Journal Entries #2

Republicans, Democrats and Populism

Many have commented that Donald Trump ran and governed as a populist. But Harvard's Bonikowski and Gidron note that populism is a campaign style with common themes which historically has been deployed by Democrats and Republicans.

As a refresher we have defined  Populism is a political style that divides everyday citizens from elites and foments anger against elites and social outgroups that are said to be keeping ordinary people from their good life. Populists then leverage that anger to gain political power. Populists often don't have a coherent ideology, be it conservative or liberal because they are focusing preexisting citizen anger and wanting to do what's popular.

Populism comes in different varieties. Soft populism  would be promoting an economic plan, for example, while saying it will "help  Main Street, not Wall Street." Hard populism would be something like the Jan. 6, 2021 attack on the capitol and attempts to overthrow the results of the 2020 the election. In its hard forms populism can embrace conspiracy theories, favor ineffective leaders who are about style, swagger, and atmospherics (Nichols 2021), and who challenge democratic institutions. In it's extreme form it can also increase the likelihood of political violence.

Harvard's Bonikowski and Gidron (1994)  note that both soft and hard populism traditionally  fueled outsider candidates. Why? An outsider has more credibility to argue for change. Interestingly, in 2020, Trump ran a populist campaign as an incumbent with a record to defend. I excerpt sections of their article below that seemed most relevant to our recent elections. You can  read the full article here.  Note that they suggest that populist themes may boost voters self-image, conferring a sense of moral superiority. (For those wanting a  deeper dive Block and Negrine (2017) further explore  the populist communication style and political identity here  comparing Trump with the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez and British BREXIT leader Nigel Farge. They argue that populist politicians connect with aggrieved citizens through cheeky or abrasive communication styles. That boosts the morale of supporters via non-traditional media and raises emotions against out-groups (and the mainstream media) as the source the aggrieved citizens' problems.)

Bonikowski and Gidron write, "Within this tradition, populism is predicated on a moral opposition between the people, who are viewed as the only legitimate source of political power, and the elites, whose interests are perceived as inherently contrary to those of the populace. The specific elites targeted by populist claims can vary, from elected politicians and business leaders to intellectuals, but they are invariably portrayed as having betrayed the public trust. In the case of elected officials, a common accusation is that instead of representing the electorate, they serve special interests in order to increase their own political and economic power. Corporate elites, on the other hand, may be seen as exploiting workers and consumers in the pursuit of wealth, often through the cooptation of politicians. In addition, populist claims often emphasize the social distance between common people and the elites, with the latter portrayed as out of touch and disconnected from the everyday problems of the former. This is a particularly common charge against intellectuals and civil servants. Finally, in some variations of populist rhetoric, elites are framed as having been co-opted by disparaged out-groups, which are placed outside the symbolic boundaries of “the people” (Bail 2008).

"Specifically, we find that populism is predominantly used by political challengers rather than incumbents and that it is more prevalent among candidates who can credibly position themselves as political outsiders. We show that reliance on populism typically declines over the course of campaigns in response to the changing characteristics of the audience (though less so among incumbents), and that speeches given in the geographic strongholds of each party are more likely to feature populist language. 

"Widely accessible narratives concerning moral worth, such as those about the inherent greed of bankers or the inevitable corruption of politicians, are likely to be particularly powerful, because they encourage group comparisons that increase people’s sense of self-worth (Lamont 2002) and produce visceral emotional reactions that serve as powerful guides for political decision- making (Haidt 2012).

"Here again, the binary classification typical of populist rhetoric performs considerable discursive work: Bush portrays himself as a regular American who believes in God and prays regularly, while Dukakis is framed as belonging to a fringe elite that is at its core un-American. The argument is reinforced by a reference to a long and salient tradition of anti-intellectualism in American public discourse (Hofstadter 1966).

"Nixon’s second presidential campaign sought to capture the same anti-liberal sentiment in subtler ways. As noted by Lowndes (2008, 130), 'Nixon identified an enemy within. The antiwar movement was, he implied, more dangerous than the external enemy itself.' He opposed the ostensible liberal rabble-rousers with a “silent majority” of peaceful Americans, a vague category with exclusionary class and racial undertones. Given that these moral appeals were based on a binary opposition between those who were committed to true American values and those who sought to disrupt the American way of life, it is not surprising that we find high levels of populism in this campaign.

"As expected, Democrats rely primarily on economic populism that targets business elites, while Republicans engage in anti-statist populism that critiques federal political elites. 

...our research has shown that neither the left nor the right holds the monopoly on populism."