Berkeley in the Sixties
Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements Author(s): J. Craig Jenkins Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 527-553 Published by: Annual Reviews Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2946077 Accessed: 07-02-2020 05:11 UTC
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Review of Sociology
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Ann. Rev. Sociol. 1983. 9:527-53
Copyright ? 1983 by Annual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
THEORY AND THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
J. Craig Jenkins
Department of Sociology, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211
Abstract
Resource mobilization theory has recently presented an alternative interpreta tion of social movements. The review traces the emergence and recent con troversies generated by this new perspective. A multifactored model of social movement formation is advanced, emphasizing resources, organization, and political opportunities in addition to traditional discontent hypotheses. The McCarthy-Zald (1973) theory of entrepreneurial mobilization is critically assessed as an interpretation of the social movements of the 1960s-1970s, and the relevance of the Olson (1968) theory of collective action is specified. Group organization is argued to be the major determinant of mobilization potential and patterns. The debate between the Gerlach-Hine (1970) and entrepreneurial theories of social movement organization is traced in terms of historical changes in the social movement sector and the persistence of organizational diversity. A model of social movement politics is outlined, building on Gam son's (1975) theory of strategy and Tilly's (1978) polity theory by emphasizing political alliances and processes shaping success and failure. Piven & Cloward (1977) are correct that disruptiveness leads to success and that disruptions can be mobilized without formal organization; they are wrong in asserting that formal organization is necessarily incompatible with mobilization. The future development of resource mobilization theory lies in two directions: extending the polity theory to deal with different states and regimes, including the development of neo-corporatism, and providing a more sophisticated social psychology of mobilization.
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534 JENKINS
"participation revolution" in American politics but merely reflected improved
facilitative conditions for professionalized mobilization. Professionals and
college students with discretionary time schedules and income, liberal institu-
tions with "slack" resources, and pervasive mass media that could be coopted
by enterprising movement entrepreneurs were the major factors behind the
stormy 1960s. Evidence on political trends, however, indicates a virtual
explosion of unconventional mass political participation between 1960 and
1974. Figure 1 shows that the number of protest demonstrations and riots
escalated dramatically, peaking in the 1967-1972 period. This "participation
revolution" was, in turn, undergirded by a general increase in the mobilization
for unconventional politics as the number of political ideologues increased
from 1% of the citizenry in the 1950s to 19% in 1972, then declining to 7% in
1976 (Nie, Verba & Petrocik 1980:367), membership in political organizations
expanded from 2.8% in 1956 to a peak of 4.4% in 1974 (Survey Research
Center & Davis et al 1981), and political activists involved in nonelectoral
activity rose from 5-12% in the 1950s to 15-20% in the late 1960s and early
1970s (Campbell et al 1960:51-2; Converse 1972:332-6; Rosenau 1974:44-
86; Milbrath & Goel 1977:18-19). Simultaneously, mobilization for routine
politics declined as voter turnout slowly declined, partisan independence
rose, and general distrust of elected officials and major institutions
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1 00 Demonstrat ions-:
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60 -Riots
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a an m in th ts,
Figure I Demonstrations a
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