history essay

"Remember Your Country and Keep up Its Credit": Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865 Author(s): Susannah Ural Bruce Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Apr., 2005), pp. 331-359 Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3397403 Accessed: 19-04-2019 13:49 UTC

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"Remember Your Country and Keep Up Its Credit": Irish Volunteers and the

Union Army, 1861-1865

Susannah Ural Bruce*

Abstract

Historians have lacked a central theme to explain Irish-American service in the Union Army during the American Civil War, due to the varying experiences of Irish immigrants. There is, however, one com- mon thread linking their service: their dual loyalties to Ireland and America. When the Union cause supported their interests in Ireland and America, Irish Americans volunteered for the war and their fam- ilies supported them. After the Emancipation Proclamation, the fed- eral draft, and a staggering rise in Irish-American casualties, they began to question, and in some cases, abandon, the Union war effort because it no longer protected their interests in both countries.

ON a sunny afternoon in April 1861, New Yorkers, most of them Irish Americans, flooded the sidewalks and buildings along Great Jones

Street as they gathered to cheer their friends and neighbors in the Irish 69th New York State Militia Regiment (NYSM) departing to secure the nation's capital. Just twenty days earlier Confederates had fired on Fort Sumter, South Carolina, and hundreds of Irish Americans filled the ranks of the 69th NYSM to defend the Union and what America meant to them.

* The author wishes to thank the following individuals for their assistance with this work: Drs. Kerby A. Miller, Donald J. Mrozek, Carol Reardon, Bruce Vandervort, and Robert B. Bruce, the anonymous readers of the article, and the suggestions from the audience at the 2003 Society for Military History Conference.

Susannah Ural Bruce is Assistant Professor of History at Sam Houston State Uni- versity in Texas. She is the author of The Harp and the Eagle: Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New York: New York University Press, forth- coming 2005), and the editor of Ethnicity and the American Civil War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, forthcoming 2006).

The Journal of Military History 69 (April 2005): 331-60 © Society for Military Ilistory * 331

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With the men formed into line, the wife of prominent Irish American Judge Charles Patrick Daly presented the regiment with a silk United States flag. The men displayed it proudly next to their Prince of Wales color with its burning sun on a field of green, symbols of the recently formed Irish American nationalist organization, the Fenian Brother- hood.1 As the 69th NYSM turned and continued down Broadway, sym- bols of these blended loyalties to America and Ireland continued to dominate the parade. A horse-drawn wagon leading the regiment bore a placard reminding the men that there was "No North, no South, no East, no West, but the whole Union," while another sign referenced a more ancient loyalty, insisting: "Sixty-ninth, remember Fontenoy," calling to mind the famous eighteenth-century battle in which another unit of Irishmen served in a foreign army, fighting for a foreign cause. Finally, Irish-born Michael Cavanagh, watching the scene that day, recalled that as the men marched past one voice rose above the others, crying out, "Remember your country, and keep up its credit, boy!" It is significant that among all the symbols of loyalty and heritage that afternoon, both Irish and American, it is unclear to which nation the speaker referred.2

During the American Civil War, approximately 144,000 Irish Ameri- cans filled the ranks of the Union Army. While most of them served in nonethnic units, a significant portion chose to serve with their fellow Irishmen in volunteer infantry regiments like the Irish 9th Massachu- setts from the Boston area and the 23rd Illinois (known as the "Irish Brigade of the West" even though it was a single regiment), which drew most of its recruits from Chicago. The most famous Irish unit was the Irish Brigade, comprised of the old 69th NYSM (which became the 69th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment), the 63rd New York, and the 88th New York. The 29th Massachusetts joined the brigade in the spring of 1862 and was nearly 100 percent non-Irish, but the men worked well together through the fall of 1862 when they were replaced by the largely Irish 28th Massachusetts and the 116th Pennsylvania, which was only

1. Terry Golway, Irish Rebel: John Devoy and America's Fightfor Ireland's Free- dom (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998), 37. Fenians chose their name in roman- tic reference to the legendary Fene or Fianna, which tradition held were the great warriors and defenders of ancient Ireland. The Prince of Wales color, which may seem an odd name for the Fenians to adopt, recalled an incident in the fall of 1860 when the regiment refused to march in a parade honoring Britain's Prince of Wales, an action that led to the court martial of the commander of the 69th, Michael Corcoran. All was forgiven, however, when the regiment pledged its support to the Union after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter. Indeed, so many Irishmen turned out that hundreds had to be turned away when the unit reached its one-thousand-man limit.

2. Michael Cavanagh, Memoirs of Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, Comprising the Leading Events of His Career, Chronologically Arranged, with Selections from his Speeches, Lectures and Miscellaneous Writings, including Personal Reminis- cences (Worcester, Mass.: Messenger Press, 1892), 375-76.

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"Remember Your Country and Keep Up Its Credit"

about half Irish and never carried a green flag. These five regiments remained in the brigade through the end of the war.3

Over the last several decades, scholars and popular historians have examined the motivations behind Irish American service in the U.S.

Civil War. Some theorize that immigrant soldiers volunteered to prove their loyalty to America and challenge nativist prejudice. Others argue that Irishmen fought to preserve the United States as a safe haven for future refugees from the Emerald Isle. Those relying heavily on the memoirs and letters of Irish Brigade veterans point to the Irish national- ists like the Fenians, who volunteered to gain military experience they hoped to use in a future war to liberate their homeland from Great Britain. Still others insist that we must not overlook the less romantic, though no less common, motivator of economic need.4

Sifting through the evidence, scholars have tried to identify the most common motivator and explain how the war affected the soldiers and their families. A popular theory is that military service in the American Civil War accelerated the process by which Irishmen adapted to life in the United States. Nonacademic authors, in particular, argue that their successful adaptation was the result of proven Irish loyalty through ded- icated military service. There are problems citing this as the primary motivation, however, because very few Irishmen expressed the hope upon volunteering that their service would disprove nativist prejudice and aid their acceptance in America. The idea that the service of Irish Americans proved their loyalty developed largely after the conflict ended, when they faced continued prejudice in the late-nineteenth-cen- tury United States. This hostility resulted from several factors relating to Irishmen's activism within the Democratic Party and that group's image as a force of wartime opposition to the victorious Republicans. Com- pounding this was the large number of former Confederates in the

3. William L. Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers: The Union's Ethnic Regiments (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 119-24, 149-50.

4. Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers, 153-54; Phillip T. Tucker, "Celtic Warriors in Blue," in The History of the Irish Brigade: A Collection of Historical Essays, ed. Pia Seija Seagrave (Fredericksburg, Va.: Sergeant Kirkland's Museum and Historical Museum, 1997), 5; Daniel George MacNamara, The History of the Ninth Regiment Massachusetts Infantry, June, 1861-June, 1864, ed. Christian G. Samito (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), xvii; David Power Conyngham, The Irish Brigade and Its Campaigns, ed. Lawrence F. Kohl (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), xv; Joseph G. Bilby, The Irish Brigade in the Civil War: The 69th New York and Other Irish Regiments of the Army of the Potomac (Conshohocken, Pa.: Com- bined Publishing, 2000), x; Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951); and William McCarter, My Life in the Irish Brigade: The Civil War Memoirs of Private William McCarter, 116th Pennsylvania Infantry, ed. Kevin E. O'Brien (Campbell, Calif.: Savas Publishing Co., 1996).

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Democratic ranks in the postwar period. Popular political cartoonists of the late nineteenth century frequently grouped Irish Americans with Confederate caricatures indicating violence, corruption, and disloyalty.5 This guilt by association outraged Irish Americans in the North, who pointed to the loyal service of tens of thousands of Irishmen to prove their dedication to the United States. Many wrote their memoirs to relate a positive image of Irish Americans as well as Catholics. Responding to the memoir of Irish Brigade chaplain Father William Corby, for example, one American Catholic declared the work "a living refutation to the base calumnies of ranting, roaring, noisy, blatherskites, who keep crying 'the country will be crippled by Catholics.' 6

Similarly, immediately following the war, Boston's leading Irish paper, the Pilot, insisted, "When the next generation records with flushed cheeks . . . this heroic age, they can say with proud conscious- ness 'we too are Americans, and our fathers bled and died to establish this beloved country."' When the war began, however, the editors warned their readers, "Let no Irishman think that because... he has lost an arm, an eye, or a leg, that he will be treated decently henceforward."7 The soldiers' postwar expressions of frustration at continued prejudice despite dedicated Irish service during the war do not indicate that a hope of challenging such attitudes inspired their decision to join the Union Army. By relying on wartime and postwar statements, especially mem- oirs written as correctives to contemporary prejudices, we have overem- phasized the idea that many Irishmen volunteered to prove their loyalty and earn acceptance as Americans.

The difficulty with trying to promote one motivation, or several moti- vations, as the key inspiration behind Irish American military service is the number of variables within the group. Most of the soldiers in Irish units were Catholic, but the majority of Irish American volunteers served in nonethnic units and included Irish Protestants. These soldiers came

from different regions of the United States and Ireland and had varying socio-economic backgrounds and levels of education, and while many had recently arrived in America, some had been living there for decades.

There is, however, one common link between the Irish-Protestant farmer in Iowa and the Irish Catholic laborer in New York City: they almost always explained their views of the Northern war effort in terms of both their Irish and American identities. Some Irishmen opposed the

5. These images were particularly common during presidential campaigns. See work by cartoonist Thomas Nast and others in Harper's Weekly, 11 May 1872, 28 August 1880, and 26 July 1884; and in Puck, 28 July 1880 and 23 July 1884.

6. William Corby, Memoirs of Chaplain Life: Three Years with the Irish Brigade in the Army of the Potomac, ed. Lawrence Frederick Kohl (New York: Fordham Uni- versity Press, 1992), xxiv.

7. Boston Pilot, 15 July 1865, and 27 July 1861.

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"Remember Your Country and Keep Up Its Credit"

war as harmful to their communities in the United States. Others sup- ported the war as a means of preserving America as a force that could check British imperial power. Even the very few who did claim, at the time they volunteered, that their service would demonstrate loyalty and challenge nativist prejudice, did so to improve their own lives and those of their families in America or Ireland. No matter how they defined it, most Irish volunteers and their families explained their support for the war in both Irish and American terms. Similarly, when they began to abandon the Union war effort in large numbers, they continued to explain their decisions as both Irishmen and Americans.

It is essential to understand that this continued sense of loyalty to Ireland, or awareness of their Irish heritage, does not mean that they were all Fenians or that radical Irish nationalism shaped their decisions. It does demonstrate, however, how their lingering ties to Ireland influ- enced their behavior. Only by examining these volunteers as individuals with a shared history and dual loyalties can we understand their deci- sions, and those of their families, as they relate to the Northern war effort from 1861 through 1865.

These blended motivations can be seen in the comments of Irish vol-

unteer officers, enlisted men, and their community leaders at home throughout the war years. Thomas Francis Meagher, for example, was the future commander of the Irish Brigade and a fervent Irish national- ist in the spring of 1861. For him, this struggle was as much about Ire- land as America:

Duty and patriotism prompt me to [support the Union]. The Repub- lic, that gave us an asylum and an honorable career,-that is the mainstay of human freedom, the world over-is threatened with dis- ruption. It is the duty of every liberty-loving citizen to prevent such a calamity at all hazards. Above all is it the duty of us Irish citizens, who aspire to establish a similar form of government in our native land. It is not only our duty to America, but also to Ireland. We could not hope to succeed in our effort to make Ireland a Republic without the moral and material aid of the liberty-loving citizens of these United States. That aid we might rely upon receiving at the proper time. But now, when all the thoughts, energies, and resources of this noble people are needed to preserve their own institutions from destruction-they cannot spare either sympathy, arms, or men, for any other cause.8

For Fenians like Meagher and other Irish nationalists in America, the Civil War served as a training ground to prepare for war against England. As Meagher would later add, "It is a moral certainty that many of our countrymen who enlist in this struggle for the maintenance of the Union

8. Cavanagh, Memoirs of Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, 369.

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will fall in the contest .... But, even so; I hold that if only one in ten of us come back when this war is over, the military experience gained by that one will be of more service in the fight for Ireland's freedom than would that of the entire ten as they are now."9 In addition to this, some Fenians went so far as to hope that a grateful American government might help free Ireland after the war, though this was never realized.10

Fellow Irish native and Fenian Michael Corcoran expressed similar sentiments. While supporting the Union cause, Corcoran's statements in the spring of 1861 revealed a dedication to the Fenians that would have confirmed the doubts of many native-born Americans who questioned the loyalty of Irish Americans. On 21 April, Corcoran addressed the New York Fenian Brotherhood, urging all members who were not part of the Irish 69th NYSM to avoid service in that unit or any other. As comman- der of the 69th and a leading Fenian, he insisted that enough Irishmen had already volunteered and that the Fenians in America should con- tinue to focus on Ireland and avoid anything that might diminish their ranks and weaken their potential military strength.

For those Fenians already in American uniforms, however, and head- ing to the front with him, Corcoran explained, "we will not be the worse for a little practice, which we engage in, with the more heart because we feel it will be serviceable on other fields."ll Like Meagher, Corcoran's dual loyalties to Ireland and America, most particularly in that order, inspired his service and many of the men in the 69th NYSM. They would train together and serve together under Irish officers and beside fellow Irishmen, gaining experience for a future war that they believed was equally, if not more, important than that facing them presently.

Although one would expect to see strong references to the ethnic heritage of Meagher and Corcoran, both fervent Irish nationalists, we can find similar motivations among common Irish soldiers. Corporal Peter Welsh, a child of Irish immigrant parents and member of the Irish Brigade, also drew a link between his Irish roots and his new life in America, but he was not a Fenian. His thinking is significant, because the majority of Irish soldiers in ethnic units were not radical Irish national- ists, but still maintained ties to Ireland while feeling a new sense of duty to their adopted homeland. Welsh saw the Civil War as "a school of instruction for Irishmen and if the day should arrive within ten years after this war is ended an army can be raised in this country that will

9. Ibid., 369. 10. See Brian Jenkins, Fenians and Anglo-American Relations during Recon-

struction (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), 48, 56. 11. Cavanagh, Memoirs of Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, 370-71. See also

Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers, 113.

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"Remember Your Country and Keep Up Its Credit"

strike terror to the Saxons heart."12 Although a desperate financial situ- ation had inspired Welsh to volunteer, by the summer of 1863, now a vet- eran and color sergeant in the Irish Brigade, he believed, "America is Irlands refuge Irlands last hope." He wrote:

Destroy this republic and her hopes are blasted .... When we are fighting for America we are fighting in the interest of Irland striking a double blow cutting with a two edged sword For while we strike in defence of the rights of Irishmen here we are striking a blow at Irlands enemy and oppressor England hates this country because of its growing power and greatness She hates it for its republican liberty and she hates it because Irishmen have a home and a government here and a voice in the counsels of the nation that is growing stronger every day which bodes no good for her.13

Some historians have argued that members of the Irish Brigade, who sought service with fellow Irishmen, would have natural links to Ireland as they defined their role in this conflict. We can find, however, similar ref- erences to the Emerald Isle in less radical men and women. Andrew

Greenlees, a Protestant Irishman from Ulster, immigrated to America in 1852. The first year of the war found him living in Illinois with his Boston- born wife Lucy. Trying to explain his position on the Northern war effort, Greenlees offered an analogy for his family in Ireland. He argued, "surely no good citizen can feel indeferent as to the result had Smith O'Brien and

his Confederates succeeded in their designs of rebelling against the British government . . . with the avowed purpose of putting down the British protestant government and establishing in its room a papal tyrannical despotism." Greenlees insisted, "would you not have been ready and will- ing at a moments notice to shouldered your knapsack and musket and marched to the defense of your Countrys dearest rights? It is so with me." Although he defined himself as a full American citizen, insisting "all my interests are here," even Andrew Greenlees described his support for the Union in Irish and American terms. Ironically, too, both Irish Catholics and Protestants found ways to defend their positions on the Union war effort relative to their opposing views of the British government.14

Similar explanations came from Samuel and Ann Nimiks, Irish Amer- ican Protestants living in Eden, Illinois, as they expressed their concerns over the brewing troubles in America to family in Ireland: "I remember

12. Lawrence Frederick Kohl and Margaret Cosse Richard, eds., Irish Green and Union Blue: The Civil War Letters of Peter Welsh, Color Sergeant, 28th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 103.

13. Ibid., 4, 102-3. 14. Andrew Greenlees, Grand Ridge, Illinois, to John Greenlees and sister,

Magheramorne, County Antrim, Ireland, 3 April 1860, Andrew Greenlees Letters, T. 2046, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast.

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often to hear my Father say that... I would see a great dale of Bloodshed in the three Kingdoms of Irelan England and Scotland but he thought America would be free as She never persecuted any but I must tell you that America did persecute," referring to the system of slavery. Despite his concerns over the bloody prospects of war, Samuel Nimiks insisted that "we have the right Cause by the end ... for this is Just the only effec- tual Speedy way of Setting the Coulered population at liberty."15

When native-born white Northerners went to war in 1861, they heard Irishmen make these references of loyalty to their families in America and Ireland, speaking proudly of the martial traditions of Irish- men who had served with the famous Wild Geese in Europe and the mar- tyrs who had fallen for an independent Ireland.16 Many Americans largely accepted these motivations, and, for a time, it appeared that by volunteering, the Irish improved their image among native-born whites. The Lowell (Massachusetts) Advertiser, a native American press, reported that the 9th Connecticut Volunteers was comprised almost entirely of Irishmen and spoke of the bravery, patriotism, and fearless- ness of the soldiers. While prewar reports from the Know-Nothing era had offered few kind words to describe Irish commanders of militia reg- iments, with some demanding their disbandment on charges of disloy- alty, the native press now described the Irish-born colonel of the 9th Connecticut as possessing "superior accomplishments and genius," and the major as a "profound scholar, a polished gentleman, and distin- guished young lawyer." The native-born women of New Haven, Con- necticut, agreed, and presented the regiment with national and state colors, the latter bearing an Irish harp.17

Prominent native-born Americans' unusual enthusiasm for Irish tra-

ditions continued as late as the winter of 1862, when Boston's Irish 9th Massachusetts celebrated the Christmas holiday with a large banquet. That evening, several native-born officers surprised Major Patrick Guiney when they "confessed that they were Irish." Most of it was "Blar-

15. Ann S. Nimiks, Eden, Illinois to William Anderson, County Derry, Ireland, 4 February 1861, Anderson Family Letters, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast.

16. In 1691 the British allowed eleven thousand defeated Irish Catholic soldiers

to sail to France, where they would serve James II, the Stuart king living in exile there. Many of these soldiers, who would become known as the Wild Geese, formed the Irish Brigade within the French Army, where they earned fame for their dedicated service. Other Irishmen exiled from their homeland over the centuries and serving in foreign armies continued the tradition of the Wild Geese, often forming themselves into units like the Irish Brigade during the American Civil War. Kerby Miller, Emi- grants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to America (New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1985).

17. New York Irish-American, 23 November 1861.

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"Remember Your Country and Keep Up Its Credit"

ney, but true of some of them," Guiney noted in a fascinating case of native-born Americans claiming Irish heritage at a time when the stereo- type of the natural Irish ability for fighting was seen as an attribute.18

This nineteenth-century tolerance for diversity would fade, however, when the interests of Ireland and the Union came into conflict. As hun- dreds of Irish Americans died on the battlefield and thousands more

returned home as invalids, their communities began to wonder how many Irishmen had to be sacrificed in this war. Terse casualty lists filled page after page of Irish newspapers, such as "Sergeant Conlin, Co. I, wounded by a fragment of a shell; Sergt. Daniel J. Reagan, Co. G, mor- tally wounded, since dead."19 Reading these reports and seeing the impact of the war in their own communities, Irish Americans were jus- tified in their concern that they carried an unfair burden in this conflict. The regiments comprising the Irish Brigade, for example, had signifi- cantly higher casualty rates than those of other Civil War brigades.20

There had also been cracks in native-Irish relations throughout 1862, including early reports of continued nativist prejudice within the Army. One member of the Irish 9th Massachusetts complained that the New York Herald's coverage of the Battle of Hanover Court House (1862) purposely omitted any reference to the heroism of Irish soldiers in that struggle. "I had, it appears, erroneously labored under the impression, that the age of narrowmindedness, bigotry and intolerance had passed away," he wrote. "I had thought that the heroic valor and bravery of the Irish soldiers had sufficiently manifested itself during the war, to disarm those prejudices that were so long entertained against us, and insure for us that even-handed justice which even those against whom we are com- bating are forced to accord." Other Irish Americans complained of per- secution for their insistence on offering Catholic education for the children of their communities. In Lowell, Massachusetts, Irish leaders reported that "bigotry and injustice still [exists] in New England," citing the city government's refusal to grant a charter to the community's

18. Patrick R. Guiney, Commanding Boston's Irish Ninth: The Civil War Letters of Colonel Patrick R. Guiney, Ninth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, ed. Christian G. Samito (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 60.

19. Boston Pilot, 14 June 1862; examples of casualty lists, especially following a battle, continue along similar lines in nearly every issue of the New York Irish-Amer- ican and the Boston Pilot, as well as native papers such as the New York Times, from 1861 through 1865.

20. According to William F. Fox, Regimental Losses in the American Civil War (Albany, N.Y: Albany Publishing, 1889), the five regiments comprising the Irish Brigade by the fall of 1862 would rank among the top three hundred Northern regi- ments for sustaining high casualties; he listed the 69th New York and the 28th Mass- achusetts with the top ten regiments for high numbers of combat deaths. For an excellent summary of their costly service to the Union, see Conyngham, The Irish Brigade and Its Campaigns, x.

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Catholic College or to recognize the local Catholic schools, which would grant students the same privileges in the community as those enjoyed by children in the public schools.21

Similar reports surfaced in the Midwest. In December 1861, Colonel James A. Mulligan, commander of the 23rd Illinois, the "Irish Brigade of the West," received word from a disgruntled Irishman. Captain R. T. Far- rell, commander of the 15th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment, the "Mulligan Chasseurs," reported bad news from Detroit, Michigan. While the "Gov. told me and others, long ago, that he would not interfere in the Selection of Field officers," Farrell explained, "I think he is ready to help some of his friends to the position of Colonel. If so he will find everything but peace." Farrell insisted that he and his men had "presented the Name of Capt. James McBride, a gentleman of Military experience, of American birth, a Catholic and a representative of our American-Franco population for Colonel. He is of Irish descent." Farrell feared that the Governor would "throw [McBride] overboard on account of his religion, as he is an inveterate Enemy of Catholicism." The commander of the Mulligan Chasseurs warned, "Let him do so and to the dogs with his big- otry and the powers that tolerate such accursed intermeddling. We shall have our way or we shall leave."22

Recruiters for the Union Army had noticed some problems as well. In the spring of 1862 an Indiana recruiter complained that the few Irish- men they managed to enlist in Irish companies became disgruntled when they discovered they would serve under native officers, and refused to muster into service.23 This was not the case with all Irish enlistments, but even General Meagher faced resistance to his efforts that summer. In July 1862, Meagher journeyed home to New York to recruit replacements for his dwindling Irish Brigade. His reception echoed the mood expressed by the Pilot and other papers. In some ways the Irish serving to defend American freedom and to preserve a united country for future Irish emi- grants were remaining true to their pledge. The Fenians were pleased to be gaining so much military experience, and Irish soldiers were grateful to be earning a steady income. Still, some of these men and their fami- lies at home were concerned that the cost of this service might be too great for their communities to handle.

On 25 July 1862, Meagher spoke at a recruiting rally at the Seventh Regiment Armory in New York City, once again using his famous skills as

21. Boston Pilot, 14 June 1862, and 26 July 1862. 22. Captain R. T. Farrell, Detroit, Michigan, to Colonel James A. Mulligan,

Chicago, Illinois, 28 December 1861, folder 6, box 1, James A. Mulligan Papers, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois (emphasis in the original).

23. Craig Lee Kautz, "Fodder for Cannon: Immigrant Perceptions of the Civil War-The Old Northwest" (Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 1976), 140-41.

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"Remember Your Country and Keep Up Its Credit"

an orator to link Irish interests with the war for the Union. He laid out

before the audience all that the Irish Brigade and their families had already sacrificed for the country. The 69th New York had entered the battle of Fair Oaks that June with 750 men, but was now reduced to 295. The 88th New York left its winter encampment with nearly 600 men, and now had less than 400. The 63rd New York had seen less action and suf-

fered fewer casualties, but it, too, had dwindled to 500 men. Meagher informed his audience that he needed 2,000 recruits to keep the Irish Brigade together as a separate unit serving Irish honor and American Union.

The assembly was generally supportive of Meagher's call to arms, though there were some indications that not all Irishmen in attendance were going to be motivated to serve as easily as they had the previous summer. After Meagher had explained the Irish Brigade's losses and his need for new recruits, one member of the audience suggested, "Take the Black Republicans," referring to the Republican abolitionists so many Irish Americans disliked. After several such outbursts, Meagher shot back, "Any man who makes a remark like that I denounce as a poltroon and coward. Because others shrink from their duty is no reason why you should shrink from yours. You have no business to shift the responsibil- ity upon others."24

The audience applauded his response, but they still had questions about how the Irish Brigade had lost so many men that spring. Some asked if the reason was insufficient attention from the government, indi- cating that perhaps nativists were at work to make sure their own troops received better equipment and more food and supplies than the Irish sol- diers. The losses, Meagher explained, were due not to "insufficient food, or clothing, or undue labor, or neglect of any kind, or sickness, but [to] hard fighting of the enemy that had thinned the ranks-fighting that was the glory and pride of Irishmen." In closing, Meagher reminded Irishmen of the debt they owed America and the importance of preserving the nation for future Irish exiles. Meagher asked his countrymen for "one more effort, magnanimous and chivalrous for the Republic, which to the thousands and thousands of you, has been a tower of impregnable secu- rity, a pedestal of renown and a palace of prosperity, after the worrying, the scandals, and the shipwreck that, for the most part, have been for many generations the implacable destiny of our race."25 The Irish audi- ence responded with a deafening applause and appeared ready to storm recruiting stations that evening.

24. New York Times, 26 July 1862. 25. New York Times, 26 July 1862; also covered in the New York Irish-Ameri-

can, 2 August 1862.

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Native-born Americans were similarly impressed with Meagher's call for Irish volunteers. After covering the entire evening's events, the New York Times correspondent reflected, "the meeting . . . adjourned amid the most earnest enthusiasm, evincing as determined patriotism and unswerving loyalty as ever was displayed in a public gathering, and prac- tically demonstrating that the hearts of Irishmen throb with as pure devotion to our flag as ever animated the hearts of a free and noble peo- ple."26 The Times was thrilled to see such loyalty from a group whose dedication to America was so often questioned.

Despite the initial response, much of the Irish American enthusiasm faded sometime during the night. The audience may have been inspired by Meagher's speech, but, after taking time to reflect, many Irish Amer- icans reconsidered their service to a cause about which they were receiving mixed messages. One possible reason may have been the reports from Irish American soldiers to their families that painted a very different picture of life in the Irish Brigade from that presented by their general.

Irish-born Captain James B. Turner, an aide to Meagher in the 88th New York, offered an excellent example of this. Turner had little positive to say of military service and made this clear to his father, who had voiced an interest in volunteering to earn a steady income. Turner warned,

As to any idea you may have of joining the Army give it up at once. Unless a man occupies a position among the very highest, the amount of vulgarity, profanity and utter tyranny that exist is to a man of any regiment and religious training such as you are, a perfect hell. Then when I see young strong men about me, who hold com- missions, sinking daily and fast under the mingled fatigue, exposure and want of proper nourishment it makes one wish that never a friend of his should be placed in like predicament. Then what must it be in the ranks or even non-commissioned [officers]. It's not like garrison duty. Think of lying, eating, and daily life in a small tent with from seven to ten men none of them the cleanest or with any pretense to education or refinement, then being cursed and cuffed about by some vulgar wretch in authority ... No. [The idea of] sol- diering in any capacity you must give up.27

Turner's descriptions of the rigors of camp life contradicted those Meagher offered at his recruiting speech four nights earlier. Turner's fam- ily, who would have heard the general's speech or read it in the New York Irish-American, must have been surprised at the discrepancy. His camp

26. New York Times, 26 July 1862. 27. James B. Turner to the Turner family, 29 July 1862, and 19 July 1862, James

B. Turner Papers, 1861-1876, New York State Library, Albany, New York.

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descriptions revealed no personal animosity toward Meagher, whom Turner praised in nearly every letter to his family. Nevertheless, he opposed seeing any additional members of his family involved in this war, despite the fact that his father had been unemployed for over a year and could earn significant money through local and state bounties and military pay. Turner was probably not alone in such comments, which could have discouraged enlistments by an Irish American population hearing one image of war from Meagher and a very different story from their loved ones in camp.

As the war continued, so, too, did the cost it exacted from Irish American communities. Irish sons, husbands, and fathers had earned a fierce reputation for fighting that summer, and they maintained that honor on the fields near Antietam Creek in September 1862. Their rep- utation came at a price, though, and as the remnants of the Irish Brigade gathered to ascertain their losses, even the battle-hardened veterans were shocked. The 63rd and 69th New York lost 60 percent of their force, while the 88th New York lost twenty-seven killed and seventy-five wounded.28 Among these New York casualties were seventy-five young men who had responded to Meagher's speeches at the Seventh Regiment Armory just three weeks earlier.29 These losses may have been a credit to the valor and ability of Irish American soldiers, but they had a devas- tating effect on their families and communities at home. Criticisms of Meagher increased, captured in the reflections of one Irish sergeant who described Meagher as "a gentleman and a soldier, but ... he wanted to gain so much praise he would not spare his men."3"

Compounding Irish concerns with casualty rates and the cost to their communities was President Abraham Lincoln's announcement of

the Emancipation Proclamation following the bloody battle. Irishmen envisioned millions of former slaves rushing North to take unskilled labor opportunities from them. Under the Republicans, the Democratic Chicago Times warned, African Americans would "take the place of white laboring men," and the editors reported that two local abolitionists had declared that foreign-born citizens should expect no rights in this country. Indeed, the Times continued, abolitionists challenged the right of Irishmen and Germans to serve in the war. "[W]here abolitionism most abounds," the Chicago Times concluded, "the hatred of foreigners is most intense."31 Similar reports surfaced in the Rock Island (Illinois)

28. Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam (1983; reprint, New York: Book-of-the-Month Club, 1994), 243 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

29. Bilby, Irish Brigade in the Civil War, 60. 30. Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers, 126. 31. Chicago Times, 30 September 1862; Illinois State Register (Springfield), 29

September 1862, 2 October 1862; quoted in Kautz, "Fodder for Cannon," 109-10.

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Weekly Argus, which insisted that Irishmen would soon see an African American's "hand in an Irish potato pot, or his mouth covering the noz- zle of an Irishman's whiskey bottle."32

Irishmen back East voiced a similar response. Irish-born New York Archbishop John Hughes, the leading voice of Irish Catholics in Amer- ica, warned that "we Catholics, and a vast majority of our brave troops in the field, have not the slightest idea of carrying on a war that costs so much blood and treasure just to gratify a clique of Abolitionists."33 Gen- eral Michael Corcoran confided to a friend, "I must acknowledge that I am not as full of hope and confidence as to the probable ultimate result of this most unhappy contest as when I last saw you" due to "the results of the late battles and anticipated results of the Proclamation."34 Irish American Judge Charles Patrick Daly, an avid supporter of the Irish Brigade and active recruiter among the New York Irish community, was equally disgusted by the proclamation, especially since it coincided with a call for the raising of African American regiments in the Union Army. Daly claimed, "If that were done he would wash his hands of the whole matter. ... [R]ecruiting was difficult enough now because of the ever- lasting Negro question."35

Similar reports appeared in the Boston Pilot, which declared the proclamation "violently opposed to the constitution" and warned that it would only incite murderous slave uprisings in the South. "The suppres- sion of abolitionism," wrote the Irish editors, "is necessary to save the Union." The President's actions, they feared, would only lengthen the conflict.36 Rowland Redmond, an Irish American living in New York City, offered a slightly different interpretation of slavery and emancipation to a friend in Ireland. He was not entirely in favor of slavery, but he saw abolitionists as hypocrites. Disgusted with the Northern war effort in November 1862, he wrote, "Did I not often tell you that 'the north cared as little for poor Sambo as a pig did about the national debt.' There are

32. Chicago Times, 30 September 1862; and Rock Island (Illinois) Weekly Argus, 28 October, 5 November, 17 December 1862; quoted in Kautz, "Fodder for Cannon," 109-11.

33. This quote and variations on it are offered in several sources; see James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 507; Edward K. Spann, "Union Green: The Irish Community and the Civil War," in The New York Irish, ed. Ronald H. Bayor and Timothy J. Meagher (Bal- timore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 207.

34. General Michael Corcoran to Judge Charles Patrick Daly, 13 January 1863, Charles P. Daly Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library, New York, New York.

35. Maria Lydig Daly, Diary of a Union Lady, 1861-1865, ed. Harold Earl Ham- mond (1962; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 177, 179 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

36. Boston Pilot, 17 January 1863, 24 January 1863, 13 December 1862.

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a few fanatics who go for abolition which in other words mean the destruction of the Blacks." Redmond had his own solution to the issue of

emancipation: "My notion is ameliorate the condition of the slave and [then enact] the gradual very gradual emancipation." With regard to the Lincoln administration, Redmond was even more direct, insisting there was "not one great mind to direct or control the councils of the country and my chief fear now is that through shear incapacity with its accom- panying self-conceit the country may drift into no one knows what. There is neither capacity to carry on the war nor to make peace. We live in a whirlpool of exaggerations, unscrupulousness and lies."37

During the fall elections of 1862, Northern Irish American leaders began to call for either an armistice to end the bloodshed or new leader- ship to fight the war more effectively. In either case, the Lincoln admin- istration and the Union war effort received sharp criticism in Irish neighborhoods. Boston's Pilot insisted, "The North cannot subdue the spirit of the South; nor could the South . . . subdue the spirit of the North.... Is there no man of potential character in the North to present this principle-this inevitable fact to the people?" Leading elements of Boston's Irish community believed an armistice that would allow a nego- tiated peace was the only solution to a war that had cost so much and settled so little. "What description of union shall we have from the bay- oneting, and sabering, and devastating by the North of the South into peace? A union bursting with all the elements of disunion ... ? [F]or the sake of the UNION, let us have an armistice," the Pilot demanded.38

Peace Democrats did not represent the entire party, but even the War Democrats, who believed in the war but under a Democratic admin- istration, railed against Lincoln's abuse of power and roundly criticized the administration for military ineptitude. Irish-born Richard O'Gor- man, speaking to the Democratic Union Association of New York in October 1862, called for a "vigorous prosecution of the war for Union," while insisting that policies such as the Emancipation Proclamation must end. O'Gorman explained, "The party in power [is] conducting the war in a manner to make Union impossible. The Union for which Democ- rats fought did not mean such a Union as that between Great Britain and Ireland."39 O'Gorman's tremendous popularity among New York Irish Americans, as well as the fact that other Irish leaders voiced similar opinions, indicates a high level of support for such views.

37. Rowland Redmond, New York City, New York, to William Young, Finaghy, Cullybackey, Ballymena, County Antrim, Ireland, 7 November 1862, Rowland Red- mond Letters, D.1364/I, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast (emphasis in the original).

38. Boston Pilot, 11 October 1862, emphasis in the original. 39. New York Times, 9 October 1862.

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As if Democrats were not sufficiently upset over the war, the Lincoln administration's next action further fanned the fires of dissent. On 5

November 1862, President Lincoln relieved General George B. McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac. It was a popular decision among Republicans and some military personnel, including General Henry W. Halleck, who complained of McClellan, "There is an immobil- ity here that exceeds all that any man can conceive of. It requires the lever of Archimedes to move this inert mass," the Army of the Potomac.40 Among Irish Americans, however, the decision was devastat- ing. The Pilot saw Lincoln's decision as tragic, warning "the fate of the Republic is growing darker every day .... The brave general who made the grand army ... has been removed in disgrace."41 Such actions offered further evidence of the ineptness of Lincoln's leadership, the editors argued, and they called on Boston's Irish to oppose the President: "At one time we did support Lincoln; but then he had the full promise of con- stitutionalism about him. He has changed and so have we. It is now every man's duty to disagree with him."42

Irish American soldiers shared that loyalty to McClellan, a man they saw as protecting their lives by avoiding unnecessary casualties, rather than sacrificing them to the administration's and Northern newspapers' demands of "On to Richmond." Many Irish soldiers expressed a willing- ness to abandon the war if McClellan was not their leader. Several days after the general's departure, the New York World published the follow- ing statement by Meagher:

Ah! If the gentlemen of the White House could have seen what I saw this morning - could have heard the cheers from those 100,000 sol- diers which rent the air and deadened the artillery itself as the part- ing salute was fired-they would have felt that a mistake or crime has been committed by them, which the Army of the Union will never forgive.43

Irish American John England, serving in the 9th New York Infantry Regiment, reflected, "Indeed the spirit and patriotism of this army is dying out every day. This is occasioned by the general humbug that's car- ried on, the great want of a proper leader, and lastly by the President's Emancipation Proclamation. I'm sorry for the country-grieved that it

40. General Henry W. Halleck, Washington, D.C., to Governor Hamilton R. Gam- ble, St. Louis, Missouri, 30 October 1862, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: GPO, 1880- 1901), Ser. III, 2:703-4. (Hereinafter cited as OR.)

41. Boston Pilot, 22 November 1862. 42. Ibid., 24 January 1863. 43. New York World, 12 November 1862.

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should come to this."44 Irish American enlisted men, officers, commu- nity leaders, politicians, and newspaper editors expressed these senti- ments frequently that fall. By late 1862 increasing numbers of Northern Irish Americans shared John England's fears of a civilian and military leadership that had created "tens of thousands of orphans whose fathers had given their blood to this country," and had so dramatically altered the war's aims that many Irishmen were no longer willing to support it.45

Amid these feelings of anger and frustration, the Irish Brigade marched toward a small Virginia town along the Rappahannock. As the sun set upon Fredericksburg on 13 December 1862, thousands in Union blue lay dead on Marye's Heights. The Irishmen of the II Corps had par- ticipated in the charge, surging forward bravely and nearly breaching the Confederate defenses. In the end, though, they, too, failed and the cost was enormous, just as it had been throughout the entire campaign sea- son of 1862.

Of the Irish Brigade regiments at the Battle of Fredericksburg, the 69th New York lost 16 of their 18 officers and 112 of 210 men killed, wounded, and missing, of those who entered that battle. They were well on their way to earning the reputation of the New York regiment to lose the most men in action.46 The 116th Pennsylvania lost most of its offi- cers and men, while the 28th Massachusetts, which had just joined the brigade that fall, lost 158 men on the field. In the days following the bat- tle, the Irish Brigade estimated that it had taken 45 percent losses and could muster only 263 men.47

As they reflected on this, a dark depression fell over the men. Father William Corby, an Irish chaplain with the 88th New York, was horrified by the suffering of the Irishmen in his care and declared that "the place into which Meagher's brigade was sent was simply a slaughter-pen." Brigade historian and staff member Captain David P. Conyngham went further, challenging the very idea that such fighting deserved the title of a military engagement: "It was not a battle- it was a wholesale slaugh- ter of human beings-sacrificed to the blind ambition and incapacity of some parties," namely General Ambrose Burnside and, some contended, General Meagher, though both Corby and Conyngham challenged such assertions. Colonel Robert Nugent of the 69th New York agreed with such descriptions of the battle, characterizing that bloody day at Fredericks- burg as a "living hell from which escape seemed scarcely possible."48

44. John England to Ellen Hargedon, 25 January 1863, John England Letters, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.

45. Spann, "Union Green," 202. 46. Fox, Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, 204. 47. Bilby, Irish Brigade in the Civil War, 70. 48. Corby, Memoirs of Chaplain Life, 132; Conyngham, Irish Brigade and Its

Campaigns, 343; Bilby, Irish Brigade in the Civil War, 67.

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The mood of the Irish soldiers and their families at home reflected

the carnage. On 27 December 1862, the New York Irish-American pub- lished a letter Captain William J. Nagle of the 88th New York sent to his father the day after the battle. In it he spoke well of Meagher, but com- plained that their efforts had been wasted. "Irish blood and Irish bones cover that terrible field to-day," Nagle wrote, "The whole-souled enthu- siasm with which General McClellan inspired his army is wanting-his great scientific engineering skill is missing-his humane care for the lives of his men is disregarded. We are slaughtered like sheep, and no result but defeat."49 John England, of the 9th New York Infantry Regi- ment, described the carnage of Fredericksburg as "one of the most fruit- less, destructive, and disastrous battles ever fought on the old or new Continent," and was shocked at the treatment of the wounded, who are "thought no more of than a pack of used up maimed dogs, and treated no better; and hundreds are stiff and cold in death to-day, who would be liv- ing and might recover if properly treated and attended."50

The year ended in darkness for Northern Irish Americans. What had begun so gloriously with the formation of the Irish Brigade found many Irishmen in late 1862 and early 1863 reexamining the direction of the war and their place in it. With the horrendous losses at Antietam and Fredericksburg, combined with Lincoln's controversial Emancipation Proclamation, the decision to relieve McClellan, and rumors of a future federal draft, Irish Americans who had supported the war for the Union and their interests as Irishmen were questioning these goals. Those fight- ing to gain military experience for the future looked about the battle- fields and camps, watching their numbers dwindle as they realized that there would be few Irishmen left to fight such wars. Those of a similar mindset at home read the casualty reports in the papers that fall in a deep sadness. For increasing numbers of Irishmen, the war's cost and its goals were creating a nation they would not wish to call home. It had become a conflict that offered little, but demanded the sacrifice of nearly everything they held dear.

Irish neighborhoods in the North that winter rumbled with com- plaints about the needless sacrifice of Irishmen on the field of battle. Men bitterly criticized the Lincoln administration's new slavery policies and expressed equally sharp comments on the inequities of state drafts and the rumors of an upcoming national draft. The cracks within Irish Amer- ican support for the war burst open during those cold, dark months, fore- shadowing an explosion of riots and protests that would characterize Irish frustrations the following year. As 1863 began an Irish soldier cap-

49. New York Irish-American, 27 December 1862. 50. John England to Ellen Hargeddon, 17 December 1862, John England Letters,

U.S. Army, 1814-1862, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.

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tured the mood that permeated Irish America: "All is dark, and lone- some, and sorrow hangs as a shroud over us all."51

Similar sentiments surfaced among Irish soldiers in the Midwest that winter. Peter Casey, of the Irish 23rd Illinois, complained, "Black aboli- tionism is potent in our times." Referring to the Union Army high com- mand and expressing his concern over rumors that James Mulligan, the 23rd's Irish American commander, was planning to leave the regiment and would be replaced by a non-Irishman, Casey insisted, "They will not give us a chance of that kind, [and] others not worthy of confidence will fill the high places which is about all they want or care for. The Negro and not the welfare of the country is what most engrosses their minds and perhaps when all is over they will turn their attention to the burn- ing of convents and churches as they have done before."52 Irish Sergeant Major M. W. Toale of the 65th Illinois made charges of prejudice as well, claiming that he had been up for a number of well-earned promotions endorsed by his commanders, but a higher-ranking officer always man- aged to stop him, and Toale suspected the reason was his Irish heritage. He asked Colonel Mulligan to "bring me to a regiment where 'national- ity' will [not] debar a 'brave man' from holding the position [he] merits, and where '35 miles of water' will no longer separate me from the fel- lowship of my brother soldiers."53 Similar reports came from Captain R. T. Farrell fighting near Grand Junction, Tennessee. He had written Mul- ligan of similar problems two years earlier and now insisted that "an Irishman, particularly a Catholic, has a devilish hard road to tread when not in an Irish regiment."54

When Thomas Francis Meagher returned to New York that January for a high mass recognizing the sacrifices of the Irish Brigade, he found evidence of similar disillusionment. Irish newspapers spoke of the com- munity mourning their husbands, fathers, and sons, and challenged the idea of sending more Irishmen into a cause many had come to question and under the direction of leaders they did not trust. The most popular Irish paper in the city warned Meagher that his visit, which included continued recruiting efforts, would work only "if men can yet be found

51. New York Irish-American, 10 January 1863. 52. Private Peter Casey, 23rd Illinois, New Creek, Virginia, to Colonel James A.

Mulligan, Chicago, Illinois, 23 March 1863, Mulligan Papers, Chicago Historical Soci- ety.

53. M. W. Toale, Camp Douglas, Chicago, Illinois, to James A. Mulligan, Chicago, Illinois, 10 February 1863, Mulligan Papers, Chicago Historical Society.

54. Captain R. T. Farrell, Grand Junction, Tennessee, to Colonel James A. Mul- ligan, 8 February 1863, folder 2, box 2, Mulligan Papers, Chicago Historical Society (emphasis in the original).

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to volunteer in a war-the conduct of which reflects anything but credit on those who have undertaken its management."55

Unknown to many Irishmen, Meagher faced resistance in several quarters. The Lincoln administration had joined those opposed to the general's efforts because they disapproved not of more troops, but rather of Meagher's methods in locating and using them. The exchange between the President, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, and Meagher indi- cates that the White House had tired of its political generals. One issue of special concern was leave time for the Irish Brigade. Sometimes Meagher did not receive responses to his requests to lead his brigade home for a well-deserved rest, and at others, War Department officials explained that there were not enough troops in the field to grant the brigade's request. When Meagher argued that other units were receiving such leaves, again, the response was silence.56

Meagher did manage to secure several brief trips from camp for him- self, but then he made the mistake of returning late to camp and having to face trial on charges of being absent without leave before a court mar- tial. In another order that allowed Meagher a medical leave in Baltimore or Philadelphia, the general traveled instead to New York, where he made several public appearances. Following a brief return to the field in May 1863 to lead his dwindling Irish Brigade, numbering only 520 men, at the Battle of Chancellorsville, Meagher feared the unit would be disbanded and he would lose his command unless he did something dramatic. In a letter indicating his dedicated service and sad frustration with the Lin- coln administration, Meagher tendered his resignation. This time the War Department's response was prompt and brief: we accept.57

For many Irish civilian leaders and soldiers, Meagher's resignation was the only honorable response to an ungrateful, prejudiced adminis- tration. The general public knew little or nothing of the conversations between Stanton, Lincoln, and Meagher, or of the latter's violations of command. All that Northern Irish Americans knew was that years of Irish sacrifice had not convinced the War Department to even acknowl- edge Meagher's requests for leave for his men. When individuals argued that the Union was in too precarious a position to allow whole brigades leaves of absence, Irish Americans pointed to units from other states that

55. New York Irish-American, 27 December 1862. 56. The entire exchange between Meagher and the Lincoln administration is

outlined in my book The Harp and the Eagle: Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New York: New York University Press, forthcoming 2005).

57. In January 1864, Meagher returned to duty as a major general, assigned to organize a division comprised of soldiers recovering from wounds, stragglers, and oth- ers. In January 1865 he and his division participated in minor operations in North Carolina until he was relieved from duty for drunkenness in February and returned home to New York. Meagher officially resigned this commission in May 1865.

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secured such periods of rest. So while the government responded to the requests of native-born commanders and expressed concern for their Protestant troops, some Irish Americans argued, they failed to grant sim- ilar attention to Irish-Catholic soldiers. Capturing this mood, the New York Irish-American charged, "If the Brigade were not so markedly and distinctively Irish, they would not have been treated with the positive injustice and neglect to which they have been exposed."58

Irish American community leaders, politicians, officers, and enlisted men resented what they saw as total disrespect from leading Republi- cans. The Pilot reflected, "there is an aching void in our hearts; a sad sense of neglect, if not of wrong done to us and our living comrades; of indifference and coldness toward the memory of our noble immortal dead, whose bones lie on every battle-field from Yorktown to the last and most fatal days at Chancellorsville." The men of the Irish Brigade had fought valiantly and heroically, knowing, as one soldier recalled, that they would be heroes upon their return home. There was, however, lit- tle evidence of this. As Captain Nagle of the 88th New York explained, "It was this that made every man determined to excel at Fredericksburg, and prove by our deeds, if any further proof could be necessary, even with our small numbers, how worthy we were of the consideration and kind offices of the government." That May they discovered that their ser- vice had achieved none of this.59

The men of the brigade, Nagle told his father, felt anger, sorrow, and bitterness when they learned of Meagher's resignation. "Am I not right in saying," he asked,

that in any other country the brigade which had fought and suffered as this has would be gratefully and proudly cherished, its ranks kept full, its deeds of heroism acknowledged and rewarded? We asked nei- ther reward nor favor, only what was right-just to the government, and for the advancement and good of the cause in which we had staked life and reputation. It was denied us, and the Irish Brigade is blotted out of the army of the Union.60

Nagle argued that Irish Americans sought only "what was right" in return for their service, and that he did not view this as a reward or favor, but simply fair treatment that Irishmen had earned. The noncommis- sioned officers of Nagle's regiment went so far as to issue an official state- ment expressing their regret that Meagher's resignation was the only means possible to maintain the honor and integrity of the brigade. The officers of the 116th Pennsylvania argued that with Meagher's resig- nation, "we have been deprived of a leader whom we all would have

58. New York Irish-American, 14 March 1863. 59. Boston Pilot, 30 May 1863. 60. Ibid., 30 May 1863.

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followed to death." Some questioned whether they, too, should resign, and as the general departed from camp, they assured Meagher of their support.61

Leading members of the Irish American community expressed their anger more boldly. Reflecting the growing disillusionment that spring, the Pilot cried, "We are an emigrant race; we did not cause this war; vast numbers of our people have perished in it. ... [T]he Irish spirit for the war is dead! Absolutely dead!"62 The editors argued that despite Meagher's countless attempts to strengthen the Irish Brigade, he received no support from the War Department. Secretary Stanton, the editors charged, "has shown his porcine proclivities to their full extent" in this matter, "but not for the first time." Despite the fact that "General Meagher [had] fully informed him of the condition of the gallant brigade

. . Secretary Stanton took no notice of his representations."63 Such clear disregard for the Irish, the editors warned, would not be forgotten. "The Irish will never forgive this extreme want to decorum. It will remain in their memory with national bitterness, as the deaths of their warriors will with national regret," wrote the Pilot. "Such sentiments will have their effect." That effect included diminished Irish support for the war.64

While Northern Irish leaders were lamenting, "How bitter to Ireland has been this rebellion! It has exterminated a generation of its warriors," they faced a new challenge: the nation's first federal draft.65 In March 1863, when Congress passed the Enrollment Act, Irish community lead- ers in Boston pointed out that, unlike the previous state drafts, this law targeted aliens. Rumors circulated around the city that immigrants who had declared their intention to become American citizens had sixty-five days after the passage of the Enrollment Act to leave the country before they became eligible for the draft, and reviews of the law confirmed this. The Pilot complained, "most [aliens] cannot get away in that time. Many of them are here, too, under the advice of Secretary [of State William H.] Seward."66

Such remarks reflected an ongoing debate in immigrant and Democ- ratic papers about Secretary Seward's response to questions from the British government regarding how the U.S. draft would apply to British subjects. In August 1862, Seward had explained, "[N]one but citizens are liable to military duty in [the United States], and ... this department has

61. Cavanagh, Memoirs of Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, 28-32. 62. Boston Pilot, 30 May 1863. 63. Ibid., 23 May 1863. 64. Ibid., 30 May 1863. 65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., 23 May 1863.

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never regarded an alien who may have merely declared his intention to become a citizen as entitled to a passport, and consequently, has always withheld from persons of that character any such certificates of citizen- ship."67 But the Enrollment Act in March 1863 changed the laws so that "persons of foreign birth who shall have declared on oath their intention to become citizens" and were twenty- to forty-five-year-old males were eli- gible for the draft. The Pilot found such revisions shameful and chastised Seward for tricking the British government into encouraging emigration so that the United States could have fodder for its war while preserving the lives of its more respectable citizens. This was, declared the editors, "a miserable Yankee trick to entice over here 'food for powder.'"68

Irish American soldier John England agreed, arguing that he was not opposed to the concept of a draft so much as the inequity of this system. The law, he insisted, "was framed for the benefit of the rich and the dis- advantage of the poor. For instance-a rich conscript can commute for $300! Now, it is a fact well known to all that there are some rich animals in the northern cities who can afford to lose $300, as much as some poor people can afford to lose one cent." For Irish Americans in the latter cat- egory, the Enrollment Act revealed a war that held nothing for them but prejudice, sacrifice, and death. England warned that the "conscription law, no matter how constructed, can never become popular, for it is the last alternative of an unpopular cause," and a cause in which many working-class Irish Americans, those most significantly affected by the bill, would refuse to participate.69

As increasing numbers of Irish Americans reflected on perceived injustices perpetrated by native-born Americans against Irish men and women, they became more and more opposed to the draft. In the Mid- west, a Democratic convention pledged, "we will resist to the death all attempts to draft any of our citizens into the army." New Yorkers were equally determined, with editor James McMaster of the Catholic Free- man's Journal proclaiming for himself and the Irish-Catholic commu- nity, "when the President called upon them to go and carry on a war for the nigger, he would be d d if he believed they would go." New York's Democratic Governor Horatio Seymour supported this as he warned Republicans, "Remember this-that the bloody and treasonable doctrine of public necessity can be proclaimed by a mob as well as by a govern- ment."70 The New York City draft riots of 13-17 July 1863 proved him

67. Ibid., 30 May 1863. 68. Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North (Madi-

son: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971), 308; and Boston Pilot, 30 May 1863. 69. John England to Mr. Hargeddon, 28 March 1863, John England Letters, Man-

uscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library. 70. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 609.

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prophetic. In five days of terror, various groups of New Yorkers, many of them Irish American unskilled laborers, voiced their opposition to the draft, emancipation, the Republican administration, and the war in gen- eral. When the violence subsided, it was clear that the memory of it, and especially the significant role played by Irishmen in those bloody July days, would not be forgotten.

New York diarist George Templeton Strong, representative of promi- nent New York Republican businessmen, characterized the rioters as "Stalwart young vixens and withered old hags ... swarming everywhere, all cursing the 'bloody draft' and egging on their men to mischief." Strong described the mob as entirely Irish, depicting "thirty-four lousy, black- guardly Irishmen with a tail of small boys . . . [and] a handful of canaille." To Strong and many other wealthy native-born New Yorkers, the Irish were "brutal, base, cruel, cowards, and as insolent as [they were] base." Reflecting on the riots, Strong mused, "No wonder St. Patrick drove all the venomous vermin out of Ireland! Its biped mam- malia supply that island its full average share of creatures that crawl and eat dirt and poison every community they infest."71

In addition to characterizing the rioters as largely Irish savages, Republican papers like the New York Times had no patience with the theory that the participants' main purpose was to protest the draft. By the second day of the riots, the Times reported, "'Resistance to the draft' was the flimsiest of veils to cover the wholesale plundering which char- acterized the operations of the day."72 Indeed, the Times chastised any- one who sought to defend the mob. The New York World, for example, had concluded, "We charge it plainly upon the radical journals of this City" that by supporting the Lincoln administration and offering no sym- pathy to Democratic opposition, papers like the Times had contributed to the explosion of rage witnessed in New York. The Times was disgusted, responding that there was no defense for such violence, and they were not to blame for simply discussing the political and social aspects of this conflict.73 When a New York laborer and rioter made an effort to explain the mob's perspective, the Times was equally impatient. Writing to the paper as "A Poor Man, but a Man for all that," the rioter argued,

You will no doubt be hard on us rioters tomorrow morning, but that 300-dollar law has made us nobodies, vagabonds, and cast-outs of society, for whom nobody cares when we must go to war and be shot down. We are the poor rabble, and the rich rabble is our enemy by

71. George Templeton Strong, Diary of the Civil War, 1860-1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1962), 336, 342-43.

72. New York Times, 15 July 1863, and 19 July 1863. 73. Ibid., 16 July 1863.

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"Remember Your Country and Keep Up Its Credit"

this law. Therefore we will give our enemy battle right here, and ask no quarter. Although we got hard fists, and are dirty without, we have soft hearts, and have clean consciences within, and that's the reason we love our wives and children more than the rich, because we got not much besides them and we will not go and leave them at home for to starve. Until that draft law is repealed I for one am willing to knock down more such rum-hole politicians as [Superintendent of Police John A.] Kennedy. Why don't they let the nigger kill the slave- driving race and take possession of the South as it belongs to them.74

Another letter to the editor, signed "A Poor Man," argued the inequality of the exemption clause, writing "If this is not releasing the rich and placing the burden of the war exclusively on the poor, I should like to know what would be." Again the Times had no sympathy, explain- ing that the three hundred dollars paid by the wealthy to escape drafted service would be distributed among the poor to induce volunteers, and in the process would increase their pay by hundreds of dollars: "Not a single poor man will be drafted now who would not be if this $300 exemption clause were not in the law. But a great many would miss the $300 which now they can obtain as a bounty for volunteering."75

Thus the debate continued. Most Irish Americans defended the moti-

vations behind the Irish rioters, while leading native-born Americans expressed a renewed belief that the Irish were a dangerous, undeserving people who could never be trusted. Nativists ignored the fact that Irish- born Paddy McCafferty helped rescue the young boys and girls from the rioters who destroyed the Colored Orphan Asylum. Nor did they recog- nize Irish American officer Robert Nugent, who tried to enforce the draft, or Irish American Captain Henry O'Brien, who lost his life in an effort to protect New Yorkers' property. Peter Welsh, a member of the 28th Mass- achusetts and the Irish Brigade, actually supported the draft, even with the exemption clause. "No conscription could be fairer" than that pro- posed in 1863, Welsh claimed, adding "It would be impossible to frame it to satisfy every one. And those drafted men may never have to fight a battle." Through conscription, Welsh believed, "the war will either be settled or the skulking blowers at home will have to come out and do their share of the fighting." When those "skulkers" included Irish Amer- icans, Welsh did not change his tone. He commended the use of canister and grape shot in putting down the New York City draft riots, and while regretting that many of the rioters were Irish, he regretted more their actions. "God help the Irish," Welsh prayed, "They are to easily led into such snares which give their enemys an opportunity to malighn and

74. Ibid., 15 July 1863. 75. Ibid.

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abuse them."76 Welsh was more the exception than the rule, but there were Irish American volunteers expressing such thoughts.

Even more, however, spoke out against the draft and the war itself. Boston's Pilot had been arguing since 1862 that "Aliens are under no obligation to fight our battles; and no one has a right to make the small- est objection to them for refusing to do so .... [W]hen a war is raging ... non-citizens of a country cannot be morally required to expose them- selves to mutilation and death for it." The Pilot reminded its readers of

all of the past wrongs inflicted on Irishmen by the native-born public and all that continued to be withheld from them, questioning why an alien would ever wish to offer his service and his life for such a nation. The

editors argued:

It is going too far to require an alien-a recent emigrant-to go to battle. We refuse aliens the right of voting, the right of holding office, and if they wanted passports for foreign travel, not one could they get. The aliens who came to vote would be knocked down at the polls, and then imprisoned; the alien who held office, would be hunted from it by every description of violence; and the alien who looked for the protection of our government would not get it. What right then have we to be severe with aliens for not enlisting?77

In response to these developments and culminating with the riots of 1863, native-born Americans stopped celebrating Irish military tradi- tions, fighting abilities, and other examples of ethnic pride, and they returned to the antebellum descriptions of the Irish as "disturbing char- acters" who upset the "community order."78 While many Americans saw this declining Irish support for the war as a betrayal, most Irish Ameri- cans considered it an act of loyalty and honor by remaining faithful to their fellow Irishmen even if this meant abandoning the Union cause. A sense of responsibility to their heritage and families in Ireland and Amer- ica had inspired Irishmen to wear Union blue, and it was these same dual loyalties that led to their eventual opposition to that cause.79

A combination of all of these events contributed to the declining Irish support for the Union war effort, and these tensions escalated through 1864 and 1865, as the ranks of the Irish Brigade continued to thin, along with Irish enlistments. Those Irishmen entering service dur- ing the final two years of the war appear to have been much more inter- ested in the enlistment bonuses than matters of Irish nationalism or

76. Kohl and Richard, Irish Green and Union Blue, 110, 113, 115. 77. Boston Pilot, 13 September 1862, emphasis in the original. 78. These characterizations are presented in David T. Knobel, Paddy and the

Republic: Ethnicity and Nationality in Antebellum America (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1986), 76, 78.

79. Lawrence J. McCaffrey, The Irish Catholic Diaspora in America (Washing- ton: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 7-8.

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"Remember Your Country and Keep Up Its Credit"

saving America for future generations of Irish refugees. By the summer of 1864, the New York Irish-American informed its readers of the despair spreading through the ranks, quoting the sentiments of one soldier that the Irish Brigade "was a Brigade no longer." It appeared that soon the brigade would exist only in the "recollection[s] of its services and suf- ferings."80 The brigade did survive, but the veterans noticed that the new men filling the ranks lacked the determination and discipline of those who had joined two years earlier, and it would be difficult to maintain the unit's superb record.81 Following the Battle of Spotsylvania in May 1864, for example, Irish-born Colonel Matthew Murphy reported that he could account for sixteen-hundred men of the Irish Brigade, many now draftees rather than volunteers, but "the remainder ... [were] drunk on the road."82 After the Battle of Reams' Station in August 1864, Brigadier General Francis C. Barlow, commanding the 1st Division of the Army of the Potomac, complained that when he ordered the Irish Brigade to fill a break in the line during the battle, the Irishmen "behaved disgracefully and failed to execute my orders. They crowded off to our right into the shelter of some woods, and there became shattered and broken to pieces."83

In October 1864 Army officials witnessed similar disinterest in ser- vice from large elements of the Irish American community in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, where four hundred to five hundred deserters and drafted men were refusing to report for service. The men developed a system of attacking cavalry detachments attempting to arrest them, fir- ing upon soldiers and then rushing into the safety of the thickly wooded hills. U.S. Army officers reported that these men were predominantly Irish and that they were committing various acts of violence ranging from breaking into private homes to beating wounded soldiers.84

This disillusionment was not unique to Irish-Catholic soldiers. Irish- born Protestant William Reese, living in Youngstown, Ohio, opposed vehemently the reelection of Abraham Lincoln in the fall of 1864. As he explained to a friend in Ireland, "General G. B. McClellan has been nom- inated for President by the Democratic Party and such an excitement as this you ever saw. The Democratic Party thinks ... Old Abe is now polit- ically dead and his funeral will take place in November next .... But mortification has already set in. Scared of 'Little Mac.'" To Reese, the

80. New York Irish-American, 2 June 1864. 81. Conyngham, Irish Brigade and Its Campaigns, 467. 82. OR, Ser. I, vol. 36, pt. 1, p. 72. 83. Ibid., Ser. I, vol. 42, pt. 1, p. 248. 84. Ibid., Ser. I, vol. 43, pt. 1, pp. 480-82. See also Grace Palladino, Another

Civil War: Labor, Capital, and the State in the Anthracite Regions of Pennsylvania, 1840-1880 (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1990).

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war had become one for abolition at the cost of poor men unable to escape service. Sharing a song that he explained was "Commonly Called Abe Doodle," it summarized the mood in camp for many Irish volun- teers: "Let Union-Constitution slide/ But give us Abe & Shoddy \ More than five 100 thousand men \ He has butchered up in war, Sir \ And for the wooly headed tribe \ We'll kill as many more, Sir. \ So let poor men as conscripts go \ And leave their wives neglected, \ Hurrah for Abraham the Great \ He must be re elected."85

Irish Americans like Reese continued to voice their disillusionment

with the Union war effort through their support of Democratic presiden- tial candidate McClellan. Some hoped his victory would secure an armistice, while others insisted that McClellan would redirect the war away from issues of emancipation and back to the original matter of Union. Regardless of his policies, the Pilot insisted that he would be an improvement over the Republicans, who saw the Irish as useful for noth- ing better "than being reduced to dust and being made food for gunpow- der."86 When the election came, Irishmen turned out in large numbers for McClellan. In some areas of New York, including the heavily Irish Sixth Ward, McClellan received 90 percent of the vote, while the entire city went to him with more than a two-to-one majority.87 It was not enough, however, to secure his victory. In fact, Irish Americans discov- ered they were in a clear minority of a country that overwhelmingly reelected President Lincoln.

McClellan's defeat was a defeat for the Irish, who would pay the price for their continuing loyalty to the Democratic Party and their criticism of the President and the war in general for years to come. For many Republicans, abolitionists, and African Americans, Lincoln's assassina- tion on 14 April 1865, Good Friday, following Confederate General Robert E. Lee's surrender five days earlier on Palm Sunday, made the President almost Christ-like. Anyone who had criticized or challenged the martyred Lincoln was seen as partly responsible for his death and the nation's suffering. For years to come, the Irish would be punished for this and for their loyalty to the Democratic Party, which would be so commonly associated by Republicans with the Confederacy, violence, and treason.88

85. William Thomas Reese, Youngstown, Ohio, to unknown friend named John?, County Down, Ireland, 20 September 1864, Private Collection of Kerby A. Miller, Ph.D., Department of History, University of Missouri, Columbia (emphasis in the original).

86. Boston Pilot, 17 September 1864. 87. Spann, "Union Green," 208. 88. Several historians have made the argument regarding Lincoln's martyrdom,

including James McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2001), 521.

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"Remember Your Country and Keep Up Its Credit"

It is essential to understand Irish support for Irish interests when studying their role in the Union war effort, though this should not be overemphasized to the point where readers see every Irish American sol- dier as a Fenian. Their motivations were based fundamentally on what was most important to them and to their families, as both Irishmen and Americans, and for many of these immigrants, these blended loyalties defined their identity. It shaped how they viewed the war and how they responded to it. When the cause of Union complemented the desires and aspirations of the Irish American community, they supported the North- ern war effort. When the interests of Irish America clashed with these

goals, however, many Irishmen abandoned that cause. The Irish would pay for their perceived disloyalty in the years following the war, despite the challenges they voiced. In the end, though, one could argue that this tenacious, clan-like loyalty of Irish Americans for Irish America paid off. Their numbers were so great and their unity so lasting that they became a powerful force in American politics, economics, and religion. The jour- ney would be long and difficult, but it was all part of the tumultuous rela- tionship between Ireland and America, between the Harp and the Eagle.

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