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Religious and Theologically Motivated Terrorism: Part 2Religious and Theologically Motivated Terrorism: Part 2

Slide 1 Opening Credits Music

Slide 2 Religious and Theologically Motivated Terrorism, Part II By Dave Brannan

Slide 3 Contemporary Religious Terrorism In the previous module, we addressed the general motivations and ideologies that drive today’s religious terrorists. This module will build on that framework in order to create a more in-depth understanding of contemporary religious terrorist groups and their belief systems.

It is difficult to consider religious and theologically motivated terrorism in the United States without the focus turning toward Islam. The 9/11 attacks forced many to consider religious motivations for political violence for the first time, and in so doing turned our attentions toward a religion that was very foreign to many in the US But we would be wrong to believe that Islam alone is capable of supporting terrorism. To that end, this module will now consider specific examples of religious groups that have supported terrorist violence.

Slide 4 Christian Identity Theology For example, Christian Identity theology has supported terrorist violence in the US and elsewhere. Although most Identity groups and believers are not terrorists and would not say that they support terrorism, the theology and group sociology is primarily considered in “studies” literature.

Christian Identity theology groups are often associated with the KKK, Aryan Nations, and other racially motivated ideologies from the extreme right. The theology insists that the lost tribes of Biblical Israel are found today in the white races from Europe and North America. Identity theology adherents believe that the “White-Adamic-man” is, as a race, the true recipient of the covenantal blessings promised to Israel in the Christian Bible. Identity literature and believers suggest that the lost tribes of Israel went north into and throughout Europe and the white races found there today—and their extension in the US—are the true people of God, the literal Israel of God.

Slide 5 Seed-line and Non-seed

Identity theology can be understood as four distinct types: Repentant Seed-line, Rebellious Seed-line, Repentant Non-Seed, and Rebellious Non-Seed. Each of these is based on textual interpretation of certain passages of the Bible coupled with local practice, and while some forms of theology do not support extra-judicial violence of any kind, others do. As an illustration of how theology and religion can be understood through Social Identity Theory—Identity theology provides an excellent canvas.

All these theological imperatives are racially discerned and thus counter to enlightened western values. As such, it can be dangerous for researcher of these groups to provide distinction between the types of Identity beliefs for fear of being labeled racist or in some way supporting racism in making those distinctions. But the issue needs to be addressed by homeland security officials and researchers, if for no other reason than resource allocation. Some of these theological types are potentially dangerous while others are not; to treat all without regard to violence is unhelpful for policy reasons, and potentially does violence to the ideals of free religious belief in the US.

Slide 6 Rebellious Seed-line The violent manifestations within Identity groups have been primarily associated with Aryan Nations and some groups of the Ku Klux Klan. These spring from an idiosyncratic understanding of Chapters 2 and 3 of Genesis in conjunction with their understanding of the implications of Romans 13. Using hermeneutics not accepted by mainstream Christianity, the Seed-line Identity adherents interpret these passages as saying that only white men are human, while all other races are either sub-human animals, or, in the case of those who identify themselves as “Jewish,” are the offspring of the Devil—the product of a sexual union between Eve and the Devil. Though this belief is impossible for many modern Christians to find rational, the theology continues to find acceptance in both the US and in other countries such as Canada, South Africa and Australia.

The Rebellious Seed-line Identity adherents in particular have committed crimes and terror attacks in the name of God. These attacks have included bombings, assassinations, robberies, counterfeit schemes and other criminal acts in support of their groups. Some of the more notable groups have included the Covenant, Sword, Arm of the Lord (a Missouri based group which was involved in a nearly two week stand off with the FBI SWAT teams), and The Order (whose members sought to break away from the US and create a Whites-only homeland in the Northwest).

Slide 7 Patron and Client For Identity theology adherents of all kinds, the ultimate patron in the patron-client relationship is God. By considering God their patron, adherents of this religion see their idiosyncratic understanding of biblical text as absolute authority. The religious in-group is defined in absolute terms by those who understand their world through the lens of Identity theology. People outside that absolute understanding of the world and world events are necessarily counter to their vision of god—the patron—and are thus the enemy. In the apocalyptically charged and cosmic view of the group, these distinctions make almost any action not only legitimate, but mandatory for the “true” believer.

Slide 8 Christian Identity Theology (cont.)

Americans do not normally associate Christianity with terrorism, but as we have previously discussed, using specific hermeneutics to interpret key texts can lead to theological justification for violent acts. Non-Seed Identity adherents may not be prone to terrorist violence and do not hold the same interpretation of the Genesis passages, yet they still believe that God has formed a special covenantal relationship with the white races.

Analysts must therefore use caution when researching these issues. The difference between a theology that supports terrorism in the name of God and one that does not (but may conflict with mainstream values and therefore be suspect) can be determined by what would appear to be small or inconsequential issues to the untrained eye. The in-group may well express their beliefs in language that is offensive to the mainstream but still not be potential terrorists. Distinguishing between the various socially constructed groups is difficult but worthwhile if authorities are to avoid wasting resources or violating minority group rights.

When analyzing various Christian Identity theology in-groups—and indeed any religiously motivated terrorist groups—it is important to recognize that what may appear to be a unified movement can in fact be highly divergent at the local level. Christian Identity groups are certainly not unified in either their understanding of theological interpretation or what interpretation means in relation to group actions, but each of these groups has something similar or transferable.

Slide 9 The Christian Identity Paradigm First, Christian Identity groups get a sense of absolute and unifying cohesion from their religious devotion. Their sense of group identity is derived from a shared understanding of something they believe is ordained by God, operating outside of politics and temporal issues. That common understanding gives these groups a sense of absolute assurance in their “rightness,” so that holding a different view immediately makes one an enemy. A second important provision of their theological understanding is a common pool of indoctrinated people for terrorist recruitment and resource provision. This can be easily seen in the virtual world of the Internet where legal but racially prejudiced websites seek to indoctrinate people anonymously, thereby providing a pool from which resources can be accessed for terrorist activity. Thirdly, Identity groups benefit from their idiosyncratic understanding of authoritative sacred text, as it allows followers to take actions without fear of doing something contrary to their perceived religious morality. Their religious worldview allows them to violate what is considered socially taboo--often illegal actions—that social pressures would otherwise prevent them from doing. The three issues we identified in this analysis—group cohesion, a common pool for recruitment and resources, and theological justification for illegal actions—are each directly identified by the framework discussed earlier in the module.

Slide 10 Jewish Extremism Let’s now move on to an international case to see how our framework provides analysis and insight on a very different religious terror group. We’ve already established that religious terrorism reaches back from the modern age to at least 70 A.D. When we started this study, we were reminded that most religions have provided ideological support for terrorism, and that some of the earliest religious terrorists were Jewish. The Jewish Zealots under 1st century Roman rule were an early example, but more contemporary examples are considered here. Take for instance the “Bloc of the Faithful,” or Gush Emunim, an Israeli right wing ultranationalist, religious and political revitalization movement formed in March 1974 in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. Gush Emunim followers received prior religious blessing for

their actions from those within the group who saw their attack as legitimate. One attack carried out by Gush Emunim members in the occupied West Bank town of Hebron resulted in the deaths of three Arabs, in addition to the wounding of thirty-three more Arab students. It is important to note that these attacks were not predicated upon nationalist reasons. The terrorists carrying out the attack sought only religious dispensation for their actions, not civil impunity or justification. New York-born Rabbi Mier Kahane, who was assassinated by a Muslim terrorist in 1999, preached a racial message of God-ordained hatred toward Arabs. The Gush Emunim attack in Hebron, was carried out by members of Gush Emunim who were also influenced by Kahane's theologically motivated message of hatred toward Muslims. His followers saw the modern state of Israel as a return to the Jewish, theocratic rule of biblical Israel. Kahane justified attacks against the Arab population living in Palestine saying; “Why is it that we do not comprehend that it’s precisely our refusal to deal with the Arabs according to halakhic obligation that will bring down on our heads terrible sufferings?” The Halakah Kahane mentions refers to Jewish law and jurisprudence. Thus, rather than being politically or nationalistically motivated, the Rabbi displayed an intense religious devotion to his perceived “truth”--that Arabs were the enemy and should be handled according to his interpretation of ancient Jewish law. The actions the Gush Emunim members took in attacking Arab students is part of a challenge and response paradigm in which they made honor claims against their foe through challenges justified according to their theological understanding of the Biblical text. Just as we saw in the Christian Identity interpretation of text, Kahane used an idiosyncratic hermeneutic to come to this conclusion. Most rabbis, however—even ultra-nationalist ones—do not hold this same interpretation of their sacred text.

Slide 11 Jewish Extremism (continued) Following WWII, the creation of Israel as a state was realized and assisted by Allied nations, in part seeking to rectify the atrocities of the Holocaust. Located in the land of biblical Israel, the secular state of Israel provided, and continues to provide, powerful religious imagery in the struggle between both secular and religious Jews and their neighboring Arab states. Rabbi Mier Kahane emigrated from the United States to Israel in 1971. While nationalist feelings were important to Kahane and his followers, it was textual interpretation that guided their actions. They saw existing civil law as insufficient to protect or respond to real and perceived grievances from Arabs and Muslims. Their interpretation of religious text, allowed them to characterize their actions as religious duty, not civil disobedience. For Kahane and the terrorists he inspired devotion to religious text and belief systems outweighed existing political realities. Instead of waiting on political change, Gush terrorists sought to assist God by taking violent action against their enemies--God’s enemies. Theological imperative was the primary issue for followers of this belief system, and in this case, proved to be a motivation even more powerful than nationalism. For students using Social Identity Theory as an explanatory framework for analysis, the Cultural markers of Honor / Shame, Limited Good, Challenge / Response and the Patron / Client relationship are key to understanding the actions from outside the group. The limited good of the group is wrapped up in the control of the Promised Land. Indeed, the group’s honor is tied to protecting their Patron—in this case God—by responding to what the group perceives as an honor challenge by Arabs living and working in that Promised Land. The in- group is clearly defined by theological understanding in the eyes of Kahane’s Gush followers and Arabs become more than just an out- group by definition—they become the enemy of God. Violence taken by the group or individuals that see themselves as a part of the Gush Emunim in-group can actually build in-group cohesion through the use of violence against perceived out-groups like Muslims and Arabs, regardless of the their actions.

Slide 12 Islamic Threat: Al Qa’ida leads As we have discussed throughout our study, religious terrorism comes in many forms and stems from many different religions. Since the 9/11 attacks, we as a Western society have thought often about radical Islam’s support for terrorist attacks against the United States. However, Islamic terrorism is not a cohesive force mobilizing against the West, and the US would be wise to not write it off as such.

Rather, many divisions exist between different Islamic groups and belief systems. The obvious schism between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam is the most basic starting point. Further cultural and local divisions within groups make it even more difficult for analysts to accurately disentangle the differences between Islamic motivations and groups.

Al-Qa’ida, meaning “the base,” was led by Osama bin Laden until he was killed by US Navy SEALS in May 2011. Since bin-Laden’s death, it is believed that the central core of al-Qa’ida, operating from Eastern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan region known as the FATA, or Federally Administrated Tribal Area, has been led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. It is important to note that al-Zawahiri doesn’t instill the same patron / client relationship with followers that bin-Laden did. Zawahiri’s failed Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization merged with al-Qa’ida in part because of al-Zawahiri’s failure in the patron role.

Al-Qa’ida is perhaps the most notorious international terrorist organization of all time. By concurrently assailing four aircraft to attack the Pentagon and both towers of the World Trade Center in New York, al-Qa’ida executed the most spectacular attack by a sub-national terrorist organization against a nation state. Nearly 3,000 people were killed, and the event was quickly labeled a religiously motivated terrorist attack. This fact was reaffirmed by bin Laden shortly after the attacks and repeatedly in years since.

Slide 13 The Al Qa’ida Doctrine Bin Laden frequently gave thanks to God for the success of the attacks, openly stating that it was made possible because al-Qa’ida had God on their side. Bin Laden and the other members of what we will refer to as “al-Qa’ida Central” (meaning that they are the root of the now-branded movement) are Sunni Muslims. Their belief system has been informed by the theology of 18th century of Wahhabist Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula. Wahhabism is a particularly fundamentalist, austere and rigid form of Islam practiced by some Saudi and other various Muslim believers. Some have called the particular brand of Islam followed by bin Laden, al-Qa’ida, and others, as “Takfir Salifism.” Takfir followers are known for accusing others claiming to be Muslims as, in fact, apostate to “true” Islam. But while others outside the movement might make this distinction, al-Qa’ida members and others who claim the ideology insist that their belief system is simply “true Islam.”

In general, Sunni Islam, with the Wahhabist and Salifist movements specifically, can be tied to a fundamentalist understanding of the Quranic text.

In particular, al-Qa’ida’s agenda can be reduced to three essential elements or goals:

The establishment of an Islamic state governed by Shari’a law as interpreted by their religious leaders alone; The liberation of Muslim lands from all “aggressors,” as they define those aggressors; and,

The actualization of a social contract between leaders and followers based on strict adherence of Islamic laws and principles--in other words, the re-establishment of the Muslim Caliphate. This Caliphate rule is seen by al-Qa’ida as the proper physical manifestation of political rule on earth.

Each of these elements relates specifically to al-Qa’ida’s understanding of their religion and theological interpretation as it relates to their desire for political and social change. Additionally, al-Qa’ida acquired an edict from a respected Saudi cleric, giving the group religious authorization to use any weapons—including nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons--against those they consider “infidels”. The cleric went on to specify that these attacks could “legitimately” kill up to 10 million people within his religious understanding of the edict.

Led by Zarqawi, the al-Qa’ida in Iraq routinely killed Shia Muslims because of Shia efforts to stir up a civil war. Although there is a substantial link between al-Qa’ida Central’s input from the Federal Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan in the major attacks since 9/11, it is also true that since the US removed them from Afghanistan, defining al-Qa’ida has become increasingly difficult. It is common for virtually any Salifist Islamic group to be labeled as “al-Qa’ida,” “al-Qa’ida sympathizers,” and the like, as the group has been dispersed from its central bases in Afghanistan.

Slide 14 Al Qa’ida’s Structure In a 2006 testimony to the US Congress, Bruce Hoffman presented a 4-tiered understanding of al-Qa’ida that is quite helpful. According to this outline, al-Qa’ida operates according to descending levels of sophistication: al-Qa’ida Central, affiliates and associates, locals, and networks.

“Al-Qa’ida Central” is comprised of the remnants of pre-9/11 al-Qa’ida. Although its core leadership includes some of the familiar, established commanders of the past (like al-Zawahiri), there are a number of new players who have advanced through the ranks as a result of the deaths and capture of key al-Qa’ida senior-level managers. Important figures such as KSM, Abu Atef, Abu Zubayda, Hambali, Abu Faraj al-Libi and Abu Hamza al-Masri, bin-Laden and most recently, al-Awaki, have all been killed or captured, and these efforts have indeed damaged the effectiveness al-Qa’ida’s of central leadership. While there is a debate about the effectiveness of the remaining core centered in or scattered around Pakistan, even recent plots from 2009 can trace training and inspiration back to al-Qaida Central.

This category comes closest to the al-Qa’ida operational template or model behind the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings and 9/11 attacks. Such high value, “spectacular” attacks are entrusted only to al-Qa’ida’s professional cadre: the most dedicated, committed and reliable element of the movement. Previous patterns suggest that these “professional” terrorists are deployed in pre-determined and carefully selected teams. They are also provided with very specific targeting instructions. In some cases, such as the East Africa bombings, they may establish contact with, and enlist the assistance of, local sympathizers and supporters. This is for logistical and other support purposes, and sometimes to enlist these locals to actually execute the attacks. The operation, however, is planned and directed by the “professional” element, with the locals clearly subordinate, playing a strictly supporting (albeit critical) role. Slide 15 Al Qa’ida: Affiliates and Associates “Al-Qa’ida Affiliates and Associates” includes formally established insurgent or terrorist groups who have benefited from al-Qa’ida over the years. This encompasses any group that has benefited from bin Laden’s largesse, his spiritual guidance, or has received training, arms,

money and other assistance from al-Qa’ida. The recipients geographically span from Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Bosnia, and Kashmir. By supporting these groups, bin Laden’s intentions were three-fold: first, he sought to co-opt these movements’ local agendas and channel their efforts towards the cause of global jihad; second, he hoped to create a jihadi “critical mass” from these geographically scattered, disparate movements that could one day coalesce into a single, unstoppable force; and third, he wanted to foster a dependent relationship. As repayment for prior al-Qa’ida support, these movements would be obligated to either undertake attacks at al- Qa’ida’s behest or provide local, logistical and other support to facilitate strikes by the al-Qa’ida “professional” cadre mentioned previously.

This category includes groups such as: al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), Abu Musab Zarqawi’s al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia (formerly Jamaat al Tawhid wa’l Jihad), Asbat al-Ansar, Ansar al Islam, Islamic Army of Aden, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),), and the various Kashmiri Islamic groups based in Pakistan.

Slide 16 Al Qa’ida: Locals “Al-Qa’ida Locals” are amorphous groups of al-Qa’ida adherents likely to have had some prior terrorism experience, participated in some previous jihadi campaign in either Algeria, the Balkans, Chechnya, or perhaps Iraq, and may have trained in some al-Qa’ida facility before 9/11. They will therefore have had some direct connection with al-Qa’ida, however tenuous. Their current relationship and perhaps even communication with a central al-Qa’ida command and control apparatus may also be insubstantial, if not dormant. The distinguishing characteristic of this category, however, is that there has been a connection with al-Qa’ida.

One specific example of this category is Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested in December 1999 at Port Angeles, Washington State, shortly after entering the U.S. from Canada. Ressam had a prior background in terrorism, having belonged to Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA). After being recruited to al-Qa’ida, he was provided with basic terrorist training in Afghanistan. In contrast to the professional cadre detailed prior, however, Ressam was given very non-specific, virtually open-ended targeting instructions before being dispatched to North America. Also, unlike the well-funded professional cadre, Ressam was given only $12,000 in ‘seed money’ and instructed to raise the rest of his operational funds from petty thievery. He was also told to recruit members for his terrorist cell from among the expatriate Muslim communities in Canada and the US.

Slide 17 Al Qa’ida: Networks The “Al-Qa’ida Network” consists ofhome-grown Islamic radicals from North Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, as well as local converts to Islam living in Europe, Africa and perhaps Latin America and North America. These individuals have no direct connection with al-Qa’ida or any other identifiable terrorist group, but nonetheless are prepared to carry out attacks in support of al- Qa’ida’s radical agenda. Motivated by a shared sense of enmity and grievance towards the United States, the West in general, and their host-nations in particular, their relationship with al-Qa’ida is more inspirational than actual. They feel stirred by profound rage over the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, as well as the oppression of Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere. Critically, these persons are neither part of a known, organized group nor even a very cohesive entity unto themselves.

Examples of this category include the group who carried out the March 2004 Madrid bombings (mostly Moroccan Islamic radicals based in Spain) and their counterparts in the Netherlands responsible for the November 2004 murder of Theo Van Gogh, among others. This framework is very helpful when studying terrorism, as it makes it clear that every level of commitment to al-Qa’ida becomes a part of its alliance without necessarily being directed operationally by al-Qa’ida Central.

Slide 18 Terror and the Rational/Irrational Al-Qa’ida’s terrorist attacks have often been derided by commentators as vicious acts of cowardly madmen. There is no doubt that they are vicious; however, the use of terrorism as a tactic by sub-national groups should not be thought of in terms of bravery versus cowardice. Rather, it is an attempt to overcome the balance of power dominated by powerful states. It is organizationally intelligent, not insane or “mad.” As objective analysts of conflict and war, we must be careful when distinguishing between morally reprehensible actions on the part of our enemies and the actions of a “mad” person, lest we underestimate their effectiveness and resolve. Studying the motivations behind religious and theologically motivated terrorists allows us to examine the internal logic of their attacks without justifying their actions or desires.

The US is the most powerful economic and military might on the planet; in fact, the current US military has been described as the greatest military might that ever existed on earth. To stand and fight such a force would be futile and the strategy employed by al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups allows effectiveness in spite of overwhelming military might. It is a generally accepted tenet of Islam that once areas have come under Muslim rule, they are forever destined to be ruled by Muslims. Thus, Al-Qa’ida’s claim to Islamic tradition may resonate with the tribal and historically aware co-religionists around the world.

After the 9/11 attacks, it was reported that the leadership of al-Qa’ida came under criticism from fellow Muslims because of the number of people killed in the attacks. These complaints related to the Quranic requirement for Muslims to give adequate opportunity to their enemies to “repent and believe” in Islam. Following these criticisms, bin Laden himself made public statements that if America would convert to Islam there would be no further attacks, and that he would personally “mentor” President Bush in his religious studies. Although this may sound outrageous to us, it is further evidence of the group’s absolute devotion to the theology and religious belief of Islam, and apparent need to appeal to the West--to not be seen as “terrorists,” but rather, as Muslims.

Slide 19 Conclusion As we look at the three essential issues being fought for by al-Qa’ida, it is again apparent that the group’s appeal to religious language allows entrance by non-violent Muslims into at least tacit support. Many Muslims of any description would like to “return the glory of the Caliphate to Muslims” define violent conflict in terms of “defense against aggressors,” and promote a social contract between leaders and followers based on adherence to Islamic laws and principles. But again, the difference lies in an individual’s or groups’ interpretation of these issues Ultimately however, as this module and the series as a whole have demonstrated, a violent religious group doesn’t need to look any further than themselves, their beliefs about god, or their hermeneutic for interpreting their religious text, in order to find justification for their violent actions.

Slide 20 Closing Credits/Music