which are necessarily multiple, and their expectations

of masculinity, which are limited to normative models. This modelling

includes what men are taught they should aspire to be and how they

judge who they are. With this reading of the narrative, men are judged

and assessed by the nation as validated, demeaned or rebuked.

During my various visits to Kosovo to speak to men and women, it

became apparent that a powerful mixture of preYugoslavian, antiSerbian

and now postconflict messages has led to a position where stereotypes

and narratives of what men and women are like have become polarized

by what they should be like and should do, and what their position in

Kosovo should be.7 Not unlike their Balkan neighbours, men are expected

to be heterosexual husbands and fathers; and their status depends on

having a wife and children and their ability to control them. An unmarried

man, for example, is called a ‘boy/kid’ (‘çunak’) and is not taken seri

ously – he is not yet a man. Some interviewees reported that unmarried

men are thought of as unable to participate in political life. Given that

some of my informants were young unmarried men who fought in the

national struggle as Kosova Liberation Army soldiers, this assumption

about adult masculinity raises interesting questions about the subject of

heroes. They were, at that time, represented as the dominant man and

the powerful myth/hero; yet in postconflict Prishtina, the public sees

them once again as a çunak, a less manly entity. Whereas any married

man is responsible, the çunak is stereotyped as selfish, impatient and

a funlover. As a result, these supposed heroes are seen as being in an

indeterminate state of manliness.

It should be noted that the current narrative of Kosovar masculinity

is often portrayed, both within the nation and to nonmembers, as a

pure Albanian ethnic identity, with a long history of a military, violent

culture. It is problematic that this narrative is so deeply entrenched in

the national psyche, just as it is embedded in an internationally negative

image of Albanians (Mertus 1999). The negative image of Albanians as

drug smugglers, pimps and human traffickers has become an interna

tional myth in its own right (Mostov 2000; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/

uk/4287432.stm>). Throughout various episodes of Balkan history, the

Albanian Kosovar has been seen as a fierce warrior to his neighbours

in Serbia, Macedonia, Albania and Greece. This legacy has created a

national narrative reinforcing and applauding dominant masculine men

as fighters and perpetrators of violence, which has been played upon by

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National myths 147

Serbs to justify the authoritarian control imposed on the province in the

past. It is also part of the international portrayal of Kosovar Albanians as

undesirables. This stereotyped reputation is juxtaposed with a Kosovar

selfperception of a nation capable of calmness and rationality that has

been led during critical national histories by great intellectual men. It

can be said, of course, that these positive internal perceptions are as

much subject to manipulation as the negative external ones.

It is important to stress that Kosovar men, in some way, have to

integrate this masculine narrative of what they ‘ought to be’ into the

underlying truth of their situation, namely that they are dominated by

foreign warriors. The foreigner is the OSCE administrator, UNMIK and

NATO soldier. Many interviewees note that protection and occupation

under either the international foreigner or Belgrade still represent weak

ness and nonrecognition as a valid nation to most Kosavars.

In August 1991, Milošević gave an interview to BSkyB reporter Arnot

Van Liden, denying involvement in the Croatian conflict. When he was

asked about a call for independence from ‘the people of Kosovo’, his

response was, ‘What part of the people? The Albanians? The Albanians

are a national minority in Yugoslavia. You know very well that there are

no international obligations, UN or CSCE obligations or the like which

determine the right of national minorities to establish their own state’

(Sky Television/Belgrade TV, 7 August 1991). Van Liden’s subsequent

question illustrates Milošević’s views on Albanians. My assertion is that

these views are part of the national narrative, thus a part of the masculine

narrative:

Van Liden: But the Serbs in Croatia are a minority?

Milošević: No, they are not. No Yugoslav people are a minority any

where in Yugoslavia. We are living in Yugoslavia and we cannot be a

national minority depending on the place we are living in. Croats are

not a national minority in Bosnia, despite the fact that they are only

15 per cent. They are a people. All Yugoslav peoples in Yugoslavia are

equal and not one of them can be a national minority. Albanians are

not a people; they are not really Yugoslav because they are not Slavs.

Albanians are not even Europeans. (ibid.)

Thus, the ongoing debate on Kosovo’s autonomy coincides with a dis

course that devalues Kosovar manliness to the status of çunak in a nation

on an indeterminate path to state(man)hood.

Just as the mythical hero forms part of the hegemonic narrative,

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so do bodies and sexualities. Connell has expressed the embodiment

of masculinity partially through discussions of sexuality, stating that

‘the most symbolically important distinction between masculinities is

in terms of sexuality. Hegemonic masculinity is emphatically hetero

sexual, homosexual masculinities are subordinated …’ (2000: 102; see

also Anand’s chapter, this volume). Contrasting versions of masculinity

are, however, highlighted in the Kosovar narrative. Contrary to the gender

stereotypes about men and relationships, there are variations. Florin,

aged twentythree, tells a story about breaking out of the old Kosovo

frame, suggesting that life in 2003 was structurally more fluid after the

arrival of international forces and support agencies.

I would like to tell people that I am a gay but I am also afraid … I fear

from other Albanian guys because of my sexuality and because of

the present [situation], there is no effective police or justice system

to protect me from homophobic attacks. So, I have a girlfriend. But

when Kosovo is a real country and in [the] EU I can be gay. I will get a

boyfriend and people can’t touch us then. I am still very nervous and

shy [when] meeting guys so I only go with internationals, they like my

sex. They see gays as normal … supernormal. We can meet and they

know I am a gay even though no friends [of mine] can tell. I hide as a

real man; they are so stupid.

We might read this as Florin seeing his own body and sexuality as part of

the shifting from outsider (unaccepted gay man) to insider (Kosovar/EU

citizen). He believes his sexuality may free him from the constraints

of the past and give him the ability to forge a new life on different

principles as he matches the change he sees in the status of Kosovo to

his selfdevelopment and pleasure. As he says himself, he constructs

a supernormal self. Florin, it could be said, is not performing the old

Kosovar masculine narrative, but the narrative that is becoming a new

masculinity in the new Kosovo.

Florin’s interview makes it clear that masculinities are also bound up

with constructions of ethnicities; for him, the international, hegemonic,

masculine man accepts his sexuality without questioning his manliness.

The key point to draw here is that understandings of the performance

narratives of sexuality are highly relevant to an analysis of a society freshly

emerging from conflict. For this reason, the images of warfare and the

soldier, both the nationalist fighter and the international warrior, are

implicated in the overlapping construction of masculinities.

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Following on from this, if Connell can be read as providing a des

criptive analysis of how masculinities are negotiated as a ‘snapshot’

of a particular culture, then the account of hegemonic masculinity is

identified as having a distinctively deterministic outcome (Kaufmann and

Williams 2004; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). In the case of Kosovo,

the hegemonic masculinity in its narrative and embodied forms alters

from Serb to KLA fighter to UNMIK or NATO soldier within a period of

months. It could be understood from reading Connell that social change

is entirely left out of the equation.

Bringing in Butler

It is now time to suggest a provocative pairing of Connell’s hegemonic

masculinities thesis and Butler’s insurrectionary speech. By pulling the

two together, I hope to present a new way of challenging how performance

and narratives of national struggles, taking the guise of social change,

can be conceived as influencing masculine identities and encouraging

multiple versions of hegemonic masculinities (Butler 1997).

As is now familiar to those studying the feminist canon, Butler posits

gender and other social convention patterns as protected and affirmed

using various symbols and social actions. In Kosovo, one could argue

that these symbols and social actions are in the form of iconography.

Iconographies are seen in stories of the Racak massacre of 1999, the

potent manliness in Mehmet Kajtazi’s novels, the ultimate selfsacrificing

woman embodied by Mother Teresa and the renaming of Prishtina’s

main streets to memorialize Albanian heroes, as in Bill Clinton Street.

Together, these national emblems and performances give Kosovars a

story of their recent past, one that defines the ‘gendered subjectpatterns’

of masculinity and femininity (Butler 1993; Zalewski 1995). These configu

rations of gendered histories are, however, neither solid nor permanent.

Each social rule or act provides only a particular snapshot and how that

snapshot is framed can alter the status quo. Therefore, the way in which

each snapshot is placed and ultimately becomes a part of the national

narrative develops Kosovo’s potential for social change. It is from this

perspective that Butler’s view of gender, as open to insurrection by the

use of symbols and performances, is most useful when analysing Kosovo

masculinities today.

I want to use Butler’s work on ‘insurrectionary speech’ to explore the

possibility that various gendered performances and depictions in Kosovo

are ‘instrument[s] of resistance in [a] redeployment that destroys the prior

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territory of [their] operation’ (Butler 1997: 163). In unveiling particular

cultural readings of gender from various interviews, ‘insurrectionary

speech’ represents the status quo out of context; and in this way, it un

settles the status quo (ibid.). One outcome of this is social and cultural

performances appearing solid in that they create counter hegemonic

ways, such as Florin’s reading of the hegemonic foreign soldier accepting

his homosexuality as supernormal. When applied to hegemonic masculin

ity, Butler’s insurrectionary speech can provide a strategy for destabilizing

the hierarchy hegemony imposes (see Schauer 2004: 31). By means of

interrupting the narrative performance of hegemonic masculinity, it may

be possible to disturb Kosovars’ hierarchy of masculinities.

This becomes tantamount to deconstructing the national gendered

narrative; Butler allows us to see the norm/narrative as malleable. Thus,

my project does not aim to simply deconstruct one ontological vision

of gender in order to replace it with another; that would be counter

productive. Although Connell has challenged Butler by arguing that she

is only responding to the question of social change by focusing on the

individual and not the larger picture, I think this statement neglects the

point that social change is influenced by which performances circulate

and what myths achieve national authority (2000: 20). Thus, my point

in making this argument is that social change revolves around the sym

bolic mechanisms through which hegemonic masculinity is performed

and potentially unseated through some representations of postconflict

Kosovar society.

A new start for state and heroes

As touched upon earlier, some existing research on postconflict

societies suggests how hegemonic masculinities are reinforced through

fictional representations of the emerging nation/state (Ayres 2000; Buch

enau 2005; Ibeanu 2001; Munn 2006). The general narratives are laid

out in three parts. First, the antagonist and hero tend to be mutually

constitutive. For Kosovo, this takes the form of oppressive Serbia as the

antagonist and the Kosovar resistance or militiaman as hero. The nar

ratives constructed for each neatly reinforce a sense of national identity

and hegemonic concepts of masculinity. Second, these national narra

tives reify the binary division of male heterosexuality and homosexuality,

subordinating the latter. Third, nationalists’ myths that focus on the

figurative male support the expected embodiment of what is to emerge

as masculine.

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Kosovo is important to both Serbian and Albanian nationalist nar

ratives; the province is seen by Serbs as the heartland of the medieval

kingdom where many cultural and national monuments are located. For

the Albanians, it is the centre of national revivalism and the founding

of the League of Prizren in 1878.8 During the 1970s, Kosovo was granted

considerable autonomy and representation in all federal Yugoslav insti

tutions, but not republic status. The longevity of the Kosovo issue and

the raising of expectations among Albanians for increased autonomy

polarized the two groups. In 1981, nationalist unrest among Albanians,

exacerbated by economic problems and the failures of economic and

political policies, led to mass demonstrations in support of secession

from Serbia and full republic status within the Yugoslav federation. The

demonstrations and their violent suppression were particularly important

in the current national narratives of both sides.

Nationalist fighting heroes are seen as resolutely individualistic, moral,

rebellious and tough. Within the nationalist myths, we see the state as the

oppressor, inhumane and mechanical. The hero’s quest becomes escape

from slavery, rebellion against the system, or a struggle to maintain his

humanity under difficult circumstances. Thus, triumph over the status

quo requires a certain kind of hero. In fact, the narrative answer to the

problem posed by the state is a hegemonic masculine protagonist. Nation

alist myths tend to be constructed/remembered in such a way as to vali

date particular qualities that are attributed to the hegemonic masculine

subject. The traditional qualities of a national identity are also reflected

in those that might be said to include independence, insubordination

and toughness.9

Male bodies in the fight for the nation

In 1993, Serbia attempted to alter the demographic makeup of Kosovo

by actively removing Albanians from their employment, evicting them

from their homes and encouraging Serbian migration into Kosovo.

Ibrahim Rugova, president of Kosovo’s parallel parliament established

in 1998 in defiance of the continued removal of political autonomy,

was seen as the embodiment of the hegemonic narrative. Rugova was

a member of Kosovo’s intelligentsia and an acclaimed poet and writer.

He attempted to lead a peaceful resistance against Serbian control.

Even as the Yugoslav wars of secession were taking place across the

federation, Rugova advocated: ‘The slaughterhouse is not the only form

of struggle. There is no mass humiliation in Kosovo. We are organised

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and are operating as a state. It is easy to take to the streets and to head

towards suicide, but wisdom lies in eluding a catastrophe’ (Guardian, 4

June 1993). Rugova embodied one form of the masculinities narrative

and represented the internal national narrative of Kosovars as intelligent,

peaceful and Western. He held the widespread support of his nation

for a period. It may be said that Kosovars saw their peaceful resistance

to Serbian authoritarianism as something that the West would reward

since the rest of the federation fell into war. It was not until 1995, when

Kosovo was ignored in the Dayton Accords, that Rugova’s role began to

weaken.10 The counternarrative of the warrior and the old stories of

national heroes from Kosovo Polje began to take hold of the nation once

again; and the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1997

altered the national narrative, which also altered the representation and

embodiment of hegemonic masculinity. This turn to the mythical rebel

and a reinvigorated manliness surged in Kosovar history. It was this form

of masculinity which the nation relied on to secure its autonomy. Thus,

not only had the heromyth become an essential part of national identity

and hegemonic masculinity but it also gained credibility through the

narrative structure of many stories and cultural imagery. Furthermore,

thematic and symbolic parallels exist between the political enemies of

the hero and the oppressive state. As the province of Kosovo lends itself

to the mythical narratives of both Kosovars and Serbs, their own national

stories have mixed and evolved one from the other, each relying on

imagery that shows the other as the national and natural enemy.

The KLA utilized these symbolic parallels as socializing influences

for gaining the popular support and weakening Rugova’s message of

passive resistance. For instance, Zani, a former KLA fighter, spoke of a

need for Kosovars to display toughness, courage and willingness to fight

as important means of presenting a positive identity to both Serbs and

the rest of the Europe.

If [the] KLA did not exist and we allowed people like Rugova and the

rest of parliament to make our decisions for us … still we would never

have sur vived and nobody would ever take us seriously. Look at the

Muslims in Bosnia, they are still controlled by the dogs, Kosova has

proven it has a backbone – push us and we push back harder … and we

will prove it again and again. We are not Muslims alone, we are Albani

ans. Europe now listens when Kosovo speaks.

The construction of a nationalist myth, wherein the militiamanhero

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challenges the oppressive regime, has certain consequences. Questions

about statehood become questions about the survival of the hero and are

performed as the hero’s triumph for the nation. The hero’s battle is won

through patriotism, ingenuity, hardiness and so forth. Thus, hegemonic

masculinity is reaffirmed; and questions about violence and abuse are

neatly avoided. Caprioli claims ‘motivation for collective action coupled

with group identification is not a sufficient cause of conflict’, but they are

necessary (2005: 163). When questioned further on the internal violence

and bullying of boys and men to join the KLA against their will, Zani

does not want to speak about it much; his only comment being that if

‘they do not want to join us then they were cowards and not worth our

time … I would [have] happily given them to the Serbs’. Another inter

viewee, Jetmir, aged twentyseven, was much more willing to talk about

intimidation and bullying of Kosovars and their families who refused to

join him in the KLA. He stated,

Of course there are cowards in Kosova … like anywhere … some are too

weak anyway, who would want them, they could never fight. Some guys

were under pressure from families not to fight or were scared, but after

you squeeze them most came around to the idea. Other ‘boys’ were

like the girls … [laughing] running out of Kosovo and stepping on the

grannies to get to a border, any border … faggot queers, we don’t want

them anyway.

I asked Zani about the rumours of rape by KLA soldiers, and although

the translator made a mistake in my question, Zani’s answer was more

telling than I thought it would be. The translator asked, ‘Tell me about

cases of KLA soldiers raping each other,’ at which Zani become very

upset and shouted, ‘We never raped each other, if that ever happened you

would be killed … [We] did have sex with some women, yes … but that

is normal. [We] did torture some guys too and maybe they [were] forced

into sucking cocks, but that is all. It was never about sex.’ Real stories

of conflict and war can then become a fantasy that reaffirms national

identity along with an idealized version of masculinity. This happened

on both sides of the Kosovo conflict. Serb forces used masculine imagery

of rape, penetration and sexual conquest during the war. A commonly

reported phrase written by Serbian forces on Albanian burnedout homes

during the conflict was ‘Shiptar, watch your ass’. The process of defining

masculinity continues through a treatment of homosexuality.

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Homosexuality as insurrection According to Connell, hegemonic masculinity is controlled by way of

an imposed binary between homosexuality and heterosexuality; domi

nant masculinity is heterosexual. This may go some way to explain why

homosexuality receives such negative attention in masculine activities

such as fighting for one’s nation. Yet when homosexuality becomes an

overt/explicit issue, as in the context of gays in the military, its treatment

by mainstream discourse confirms the cultural legislation of hegemonic

masculinity as resolutely heterosexual. Furthermore, within this frame,

sexual domination of one over another is implied if not explicit. Serbs

and Albanians have used similar depictions of sexuality in their rhetoric,

both seeing the other as the sexual aggressor or the sexual victim to be

conquered. One thing that remains clear is that such sexualized discourse

is from a heterosexual standpoint. This is clear when considering lan

guage context, such as the rape of Serbian monasteries. Attacks, which

need defence, are seen as heterosexual rapes on women; and attacks that

are offensive, such as against the enemy, are phrased by both sides as

homosexual rapes of men. A Serbian religious layman in late 2001, while

discussing the state of the Serbian monasteries in Kosovo, reported to

me, ‘Under the new leadership in Belgrade, Serbia is spreading its legs

for NATO when it talks of Kosovo. She will let anyone enter her these

days. For me it is the same disgrace as being personally sodomized.’

As a result, while a somewhat hysterical fear of homosexual assault

characterizes aggressive nationalist discourse, more positive, consensual

homosexual relationships are absent. Violence and aggression may be

displayed as a way to meet the gender expectations of the nation as well

as to more broadly meet the hegemonic notions of masculinity. Fatmir,

aged twentyeight and a former KLA fighter, says, ‘Everything I did was in

service to Kosovo. Sometimes that included things I am not proud of … but

I had to do these things to prove I was a good Kosovar.’ I asked whether he

would tell me what things he meant and he replied, ‘You know, beating

on old people, girls were used and stuff like that. It was harder for me

maybe as a gay [man] but I had to do [them] anyway … just because I am

gay does not mean I [am] not a good Kosovar or a good fighter.’

During a second interview with Zani (approximately three months after

the first time we spoke), it was clear he wanted to address the question of

rape and attempt to ‘clear up things’. He said, ‘It is common knowledge

that Serb girls are all whores, they have no respect for their sex and give

it to people … we didn’t rape them really. When it happened and not

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much, it was when they were ready only.’ It was obvious that Zani was

attempting to justify the actions, be it his or those of his friends. But he

did return to the question of male rape. He asked whether it was true

that I was speaking to Fatmir. I told him I was not permitted to say as

all interviews were confidential. He then said,

I bet you, man, that Fatmir gave sex to some Serb guys. [Laughing

nervously] He was in my troop for most of the war and we all saw how

he looked at the guys, even me! It was not nice, but he is strong. If you

want to write about punishing someone … it is Fatmir that you should

say was evil. Even Serb guys [should not] get fucked. I would kill anyone

trying that on me.

This further implies that homosexual relationships are always violent,

nonconsensual ones. Accordingly, during my interviews, when the topic

of KLA brotherhood or emotional connections between soldiers was dis

cussed, the majority responded quickly with a line similar to ‘we were like

brothers or cousins – not like gays’. There tends to be a focus on violent

homosexual acts, which were presented sometimes as power struggles

and most often as abuse or assault. Consensual, emotional depictions

of homosexuality were often excluded. As a result, the interviewees’ nar

ratives of their experiences in the Kosovo conflict reinforced the binary

division that Connell identifies as key to defining and policing hegemonic

masculinity, the dominance of heterosexuality and its radical separation

from homosexuality (Schauer 2004).

The narrative of dominant masculinity is, in part, that of a bodily

practice (Connell 2000). Certain types of male bodies are represented

in Connell’s The Men and the Boys as ideal; and, through narrative rep

resentation of the nationalist hero, hegemonic masculinity acquires an

embodied image. Mertus, in Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War,

gives an excellent account of how Kosovo’s nationalist myths allow for the

militiamanhero to take a male heterosexual dominant form. She shows

how myth and experience inform the political ideologies of Kosovo and

explores how these competing beliefs have been created and per petuated

from the thirteenth century to the present KLA fighter. Hegemonic mas

culinity in nationalist myths has been performed in a number of ways:

through the depiction of bodies, through narrative and visual treatment

of sexuality and via the myth of the hero’s quest. Setting up the state as

political oppressor structures a nationalist narrative in which the main

obstacle becomes the institution and its agents, as in the case of Kosovo

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versus the Serbian oppressor. The answer to this problematic situation

is an embodiment of the mythical hero whose triumph hinges on main

taining his nationalistic and masculine identity. His weapons of defence

are the characteristics of male strength, courage and resourcefulness.

The militiamanhero is incarnated in hyper masculine physical form.

Friendly homosexuality is not an option for the hero; in fact, this type

of relationship is not part of the nationalist narrative and is completely

ignored by both sides during the conflict.

Conclusion: insurrectionary potential

This chapter contemplates the latent insurrectionary power of

national ist myths and practices as narrative performances of hegemonic

masculinity. There is no one correct reading of the myths and legends

that have constructed Kosovars’ hegemonic masculinities; and such

myths and narratives take the form of constructing embodied metaphors

that assist the nation in a given time and space. By placing the state of

Serbia and its people in the role of an oppressive regime, one that has

dehumanized and devalued the Albanian population, the Kosovo mythic

narrative forces the state to become the primary obstacle for a nationalist

militiamanhero to overcome. The state is set up in contrast with the

nationalists’ own superior type of masculinity. The narrative structure

pays tribute to the heroes’ hegemonic masculine qualities and feats in

war. Hegemonic masculinity is further reinforced by the performance of

the militiamanhero’s body; it becomes the emblem of the nation at war.

For Kosovo, this depiction has been through men attempting to emulate

the heroes of Kosovo Polje in deed and manner. This process continues

through depictions of homosexual contact between men as violent and

threatening, unlike the heterosexual contact between man and woman,

even when it is violent.

Some nationalist movements, such as the positioning of Rugova, com

plicate this picture, making porous the binary categorization of male

relationships into heterosexual and homosexual. These relationships

might be formed along the lines of complicit masculinity, gentry or

exemplary masculinities (Connell 1995: 79). In truth, it is in understand

ing the renderings of homosexuality in narrative performances that I

see the most likely insurrectionary potential. Homosexuality has long

been a theme in counternationalism, just as hegemonic masculinity

has been a key to nationalism.11 I hope this investigation will convince

other researchers that exploring narratives like those of Zani, Fatmir and

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Notes 1 During a number of field visits

to Kosovo I interviewed men, women and boys (between the ages of thirteen and sixteen); for the purpose of this chapter the time frame is 2000 through to 2005.

2 This point will be explored in greater detail later in the chapter.

3 Over a period of four years, I have interviewed many men who struggle with ‘acting out’ their masculinity in a society that they see as ‘occupied’ and in a state of flux.

4 Kosovar Albanians have always maintained that the objective of the civil war was to be an independent state, whereas the minority Kosovan Serbs are supported by Serbia in the argument that Kosovo is a core of the Serbian national identity.

5 For the purposes of the chapter I will refer to Kosovar Albanians as Kosovar.

6 I have explored this point at length in ‘Gendered realities of life in postconflict Kosovo: addressing the hegemonic man’, Nationalities Papers, 34(3): 289–304.

7 Fieldwork was conducted over various visits between late 1999 and 2004. The examples given in this chapter are drawn largely from my personal observations and interviews over that period. I interviewed forty women and sixtyfive men. All names

have been changed as requested by the majority of those interviewed.

8 The League of Prizren, a mili tary and political organization, was created to reestablish the autonomy of a unified Albanian state. There was a second League of Prizren, also founded for the unification of ethnic Albanians, in 1943. Neither of the leagues actually saw success in their lobbying to create a greater Albania.

9 I have discussed the connection of Kosovo’s national narrative and the rise of a hegemonic masculinity in detail in Munn (2008).

10 The Dayton Accords ended the war in Bosnia. The Accords rec ognized that conflicts (national and ethnically driven) have a shortterm and a longerterm feature, the short term being the end of hostilities and the longerterm the longevity of international involvement and invest ment. See Swomley (1999).

11 Counternationalism contains definitions of masculinities which can influence the hegemonic narra tives and complicate definitions of men and masculinity.

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