w3d
Steven911
resource.docxRequired Resources
Text
Osborne, A. G., & Russo, C. J. (2003). Special education and the law: A guide for practitioners (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.
· Chapter 2: Rights to a Free Appropriate Public Education
Article
DeMitchell, T., & Kearns, G. (1997). Where to educate Rachel Holland? Does least restrictive environment mean no restrictions? Clearing House, 70(3), 161-166. doi:10.1080/00098655.1997.10543918
See bottom of this resource Page. For this article
· The full-text version of this article can be accessed through the EBSCOhost database in the Ashford University Library. This article provides an explanation of the case as well as a rationalization of the finding in today’s school setting and procedures.
Multimedia
National Center for Education Statistics. (2014, January). Percentage of students ages 6–21 served under the individuals with disabilities education act, part b, placed in a regular public school environment, by amount of time spent inside general classes: Selected school years 1990–91 through 2011–12 (Links to an external site.) [Graph]. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgg.asp
Websites
Center for Parent Information and Resources. (2014, March). Considering LRE in placement decisions (Links to an external site.) . Retrieved from http://www.parentcenterhub.org/repository/placement-lre/#regular
· This webpage assists parents in participating in the IEP team when determining their child’s education placement. Accessibility Statement does not exist. Privacy Policy does not exist.
Kids Together, Inc. (2010, June 29). Sacramento v. Rachel H (Links to an external site.) . Retrieved from http://www.kidstogether.org/right-ed_files/rachel.htm
· This webpage provides a case summary for Sacramento v. Rachel H including the facts and implications for special education programming and placement. It is referenced in the Week Three Assignment Case Study: Sacramento City School Board v. Rachel H. Accessibility Statement does not exist. Privacy Policy does not exist.
U.S. Department of Education. (n.d.). Building the legacy: IDEA 2004 (Links to an external site.) . Retrieved from http://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/%2Croot%2Cstatute%2CI%2CB%2C612%2Ca%2C5%2C
· The U.S. Department of Education published the legal statute for the Least Restrictive Environment, which is used as a reference in Week Three Assignment Case Study: Sacramento City School Board v. Rachel H. Accessibility Statement does not exist. Privacy Policy (Links to an external site.)
U.S. Government Publishing Office. (2014). Off. of spec. educ. and rehab. services, education (Links to an external site.) . Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2014-title34-vol2/pdf/CFR-2014-title34-vol2-sec300-114.pdf
· Accessibility Statement does not exist. Privacy Policy does not exist.
Recommended Resource
Website
Disability Rights California. (2011, September 20). Special education rights and responsibility: Information on least restrictive environment (Links to an external site.) . Retrieved from http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/pubs/504001Ch07.pdf
· This 31-page document clearly outlines the Special Education Rights and Responsibilities specific to the Least Restrictive Environment written by Disability Rights California. It is referenced the Week Three discussion, “Is that Legal?”
· Disability Rights California provides materials in alternative formats (Links to an external site.) and provides disability related reasonable accommodations when requested.
·
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Where to educate Rachel Holland? Does least restrictive environment mean no restrictions?
Authors:
DeMitchell, Todd Kerns, Georgia M.
Source:
Clearing House. Jan/Feb97, Vol. 70 Issue 3, p161. 6p.
Document Type:
Article
Subject Terms:
*SPECIAL education *EDUCATION of students with disabilities
Abstract:
Explores on the kind of special education for children with disabilities and special education needs. Case of Rachel Holland; Case law on least restrictive environment; Application of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Accession
WHERE TO EDUCATE RACHEL HOLLAND? DOES LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT MEAN NO RESTRICTIONS?
What shall be taught? How shall it be taught? Who shall teach our children? Those three critical questions have long been a part of the discussion about the appropriate role of public education in our society. Since the rise of the "one best system" of public education, the questions have been the subject of much dialogue, debate, and policy making. During the last fifty years, a fourth question has been added to those three: Where shall the student be educated? Separate but equal schools, desegregated schools, neighborhood schools, special schools, and magnet schools have been some of the answers to that question.
In the past, that matter of where a child will be educated has been a civil rights issue. Recently, a new dimension of the issue has emerged--that is, whether to include students with disabilities in the regular class or to educate them in a more restricted environment. This question has divided the educational community as well as the broader community. As with other important questions, the debate has produced much heat and has seen the various antagonists turn to the courts for support of their positions.
Determining the appropriate educational environment for students with special education needs can be problematic. Consider the case of Rachel Holland, who has a tested IQ of 44. Rachel was born in 1982, and from 1985 to 1989, she attended a variety of special education programs in the Sacramento City School District in California. During these four years, Rachel spent approximately one hour a day in a regular classroom. Her parents constantly tried to convince the school district to increase the amount of time that Rachel spent in regular classrooms. In the fall of 1989, Rachel's parents requested that their daughter be placed full-time in a regular classroom for the 1989-1990 school year. The district rejected their request and instead offered a placement that divided Rachel's time between a regular education class for nonacademic subjects--art, music, lunch, and recess--and a special education class of children with disabilities for all academic subjects. This placement would have required that Rachel move six times a day between the two classes. Rachel's parents rejected the district's proposal and enrolled Rachel in a regular kindergarten class at Shalom School, a private school. Her parents decided to fight the Sacramento City School District's stance on what education was appropriate for Rachel. The odyssey of where to educate Rachel had now truly begun.
Appropriateness and Special Education
The issue of what constitutes an appropriate educational environment for a special education student is not unique to Rachel. How much to include or mainstream a special education student into a regular education classroom as part of a legal mandate is a matter that has received a lot of attention lately. The National Association of State School Boards of Education (1992) has endorsed full inclusion, as has the Council for Exceptional Children (1993). On the other hand, the Learning Disabilities Association of America (1993) has taken a stand against full inclusion, as has the National Joint Committee on Learning Disabilities (1993). The American Federation of Teachers (Richardson 1994) has called for a moratorium on the placement of children with disabilities in regular classrooms.[1]
The matter of how to appropriately educate students who qualify for special education is of large consequence to education in general. In the 1991-1992 school year, 4,994,169 students received special education services in the regular classroom and via other service modalities. Almost three and one-half million of those students (69.3 percent) spent more than 40 percent of their instructional day in a general classroom while 25.1 percent, just over 1.2 million students, received services in a separate class for at least 60 percent of the day. Only 5.7 percent of the students received special education services in a separate school or other location (Ayers 1994).
Rachel Holland is and was one of these students who is entitled to special education services under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). IDEA is predicated on the assumption that all children are capable of benefiting from an education. The corollary is that all identified special education children can be educated. As the Rochester School District in New Hampshire found out in the Timothy W. (1989) case, a school district does not have the authority to withhold services if it deems a special education student is not capable of benefiting from an education. The court characterized IDEA as a "zero reject" of services for an identified student. In other words, any student who is entitled to special education services must receive an appropriate education. A school district may not impose a litmus test of whether it believes a child can benefit from services as a pre-condition for receiving educational services.
IDEA requires that a state that accepts federal IDEA funds must meet three basic requirements in order to comply with the law. First, it must provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to qualified students, and second, to the "maximum extent appropriate," a child with a disability must be educated in the least restrictive environment. This last requirement is often called the main streaming mandate. The underlying rationale for this mandate is found in the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) desegregation case, which embraced the concept that separate is not equal. A third principle of IDEA is that education is to be individualized and appropriate to the child's needs. This is usually accomplished through the formulation of an individualized educational plan (IEP). All three of these components are important, but the one that has received the most attention lately, and maybe the least understood of the three, is the least restrictive environment (LRE) requirement. Because the issue of Rachel Holland's education turns on what the appropriate environment for Rachel is, we will explore this requirement in a little more depth.
Least Restrictive Environment: Case Law
The IDEA provides that each state must establish
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated with children who are not disabled, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (20 U.S.C. 1412(5)(B))
Also, IDEA regulations require schools to educate children with disabilities together with children who do not have disabilities (34 C.F.R. Sect. 300.500). According to the regulations, when selecting the least restrictive environment, school authorities should give consideration to any potential harmful effect on the child or on the quality of services that he or she needs; consideration should also be given to any potential harmful effect on the education of the other students (34 C.F.R. Sect. 300.522).
The courts have likewise underscored the importance of the LRE mandate. For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Roncker v. Walter (1983) wrote, "We recognize that the mainstreaming issue imposes a difficult burden on the district court. Since Congress has chosen to impose that burden, however, the courts must do their best to fulfill their duty" (1063).
Prior to 1994, two LRE tests were devised by the federal circuit courts of appeal to ascertain if the defendant school district had met its burden of compliance under IDEA. The first LRE test was devised by the Sixth Circuit in Roncker, mentioned above. The test looked at three areas:
1. Comparison of educational benefits in the restricted setting with educational benefits in a regular setting
2. Degree to which the student will disrupt the regular classroom
3. Cost of the regular classroom placement
The Roncker test was adopted by the Eighth Circuit (A. W. v. Northwest R-1 School District (1987)) and the Fourth Circuit (DeVries v. Fairfax County School Board (1989)).
A second appellate LRE test was devised by the Fifth Circuit in Daniel RR v. State Board of Education (1989). In establishing a new test, the Daniel RR court wrote as follows:
We respectfully decline to follow the Sixth Circuit's analysis. Certainly the Roncker test accounts for factors that are important in any mainstreaming case. We believe, however, that the test necessitates too intrusive an inquiry into educational policy choice that Congress deliberately left to state and local officers. Whether a particular service feasibly can be provided in a regular or special educational setting is an administrative determination that state and local officials are far better qualified and situated than we are to make. (1046)
The court's reluctance to substitute its judgment on policy matters for that of professional educators is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v. Rowley (1982). In that case, the High Court reminded the lower courts not to second-guess school leaders on matters relating to educational methodology.[2]
The Fifth Circuit in Daniel RR started its LRE inquiry by examining whether the school district had "taken steps to accommodate the handicapped child in regular education" (1048). The IDEA, according to the court, requires school districts to provide supplementary aids and services and to modify the regular education program when they mainstream children with disabilities. This is similar to the Supreme Court's FAPE decision in Rowley, in which the Court stated that an appropriate education is "personalized instruction with sufficient support services that will permit the child to benefit educationally from instruction" (203). Whether education in a regular classroom with the use of supplemental aids and services is appropriate for a given child involves the following three-part inquiry:
1. Will the child receive an educational benefit, both non-academic and academic, from the regular education placement?
2. What is the child's overall educational experience in the mainstreamed environment, balancing the benefits of regular and special education?
3. What effect does the special education child's presence have on the regular classroom environment and the education that the other students are receiving?
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal have construed the least restrictive environment requirement of the IDEA as a presumption in favor of mainstreaming or educating children with disabilities in regular classrooms alongside their fellow students. For example, citing the Daniel RR test of the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Oberti v. Board of Education of Borough of Clementon School District (1993) ruled that school districts have an obligation to consider placing students with disabilities in regular education classes with supplementary aids and services before they explore other alternatives. "The court stressed that in passing the IDEA, Congress recognized the fundamental right of students with disabilities to associate with nondisabled peers" (Osborne 1994, 548-49). Therefore, the starting place for any inquiry into what the appropriate least restrictive environment for a student is must be inclusion as a regular member of a regular education classroom; the inquiry can then move to the matter of a more restrictive environment if it is found that that environment is not appropriate. This view is consistent with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which calls for placing a person with a disability in the regular education environment unless it is demonstrated that the education received in the regular classroom along with supplementary aids and services is inadequate. Thus, although the starting point for a least restrictive environment inquiry is the regular classroom, that does not mean that there can be no restrictions on what environment is appropriate for any given student. The decision as to whether a particular child should be educated in a regular classroom setting all of the time, part of the time, or none of the time is predicated on an inquiry into the needs and abilities of the child. The issue is not cast as the best academic setting possible for the student; rather, the presumption of the IDEA's least restrictive environment mandate in favor of mainstreaming is that the student receive a satisfactory education.
For example, in Greet v. Rome City School District in Georgia (1991), mainstreaming was emphasized over special education services.[3] This ruling allowed a nine-year-old student with Down's syndrome to be placed in a regular education kindergarten class rather than in the substantially separate special education class recommended by the school district. The court found that the student had made some progress in kindergarten with supplemental aids and services and was not disruptive. Greer also added "cost" to the Daniel RR test. The Eleventh Circuit in Greer stated that "[i]f the cost of educating a handicapped child in a regular classroom is so great that it would significantly impact upon the education of other children in the district, then education in a regular classroom is not appropriate" (697).
However, the LRE mandate does not require school districts to place students in their neighborhood schools, let alone in the regular classroom, in all situations. In Barnett v. Fairfax County School Board (1991), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a centralized program for high school students with heating impairments, even though the parents of a student objected to busing their child several miles from home and requested that a similar program be established in the neighborhood school. The Tenth Circuit in Murray by and through Murray v. Montrose County School District, RE-IJ (1995) held that a twelve year old with multiple disabilities was not entitled to an education in the neighborhood school because the child's needs could not be met in that setting. The court stated that while IDEA "clearly commands schools to include mainstreamed disabled children as much as possible, it says nothing about where, within a school district, that inclusion shall take place" (928-29). A federal district court in Colorado (Urban v. Jefferson County School District, R-1 (1994)) reached a similar conclusion when it found that "the statutory preference for placement at a neighborhood school is only that--and it does not amount to a mandate" (1568),
Similarly, in Nebraska (French v. Omaha Public Schools) and in Pennsylvania (Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13) in 1991, two different federal district courts upheld the decision not to mainstream students who had profound hearing loss, severe language delays, and no meaningful communicative interaction with the hearing world. In those two cases, a more restricted environment more appropriately met the needs of the student than the less restrictive environment of the regular education classroom.
In DeVries v. Fairfax County School Board (1989), which adopted the Roncker test, the mother of a child with autism (who had depressed cognitive functioning, exhibited immature behavior, and needed a predictable environment) contested the school district's proposed placement in a vocational center. The mother wanted the child educated in the local public high school. The district court and the court of appeals found that the vocational center placement was appropriate because the student could not be educated satisfactorily, even with supplementary aids. The disparity between the cognitive levels of the seventeen-year-old student and his non-disabled peers was so great that the court was concerned that the student would be simply "monitoring" the regular class.
From a different perspective, the Ninth Circuit in Clyde K. and Sheila K. v. Puyallup School District (1994) supported the transfer of a student with a special education designation from a regular classroom setting to a more self-contained setting. The student had Tourette's syndrome and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. The behavior on his part that precipitated an emergency suspension and then placement in the restricted environment (a placement to which the parents initially agreed but one that they later rejected) included vulgar and profane comments, class disruptions, sexual harassment of female students, and the assault of a staff member and students.
The Case of Rachel Holland
We have briefly reviewed several court cases that found that the least restrictive environment for a student was one in which there were restrictions. What we have not looked at in depth is how that determination is made. For that part of the discussion, we return to the case of Rachel Holland to see how it was resolved. Should Rachel be educated in a special education classroom or should there be full inclusion?
The parents of Rachel Holland wanted Rachel to be educated full-time in a regular education classroom; the school district wanted her to be educated in a more restrictive environment. Rachel's parents appealed the Sacramento City School District's placement. Following a two-week heating, the hearing officer, in a lengthy opinion dated August 15, 1990, found that the school district had failed to make an adequate effort to educate Rachel in a regular education class as required by the IDEA. The heating officer found that Rachel had benefited from her year of kindergarten in a regular class at Shalom School, that Rachel was motivated to learn, and that she learned from imitation and modeling and thus would benefit from a regular education classroom setting with nondisabled peers. The heating officer also found that Rachel would not be disruptive and that her IEP was consistent with the first-grade curriculum. The hearing officer ordered the district to place Rachel in a regular education classroom with appropriate support services, including a part-time special education consultant and a part-time classroom aide.
The school district appealed the decision of the hearing officer to the federal district court (Sacramento City Unified School District v. Holland (1992)). During the judicial proceedings, Rachel stayed put, completing first grade and half of second grade before the district court handed down its decision. The court fashioned a four-factor balancing test that was adapted from the Daniel RR test and the Greer addition of cost as a factor. The Rachel Holland court's four factors are (1) the educational benefits of placement in a regular class; (2) the nonacademic benefits of interaction with children who were not disabled; (3) the effect that Rachel had on the teacher and children in the regular class; and (4) the costs of mainstreaming Rachel. The school district lost and appealed the decision (Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H. (1994)).
The court of appeals approved the district court's four-part test and adopted it and used it several months later in Clyde K. and Sheila K. v. Puyallup School District (1994) mentioned above. The court of appeals also accepted the findings of fact of the district court. The appellate court decided that the school district carried the burden of proof that its placement for Rachel provided mainstreaming to "the maximum extent appropriate."[4] Thus, the school district had to show that the four factors favored its preferred placement. The court found as to the first factor that, if a child's disabilities were so severe that he or she would receive little or no academic benefit from placement in a regular education class, then inclusion may not be appropriate. The experts for both sides provided conflicting evidence. The bulk of the evidence offered by the district related to Rachel's performance on achievement and aptitude tests. By contrast, Rachel's witnesses, who had observed her for extended periods of time in her classroom at Shalom School, testified that she had made significant academic strides there. The court, while acknowledging that the expert witnesses brought their own points of view to the case, gave great weight to the testimony of Rachel's second-grade teacher, Ms. Crone, who was characterized as experienced and skillful (and who was not a partisan to the controversy). Ms. Crone noted that Rachel was in many ways a typical second grader, eager to participate and very motivated. The district did not meet its burden of establishing that Rachel would not receive academic benefits in regular classes and failed to demonstrate that placement in special education classes would provide equal or greater educational benefit to Rachel.
The analysis of the second factor, nonacademic benefits to Rachel, centered on Rachel's attitude, her social communication skills, and her self-confidence. The school district's experts from the state's Diagnostic Center testified that Rachel was making little progress on her IEP goals and was isolated from her classmates. The school district's standardized testing techniques and results in this area were not persuasive to the court, however. The strongest evidence, according to the court, was Rachel's excitement about her class and her improved self-confidence. The district court concluded that the differing evaluations in large part reflected the predisposition of the evaluators. The testimonies of the classroom teacher and Rachel's mother were considered more credible by the district court.
The third factor, effect on the teacher and students, has two aspects. The first is whether there is a detriment to the other students because the child with the disability is disruptive, distracting, or unruly. There was no evidence that Rachel was a discipline problem at Shalom School; in fact, all parties agreed that Rachel was well-behaved. The second aspect is whether the child with special education needs would take up so much of the teacher's time that the other students would suffer from lack of attention. On this point, Rachel's second-grade teacher testified that Rachel's presence did not interfere with her ability to teach the other children in the class.
The fourth and last factor is cost. The court found that the school district had painted an exaggerated picture of what it would cost to educate Rachel in a regular classroom with appropriate services. For example, the district claimed that it would cost over $80,000 to provide school wide sensitivity training and another $29,000 for a full-time aide. Yet the district did not establish that such training was necessary. Further, much to the displeasure of the court, the district did not provide a cost comparison between placing Rachel in a special education class with a full-time teacher and two aides and the cost of placing her in a regular class with one part-time aide. The court found that the district did not offer any credible or persuasive evidence that educating Rachel in a regular classroom would be significantly more expensive than educating Rachel in a special classroom. The school district lost on all four factors of the test.
Conclusion
Where best to educate a child has emerged as one of the perennial questions of education. To include or not to include is an important part of the question. It is a question that must be answered based on the individual needs and abilities of the child. We start from the proposition that the regular classroom is the appropriate setting; if through an analysis, such as Holland's four-factor analysis test, it is found to be inappropriate, then we must restrict the environment accordingly. A hard-and-fast role that all children will be mainstreamed irrespective of their needs and abilities and the best interests of the other students without doing an analysis runs counter to the IDEA, judicial decisions, and good sense. Similarly, a rule that automatically places a student in a special restricted environment without an analysis is just as wrong. An appropriate analysis is crucial to meeting the needs of our students. The Holland analysis of educational benefit, noneducational benefit, effect on the teacher and other students, and cost is a fair and defensible test to use when we are deciding where best to educate a student.
NOTES
1. While much has been made of the difference between the terms inclusion and mainstreaming, we will not wade into that battle. The issue we are exploring here is that of determining a starting point for a special education student, regardless of what educators call it. McCarthy (1995) distinguished between the two terms as follows: "inclusion [consists of] bringing support services to the child rather than moving the child to a segregated setting to receive services" and mainstreaming means "integrating children with disabilities and nonhandicapped children for a portion of the day, usually at times when the regular education program does not have to be significantly modified to accommodate children with disabilities" (824). Yell (1995) asserted that while "mainstreaming refers to placement in regular education, LRE is a principle stating that students with disabilities are to be educated in settings as close to regular classes as appropriate for the child" (193, f.n. 7). Both terms refer to a special education student's receiving a meaningful education in a regular classroom with appropriate support services for as long as practical; therefore, we will use the terms interchangeably to avoid the definitional debate.
· 2. The Supreme Court in Rowley stated the following: "In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been met, courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States" (207).
· 3. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991)) affirmed the judgment of the district court (762 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ga. 1990)), but withdrew its opinion (956 F. 2d 1025 (11th Cir. 1992)) when the issue of jurisdiction arose. It reinstated its opinion (967 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992)) supporting the district court except for Part 2 on jurisdiction, when the two parties signed a consent decree.
· 4. The court did not resolve the conflict of which party bears the burden of proof. The Third Circuit has held that the school district has the initial burden of justifying its placement decision at the administrative-hearing level and the trial level if the student challenges the placement (Oberti v. Board of Education, 995 F.2d 1204 (3rd Cir. 1993)). Also, the court in Mavis and Mavis on behalf of Emily Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) held that in mainstreaming cases, the burden is on the school district to establish compliance with the LRE mandate. Other courts of appeal have held that the burden of proof at the trial level rests with the party challenging the agency decision (Roland M. v. Concord School Committee, 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990)). Either way, the school district in the Holland case carried the burden of proof, because the district was challenging the agency decision.
REFERENCES
A. W. v. Northwest R-1 School District, 813 E2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987).
Ayers, G. E. 1994. Statistical profile of special education in the United States, 1994. Supplement to TEACHING Exceptional Children 26(3): 1-4.
Barnett v. Fairfax County School Board, 927 F. 2d 146 (4th Cir. 1991).
Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
Brown v. Board of Education, 47 U.S. 483 (1954).
Clyde K. and Sheila K. v. Puyallup School District, 35 F. 3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994).
Council for Exceptional Children. 1993. Policy on Inclusive Schools and Community Settings. Adopted by the Council for Exceptional Children Delegate Assembly, San Antonio (April).
Daniel RR v. State Board of Education, 874 F. 2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
DeVries v. Fairfax County School Board, 882 E2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).
French v. Omaha Public Schools, 766 F. Supp. 765 (D. Neb. 1991).
Greer v. Rome City School District, 950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991).
Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 757 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
Learning Disabilities Association. 1993. Position paper on full inclusion of all students with learning disabilities in the regular education classroom. Journal of Learning Disabilities 26(9): 594.
McCarthy, M. M. 1995. Inclusion of children with disabilities: Is it required?" 95 Ed. Law Rep. [823] (9 Feb).
Murray by and through Murray v. Montrose County School District, RE-1J, 51 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 1995).
National Association of State Boards of Education. 1992. Winners all: A call for inclusive schools. Washington D.C.: National Association of State Boards of Education.
The National Joint Committee on Learning Disabilities. 1993. A reaction to full inclusion: A reaffirmation of the right of students with learning disabilities to a continuum of services. Journal of Learning Disabilities 26(9): 596.
Oberti v. Board of Education of Borough of Clementon School District, 995 F.2d 1204 (3rd Cir. 1993).
Osborne, A. G. Jr. 1994. The IDEA's least restrictive environment mandate: A new era. 88 Ed. Law Rep. [541] (24 March).
Richardson, J. 1994. A.F.T. says poll shows many oppose 'inclusion'. Education Week (3 August): 14.
Roncker v. Walter, 700 E2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983).
Sacramento City Unified School District v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H., 14 E3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
Timothy W. v. Rochester School District, 875 F.2d 954, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989).
Urban v. Jefferson County School District, R-1, 870 E Supp. 1558 (D. Colo. 1994).
Yell, M.L. 1995. Judicial review of least restrictive environment disputes under the IDEA. Illinois School Law Quarterly 15(4): 176-95.
~~~~~~~~
By TODD DEMITCHELL and GEORGIA M. KERNS
Todd DeMitchell is associate chair and an associate professor and Georgia M. Kerns is an assistant professor and program coordinator of special education--both in the Department of Education, University of New Hampshire, Durham.
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