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Fate, Chance, and Tragic Error

Author(s): Roger A. Pack

Source: The American Journal of Philology , 1939, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1939), pp. 350-356

Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/291299

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FATE, CHANCE, AND TRAGIC ERROR.

In an earlier paper 1 I discussed the value of the commentator

Alexander's treatise On Destiny for the Aristotelian theory of

tragic error. I now wish to propose a means by which this and

kindred ideas may be so further correlated as to suggest an

answer to a question which was only touched upon before,

namely: Is there such a thing as a "tragedy of fate "?

Let us begin by representing schematically the classification

of harmful acts given in Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 1374 B:

rdue to AoX0np1a a wrong (MdKIKfla) lpredictable (i. e., not 7rap6Xoyov) an error (&a'AdpT?7/a a)

r not due to ,.oxOn7pIC a mischance ( dzr6xrna) L unpredictable

By making certain valid substitutions we can illustrate the aapprta of Oedipus, and we can also add a classification of pur-

posive acts, based upon Alexander's De Pato: 2

Purposive acts Harmful acts

A. due to ante-

cedent causes

a. according

to destiny

rndeliberate patricide and incest (G) b. according -wrong wdeliberate homicide and marriage (R) to free will r

error

B. not due to *mischane [accidental patricide and incest (I) accidental homicide and marriage3 (NR)

antecedent causes,

but according to

chance

For the criteria involved I think it would be fair to adopt the words guilt (G) and innocence (I), and responsibility (R) and its opposite (NR), as indicated in the scheme, because the result so obtained squares exactly, as I shall show, not only with the

ISee A.J.P., LVIII (1937), pp. 418-436. 2 For the complete outline, see A. J. P., LVIII, pp. 418-19.

3I realize that "accidental marriage "sounds somewhat anomalous,

but it has at least a certain theoretical value. " Responsibility " means,

of course, responsibility for patricide and incest, incurred through

homicide and marriage.

350

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FATE, CHANCE, AND TRAGIC ERROR. 351

terms of the definition but with all that can be learned from the

Oedipus plays about the error of their hero: that is, the fact

that he disclaims guilt, but accepts responsibility.

In joining the two halves of our equation we had no hesita-

tion, I believe, in connecting mischance with acts according to

chance, and wrong with acts according to free will (cf. Rhet.,

I, 10, 1368 B 6-16), but what was to be done with error? A

second glance at the scheme showed that it had already been

disposed of: its element of responsibility belongs to acts accord-

ing to free will, and its element of innocence to acts according

to chance. This would appear to bring out the composite nature

of error: a combination of free will and chance would seem to

dominate the sort of tragedy in which a tragic error is com-

mitted. Such would be the logical outline of a "tragedy of

chance," and the appropriate apology of Oedipus would be, "I admit that I killed a man and married a woman, knowing well

at the time that it was hazardous for me to do so. Yet I did not

realize then that the man was my father, the woman my mother.

That part of it was purely accidental."

Since the hero's innocence is thus explained by the action of chance rather than of fate, the latter might seem to be left entirely out of consideration, and with it the whole concept of

" Schicksalstragodie " might seem to disappear. In my earlier paper, however, I held that this element of innocence " has as its fitting background the ontological fatalism of Aristotle."

A priori and on commonsense grounds it is evident that either fate or chance will serve as a warrant of innocence.4 Instead of a " tragedy of chance " we may have a " tragedy of fate," and it may be represented in schematic form by changing the order of the harmful acts so as to bring them into relation with a. instead of B, and substituting fatality for mischance and pre- destined for accidental.5 Oedipus' defense will also need recast. ing: "I confess that I killed a man and married a woman, knowing full well that I was 'tempting fate' by so doing. But

4For fate, cf. Alexander, De Fato, 16, and A. J. P., LVIII, p. 425.

F predestined homicide and marriage 6a. destiny -fatality ~{predestined patricide and incest

error

b. free will -wrong ~ Fdeliberate homicide and marriage Ldeliberate patricide and incest

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352 ROGER A. PACK.

I did not realize then that I was committing patricide and incest:

that was the work of destiny."

Logically there are only these two possibilities, in either of

which free will can have but a secondary place,6 essential though it may be. If, therefore, we reject the " Schicksalstragidie" we shall do so at the cost of accepting in its stead either a "Zufallstrag6die" or a sort of genus imixtum in which both

fate and chance would somehow be active. Admittedly, 4ipxTia can be interpreted in accidental as well as fatalistic terms, and accidental error offers no contradiction to logic or everyday experience,7 whereas the fatalistic sort involves a dilemma, as I showed before. Yet an analysis of that much-studied play, the Oedipus Rex, will make it evident that in tragedy there can be no place for accidental error.

Let us begin with the evidence of the oracles. Here we may use to advantage the distinction, stated fully by Servius on Aeneid, IV, 696,8 between fatum denuntiativunt and f. condi- cionale. According to the first, the oracle received by Oedipus would take the form, " You will kill your father and wed your mother "; according to the second it would be in the form, " If you kill a man, it will be your father, and if you wed a woman, it will be your mother." Obviously the one is purely fatalistic, leaving no avenue of escape, while the other is only semi-

a In an unadulterated " Freiwillenstrago5die " there would obviously be no place for &a,uprla, but only for 7rovpt'a. The Orestes of Euripides is, in some measure, a tragedy of this sort, and it is significant that we find in it that degradation of character which is noted in one of the ancient hypotheses.

7 The statement, " men often err accidentally," i. e., " it is an observed fact that their acts are often followed by unexpected results," is " ex- perimental," whereas the statement that "men often err because of fate " is " non-experimental " and bears to the first statement the same relation as an enthymeme bears to a syllogism. It is a "derivative " in the sense of Pareto, and its "residue" belongs, like that of hybris (" Pride goeth before a fall ") to the class of " combinations." The fact that " fatalistic error " is more closely related to the idea of hybris than is " accidental error," appears to support my general con- tention. For these distinctions, see George C. Homans and Charles P. Curtis, Jr., An Introduction to Pareto (New York, 1934), especially pp. 105, 177.

8. . . denuntiativa sunt quae omni modo eventura decernunt, ut verbi gratia 'Pompeius ter triumphaturus est: ' . . . condicionale vero huius modi est 'Pompeius si post Pharsalicum bellum Aegypti litus attigerit, ferro peribit: ' . . .

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FATE, CHANCE, AND TRAGIC ERROR. 353

fatalistic, because it makes the crimes of patricide and incest

contingent upon the presumably avoidable acts of homicide and marriage. Now Oedipus twice recalls the oracle (Oed. R. 787- 93, 994-6), and both times he uses the "denuntiative" form.

That is, he regards the bare fact of his homicide and marriage as having been inescapable 9 no less than the awful circumstance

that his own parents were the victims of these acts. He feels that he had received a prophecy the fulfilment of which he could

passively experience, but not a warning which he might have heeded. Since he could at no time have behaved otherwise than as he did, complete exculpation is the result as far as the oracles

are concerned,10 and error is barred as well as guilt.

Of course we should have expected to find the " conditional"

form. This alone admits of a"papri'a, because it combines the same elements, the protasis embodying free will and responsi- bility, the apodosis fate and innocence.'1 Oedipus' homicide and marriage do not involve guilt, because these acts, under the cir- cumstances, are not culpable. No more is he guilty of patricide and incest, for these are the work of fate. Yet he is responsible

for the initial acts and so in turn for the horrors into which fate

transforms them. His error actually consists in his having

disobeyed the warning of a conditional oracle.12

9 This is in agreement with Oed. Col. 997-8, e06v dLy6ovrc'. 10 Robert (Oidipus, pp. 67-8) held that Sophocles uses only the

denuntiative form for the oracle received by Laius, in contrast to the

practice of Aeschylus and Euripides. But in Oed. R. 711-14 it appears

to be conditional; 0a',rLs ye'OLT' surely points to a " should-would " pro-

tasis. If the poet had wished to make it denuntiative, he would have

had to write o's oyevIaoro, representing yev2eratc of the direct statement. Yet in a sense the choice of the conditional form here is a departure

from the general tone of the play. In this passage Jocasta indulges in

special pleading, the whole trend of which is to minimize the control of

destiny over the life of Oedipus.

11 A condition can be framed in either fatalistic or accidental terms:

"If you kill a man, it will be your father," or "If, etc., it may turn

out to be your father." The first is fallacious because it assigns to a

future, particular enunciation the validity of a general enunciation

(cf. A. J. P., LVIII, p. 432, note 49). But the second is logical, because

it does not exclude potentiality. In other words, a " tragedy of chance "

would be in harmony with Aristotle's logic, but a "tragedy of fate "

contains the inconsistency mentioned in my earlier paper (ad fin.).

12 To illustrate &caprca, van Braam (C. Q., VI [1912], p. 270) submits

the case of a man who, unaware that his wine contains poison, serves it

6

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354 ROGER A. PACK.

Other evidence shows that such is the situation. Oedipus has no consciousness of guilt, because he declares in 0. Col. 266-7

that he is " more sinned against than sinning." A few lines

below (270-2) he adds that in his encounter with Laius he was

provoked (cf. 0. Col. 991-6) to a deed that would have been

justifiable even if wrought with perfect deliberation (Opov6v)

...... .KlO 7r KafOt 4 KOSrtV, O 7Ttr 7LOwV fLEv JvreSpwv, (IYT Et pOVOV

E7rparu0ov OM8 av w(0( C/7tYVtLvoJV KoS;

The clause E.. . .hrpauuov may be compared with Oed. R. 807, where he admits that he killed in anger, St' opys.g3 But pro- voked or not, it would have been better for him to stay his hand, for he knew that homicide, no matter how justifiable it might seem at the time, was not the thing for him under any circum- stances. He could hardly have said that the possible result was 70,paxoyov. On the whole his mind is none too clear on the

question of his guilt or innocence, though dramatically such confusion is perhaps natural enough. 14 He has no doubt that

in good faith to a guest; if the guest merely helps himself, unbidden, it is an drvxriXca, he says, and not ain acAdLpTrT,aa. But another condition must be added to make the case strictly parallel to that of Oedipus: we must suppose that the host somiiehow knows beforehand that at some future time a guest of his will (or may) die in this fashion. A prudent host, therefore, will refrain entirely from this sort of hospitality, re- fusing either to " risk an accident " or to " tempt providence," according to the explanation which appeals to him the more. To be sure, it is unlikely that he will so refrain, in the presumable absence of an oracular warning, but the criterion of the " calculable " is not eliminated thereby, because he may still be guided by the laws of probability (e. g., the tables of risks prepared by insurance companies). This, in fact, would be the only source of foreknowledcge according to a purely " ex- perimenital " view of the problem. Alexander, in ascribing a partial foreknowledge to the gods (De Fato, 30-1), runs needlessly afoul of a difficult imletaphysical problem (cf. E. B. Stevens, "Divinity and delib- eration," A. J. P., LIV [1933], pp. 225-46).

1 Responsibilty was incurred for such an act according to Aristotle, Rhet., I, 10, 1368 B 37 ff.; 1369 A 4. It is virtually forced upon Oedipus because he finds that the curse which he has laid upon the unknown malefactor (Oed. R. 246-51) comes flying back and seizes upon himself (cf. 294-5; 350-3; 744-5; 819-20; 830-3; 1291). As a man of his word, he cannot honorably refuse this self-imposed penalty.

14 Maurice Croiset remarked very justly (Bist. de la litt. gr., III [Paris, 18992], p. 257): "Une tragedie, a la fin de laquelle on pourrait

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FATE, CHANCE, AND TRAGIC ERROR. 355

his patricide was predestined, but to explain his homicide he

wavers between fate (witness the "denuntiative" oracles) and

free will (witness his admission of 6py71). To chance there is lio appeal whatever.

In fact, the whole play contains only one episode in which

chance presumes to dispute the field, and its repulse is sudden

and decisive. It is that in which the messenger reports the

death, by natural causes, of King Polybus of Corinth. Due to a

misunderstanding it has been thought that Oedipus is destined

to slay this, his supposed father, so Jocasta receives the news exultantly as proof that the oracles are worthless (Oed. R. 952-

3). Polybus' death, she says, was only an accident, and fate,

through the agency of Oedipus, had no hand in it (948-9):

KGL VVV 0o8E

7rpOS T`S Tv'X7S OAXIEV OV'fE TOVO V7rO.

After cautiously verifying the facts, Oedipus agrees (964-72),

then has misgivings; the second part of the oracle is still a source

of fear so long as Merope lives (976). But Jocasta tries to reas-

sure him by enlarging upon her new-found philosophy (977-9):

T-t o' av fo/oEr' p qnros , T_ TN TxDsT KpcLT4E, 7rpovoba ' CYTtV OVEV o c'4;

ELK17 XpaflTOV C7V, OT(OS OVV1U-O' TV3.

dire absolument du personnage principal qu'il a eu tort ou raison, aurait

quelque chose d'abstrait et d'etroit et ne ressemblerait pas 'a la vie;

elle serait sans profondeur et sans attrait." It is not intended here to

multiply subjective criticisms of the dramatist, but only to see what

basis he affords for the interpretation of the philosopher. The " Sopho-

clean " approach has often been treated adequately enough, e. g., in an

Antrittsrede by Siegfried Sudhaus, Kbnig Odipus' Schuld (Kiel, 1912);

the point of view is indicated in a note on p. 13: " Den Begriff Schuld

verstehe ich natiirlich iuberall nur im Sophokleischen Sinne; . . ." In

the "Aristotelian sense " Sudhaus' very title would be a misnomer. In

extending the concept of a/hapria to various " tragic heroes," critics

have tended strangely to misprize Aristotle and cherish overfondly the

dicta of sundry moderns. Despite their general excellence, even the

most recent studies are not altogether free from this false emphasis.

See S. E. Bassett, "The 'AgaprTa of Achilles," T. A. P. A., LXV (1934), pp. 47-69; A. S. Pease, " Dido's Tragic Flaw " and "Aeneas's Tragic

Flaw," pp. 38 f. and 44-47 of his exhaustive commentary on the Aeneid,

Bk. IV (Harvard University Press, 1935) ; and (Mrs.) Minnie Keys

Flickinger, The 'AluaprTia of Hophocles' Antigone, Iowa Studies in Classi- cal Philology, No. II (Scottdale, Pa., The Mennonite Press, 1935).

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356 ROGER A. PACK.

The messenger, an interested listener, asks for an explanation (989-99), then, thinking to relieve Oedipus of this second fear

as well, he discloses a fact which unexpectedly brings back the first-that Polybus and Mlerope were only the adoptive parents.'5 As the truth dawns uponl Jocasta she begs Oedipus to drop the investigation.16 Her new philosophy thus suddenly overthrown,

she returns to the old, as shown by her significant vocative, " ill- fated " (1068, 1071). Oedipus misunderstands her motive. He thinks she is only afraid he may prove to be of humble birth (1070; 1078-9). Having accepted her reasoning all too com-

pletely, he counts himself the son of Tyche, for whom he feels no shame (1080 ff.). The next episode brings the full revela-

tion, and with it Oedipus reverts to his former belief. So we have found that in the main the atmosphere of the play

is fatalistic, free will being reflected only in the opyV of Oedipus

and chance only in a momentary attitude of Jocasta. If by " tragedy of fate " is meant a drama in which fate is the sole motivating factor, it is correct to deny its existence. Yet it ought not to be forgotten that fate is a normal and important concomitant of error when taken in the sense defined by Aristotle.

ROGER A. PACK. ANN ARBOR, MICH.

15 LI. 1016 ff. In Poetics, 11, this episode is cited as an example of a peripeteia or re'versal, and that it is, in the philosophical background of the play as much as its action.

16 LI. 1056 ff. Some critics have thought that Oedipus' acjAapr1a is his curiosity and insistence on learning all the facts. But this rests on the assumption that if the truth had never been uncovered no harm would have been done, and that any misdeed is pardonable so long as it remains concealed! Surely such reasoning would have be'en abhorrent to Greek ethics. Granted that this impulsive curiosity of his is of a piece with the impulsiveness which prompted the slaying of Laius, still we cannot look for his a'uapTr?7a proper in the play itself, which is merely a Xvs, but only in the 'TLts which precedes it (cf. Poetics, 1453 B 29 ff.).

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