International Relations Research draft
Private22
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I. Introduction
Two-thirds of Africa's nations have immediate access to a sea of wealth because of the
continent's 16,000 miles of coastline. The fishing and tourist industries in the maritime sector
have tremendous earning potential. Both rural and coastal people rely on it as a crucial source of
livelihood and a significant cultural touchstone. Additionally, having access to the sea affords
Africa a tactical edge in diplomacy, trade, and national growth. Another area of uncertainty that
weakens the security of the African continent is the maritime sphere. In Africa's maritime realm,
transnational risks such as piracy, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and others flourish,
undermining investor confidence and government authority. However, due to a lack of
knowledge, political will, and financial means, maritime security is rarely emphasized in
economic and national defense programs. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies convened
delegates from 12 African nations in Accra, Ghana, on March 2–4, 2016, to evaluate the
procedure for establishing maritime national security strategies as part of efforts to boost
maritime security activities on the continent. The main marine routes encircle Africa, yet despite
being host to more than 15 percent of the global population, Africa's proportion of global trade
(approximately 2%) continues to be relatively modest. A crucial economic engine, 90% of intra-
African trade, particularly two-thirds of its fuel supplies, arrive through the sea, particularly in
light of recent offshore natural gas and oil discoveries found in Mozambique, Angola, and
Nigeria.
Another significant non-oil source of income is the maritime sector. For example, tourism
contributes 12% of Kenya's GDP, 60% of which comes from trips to the seaside.1 Achieving the
1 Muragu, Mercyann Mukami, Israel Nyaburi Nyadera, and Cathrine Wanjiru Mbugua.
"Gearing up for the new normal: Kenya’s tourism sector before and after the COVID-19
pandemic." Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure, and Events (2021): 1-18
2
levels of growth needed to maintain this enormous population increase will only be achievable if
the marine realm is exploited and secured by 2050 when Africa's population will now have
doubled to 2.5 billion. The African Union claims that there is one weekly pirate raid in the Gulf
of Guinea, which results in a 4.1 percent annual decline in shipping.2 Africa has lost $100 billion
in oil profits since the 1960s due to the instability in its seas, which costs the continent $25
billion annually in piracy in the Gulf of Aden region. Given these figures, it is essential to
consider that piracy should not just be seen as a criminal problem but also as a significant
strategic barrier to Africa's development because trade relies on secure seas, which are highly
firmly dependent on sustainable economic growth. Due to smugglers taking advantage of
Africa's lax customs regulations, maritime law enforcement, lack of government oversight over
maritime territories, and bribery, maritime instability has also contributed to the growth of
transnational firearms and human trafficking. The effects of maritime insecurity have multiplied
as a result.
Additionally, despite the old paradigm's assertion that narcotic use was primarily a
Western problem, numerous African nations have managed to evolve from being mere transit
hubs to crucial markets in the international drug trade, placing additional strain on already fragile
public health services, the rule of law, food security, and public safety. This demonstrates the
importance of maritime security throughout African coastlines, which also clearly reflects the
need for global cooperation to guarantee maritime security. This paper will answer the question
Why is the maritime security of Africa a concern for the International system?
2 Onuoha, Freedom C. "Piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea: Trends,
concerns, and propositions." The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 4, no. 3 (2013): 267-293.
3
II. Case Study
A. Africa's Growing Maritime Security Challenge
1. Case study 1
The Nigerian Trawler Owners' Association (NTOA) called in its trawlers in February
2008 and declined to set sail. The year before had been challenging. By the close of 2007, only
170 fishing trawlers were left, down from 250 in 2003 due to a recorded 107 armed robberies.
The beginning of 2008 was considerably worse for NTOA ships, who were the targets of 50
further attacks and ten deaths in just one month. The fact that there was no one to call for
assistance during an attack was one of the many grievances made by NTOA that had been
extensively documented.
NTOA has developed a campaign to persuade the Federal Republic of Nigeria's
government to create a coast guard from several recommendations. The primary defense argues
that the Nigerian navy, among the most advanced in Africa and has a track record of successfully
sailing to South America and Europe, is not equipped to stop piracy and aggravated robbery at
sea.
The maritime security climate in Africa is reflected in Nigeria's experience. Only 5 of the
33 sovereign coastal states in sub-Saharan Africa possess maritime units that can be classified as
coast guards instead of navies: Liberia, Cape Verde (after the law is finalized), the Republic of
Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles. However, threats like drug trafficking, illegal
fishing, and marine disaster response make up most of Africa's maritime security challenges—
threats that need the technical expertise and cooperative ties with civilian groups characteristics
of a coast guard.
4
For Africa, properly addressing such threats is crucial: Inadequate investments and
commerce in Africa are made riskier and more expensive by piracy, which undermines the
continent's economic growth and aggravates its problems with food security. In turn, the
expanding drug trade is providing international crime organizations a foothold inside some
African governments, making it harder for them to resolve other key objectives. Illegal trading
also affects legitimate businesses and global markets, including oil bunkering, the transportation
of fake goods, and theft. In other words, many of Africa's new risks come from the water.
The rest of the globe is directly impacted by Africa's maritime security. Around 60
percent of the $1.8 billion worth of cocaine sold in Europe in 2007 is thought to have originated
in West Africa. Most drugs are transported to Africa by cargo ships, disembarked in fishing and
small boats, and then frequently smuggled overseas. The $438 million in fake malaria drugs and
the $775 million in illegal cigarettes that pass through West Africa annually mostly travel by sea.
Sub-Saharan Africa is thought to lose well over $1 billion annually due to illegal fishing,
predominantly carried out by Asian, European, and African fishing ships. An increasing issue
with more serious ramifications for the continent's safety and the security of the entire world than
is often acknowledged is improving Africa's maritime security capability to address these new
challenges.
2. Case study 2:
According to Stehr (2011), maritime hijacking can be seen as a phenomenon that
emerged very recently. When Somali pirates seized the cruise ship Seabourn Spirit in November
2005, the public became aware of the first incidents of modern piracy. This was followed by
public discussion in the aftermath of the successful hijackings of the supertanker Sirius Star and
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the French luxury yacht in 2008.3 The International Maritime Bureau received its first complaints
of acts of maritime piracy in 1994. Westberg, on the other hand, contends that around 2005, a
new attack paradigm evolved, shifting from sporadic and opportunistic activities to those
organized and carried out by professionals.4 Even though piracy is a global problem, there are
particular areas of the world in which incidences have been reported a great deal more frequently
than in other parts of the world. IMB yearly reports demonstrate that a significant number of
incidents have been documented throughout the past two decades, particularly in Asia and
Africa. Affected regions are frequently found close to sea gates or tight passes that see a large
volume of maritime traffic, such as essential shipping lanes or unavoidable straits. The Strait of
Malacca, the South China Sea, and the Gulf of Aden are some of the regions that have been most
severely impacted. The maritime domain has been described as "a backbone of European
livelihoods and wealth through fishing and global trade" for many decades, if not millennia.5
These days, one of the most critical trade corridors for the European Union is the Gulf of Aden,
which connects Asia and Europe through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.6 As a result, it has a
3 Lehr, Peter. "Somali piracy: the next iteration."Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 4
(2009): 26-36.
4 Westberg, Andreas Bruvik. "Bloodshed and breaking wave: The first outbreak of
Somali piracy."Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of military studies 43, no. 2 (2015): 1-
38.
5 Landman, Lennart. "The EU Maritime Security Strategy: Promoting or Absorbing
European Defence Cooperation?." (2015).
6 Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, and Kerstin Petretto. "Stabilizing Somalia: can the EU's
comprehensive approach work?." European security 23, no. 2 (2014): 179-194.
6
significant bearing on the state of the economy in Europe, making it a primary focus of attention
for businesses, governments, and other administrative bodies.
III. Literature review
According to Lekunze (2022), maritime policy in Africa was discussed. The results
indicated that Africa's existing threat approach (complete absence of a comprehensive and
integrated joined-up strategy) to maritime strategy, the lack of maritime power, and poor
recognition of the prospective adverse repercussions of an evolving international system prove
that strategic approach in Africa is entirely unsuitable for its role.7 The implication is that Africa
is subjected to disproportionate increased rates of marine insecurity, the loss of marine resources,
and a significant risk of external dominance. In a word, the weaknesses in maritime strategic
strategy and execution subject Africa to a wide variety of threats, including everything from food
insecurity to foreign dominance.
To forestall the deterioration of maritime security as a component of African security and
to bring about significant and far-reaching reforms in Africa's strategic behavior, the continent
needs to undergo profound shifts in its way of thinking about maritime security. More studies
must be completed for the African maritime strategy to determine the best feasible possibilities
for integrating techniques to achieve objectives in maritime security, which is an essential
component of the continent's overall security. Failure to take action maintains Africa's
vulnerabilities.
7 Lekunze, Manu. "Maritime strategy in Africa: strategic flaws exposing Africa to
vulnerabilities from food insecurity to external domination." Third World Quarterly (2022): 1-
17.
7
According to Vrey (2010), African security issues typically reflect a dominant landward
greater emphasis.8 Regime security, militaries monopolized by military units, and irregular
groups fighting incumbent systems of government shape the majority of the African security
environment. Consequently, African maritime matters frequently come second to an obsessive
focus on national security issues on land. Since 2006, the events occurring off the coast of Africa
have become more dangerous and harmful to the maritime sector. Piracy has become common in
the Gulf of Guinea and the Horn of Africa; it has been intertwined with the agendas of both
rebels and criminals. Even though piracy is generally seen as the most prominent maritime
hazard in Africa, it is just one aspect of a far more comprehensive maritime threat environment.
By 2010, worldwide worries over security in African waters corresponded with more specific
African attitudes to dealing with challenges to good order on the sea. This occurred on both the
international and continental levels. In the meantime, international concern led to several
resolutions at the United Nations, which kicked off a global response to securitize piracy and
send naval contingents along the coast of the Horn of Africa. It would appear that Africa's oceans
are attracting an ever-increasing variety of actors, contributing to safety and instability in the
African offshore realm. Maintaining peace and security at sea has become necessary for
decision-makers in Africa.
According to Dua (2019), in the past few years, coastal Africa, more notably the
waterways of the Gulf of Guinea and the Somali coastline, has seen an increase in the number of
instances of maritime piracy on a scale that has never been seen before.9 Because of these
8 Vreÿ, Francois. "African maritime security: a time for good order at sea."Australian
Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 2, no. 4 (2010): 121-132.
9 Dua, Jatin. "Piracy and Maritime Security in Africa." In Oxford Research Encyclopedia
of Politics. 2019.
8
regions' geopolitical and economic significance, several military and legal actions have been
taken to tackle this issue at the national, regional, and international levels. Maritime piracy has a
more complicated relationship with land- and sea-based governance, despite the common
perception that it is a symptom of failed nations or criminal activity on the high seas. Maritime
piracy is better defined as a practice of extraction and claims-making on mobility that originates
from broader historical circumstances and is tied to land-based economy and politics. This
practice predominately takes place in politically fractured but generally stable locations. The
importance of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the Horn of Africa within these larger
geographical and historical contexts draws attention to the intertwined roles that the geopolitical
and the economic have had in determining the practice's beginnings and subsequent
modifications.10 This is not to ignore the violence that forms the core of maritime piracy; instead,
it is to position pirates within the context of broader governance and mobility processes on the
African continent and beyond. In addition to affecting local populations, mariners, and
international shipping, piracy is essential to understanding the problems presented to global
governance when viewed from the perspective of the world's waters.
IV. Discussion
Based on the literature review and case studies provided above, the international
maritime security of Africa is of essence to the global community or the international system due
to its strategic location and the relative incapacities or lack of proper capabilities to tackle the
many challenges that may arise within the African maritime space. Because of their
advantageous positioning, African shorelines have become significant thoroughfares for
international commerce. The safety of these transportation corridors, in particular the Gulf of
Aden, is of the utmost importance not just to the countries of Africa but also to all of the nations
10
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worldwide.11 If any of these trading routes were to become inaccessible, it would harm global
supply chains and the economy as a whole. Because of this, the security of the African maritime
environment is of the utmost significance. The absence of maritime security in the Horn of
Africa has become a significant issue. The primary reason for this is the collapse of the central
federal authority in Somalia. This represents one of the rare instances in Africa in which land-
based security concerns have significantly impacted marine security due to spillover from the
land. The absence of maritime security has evolved into an issue of concern on a global scale as
a direct result of the placement of Somalia on the map and the expensive goods transported over
the waters surrounding the Horn of Africa. The absence of adequate marine security throughout
the region has a detrimental effect on the already precarious situation on land and all elements of
life connected to water utilization. Because it was impossible to strictly enforce the law as well
as maintain order at sea, this created several problems, including a threat to maritime
communications, an increase in instances of piracy, serious harm to the marine ecosystem, a
breach in maritime sovereignty, and a significant increase in the costs incurred in terms of both
economic and humanitarian aid.
The attacks on ships at sea committed by pirates that take place off the coast of the Horn
of Africa are seriously impeding international trade. The route that connects the Far East and
Europe represents one of the busiest transcontinental maritime routes worldwide since it is used
for approximately 20% of all of the world's commercial activities, and more than 80% of all
commercial activity passes through the Gulf of Aden12. More specifically, almost 20,000 ships
transporting most of the world's affordable apparel, crude oil, and non-perishables sail via this
11 Hamza, Farah Robleh, and Jean-Philippe Priotti. "Maritime trade and piracy in the Gulf
of Aden and the Indian Ocean (1994–2017)." Journal of transportation security 13, no. 3 (2020):
141-158.
10
route yearly. However, there is a significant obstacle in the form of the Puntland region, located
in northeastern Somalia.13 Many Somali pirates are based in the Gulf of Aden, next to the volatile
region governed by warlords and tribes that rule themselves.14 Their primary objectives are to
board ships, seize the items being transported on board, and then keep the ships hostage until the
businesses pay a ransom demanded to regain control of both their vessels and their crews. As a
result, this path accurately represents maritime piracy's tremendous impacts on global shipping
and development. A wide range of financial fallout results from acts of maritime piracy. Because
Somalia does not have a centralized government, pirates can utilize the waters surrounding their
country, risking cargo routinely moving between Asia and Europe. One of the most significant
implications is that large shipping corporations have been compelled to change their shipping
courses from the Far East to Europe in response to the attacks. For instance, to reduce the
possibility of being attacked by pirates, several businesses are rerouting their shipping routes
away from the Gulf of Aden and toward the Suez Canal or the Cape of Good Hope.15 These sorts
of modifications result in considerable increases in additional costs. Attacks have resulted in
increased prices for energy and increased premiums for insurance, both of which inevitably place
12 Knight, W. Andy, and Afyare A. Elmi. "Combatting Piracy in the Horn of Africa
Waters." In The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary International Political Economy, pp. 485-
500. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2019.
13 Beloff, Jonathan R. "How piracy is affecting economic development in Puntland,
Somalia. "Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 1 (2013): 47-54.
14 Hamza, Farah Robleh, and Jean-Philippe Priotti. "Maritime trade and piracy in the Gulf
of Aden and the Indian Ocean (1994–2017)." Journal of transportation security 13, no. 3 (2020):
141-158.
15 Ibid
11
an increased charge on customers in the form of price increases for the commodities they
purchase.
After 2009, major economic powers started stationing naval forces all along the coast of
the Gulf of Aden to safeguard goods that were being moved along the route that runs from the
Far East to Europe.16 The lack of engagement by governments is a significant contributor to the
rise in the number of instances of piracy, as shown by the data. The number of piracy cases
increased by a factor of seven between 2007 and 2008, a trend that unquestionably would have
been less severe with increased administrative engagement. If the nations had not intervened, the
total traffic volumes would have already decreased by 30.25 %, lending credence to the
hypothesis that maritime piracy in Somalia is indeed affecting the regular practice of global
shipping companies. Even if the costs that are affected are different, the broader economic
negative externality is significantly higher. This is because it considers the losses caused by a fall
in traffic volumes and the productivity losses caused by utilizing an alternate route.
Both international shipping and locals living along the coast have been terrorized for a
considerable time by the threat of maritime piracy. Nevertheless, a blockage of the Suez Canal
by the Ever Given, in instances of pandemic-induced port closures of ports, and power struggles
between rival administrations in South East Asia and the Strait of Hormuz, doesn't occur as the
most significant threat to global transportation networks.17 However, contemporary piracy
continues to pose a significant risk to the shipping industry on a global scale. Upwards of a
hundred individuals were taken hostage, and some were injured as a direct consequence of the
16 Ibid
17 Cosar, Kerem, and Benjamin Thomas. "The geopolitics of international trade in
Southeast Asia." Review of World Economics 157, no. 1 (2021): 207-219.
12
229 incidents in 2020. At the level of company transactions, piracy causes a decrease in the
number of operations carried out by vessels.
In contrast, at the same time, it increases the average size of each shipment. Both findings
are consistent with the theoretical concerns that Kropf & Sauré have presented.18 A rise in the
fixed expenses per shipment – including investing in security against piracy – results in a
reduction in the number of shipments while simultaneously increasing the volume of the typical
cargo. Following their conceptual framework, the number of goods shipped by Chinese
companies grew in proportion to the number of attacks by pirates. Results show that the size of
ocean-going shipments increased by 0.13% for every additional piracy instance. This results in a
3.4% rise in the amount of cargo that is sent to Europe. Additionally, the possibility of a
company delivering a commodity by sea along vulnerable routes is reduced by 0.02% for every
consecutive attack that is carried out. Because of this, several businesses have moved their
shipping operations to the air.
It has been demonstrated that the effects of piracy and armed robbery on export behavior
are long-lasting. This is especially true for smaller businesses, which may be impacted more
severely by rising insurance costs. In addition, the average level of impact is more significant for
items with lower unit values than for items with higher unit values.
A. The impact on ship behavior
The coefficient estimates that result from regressing the frequency of ship locations in a
specific region on the frequency of piracy occurrences suggest that cargo ships steer clear of
places that pirates have recently targeted. Given an estimated parameter of -0.005 in the most
rigorous fixed effects analysis, the findings show that 26 hijackings decreased the number of
18 Kropf, Andreas, and Philip Sauré. "Fixed costs per shipment." Journal of International
Economics 92, no. 1 (2014): 166-184.
13
vessel locations by 12%. This supports the theory that ships use alternative routes after an
increase in the amount of pirate activity. There will also likely be a general reduction in the
number of boats departing ports to sail to a particular location. In addition, some circumstantial
evidence suggests that ships increase their cruise speed after sailing through affected areas. Both
adjustment techniques raise transport costs by lengthening trip times and raising the amount of
fuel consumed, which partially explains the general decline in trade volumes.
Regarding financial considerations, maritime security is of the utmost importance.
According to the evidence, piracy constitutes one of the most significant challenges to the
maritime security of Africa. Global trade suffers billions of dollars yearly losses yearly due to
incidents in the turbulent Gulf of Guinea region, including kidnappings, escorting of ships, and
numerous other incidents.19 These enormous expenses are not acceptable in the long run, and the
rest of the world will, at some point, require a powerful solution to the problem of pirates and
lawlessness in the Gulf of Guinea. It is necessary to have a secure and stable marine environment
to protect the interests of the United States and European nations within the African continent.
Both parties will be able to exert a significant influence on many policies on the African
continent without accruing hefty fees or being obliged to constantly look over their shoulders
concerning the instability within the maritime borders of Africa. The fight against armed robbery
and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has resulted in significant expenses being expended by the
global system. In particular, the maritime industry has been responsible for bearing a substantial
percentage of these costs to avoid and deter mishaps involving ships in the region. The number
of active commercial vessels in the region is an essential piece of data that must be collected to
assess the direct cost incurred by critical stakeholders to avoid and deter armed robbery at sea
19 Nwalozie, Chijioke J. "Exploring contemporary sea piracy in Nigeria, the niger delta
and the Gulf of Guinea." Journal of transportation security 13, no. 3 (2020): 159-178.
14
while crossing the Gulf of Guinea.20 The region presents a problem since vessels operating
frequently make many calls at various ports around the Gulf. It is estimated that 11,660 vessels
are operating in the region yearly.21
Additionally, there are no estimates for the costs for which it was unable to find any
information. These expenses include "rerouting," a kind of anti-ship piracy defense frequently
used off of the East African coastline during the peak of Somalia-based piracy. To avoid being
attacked by pirates throughout this time, ships would avoid dangerous waters. Even though there
is some indication that certain ships may bypass specific harbors in the Gulf of Guinea in favor
of a path that would be significantly safer (such as the Togolese or Benin seas), ships are unable
to avoid a lot of these sites due to the region's geographic location.22 In addition, several
unconnected elements, such as corruption at ports, may significantly impact the area's shipping
activity features. Due to this, it is impossible to arrive at a precise assessment, and most studies
need to look into this situation. Similar to the preceding point, the report does not calculate the
cost of the ransoms paid in the Gulf of Guinea. It is well known in this region of the world that it
is impossible to determine whether ransoms were paid, how much was spent, or which individual
or group was responsible. This may be the case for several reasons, including that the Nigerian
government officially forbids paying ransoms. This may also discourage certain interested
parties from disclosing details after the crew on board has been released. Alternatively, given
that some crew members were freed in exchange for a ransom, this is likely the case. Insurers
20 Onuoha, Freedom C. "Piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea: Trends,
concerns, and propositions." The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 4, no. 3 (2013): 267-293.
21 Nwalozie, Chijioke J. "Exploring contemporary sea piracy in Nigeria, the niger delta
and the Gulf of Guinea." Journal of transportation security 13, no. 3 (2020): 159-178.
22 Ibid
15
and shipping firms, for example, could be reluctant to participate in a very public discussion
about ransoms for fear of inflating the price and attempting to prolong the release of hostages.
The most precise estimate of ransom payments is provided in a study from the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released in 2021. The analysis calculates that, given the
frequency of kidnappings for ransom and the increasing trend in the amount of ransom paid per
event, Niger Delta-based piracy organizations were most likely to have garnered close to USD 4
million in 2020. These projections are predicated on an increase in the average ransom amount
paid per occurrence.
In the Gulf of Guinea, it is projected that piracy and armed robberies will cost between
USD 529 million and 880 million in 2019.23 The expenses of insurance, additional labor and,
hazardous pay, sand security escort vessels are all included in this estimate because they are
related to piracy and armed robberies at sea in the area of interest. However, there were several
restrictions on the amount of available data. These restrictions resulted from a mix of classified
and uncontrolled local vessel activity, which follow distinct transit trends than international
maritime traffic, and a lack of publicly accessible information by government or naval forces.
When contrasting the number of crew on smaller fishing vessels to those employed on big ships
involved in commercial shipping, there is also a sizable difference. The variation in crew size is
one element that affects the overall labor costs and risk pay. These massive expenditures burden
states and developed economies in Europe and North America to suffer annual losses of millions
of euros as a direct outcome of this threat. This demonstrates in clearly just how expensive
maritime insecurity can become.
Terror-related activities are also a significant threat caused by the lack of maritime
security. Terrorism is a global phenomenon and affects all groups of people. Terrorists tend to
23 Ibid
16
prey on western targets or areas frequented by foreigners, particularly westerners, as it would
give terror organizations "real credentials." Maritime insecurity can play a significant role in the
lifeline of a terror organization. As long as a group receives funding from a particular source, it
means that the group can sustain terror activities that not only weaken regional security but
threaten world security. Despite the distance between America and Somalia, America still feels
the effects of al-Shabaab terrorism through the death of its citizens, particularly in Kenya. The
Westgate mall attack in 2013 and the Dusit D-2 attack also claimed American lives. The
maritime security of east Africa is, therefore, a significant concern for America and the entire
international community. If the international community cooperates and stems this insecurity, the
Horn of Africa region will be secure.24 In return means that American and British interests,
whether economic or military, are safeguarded.
Smuggling contraband over international waters, including illegal drugs, weapons, and
people, is one of the primary sources of revenue for terrorist organizations. Many violent
extremists exploit resources like cereals, sugar, and textiles. Since 2011, Al-Shabaab has been
active in the illegal trafficking of charcoal. The organization can safeguard its long-term
continuity and continue funding its land-based terrorist assaults thanks to the approximately $7
million in annual profits it receives from maritime crime. An additional source of revenue for Al-
Shabaab has been the extortion and illegal taxation of companies affiliated with the Port of
Mogadishu and other independent companies. For instance, al-Shabaab will get shipping
manifests so that it can tax companies, under the threat of physical force, Approximately USD
100 for each 20-foot container and USD 160 for 40-foot containers. IS-Somalia is another
24 Knight, W. Andy, and Afyare A. Elmi. "Combatting Piracy in the Horn of Africa
Waters." In The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary International Political Economy, pp. 485-
500. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2019.
17
organization active in the coastal regions of Somalia and Tanzania. IS-Somalia has regularly
taken advantage of a lack of maritime attention for its activities, although it is not as active as al-
Shabaab. Within a year of its establishment, the Islamic State of Somalia (IS-Somalia) has
overrun and taken control of the northern port city of Qandala. The substantial funding of
terrorist activities through the exploitation of lax maritime security and regulations along the
shorelines of the Horn of Africa implies that a significant risk is posed not only to western-
backed military bases in the region, such as those in Kenya and Djibouti, but also to critical
infrastructure and the risk of human lives.25 Terrorists can provide financial support to pirates for
them to sabotage a commercial vessel, which poses not only a global threat but also the potential
to disrupt international commerce. Therefore, concerns regarding the maritime needs of Africa
and their security must continue to be addressed on a global scale to ensure the safety, security,
and equilibrium of the worldwide community over the long term, particularly issues concerning
food, trade, security, and to permit the flourishing of business.
V. Conclusion and Recommendations
Through present norms, initiatives, and connections, international allies can maintain and
grow their efforts to offer venues for African maritime enforcement agencies. They can also help
the AU's information-fusing and sharing activities. African boarding parties might be included in
current counterpiracy collaborations, providing African involvement and ownership while
enhancing African capabilities. Legal issues about the management of caught pirates are perhaps
the most challenging obstacles, but these should be manageable barriers after over two years of
operation. Equally crucial is that international partners collaborate with the African Union and
25 Knight, W. Andy, and Afyare A. Elmi. "Combatting Piracy in the Horn of Africa
Waters." In The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary International Political Economy, pp. 485-
500. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2019.
18
the International Maritime Entity to combine these multiple task forces into a unified agency to
boost effectiveness and ease control and command. Such a force must broaden its scope to
include the enforcement of global and African maritime regulations, particularly those about
illegal dumping and fishing, under the direction of the UN, the AU, and African governments.
The African Union and sub-regional agencies could benefit from international partners' financial
and technical assistance. In addition to enhancing African maritime domain awareness, this
would also give maritime law enforcement activities valuable intelligence and increase seafarer
safety. By taking these two actions, the International maritime organization, the AU, and its
members would also be capable of beginning work on the International Charter for the African
Maritime Sector and focus on developing and enhancing maritime trade, governance, and
economies in Africa—leaving the much more expensive tasks of developing coast guards and
navies for the medium term.
VI. References
Beloff, Jonathan R. "How piracy is affecting economic development in Puntland, Somalia."
Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 1 (2013): 47-54.
Cosar, Kerem, and Benjamin Thomas. "The geopolitics of international trade in Southeast Asia."
Review of World Economic 157, no. 1 (2021): 207-219.
Dua, Jatin. "Piracy and Maritime Security in Africa." In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Politics. 2019.
Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, and Kerstin Petretto. "Stabilizing Somalia: can the EU's comprehensive
approach work?." European security 23, no. 2 (2014): 179-194.
19
Hamza, Farah Robleh, and Jean-Philippe Priotti. "Maritime trade and piracy in the Gulf of Aden
and the Indian Ocean (1994–2017)."Journal of transportation security 13, no. 3 (2020):
141-158.
Knight, W. Andy, and Afyare A. Elmi. "Combatting Piracy in the Horn of Africa Waters." In
The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary International Political Economy, pp. 485-500.
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2019.
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- I. Introduction
- II. Case Study
- A. Africa's Growing Maritime Security Challenge
- 1. Case study 1
- 2. Case study 2:
- III. Literature review
- IV. Discussion
- A. The impact on ship behavior
- V. Conclusion and Recommendations
- VI. References