Ethics Help

r Academy of Management Journal 2016, Vol. 59, No. 5, 1508–1534. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2014.0545

WHATEVER IT TAKES TO WIN: RIVALRY INCREASES UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR

GAVIN J. KILDUFF New York University

ADAM D. GALINSKY Columbia University

EDOARDO GALLO University of Cambridge and Queens’ College

J. JAMES READE University of Reading

This research investigates the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. We propose that peoplewillbemorelikelytoengageinunethicalbehaviorwhencompetingagainsttheirrivals thanwhencompetingagainstnon-rivalcompetitors.Acrossanarchivalstudyandaseriesof experiments,wefoundthatrivalrywasassociatedwithincreasedunsportingbehavior,useof deception, and willingness to employ unethical negotiation tactics. We also explore the psychological underpinnings of rivalry in order to illuminate how it differs from general competitionandwhyitincreasesunethicalbehavior.Thedatarevealaserialmediationpathway whereby rivalry heightens the psychological stakes of competition (by increasing actors’ contingency of self-worth and status concerns), which leads to the adoption of a stronger performance-approach orientation, which then increases unethical behavior. These findings highlight the importance of rivalry as a widespread, powerful, yet largely unstudied phenomenon with significant organizational implications. They also help to inform when and why unethical behavior occurs within organizations, and demonstrate that the effects of competition are dependent upon relationships and prior interactions between actors.

“I want them on their knees. Begging for mercy. Pleading for their lives. Confessing every sin. Kill! Kill! Kill!” (Oracle CEO Larry Ellison, “speaking” to fellow executivesaboutIngres,hiscompany’sprimaryrivalin the early 1980s.)1 A wide range of anecdotal evidence suggests that certain competitors—rivals—can push us to pursue victorywithafervencythatgoesbeyondtheboundsof ethicalcompetitivebehavior.Inathletics,forexample, fewcanforgetthebrutalphysicalattackperpetratedby Tonya Harding’s ex-husband against her rival Nancy Kerrigan in the 1994 Winter Olympics. In the U.S. military,interservicerivalries(e.g.,theAirForcevs. the Navy) have been linked to unethical practices such as fudgingperformancedata(Ash,2001).Inbusiness,BritishAirways’executivesadmittedina1993libelsuit that they had engaged in a “dirty tricks” campaign

against rival Virgin Atlantic, which included stealing Virgin’s confidential data, calling Virgin’s customerstotellthemtheirflightshadbeencancelled, and circulating rumors that Virgin CEO Richard Branson had contracted HIV (Gregory, 1994). Such examples suggest that the experience of rivalry goes beyond that of everyday competition. However, researchers have generally treated rivalry and competition as one and the same, leaving us largelyuninformedaboutthisprevalentandpowerful phenomenon. We believe that distinguishing rivalry and competition is conceptually important—and critical for understanding and predicting behavior within competitive environments and organizations. We build upon recent research by conceptualizing rivalry as a subset of competition that is uniquely relational, and then compare the effects of rivalry and non-rival competition on unethical behavior. Across four studies, we find that people are more likely to engage in unethical behavior when competing against their rivals, independent of the tangible1 White, 2001: 373–374.

1508 Copyright of the Academy of Management, all rights reserved. Contents may not be copied, emailed, posted to a listserv, or otherwise transmitted without the copyright holder’s express written permission. Users may print, download, or email articles for individual use only.

stakes of competition. We also examine the psychologyofrivalryandthemechanismsthatexplain its effects on unethical behavior. We find that competition against rivals invokes greater psychologicalstakes,intheformofincreasedcontingency of self-worth (e.g., Crocker & Wolfe, 2001) and increased status concerns (Blader & Chen, 2011), compared to non-rival competitors. These increasedpsychologicalstakesinturnleadpeopleto adoptastrongerperformance-approachorientation against rivals (Dweck & Legget, 1988), which leads to greater unethical behavior. We seek to make several theoretical contributions withthisresearch.First,weextendexistingworkon rivalry, which suggests that it fosters greater motivationandeffort(Kilduff,2014;Kilduff,Elfenbein,& Staw, 2010; Ku et al., 2005; Malhotra, 2010), by exploring its “dark side.” Second, as described above, we offer new insights into the psychology of rivalry andhowitdiffersfromnon-rivalcompetition.Third, we extend scholars’ understanding of the roots of unethical behavior and organizational misconduct by identifying rivalry as a previously unexplored antecedentofsuchbehavior.Indoingso,wealsoshed light on the conditions under which competition is more or less likely to corrupt. Fourth, our research broadly extends prevailing theoretical models of both competitionandunethicalbehaviorbydepictingthese phenomenaasinherentlyrelational—dependentupon existing relationships and histories of interaction between actors. Research in both of these areas has focused on identifying the individual and situational drivers of behavior (e.g., Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010); our study adds toa small but growing bodyofworkshowingthatrelationalfactorsmatteras well (e.g., Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Tesser, 1988), whichsuggestsnew avenuesforresearch.

RIVALRY AND COMPETITION The Critical Role of Prior Relationships Competition is everywhere, in nature and modern civilization alike, and thus has long been a topic of interesttoresearchersacrossthesocialsciences. Prevailingtheoreticalmodelswithinmanagement,economics, and psychology view competition in primarily structural terms—as a situation in which the outcomes of actorsareopposedtooneanother,withactorsvyingfor the same scarce resources (e.g., Deutsch, 1949; Porter, 1980;Scherer&Ross,1990).Forinstance,competition between individuals has been experimentally created by offering rewards to the highest performer

(e.g.,Beersma,Hollenbeck,Humphrey,Moon,&Conlon, 2003;Scott&Cherrington,1974)orbygivingindividuals the goal of outperforming each other (e.g., Deci, Betley, Kahle, Abrams, & Porac, 1981; Tauer & Harackiewicz, 1999).Similarly,competitionbetweenorganizationshas been measured by the extent to which firms operate in thesamemarkets,vyingforcustomersandmarketshare (e.g.,Chen,1996;Greve,1998). Within these literatures, the word “rivalry” is generally used synonymously with competition; rivals are simply actors in competition with one another, whether at the individual (e.g., Wankel, 1972) or organizational levels (e.g., Katila & Chen, 2008; Porter, 1980). However, in line with recent research (Kilduff, 2014;Kilduffetal.,2010),webelievethatthereismore to rivalry than just a state of opposing goals or contested resources. Equating rivalry with such “structural” competition fails to capture the relational andhistoricalfactorsthatareessentialtorivalry.Isthe rivalry between England’s Oxford and Cambridge universities nothing more than a current state of conflicting goals? Why might Pete Sampras and Andre Agassi be so fiercely competitive with one another morethanadecadeafteranymeaningfulcompetition, even during matches staged purely for charity?2 In theseexamples,thereexistsarelationshipandhistory thatextendsbeyondjustacurrentstateofconflictover tangible resources, which we believe may substantiallyaffect behavioral responsestocompetition.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RIVALRY Wefollow Kilduff and colleagues(2010) inconceptualizingrivalryasarelationshipbetweenafocalactor and a target actor that is characterized by the experience of heightened psychological stakes of competition by the focal actor when competing against the target actor. Thus, rivalry exists when the psychologicalstakesofcompetitionareincreasedasaresultofthe existing relationship between competitors, independent of objective stakes or other structural or situational characteristics. Below, we discuss the factors thatcanleadtothedevelopmentofrivalry,including repeated competition and closely decided past contests; we also examine more precisely the nature of these proposed psychological stakes. This conceptualization of rivalry can be seen as analogoustohowonemightconceptualizefriendship, a relationship characterized by increasing liking and familiaritythattypicallyemergesfromfactorssuchas

2 http://www.aolnews.com/2010/03/13/agassi-samprasfeud-publicly-at-charity-event(accessedFebruary12,2012)

2016 1509 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

repeatedsocial interactionandsimilarityininterests. In both friendship and rivalry, the psychological significanceofaninteractionisintensifiedbytheexisting relationship between the focal and target actors, independent of theobjective features of theinteraction. Thewords “rivalry” and “friendship” canalsoboth be used to refer to a relationship as well as the internal psychological state it creates. Further, we take thepositionthattherelationshipexistsinthemindof theactor;ifanactorfeelsrivalry,orfriendship,toward anotheractor,thenthe relationshipexists, regardless of the objective situation. This is why we discuss factors such as repeated competition as contributing to the formation of rivalry rather than being prerequisites for it to exist. Our conceptualization also leaves open the possibility of one-sided rivalry, such thatonesideconsiderstheotherarivalbutthisisnot reciprocated. It is also worth exploring in more detail how this conceptualizationofrivalryoverlapswith,anddiverges from,thetraditionaldefinitionofcompetitionasacurrent state of opposing goals (Deutsch, 1949). We will refer to this as “structural competition.” First, competitionagainstone’srivalsisclearlyaformofcompetition more broadly; for rivalry to exist, there must be some competition for valued outcomes or opposition between goals, at least in the minds of the actor(s). However, due to its relational nature, rivalry differs from structural competition in some important ways. First, rivalry entails a focus on a specific, identifiable opponent. With structural competition, the significance of one competitor versus another is simply driven by the level of objective threat each poses to the focal actor’s goals, and thus competitors are often interchangeable withoneanother.Structuralcompetitioncantakeplace between unknown or anonymous opponents, and, as wenotedearlier,thisisoftenhowithasbeenstudied.In contrast,giventhatrivalryrepresentsarelationship,itis alwaysdirectedtowardaknowncompetitor. Second, rivalry, unlike structural competition, has ahistoricalcomponenttoit.Relationshipsaretypically built up over a series of interactions, and thus rivalry cannot be fully captured by the characteristics of the current competitive setting. This is a critical distinction: although structural models of competition implicitlyassumethathistorydoesnotmatter,webelieve that it can play a substantial role.3 Finally, we cast abroadnetwhenreferringto“competitionsagainstthe

targetactor.”Aslongasthereisperceivedcompetition intheactors’ minds,thisissufficient,evenifthereare not any immediate objective rewards at stake. For example, rival athletes may feel as though they are in competition with one another even while training in theoffseason.

EXTANT RESEARCH ON RIVALRY Consistent with thedistinctionsdrawn above, afew researchershaverecentlybeguntoinvestigaterivalryas somethingmorethanasynonymforcompetition.Two mainsetsoffindingshaveemergedfromthisresearch. First, we now have some insight into how and why rivalry forms—that is, the factors that can lead competitors to place increased importance on competitive outcomes vis-`a-vis certain other opponents, independent of objective stakes (Kilduff, 2014; Kilduff et al., 2010). First, similarity between competitors, by amplifying pressures toward social comparison and heightening the relevance of the competition to their identities (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Tesser, 1988), fosters greater rivalry.4 Second, repeated competition, in a process analogous to the “mere exposure” effect, whereby repeated exposure to a stimulus intensifies one’s initial disposition toward it (Brickman, Redfield, Crandall, & Harrison, 1972; Zajonc, 1968), can increase feelings of rivalry. That is, competitors who repeatedly compete develop greater and greater feelings of rivalry toward one another—an idea supportedbyresearchshowingthatrepeatedsocial comparison to a target makes that target increasingly likely to become a “routine standard” of comparison, with whom comparisons carry greater weight for self-evaluations (Mussweiler & R¨uter, 2003).5 Third, closelydecidedcontestscancontribute

3 Our conceptualization also differs from work that has used “rivalry” to indicate competitors of proximate hierarchicalrank(Bothner,Kang,&Stuart,2007;Garcia,Tor,& Gonzalez, 2006).

4 Althoughithasnotyetbeenestablishedempirically,it is possible that certain key differences between competitors will also foster greater rivalry, particularly if these differences are along domains central to the competitors’ identities. This would be consistent with some recent work suggesting that organizational members (Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001) and individuals (Zhong, Phillips, Leonardelli, & Galinsky, 2008) may sometimes derive identity from who they are not as much as from who they are. Generally, however, similarity fosters rivalry. 5 Repeated competition between firms can also sometimesresultinmutualforbearance,orasituationinwhich competitiveness and aggression is actually constrained, particularly among firms that compete across multiple markets (Baum & Korn, 1996). However, this is thought to be due to increased concerns over potential retaliation rather than a reduction in subjective rivalry.

1510 October Academy of Management Journal

to rivalry by prompting greater counterfactual thinking, rumination, and emotional reactions (Kahneman&Miller,1986;Medvec,Madey,&Gilovich, 1995; Medvec & Savitsky, 1997), and by creating expectations of future evenly matched competition, whichhasbeenshowntoheightenpsychologicalstakes (Brehm,Wright,Solomon,Silka,&Greenberg,1983). Insupportoftheseideas,rivalrybetweenuniversity basketball teams was found to be positively related to similarity (in geographic location, success in basketball,andbroaderuniversitycharacteristics),repeated competition (games played against each other), and evenlymatchedpastcompetition(narrowermarginsof victory, more evenly matched head-to-head records; Kilduff et al., 2010). Further, individuals within the generalpopulationreportfeelinggreaterrivalrytoward competitors who are higher along these three dimensions(Kilduff, 2014). The second main finding that has emerged is that rivalry appears to increase motivation and effort. Kilduff et al. (2010) observed a positive correlation between rivalry and defensive statistics in basketball,whileKilduff(2014)foundthatpeoplereported being more motivated against their rivals as compared to non-rival competitors, and that longdistance runners ran faster in races in which their rivals—identified based upon the antecedents of rivalry—werealsopresent.Otherworkhasobserved heightened testosterone levels in soccer players prior to a match against a “fierce” rather than a“moderate”rival(Neave&Wolfson,2003),andhas identified feelings of rivalry as a potential explanation for why bidders are more likely to exceed their bidding limits when facing a few, rather than many, competing bidders (Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005; Malhotra, 2010). There is also some work on the topic of international conflict that makes the same broad point that the intensity of conflict between nation states cannot be understood solely fromthecurrentsituation—instead,historiesofpast interaction between states must also be considered (Goertz & Diehl, 1993; Stinnett & Diehl, 2001; Thompson, 1995). Research on rivalry is still very much in its infancy, however. Apart from a few studies linking rivalry to greater motivation, its consequences remain largely unexplored. Here, we examinethepotential “darkside” ofrivalry,looking at its effects on unethical behavior.

RIVALRY AND UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR The question of when and why people engage in unethical behavior is an important one for both

academics and practitioners, given its costly and destructive consequences for individuals, organizations,andsociety.Consistentwithpriorresearchers, wedefine“unethicalbehavior”asbehaviorthatfalls outside of generally accepted norms of moral behavior,suchascheating,lying,orstealing(Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). We focus primarily on unethical behavior that is directed at a target with the aim of harming, limitingtheperformanceof,orgaininganadvantage over that target, in the context of competitive or mixed-motive interactions. Existing research has identified a range of factors that can contribute to unethical behavior (for a review, see Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), as well as the related construct of organizational misconduct, which includes organization-level unethical behavior along with behavior that may be less intentional (for a review, see Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010). Both individual (e.g., age, gender, cognitive moral development)andenvironmental(e.g.,norms,honor codes, organizational culture) factors can influence unethical behavior and organizational misconduct (Greveet al., 2010; Kish-Gephartet al., 2010; Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009; Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012; Whitley, 1998). Most germane to the current research, some prior work has identified competition as a driver of unethical behavior (e.g., Kohn, 1992; Hegarty & Sims, 1978; Perry, Kane, Bernesser, & Spicker, 1990; Vaughan, 1999). For example, in a business simulation, MBA students more often provided illegal “kickbacks” to purchasing agents when they were placed in competition with one another, provided that this behavior benefited their performance (Hegarty & Sims, 1978). However, there exist some exceptions to the positive link between competition and unethical behavior; for example, Schwepker (1999) found that salespeople’s perceptions of the competitive intensity of their markets negatively predicted their intentions to behave unethically. Further,researchershavelargelyfailedtooutlinethe conditions under which this link is more or less likely to exist. In particular, it is unclear in past research whether or not any rivalry existed between the competitors being studied, thus confounding rivalry and non-rival competition. We propose that the effects of competition on unethical behavior will depend upon whether one is competing against a rival versus a non-rival. Specifically,wepredictthatcompetitionagainstarivalwill lead toincreasedunethicalbehaviorascompared to

2016 1511 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

non-rivalcompetition.Thispredictionisgrounded within longstanding models of ethical decisionmaking.Prominentmodelswithintheliteratureson crime, academic dishonesty, and deception have proposedthatpeopleundergocost–benefitanalyses when deciding whether to behave unethically, weighing the perceived benefits of the behavior against the perceived costs (e.g., Becker, 1968; Eccles, 1983; Greve et al., 2010; Lewicki, 1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992). Similarly, at the organization level, rational-choice perspectives posit that organizations weigh potential benefits and costs to their reputation in decisions to engage in misconduct(e.g.,Karpoff,Lee,&Vendrzyk,1999;Kreps & Wilson, 1982). Thus, because increased scarce resourcesorotherdesiredoutcomesareawardedto thewinnersofcompetition,aprimarywayinwhich competition may foster unethical behavior is by providingincentivesforhigh-rankingperformance, encouragingunethicalbehaviorthatconfersacompetitive advantage. Rivalry, given that it entails increased psychological stakes on top of the tangible stakes of competition, should further tip the scales in favor of unethical behavior. Hypothesis 1. Actors will exhibit more frequent unethical behavior when competing against their rivals than when competing against nonrival competitors. In addition to testing this primary hypothesis, we also conduct an initial investigation into the psychologicalunderpinningsofrivalry,withthegoalsof morepreciselyilluminatingthenatureofrivalryand the mechanisms by which it increases unethical behavior. We focus on potential psychological mechanisms that fall within two general categories: (1) increased psychological stakes and (2) altered psychological orientations. First, as suggested by prior theory on rivalry (e.g.,Kilduffetal.,2010)andarguedabove,rivalrymay increase unethical behavior by increasing the subjective importance placed upon competitive outcomes, which in turn will tip cost–benefit analyses in favor of unethical behaviors that can provide a competitive advantage. Within this category of increased psychological stakes, we investigate two specific mediators. First, competition against rivals may have greater implications for one’s sense of self than competitionagainstnon-rivals.Workonthecontingencyof self-wortharguesthatpeoplehavevariousdomainsin which they invest their self-esteem, such that success inthesedomainsboostsself-esteem,andfailurelowers it(Crocker&Wolfe,2001;Crocker,Luhtanen,Cooper,

& Bouvrette, 2003). Competition is one of the areas uponwhichself-worthcanbecontingent,andtheselfesteem of people high on this dimension of contingency of self-worth depends more heavily on their performancerelativetoothers.Thecontingencyofselfworthframeworkhasbeenappliedprimarilyasasetof individualdifferencemeasures;however,competition asacontingencyofself-worthmaydependonwhoone is competing with. Given that rivals are competitors whoaremoresimilar,whoattractgreaterattentionand social comparison, and with whom actors have longstanding competitive relationships, outcomes of competitions against rivals are likely to affect self-esteem to a greater degree than competition against non-rivals. Indeed, some prior work suggeststhatcomparisonstomorefamiliarotherscarry greater weight on our own self-evaluations (Locke, 2007;Mussweiler&R¨uter,2003;Tesser,1988).This increased contingency of self-worth may then increase unethical behavior. Indeed, other work has observed positive relationships between contingency of self-worth in academics and academic dishonesty (Covington, 1984; Niiya, Ballantyne, North, & Crocker, 2008). Hypothesis 2. Contingency of self-worth will mediate the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. Asecondformofpsychologicalstakesthatmaybe increased by rivalry is concern over one’s relative status, or level of social standing (e.g., respect and prestige; Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Blader & Chen, 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Again, in contrast to novel or anonymous competitors, rivals are competitors with whom actors have standing relationships and experience regular competition, which may also include expectations of future competition. As a result, people are likely to bemoreconcernedabouttheirstatus—orhowothers see them—relative to their rivals as opposed to nonrival competitors. In support of this idea, recent evidence suggests that people care more about their social status vis-`a-vis well-known members of their face-to-face groups than about their status in society morebroadly(Anderson,Kraus,Galinsky,&Keltner, 2012). Further, as mentioned above, rivalry in professional soccer players predicted increased testosterone (Neave & Wolfson, 2003), and testosterone has been shown to correlate with both sensitivity to status-related information and motives to gain and maintain status (Liening, Mehta, & Josephs, 2012; Ronay&Galinsky,2011;Schultheiss&Rohde,2002). The idea that we care more about our status relative

1512 October Academy of Management Journal

to our rivals is also consistent with how we might think about rivalry from an evolutionary perspective: frequent, similar, and evenly matched individuals would have typically been those most likely to compete for reproductive opportunities, and status is a primary predictor of reproductive success (Barkow, 1975; De Waal, 1982; Ellis, 1994). In terms of the link between status concerns and unethical behavior, a recent study found that individualsweremorelikelytoengageinundermining behaviors toward individuals they perceived to be a status threat (Pettit, 2012). Thus, in addition to potentially carrying greater consequences for one’s internal sense of self, competition against rivals may also loom larger, psychologically, due to increased concerns about how the outcomes will influence the opinions of others. Hypothesis 3. Relative status concerns will mediate the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. In addition to increasing unethical behavior via increased psychological stakes, it is also possible that rivalry will alter competitors’ mindsets or orientations heading into, and during, competition. A number of recent studies have demonstrated that unethical behavior is not always driven by the kind of calculative cost–benefit analysis that is central to traditional models (e.g., Becker, 1968; Eccles, 1983)—it can also be a product of impulses, emotions, goals, and decision frames (Haidt, 2001; Kern & Chugh, 2009; Reynolds, 2006; Sunstein, 2005; Tenbrunsel,Diekmann,Wade-Benzoni,&Bazerman, 2010; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). For example, individuals who perceive a decision to be a “business decision” are more likely to engage in unethical behavior than those who see it as an ethical decision (Tenbrunsel& Messick, 1999). We examine two types of psychological orientations or mindsets that might underlie the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. First, we examine the goals that individuals carry with them into competition. Theories of achievement orientationpositthatindividualscanadopttwobroadtypes ofgoalswithintasksettings(Dweck&Leggett,1988). Performance goals entail the desire to outperform others and demonstrate superior ability, whereas learningormasterygoalsreflectthedesiretodevelop one’scompetenceandimproverelativetoone’sown past performance. Even in a competitive setting, some individuals may focus primarily on defeating their opponents, whereas others care more about theirperformanceandbehaviorrelativetotheirown

standards, or the extent to which they learned something valuable. Pastresearchhasshownalinkbetweenperformanceapproach goals and unethical behavior. Students adopting performance-approach goals are more likely to engage in academic dishonesty than students adopting mastery goals (Anderman, Griesinger, & Westerfield, 1998; Anderman & Midgley, 2004; Murdock, Hale, & Weber, 2001). Similarly, “winframed” negotiators, who are focused more on outperforming their negotiation counterparts than on achieving mutual benefits, are more likely to deceive their counterparts (Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2005).Asrivalsincitegreatersocialcomparisonpressure and greater motivation to win (e.g., Kilduff, 2014), it standstoreasonthatactorswilladoptgreaterapproach performancegoalsincompetitionsagainsttheirrivals.In other words, we expect rivalry to increase actors’ focus ontheirrelativeperformanceandonthefinaloutcomeof winning in competition to the detriment of other concerns, including the means used to achieve those outcomesandwhethersuchbehaviorisethical.Forthesake of brevity, we refer hereafter to increased performanceapproachgoalsasa “performanceorientation.” Hypothesis 4. A performance orientation will mediate the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. Second, it is possible that rivalry could increase feelings of threat. Past researchers have argued that people respond to task settings with evaluative components and/or consequences for their wellbeing, progress, and self-esteem with either a sense of challenge or a sense of threat, which have different physiological profiles (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999). Given its heightened psychological significance, competition against rivals might very well invokeoneofthesemindsets.Inparticular,thoughthere is less existing evidence to support this connection thanthe other proposed mediators, if rivalryinvokes asenseofthreat,thismighthelpexplainwhyitleads to greater unethical behavior (Fast & Chen, 2009; Kouchaki & Desai,2015). Hypothesis5.Feelingsofthreatwillmediatethe link between rivalry and unethical behavior. In summary, we consider two sets of potential mediators that can explain the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. We examine two forms of increased psychological stakes—a greater contingencyofself-worth,whichisinternallyfocused,and increasedstatusconcernsthatfocusontheopinions

2016 1513 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

of others—and investigate two psychological orientations:performanceorientation, which is approach oriented, and feelings of threat, which are avoid or preventionoriented.Wetesteachofthesemediators in Study 4, and also explore the possibility of serial mediation (e.g., Hayes, 2013). That is, we test the following theoretical model: rivalry leads to increased psychological stakes, which causes people to adopt a different orientation during competition, which causes them to engage in increased unethical behavior.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES We conducted four studies that investigated the linkbetweenrivalryandunethicalbehavior.Study1 examined rivalry and unethical behavior in a realworld, high-stakes context: professional soccer. Study 2 explored the extent to which university students deceived counterparts from a rival versus a non-rival university, while controlling for other possible explanatory variables, such as dislike and perceived tangible stakes. Study 3 sought to replicate the effect of rivalry on unethical behavior within the context of a business scenario, examining the extent to which people were deceitful in their opening statements of a negotiation. Finally, Study 4 delved into the psychology of rivalry and thefactorsthatmightexplainitseffectsonunethical behavior.

STUDY 1: AN ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS OF MISCONDUCT IN SOCCER We began by examining the link between rivalry andunethicalbehavior(Hypothesis1)inareal-world context involving high-stakes, face-to-face competition. Specifically, we examined unethical conduct among professional soccer players in Italy. This setting was well suited for testing our hypothesis, for severalreasons.First,itisoneinwhichfiercerivalries areknowntoexist.Second,itfeatureshighstakesfor bothindividualplayersandteams.Thus,wecouldbe confident that the competitors were fully invested in thesecontests,andthatwewerestudyingasettingin which competitive behavior carried significant consequences. Third, soccer provides a face-valid and accepted measure ofunethical behavior,inthe form of yellow and red cards, which we describe below. Finally, sports organizations have long been recognizedasanexcellenttestinggroundformanagement topics(e.g.,Day,Gordon,&Fink,2012;Marr&Thau, 2014; Staw & Hoang, 1995).

Setting and Sample Our sample consisted of 2,788 matches played between2002and2009inSerieA,Italy’stopsoccer league.Rivalryisknowntoexistinthisleague,most oftenbetweenteamsco-locatedinthesamecity.For example, Genoa C.F.C.’s coach once described the Genoaderby(intra-cityrivalry)betweenGenoaC.F.C. and U.C. Sampdoria by saying: “The only thing that counts in Genoa is the derby. If you don’t win it, it’s like robbing a bank and getting out with a suitcase full of rags” (Flamigni, 1995). Serie A includes 20 teams (18 teams in 2002 and 2003), and matches are played between August and May each year. Data on these matches were collected online from ESPN Soccernet (now ESPN FC; http://espnfc.com/), La Gazzetta dello Sport (The Sports Gazette; www. gazzetta.it), the Associazione Spaghettitaliani’s sports editorials (http://www.spaghettitaliani.com/ Sport/Index.php), and the Italian social network Digiland (http://digilander.libero.it/). We first present analyses of these data at the match level (the variables described below are at the match level; correlationsbetweenthesevariablesaredisplayedin Table 1). Then, as a robustness check, we present analysesattheplayer–matchlevel,whichallowsfor additional player-level controls.

Measures Unsporting conduct. Our dependent variables were the number of yellow and red cards issued in each match. Yellow and red cards are given to players by referees as punishment for a variety of infractionsthataregenerallyrelatedtounsportingor unethical behavior; yellow cards are given for moderate infractions and red cards for more serious ones.6 Thesecanincludedangeroustackles thatrisk injuring other players as well as attempts to deceive the referee by “taking a dive.” Rivalry. To assess rivalry between teams, we created a dummy variable indicating whether teams were located within the same city. As illustrated by thecoach’squoteabove,anecdotalevidenceindicates thatco-locatedteamsaregenerallythefiercestrivals.7

6 See the International Federation of Association Football’s “Laws of the Game” for further details: http://www.fifa.com/ mm/document/affederation/generic/81/42/36/lawsofthegame_ 2010_11_e.pdf(accessedJanuary16,2012). 7 For an in-depth description of the intensity of these intra-city rivalries in the English Premier League, see also http://espn.go.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/12448117/thepremier-experience (accessed June 20, 2014).

1514 October Academy of Management Journal

Furthermore,geographicproximitywasidentifiedby Kilduffetal.(2010)asthesinglestrongestpredictorof rivalry betweenathletic teams. Control variables. We collected a variety of controlvariablesthatmightinfluenceteams’ tendencies to receive yellow and red cards. First, we measured theproximityinstandingsbetweenpairsofteams,as the absolute difference between the two teams’ pointsintheseason-longstandings.8 Weconsidered this to be a rough measure of the objective stakes of the contest—teams that are closer to one another in the season-long standings generally have more at stake when they play one another because they are vying for ranking within the league standings. Second, we collected similarity in recent performance,

to account for the possibility that matches between more evenly matched teams—in terms of how they are currently performing—are objectively more intense, independent of rivalry. This was measuredas the absolute difference between the two teams’ points earned during their past three matches. It is worth noting that similarity in performance, measured by these first two control variables, is thought of as an antecedent to rivalry. However, in terms of driving rivalry, the evidence suggests that it is longterm similarity in performance that matters, rather than recent similarity (see Kilduff et al., 2010: 956–957 for details). Nonetheless, in addition to the modelspresentedhere,weranallmodelswiththese control variables excluded and observed no meaningful differences in the results of our hypothesis tests. Third,tocontrolforthepossibilitythatyellowand red cards are more common at certain stages of the season—perhaps due to differences in perceived objective stakes—we created two dummy variables

TABLE 1 Study 1—Correlations between Match-Level Variables

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1. Yellow cards — 2. Red cards .18*** 3. Rivalry (0 or 1) .12*** .04† 4. Proximity in standings .09*** .05* .00 5. Similarity in recent performance .01 2.02 .00 .29*** 6. Mid-season (0 or 1) .01 2.02 2.04† 2.06** 2.10*** 7. Late-season (0 or 1) 2.06** 2.01 2.02 .38*** .00 2.48*** 8. Attendance (in thousands) 2.06** 2.04* .27*** .13*** 2.05* 2.03 .02 9. No crowd (0 or 1) 2.00 2.00 2.01 2.03 2.05* .04* 2.02 .12*** 10. Goal differential 2.13*** .03 2.01 2.05** 2.04* .01 2.03 .11*** 2.01 11. Avg. no. of yellow cards given by referee .14*** .02 .04* 2.06** 2.05** .03† .07*** .06** 2.00 .04† 12. Avg. no. of red cards given by referee .05* 2.01 .01 2.02 2.03† .02 .02 2.00 .00 .02 .41***

Note: n 5 2,788. †p # .10 *p # .05 **p # .01 ***p # .001, two-tailed tests

8 Teams earn three points for a win, and one point for adraw.Season-longstandingsarethesumoftheseacrossall gamesplayed,anddeterminewhichteamswillreceivebids intolucrativetournaments(highfinishers)andwhichteams willbe “relegated” to a lowerdivision(low finishers).

2016 1515 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

(mid-season and late-season) that indicated which third of the season the match was played in. Fourth, we collected attendance data for each match, because it seemed possible that greater fan attendance might promote greater arousal among players, perhaps making them more likely to engage in the kind of unethical and aggressive behavior deserving of yellowandredcards.Fifth,20ofthematches(0.7%) in our sample had no crowd, as a result of disciplinary action against teams and fans; we created a dummy variable (no crowd) as a control. Sixth, we measuredtheabsolutemarginofvictoryinthematch (goal differential), as more closely decided matches might also foster greater arousal. Seventh, we measured referees’ propensity to issue yellow and red cards, equal to the average number of cards (yellow orred, depending onthe analysis) that eachmatch’s referee had issued across all matches they had refereed up to that point in the season (avg. no. of cards given by referee).9

Results The average number of yellow cards issued to players was significantly higher in rivalry matches as comparedtonon-rivalrymatches,M56.03versusM5 4.25, t(2786) 5 6.12, p , .001, d 5 .91, h2 5 .013. We then ran a Poisson regression analysis that included ourcontrolvariables.AsshowninModel1ofTable2, the positive relationship between the rivalry dummy and the frequency of yellow cards was positive and significant,Waldx2 540.23,p,.001.Redcardswere alsomorecommoninrivalrymatchesthannon-rivalry matches,M50.50versusM50.33,t(2786)51.90,p5 .057,d5.27,h25.001;asshowninModel2,thisheld up in a Poisson regression with controls, Wald x2 5 8.15, p 5 .004.Thus, Hypothesis1wassupported. To address concerns over a lack of independence withinthesedata,wealsoranthesemodelswithteamlevelfixedeffects(dummyvariables)includedforboth the home and away teams. This served to control for any team-level tendencies toward earning yellow and redcards,aswellaselicitingthemfromopponents.The resultswerenotmeaningfullydifferent:rivalrywasstill associatedwithhigherratesofyellow(Waldx2535.97, p, .001)andredcards(Wald x2 5 4.24, p5 .039).As an additional robustness check, we conducted similar analyses at the player–match level of analysis, which allowedustocontrolforanumberofotherfactorsthat varied at the player–match and player levels. These included player position (goalkeeper, defender, midfielder, or forward), minutes played in the match, whetherornottheplayerwasasubstitute,theaverage number of yellow (or red) cards that the player had receiveduptothatpointintheseason,andwhetherthe player was playing at home or away. Our sample for theseanalysesconsistedof100,310matchesplayedby individual players between 2002 and 2009 (the same sampleofmatchesusedformatch-levelanalyses). Werantwologisticregressionanalysespredicting whetherornotaplayerearnedayelloworaredcard in a given game, with all match-level, player-level, andplayer–game-levelcontrolvariablesincluded.In the model for yellow cards, rivalry was positively and significantly associated with likelihood of earning a yellow card, Wald x2 5 54.27, p , .001, odds ratio 5 1.73. The logistic regression for red cards yielded a Wald x2 for rivalry of 9.12, p , .01, and odds ratio of 1.99.

Discussion Study1foundthatprofessionalsoccerplayerswere more likely to be penalized for unsporting behavior

TABLE 2 Study 1—Poisson Regression Analysis Models of Yellow and Red Cards

Variable Yellow cards Red cards

Rivalry (0 or 1) 0.41*** 0.64** (0.06) (0.23) Proximity in standings 0.00* 0.01* (0.00) (.00) Similarityinrecentperformance 20.00 2.03† (0.01) (.02) Mid-season (0 or 1) 20.01 20.05 (0.02) (.08) Late-season (0 or 1) 20.06* 0.03 (0.03) (0.09) Attendance (in thousands) 20.00*** 20.01** (0.00) (0.00) No crowd (0 or 1) 20.07 20.21 (0.11) (0.41) Goal differential 20.06*** 0.06* (0.01) (0.03) Avg.no.ofcardsgivenbyreferee 0.08*** 20.08 (0.01) (0.17) Log likelihood 25761.51 22061.94 Likelihood ratio x2 167.84*** 25.87**

Notes: n 5 2,788. Standard errors are in parentheses. †p # .10 *p # .05 **p # .01 ***p # .001, two-tailed tests

9 We ran additional models in which we controlled for referees’ averagesfortheentireseason,regardlessofwhen thegamewasplayed.Thisdidnotresultinanymeaningful differences in results.

1516 October Academy of Management Journal

when playing against rival teams, as compared to matchesagainstotherteams.Supportingtheideathat rivalry promotes unethical behavior independent of moreobjectiveorstakes-baseddriversofcompetitive intensity, these effects held when controlling for proximity between teams in the season standings, proximitybetweenteamsinrecentperformance,and the marginof victory inthe match. There are, however, some limitations to this study thatareworthnoting.First,ourmeasureofrivalrywas indirectandmaynothavecapturedalloftherivalries existing in the Serie A league, as some pairs of rival teams may not be co-located. However, this should have worked against finding a significant difference between matches classified as rivalry versus nonrivalry. Second, although yellow and red cards are fairlyface-validmeasuresofunethicalbehavior,they are occasionally issued for behaviors that are less directly unethical (e.g., taking one’s jersey off after scoringagoal).Third,yellowandredcardsarebased upon subjective judgment calls by referees, so one possible alternative explanation for our findings could be that referees are more likely to penalize playersinrivalrymatches,eveniftheirbehaviorisnot any different. The plausibility of this explanation, however, is reduced by the fact that referees are extensively trained on what constitutes a punishable offense,areexpectedtomaintainconsistentstandards acrossmatches,andarepromotedanddemotedbased ontheirperformance.Fourth,althoughwecontrolled forproximityinleaguestandingsasarough measure oftheobjectivestakesofthecontest,thisisnotaperfect measure, so we cannot definitively rule out objective stakes as a possible alternative explanation. Overall,asisthecasewithallarchivalstudies,weare constrained in our ability to make causal inferences; Studies2–4involvedexperimentstoprovideabetter demonstrationofacausalconnectionbetweenrivalry and unethical behavior.

STUDY 2: UNIVERSITY RIVALRY AND DECEPTION In Study 2, we conducted an experimental test of Hypothesis 1. We used an established and longstanding organizational rivalry asthe context for this study,andexaminedindividuals’useofdeceptionfor personal gain.

Participants and Design Participantswere70undergraduatestudentsfrom theOhioStateUniversityinColumbus,Ohio(55.7%

male;Mage 5 21.1years;SD 5 1.76);oursamplesize, andthusstatisticalpower,inthisstudywaslimitedby the number of participants we succeeded in recruiting, as described below. We selected this institution for study due to its intense and long-running rivalry with the University of Michigan. The rivalry dates back to at least 1897, when the two first met on the football field, and was recently named by the Huffington Post as the ultimate inter-university rivalry in the United States.10 Participants were randomly assigned to interact with a counterpart from eithera rival or a non-rival academicinstitution.

Procedure Participants were recruited via a publicly availablelistofstudentclubsandassociations(including fraternities and sororities) at the university. Specifically,theofficersoftheseassociationswereemailed and asked to distribute the survey to their members; for each member that participated, the association received $5. Participantscompletedanonlinesurveydescribed as examining inter-university attitudes between studentsatfourpublicU.S.universities.Theyweretold thattheywouldengageinajointdecision-makingtask with a randomly selected student from one of the otheruniversities. Rivalrymanipulation.Participantswererandomly assigned to be paired with a student from the University of Michigan (rival; n 5 26), the University of California, Berkeley(non-rival;n 5 23),ortheUniversity of Virginia (non-rival; n 5 21). Counterparts were computersimulated,notactualpeople.Wechosethese universitiesbecauseallofthem,includingOhioState, are ranked in the top 16 U.S. public universities, according to U.S. News and World Report, and the opponentschoolsinparticularareverycloselymatched onacademicstatus.11,12 Participantsthencompletedmeasuresofperceived tangible stakes of competition, as well as dislike felt towardmembersoftheotheruniversity.Thesefactors might covary with rivalry and also affect unethical

10 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/01/the-10best-college-rival_n_944635.html#s346517&title5Ohio_ State_vs (accessed September 10, 2013) 11 http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/ best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/top-public (accessed April 5, 2013) 12 Ohio State plays Michigan in football every year, and hadplayedUCBerkeleytheprevioustwoyearsatthetime of our survey.

2016 1517 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

behavior, and were thus used as control variables. Following this, participants completed a decisionmaking taskinwhich theyhadthe opportunity tolie to their counterpart for personal gain. The survey concluded with measures of demographics and perceived institutional status, as well as manipulation and suspicion checks, and a debriefing.

Measures Manipulation check. Four items assessed felt rivalry(e.g.,“Iconsiderthispersontobearival”and“I feelrivalrytowardstheuniversitythatthispersonis affiliated with”; a 5 .93; M 5 3.80, SD 5 2.12). Deception. Participants played a version of Gneezy’s (2005) Deception Game, which has previously been used to study unethical behavior in organizations (Zhong, 2011), and in our study was referredtoasan “interaction.” Theyweretoldthatthe interaction involves two players: an “advisor” and an “advisee.” The advisee must choose between two options, A and B, which determine the payoffs for each party. One of these pays the advisee $.80 and the advisor$.40,andtheotherpaystheadvisee$.40andthe advisor$.80.However,onlytheadvisorknowswhich optioniswhich.Participantswereassignedtotherole ofadvisorandgivenachoiceoftwomessagesthatthey could send to their counterpart. The first was true, telling the advisee “Option A will pay you more than Option B.” The second was a lie,“Option B will pay you more than Option A.” The advisor was told that roughly80%ofpeopleintheadviseeroletendtotrust the message sent (Zhong, 2011). Thus, our dependent measure involved a choice between telling the truth and telling a lie for purposes of self-gain, a common ethical dilemma. Control variables. Participants rated their agreementwith“Thetangiblestakes(e.g.,money,resources) associated with competitions between my university and this other university are very high” from 1 5 “Stronglydisagree”to75 “Stronglyagree”(M53.98, SD51.84).Theyrateddislikeoftheircounterpartand associatedinstitutionwiththreeitems(e.g.,“Idislikethis otheruniversity”and“Idislikestudents,alumni,orother affiliates of this university”; a 5 .81; M 5 2.41, SD 5 1.45). Finally,we measuredparticipants’ perceptionsof the academic—and athletic—status of all four universitiesonascalefrom15“Lowstatus”to75“Highstatus.”

Results Manipulation and suspicion checks. Five participants (7.1%; two each for participants matched

withacounterpartfromUCBerkeleyandMichigan, one that was matched with Virginia) indicated being suspicious, e.g., “I knew there was no real counterpart.” We present results excluding these individuals; including them does not significantly change our results. Also, because no significant or meaningful differences were observed between participants matched with a counterpart from UC Berkeley versus Virginia, we report results with these conditions combined. Participants matched with a rival (i.e., a counterpart from Michigan) reported feeling much higher levels of rivalry than participants in the non-rival conditions(M 55.70vs.2.52,t(63) 58.83,p,.001; all reported tests are two-tailed). Deception.InsupportofHypothesis1,participants in the rivalry condition were far more likely to lie to their counterparts than participants in the other conditions, M 5 50.0%versus12.2%, x2 (1, 65) 5 11.20, p , .001, d 5 1.09. This effect held up in a logistic regression analysis (Wald statistic 5 4.24, p 5 .040), whencontrollingfortangiblestakes(Wald52.08,p5 .15), dislike (Wald 5 .00, p 5 .95), and perceived academic and athletic status of the counterpart’s university (Wald 5 1.04, p 5 .31, and Wald 5 1.51, p 5 .22, respectively). The odds ratio for the rivalry dummywasequalto9.26,indicatingthattheoddsof participants in the rivalry condition using deception was more than nine times that of participants in the non-rivalryconditions.Wealsoranamodelinwhich we examined the interaction between rivalry and dislike;therivalrymanipulationremainedsignificant (Wald 5 4.33, p 5 .038) and neither dislike (Wald 5 1.07,p5.30)northeinteractiontermwassignificant (Wald 5 .57, p 5 .45).

Discussion Study2foundthatparticipantsweremorelikelyto deceive counterparts from a rival organization than those from a non-rival organization. This occurred independent of dislike, perceived tangible stakes, andperceivedstatusofthecounterpart’sinstitution.

STUDY 3: DECEPTION IN NEGOTIATIONS Study 3 sought to replicate our main finding in adifferentcontext,andwithadifferentmanipulation of rivalry. Online participants were matched withan ostensible counterpart and given information about the roles that they, and their counterparts, had been assigned to play, as well as the relationship and history that existed between the two parties. We then

1518 October Academy of Management Journal

examined the extent to which participants were deceitful in their initial communications to their counterparts,inanattempttoextractgreatervaluefromthe negotiation.

Participants and Design Participantswere101adultsrecruitedviaAmazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online service that matches“workers”with“requesters”whopostjobsto be completed (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011, for further details on this service as well as analyses that confirm the quality of responses). Participants were paid a base amount of $1, plus bonuses earned,foranonlinestudythattookabout10minutes tocomplete.Withinthesample,65.3%ofparticipants werefemale,andtheywere32.4yearsoldonaverage (SD510.5),withanaverageof11.8yearsoffull-time work experience (SD 5 10.7). Participants were randomlyassignedtooneoftwoconditions:rivalry(n5 49) and non-rival competition (n 5 52).

Procedure and Rivalry Manipulation Participants were informed that they would be taking part in a study of virtual negotiations. They were told that they would engage in an online negotiation with another MTurk worker and that their performanceinthenegotiationwouldaffect thesize of the bonus they received. They were then given their role instructions, which began as follows: You will be playing the role of “Taylor,” owner and CEO of a car dealership located in a mid-sized town (population100,000).Yourcounterpart,Runner33,is playing the role of “Jamie,” who owns and runs a competing car dealership in the same town. At this point, we introduced the manipulation of rivalry versus non-rival competition. In the rivalry condition, participants were told: You andJamiehave alonghistoryof competing with one another. You both opened car dealerships at almost the same time, about 20 years ago, and, in the years since, you have repeatedly competed for customers, marketshare, and tohave the best reputation in town. The two of you have been very evenly matched over theyears, with neither side ever taking adecisivelead.Asresultofthis,youfeelagooddealof rivalrytowardsJamieandhiscardealership,andyou get the impression that these feelings are mutual. Inthenon-rivalcompetitioncondition,participants weretold:

YouandJamiedonothavemuchofahistorytogether. Youhavebeenoperatingyourdealershipforabout20 years, but Jamie’s dealership opened fairly recently, so the two of you have not yet experienced direct competition with one another. All participants were then told: Atstakeinthecurrentnegotiationisthesaleofapieceof repair equipment that you no longer need. Jamie has expressed interest as a potential buyer. You originally purchased this equipment for a cost of $75,000, three yearsago,whichisstillthepriceforwhichitsellsbrand new.Athirdparty(notJamie)hasalsoexpressedinterest inacquiringtheequipment,andhasmadeyouanofferof $25,000. However, you are hoping that you can sell the equipment to Jamie for more than that. You also understand that it is possible that Jamie may include some non-monetary considerations—such as used vehicles or accesstodistributionchannels—aspartofanyoffermade. Participants were then asked to take a moment to put themselves in this situation and imagine how theywouldfeel.Next,theyweregiventhefollowing instructions: As a result of your prior experience with negotiations, youhavelearnedthathavingexistingoffersinhandcan be a source of power. In other words, when multiple biddersarecompeting to buy the same item, the seller can sometimes play the bidders off of one another,usingeachone’sbidstogettheothertobidhigher.Thus, thehighertheofferinhand,thegreaterthepowerofthe sellerto extractahigherpricefrom the buyer. In the current situation, Jamie has no knowledge of whether or not you have any existing offers on the repair equipment, or the amount of these offers. Furthermore, you are confident that Jamie will not find out. However, you are planning to tell Jamie that you have another offer because, as described above, you know that this is likely to help your position. As an incentive for you in this negotiation, for every $1,000 above $20,000 that you are able to sell the equipment for, you will earn an additional $.02 bonus.Thus,youarecurrentlyguaranteedatleasta$.10 bonusbecauseofyourexistingofferof$25,000,which you can always accept if Jamie is not willing to pay any higher. If you can get Jamie to agree to pay more, you will earn a higher bonus.

Tobeginthenegotiation,youmustdecidewhattotell Jamieaboutyourexistingoffer.Yourealizethatthisis likely to set the price around which the negotiation will take place. Please enter your initial communicationtoJamiebelow,completewithdetailsaboutyour existing offer.

2016 1519 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

Thus, the negotiation was constructed such that participantshadafinancialincentivetolieaboutthe size of their existing offers, and this was equivalent across conditions. It was from these opening statements that our measure of unethical behavior was drawn, as described below. After making their opening statements, participants completed a manipulation check and were then informed that the study was being cut short. They were told that, becausethechatprotocolwasstillbeingperfected,this study was serving as pretest for the main study and that they would not engage in the negotiation with their counterpart. They still received a $.10 bonus, however. The survey ended with a check for suspicions and basic demographic questions.

Measures Manipulationchecks.Rivalrywasmeasuredwith a 4-item scale (Kilduff, 2014; e.g., “I feel rivalry towards this person,” a 5 .85, M 5 3.43, SD 5 1.99). Deception.Participants’ openingstatementswere examined for deception. There were a range of opening statements, and, after reading them, we created six different categories in which to group them. A research assistant who was blind to the conditions and our hypothesis categorized each statement. Twenty (19.8%) participants told their counterparts the “complete truth,” indicating that theyhadasingleexistingofferof$25,000(category1; e.g., “I currently have an eager buyer willing to pay $25,000 for the equipment.”). Thirty-six (35.6%) participants effectively skirted the issue, either by not mentioning that they had an existing offer, or by not offering any information about its magnitude (category 2; e.g., “I have a piece of equipment that I am willing to sell. I will settle the transaction at $30,000.Doyouaccept?”).Bothofthesecategoriesof responses were coded as not exhibiting unethical behavior (deception 5 0). Twenty-seven participants (26.7%) lied directly, in numerical terms, about the amount of the offer they had in hand (category 3; e.g., “I have been offered $35,000 for this part. However, I would prefer to sell it to you. Make an offer.”). The remaining 18 participants (17.8%) employed some form of deceptionthatwaslessdirectthananumericallie.This included participants who lied about the amount of the offer in words (category 4; 5.0%; e.g., “Hello, Jamie.Gladtohearyou’reinterestedinmyhardware. Ialreadyhaveanofferforitsoyou’llhavetotalkme intogivingittoyouforagoodprice.Iexpecttogetat least1/2whatIpaidastheotherofferisjustabitover

that. What do you say, buddy?”); exaggerated the amount of the offer by describing it as “very good,’ “very generous,” or something similar (category 5; 7.9%;e.g.,“HiJamie,I’mgladtohearofyourinterest in the repair equipment I’m selling. I have a very strongofferalreadyfromathirdparty,butIwouldbe happy to work with you for a fair price”);13 or indicated having multiple offers (category 6; 5.0%; e.g., “The part you are interested in is highly sought after and I have a few offers ... I can sell it to you for 50,000”).Toconductourmainanalysis,wesplitthe sixcategoriesofopeningstatementsdescribedabove intotwobroadcategories:ethical(categories1and2) and unethical (categories 3–6).

Results Manipulation and suspicion checks. Thirteen participants (12.9%) indicated being suspicious; for example, “I suspected early on that I would not actually be communicating with a real person.” We present results excluding these individuals. There wasahigherrateofsuspicionintherivalrycondition than in the non-rival competition condition (10/49 (20.4%)vs.3/52(5.8%),x2(1,101)54.82,p5.028), but all analyses yield qualitatively equivalent levels of significance when suspicious individuals are included.Participantsintherivalryconditionreported higher levels of rivalry than participants in the nonrival competition condition (M 5 5.12 vs. 3.02, t(86) 5 8.28, p , .001). Deception. In support of our main hypothesis, 56.4% of participants in the rivalry condition used someformofdeceptionversus32.7%ofparticipants in the non-rival competition condition, x2 (1, 88) 5 5.00,p5.025,d5.49.Wethenlookedmoreclosely at the categories of deception employed. In terms of directlyingaboutthenumericalvalueoftheexisting offer(category3),therewasanon-significanttrendin favor of greater deception in the rivalry condition, MRivalry528.2%versusMNon-rivalcompetition524.5%, x2 (1, 88) 5 .16, p 5 .694. However, participants in the rivalry condition were significantly more likely to employ the other, less direct forms of deception (categories 4–6) than were participants in the nonrivalcompetitioncondition,MRivalry 528.2%versus MNon-rival competition 5 8.2%, x2 (1, 88) 5 6.17, p 5 .013, d 5 .54.

13 We classified highly positive characterizations of the existing offer of $25,000 as indirect deception due to the fact that the equipment was only three years old, in good working order, and sold new for $75,000.

1520 October Academy of Management Journal

Discussion Study3providedadditionalevidenceforourmain hypothesis,findingthatparticipantsplayingtherole of a car dealership owner were more likely to use deception in their opening negotiation statements whentheybelievedthattheircounterpartwasarival, as opposed to a non-rival. Interestingly, we found that this was driven primarily by an increase in the use of more indirect forms of deception. Although notaprimaryfocusofthispaper,wereturntothisin thegeneraldiscussionandidentifythisasapotential area for future research.

STUDY 4: PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS Study4soughttobuilduponthefindingsofStudies 1–3 by exploring the psychological mechanisms underlying the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. Participants were asked to recall a personal rival,non-rivalcompetitor,oracquaintance,andthen imagine that they were going to negotiate with this person in a scenario very similar to that in Study 3. Participantsindicatedwhattheiropeningstatements wouldbe,whichwerecodedfordeceptionasinStudy 3, and then rated their willingness to use a range of ethically questionable negotiation tactics. Finally, they rated their feelings toward the negotiation and their imagined counterparts along a number of dimensions, which were assessed as potential mediators. As described above, we examined two types of psychological stakes (contingency of self-worth and status concerns) and two psychological orientations (a performanceorientation and feelingsof threat). Wedecidedtoemploytherecallmethod,inwhich peopleheldinmindrealpersonalrivals,becausewe thought it would provide the best insight into people’sfeelingstowardtheirrivalsandthusofferusthe best chance of understanding why rivalry increases unethical behavior, even in settings that do not involveintergroupdynamics(whichmayhaveplayed a role in Studies 1 and 2). Study 4 also extended the prior studies by adding a non-competition control condition, which allowed us to get a sense for how rivalry affects unethical behavior in general, compared to interactions and relationships that are not competitive.

Participants and Design Participantswere243adultsrecruitedviaMTurk. They were paid $1.40 for an online study that took about15minutestocomplete.Withinthegroup,50.6%

ofparticipantsweremale,andtheywere31.1yearsold onaverage(SD510.5),withanaverageof10.2yearsof full-time work experience (SD 5 10.0). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: rivalry (n 5 79), non-rival competition (n 5 81), and control (n 5 83).

Procedure and Rivalry Manipulation Intherivalrycondition,participantswereaskedto recallacompetitortowardwhomtheyfeltrivalry,as follows: Please try to think of someone you have competed againstwhoyoufeelorfeltrivalrytowards(forinstance, someoneyouhaverepeatedlycompetedagainstand/or have been evenly matched with). This competition couldbeonanything,bigorsmall.Pleasedescribethis personandwhatyoucompetedon. In the non-rival competition condition, participants were advised: Please try to think of someone you have competed againstwhoyoudo/didNOTfeelanyrivalrytowards (forinstance,someoneyouonlycompetedagainstone timeand/orsomeoneyouhaveNOTbeenveryclosely matched with). This competition could be on anything, big or small. Please describe this person and what you competed on. Lastly, participants in the control condition were asked to think of an acquaintance. Allparticipantswerealsotoldthatthepersonthey thoughtofshouldnotbea“spouse,significantother, or family member,” because interactions with such individuals are apt to be unique. Participants were then asked to imagine that they were preparing to negotiatewiththepersontheyhadjustdescribed.As in Study 3, they were told that they and their counterparts each owned competing car dealerships within the same mid-sized town and were going to negotiate over the sale of a piece of equipment. The negotiation was described exactly as in Study 3, including the information that the participant had astandingofferof$25,000,butwithtwoexceptions. First, no mention of the existing relationship or history between the individuals and their dealerships was made, as the rivalry manipulation had already taken place. Second, as this was a simulated negotiation, there was no mention of a bonus tied to their performance. Participants were asked to indicate what their opening statement would be, and to rate their willingness to employ a number of ethically questionablenegotiationtactics.Consistentwithour

2016 1521 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

maintheoreticalarguments,weexpectedparticipants to indicate greater willingness to behave unethically towardtheirrivalsthantowardnon-rivalcompetitors or acquaintances. However, given the prior mixed findings surrounding the effects of general competitiononunethicalbehaviorandthefactthatpriorwork mayhavelumpedrivalryinwithcompetition,wedid not make any a priori predictions regarding differencesbetweenthenon-rivalcompetitionandcontrol conditions. Following our dependent measures, participants completed items related to our proposed mediators, items to be used as control variables, and a manipulation check.

Measures Manipulationchecks.Rivalrywasmeasuredwith the same 4-item scale used in Study 2 (a 5 .89, M 5 3.14, SD 5 1.88). Deception. Participants were asked to provide hypothetical opening statements and these were coded for the use of deception as in Study 3. Eightythree(34.2%)participantstoldtheircounterpartsthe “complete truth,” indicating that they had a single offer of $25,000 (category 1), and 87 (35.8%) either didnotmentionthattheyhadanexistingoffer,ordid not offer any information about its magnitude (category 2). Among those who engaged in some form of deception, 35 participants (14.4%) lied directly in numericalterms(category3);7(2.9%)liedaboutthe amount of the offer in words; 17 (7.0%) exaggerated the amount of the offer by describing it as “very good,”“very generous,” or something similar (category 5); and 14 (5.8%) indicated having multiple offers (category 6). Unethical negotiations tactics. Participants’ unethicalitywasalsoassessedwithsevenitemsdrawnfrom the Self-reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies (SINS) scale (Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000), which has been used by a number of researchers as a measure of unethical behavior (e.g., Cohen, 2010; Hershfield, Cohen, & Thompson, 2012; Pierce et al., 2013;Ruedy&Schweitzer,2010).Participantsindicated their willingness to use a variety of ethically questionable behaviors and tactics, such as “Intentionally misrepresent factual information in order to support your negotiating arguments or position,”“Promise things you know you can’t (or won ’t) deliver,” and “Acquire negativepersonalinformationaboutyouropponentand usethatinformationtoforcethemtogiveyouwhatyou want.”Participantsratedtheseitemsonascalefrom15 “Definitelywouldnotuse” to7 5 “Definitelywouldbe willingtouse” (a 5 .75; M 5 2.91; SD 5 1.08).

Mediators. Following the dependent measures, we asked participants a range of questions about their feelings toward the people they had imagined negotiating against, which were based on our theoretical discussion of potential mediators of the effects of rivalry on unethical behavior. Items were worded in the present (as listed here) or past tense, depending upon participants’ response to the question “Do you currently compete with this person?” In terms of psychological stakes, we measured contingency of self-worth, or the extent to which participants’senseofself-worthdependedupontheir performancerelativetotheircounterparts,withthree items (adapted from Crocker et al., 2003; e.g., “It is important to my personal sense of success and accomplishment to outperform this person”; a 5 .84; M 5 3.58; SD 5 1.71). We measured the extent to which participants were concerned with their status relativetotheircounterpartswithfiveitems(Blader& Chen, 2011; e.g., “I strive to have higher status than this person,”“I am rarely concerned with how my statuscomparestothisperson” (reverse-coded);from 15 “Notatall” to7 “Verymuch”; a 5 .78;M 5 3.68; SD 5 1.41). In terms of psychological orientations, we measured the extent to which participants adopted a performance orientation in the imagined negotiationwiththeircounterpartswithtwoitems(adapted fromElliot&Church,1997; “Mymaingoalwouldbe tooutperformthisotherperson” and “Iwouldstrive tomaximizethevalueIclaimedrelativetothisother person”;from15 “Notatall” to7 “Verymuch”).As acomplementtothis,wealsocreatedtwoitemsthat more explicitly examined the trade-off between focusing on performance outcomes versus process (“When competing against this person, I am more concernedaboutwhetherIwinthanhowIwin” and “When I am competing against this person, what matterstomeisthefinaloutcomeratherthanhowit was reached”). These four items showed high interitem reliability and were thus combined into an aggregate measure of adopting a performance orientation (a 5 .77; M 5 3.50; SD 5 1.40).14 For comparisonpurposes,wealsomeasuredadoptionofamastery orientation (adaptedfrom Elliot & Church, 1997; two items; e.g., “My main goal would be to improve my negotiation skills and mastery”; a 5 .76; M 5 4.92; SD 5 1.57). Finally, we assessed the extent to which participantswouldseethenegotiationasthreatening

14 We also ran all relevant analyses using only the established2-itemmeasure,andresultswerequalitatively identical.

1522 October Academy of Management Journal

and challenging. Although these states are best assessedviaphysiologicalmeasures(e.g.,Blascovich et al., 1999), here we settled for self-report measures (e.g., Meijen, Jones, McCarthy, Sheffield, & Allen, 2013; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997), while acknowledging that exploration of the physiology of rivalry is an important avenue for future research.Weaskedparticipantstoindicatetheextentto which six adjectives would accurately describe their feelings about the imagined negotiation (from 0 5 “Not at all” to 5 5 “Very much so”; threat:“frightening,”“threatening,”“fearful”;a5.84;M52.47;SD5 1.22; challenge: “exciting,”“challenging,”“stimulating”; a 5 .74; M 5 4.08; SD 5 1.12). Control variables. We collected two control variables. First, we measured perceived tangible stakes of competition for participants in the rivalry and non-rivalcompetitionconditions,asappliedtotheir actual competitions against this person (“How high werethetangiblestakes(e.g.,money,careersuccess, grades, athletic success, etc.) associated with your competition(s) against this person?”; from 1 5 “Nothing tangible at stake” to 7 5 “Very high”; M 5 3.63; SD 5 1.95). Although the described tangible stakes of the negotiation were held constant across conditions,someofourproposedmediatorsfocused on participants’ feelings toward their counterparts more generally, and we wanted to ensure any relationships between these and rivalry were not driven by perceived tangible stakes. Second, we collected a measure of proximity in rank (“I am closely ranked to this person”;15 “Not at all” to 7 “Very much”; M 5 4.54; SD 5 1.85), because a potential alternative explanation for any link between rivalry and status concerns could be that rivals are simply competitors who are more closely ranked to ourselves(indeed,someresearchersinthepasthave operationalized rivalry in this fashion; e.g., Garcia et al., 2006). Across participants in the rivalry and non-rivalcompetitionconditions,rivalrywasfound to be moderately correlated with perceived tangible stakes(r(160)5.28,p,.001),andweaklycorrelated with proximity in rank (r (160) 5 .16, p 5 .05); however, all analyses described below yield qualitativelyequivalentlevelsofsignificancewhenthese measuresareincludedascontrolvariables,sowedo not discuss them further.

Results Manipulation check. As expected, an analysis of variance revealed significant differences in reported rivalryacrossconditions,F(2,240)5120.29,p,.001.

Planned contrasts indicated that participants who described personal rivals reported significantly stronger rivalry (M 5 5.04, SD 5 1.39) than participants in the non-rivalcompetitioncondition(M52.24,SD51.24, t(240) 5 13.30, p , .001) and the control condition (M5 2.19,SD5 1.36,t(240)5 13.65,p, .001).These latter two conditions did not differ significantly from oneanother, t(240) 5 .27, p 5 .79. Deception. To analyze use of deception, we first created a dichotomous variable indicating whether participantsusedsomeformofdeception(categories 3–6) or not (categories 1 and 2). A chi-squared analysisindicatedthatthereweresignificantdifferences among the three conditions, x2 (2, 240) 5 16.28, p , .001. In support of our main hypothesis, and as shown in Figure 1, participants in the rivalry condition(M546.8%)weresignificantlymorelikelyto employ deception than participants in the non-rival competition condition (M 5 24.7%; x2 (1, 158) 5 8.55, p 5 .003) and participants in the control condition (M 5 19.3%; x2 (1, 160) 5 13.96, p , .001), whichdidnotdiffersignificantlyfromeachother,x2 (1, 164) 5 .71, p 5 .40). We then looked more closely at the categories of deception employed (means by category and condition are shown in Table 3). Consistent with Study 2, there were no significant differences across condition in the frequency of lying directly, in numerical terms,x2(2,240)5.65,p5.72.However,therewere significant differences across condition in the likelihood of using more indirect forms of deception (categories 4–6), x2 (2, 240) 5 19.50, p , .001. Participants in the rivalry condition (M 5 30.3%) were more likely to employ indirect deception than were participants in the non-rival competition condition (M59.9%;x2 (1,158)510.51,p5.001)andcontrol condition (M 5 7.2%; x2 (1, 160) 5 14.38, p , .001). Unethical negotiation tactics. An analysis of variance revealed significant differences in willingness to employ ethically questionable tactics across conditions, F(2, 240) 5 12.94, p , .001. Planned contrasts indicated that participants who imagined negotiating with a rival scored higher on the SINS scale (M 5 3.35; SD 5 .99) than participants who imagined negotiating with a non-rival competitor (M52.89;SD51.15;t(240)52.85,p5.005,d5.43) and participants who imagined negotiating with an acquaintance(M52.53;SD50.95;t(240)55.08,p, .001, d 5 .85). SINS scores were also higher in the non-rival competition condition than the control condition, t(240) 5 2.22, p 5 .027, d 5 .34. Mediation. We next examined the psychological mechanismsunderlyingtheobservedpositiveeffect

2016 1523 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

of rivalry on intended unethical behavior. For these analyses, we restricted our comparison to the rivalry versusnon-rivalcompetitionconditions,asthisisthe key distinction upon which this paper is focused. Participants in the rivalry condition reported significantlygreatercontingenciesofself-worthbasedupon their performance vis-`a-vis their recalled counterparts (MRivalry 5 4.85 vs. MNon-rival competition 5 3.40, t (158) 5 6.42, p , .001), status concerns (MRivalry 5 4.71vs.MNon-rival competition 5 3.16,t(158) 5 7.89,p, .001), and performance orientations (MRivalry 5 4.22 vs.MNon-rival competition53.38,t(158)54.01,p,.001). All three of these factors also significantly predicted both dependent measures. There were no significant differences between the rivalry and non-rival competition conditions for perceptions of challenge, perceptionsofthreat,ormasteryorientation(seeTable4 forcorrelationsbetweenmeasures).Thus,Hypothesis 5 was not supported.

We began testing Hypotheses 2–4 by running a set of simple mediation bootstrapping tests (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; all bootstrapping mediation tests were run using the PROCESS macro in IBM’s statistical analysis software SPSS; Hayes, 2013), in which each of the three potential mediators was analyzed independently for both dependent measures. The indirecteffectofrivalryonintendedunethicalbehavior viacontingencyofself-worthwassignificantforSINS (95% CI [.186, .403]) but not for deception (95% CI [2.057,.420]).Similarly,statusconcernssignificantly mediated the effect of rivalry on SINS (95% CI [.154, .412]) but not on deception (95% CI [2.072, .474]). However, performanceorientationservedasa significantmediatorforbothSINS(95%CI[.369,.583])and deception (95% CI [.123,.665]). Wethenexaminedallthreefactorsinsimultaneous parallel mediation models (Hayes, 2013). For deception, performance orientation significantly mediatedtheeffectofrivalry(95%CI[.076,.765]),whereas status concerns (95% CI [2.341, .397]) and contingency of self-worth (95% CI [2.405, .285]) did not. Similarly, for SINS, performance orientation significantly mediated the effect of rivalry (95% CI [.298, .575]),whereasstatusconcerns(95%CI[2.140,.158]) and contingency of self-worth (95% CI [2.087, .190]) didnot.Thedirecteffectsofrivalryondeception(95% CI [2.078, .1.52]) and SINS (95% CI [2.319, .340]) werereduced to non-significanceinbothmodels. These parallel mediation analyses suggest that anincreasedperformanceorientationservesasthe primary mediating mechanism between rivalry and

FIGURE 1 Study 4—Use of Deception by Condition

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Control Rivalry Non-rival competition

TABLE 3 Study 4—Categories of Opening Statements by Condition

Control Competition Rivalry

Told the complete truth 43.4% 43.2% 15.2% Did not mention offer or amount 37.3% 32.1% 38.0% Lied in numerical terms 12.0% 14.8% 16.5% Lied in words 1.2% 0.0% 7.6% Exaggerated 2.4% 6.2% 12.7% Indicated having multiple offers 3.6% 3.7% 10.1%

1524 October Academy of Management Journal

unethical behavior. As a final test, however, we examined the possibility of serial mediation (Hayes, 2013); specifically, the idea that rivalry fosters increased contingency of self-worth and/or status concerns, which in turn leads to an increased performance orientation, which then fosters greater unethicality. A serial mediation model for SINS indicated that the indirect effect of rivalry on unethicality through contingency of self-worth and performance orientation in serial was significant (95%CI[.122,.465]).Similarly,theindirecteffectof rivalry on unethicality through status concerns and performance orientation in serial was also significant(95%CI[.020,.180]).Noneoftheindirectpaths that included only a single mediator were significant, including the indirect effect of rivalry on unethicality via performance orientation only (95% CI [2.254, .085]). Similar results were achieved for intended deception. The indirect effect of rivalry on intended deception through contingency of selfworth and performance orientation in serial was significant(95%CI[.041,.557]),aswastheindirecteffect throughstatusconcernsandperformanceorientation

in serial (95% CI [.016, .211]). The indirect effect via performance orientation only was not significant (95%CI[2.278,.086]).Thus,wehaveevidenceoftwo serial mediation pathways from rivalry to unethical behavior,oneviaincreasedcontingencyofself-worth and performance orientation and the other via increasedstatusconcernsandperformanceorientation. Figure2 illustrates this theoretical model.

Discussion Study4providedadditionalevidenceforthepositive effectsofrivalryonunethicalbehavioraswellasinsight into the psychological mechanisms underlying these effects. Within a hypothetical negotiation scenario, participantsemployedgreaterdeceptionandindicated agreaterwillingnesstouseunethicalnegotiationtactics whentheyimaginednegotiatingwithapersonalrivalas compared to a non-rival competitor or acquaintance. Further, participants indicated that their performance vis-`a-vistheirrivalscarriedsignificantlygreaterweight indrivingtheirsenseofself-worth,thattheyweremore concernedabouttheirstatusrelativetotheirrivals,and

TABLE 4 Study 4—Correlations

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Rivalry (0 or 1) 2. Deception .23** 3. SINS .21** .40*** 4. Contingency of self-worth .46*** .26*** .51*** 5. Status concerns .53*** .240*** .45*** .72*** 6. Performance goals .31*** .32*** .65*** .69*** .61*** 7. Mastery goals 2.06 .16* .41*** .29*** .23*** .45*** 8. Challenge .09 .10 .38*** .28*** .17** .39*** .48*** 9. Threat .05 .01 .16* .20** .24*** .22** .10 .05

Note: n 5 243. *p # .05 **p # .01 ***p # .001, two-tailed tests

FIGURE 2 Theoretical Model

Rivalry

Contingency of Self-worth

Status Concerns

Performance Orientation

Unethical Behavior

2016 1525 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

thattheprospectofnegotiatingwitharivalincreased the extent to which they adopted a performance orientation.Inaparallelmediationmodel,thislasteffect was found to be most responsible for the effects of rivalry on unethical behavior; however, serial mediation models indicated that the psychological pathway from rivalry to unethical behavior is more complex. It seems that rivalryincreases contingency of self-worth and status concerns, both of which independently increase performance orientation, which then leads to greater unethicality.

GENERAL DISCUSSION Despite substantial anecdotal evidence of its power to influence behavior, the topic of rivalry has received relatively little scientific scrutiny. In the current research, we compared rivalry to non-rival competition in terms of their consequences for unethical behavior. Across four studies, involving professional athletes, undergraduates, and adults from the general population, we observed that rivalrypromotedgreaterunethicalbehaviorthannonrival competition, independent of tangible stakes. This was true across multiple manipulations of rivalry and multiple measures of unethical behavior. These results are summarized in Table 5.

Theoretical Contributions We believe that this research makes a number of theoretical contributions. First, we contribute in several ways to the burgeoning literature on rivalry. Existingresearchhaslinkedrivalrytoincreasedeffort andmotivation;ourresearchexploresthedarksideof rivalryandsuggeststhatitmayalsopushindividuals to pursue success in unethical ways, to a greater degree than general competition. Thus, rivalry may be a double-edged sword that merits careful management.

OurresultsfromStudy4alsoshedsomelightonthe psychologicalexperienceofrivalry,howitdiffersfrom non-rival competition, and how this helps to explain the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. First, we observed that individuals viewed competitions against their rivals as more important to their sense of self-worth,andweremoreconcernedabouttheirstatus relative to their rivals, as compared to other competitions and competitors. Both of these findings help to illuminate the nature of the increased psychological stakes theorized to accompany rivalry (Kilduff, 2014; Kilduffetal.,2010),andunderscoretheideathatrivalry isfundamentallydifferentfromnon-rivalcompetition. Rather than simply mirroring competition with high tangiblestakes,rivalryseemstobequalitativelydifferent.Thisnotionissupportedbythefactthatmeasures of tangible stakes in our studies did not relate to unethical behavior in the way that rivalry did. Competition against rivals appears to be uniquelyimportant to oursenseofselfandsocialstanding,whichmayhelpto explainwhyitissoengagingandpowerful. Furthermore,wefoundthatrivalryleadspeopleto adopt a stronger performance orientation—that is, to focus more on performance-approach goals. Within a given interaction, people may adopt a variety of goals (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988), and, in our research, rivalry led people to focus more on winning and outperforming their opponents, and less on the means used to achieve these goals, thus leading to greater unethical behavior. Mediation analyses depicted a model in which rivalry heightens psychological stakes, which leads to a greater performance orientation,whichleadstogreaterunethicality. Inaddition to shedding light onthe psychological experience of rivalryand why it promotes unethical behavior, our findings link rivalry to existing literatures on contingency of self-worth (Crocker et al., 2003; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001), status and status concerns(e.g.,Andersonetal.,2001;Andersonetal.,2012; Blader & Chen, 2011; Pettit, Yong, & Spataro, 2010),

TABLE 5 Rivalry Versus Non-Rival Competition—Summary of Findings

Study 1 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 4 Yellow cards Red cards Deception Deception Deception SINS

Non-rival competition 4.25 (1.95) 0.33 (0.60) 12.2% 32.7% 24.7% 2.89 (1.15) Rivalry 6.02 (1.99) 0.50 (0.96) 50% 56.4% 46.8% 3.35 (.99) Test of difference in means t 5 6.12*** t 5 1.90† x2 5 11.21** x2 5 5.00* x2 5 8.55** t 5 2.85**

Notes: Means by condition are displayed. Standard deviations are in parentheses. *p # .05 **p # .01 ***p # .001, two-tailed tests

1526 October Academy of Management Journal

andperformancegoals(Elliot&Church,1997;Elliot &Harackiewicz,1994;Midgley,Kaplan,&Middleton, 2001; Tangirala, Kamdar, Venkataramani, & Parke, 2013),which,amongotherthings,suggestsarangeof additionalconsequences to rivalry. Thesecondbroadcontributionofthisresearchisin identifying rivalry as a previously unexplored determinant of unethical behavior, thus helping scholars to better understand when and why actors behave unethically. Further, by drawing upon existing research on the factors that contribute to rivalry (Kilduff,2014;Kilduffetal.,2010),weareabletoshed light on the conditions under which competition is generally more or less likely to lead to unethical behavior. That is, competition is more likely to foster unethical behavior when it entails repeated contests between similar or evenly matched competitors, as compared to when it takes place between unfamiliar oranonymous ones. Third,ourfindingshighlighttheimportanceoftaking a relational approach to the study of both competition and unethical behavior. As discussed, competition has traditionallybeenmodeledinobjective,structuralterms, but our results suggest that it can vary substantially dependingoncompetitors’relationships.Seminalwork oncooperationbetweenorganizationshasdemonstrated that accurate prediction of alliance formation requires taking into account past interactions and trust (Gulati, 1995);competitionresearchisapttobenefitfromasimilar perspective. Likewise, research on unethical behavior has generally focused on the roles of individual and situational characteristics (e.g., Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). However, a small but growing body of work has begun to examine the importance of various relational factors(e.g.,Ginoetal.,2009;Gino&Pierce,2010;Mayer, Nurmohamed,Treviño,Shapiro,&Schminke,2013; Mayer,Thau,Workman,VanDijke,&DeCremer,2012). Forexample,therelationshipbetweenleadersandtheir subordinatescansubstantiallyaffectunethicalbehavior (Mayeretal.,2012).Ourfindingscontributetothisnew perspective and dovetail with a broader relational trend within organizational research, which has included topics such as job design (Grant, 2007), negotiations(Gelfand,Smith,Raver,Nishii,&O’Brien, 2006) and job attitudes (Wrzesniewski, Dutton, & Debebe, 2003).

Organizational and Practical Implications Our findings also suggest a range of important organizational and practical implications. Competitioniseverywhereinthebusinessworld,anditoften occursbetweenfamiliarandlongstandingrivals.Itis

important to recognize that this may be a uniquely intenseformofcompetitionthatvariessubstantially from anonymous “perfect market” competition. Assuming that the two are the same could result in serious miscalculations and predictions about one’s own,andone’sopponents’,behaviors.Morespecific tothefindingsdocumentedhere,unethicalbehavior is costly and destructive, and preventing it has become one of the primary applied goals of organizational research. Given the apparent role of rivalry in promoting unethical behavior, managers should carefullyconsiderhoworganizationalstructuresand policies might influence feelings of rivalry within employees. For instance, managers may want to design jobs, incentives, and promotion systems to avoid the antecedents of rivalry such as repeatedly pitting employees against eachother,asmany sales, legal, and financial firms are known to do. The upside may be increased motivation (Kilduff, 2014; Kilduff et al., 2010), but with significant downsides. Organizations might also be wary of placing too much emphasis on outperforming rival companies, lest this foster a culture of rivalry that prioritizes performanceatthecostofethicalbusinesspractices. Managers should also be cognizant of their own propensity to be influenced by rivalry. Top management teams and boards of directors may want to take explicit measures to guard against rivalry influencing their strategic and moral judgments, such as relying on objective data and decision criteria, and soliciting the opinions of outsiders. Overall,givenitspotentialbenefitsanddownsides, organizations are faced with important decisions abouthowtobestmanagerivalry.Futureworkshould examinewhethercertainorganizationalfactors,such as culture, incentives, and leadership, may allow organizations to harness the benefits of rivalry while simultaneously avoiding its downsides. The consequencesofrivalrymayalsodifferacrossdifferentjob settings and job characteristics. For instance, jobs for which performance is effort based and autonomy is limited (thus limiting the opportunity for unethical behavior)may tend tobenefitmorefrom rivalry than jobs that offer freedom in decision making or center aroundfunctionsforwhichunethicalityisaconcern. Exploring the conditions under which rivalry is generally beneficial versus harmful constitutes an important next stepfor thisresearch.

Future Directions There are a number of additional potential avenuesforfutureresearchonrivalry.First,futurework

2016 1527 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

should examine unethical behavior at the organizationallevel.AlthoughStudies1and2examinedrivalry between organizations, these were not traditional forprofit businesses, and the unethical behavior was perpetrated by individuals. Theoretically, there is reason to believe that our results will generalize to organizations—a range of organizational outcomes have been successfully predicted by psychological theories that treat the organization as an individual (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991), and the strategy, structure, and culture of organizations are often determined by a few key individuals in positions of power (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Kaplan, 2011; Miller & Dr¨oge, 1986; Staw & Sutton, 1992).Futureresearch,however,shouldinvestigate this empirically—for instance, examining the role of rivalry in promoting accounting fraud. In such research, interfirm rivalry might be measured via surveys of industry experts, text analysis of media reports,ormeasuresthattapintotheantecedentsof rivalry,suchasrepeatedcompetition(e.g.,tenurein the same industry). To control for more objective competitivepressuresandstakes,onecouldcollect measuresofmarketoverlapandresourcesimilarity (Chen, 1996). Second, research should explore the range of unethical behaviors affected by rivalry, and whether it increasescertaintypesmorethanothers.InStudies3 and 4, we observed that rivalry increased participants’ useofindirectformsofdeception,butnotthe extent to which they lied in concrete, numerical terms.However,inStudy2,wefoundthatrivalrydid leadtotheuseofdirect,unambiguousdeception.Itis possible that these findings are the result of differences in study context. Study 2 involved an organizational rivalry and a one-shot decision game, whereas Studies 3 and 4 examined individual-level rivalry in the context of a negotiation; future work should examine these possibilities. More generally, in this research, we examined forms of unethical behavior that were specifically directed at one’s rival, as well as behavior that can be, at least loosely, classified as furthering performance (that rivalry increased this kind of unethical behavior is consistent with our finding that it invokes a performance orientation). Future work should explore whether rivalry affects other types of unethical behavior. In particular, it would be very interesting to explore whether rivalry exhibits any evidence of a “carryover” effect (Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Jacoby, & Hansen, 2007), such that the experience of competing against a rival might promote greater unethical

behaviorevenindomainsoutsideoftherivalryitself, duetothemindsetactivatedbyrivalry.Forexample, negotiatingwitharivalmightactivateaperformance orientation that carries over to a subsequent negotiationwithanon-rival.Orperhapsathletes,andeven their fans, behave more unethically following matches against rival teams. It would also be interesting to see whether exposure to rivalry could affect unethical behavior less connected to performance goals—for example,usingcompanysupplies for personal purposes or downloading software illegally (e.g., Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008). Third, research should continue to explore the psychological underpinnings of rivalry and its effects on unethical behavior. In particular, the “hot” side of rivalry would seem a fruitful avenue for research. This could include a more complete investigation into both the affective and physiological profilesofrivalry.Asmentioned,thereissomeinitial evidence that rivalry promotes heightened testosteroneascomparedtonon-rivalcompetition(Neave & Wolfson, 2003)—future work could build upon this by examining additional hormones, cardiovascular responses, and even brain activity. Doing so wouldshedfurtherlightontheexperienceofrivalry andalsoprovideabettertestforthepotentialrolesof challenge and threat responses. Related work might also more directly compare rivalry to other forms of competition with heightened stakes. This could include competition with high tangible stakes, and competitionwithhighpsychologicalstakes,perhaps due to heightened status concerns (e.g., competitors of proximal rank) or contingency of self-worth (e.g., tasks that are identity-relevant). Future researchshouldalsodelvedeeperintothedeliberative versus automatic nature of rivalry’s effects on unethical behavior. Scholars are increasingly realizing that ethical decisions are a product of both deliberativeandautomaticprocesses,andtheextentto which each cognitive system is active depends on a wide range of factors (Moore & Gino, 2015). A related question is whether rivalry might even alter individuals’ awareness of whether a given behavior or decision has an ethical component, perhaps by shifting decision frames (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) or creating a kind of performance-focused tunnelvision(Moore&Gino,2015).Itisalsopossible that people might have an easier time rationalizing unethical behavior within the context of rivalry; perhaps “all is fair in love and rivalry.” Fourth, research should explore additional consequences of rivalry besides motivation and unethical behavior. By increasing status concerns,

1528 October Academy of Management Journal

contingency of self-worth, and performance orientation independent of tangible stakes, rivalry could lead to a range of important behaviors, many of which might be suboptimal. First, actors might be more likely to focus on relative performance as opposed to absolute performance when competing against their rivals—that is, adopt a “competitive” social value orientation (Messick & McClintock, 1968). In turn, they may be willing to sacrifice their owngainsinordertolimitthoseofarival.Inarelated vein, actors might be unwilling to cooperate with theirrivals(e.g.,pursuejointventures)evenwhenit is beneficial to do so. Second, rivalry might create such a strong reluctance to concede defeat that competing actors escalate commitment to losing competitive endeavors instead of abandoning them (e.g., Staw, 1976). For instance, rival firms might continue investing in underperforming product lines rather than cutting their losses and exiting the market. Third, given conditions of limited attention and cognitive resources (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963), actorsengagedinfiercerivalriesmightoverlooknonrival competitors. In other words, rivalry could lead to a form of tunnel vision or myopia in which actors aresopreoccupiedwiththeirrivalsthattheybecome vulnerable to other competitive threats. Fourth, the observed link between rivalry and status concerns suggests that rivalry might lead to increased conspicuous consumption (Miller, 2009; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008; Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010), and, if rivals are placed upon the same team, increased status conflict (Bendersky & Hays, 2012). Finally, future research could explore whethercertain interventions can diminish or extinguish rivalry or itsunwantedconsequences.For example,perhaps cooperationamongrivals,evenifforceduponthemby authorities or regulatory bodies, could diminish the rivalry between them (e.g., Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Another, individual-level intervention that could work might be self-affirmation. Numerous studies show that allowing individuals to affirm their sense of self can reduce a host of biases (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), and, given our results showing that rivalry invokes increased status concerns and contingency of self-worth, interventions that mitigate such concerns may also mitigate the power of rivalry to affect behavior. Besides selfaffirmation, providing individuals with admiration and respect might also limit the effects of rivalry by mitigatingstatusconcerns.Futureworkcoulddirectly manipulate these factors and others that may that shiftparticipants’ goalsandobjectivesincompetition away from relative performance; examining such

moderators would (a) provide greater evidence for the mechanisms that link rivalry to unethical behaviorand(b)highlightpotentialwaysofpreventing rivalryfrombecomingharmful.Further,althoughin Study 2 we found that the effects of rivalry on unethical behavior did not vary by participants’ feelingsofdisliketowardtheircounterparts,futurework could conduct a more thorough investigation of the interplay between rivalry and dislike, and whether thereareanyimportantdifferencesbetweenlikedor respected rivals and disliked rivals.

Conclusion Competition is ubiquitous among individuals, groups,andorganizations.Whencompeting,actors faceavarietyofdecisionsabouthowtobehave,how to compete, and how to attempt to increase their chances of victory. The relationships—and, in particular, the rivalries—that exist between actors can affectthesedecisions.Ourworksuggeststhatactors who feel rivalry towards their opponents are more likelytoengageinthekindofbehaviorthatdefines the ugly side of competition, including deception, cheating, and sabotage. These results paint rivalry as a powerful motivational and corruptive force with significant implications for organizations.

REFERENCES Anderman, E. M., Griesinger, T., & Westerfield, G. 1998. Motivation and cheating during early adolescence. Journal of Educational Psychology, 90: 84–93. Anderman, E. M., & Midgley, C. 2004. Changes in selfreportedacademiccheatingacrossthetransitionfrom middle school to high school. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 29: 499–517. Anderson,C.,John,O.P.,Keltner,D.,&Kring,A.M.2001. Who attains social status? Effects of personality and physical attractiveness in social groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81: 116–132. Anderson, C., Kraus, M. W., Galinsky, A. D., & Keltner, D. 2012. The local-ladder effect: Social status and subjective well-being. Psychological Science, 23: 764–771. Ash, E. 2001. Purple virtues: A leadership cure for unhealthyrivalry.AerospacePowerJournal,15:32–39. Barkow, J. H. 1975. Prestige and culture: Biosocial interpretation. Current Anthropology, 16: 553–572. Baum,J.A.C.,&Korn,H.J.1996.Competitivedynamicsof interfirm rivalry. Academy of Management Journal, 39: 255–291.

2016 1529 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

Becker, G. S. 1968. Crime and punishment: Economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76: 169–217. Beersma,B.,Hollenbeck,J.R.,Humphrey,S.E.,Moon,H., & Conlon, D. E. 2003. Cooperation, competition, and team performance: Toward a contingency approach. Academy of Management Journal, 46: 572–590. Bendersky, C., & Hays, N. A. 2012. Status conflict in groups. Organization Science, 23: 323–340. Blader, S. L., & Chen, Y.-R. 2011. What influences how higher-status people respond to lower-status others? Effects of procedural fairness, outcome favorability, andconcernsaboutstatus.OrganizationScience,22: 1040–1060. Blascovich,J.,&Mendes,W.B.2000.Challengeandthreat appraisals:Theroleofaffectivecues.InForgas,J.(Ed.). Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition: 59–82. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Blascovich,J.,Mendes,W.B.,Hunter,S.B.,&Salomon,K. 1999. Social “facilitation” as challenge and threat. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77: 68–77. Bothner,M.S.,Kang,J.H.,&Stuart,T.E.2007.Competitive crowding and risk taking in a tournament: Evidence from NASCAR racing. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52: 208–247. Brehm, J. W., Wright, R. A., Solomon, S., Silka, L., & Greenberg, J. 1983. Perceived difficulty, energization, and the magnitude of goal valence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19: 21–48. Brickman, P., Redfield, J., Crandall, R., & Harrison, A. A. 1972. Drive and predisposition as factors in the attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 8: 31–44. Buhrmester, M. D., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. 2011. Amazon’sMechanicalTurk:Anewsourceofinexpensive yethigh-qualitydata?PerspectivesonPsychological Science, 6: 3–5. Chen, M.-J. 1996. Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration. Academy of Management Review, 21: 100–134. Cho, T. S., & Hambrick, D. C. 2006. Attention as the mediator between top management team characteristics andstrategicchange:Thecaseofairlinederegulation. Organization Science, 17: 453–469. Cohen, T. R. 2010. Moral emotions and unethical bargaining: The differential effects of empathy and perspective taking in deterring deceitful negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics, 94: 569–579. Covington, M. V. 1984. The self-worth theory of achievement motivation: Findings and implications. The Elementary School Journal, 85: 5–20.

Crocker, J., & Wolfe, T. C. 2001. Contingencies of selfworth. Psychological Review, 108: 593–623. Crocker,J.,Luhtanen,R.K.,Cooper,M.L.,&Bouvrette,A. 2003.Contingencies ofself-worth incollegestudents: theoryandmeasurement.JournalofPersonalityand Social Psychology, 85: 894–908. Cyert,R.,&March,J.1963.Behavioraltheoryofthefirm. Oxford: Blackwell. Day, D. V., Gordon, S., & Fink, C. 2012. The sporting life: Exploringorganizationsthroughthelensofsport.The Academy of Management Annals, 6: 397–433. De Waal, F. B. M. 1982. Chimpanzee politics: Sex and power among apes. London: Jonathan Cape. Deci, E. L., Betley, G., Kahle, J., Abrams, L., & Porac, J. 1981. Whentryingtowin:Competitionandintrinsicmotivation. PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,7:79–83. Detert, J. R., Treviño, L. K., & Sweitzer, V. L. 2008. Moral disengagementinethicaldecisionmaking:Astudyof antecedents and outcomes. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 93: 374–391. Deutsch, M. 1949. A theory of cooperation and competition. Human Relations, 2: 129–152. Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. 1988. A social-cognitive approach to motivation and personality. Psychological Review, 95: 256–273. Eccles, J. S. 1983. Expectancies, values, and academic choice:Originsandchanges.SanFrancisco:Freeman. Elliot,A.J.,&Church,M.A.1997.Ahierarchicalmodelof approach and avoidance achievement motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72: 218–232. Elliot, A. J., & Harackiewicz, J. M. 1994. Goal setting, achievement orientation, and intrinsic motivation: A mediational analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66: 968–980. Ellis,L.(Ed.)1994.Socialstratificationandsocioeconomic inequality, vol. 2: Reproductive and interpersonal aspectsofdominance and status. Westport, CT: Praeger. Elsbach, K. D., & Bhattacharya, C. B. 2001. Defining who you are by what you’re not: Organizational disidentification and the National Rifle Association. Organization Science, 12: 393–413. Fast,N.J.,&Chen,S.2009.Whenthebossfeelsinadequate Power, incompetence, and aggression. Psychological Science, 20: 1406–1413. Festinger, L. 1954. A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7: 117–140. Flamigni,P.1995.Ilderbydelleparole.Genoa,Italy:Erga. Garcia, S. M., Tor, A., & Gonzalez, R. 2006. Ranks and rivals:Atheoryofcompetition.PersonalityandSocial Psychology Bulletin, 32: 970–982.

1530 October Academy of Management Journal

Gelfand,M.J.,Smith,V.,Raver,J.,Nishii,L.,&O’Brien,K. 2006. Negotiating relationally: The dynamics of the relational self in negotiations. Academy of Management Review, 31: 427–445. Gino,F.,Ayal,S.,&Ariely,D.2009.Contagionanddifferentiationinunethicalbehavior:Theeffectofonebadapple onthebarrel. PsychologicalScience,20:393–398. Gino, F., & Pierce, L. 2010. Robin Hood under the hood: Wealth-based discrimination in illicit customer help. Organization Science, 21: 1176–1194. Gneezy, U. 2005. Deception: The role of consequences. The American Economic Review, 95: 384–394. Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. 1993. Enduring rivalries: Theoretical constructs and empirical patterns. International Studies Quarterly, 37: 147–171. Grant,A.M.2007.Relationaljobdesignandthemotivation to make a prosocial difference. Academy of Management Review, 32: 393–417. Gregory, M. 1994. Dirty tricks: Inside story of British Airways’ secret war against Richard Branson’s Virgin Atlantic. New York: Little, Brown. Greve, H. R. 1998. Performance, aspirations, and risky organizational change. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43: 58–86. Greve,H.R.,Palmer,D.,&Pozner,J.E.2010.Organizations gone wild: The causes, processes, and consequences of organizational misconduct. The Academy of Management Annals, 4: 53–107. Gulati,R.1995.Doesfamiliaritybreedtrust?Theimplications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 85 –112. Haidt, J. 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108: 814–834. Hayes,A.F.2013.Introductiontomediation,moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regressionbased approach. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Hayward,M.L.A.,&Hambrick,D.C.1997.Explainingthe premiums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 103–127. Hegarty, W. H., & Sims, H. P. 1978. Some determinants of unethical decision behavior: An experiment. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 63: 451–457. Hershfield,H.E.,Cohen,T.R.,&Thompson,L.2012.Short horizons and tempting situations: Lack of continuity toourfutureselvesleadstounethicaldecisionmaking and behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 117: 298–310. Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. 1986. Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93: 136–153.

Kaplan, S. 2011. Research in cognition and strategy: Reflections on two decades of progress and a look to the future.JournalofManagementStudies,48:665–695. Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., & Vendrzyk, V. P. 1999. Defense procurement fraud, penalties, and contractor influence. Journal of Political Economy, 107: 809–842. Katila, R., & Chen, E. L. 2008. Effects of search timing on innovation:Thevalueofnotbeinginsyncwithrivals. Administrative Science Quarterly, 53: 593–625. Kern, M. C., & Chugh, D. 2009. Bounded ethicality: The perils of loss framing. Psychological Science, 20: 378–384. Kilduff,G.J.2014.Driventowin:Rivalry,motivation,and performance. Social Psychological & Personality Science, 5: 944–952. Kilduff, G. J., Elfenbein, H. A., & Staw, B. M. 2010. The psychology of rivalry: A relationally dependent analysis of competition. Academy of Management Journal, 53: 943–969. Kish-Gephart, J. J., Harrison, D. A., & Treviño, L. K. 2010. Bad apples, bad cases and bad barrels: Meta-analytic evidenceaboutsourcesofunethicaldecisionsatwork. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 95: 1–31. Kohn,A.1992.Nocontest:Thecaseagainstcompetition. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Kouchaki, M., & Desai, S. D. 2015. Anxious, threatened, and also unethical: How anxiety makes individuals feelthreatenedandcommitunethicalacts.Journalof Applied Psychology, 100: 360–375. Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. 1982. Reputation and imperfect information.JournalofEconomicTheory,27:253–279. Ku, G., Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. 2005. Towards a competitive arousal model of decision-making: A study of auction fever in live and Internet auctions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 96: 89–103. Lewicki, R. J. 1983. Lying and deception: A behavioral model. In M. H. Bazerman & R. J. Lewicki (Eds.), Negotiatinginorganizations:68–90.BeverlyHills,CA:Sage. Liening, S. H., Mehta, P. H., & Josephs, R. A. 2012. Competition. In V. S. Ramachandran (Ed.), Encyclopedia of human behavior (2nd ed.): 556–562. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Locke, K. D. 2007. Personalized and generalized comparisons: Causes and consequences of variations in the focus of social comparisons. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33: 213–225. Magee,J. C., & Galinsky, A.D. 2008.Socialhierarchy:The self-reinforcing nature of power and status. The Academy of Management Annals, 2: 351–398. Malhotra, D. 2010. The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and performance.

2016 1531 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,111:139–146. Marr,J.C.,&Thau,S.2014.Fallingfromgreat(andnot-sogreat) heights: How initial status position influences performance after status loss. Academy of Management Journal, 57: 223–248. Mayer, D. M., Kuenzi, M., Greenbaum, R., Bardes, M., & Salvador, R. 2009. How low does ethical leadership flow? Test of a trickle-down model. Organizational BehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,108:1–13. Mayer, D. M., Nurmohamed, S., Treviño, L. K., Shapiro, D.L.,&Schminke,M.2013.Encouragingemployeesto report unethical conduct internally: It takes a village. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 121: 89–103. Mayer,D.M.,Thau,S.,Workman,K.M.,VanDijke,M.,& DeCremer,D.2012.Leadermistreatment,employee hostility, and deviant behaviors: Integrating selfuncertainty and thwarted needs perspectives on deviance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 117: 24–40. Medvec,V.H.,Madey,S.,&Gilovich,T.1995.Whenlessis more:Counterfactualthinkingandsatisfactionamong Olympic medal winners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69: 603–610. Medvec, V. H., & Savitsky, K. 1997. When doing better means feeling worse: The effects of categorical cutoff points on counterfactual thinking and satisfaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72: 1284–1296. Meijen, C., Jones, M. V., Mccarthy, P. J., Sheffield, D., & Allen,M.S.2013.Cognitiveandaffectivecomponents of challenge and threat states. Journal of Sports Sciences, 31: 847–855. Messick, D. M., & McClintock, C. G. 1968. Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4: 1–25. Midgley,C.,Kaplan,A.,&Middleton,M.2001.Performanceapproach goals: Good for what, for whom, under what circumstances, and at what cost? Journal of EducationalPsychology,93: 77–86. Miller, D., & Dr¨oge, C. 1986. Psychological and traditional determinants of structure. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31: 539–560. Miller, G. 2009. Spent: Sex, evolution, and consumer behavior. New York: Viking. Moore,C.,Detert,J.R.,Treviño,L.K.,Baker,V.L.,&Mayer, D. M. 2012. Why employees do bad things: Moral disengagement and unethical organizational behavior. Personnel Psychology, 65: 1–48. Moore,C.,&Gino,F.2015.Approach,ability,aftermath:A psychological framework of unethical behavior at

work. The Academy of Management Annals, 9: 235–289. Murdock,T.B.,Hale,N.M.,&Weber,M.J.2001.Predictors of cheating among early adolescents: Academic and social motivations. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 26: 96–115. Mussweiler,T.,&R¨uter,K.2003.Whatfriendsarefor!The useofroutinestandardsinsocialcomparison.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85: 467–481. Neave, N., & Wolfson, S. 2003. Testosterone, territoriality, and the “home advantage.” Physiology & Behavior, 78: 269–275. Niiya, Y., Ballantyne, R., North, M. S., & Crocker, J. 2008. Gender,contingenciesofself-worth,andachievement goals as predictors of academic cheating in a controlled laboratory setting. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 30: 76–83. Perry, A. R., Kane, K. M., Bernesser, K. J., & Spicker, P. T. 1990. Type A behavior, competitive achievementstriving, and cheating among college students. Psychological Reports, 66: 459–465. Pettit,N.C.2012.Thedysfunctionalsideofstatus:Status distance and change as determinants of damaging intragroup behavior. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting in Boston, MA. Pettit,N.C.,Yong,K.,&Spataro,S.E.2010.Holdingyourplace: Reactionstotheprospectofstatusgainsandlosses.Journal ofExperimentalSocialPsychology,46:396–401. Pierce,J.R.,Kilduff,G.J.,Galinsky,A.D.,&Sivanathan,N. 2013. From glue to gasoline: How competition turns perspective takers unethical. Psychological Science, 24: 1986–1994. Porter, M. E. 1980. Competitive strategy. New York: Free Press. Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. 2004. SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36: 717–731. Reynolds, S. J. 2006. A neurocognitive model of the ethical decision-makingprocess:Implicationsforstudyandpractice. TheJournalofAppliedPsychology,91:737–748. Reynolds, S. J., & Ceranic, T. L. 2007. The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: An empirical examination of the moral individual. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 92: 1610–1624. Robinson, J. R., Lewicki, R. J., & Donahue, E. M. 2000. Extendingand testingafivefactormodelofethicaland unethicalbargainingtactics:IntroducingtheSINSscale. JournalofOrganizationalBehavior,21:649–664. Ronay, R., & Galinsky, A. D. 2011. Lex talionis: Testosterone and the law of retaliation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47: 702–705.

1532 October Academy of Management Journal

Rucker, D. D., & Galinsky, A. D. 2008. Desire to acquire: Powerlessness and compensatory consumption. The Journal of Consumer Research, 35: 257–267. Ruedy,N.E.,&Schweitzer,M.E.2010.Inthemoment:The effect of mindfulness on ethical decision making. Journal of Business Ethics, 95: 73–87. Sassenberg,K.,Moskowitz,G.B.,Jacoby,J.,&Hansen,N. 2007. The carry-over effect of competition: The impactofcompetitiononprejudicetowardsuninvolved outgroups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43: 529–538. Scherer, F. M., & Ross, S. 1990. Industrial market structure and economic performance (3rd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Schultheiss, O. C., & Rohde, W. 2002. Implicit power motivation predicts men’s testosterone changes and implicit learning in a contest situation. Hormones and Behavior, 41: 195–202. Schweitzer, M. E., DeChurch, L. A., & Gibson, D. E. 2005. Conflict frames and the use of deception: Are competitive negotiators less ethical? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35: 2123–2149. Schwepker, C. H., Jr., 1999. Understanding salespeople’s intention to behave unethically: The effects of perceived competitive intensity, cognitive moral development and moral judgment. Journal of Business Ethics, 21: 303–316. Scott, W. E., & Cherrington, D. J. 1974. Effects of competitive, cooperative, and individualistic reinforcement contingencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30: 748–758. Sherif,M.,Harvey,O.J.,White,B.J.,Hood,W.R.,&Sherif, C.W.1961.Intergroupcooperationandcompetition: The Robbers Cave experiment. Norman, OK: University Book Exchange. Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. 2006. The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38: 183–242. Sivanathan,N.,&Pettit,N.C.2010.Protectingtheselfthrough consumption:Statusgoodsasaffirmationalcommodities. JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,46:564–570. Staw, B. M. 1976. Knee deep in the Big Muddy. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35: 124–140. Staw,B.M.,&Hoang,H.1995.SunkcostsintheNBA:Why draft order affects playing time and survival in professional basketball. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 474–494. Staw, B. M., & Sutton, R. I. 1992. Macro organizational psychology. In J. K. Murnighan (Ed.), Social psychology in organizations: Advances in theory and research: 350–384. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.

Stinnett, D. M., & Diehl, P. F. 2001. The path(s) to rivalry: Behavioral and structural explanations of rivalry development. The Journal of Politics, 63: 717–740. Sunstein, C. R. 2005. Moral heuristics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28: 531–541. Tangirala, S., Kamdar, D., Venkataramani, V., & Parke, M. R. 2013. Doing right versus getting ahead: The effects of duty and achievement orientations on employees’ voice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 98: 1040–1050. Tauer, J. M., & Harackiewicz, J. M. 1999. Winning isn’t everything: Competition, achievement orientation, and intrinsic motivation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35: 209–238. Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. 1999. Sanctioning systems, decision frames, and cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44: 684–707. Tenbrunsel,A. E.,Diekmann,K. A.,Wade-Benzoni,K. A., & Bazerman, M. H. 2010. The ethical mirage: A temporalexplanationastowhywearenotasethicalaswe think we are. Research in Organizational Behavior, 30: 153–173. Tesser, A. 1988. Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of social behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. 21: Socialpsychologicalstudiesoftheself—perspectives and programs: 181–227. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Thompson,W.R.1995.Principalrivalries.TheJournalof Conflict Resolution, 39: 195–223. Tomaka, J., Blascovich, J., Kibler, J., & Ernst, J. M. 1997. Cognitiveandphysiologicalantecedentsofthreatand challenge appraisal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73: 63–72. Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., & Reynolds, S. J. 2006. Behavioral ethics in organizations: A review. Journal of Management, 32: 951–990. Vaughan,D.1999.Thedarksideoforganizations:Mistake, misconduct, and disaster. Annual Review of Sociology, 25: 271–305. Wankel, L. M. 1972. Competition in motor performance: An experimental analysis of motivational components. JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,8:427–437. White, M. 2001. Acid tongues and tranquil dreamers: Eight scientific rivalries that changed the world. New York: HarperCollins. Whitley, B. E. 1998. Factors associated with cheating amongcollegestudents:Areview.ResearchinHigher Education, 39: 235–274. Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. 1992. The development of achievement task values: A theoretical analysis. Developmental Review, 12: 265–310.

2016 1533 Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, and Reade

Wrzesniewski, A. C., Dutton, J. E., & Debebe, G. 2003. Interpersonal sensemaking and the meaning of work. Research in Organizational Behavior, 25: 93–135. Zajac,E.J.,&Bazerman,M.H.1991.Blindspotsinindustry and competitor analysis: Implications of interfirm (mis)perceptions for strategic decisions. Academy of Management Review, 16: 37–56. Zajonc, R. B. 1968. Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9: 1–27. Zhong, C-B. 2011. The ethical dangers of deliberative decision making. Administrative Science Quarterly, 56: 1–25. Zhong, C., Phillips, K. W., Leonardelli, G. J., & Galinsky, A. D. 2008. Negational categorization and intergroup behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34: 793–806.

Gavin J. Kilduff ([email protected]) is an associate professor in the management and organizations department at the Stern School of Business at New York University. He received his PhD from the University of

California, Berkeley. His research focuses on competition andrivalry,statusdynamicsandhierarchy,andtheimpact of relationships within competitive and mixed-motive settings, such as negotiations. Adam D. Galinsky ([email protected]) is theVikramS.PanditProfessorofBusinessandchairofthe managementdivisionattheColumbiaBusinessSchool.He received his PhD from Princeton University. His research and teaching focus on leadership, power, negotiations, decision making, diversity, and ethics. Edoardo Gallo ([email protected]) is a lecturer in the facultyofeconomicsattheUniversityofCambridgeandan Official Fellow in Economics at Queens’ College. He received his DPhil in economics from the University of Oxford. His research interests are experimental economics, networks, and behavioral economics. J. James Reade ([email protected]) is a lecturer in economics at the University of Reading in England. He received his DPhil in economics from the University of Oxford. His research interests are applied econometrics, withaparticularinterestinapplications tosport, political elections, and betting.

1534 October Academy of Management Journal

Copyright of Academy of Management Journal is the property of Academy of Management and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.