QBRDM #6

https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732318788379

Qualitative Health Research 2018, Vol. 28(13) 2094 –2101 © The Author(s) 2018 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/1049732318788379 journals.sagepub.com/home/qhr

Commentary

In one word, to draw the rule from experience, one must generalize: This is a necessity that imposes itself on the most circumspect observer.

―Henri Poincaré

Between the 1970s and the early 1990s, advancements in computer technology facilitated the processing of large data sets in quantitative studies (Morse, 2008; Ormston, Spencer, Barnard, & Snape, 2014). This fact, together with the increased interest of evidence-based decision making in medical and health fields in the 1980s, and a widespread diffusion of the systematic review methodol- ogy in scientific research (Bradt, 2009), has made gener- alizability of findings, already a valued standard for decades, a pivotal criterion for evaluating the excellence of quantitative research (Polit & Beck, 2010).

Since then, researchers in the qualitative tradition have begun to pay greater attention to discussions on the feasibil- ity of generalization in qualitative studies (Flyvbjerg, 2001). However, this feasibility of generalizing findings could be seen as a “phantom,” as an “illusion,” for qualitative schol- ars (Groleau, Zelkowitz, & Cabral, 2009, p. 417). Indeed, without due precautions and clarifications, the nature of interpretivist paradigm, relying on a different logic to the positivist paradigm, could make generalizability almost an unachievable aim in qualitative research (Morse, 2008).

Trying to define the thorny and illusive concept of gen- eralizability may represent a challenge to researchers because of the ambiguity and polyhedral meanings associ- ated with it (Polit & Beck, 2010). Simply put, the act of generalizing involves forming general and broad statements from specific cases (Schwandt, 2001), which also means that inferences about what cannot be observed are made on the basis of what can be observed (Polit & Beck, 2010). Defined in this way, the notion of generalizability has neither a quantitative nor a qualitative dimension per se, but it has, instead, a neutral and impartial connotation.

Nevertheless, the dominant role of the positivist tradi- tion in social sciences has led generalizability to acquire a more quantitative nature (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Thus, generalizability has become almost inherently associated with quantitative research and its focus on finding univer- sal laws and statistical generalizations (Delmar, 2010). Consequently, due to this positivist echo, the application of the same concept of generalizability to qualitative per- spectives, grounded in an interpretivist paradigm, has

788379QHRXXX10.1177/1049732318788379Qualitative Health ResearchCarminati article-commentary2018

1University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom

Corresponding Author: Lara Carminati, Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, 388 Stag Hill, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK. Email: [email protected]

Generalizability in Qualitative Research: A Tale of Two Traditions

Lara Carminati1

Abstract Generalizability in qualitative research has been a controversial topic given that interpretivist scholars have resisted the dominant role and mandate of the positivist tradition within social sciences. Aiming to find universal laws, the positivist paradigm has made generalizability a crucial criterion for evaluating the rigor of quantitative research. This positivist echo has led generalizability to acquire a quantitative meaning, inappropriate for describing qualitative studies. The purpose of qualitative research has, thus, been directed toward providing in-depth explanations and meanings rather than generalizing findings. Through a critical review of empirical and theoretical studies, this commentary seeks to show that in qualitative domains, generalizability is possible provided that, first, generalizability is the main objective of the study; second, due precautions concerning the philosophy and terminology selected are taken. Hence, this commentary contributes to the literature on qualitative research by making suggestions for more consistent and unanimous procedures to adopt in qualitative inquiries.

Keywords qualitative and quantitative research; positivist and interpretivist tradition; probabilistic generalizability; theoretical generalizability; transferability; critical review; the UK

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become rather controversial (Polit & Beck, 2010). As a result, generalizability in qualitative studies has often been misunderstood and disregarded in favor of the more common purpose of providing in-depth understanding of the specific topics under research (Ayres, Kavanagh, & Knafl, 2003).

However, dismissing a priori the ability to generalize from qualitative studies on the bases of biased premises due to “quantitative contamination” can significantly limit the strength and beauty of qualitative research, espe- cially in the eyes of early-career researchers. A clear con- ceptualization of the meanings associated with the concept of generalizability in qualitative research is needed, taking into account both methodological and philosophical boundaries.

Therefore, this commentary aims to show that even in qualitative domains, generalizability is possible provided two paramount conditions exist. First, generalizability is the main objective of the study. Second, due precautions related to the terminology selected are taken into consideration. Concerning these due precautions, on one hand, if research- ers want to preserve the term generalizability in qualitative enquiries, the philosophical traditions underpinning the research have to be clearly specified. In so doing, the kind of generalizability that can be attained, namely, analytical/ theoretical, and the type of knowledge that can be pursued in qualitative research would be straightforward and unequivocal. On the other hand, if new terms were to be introduced, a suitable vocabulary should be unanimously shared by all qualitative scholars to unmistakably describe quality in qualitative enquiries. Hence, this commentary contributes to the literature on qualitative research approaches by making suggestions on those paramount conditions that may lead to more consistent and unanimous procedures to describe and elaborate qualitative research.

The commentary unfolds in four main parts. In the first section, “Generalizability in the Positivist, Quantitative Tradition,” after providing a brief definition of the term, the value of generalizability within the positivist tradition is analyzed. The second section “Generalizability in the Interpretivist, Qualitative Tradition” investigates the nature of generalizability in qualitative approaches in light of interpretivist perspectives. In the third section, “Grounded Theory, a Theory-Generating Research Method,” an exam- ple of a theory-generating research method, that is, grounded theory, within the interpretivist tradition is out- lined. The fourth section “Due Precautions in Qualitative Investigations” tackles two main precautions researchers should take when conducting qualitative investigations. This part specifically proposes the adoption of the notion of contextual knowledge as phronesis and the diffusion of a terminology for qualitative research universally approved by the scientific community. The section “Implications and Conclusion” closes the commentary.

Generalizability in the Positivist, Quantitative Tradition

The positivist tradition in social sciences has strongly polarized the notion of generalizability and influenced the terminology in scientific research (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Ormston et al., 2014). Since the Enlightenment, natural sciences, which are nomothetic by essence (Thomae, 1999), have indisputably dominated Western culture, drawing attention to instrumental rationality and the focus on generalizable and context-independent theories (Falk, Rocha, & Warnick, 2009). In an effort to emulate natural science (Flyvbjerg, 2001), the positivist tradition in social sciences, which traces back to philosophers such as Comte, Hume, and Bacon, has argued and acknowl- edged the possibility of reaching one, monolithic truth (Lee & Baskerville, 2003). Positivism assumes that “sci- entific knowledge is the paradigm of valid knowledge” (Larrain, 1979, p. 197), and, as such, authentic knowl- edge can be verified through empirical evidence, which is in turn interpreted through reason and logic (Macionis & Gerber, 2010).

Consequently, the ultimate aim of quantitative research defined by the positivist tradition is to produce laws able to explain and govern every observed phenomenon and to determine a universal knowledge (Delmar, 2010) that holds true, and is invariable in, all places and at all times (Falk et al., 2009). In this sense, as Morse (2008) has underlined, generalizability is at the heart of usefulness. Hence, by assuming an impartial and objective research- er’s involvement (Winter, 2000) to limit any possible forms of influence in the research process (Davies & Dodd, 2002), quantitative experimental methods have been employed to test hypotheses and infer generalizable conclusions (Dingwall, Murphy, Watson, Greatbatch, & Parker, 1998; Hoepfl, 1997).

These generalizable conclusions stem from a research process based on methodological rigor. Rigor in the posi- tivist tradition refers to the soundness, exactitude, and accuracy of a study with regard to its planning, data col- lection, analysis, and reporting (Marquart, 2017). The assessment of objective scores, such as reliable and valid measurements, are indicators of such exactitude, so that results from one study can be replicated in other studies and then generalized (Claydon, 2015).

Results in quantitative research can be generalized through probabilistic generalization (Polit & Beck, 2010), which is based on randomly selected samples representa- tive of the population (Lee & Baskerville, 2003). Although some authors have claimed that convenience sampling bias could hamper the validity of findings in many studies (Gheondea-Eladi, 2014), statistical generalizability remains a crucial tenet and a prerogative in quantitative approaches (Winter, 2000). This probabilistic generalization is also

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termed external validity (Gheondea-Eladi, 2014). External validity, together with internal validity, namely, the degree to which it is possible to infer causality between two vari- ables (Bryman, Becker, & Sempik, 2008; Joppe, 2000), and reliability, which describes the extent to which results are consistent over time and accurately represent the total pop- ulation (Bryman et al., 2008; Joppe, 2000), is a paramount criterion for evaluating quality in quantitative studies (Gheondea-Eladi, 2014; Polit & Beck, 2010).

As a result, generalizability has become associated with the notion of external validity, which represents only a specific aspect of the original term, namely, probabilistic generalizability (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Lee & Baskerville, 2003). Hence, generalizability has been pulled toward the positivist approaches, and their quantitative influence has been instilled. It is no surprise that when the term general- izability is mentioned, statistical generalization is the first notion to come into one’s mind, as if synonymous with it.

Generalizability in the Interpretivist, Qualitative Tradition

The highlighted importance of the word generalizability in quantitative studies has led many qualitative scholars to question the possibility of generalizing results from qualitative research (Davies & Dodd, 2002) and, conse- quently, ponder on how to judge its quality (Hallberg, 2013). As Ormston et al. (2014) have underlined, qualita- tive approaches in social sciences have started to emerge as recent phenomena alongside the widespread diffusion of sophisticated statistical methods, which were framed within positivist principles to imitate natural sciences methodology.

Nonetheless, the philosophical tradition behind qualita- tive research, drawing from authors such as Weber, Kant, and Dilthey is the interpretivist paradigm (Bryman et al., 2008; Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002) and, in an antipodal way to the positivist perspective, is idio- graphic in nature (Thomae, 1999). Interpretivism priori- tizes the understanding of human behaviour over the prediction and generalization of causes and effects (Macionis & Gerber, 2010).

As such, the strength of qualitative inquiries defined by the interpretivist tradition is the understanding of how individuals, through their narratives, perceive and experi- ence their lives, constructing meanings within their social and cultural contexts (Groleau et al., 2009; Mishler, 2000). In this sense, interpretivist research emphasizes the hermeneutics and perception of the social world, and the interactions between individuals and the surrounding context (Ormston et al., 2014). It follows that findings are intrinsically linked to the research context and that the interfacial distance between the researcher and the researched is minimized (Davies & Dodd, 2002).

Consequently, the researcher is an agentic instrument for collecting and analyzing data and an essential tool for actively constructing concepts (Hallberg, 2013). Thus, by using either theoretical or nonprobabilistic samples (Gheondea-Eladi, 2014), qualitative studies aim to explore meanings and processes of people’s everyday lives to gain an in-depth understanding of situations and actions (Groleau et al., 2009; Hallberg, 2013). Because of this stress on values and subjective meanings, qualitative research has often been criticized as being relativistic, soft, or unscientific compared with quantitative enquiries (Ormston et al., 2014).

To avoid this subordinated position, the same stan- dards used to judge quality in quantitative research have been transposed and employed to evaluate quality in qualitative studies (Delmar, 2010), so that generalizabil- ity has become a rather pivotal matter even in an area where it is beset by indistinctness (Delmar, 2010; Golafshani, 2003). In fact, this osmotic transfer has raised numerous issues related to its fundamental inadequacy in depicting the true nature of qualitative research processes and aims (Kitto, Chesters, & Grbich, 2008). Winter (2000) has stated that “qualitative research sets itself up for failure when it attempts to follow established proce- dures of quantitative research” (pp. 11). Indeed, by doing so, interpretivist social sciences have accepted terms that are by nature self-defeating (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

As a result, the importance of generalizability of find- ings in the qualitative field has been frequently dismissed, considered unattainable or irrelevant (Kitto et al., 2008) and not the purpose of quality enquiries (Morse, 1999). Researchers have, thus, preferred to invert their focus to the other fundamental aim of qualitative studies, which is to engage in research able to produce thorough descrip- tions as well as a deep, rich, and contextualized under- standing of human experience (Polit & Beck, 2010).

However, (a) if the purpose of a study and its research questions aim to build a new theory to bridge a gap in the literature (Gheondea-Eladi, 2014) or (b) if due precau- tions of the conceptualization of generalizability are respected (Hallberg, 2013), then discussing generaliz- ability of findings even in qualitative research makes sense (Delmar, 2010; Krefting, 1991; Morse, 1999; Polit & Beck, 2010; Winter, 2000). The following two sections expand on these two paramount conditions to clarify gen- eralization in the interpretivist paradigm.

Grounded Theory, a Theory- Generating Research Method

With regard to the first point of building a new theory, within the many different qualitative methods (Krefting, 1991), theory-generating procedures seek to generalize findings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967;

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Hallberg, 2013; Ormston et al., 2014). An example of these theory-generating procedures is grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Although the aim of this commentary is far beyond providing an exhaustive description of grounded theory, some key features of this theory-gener- ating method are now discussed to provide evidence and strength to the argument that generalizability is achiev- able also in qualitative research. This is feasible since the purpose of grounded theory is to inductively construct a general theory that is able to answer the research question in the absence or incompleteness of alternative existing frameworks (Gheondea-Eladi, 2014).

Starting from thick descriptions and then going beyond through to high levels of abstraction (Goulding, 2002), grounded theory develops an iterative process based on four main steps, namely, coding, conceptualiza- tion, classification, and categorization, to build a sub- stantiated theory (Gheondea-Eladi, 2014). After this first theoretical result, the research is replicated in other set- tings so that several other substantiated theories can be yielded (Goulding, 2002). Indeed, as Firestone (1993) has noted, replication in different conditions reinforces generalizability in qualitative investigations, since con- sistency of results when conditions vary indicates that findings are robust. This also explains the reason why extreme cases, those that due to their extreme character- istics accentuate the dynamics being investigated facili- tating the emergence of the aspects of interest (Eisenhardt, 1989), are so critical for enhancing qualitative research (Polit &Beck, 2010).

When every observation has been incorporated and no unexplained variance has been left out, then saturation is reached (Dingwall et al., 1998). Saturation implies that sufficient and redundant information for all aspects of the phenomenon under research has been gathered (Morse et al., 2002), and thus, no further themes or concepts can emerge (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). At this point, a formal, final theory can be elaborated (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

The formulation of a new theory is possible due to the action of abstracting the “general” from the “particular” in terms of similarities and differences in individuals and circumstances (Delmar, 2010). From this perspective, the power of generalization of the final theory not only depends on the researcher’s thorough immersion and engagement with the data (Polit & Beck, 2010) but also on the intensity of within-case and across-case analyses (Ayres et al., 2003). As Morse (1999) has argued, “if qualitative research was considered not generalizable, then it would be of little use, insignificant and hardly worth doing” (p. 5). Hence, there would be a high risk of falling into an endemic relativism (Davies & Dodd, 2002). Nevertheless, as grounded theory has shown, gen- eralizability of findings in qualitative studies is possible:

It is simply a different kind of generalizability compared with that of quantitative research (Polit & Beck, 2010). It is an analytic, or theoretical, form of generalization.

Due Precautions in Qualitative Investigations

Given the fact that research undertaken in the interpretiv- ist tradition can aim for theoretical generalizability, how are researchers able to avoid confusion when using such an ambiguous and misused term? What can be done to properly describe qualitative studies, releasing them from the pervasive influence of positivist perspectives?

First Precaution

The first due precaution is related to the fact that if researchers want to preserve the term generalizability within the qualitative enquiries, then the interpretivist paradigm should be clearly specified at the beginning of a study (Hallberg, 2013). Stating the philosophical tradi- tion underpinning a research determines the kind of gen- eralizability, that is, analytical/theoretical, that can be obtained and pursued and prevents misunderstandings (Hallberg, 2013). In this sense, by recognizing and acknowledging the existence of this other specific form of generalization, the quantitative meaning can be bal- anced out and the originally neutral connotation of the broad term restored. Restoring the neutral connotation of the term generalizability emphasizes the view that gener- alizability in social sciences can never be certain (Polit & Beck, 2010).

Because of the focus on and importance of the context, interactions, and hermeneutics, the aim of the interpretiv- ist tradition is to predict a theoretical understanding of the topic under examination (Yin, 1994). As such, results are not reached through statistical procedures or other means of quantifications (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), and general- ization is interpreted as generalization toward a theory rather than toward the population (Polit & Beck, 2010).

This is why the notion of sample size in relation to generalizability is rather controversial in qualitative investigations (Malterud, Siersma, & Guassora, 2016). On one hand, sample sizes may be too large to permit a deep and detailed analysis; on the other hand, they may be too small to support claims of having achieved either theoretical saturation or information redundancy (Boddy, 2016). In addition, data saturation and information redun- dancy are elusive concepts, and no clear explanations of how they should be understood or implemented to justify the number of participants exist (Morse, 1995). Although, recently, some guidelines have been proposed to deter- mine “information power” (Malterud et al., 2016), defin- ing the adequate sample size in qualitative research is

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ultimately a matter of the researcher’s experience and judgment of the quality of the data collected and the research method employed (Boddy, 2016).

Thus, generalizability in qualitative studies is focused on the researcher’s analysis and understanding of circum- stances rather than on the collection of representative data (Delmar, 2010; Morse, 1999). In this sense, generalization entails inferring the potential extrapolations, or transfer- ability, of those results on the basis of both a theoretical analysis of the aspects generating the outcomes and the effects of the context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994).

Such contextual effects are crucial in qualitative enquiries. Since they seek to understand phenomena unfolding naturally in specific environments (Patton, 2002), declaring the philosophical tradition underpin- ning a study also has an impact on the type of knowledge that can be acquired. Within the philosophical tradition of interpretivism, a theory that pertains only to the set- ting in which it was developed would not detract from its scientific status nor would it prohibit researchers from extending that theory to additional settings (Lee & Baskerville, 2003). On the contrary, what may work for people in a certain circumstance is likely to work for other people placed in a similar situation (Hallberg, 2013; Hyde, 2000).

Therefore, since qualitative understanding relies on a comprehensive knowledge of the case and its nuances in each specific context (Hyde, 2000), talking about “situ- ated” knowledge rather than epistemological knowledge would then be more appropriate (Davies & Dodd, 2002; Haraway, 1988). As such, as Flyvbjerg (2001) has sug- gested, it would be interesting to introduce the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, value-based, context-dependent knowledge. Words such as episteme (pure knowledge) and techne (applied knowledge) have informed the cur- rent language (i.e., epistemology, technic, technology). While episteme indicates generalizable-across-settings knowledge, usually called science, techne refers to practi- cal, specific knowledge. However, occurrences of the word phronesis, which sits between episteme and techne, and encompasses both scientific and technical knowledge by adding values, experiences, context, and reflexivity, do not exist in the present language (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

It follows that the idea according to which true knowl- edge is only that which can be replicated in different places and times has to be rejected. Instead, context- dependent knowledge, with its different modes of expres- sion, can offer a likewise true understanding, but in another form in terms of its replicability and applicability (Delmar, 2010). Thus, in the interpretivist tradition of social science, for which the constant interaction between human agents and the surrounding context is essential, it would be more suitable to talk about phronetic knowl- edge (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Because of the link with the

setting, a context-dependent knowledge would do justice to the essence of qualitative enquiries and their conceptu- alization of generalizability.

Second Precaution

The second precaution is related to the introduction of new terms. It refers to some qualitative scholars’ plea to select a novel and unanimously accepted vocabulary to better indicate the principles underpinning qualitative approaches and evaluate their quality (Agar, 1986; Golafshani, 2003; Seale, 1999). Quality is in fact a hall- mark of every piece of research (Hallberg, 2013), and “each paradigm should be judged by its own paradigm’s terms” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 601). This calls into ques- tion the use of the term generalizability itself.

Some researchers, echoing Shakespeare’s “What’s in a name?”1 (Romeo & Juliet, Act II, Scene II, v. 47), have argued that the positivist terminology, such as the head- ings reliability, validity, and rigor, could be still used in interpretivist qualitative research and just redefined in terms of meaning (Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Morse et al., 2002). For instance, while reliability could indicate the “negotiation of truths through a series of subjective accounts,” validity could reside “with the representation of the actors, the purposes of the research and appropriate- ness of the processes involved” (Winter, 2000, pp. 9–10).

Nonetheless, some new labels have also been pro- posed to cut ties with the positivist tradition and under- line the independent identity of the interpretivist perspective (Agar, 1986). Indeed, qualitative research often breaks with and challenges many of the tenets of so-called good quantitative research, as it is the case with the notion of reliability and validity (Davies & Dodd, 2002; Golafshani, 2003). Hence, a plethora of alternative concepts have arisen to mark the initially moderate and then radical paradigm shift (Seale, 1999), and an alternative terminology, able to express qualita- tive connotations, has been supported. For example, the word trustworthiness could be considered as an alterna- tive to the qualitative term for rigor (Davies & Dodd, 2002; Morse et al., 2002). Trustworthiness has been pro- posed and initially defined by Guba and Lincoln (1981) through four criteria: truth value (corresponding to quantitative internal validity), applicability (quantita- tive external validity or generalizability), consistency (quantitative reliability), and neutrality (quantitative researcher’s objectivity and distance).

To relate this term even more closely to the interpretiv- ist tradition, the same authors have further modified the four-point list of criteria (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This modified and well-established model comprises concepts such as credibility (prior truth value—quantitative internal validity), transferability (prior applicability—quantitative

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external validity or generalizability), dependability (prior consistency—quantitative reliability), and confirmability (prior neutrality—quantitative researcher’s objectivity and distance; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In subsequent semi- nal works, Guba and Lincoln (1989, 1994) also introduced the notion of authenticity, to represent a range of multiple realities and truths in line with the interpretivist perspec- tive. In line with this alternative terminology, transferabil- ity should be used and preferred in qualitative research instead of theoretical generalizability.

However, even if the original aim of the changes in the terminology was to bring clarity and a universally acknowledged terminology in the field, these guidelines still lack shared agreement between academics (Morse et al., 2002). A bewildering proliferation of new terms has hindered the selection of a vocabulary unanimously accepted by scholars (Seale, 1999). The absence of a rec- ognized canon, through which to appropriately evaluate the quality and trustworthiness of the study may be one of the reasons for the skepticism surrounding generalizabil- ity in qualitative research (Delmar, 2010).

Nevertheless, while this burgeoning terminology reflects the difficulties and contradictions that qualita- tive methodologists have met in developing an over- arching system for specifying quality (Seale, 1999), it also represents an essential first step toward defining the autonomous status of qualitative research (Morse, 2008). These criteria are in fact fundamental to judge the rigor or, better, trustworthiness and attentiveness of qualitative inquiries because they are a watershed between “good” and “bad” quality research (Davies & Dodd, 2002). Trustworthiness is built through the trans- parency, reflexivity, and accuracy of the research prac- tice itself, and the credibility and genuineness of a qualitative study depends mainly on the researcher’s ability and effort to unfold and explain interactions (Golafshani, 2003; Thorne & Darbyshire, 2005).

Hence, a thorough and exhaustive explanation of these processes should be able to provide high-quality qualita- tive works (Golafshani, 2003). In this sense, by reflecting valid and rich descriptions of sufficient depth, the research findings warrant a degree of generalizability (Thorne & Darbyshire, 2005), or, following the well-established cri- teria (Golafshani, 2003; Shenton, 2004) proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985), transferability. Transferability becomes possible thanks to the agentic role of the reader. As final recipient and arbiter, and thanks to the thick details of the phenomena under investigation provided by the author (Delmar, 2010), the reader can justify the extrapolation and application of the findings to other set- tings and situations, thus making transferability infer- ences (Shenton, 2004). In so doing, a final and solid knowledge is confirmed and approved by the research community (Delmar, 2010).

Implications and Conclusion

The aim of this commentary has been to show that qual- itative studies, besides providing an in-depth under- standing of contextualized human experience, may also pursue theoretical generalizability or, more pertinent for qualitative approaches, transferability, as outlined by Lincoln and Guba (1985). This purpose can be achieved depending on two circumstances: First, gener- alization of results has to be the aim of the research and implemented method; second, terminological precau- tions have to be taken.

Regarding terminological precautions, on one hand, if researchers want to make use of the term generaliz- ability, a first precaution would suggest that the philo- sophical roots underpinning a study are briefly declared at the beginning of that study (Hallberg, 2013). Given the variety of philosophical approaches, providing details on the author’s specific philosophical orientation would help clarify the kind of generalizability, that is, analytical/theoretical, that can be drawn from the find- ings, avoiding potential future misinterpretations. This may also have an impact on the specific knowledge that can be acquired in social sciences (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Because this major category of academic disciplines deals with the unpredictable and ever-changing human subject, the importance of the context, especially in the interpretivist tradition, is paramount to defying the dynamics surrounding the role of the researcher, the par- ticipants, the corpus of data, the analysis, and the gen- eral interpretations of their emerging interrelationships. As such, a contextual knowledge, which could be called phronetic knowledge, is as fundamental as a more posi- tivist epistemological knowledge.

On the other hand, the second precaution concerns the use of a new terminology, symbol of a paradigm shift, more suitable and consistent with the interpretivist philo- sophical tradition of qualitative enquiries. To be efficient and effective, the community of scholars should unani- mously agree on and adopt an adequate, recognized, and unambiguous vocabulary to accurately describe their findings, their own role in the study, and the research pro- cess as a whole. Although variety and creativity also play an important role in qualitative research, a shared termi- nological canon may facilitate the evaluation of the excel- lence and trustworthiness of qualitative studies.

In so doing, the commentary has contributed to the lit- erature on qualitative research approaches by making suggestions for more consistent and common procedures in qualitative inquiries. Indeed, introducing precise guidelines may enhance the clarity of qualitative investi- gations and give more justice to the importance and beauty of such research. This would also spur researchers who have just started their research journey traditions not

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to dismiss qualitative research as less scientific, but, instead, to better appreciate the inherent differences between two opposite philosophical approaches.

From a more practical point of view, appreciating such differences would recognize the massive contribution of qualitative research to the understanding of real-world problems and phenomena. This is particularly evident, for instance, when considering decision-making issues in the crucial field of medicine and health, as well as in busi- ness, marketing, and ethics problems. Qualitative research explores individuals’ perceptions and feelings about those processes and dynamics underpinning decision making, accessing areas not amenable to quantitative research (Pope & Mays, 1995). In this sense, they are also prerequisite and, thus, complementary to good quantita- tive research (Pope & Mays, 1995). As Albert Einstein has famously stated, “Everybody is a genius. But if you judge a fish by its ability to climb a tree, it will live its whole life believing that it is stupid.”

Acknowledgment

The author would like to thank Professor MariaLaura Di Domenico for her constructive and helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript and Claire Booth for proofreading this manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Note

1. “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,” William Shakespeare— Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II, v. 47 (Clark & Aldis Wright, 1998).

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Author Biography

Lara Carminati is a PhD candidate in Management, Organisational Behaviour, at Surrey Business School. Her PhD project deals with healthcare professionals’ identity conflict in decision making in End-of-Life situations.