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Requiredreading.docx■■INDUCTIVE THEORY CONSTRUCTION
Quite often, social scientists begin con- structing a theory through the inductive method by first observing aspects of social life and then seeking to discover patterns that may point to relatively universal principles. Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) coined the term grounded theory in reference to this method. Field research—the direct observation of events in progress—is frequently used to develop theories through observation (see Chapter 10). A long and rich anthropological tradition has seen this method used to good advantage. Among social scientists of the twentieth century, no one was more adept at seeing the pat- terns of human behavior through observation than Erving Goffman: A game such as chess generates a habitable universe for those who can follow it, a plane of being, a cast of characters with a seemingly unlimited number of different situations and acts through which to realize their natures and destinies. Yet much of this is reducible to a small set of interdependent rules and practices. If the meaningful- ness of everyday activity is similarly dependent on a closed, finite set of rules, then explication of them would give one a powerful means of analyzing social life. — (1974: 5) In a variety of research efforts, Goffman uncovered the rules of such diverse behaviors as living in a mental institution (1961) and managing the “spoiled identity” of disfiguration (1963). In each case, Goffman observed the phenomenon in depth and teased out the rules governing behavior. Goffman’s research provides an excel- lent example of qualitative field research as a source of grounded theory. Our earlier discussion of the Comfort hypothesis and church involvement shows that qualitative field research is not the only method of observation appropriate to the development of inductive theory. Here’s another detailed example to illustrate further the construction of inductive theory using quantitative methods.
An Example of Inductive Theory: Why Do People Smoke Marijuana?
During the 1960s and 1970s, marijuana use on U.S. college campuses was a subject of considerable discussion in the popular press. Some people were troubled by marijuana’s popularity; others welcomed it. What interests us here is why some students smoked marijuana and others didn’t. A survey of students at the University of Hawaii (Takeuchi 1974) provided data to answer that question. While the reasons and practices regarding pot may have changed, the subtle redefinition of what needed explaining is still instructive At the time of the study, people were offering numerous explanations for drug use. Those who opposed drug use, for example, often suggested that marijuana smokers were academic failures trying to avoid the rigors of college life. Those in favor of marijuana, on the other hand, often spoke of the search for new values: Marijuana smokers, they said, were people who had seen through the hypocrisy of middle-class values. David Takeuchi’s 1974 analysis of the data gathered from University of Hawaii students, however, did not support any of the explanations being offered. Those who reported smoking marijuana had essentially the same academic records as those who didn’t smoke it, and both groups were equally involved in traditional “school spirit” activities. Both groups seemed to feel equally well integrated into campus life.
There were differences, however:
1. Women were less likely than men to smoke marijuana.
2. Asian students (a large proportion of the student body) were less likely than non- Asians to smoke marijuana.
3. Students living at home were less likely to smoke marijuana than were those living in their own apartments.
As in the case of religiosity, the three variables independently affected the likelihood of a student’s smoking marijuana. About 10 percent of the Asian women living at home had smoked marijuana, compared with about 80 percent of the non-Asian men living in apartments. And, as in the religiosity study, the researchers discovered a powerful pattern of drug use before they had an explanation for that pattern. In this instance, the explanation took a peculiar turn. Instead of explaining why some students smoked marijuana, the researchers explained why some didn’t. Assuming that all students had some motivation for trying drugs, the researchers suggested that students differed in the degree of “social constraints” pre- venting them from following through on that motivation. U.S. society is, on the whole, more permissive with men than with women when it comes to deviant behavior. Consider, for example, a group of men getting drunk and boisterous. We tend to dismiss such behavior with references to “camaraderie” and “having a good time,” whereas a group of women behaving similarly would prob- ably be regarded with at least some disapproval. We have an idiom, “Boys will be boys,” but no comparable idiom for girls. The researchers reasoned, therefore, that women would have more to lose by smoking marijuana than would men. Being female, then, provided a constraint against smoking marijuana. Students living at home had obvious constraints against smoking marijuana, compared with students living on their own. Quite aside from differences in opportunity, those living at home were seen as being more dependent on their parents—hence more vulnerable to additional punishment for breaking the law. Finally, the Asian subculture in Hawaii has traditionally placed a higher premium on obedience to the law than have other subcultures. As such, Asian students would have more to lose if they were caught violating the law by smoking marijuana. Overall, then, a “social constraints” theory was offered as the explanation for observed differences in the likelihood of smoking marijuana. The more constraints a student had, the less likely he or she would be to smoke marijuana. It bears repeating that the researchers had no thoughts about such a theory when their research began. The theory came from an examination of the data.
An Example of Deductive Theory: Distributive Justice
A topic of central interest to scholars is the concept of distributive justice, people’s perception of whether they’re being treated fairly by life, whether they’re getting “their share.” Guillermina Jasso describes the theory of distributive justice more formally, as follows: The theory provides a mathematical description of the process whereby individuals, reflecting on their holdings of the goods they value (such as beauty, intelligence, or wealth), compare them- selves to others, experiencing a fundamental instantaneous magnitude of the justice evaluation ( J ), which captures their sense of being fairly or unfairly treated in the distributions of natural and social goods. — (1988: 11) Notice that Jasso has assigned a letter to her key variable: J will stand for distributive justice. She does this to support her intention of stating her theory in mathematical formulas. Though theories are often expressed mathematically, we’ll not delve too deeply into that practice here. Jasso indicates that there are three kinds of postulates in her theory. “The first makes explicit the fundamental axiom which represents the substantive point of departure for the theory.” She elaborates as follows:
The theory begins with the received Axiom of Comparison, which formalizes the long-held view that a wide class of phenomena, including happiness, self-esteem, and the sense of distributive justice, may be understood as the product of a comparison process. — (1988: 11)
Thus, our sense of whether we are receiving a “fair” share of the good things of life comes from comparing ourselves with others. If this seems obvious to you, that’s good. Remember, axioms are the taken-for-granted beginnings of theory. Jasso continues to do the groundwork for her theory. First, she indicates that our sense of distributive justice is a function of “Actual Hold- ings (A)” and “Comparison Holdings (C)” of some good. Let’s consider money. My sense of justice in this regard is a function of how much I actually have, compared with how much others have. By specifying the two components of the comparison, Jasso can use them as variables in her theory. Jasso then offers a “measurement rule” that further specifies how the two variables, A and C, will be conceptualized. This step is needed because some of the goods to be examined are concrete and commonly measured (such as money), whereas others are less tangible (such as respect). The former kind, she says, will be measured conventionally, whereas the latter will be measured “by the individual’s relative rank within a specially selected comparison group.” he theory will provide a formula for making that measurement (Jasso 1988: 13). Jasso continues in this fashion to introduce additional elements, weaving them into mathematical formulas for deriving predictions about the workings of distributive justice in a variety of social settings. Here is a sampling of where her theorizing takes her (1988: 14–15).
●● Other things [being] the same, a person will prefer to steal from a fellow group member rather than from an outsider.
●● The preference to steal from a fellow group member is more pronounced in poor groups than in rich groups.
●● In the case of theft, informants arise only in cross-group theft, in which case they are members of the thief ’s group.
●● Persons who arrive a week late at summer camp or for the freshman year of college are more likely to become friends of persons who play games of chance than of persons who play games of skill.
●● A society becomes more vulnerable to deficit spending as its wealth increases.
●● Societies in which population growth is welcomed must be societies in which the set of valued goods includes at least one quantity- good, such as wealth. Jasso’s theory leads to many other propositions, but this sampling should provide a good sense of where deductive theorizing can take you. To get a feeling for how she reasons her way to these propositions, let’s look briefly at the logic involved in two of the propositions that relate to theft within and outside one’s group.
●● Other things [being] the same, a person will prefer to steal from a fellow group member rather than from an outsider.
Beginning with the assumption that thieves want to maximize their relative wealth, ask your- self whether that goal would be best served by stealing from those you compare yourself with or from outsiders. In each case, stealing will increase your Actual Holdings, but what about your Comparison Holdings? A moment’s thought should suggest that stealing from people in your comparison group will lower their holdings, further increasing your relative wealth. To simplify, imagine there are only two people in your comparison group: you and I. Sup- pose we each have $100. If you steal $50 from some- one outside our group, you will have increased your relative wealth by 50 percent compared with me: $150 versus $100. But if you steal $50 from me, you will have increased your relative wealth 200 percent: $150 to my $50. Your goal is best served by stealing from within the comparison group.
●● In the case of theft, informants arise only in cross-group theft, in which case they are members of the thief ’s group.
