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Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 75–84

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

ssessment of creativity evaluation skills: A psychometric nvestigation in prospective teachers

athias Benedek a,∗, Nora Nordtvedt a, Emanuel Jauk a, Corinna Koschmieder a, ürgen Pretsch a, Georg Krammer a,b, Aljoscha C. Neubauer a

Department of Psychology, University of Graz, Austria University College of Teacher Education Styria, Austria

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 1 December 2015 eceived in revised form 3 May 2016 ccepted 22 May 2016 vailable online 24 May 2016

eywords: reativity ivergent thinking iscernment penness

ntelligence

a b s t r a c t

An accurate judgement of the creativity of ideas is seen as an important component under- lying creative performance, and also seems relevant to effectively support the creativity of others. In this article we describe the development of a novel test for the assessment of creativity evaluation skills, which was designed to be part of an admission test for teacher education. The final test presents 72 ideas that have to be judged as being common, inappro- priate, or creative. Two studies examined the psychometric quality of the test, and explored relationships of creativity evaluation skills with cognitive ability and personality. In the first study, we observed that creativity evaluation skills are positively correlated with divergent thinking creativity and creative achievement, which suggests that evaluation skills are rel- evant for creative ideation as well as creative accomplishment. Across both studies, people tended to underestimate the creativity of ideas. Openness, intelligence and language com- petence predicted higher creativity evaluation skills, and this effect was partly mediated by a less negative evaluation bias. These findings contribute to our understanding of why people sometimes fail to recognize the creativity in others.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

. Introduction

How well can people evaluate the creativity of ideas? On the one hand, people show reasonable agreement when eval- ating the creativity of ideas, which indicates creativity is a quantifiable aspect of ideas. On the other hand, there is also

substantial amount of variability in judgements, suggesting that people differ in how discerning they are. An accurate valuation of creativity is thought to be conducive to one’s own creative performance (Cropley, 2006; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 992), and should be similarly important for providing a selective feedback and fostering creativity in others. In this article,

e describe the development of creativity evaluation test, designed to be part of an admission test for teacher education. We

nalyzed data from two studies that examined the psychometric quality of the test, and explored relationship of creativity valuation skills with cognitive ability and personality.

∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of Graz, Universitätsplatz 2, 8010 Graz, Austria. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Benedek).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.007 871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

76 M. Benedek et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 75–84

1.1. Evaluating creativity

A central challenge in creativity research is the criterion problem (Amabile, 1982; Brown, 1989; Shapiro, 1970): There is no easy way to objectively assess the creativity of an idea or product. Moreover, creativity is not an invariant feature of a product, but depends on the time and socio-cultural environment it is born into (e.g., Glăveanu, 2014; Simonton, 1998). Still, within a certain time and group, people tend to agree on whether an idea can be considered more or less creative. Creativity research capitalizes on this agreement by using a consensual definition of creativity, which defines the creativity of a product as the averaged evaluation across a set of judges (Amabile, 1982). Subjective ratings of creativity show good inter-rater-reliability for different kinds of creative products including drawings (e.g., Dollinger & Shafran, 2005), stories (e.g., Baer, Kaufman, & Gentile, 2004), or ideas in divergent thinking tasks (Benedek, Mühlmann, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2013; Silvia et al., 2008). The agreement across judges indicates that creativity is generally an identifiable and quantifiable characteristic of new ideas and products (Benedek & Jauk, 2014).

Creativity scholars have tried to further define the characteristics that lead to the perception of creativity. While many relevant characteristics have been proposed, there is strong agreement that a creative product above all needs to be novel. If it is not novel, it cannot be creative “no matter what other positive qualities it might possess” (Jackson & Messick, 1967). However, mere novelty is usually not enough, but a product is additionally required to meet a criterion of meaningfulness or appropriateness to be considered creative (Barron, 1955; Stein, 1953; see also Runco & Jaeger, 2012). This notion has been confirmed by research showing that creativity evaluations strongly depend on the perceived novelty, and, to a lesser degree, also on their perceived appropriateness (Caroff & Besancon, 2008; Diedrich, Benedek, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2015;Runco & Charles, 1993). It is important to note that novelty and appropriateness are generally inversely related, because highly common ideas are usually also highly appropriate. But within novel ideas, appropriateness predicts perceived creativity, thereby moderating the effect of novelty on creativity (Diedrich et al., 2015).

1.2. Assessment of creativity evaluation skills

Different ways have been proposed to measure discernment of creativity evaluations (cf. Silvia, 2008). One approach is to measure evaluation accuracy in terms of hit rates, which is the percentage of correctly identified creative or uncreative ideas (Runco & Dow, 2004; Runco & Smith, 1992). Runco and Smith asked participants to rate lists of ideas from others as well as own ideas for creativity on a 1–7 scale. A judgement was defined as correct when an idea was unique (i.e., statistically infrequent) and given a rating of 6 or 7, or when the idea was common (i.e., given by more than 10%) and rated as 1 or 2. Accuracy rates were generally moderate (20–50%). Interestingly, divergent thinking ability predicted higher evaluation accuracy for own ideas but not for the evaluation of others’ ideas. A potential problem with this way of scoring is that it uses different criteria for individual judgements and criterion values. Moreover, it separately scores the evaluation accuracy related to creative and common ideas, which can be differently affected by response biases: judging most ideas as creative will lead to high hit rates for creative ideas, but low hit rates for common ideas, thus reflecting high sensitivity but low specificity in separate scores. Finally, low intercorrelations of scores across tasks indicate low reliability of this scoring.

Another approach to assess accuracy is to compute the discrepancy of evaluations with criterion scores measured on the same scale. Grohman, Wodniecka, and Kłusak (2006) employed this approach and separately measured accuracy for rated originality and uniqueness when judging own ideas and ideas from others. Criterion values were based on the ratings of three trained raters and the relative frequency of ideas within the sample. They found that people generally overestimate the originality of ideas, which was more pronounced for own ideas than for the ideas from others. Divergent thinking ability, however, was not consistently related to better evaluation accuracy. While this approach aims at a more differentiated measurement of discernment compared to hit rates, its actual precision seems to strongly depend on the reliability of the established criterion scores.

Finally, discernment can also be measured in terms of the covariation of evaluations with criterion values. This method does not require the presumption that criterion values reflect the true, absolute level of creativity and hence reflects accuracy in terms of relative rather than absolute agreement. For example, Silvia (2008) asked people to select their two most creative ideas and analyzed to what extent top-2 choices predict the ratings of judges by means of a multi-level approach. He found that people are generally discerning when evaluating their own ideas, but people high in openness were more discerning than others. Since this method is based on covariation, it reflects whether people are able to recognize relative differences in creativity, but is not affected by judgement biases such as general leniency or strictness. However, this method does not necessarily indicate whether people agree on whether a particular idea is creative or not, because this requires a judgement of the absolute level of creativity. Accuracy in the absolute level of creativity is not needed when people are asked to select the best from a set of given ideas, but it should be relevant in contexts that require the judgement of individual ideas, which is common in many applied settings such as those of teachers, curators, or investors (Cropley, 2001; Sternberg & Lubart, 1992).

1.3. The present research

The main goal of this project was the development and psychometric examination of a creativity evaluation test (CET). The CET was designed to be included in an admission test for teacher education in Austria, because creativity evaluation

M. Benedek et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 75–84 77

Table 1 Descriptive statistics and Spearman correlations for Study 1.

N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1 CET Informedness 214 0.68 0.19 2 CET Bias 214 −0.11 0.17 0.54** 3 CET Sensitivity 214 0.80 0.15 0.83** 0.89**

4 CET Specificity 214 0.88 0.10 0.52** −0.34 0.04 5 DT creativity 147 4.12 1.07 0.18* 0.14 0.18* 0.04 6 DT fluency 147 16.35 6.66 0.15+ 0.18* 0.19* 0.02 0.53**

7 CA 75 1.89 0.66 0.27* 0.17 0.31** 0.06 0.27* 0.10 8 Honesty 213 3.69 0.61 0.02 −0.07 −0.03 0.00 −0.02 −0.10 0.00 9 Emotionality 213 3.20 0.71 0.04 −0.01 0.00 0.02 −0.13 0.08 −0.23+ −0.13 10 eXtraversion 213 3.82 0.62 0.05 0.03 0.04 −0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.20** −0.36** 11 Agreeableness 213 3.33 0.60 −0.02 0.06 0.02 −0.07 −0.06 −0.07 −0.05 0.21** −0.21** 0.23** 12 Conscientiousness 213 3.81 0.71 −0.13+ −0.12+ −0.16* −0.05 −0.06 0.01 −0.28* 0.28** −0.09 0.23** 0.07 13 Openness 213 3.80 0.58 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.21* 0.11 0.14 0.34** −0.30** .28** 0.11 0.31**

Notes: CET = creativity evaluation test; DT = Divergent thinking; CA = Creative achievement.

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kills are seen as an important prerequisite for being able to foster creativity in education (Cropley, 2001; Finke et al., 1992; rban & Cropley, 2000). As in previous research, we decided to use ideas from divergent thinking tasks as item material to nsure that the test does not require any domain-specific knowledge or depend on aesthetic preferences (Kaufman, Baer, ropley, Reiter-Palmon, & Sinnett, 2013). The CET asks for the evaluation of a prespecified set of ideas, rather than for the valuation of own, self-generated ideas. Being able to accurately evaluate one’s own ideas is assumed to be a critical skill nderlying creative potential (Cropley, 2006; Finke et al., 1992; Groborz & Nęcka, 2003). It seems likely that this skill reflects

more general evaluation skill, which is not restricted to own ideas. Moreover, the evaluation of own ideas implies serious ethodological issues, because the assessment is biased by the person’s creative ability. More creative people produce more

deas and more creative ideas, which may make it easier to differentiate between them. This may also explain why previous esearch found that divergent thinking ability is related to evaluation accuracy for own ideas but not for others’ ideas (Runco

Smith, 1992). Finally, we aimed to assess creativity evaluation skills in a way that reflects discernment on relevant dimensions that

ontribute to an overall perception of creativity. Standard definitions of creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 2012) emphasize that reative ideas require both originality/novelty and usefulness/appropriateness. Educators sometimes confuse creativity with riginality, thereby ignoring that creative value arises from meeting relevant constraints placed on originality (Beghetto, 010). However, when they do not recognize the necessary role of constraints for creativity they may easily associate reativity with negative forms of deviance rather than with a desirable trait (Plucker, Beghetto, & Dow, 2004). Following he two-dimensional definition of creativity, we initially considered asking people to assign ideas to one of four categories esulting from the combinations of low vs. high novelty and low vs. high appropriateness. An initial pilot test (n = 15), owever, showed that people hardly ever evaluate ideas as being low on both novelty and appropriateness. Highly common i.e., not-novel) ideas are typically proved and tested and hence appropriate (Diedrich et al., 2015). Therefore, we decided o use three response categories: creative (novel and appropriate), common (not novel but appropriate) and inappropriate novel but not appropriate).

We compiled an initial test version consisting of 180 candidate items. In Study 1, we performed a thorough psychometric nalysis of this initial test version. The findings led to the construction of a final test version consisting of 72 items, which as employed in the teacher admission test of 2014 (Study 2).

. Study 1: test development

.1. Methods

.1.1. Participants A total of 214 people participated in study 1. This study included a large number of newly devised tests as well as

stablished validation tests. Therefore, it was not possible to assign all tests to all participants, and the actual sample size aried across measures as described in Table 1. Participants were university students (77.6% females) aged between 18 and 9 years (M = 22.54, SD = 3.79) majoring mostly in psychology (44%) or teacher education (43%). The study was approved by he local ethics committee.

.1.2. Tests and measures

.1.2.1. Creativity evaluation test (CET). The test instructions explained that this test presents lists of ideas that were collected rom various creative idea generation tasks, but that not all ideas are really creative. The task hence is to decide which of those deas are common, inappropriate or actually creative. A common idea was described as obvious and typical; it is appropriate,

78 M. Benedek et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 75–84

but not novel and hence not creative (e.g., “Using a hat for collecting donations”). An inappropriate idea was described as one that is not appropriate for the task at hand; it is often novel, but not actually creative (e.g., “Using a hat as cooking pot”). A creative idea was described as being both novel and appropriate; it can be clever, humorous and imaginative (e.g., “Using a hat as a Frisbee”).

The initial version of the CET included 180 items, which represented actual responses collected in previous research on creative idea generation (Benedek et al., 2013, 2014; Diedrich et al., 2015; Jauk, Benedek, & Neubauer, 2014). The responses referred to twelve different divergent thinking (DT) tasks, eight alternate uses tasks (car tire, knife, can, bucket, glass bottle, hairdryer, paper clip, and funnel) and four instances tasks (faster locomotion, noise, flexible, and round) with 15 items per task. Items were presented in blocks for each DT task. Each block was headed with a brief task description (e.g., “What can a car tire be used for?”) followed by 15 ideas related to this task (e.g., “It can be burned”). Participants were asked to assign each idea to one out of three response categories (i.e., common, inappropriate, or creative) by marking the respective box. The ideas within each block were distributed equally across these three categories. The full item list cannot be disclosed because it is part of an admission test.

For the scoring of the CET we computed the informedness of judgements, a standard index from signal detection theory that equally accounts for sensitivity and specificity of judgements (Powers, 2011). Sensitivity reflects the ratio of correctly identified creative ideas; specificity reflects the ratio of correctly identified non-creative ideas (i.e., common or inappropriate). The informedness of judgements is defined as Informedness = Sensitivity + Specificity − 1. A perfect informedness of 1 hence is achieved when sensitivity and specificity are both maximal. We can further assess the bias of judgments, which is defined as Bias = Sensitivity − Specificity. A positive bias occurs when sensitivity is higher than specificity and hence reflects a tendency to overrate the creativity of responses.

2.1.2.2. Divergent thinking ability. We assessed divergent thinking (DT) ability with three alternate uses tasks, which were different from those used in the CET (i.e., umbrella, toilet paper, and garden hose). Participants had 2 min per task to produce creative uses and enter them in a text box. The responses were scored for fluency and creativity. The average number of ideas per task was used as an index of DT fluency. For the scoring of DT creativity, we created a list of 1936 non-redundant responses, which were alphabetically sorted and rated for creativity by four independent raters on a scale between 0 (not creative) to 3 (very creative). The inter-rater reliability at idea level ranged from ICC = 0.72 to 0.80 for the three tasks. The average creativity of the three most creative ideas per task (according to the ratings averaged across raters) was used as an index of DT creativity (for a similar procedure see Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy, & Neubauer, 2014). Total scores of DT fluency and DT creativity were computed by averaging across the three tasks. The internal consistency was good for DT fluency (� = 0.84) and satisfactory for DT creativity (� = 0.71).

2.1.2.3. Creative achievement. The individual level of creative achievement was assessed by asking to report the three most creative achievements of one’s life (a brief screening measure included in the Inventory of Creative Activities and Achieve- ments, ICAA; https://osf.io/zjrn6/). The responses were rated by four raters on a 6-point scale ranging from 0 (not creative) to 5 (ingenious) with each level being briefly described in a rater’s instruction. The inter-rater reliability was acceptable (ICC = 0.78).

2.1.2.4. Personality. The structure of personality was assessed with the 60-item version of HEXACO personality inventory (Ashton & Lee, 2009), which measures the six dimensions honesty-humility, emotionality, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness.

A number of other newly devised tests were also piloted in this study, but were not analyzed for this article.

2.1.3. Procedure Participants were tested in groups in university computer classes. All tests were individually administered with the

assessment software Questionmark Perception (Questionmark; London, UK). The order of tests was varied between test sessions. The total test session took up to 2 h.

2.2. Results

2.2.1. Test analysis The goal of this first study was to construct a shortened, reliable test based on the initial item pool of 180 items. In a

first step, we removed items that were ambiguous in terms of low consensual agreement regarding the target category (i.e., correct response category; either common, inappropriate, or creative). Items were considered unambiguous if the target category was selected at a rate that was at least 50% higher than any of the two distractor categories. This criterion was met by 109 items, whereas 71 items had to be excluded. In a next step, we removed items that showed low discriminatory power

(rit < 0.10), which led to the exclusion of another 13 items. The remaining 96 items included only 24 items from the response category “creative”. Therefore, we finally removed further “inappropriate” and “common” items based on item difficulty and discriminatory power until we reached a balanced distribution of items across response categories in total and within task blocks. Finally, one “common” item had to be removed because it was the only item left within one task block.

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M. Benedek et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 75–84 79

The shortened test version hence consisted of 71 items, including 23 common, 24 inappropriate and 24 creative responses. ue to the selection of items with high consensual agreement, the remaining items showed high solution rates (M = 0.85, D = 0.08, range = 0.68–0.99) and thus generally low item difficulty. The average discriminatory power of items was 0.21 SD = 0.08; range = 0.06–0.44) and the internal consistency of the test was acceptable (� = 0.78).

.2.2. Validity analysis Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of all measures including the informedness and bias

f creativity judgements, divergent thinking ability, creative achievement, and personality. We examined whether nor- al distribution can be assumed for informedness and bias measures with tests of skewness and kurtosis (alpha

evel = 0.01; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The informedness measure was substantially negatively skewed and leptokurtic skewness = −1.66, z = 9.76, p < 0.01; kurtosis = 4.92, z = 14.91, p < 0.01); the bias measure was not skewed but leptokurtic skewness = −0.02, z = 0.41, ns.; kurtosis = 1.42, z = 4.30, p < 0.01). We hence employed non-parametric tests throughout this tudy.

Higher creativity evaluation skills (i.e., informedness of creativity judgements in the CET) was associated with higher DT reativity and higher creative achievement, but it was not correlated with any of the personality measures (see Table 1). nterestingly, individual differences in Hexaco openness were not significantly associated with CET informedness or creative chievement in this study, but only with DT creativity and some other Hexaco traits. The average judgement bias was negative Wilcoxon W = 3791, z = −8.45, p < 0.001), which indicates that people tend to underestimate the creativity of ideas. A smaller i.e., less negative) judgement bias was correlated with higher creativity evaluation skills (CET informedness) and higher DT uency, but it was not significantly correlated with other creativity measures or the HEXACO personality traits. It should be oted that significant correlations were generally rather small.

. Study 2: admission test

.1. Methods

.1.1. Participants A total of 1119 people participated in the admission test for secondary teacher education of 2014. One participant did

ot complete the creativity evaluation test. We hence report all findings for a sample of 1118 participants, which consisted f 675 females (60.4%) and 443 male (39.6%) aged between 17 and 49 years (M = 20.83, SD = 4.51).

.1.2. Tests and measures

.1.2.1. Creativity evaluation test (CET). The item analysis of the original 180 CET items in Study 1 led to a shortened test ver- ion, which encompasses 71 items with unambiguous solutions. In Study 2 we used the shortened test version and included ne new “common” item to ensure an equal distribution of 24 items per solution category (i.e., common, inappropriate, and reativity). The final test hence consisted of 72 items that were grouped to 10 task blocks with five to ten items each (the ask blocks knife and faster locomotion were entirely removed from the original test, since no items survived the criteria of tem analysis in Study 1). The task was administered and scored as described in Study 1.

.1.2.2. Intelligence. Intelligence was assessed with four tests of the Intelligence Structure Battery (INSBAT; Arendasy et al., 009). Tests of figural-inductive thinking, arithmetic flexibility, visual short-term memory, and verbal fluency were admin-

stered as computerized adaptive tests (CAT: van der Linden & Glas, 2000) with the target reliability set to an equivalent of ronbach’s � = 0.80. The adaptive testing algorithm terminated the test, as soon as the target reliability was reached. The

our tests were used to compute a total IQ score reflecting general cognitive ability. The total test duration varied due to the daptive testing method, but on average was roughly one hour.

.1.2.3. Language competence. Individual differences in language competence was assessed with tests on orthography (38 tems), grammar (23 items), and reading comprehension (11 items). The total number of correct responses is used as an ndex of language competence. Reliability was � = 0.71, and test duration on average 30 min.

.1.2.4. Personality. Personality structure was measured with the Big-Five Inventory (BFI; Lang, Lüdtke, & Asendorpf, 2001). he self-report test included 42 items that had to be answered on a 5-point scale. Additional tests were included in the dmission test but are not relevant to the topic of creativity evaluation and, therefore, were not further considered in this rticle.

.1.3. Procedure

Participants enrolled for the admission test were tested in groups in university computer classes. All tests except, for

he intelligence tests, were individually administered with the assessment software Questionmark Perception (Question- ark; London, UK). The assessment started with the intelligence tests, followed by tests of language competence, emotional

ompetence, creativity evaluation and personality. The total assessment took on average 3 h.

80 M. Benedek et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 75–84

Table 2 Relative frequency of responses across items with different target responses.

Target response Actual response (%)

Common Inappropriate Creative

Common 86.3 5.5 8.1 Inappropriate 2.4 90.4 7.2 Creative 7.8 16.9 75.3

Table 3 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for Study 2.

M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1 CET Informedness 0.62 0.16 2 CET Bias −0.18 0.14 0.64 3 CET Sensitivity 0.74 0.13 0.89 0.91 4 CET Specificity 0.88 0.07 0.59 −0.21 0.16 5 Intelligence (IQ) 110.32 11.11 0.26 0.10 0.19 0.23 6 Language 38.77 5.14 0.33 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.29 7 Neuroticism 2.05 052 0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.04 0.00 8 Extraversion 4.18 048 0.02 0.06 0.03 −0.02 −0.06 −0.03 −0.51 9 Openness 4.09 047 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.13 −0.26 0.38 10 Agreeableness 4.14 0.45 0.01 0.05 0.04 −0.04 −0.05 0.03 −0.41 0.29 0.24

11 Conscientiousness 4.20 0.47 −0.06 −0.03 −0.05 −0.04 −0.04 0.09 −0.38 0.36 0.30 0.48

Notes: Given N = 1118, p < 0.05 for r ≥ 0.06, and p < 0.01 for r ≥ 0.08. Language = language competence.

3.2. Results

3.2.1. Test analysis In a first step, the dimensionality of the CET was assessed with a confirmatory factor analysis approach. Since the informed-

ness of creativity evaluation reflects sensitivity (i.e., the percentage of correctly identified creative ideas) and specificity (i.e., the percentage of correctly identified common and inappropriate ideas), the 24 creative items were assumed to form one factor, and the 48 common and inappropriate items were assumed to form another factor, and both factors were assumed to correlate. For the resulting model, items were parceled into eight indicators per factor: each 3rd creative item was aggre- gated to item parcels for the sensitivity factor; each 6th common or inappropriate item was aggregated to item parcels of the specificity factor. To account for the essentially dichotomous nature of the items, a WLSMV estimator was used. The resulting model fitted the data well (�2[244.166] = 103, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.035, CFI = 0.948, SRMR = 0.045), and showed sensitivity and specificity to be correlated (r = 0.31, p < 0.001). The construct reliability (Hancock & Mueller, 2001) was H = 0.69 and 0.73 for the sensitivity and specificity factor, respectively.

The solution rate of the CET items ranged from p = 0.48 to 0.99, with an average solution rate of 84%, representing relatively low average item difficulty. The target response (i.e., correct response category) was selected most frequently in all 72 items. Moreover, the selection rate of the target response was at least 50% higher than for any of the two incorrect response categories in 88% of items. The average discriminatory power of items was M = 0.15 (SD = 0.07); 15 items (21%), however, showed a low discriminatory power (rit < 0.10). Table 2 shows the average distribution of responses across response categories for common, inappropriate and creative items. Creative ideas tended to be mistaken more often for inappropriate ideas than for common ideas, and inappropriate ideas were more often misjudged as creative than as common. For common ideas false responses appear balanced across inappropriate and creative categories.

The average informedness was high and the average bias was again slightly negative (t[117] = −42.92, p < 0.001; see Table 3). A negative response bias indicates a tendency to underrate the creativity of ideas, by judging creative ideas as common or inappropriate. The distribution of informedness scores was negatively skewed and leptokurtic (skewness = −0.81, z = 11.12, p < 0.01; kurtosis = 1.58, z = 10.82, p < 0.01), whereas the bias score was normally distributed (skewness = −0.18, z = −2.01, ns.; kurtosis = 0.09, z = 0.62, ns.). Given the large sample size of study 2, we employed parametric tests throughout this study.

Age was negatively correlated with creativity evaluation skills in terms of CET informedness (r = −0.08, p < 0.01), but not with bias (r = −0.04, ns.). Analyses of sex differences revealed that women showed slightly higher creativity evaluation skills (M = 0.64, SD = 0.16) compared to men (M = 0.60, SD = 0.16; t[1116] = −3.57, p < 0.01, d = .21), as well as a less negative creativity evaluation bias (M = −0.17, SD = 0.14) than men (M = −0.20, SD = 0.16; t[1116] = −2.81, p < 0.01, d = 0.17) reflecting a lower underestimation of creativity.

3.2.2. Creativity evaluation, cognitive ability and personality. Table 3 shows the correlations between creativity evaluation skills (i.e., CET informedness) and evaluation bias with intel-

ligence, language competence and the Big 5 personality traits. Higher creativity evaluation skills were associated with higher intelligence, higher language competence and, to a lesser degree, also with higher openness and lower conscientiousness.

M. Benedek et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 75–84 81

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ig. 1. Path analysis testing direct effects and indirect effects by intelligence (IQ), language comptence (Lang), Openness (Open) via the mediator evaluation ias (Bias) on creativity evaluation skills (Inform = CET informedness). Positive associations with bias indicate reflect a lower underestimation of creativity or higher trait scores.

imilarly, a lower underestimation of creativity (i.e., a smaller, less negative evaluation bias in the CET) was correlated with igher intelligence, language competence and openness. In order to determine the independent contributions of cognitive bility and personality for creativity evaluation skills (i.e., CET informedness), we computed a hierarchical regression analysis. n a first block, we entered age and sex to account for general variability in these basic demographic variables. In the second lock, we entered intelligence, language competence and the Big 5 personality traits. This regression analysis revealed that all ariables that showed significant zero-order correlations with CET informedness actually explained unique variance of the nformedness of creativity evaluations (F[9, 1105] = 27.63, p < 0.01; R2 = .18). Independent predictions of CET informedness ence include intelligence ( ̌ = .20, p < 0.01), language competence (� = .26, p < 0.01), openness ( ̌ = .13, p < 0.01), and consci- ntiousness ( ̌ = −.17, p < 0.01), which together explained �R2 = 17% of variance in CET informedness above and beyond the ontrol variables. Neuroticism, extraversion and agreeableness did not significantly predict CET informedness (all ps > 0.10).

Considering that evaluation bias was also correlated with intelligence, language competence, and openness, as well as with ET informedness, it seems possible that effects of cognitive ability and personality on CET informedness are to some extent ediated by evaluation bias. To test this mediation hypothesis, we computed a path analysis with MPlus 7 using maximum

ikelihood (ML) estimation. In this mediation model, informedness is directly predicted by intelligence, language competence, penness, as well as indirectly predicted by these variables via the potential mediator evaluation bias (see Fig. 1). The tatistical significance of indirect effects was determined by means of bias-corrected bootstrap (1000 iterations; MacKinnon, ockwood, & Williams, 2004). This path analysis revealed that evaluation bias significantly mediates the effects of all three redictors on creativity evaluation informedness. Intelligence and language competence show significant indirect effects � = .04, p < 0.05; � = .07, p < 0.01, respectively) and significant direct effects suggesting a partial mediation by evaluation ias (see Fig. 1). Openness showed a significant indirect effect (� = .09, p < 0.01), but no significant direct effect on CET

nformedness and hence was fully mediated by evaluation bias. Direct and indirect effects on informedness are generally mall but statistically significant due to the large sample size.

. Discussion

We examined the psychometric properties of a newly devised creativity evaluation test (CET) to measure creativity valuation skills in two consecutive studies. Study 1 describes the test analysis leading to the final test version, and examines ts validity with respect to common criteria of creativity. Study 2 analyzed the relationship between creativity evaluation kills and individual differences in cognitive ability, personality and the role of evaluation bias.

82 M. Benedek et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 75–84

In study 1 we observed positive correlations between creativity evaluation skills (i.e., informedness in the CET) and divergent thinking creativity, as well as a tendency towards a positive correlation with divergent thinking fluency, two common indicators of creative cognitive potential. People who produce more creative ideas thus tend to be more discerning in the evaluation of ideas. This finding extends previous research, which has only provided evidence that creative people are better at identifying their own best ideas (Karwowski, 2015; Runco & Smith, 1992; Silvia, 2008), but not necessarily better at evaluating the ideas of others (Grohman et al., 2006; Runco & Smith, 1992). Moreover, it was unclear whether the association between creativity and intrapersonal evaluation skills is biased by the fact that the assessment of creative potential and evaluation skills relies on the same response data. Our findings substantiate the association between creativity evaluation skills and creative potential on the basis of independent assessments of these constructs. The finding corroborates the notion that evaluative processes play an important role in creative thought as claimed by creativity theory (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014; Campbell, 1960; Cropley, 2006; Finke et al., 1992) and as also suggested by recent neuroscience evidence (Beaty, Benedek, Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015; Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016). Similar arguments apply to the finding that creativity evaluation skills were also correlated with creative achievement. Higher evaluation skills may be helpful to adequately identify high potential ideas that have good chances to become acknowledged and hence are worth to invest in their realization (Sternberg & Lubart, 1992). Taken together, these findings provide initial support for the validity of the CET. Future research will also examine the predictive validity of the CET. For example, it would be highly interesting to see whether individual differences in creativity evaluation skills of prospective teachers actually predict later job performance in terms of teaching and fostering of students.

Consistent across both studies, we observed a negative average evaluation bias, and a substantial positive correlation between evaluation bias and evaluation skills. A negative evaluation bias indicates that people tended to underrate the cre- ativity of ideas in this test, and hence showed higher specificity than sensitivity in their judgements. The positive correlation between bias and creativity evaluation skills suggests that the underestimation of creativity is an important reason of low performance in the CET: the smaller the negative bias, the higher is the total informedness. A closer examination of the response behavior in study 2 revealed that creative ideas were more often misjudged as inappropriate than as common. People recognized that these creative ideas were original, but sometimes felt that they are not useful and appropriate enough to qualify as being creative. Judging the novelty of ideas appears simpler, because people can sample their experience on whether or how often this idea has been previously encountered. Once an idea is recognized as uncommon, the more chal- lenging task is to evaluate its quality in terms of appropriateness (Runco & Charles, 1993). Jackson & Messick (1967) noted that appropriateness is often particularly difficult to recognize because “it may violate conventional logic. . . [and] have a logic of its own” (p. 5). Creativity evaluation skills hence critically rely on the adequate judgement of the appropriateness or effectiveness of novel ideas.

Understanding why prospective teachers in our study tended to underestimate the creativity of others’ ideas is a question of high practical significance. On the one hand, it seems possible that the divergent thinking responses employed in our evaluation test are too abstract or simplistic to meet teachers’ implicit theories of creativity (Fryer & Collings, 1991). Future research may test this notion by using responses to real-life problems that might for instance be collected in real educational settings (Chand & Runco, 1993; Groborz & Nęcka, 2003). On the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that too often teachers have serious problems with recognizing creativity of their students (e.g., Gralewski & Karwowski, 2013; Karwowski, 2007; Sommer, Fink, & Neubauer, 2008; Urhahne, 2011) and do not value creativity (e.g., Beghetto, 2007, 2008; Beghetto & Plucker, 2016; Westby & Dawson, 1995). It would be interesting to examine how pronounced this effect is in teachers, by comparing their evaluations, for instance, with those of parents or other groups. Also, we need to keep in mind that a better recognition of creativity does not simply mean to value all original ideas as more creative, which would correspond to increasing sensitivity at the cost of specificity. Inflated praise of creative products can even have adverse effects on children, especially to those with low self-esteem (Brummelman, Sanders, Orobio de Castro, Overbeek, & Bushman, 2014).

There appear to be two main reasons why people underrate the creativity of ideas: because they do not properly under- stand the idea, or because they do not value its creative quality. In the former case we might expect that creativity evaluation skills are associated with cognitive ability, whereas the latter case could be supported by associations with relevant person- ality traits like openness. A mediation analysis confirmed that individual differences in both cognitive ability and openness affected informedness via evaluation bias, although effects were generally small. Regarding personality, higher openness was associated with a less negative bias in study 2 that used a Big Five test, but not in study 1 that used the HEXACO. Openness is associated with the endorsement of novelty, unconventionality and creativity (Feist, 1998; Jauk et al., 2014; McCrae, 1987), and hence people high in openness may be more likely to appreciate the creativity in novel ideas. The finding is consistent with previous research showing a positive association between openness and discernment (Silvia, 2008), and suggests that openness supports creativity discernment by reducing the negative creativity bias.

Regarding cognitive ability, we observed that higher intelligence and higher language competence were also related to a lower underestimation of creativity (i.e., less negative evaluation bias). It seems possible that cognitive abilities are some- times relevant to appreciate technical or semantic subtleties involved in creative ideas presented in short verbal description. Additionally, we observed direct effects on informedness, which suggests that cognitive abilities are not only relevant for

high sensitivity as reflected in a less negative evaluation bias, but also for specificity of judgements. These findings con- tribute to the rich discussion on the cognitive mechanisms underlying the consistent relationship between intelligence and creativity (Benedek et al., 2014; Jauk, Benedek, Dunst, & Neubauer, 2013; Kim, 2005; Silvia, 2015). The positive correlations between creativity evaluation skills and intelligence in Study 2, and with creativity in Study 1, together suggest that intelli-

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M. Benedek et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 75–84 83

ence facilitates creative thought by means of more accurate judgements of the creativity of ideas. Future research should ssess intelligence, creativity and creativity evaluation skills in one study in order to allow for a proper test of this mediation ypothesis.

Another novel aspect of this study was the usage of informedness based on signal detection theory as an index of creativity valuation skills. Previous research commonly measured the accuracy of evaluations in terms of correctly identified creative deas (e.g., Runco & Smith, 1992) or in terms of the discrepancy between participants and judges’ evaluations (e.g., Grohman t al., 2006), or assessed the extent of agreement in terms of the covariation between participant and judges’ evaluations e.g., Silvia, 2008). Measuring evaluation skills by means of informedness has several potential advantages. First, while the umber of correctly identified creative ideas only reflects sensitivity of judgements, informedness equally reflects sensitivity nd specificity. Second, assessing the absolute or relative discrepancy between participants and judges puts much weight n the judges’ ratings as a gold standard criterion, with every subtle (absolute or relative) deviation from the judges’ rating eing interpreted against the participant. In contrast, in the present approach correct responses were defined based on a

argely unambiguous, consensual criterion. Finally, unlike covariation measures, this approach implies separate indices of ensitivity and specificity that can be used to explore the reasons behind low evaluation skills.

A few additional findings seem noteworthy. We observed small but significant effects indicating that creativity evaluation kills are associated with lower age and higher in women compared to men. Post-hoc analyses revealed that age effects re not explained by differences in cognitive ability. In contrast, gender effects disappear when controlling statistically or differences in language competence and evaluation bias. While a small superiority of women in verbal ability is well ocumented (e.g., Hyde & Linn, 1988), it still remains the question why women underestimate creativity to a lower extent han men. Reviews on the role of gender differences in creativity in terms of creativity potential and achievement are enerally inconclusive, but, if anything, tend to favor women (Abraham, 2016; Baer & Kaufman, 2008). Future research may xamine whether potential gender differences in creativity are related to gender differences in evaluation bias. Finally, it hould be noted that conscientiousness only showed no significant correlation with creativity evaluation skills but became a ignificant negative predictor in the regression analysis after including other personality and ability traits. This result pattern uggests a suppression effect and hence needs to be interpreted with caution.

We conclude that the CET is a promising measure for the assessment of creativity evaluation skill. It can be useful or advancing research on the role of evaluative processes in creative thought, but also in applied research. Our findings upport the notion that more creative people show slightly better discernment in their creativity evaluations. Interestingly, reativity evaluations were found to be particularly impaired by an underestimation of creativity. We identified relevant raits associated with a lower evaluation bias, although effects were generally small: More open people, and people with igher language competence and intelligence were less prone to underestimate creativity, and showed higher creativity valuation skill. Future research should aim to further explore why people often do not value creativity of others. This is articularly relevant in an educational context, because the recognition and appreciation of creative ideas clearly represent n important precondition for an effective fostering creativity in the classroom.

cknowledgements

This research was supported by the HRSM Fund from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Econ- my (project “PädagogInnenbildung Neu—Development and Implementation of a common selection procedure for teacher tudents”). We are grateful for the help of Katharina Sieber and Martin Trosien who assisted in this project.

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  • Assessment of creativity evaluation skills: A psychometric investigation in prospective teachers
    • 1 Introduction
      • 1.1 Evaluating creativity
      • 1.2 Assessment of creativity evaluation skills
      • 1.3 The present research
    • 2 Study 1: test development
      • 2.1 Methods
        • 2.1.1 Participants
        • 2.1.2 Tests and measures
          • 2.1.2.1 Creativity evaluation test (CET)
          • 2.1.2.2 Divergent thinking ability
          • 2.1.2.3 Creative achievement
          • 2.1.2.4 Personality
        • 2.1.3 Procedure
      • 2.2 Results
        • 2.2.1 Test analysis
        • 2.2.2 Validity analysis
    • 3 Study 2: admission test
      • 3.1 Methods
        • 3.1.1 Participants
        • 3.1.2 Tests and measures
          • 3.1.2.1 Creativity evaluation test (CET)
          • 3.1.2.2 Intelligence
          • 3.1.2.3 Language competence
          • 3.1.2.4 Personality
        • 3.1.3 Procedure
      • 3.2 Results
        • 3.2.1 Test analysis
        • 3.2.2 Creativity evaluation, cognitive ability and personality.
    • 4 Discussion
    • Acknowledgements
    • References

Related Articles/Closing-the-assessment-loop-on-critical-thinking--The-cha_2016_Thinking-Skil.pdf

Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 158–168

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

Closing the assessment loop on critical thinking: The challenges of multidimensional testing and low test-taking motivation

D. Alan Bensley ∗, Crystal Rainey, Michael P. Murtagh, Jennifer A. Flinn, Christopher Maschiocchi, Paul C. Bernhardt, Stephanie Kuehne Frostburg State University, Frostburg, MD 21532, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 21 December 2015 Received in revised form 19 May 2016 Accepted 27 June 2016 Available online 28 June 2016

Keywords: Critical thinking skills Critical thinking dispositions Metacognitive monitoring Test-taking motivation Learning outcomes assessment

a b s t r a c t

Unlike most previous studies that have only assessed critical thinking skills, our study took a comprehensive approach to critical thinking assessment. We examined the impact of explicit critical thinking instruction on skill acquisition as well as changes in critical think- ing dispositions and metacognition. Students receiving explicit critical thinking instruction showed significantly greater gains on an argument analysis skills test than students in a control class. In addition, only the skills test scores of the critical thinking group were sig- nificantly correlated with metacognitive measures after instruction. However, the critical thinking group showed no greater gains on measures of critical thinking dispositions. To examine another neglected aspect of critical thinking research, we manipulated students’ test-taking motivation before assessment, but our manipulation produced no significant gains in test-taking motivation or critical thinking skills. Nevertheless, test-taking motiva- tion was significantly correlated with scores on the critical thinking skills test both before and after instruction and declined significantly in the control group. Our results suggest that future studies should further examine the impact of explicit critical thinking instruc- tion on critical thinking skills, dispositions, and metacognition and identify ways to raise low test-taking motivation.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

1.1. Multi-dimensional assessment of critical thinking

Educators and experts on learning outcomes assessment (LOA) have recognized the importance of assessing critical think- ing as an outcome of higher education (e.g., Banta, 2002; Kurfis, 1988). Comprehensive assessment of critical thinking (CT) is challenging, due to CT being a multidimensional construct that includes skills in reasoning, decision making, and problem solving (Willingham, 2007) as well as dispositions for thinking critically and a metacognitive component for monitoring and

regulating thinking (Bensley, 2011; Halpern, 1998). Many studies have reported effective interventions for improving the CT skills of psychology students (e.g., Bensley, Crowe, Bernhardt, Buckner, & Allman, 2010; Bensley & Haynes, 1995; Burke, Sears, Kraus, & Roberts-Cady, 2014; Nieto & Saiz, 2008; Penningroth, Despain, & Gray, 2007; Solon, 2007; see Abrami et al.,

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (D.A. Bensley).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.06.006 1871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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008 for a review of effective CT instruction in other fields). Yet, few LOA studies have investigated whether CT instruction lso impacts dispositions and metacognition. Accordingly, the purpose of our LOA study was to comprehensively assess he impact of explicit CT instruction on CT skills, dispositions, and metacognition under varying conditions of test-taking

otivation. Metacognition is a central component of CT (Tarricone, 2011) and, therefore, LOA researchers should assess it. Metacog-

ition is the knowledge and awareness of one’s own thinking and cognitive processes that allows a person to regulate that hinking. If students inaccurately self-assess their CT skill levels and do not know when to use their CT skills, then they are ess likely to think as effectively as their skill levels might indicate.

CT dispositions are another important component of CT that should be a part of its comprehensive assessment (Ennis, 987; Facione, 1990a,b). CT dispositions are attitudes, traits, and tendencies that make it more likely that a person will ngage in CT. Research supports that CT disposition is a separate dimension from CT skill (Clifford, Boufal, & Kurtz, 2004; aub, 1997). Researchers in the area of CT commonly identify dispositions, such as open-mindedness (Ennis, 1987; Facione, 990a,b; Halpern, 1998; Stanovich & West, 1997), fair-mindedness and objectivity (Baron, 2008; Paul, 1993), skepticism Bensley & Murtagh, 2012; Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1993) and intellectual engagement and effort (Bensley & Murtagh, 2012; alpern, 1998).

This suggests the need for comprehensive assessment of CT that includes measurement of skills, dispositions, and etacognition. We argue that without comprehensive assessment of CT, it is difficult to make good decisions about how to

mprove CT instruction and learning outcomes, that is, to close the assessment loop on CT. In this article, we first review the iterature on CT assessment that illustrates the challenges and limitations, especially regarding the comprehensive assess-

ent of CT instructional interventions. We also examine this research in relation to test-taking motivation, another factor hat can affect the validity of CT assessment. Then, we report the results of a LOA study intended to comprehensively assess T-related outcomes in students who have received explicit CT instruction versus those who have not, while also testing he effects of a manipulation designed to improve their test-taking motivation.

.2. Research on assessment of critical thinking skills

Much of the research on CT has focused on skill acquisition in college students who have been assessed at the general ducation (institutional) level. The results from numerous outcome studies reviewed by Pascarella and Terrenzini (2005) uggest that colleges and universities may now be producing less improvement in CT skills than when they conducted their arlier review (Pascarella & Terrenzini, 1991). Likewise, a review of results from many colleges and universities using the ollegiate Learning Assessment found that after four years of college as many as 37% of all seniors showed no improvement

n their CT skills and writing (Arum & Roksa, 2011). These institutional studies are typically longitudinal in design, testing college students at the beginning of college and

hen again later, often in their senior year. Longitudinal studies are very useful in evaluating the summative outcomes of program, but they do little to identify which specific components of CT instruction in a program lead to gains. Bensley nd Murtagh (2012) recommended that departments use classroom assessment to assess students more often than just t the beginning and end of their program in order to acquire more information about the process of acquiring CT skills. hey further recommended comparing students in courses that receive CT instruction to those in similar courses that do ot. Accordingly, in the present study, we compared students from one course receiving explicit CT instruction to similar tudents in another course not receiving it.

Many studies demonstrating success in improving CT skills have used some form of explicit instruction; see Abrami et al. 2008) for a review. In psychology, two such studies (Nieto & Saiz, 2008; Solon, 2007) used explicit instruction based on alpern (2003) that produced gains on the Cornell Test of Critical Thinking-Form Z, a test of general CT skills primarily ssessing argument analysis skill. Solon (2007) found that after instruction a group of general psychology students receiving xplicit instruction of CT skills infused into the course did significantly better on the Cornell Test of Critical Thinking than

similar control group studying the same content but not receiving the CT instruction. Moreover, the CT-instructed group erformed as well as the control group on a test of general psychology, suggesting that the explicit CT instruction improved T skills without negatively impacting acquisition of subject matter knowledge.

Other studies focusing on the ability to think critically in psychology have found that explicit instruction of CT skills was ffective (e.g., Bensley et al., 2010; Bensley, Flinn, Murtagh, & Powell, 2011; Bensley & Haynes, 1995; Nieto & Saiz, 2008; enningroth et al., 2007). The explicit CT skill instruction in many of these studies employed some common components, such s targeting specific CT skills, making CT rules and principles explicit through class assignments and exercises that provide ractice and corrective feedback. Bensley et al. (2010) described this form of explicit CT instruction as “direct infusion” ecause it combines elements of direct instruction with infusion, an approach to teaching CT rules and principles along with egular course content instruction. For more information on direct infusion, see Bensley (2011).

The success of direct infusion and other forms of explicit instruction in promoting acquisition of CT skills influenced ur department to develop a new CT course for beginning majors in our program, using direct infusion as an instructional ramework (Bensley & Murtagh, 2012). Although CT is a multi-dimensional construct, few LOA studies have reported results or other CT dimensions besides CT skills, such as CT dispositions and metacognition, as discussed in the next section.

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1.3. Studies examining critical thinking and metacognition

Few studies have examined metacognition in the context of argument analysis skills, e.g., (Ku & Ho, 2010; Magno, 2010). Magno (2010) gave students the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal and the Metacognitive Assessment Inventory (MAI) of Schraw and Dennison (1994). Magno found that monitoring and other metacognitive factors derived from the MAI predicted critical thinking test performance on the Watson-Glaser test. In a study focused more on the metacognitive processes involved in CT task performance, Ku and Ho (2010) asked students to think aloud as they performed selected tasks from the Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment (Halpern, 2007). They found that good critical thinkers engaged in monitoring, evaluation, planning, and other high-level metacognitive strategies more than poorer critical thinkers. Although these two studies reveal individual differences in metacognitive monitoring related to CT skill, they did not test whether explicit instruction affects the acquisition of argument analysis skills and metacognitive monitoring.

Recently, Bensley and Spero (2014) tested the impact of direct infusion of CT on acquisition of argumentation and critical reading skills, as well as metacognitive monitoring, while controlling for CT disposition in multiple classes of the same cognitive psychology course. Initially, the group receiving direct infusion of CT skills for argumentation did not differ from two other control groups on Analyzing Psychological Statements (APS), an argument analysis test, and on a critical reading test (CRT). However after instruction, the CT-infused group showed significantly greater gains than both control groups on the APS and CRT.

Bensley and Spero (2014) also tested the metacognitive monitoring of the three instructional groups as measured by their ability to accurately postdict or estimate their scores on the two tests after taking each. After instruction, the CT-instructed students showed significantly greater gains in their ability to accurately estimate their post-test APS and CRT scores than the students in the two control groups. Although detecting this effect required statistically combining the two dependent variables, this finding provides some support for the unskilled and unaware effect in CT instruction. According to Kruger and Dunning (1999), when people lack knowledge or skill, their ignorance prevents them from knowing they lack these; however, after they acquire knowledge or skill, they become more accurate in estimating their test performance. Indeed, Bensley and Spero (2014) found that after instruction the CT-infused students became better calibrated in estimating their scores than the other two groups, but all three groups continued to be overconfident of their CT skills.

1.4. Studies examining critical thinking dispositions

Initially, Bensley and Spero (2014) found that the three groups did not differ on the Need for Cognition (NFC), the CT disposition measure used in their study to assess intellectual engagement. Although NFC scores did not improve after CT instruction, scores on both the CRT and APS were significantly correlated with NFC scores after instruction, suggesting an association between intellectual engagement and performance on the effort-demanding CT tests.

Recently, Lawson, Jordan-Fleming, and Bodie (2015) conducted a cross-sectional LOA study of beginning, junior, and senior psychology students in their program, testing both CT skills and dispositions. They used an improved version of their test, the Psychological Critical Thinking Exam (PCTE) to measure CT skills and the Objectivism Scale of Leary, Shepperd, McNeil, Jenkins, and Barnes (1986) to measure the CT disposition, objectivism, the tendency to take a rational/objective approach to evidence. This LOA study also examined the effects of explicit CT instruction. As part of their senior thesis course in psychology, seniors read and discussed a CT textbook by Stanovich (2013) and received explicit instruction with questions pointing to problems in research. The CT-instructed students did exercises and a practice quiz with questions similar to those on the PCTE, receiving feedback on their responses before taking the PCTE.

Lawson et al. (2015) found that senior psychology majors who received CT instruction performed significantly better on the PCTE than all other groups, including junior psychology majors in a research methods class, introductory psychology students, seniors in biology, and seniors in art. However, senior psychology majors did not perform better than any other group on the Objectivism Scale. Consistent with the findings of Bensley and Spero (2014), these results suggest that explicit CT skill instruction can be effective in improving psychological CT skills, but it has little effect on CT dispositions.

Some studies in fields other than psychology have assessed both CT skills and dispositions in the same study, with many of these studies conducted on nursing programs (e.g., Paans, 2010; Rapps, Riegel, & Glaser, 2001). Paans (2010) examined how knowledge sources, CT dispositions, and reasoning skills contributed to the accurate diagnoses made by student nurses. Paans found that the analysis component of the reasoning test contributed the most to the accuracy of their diagnoses. Although studies like this one improve our understanding of the role of CT skills and dispositions in CT tasks, they do not inform our understanding of how instruction is related to the acquisition of CT skills and dispositions.

Taken together, these studies suggest connections between CT skills, CT dispositions, and metacognition and imply that LOA studies of CT should comprehensively assess other components of CT in addition to CT skill. Accordingly, in the

study reported in this article, we examine the impact of explicit CT instruction on gains in CT skills, CT dispositions, and in metacognitive monitoring accuracy of test performance. Although the comprehensive assessment of CT could provide a fuller picture of the effect of instruction on CT, this picture could be distorted if students are insufficiently motivated to do their best on assessments, a problem we turn to next.

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.5. Test-Taking motivation and critical thinking

Several studies have found that the test-taking motivation of students is often inadequate on low-stakes assessments e.g., Barry, Horst, Finney, Brown, & Kopp, 2010) and that students with low test-taking motivation perform worse on tests han those with high test-taking motivation (Cole & Osterlind, 2008; Wise & DeMars, 2005). Liu, Bridgeman, and Adler (2012) rgued that test-taking motivation is low because the low-stakes assessments typically conducted for LOA have no personal onsequences for students being tested.

In assessment of our program, our usual motivational instructions likely signal that the testing is low-stakes. We do nstruct students that the assessment is important for evaluating our students and program to improve it, and we urge them o do their best on tests and to report honestly on other measures. Nevertheless, when we tell them that the results of their ssessment are not part of their permanent record and that their data is not identified by their name and only by subject umber in the computer data set, they likely interpret the assessment as low stakes. They perceive that their performance as no personal consequences for them. Consequently, their test-taking motivation may be lower than if they perceived heir performance as more consequential.

Low test-taking motivation may be especially low in control groups not receiving an active treatment because their articipation may seem less consequential than classes receiving active CT instruction related to their course. Although two f the authors of this article (Bensley & Murtagh, 2012) earlier recommended that LOA researchers compare classes receiving T instruction to similar classes not receiving the instruction to study instructional effectiveness, we became increasingly oncerned about possible low test-taking motivation of students in the course serving as our control group. For example, we ound that students assessed in the Introduction to the Profession of Psychology course serving as a control group showed egative gain on a CT test for evaluating information on the Internet (Bensley, 2011).

Low test-taking motivation may be especially problematic for the accurate and valid assessment of CT because engaging in T requires reflection, considerable effort, and intellectual engagement (Halpern, 1998). In general, critical thinking involves igh levels of effortful cognitive processes, such as metacognition (Miele & Wigfield, 2015). Shehab and Nussbaum (2015)

ound that students who generated complex refutations on a critical writing task reported that they applied more mental ffort to the task and had higher scores on the Need for Cognition scale than control students not given CT prompting nstructions. From this, one might expect that success on CT tasks, whether during CT practice or tests, would demand onsiderable mental effort and motivation.

In response to our concern about low test-taking motivation in assessment of our students, we began to administer he Student Opinion Scale (SOS) of Sundre (2003) to assess our students’ test-taking motivation after they completed CT

easures. One of our first studies using the SOS examined short-term gains from CT instruction on the APS, the Inventory of hinking Dispositions in Psychology-Revised (ITDP-R), and in the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring of test performance. tudents in the beginning-level psychology course, Introduction to the Profession of Psychology, who did not receive the CT nstruction, served as a control group, completing the same measures.

The results raised even greater concerns about low test-taking motivation (Bensley, Rainey, Lilienfeld, & Kuehne, 2015). lthough the CT-instructed class showed greater gains in CT skills for argument analysis and in psychological knowledge

han the control class, test-taking motivation (SOS scores) declined in both courses and declined significantly more in the ontrol course than in the CT course.

These results make it difficult to validly assess the impact of CT instruction and to accurately evaluate the efficacy of the nstructional intervention. Moreover, because of low and variable test-taking motivation, this makes it difficult to establish ppropriate benchmarks for proficient performance, an important objective of LOA when using new measures. To better nderstand and perhaps improve test-taking motivation, we manipulated and measured it, while comparing students in a ourse receiving explicit CT skill instruction to those in a control course not receiving it.

Recognizing the problems created by low test-taking motivation, we sought ways to increase test-taking motivation so hat we could be assured that students were motivated to perform as well as they could on a CT skills test. Accordingly, we

anipulated the perceived consequences of assessment performance to create different levels of test-taking motivation, as ecommended by Liu et al. (2012) who obtained significantly higher scores on test-taking motivation and on a reasoning est when they made the consequences of the assessment more personally consequential.

. Method

.1. Participants

We assessed a total of 112 psychology majors in two 100-level beginning courses in psychology, taken soon after they eclared the psychology major at Frostburg State University. Of these 112, we retained 90 who completed the principal

easures and who had not previously taken the CT course. The remaining 90 students included 44 from the CT course

aught by the first author and 46 from the 1-credit Introduction to the Profession of Psychology course taught by the fourth uthor. Of those answering questions on the demographics form, 24 were male and 65 were female. Participants ranged n age from 18 to 38 years (M = 20.22; SD = 2.72). Of the 85 reporting ethnicity, 62.4% reported white (Non-Hispanic), 29.4%

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reported African American, 1.2% reported Latino/a, 1.2% reported Asian American, and 5.9% reporting “Other.” Of the 89 reporting class rank, 19.1% were first-years, 32.2% were sophomores, 42.7% were juniors, and 5.6% were seniors.

2.2. Measures

To test CT skill and knowledge, we used the 20-question, multiple-choice version of Analyzing Psychological Statements of Author (2016). The APS has shown sensitivity to change following four weeks of CT instruction (Bensley, Rainey, Lilienfeld, & Kuehne, 2015) and has test-retest reliability of r = 0.70 at 4 weeks (Bensley, Lilienfeld, & Powell, 2014). The revised APS included seven items describing everyday, psychology-related situations and 13 describing psychological research or clinical practice examples. Of the 20 items, three were designed to test the ability to distinguish arguments from non-arguments, seven the ability to identify and evaluate kinds of evidence, three on finding assumptions, three on drawing appropriate conclusions, and four on identifying problems in reasoning about psychology-related questions.

For example, the following APS item assesses the ability to identify arguments from non-arguments in psychology. (The correct answer is option c.)

A therapist assessed a new client using measures such as the Beck Depression Inventory, interview data, and behavioral observation. Later, he told his client that the assessment results had led him to

diagnose her with major depression. Is the therapist making a basic argument?

a No, this is an unsubstantiated claim. b No, the therapist is offering an opinion. c Yes, the therapist is making an argument. d Maybe, if the therapist is correct.

We also administered three self-report inventories to measure CT dispositions, adapted from the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale of Stanovich and West (1997). To measure open-mindedness, students completed the 8-item Openness to Ideas subscale of the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). To assess a flexible thinking style, they completed the 10-item Flexible Thinking subscale created by Stanovich and West (1997). Flexible thinking is thought to be related to open- mindedness (Halpern, 1998) because it involves the willingness to change one’s mind. To assess intellectual engagement and open-mindedness, students completed the 20-item rationality scale of the Rational Experiential Inventory of Pacini and Epstein (1996), based on the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale of Cacioppo, Petty and Kao (1984). The NFC has been found to be reliable and to be correlated with openness to experience and the need to evaluate information (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1984). Participants rated all items in the three scales on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.

To measure metacognitive monitoring of CT, students completed three self- assessments of CT ability. To test their skill in postdicting CT test performance, participants completed another form on which they were asked to estimate how many questions out of 20 they had correctly answered on the APS after completing it. The next question asked them to estimate how many questions they thought the average student in their course got right. To measure critical thinking self-efficacy, we asked participants to rate themselves on how good of a critical thinker they judged themselves to be, in general and in psychology, on two 5-point, Likert items with scale values ranging from 1 = very poor to 5 = very good. After each of these ratings, a parallel question asked them to rate the average student in their class on the same dimensions.

Participants completed two types of measures to assess their motivation for engaging in the assessment. After each APS question, they rated how much effort they applied to answering that question to assess item-by-item changes in test-taking motivation related to item difficulty, using a 7-point, Likert scale, 1 = Very Little to 7 = Very Much. To assess overall test-taking motivation, they completed the 10-item Student Opinion Scale (SOS) of Sundre (2007). Each item of the SOS is reported on a scale with five different categorical response options ranging from A = Strongly Disagree to E = Strongly Agree. For purposes of quantitative analysis, we transformed all alphabetic responses to numeric scores (A = 1 to E = 5). The SOS has two factors, effort expended and assessment importance, with reliabilities ranging from 0.80 to 0.89 in a sample of over 15,000 students (Sundre & Moore, 2002).

2.3. Instruction

Instruction of students in the CT course (Critical Thinking and Scientific Inquiry) focused on acquiring skills in basic argumentation in CT in psychology and in science. Students in the CT-instructed course studied ten chapters from the manuscript of a textbook on critical thinking in psychology, written by the first author (Bensley, 2013). The first four chapters included discussion and exercises on argument analysis skill. This included recognizing arguments from non-arguments, finding assumptions, learning and applying standards of evidence, identifying and dealing with thinking and reasoning errors.

Other instruction centered on rules and guidelines for evaluating the quality of evidence provided by different research methods such as true experiments versus correlation and evidence provided by non-scientific sources such as anecdotes, commonsense belief, and statements of authority. To scaffold this presentation, the CT-instructed group received two tables that compared the strengths and weaknesses of non-scientific and scientific kinds of evidence adapted from Bensley (1998,

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011). Later chapters included application of these standards and guidelines to critical reading of literature reviews of sychological questions. For practice, students in the CT group completed exercises on all of these skills as activities in their extbook and competed online exercises, quizzes, and tests during the 12 weeks of instruction. Students were provided nformation about CT dispositions, such as open-mindedness and skepticism, but received no explicit instruction designed o directly improve their CT dispositions.

The Introduction to the Profession of Psychology course was selected to serve as the control group, because like the CT ourse, this course was a 100-level course for beginning majors; but unlike the CT course, it had no explicit CT component. ather, instruction in the control course focused on acquisition of general knowledge about the field of psychology and the sychology major at our institution.

.4. Procedure

At the beginning of the semester, the third author, who did not teach either of the two courses, served as assessment dministrator and tested all participants in order to dissociate the assessment from the first and fourth authors who taught he courses. However, students were aware that they were being assessed on their CT skills and dispositins. Participants ere randomly assigned to a high or low test-taking motivational condition. The second and seventh authors assisted him

n distributing the assessment booklets of measures that included the consent form, APS, SOS, metacognitive ratings, NEO- penness to Ideas, NFC from REI, Flexible Thinking scale, and demographics form, assembled in that order. The name of

he participant was on the outside of the booklet, but otherwise all booklets were identical except for one paragraph in the nformed consent form.

In addition to the usual information required on our consent form, it also contained instructions designed to manipulate est-taking motivation. The wording in the low motivation consent form was similar to that usually presented to our LOA articipants. It informed them that the purpose of the assessment was to evaluate our program and the students in it and that

t was not part of their permanent record, and they should do their best on tests and to report honestly on the surveys they ere asked to complete. The high motivation consent form stated the same thing, but following the procedure of Liu et al.

2012), it also told them that the results of the assessment would be forwarded on to their instructors, academic advisers, nd to the assessment committee to make the assessment seem more personally consequential to them. The assessment dministrator instructed participants to read the consent form. To ensure that they read these instructions in the consent orm, he instructed them to initial each part of the consent form in designated places after they had read and understood ach part. As a post-experimental manipulation check of the motivation instructions, participants reported at the end of the ooklet what they thought was to happen to their data after the assessment after completing all forms at the end of the tudy.

. Results

.1. Analyses of critical thinking skills

We first conducted a two-way ANOVA on pretest APS scores to determine if either of the two instructional groups or the wo motivational groups differed before instruction. We found that no significant differences on the pretest APS scores of wo instructional groups and two motivational groups.

To test whether argument analysis skills improved over the course of the semester, we calculated gain scores by subtract- ng pretest APS scores from post-test APS scores for both courses. For LOA purposes, we typically conduct analyses on gain cores because, along with effect size measures, they provide convenient measures of the value added by instruction in single easures. A two-way ANOVA on the APS gain scores of the two courses across the two kinds of test-taking motivational

nstructions was significant, F(3,85) = 6.21, p = 0.001, �p2 = 0.18. The main effect of course was significant, F(1,85) = 16.41, < .001, �p2 = .16 with the CT-instructed course (M = 1.98, SD = 3.43) showing significantly greater gain on the APS than the ntroduction to the Profession course, (M = −0.80, SD = 2.90). The effect size for the two-way ANOVA was medium.

A paired samples t-test comparing pre- and post-test APS scores of the students in the CT-instructed class was also ignificant, t(43) = 3.82, p < .001, d = 0.58. The mean of the CT-instructed students (M = 12.50; SD = 4.63) after instruction as significantly higher than their mean before receiving CT instruction (M = 10.52; SD = 3.08) with a medium effect size; owever, the means of the control group did not differ after instruction.

.2. Analyses of test-taking motivation

Similar analyses on SOS pretest scores revealed no significant main effect or interaction, indicating that initially the two ourses and motivational conditions did not differ on test-taking motivation. However, a two-way ANOVA on the SOS gain cores of the two courses revealed a significant main effect of course, F(1,85) = 4.13, p < .05, �p2 = .05 with the CT-instructed

ourse (M = 0.50, SE = 0.87) showing significantly greater gain on the SOS than the Introduction to the Profession course, M = −2.00, SE = .87). There was no significant main effect of motivational instructions and no interaction between course nd motivational instructions on gain in test-taking motivation. The effect size for the two-way ANOVA on SOS gain scores as small. A paired samples t-test on the pretest and posttest SOS scores, t(45) = 3.07, p < .01, d = .45, showed that pretest

164 D.A. Bensley et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 158–168

Table 1 Correlations above the Identity Are for Pretest Measures and Those Below It Are for Gain Scores on the Same Measures.

Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1. APS Total N= – −.34** .22* .22* .06 .12 .30** 90 77 90 90 89 88 89

2. APS Effort N= −.03 – −.04 .03 −.01 −.04 .02 73 73 77 77 76 76 76

3. SOS Effort N= .31** −.04 – .86*** .27** .37*** .26* 89 73 89 90 89 88 89

4. SOS Total N= .35*** −.01 .81*** – .36*** .42*** .32** 90 73 89 90 89 88 89

5. Openness N= .07 .20 .09 .14 – .70*** .49***

89 72 88 89 89 88 89

6. NFC Total N= .14 .23 .20 .19 .48*** – .44***

88 72 87 88 88 88 88

7. Flexible Th. N= .29** −.01 .18 .11 −.06 .16 – 87 70 86 87 87 86 87

Note: APS Total = total score on Analyzing Psychological Statements; APS Effort = sum of effort ratings on APS; SOS Effort = effort subscale of the Student Opinion Scale; SOS Total = total score on the Student Opinion Scale; Openness = total score on the NEO Openness to Ideas Scale; NFC = total score on the Need for Cognition; Flexible Th. = total score on the Flexible Thinking Scale.

* p < .05. ** p < .01.

*** p < .001.

SOS scores (M = 35.67, SD = 5.05) declined significantly on the posttest (M = 33.74, SD = 5.47) while a t-test on the CT group showed a nonsignificant increase.

Next, we calculated the correlation between SOS scores and APS scores on the pretest and again for the gain scores of each measure. As shown in Table 1, the pre-test SOS scores were significantly correlated with APS scores. Students who performed better on the APS pretest tended to have higher test-taking motivation before instruction in the course. Consistent with these correlations, and more problematic for interpreting the significantly greater gain in APS scores in the CT-instructed group, was a significant, positive correlation between APS gain scores and SOS gain scores shown in the lower part of Table 1. Unfortunately, the significant difference in the two instructional groups on SOS gain scores precluded the possibility of conducting an ANCOVA on the data using SOS gain scores as a covariate, because our data did not meet the ANCOVA assumption that the treatment groups and covariate should be independent. According to Miller and Chapman (2001), in such a case, conducting an ANCOVA using SOS gain scores as a covariate would be inappropriate.

To check the motivational manipulation, we examined the initialing of the consent forms and found that all students initialed the part that indicated they had read and understood the explanation of what was to happen to their data. Likewise, at the end of the study students answered correctly the question of what was to happen to their data. This suggested that the motivational manipulation was successful in creating different expectations about the consequences of their assessment although these different consequences were not sufficient to produce differences in test-taking motivation.

To further examine test-taking motivation, we summed the ratings of the effort applied on each of the 20 APS items. A two-way ANOVA on pretest APS effort total scores showed no significant main effect for either course or motivational condition and no interaction on the pretest, indicating that the two instructional groups and two motivational groups did not differ before instruction. To determine if effort on APS items changed after instruction, we calculated gain scores (subtracting the pretest sum of APS effort scores from the posttest sum of APS effort scores). Again, a two-way ANOVA on APS effort gain scores revealed no significant effects.

3.3. Analyses of metacognitive measures

Next, we conducted a series of analyses to examine the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring. To find out if students’ postdiction estimates of their APS improved after instruction, we subtracted the difference between their estimated and actual APS scores on the pretest and on the posttest and then subtracted the posttest calibration scores from the pretest calibration scores to create calibration change scores. A two-way ANOVA on calibration scores showed no significant main effect for course, F(1,82) = 1.17, p = .28 �p

2 = .01; however, there was a significant main effect for motivation, F(1,82) = 6.55, p < .02, �p2 = .07 with the high motivation group (M = 0.36, SD = 2.92) showing significantly greater gain in calibration accuracy than the low motivation group (M = −1.68, SD = 4.18) and a small effect size. Inspection of the means showed that while

the high motivation group showed a positive increase in APS calibration, the low motivation group showed a decrease in calibration.

A comparison of the pretest APS mean score (M = 10.21 or 51.1%) to the pretest mean estimated APS score (M = 12.15 or 60.7%), showed that overall participants were overconfident in estimating their scores by 9.6%. A comparison of the posttest

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PS mean score (M = 10.78 or 53.9%) to the posttest mean estimated APS score (M = 13.35 or 66.8%), showed they were verconfident in estimating their scores by 12.9%.

Next, we examined the impact of course and motivational instructions on students’ self-assessments of their CT efficacy. two-way ANOVA on the change in their ratings in response to “How good are you at thinking critically?” revealed no ignificant gain for course, motivational condition, or the interaction of the two variables. Likewise, students showed no ignificant gain in their ratings on the question, “How good are you at thinking critically about psychology?” These results uggest that students in the CT course did not perceive that their ability to think critically increased although their skill had ncreased significantly, but this does not mean that students lack any knowledge of their level of ability.

To assess whether global self-assessments of CT efficacy are related to CT argument analysis skill, we calculated cor- elations between the self-ratings of CT competence, the self-estimate of APS scores, and APS scores on both the pretest nd posttest. We found that pretest APS scores were not correlated with any of these metacognitive measures in either roup. The beginning majors in the control group also showed no correlation between the APS and the posttest metacogni- ive measures, but after instruction the CT group showed significant positive correlations between the posttest APS and all hree of the posttest metacognitive measures. In the CT-instructed group, posttest APS scores were significantly correlated ith ratings of how good of a critical thinker they judged themselves to be, r(42) = .40 p < .01; with ratings of how good

hey judged themselves to be at thinking critically about psychological questions, r(42) = .41, p < .01; and with their posttest elf-estimates of their APS scores, r(42) = .69, p < .001.

.4. Analyses of critical thinking dispositions

We first conducted a two-way ANOVA on pretest scores on each of the CT dispositions to determine if the two instructional roups and the two motivational conditions differed before instruction on these. We found no significant differences on the retest scores on the NEO Openness to Ideas scale, on the Flexible Thinking scale, and on the Need for Cognition scale. Nor did e find any significant effect for either instruction or motivation in two-way ANOVAs on the gain scores of NEO openness, exible thinking, and need for cognition. Neither instruction nor the motivational manipulation affected any of these three T dispositions.

.5. Correlations between critical thinking skill, dispositions, and motivation

To further explore the relationships among the various measures, we calculated correlations between pretest measures, ncluding APS, APS total effort, SOS effort subscale scores, SOS total scores, and CT disposition measures as shown above and o the right of the diagonal in Table 1. We found that although APS scores were positively correlated with both SOS effort nd SOS total scores, APS scores were negatively correlated with APS total effort. However, APS effort was not significantly orrelated with either SOS effort or SOS total scores, suggesting that APS total effort was measuring perceived difficulty of PS items and not measuring test-taking motivation. APS was also positively correlated with one CT disposition measure,

he Flexible Thinking Scale. Interestingly, both SOS effort and SOS total scores were positively correlated with all three CT ispositions measures, NEO Openness to Ideas scores, Flexible Thinking Scale scores, and with Need for Cognition scores. s would be expected if the CT dispositions scales were all measuring actively open-minded thinking, the pretest scores n NEO Openness to Ideas, NFC, and the Flexible Thinking Scale were all inter-correlated as found in Stanovich and West 1997).

To better understand changes associated with instruction and the motivation manipulation, we next examined the rela- ionships among the various measures of gain, including gains in APS, APS total effort, SOS effort subscale scores, SOS total cores, and CT disposition measures, as shown below and left of the diagonal in Table 1. We found that although APS gain cores were positively correlated with gains in both SOS effort and SOS total scores, APS gain scores were not negatively orrelated with gain in APS total effort as pretest APS and APS effort had been. However, consistent with the pattern in retest correlations, the gain in APS effort was not significantly correlated with either gain in SOS effort or SOS total scores. his again suggests that APS total effort was measuring perceived difficulty of APS items and not test-taking motivation. As ith the pretest correlations, APS gain scores were positively correlated with one of the CT disposition measures, the Flexible

hinking Scale. Unlike the findings from the pretest, the gain scores for SOS effort and for SOS total were not correlated with ny of the three CT dispositions measures, NEO Openness to Ideas scores, Flexible Thinking Scale scores, and with Need for ognition scores. Only gain scores on NEO Openness showed a significant, positive correlation with Need for Cognition gain cores.

. Discussion

The purpose of our LOA study was to comprehensively assess the impact of explicit CT instruction on CT skills, dispositions, nd metacognition under varying conditions of test-taking motivation. Based on previous research, we expected that students

n a CT course who received explicit CT instruction would show significantly greater gains on a CT argument analysis test than tudents in another course not receiving the explicit CT instruction. We also expected that after instruction the metacognitive onitoring of the CT-instructed students would show significantly greater gains in calibration accuracy. To the extent that CT

nstruction is generally effective we expected that CT-instructed students would show gains in measures of their disposition.

166 D.A. Bensley et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 158–168

Finally, we examined whether a manipulation of test-taking motivation would induce greater test-taking motivation in students and also affect performance on the CT test, perhaps solving the problem of low test-taking motivation on these low-stakes tests.

We found that students completing the semester-long, CT course showed greater on the APS, the argument analysis skills test, than students in the control course not receiving explicit CT instruction. However, the significant, positive correlation between APS gain scores and SOS gain scores, the measure of test-taking motivation, calls into question the simple interpre- tation that the increase in CT skill test performance was due only to CT instruction and shows that test-taking motivation as measured by the SOS was also involved.

This correlation is especially problematic, given that along with their declining SOS scores, the APS scores of students in the control course declined 0.76 of a point on the 20-item APS while students in the CT-instructed course showed positive gain, improving 1.98 points on the APS. Although the CT-instructed group remained stable on the SOS, gaining 0.50 of a point out of a total of 50 points possible, the control group significantly declined in test-taking motivation by 2.00 points. Therefore, the problem seems to be the decline in test-taking motivation in the control course.

The finding that the high test-taking motivation group showed no greater gain on the SOS than the low motivation group failed to support our prediction that making the results of CT testing more consequential would improve test-taking motivation. Apparently, students did not find the reporting their scores results to their academic adviser, instructor, and the assessment committee very consequential. Nor did the high test-taking motivation group perform better on the APS than the low motivation group or show any gain in CT disposition. The only significant effect observed was that the high motivation group showed a significantly greater gain in calibration accuracy in postdicting their APS scores than students in the low motivation group.

It is unclear why higher test-taking motivation would produce a greater gain in postdiction accuracy but not affect the other two metacognitive ratings. One possible explanation is that higher test-taking motivation was sufficient to adjust the criterion for estimating scores but not sufficient to motivate higher levels of skill test performance. Although reporting scores to advisers and instructors was not consequential enough to boost the effort required to perform better on the CT skills test, it may have sensitized them to the need to more accurately estimate their performance, a less effortful task.

Nor did the test-taking motivational manipulation affect the total ratings of effort applied to answering each APS question, suggesting that test-taking motivation and effort applied to answering individual questions may differ. The correlations between the motivational measures, CT skill, and CT dispositions found in Table 1 may help shed some light on what the new measure of effort applied to answering APS items actually measures. Neither SOS effort scores nor SOS total scores were correlated with the APS effort ratings. Although both SOS measures were positively correlated with APS scores on the pretest and even more highly on the gain scores, only the pretest the APS effort ratings were negatively correlated with APS pretest scores. This suggests that students experienced the APS questions as more difficult on the pretest than on the posttest.

In addition, pretest SOS effort and SOS total scores were correlated with all three pretest CT dispositions measures, but pretest total ratings of effort applied to answering APS questions were not correlated with any CT disposition measure. These results suggest that pretest SOS measures and pretest APS effort ratings were measuring different kinds of motivation. The SOS was measuring global test-taking motivation that we would expect to be related CT disposition, including intellectual engagement as measured by the NFC; whereas, APS effort ratings were measuring what they were designed to measure, the difficulty associated with answering individual APS questions which would not necessarily be related to CT disposition.

The correlations in gain scores among the same measures were somewhat attenuated in comparison to the pretest correlations in Table 1. The gains in the two SOS measures were not correlated with gains in any CT disposition measure although the correlation between SOS total gain scores and the gain in Need for Cognition scores was marginally significant (p = 0.06). The gain in APS scores was not correlated with gain in NFC, but APS gain was positively correlated with gain in scores on the Flexible Thinking Scale, partially replicating with a different CT disposition the positive correlation of NFC with APS gain found by Bensley and Spero (2014).

An important goal in our comprehensive assessment of CT was to test whether CT instruction was associated with changes in metacognition measures. A two-way ANOVA revealed no gain in postdiction accuracy for CT instruction, contrary to the prediction based on the theory behind the unskilled and unaware effect of Kruger and Dunning (1999). Nevertheless, we did obtain some support for the unskilled and unaware hypothesis when we found that after instruction only the CT-instructed group showed significant positive correlations between argument analysis test scores and all three metacognitive measures. These findings suggest that CT instruction was associated with better calibration in postdicting scores and in perceived self-efficacy of CT ability.

It should be noted that although the instructor of the CT course discussed the importance of metacognition to CT and the general tendency for people to be overconfident of their performance, this was still not sufficient to eliminate the overconfidence in the CT-instructed group. Although after instruction the APS scores of students in the CT-instructed course were significantly correlated with their metacognitive monitoring scores, students continued to overestimate their scores. This persistent overconfidence after explicit CT skill instruction replicates that found by Bensley and Spero (2014).

Finally, it is notable that explicit CT instruction failed to produce any significant gains on the self-report measures of CT

dispositions despite the significant gains obtained on the APS. The argument analysis skills test. The most straightforward explanation for this failure was that the focus of the CT course instruction was on improving CT skills. Although dispositions were discussed, no exercises or activities were designed to directly target and improve CT dispositions. An alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanation is that CT dispositions are like other traits, and are very stable over time, as research on

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raits has shown (Fleeson & Law, 2015). Therefore, it may be necessary to develop specific interventions, explicitly designed o improve CT dispositions.

. Conclusion

Taken together, these results have important implications for LOA studies of CT in our department and in other programs. he first is that test-taking motivation matters. As with other studies (e.g., Cole & Osterlind, 2008; Wise & DeMars, 2005), we ound that students who had lower test-taking motivation performed more poorly on low-stakes tests. The time and context f the test administration matter, too. Although students in the two classes did not differ on any pretest measure, including est-taking motivation, after instruction, post-test scores in the group not receiving CT instruction declined on both the APS nd the SOS. More problematic was the significant correlation between APS gain scores and SOS gain scores. Our failure to uccessfully increase test-taking motivation further suggests that it may be difficult to increase test-taking motivation and hat the development of more effective motivators is needed. In addition, the correlations between motivational measures, he APS, and CT dispositions measures warrant further study of motivation in CT assessment settings.

The decline in test-taking motivation in the control group makes the gain of the CT-instructed students on the APS hard o interpret. This pattern of results also suggests that the Introduction to the Profession of Psychology course does not make

good control group to compare with the CT-instructed course. Although it is a 100-level course like the CT course, it is raded pass/fail and requires much less work than the CT course. Although a paired samples t-test on the APS scores of the T-instructed students showed that their gain in the course was significant with a medium effect size, it is difficult to gauge he magnitude of improvement of the CT-instructed students without an adequate control group. Our results do provide a artial replication of those found in better controlled quasi-experiments showing improvement in CT skills following explicit T instruction in the same course (e.g., Bensley & Spero, 2014; Solon, 2007); but interpretation of the results are complicated y the reduction in test-taking motivation in the control group.

Moreover, we do not know how well students can perform when highly motivated because even the CT-instructed group nly showed moderate levels of test-taking motivation. A pilot study on improving test-taking motivation in the CT course y including the APS as a cumulative component of the final exam showed that students under these conditions increased oth their SOS scores and their APS scores (Bensley et al., 2015). If this strategy proves to be effective in improving test-taking otivation, we will be in a better position to establish an evidence-based benchmark for evaluating future performance of

tudents on the APS. Analyses of CT instructional effects on CT metacognitive monitoring accuracy showed mixed results. Although the ANOVA

howed no effect of CT instruction on any of the three metacognitive measures, the correlations of APS scores with metacog- itive measures were significant for all three measures, but only in the CT-instructed group after instruction, suggesting that etacognitive skill did improve some with CT instruction. Moreover, the gain in APS scores was correlated with gain on the

lexible Thinking Scale, suggesting an association with CT instruction since only the CT-instructed group improved on the PS.

Taken together, our results suggest that programs seeking to improve the CT of their students should take a comprehensive pproach to assessment of the multi-dimensional construct that is CT. Furthermore, they should monitor the test-taking otivation of their students because, as we have shown, test-taking motivation can be related to CT skill performance, CT

ispositions, and metacognitive monitoring accuracy. They further suggest that in future studies LOA researchers should mploy similar instructional and control groups that are equally motivated when testing the impact of explicit critical hinking instruction on critical thinking skills, disposition, and metacognition.

cknowledgements

The authors declare no conflict of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/o publication of this article and eceived no financial support for the research, authorship and/o publication of this article. We wish to thank Frostburg tate University for support of presentation of part of our findings at the 2014 annual meeting of the American Educational esearch Association in Philadelphia, PA.

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  • Closing the assessment loop on critical thinking: The challenges of multidimensional testing and low test-taking motivation
    • 1 Introduction
      • 1.1 Multi-dimensional assessment of critical thinking
      • 1.2 Research on assessment of critical thinking skills
      • 1.3 Studies examining critical thinking and metacognition
      • 1.4 Studies examining critical thinking dispositions
      • 1.5 Test-Taking motivation and critical thinking
    • 2 Method
      • 2.1 Participants
      • 2.2 Measures
      • 2.3 Instruction
      • 2.4 Procedure
    • 3 Results
      • 3.1 Analyses of critical thinking skills
      • 3.2 Analyses of test-taking motivation
      • 3.3 Analyses of metacognitive measures
      • 3.4 Analyses of critical thinking dispositions
      • 3.5 Correlations between critical thinking skill, dispositions, and motivation
    • 4 Discussion
    • 5 Conclusion
    • Acknowledgements
    • References

Related Articles/Creativity-support-systems--A-systematic-mappi_2016_Thinking-Skills-and-Crea.pdf

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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

reativity support systems: A systematic mapping study

. Gabriel a,∗, D. Monticolo a, M. Camargo a, M. Bourgault b

ERPI Laboratory, Université de Lorraine, Nancy, France Polytechnique Montréal, Montreal, Canada

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 25 July 2014 eceived in revised form 31 January 2016 ccepted 30 May 2016 vailable online 2 June 2016

eywords: reative support system emote collaboration reative problem solving reativity process omputer-assisted creativity

a b s t r a c t

As part of the innovation process, creativity has become a critical dimension for organiza- tions that wish to maintain their competitiveness. In order to foster the creativity potential within organizations, processes and systems need to be designed and integrated so that all stakeholders can participate in a coordinated and timely fashion, and despite the various dispersion levels that may separate them. Although many tools are already available on the market or being tested, a significant gap still exists between those products and the creativ- ity process that they are supposed to support. To truly respond to the need for creativity in a distributed environment, it is suggested that the entire process be re-examined and understood so that future Creativity Support Systems can fulfil real needs. This paper is a systematic mapping study of the literature on existing digital tools dedicated to creativity. A thorough examination of over 49 digital tools is carried out, providing the action channel for emerging Creativity Support Systems that would better support collaboration diversity throughout the creative process.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

. Introduction

In today’s globalized competitive context, organizations need to maintain their competitiveness by regularly generating ew ideas, new products or services, and new processes. Globalization also requires remote collaboration and extensive use f digital devices, as creativity is becoming a collective process. From the perspective of the innovation process, numerous actors influence the generation of value and novelty for a company. A trend that confirms and combines innovation and emote collaboration is the increase in open innovation strategies and associated platforms (i.e. OpenIdeo,1 Dell IdeaStorm,2

tc.). This article focuses on digital systems that support creativity during conceptual design and innovative initiatives and, ore specifically, innovation approaches that involve teams, such as creative workshops. Designing an entire system that supports creativity integrated into the entire innovation process is a complex problem

hat involves different research fields. (Ardaiz-Villanueva, Nicuesa-Chacón, Brene-Artazcoz, Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga, & Sanz e Acedo Baquedano, 2011) identified four separate groups of studies, each of which has a different underlying goal: (1) to

etermine how creativity is associated with personal characteristics (personality traits, cognitive ability); (2) to examine the ognitive and social processes that are involved in creativity; (3) to foster ideational creativity by means of computer tools; nd (4) to identify the environmental factors that nurture or inhibit creativity. The challenge is to gather these different

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Gabriel), [email protected] (D. Monticolo), [email protected] (M.

amargo), [email protected] (M. Bourgault). 1 OpenIdeo: https://openideo.com/. 2 Dell Idea Storm: http://www.ideastorm.com/.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.009 871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

110 A. Gabriel et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 109–122

approaches to create satisfying digital tools. In other words, foster the creativity by means of computer tools by considering individual characteristics, the social interaction processes involved in creativity, and the environmental factors that influence the individual and social fields and thus creativity.

In this paper, we investigate how currently available digital tools dedicated to creativity are supporting it. Investigat- ing these systems requires consideration of the social and cognitive process of creativity, social interaction through the collaborative mode, and the environmental factors as the technological means and the creative techniques applied. This investigation was done through a systematic mapping study defined as a “broad review of [. . .] in a specific topic area that aims to identify what evidence is available on the topic” (Kitchenham & Charters, 2007). Ultimately, the aim is to describe the actual “progress” concerning the support of creativity through digital tools and address the area to explore for future research in the field. The present work does not pretend to evaluate the efficiency of the systems to facilitate creativity, but rather is focused on the functionalities communicated by the authors reviewed.

As a starting point, in the coming section we will develop several concepts such as creativity, innovation, creative process, and creative support system and set the point of view of this work. In Section 3, the applied methodology for this mapping study will be described. Section 4 will then present the main results of the study. To conclude the result of the study, we will discuss confirmation of the fact that the domain of the digital systems dedicated to creativity is incomplete as suggested by (Bonnardel & Zenasni, 2010; Shneiderman, 2007).

2. Overview on creativity and some associated concepts

Several concepts were introduced in the previous section, most of them requiring further explanation and positioning to understand the assumptions underlying the systematic mapping study in this article.

2.1. Innovation vs. design vs. creativity

Innovation, defined as the acceptance and widespread use of a new product, process, or service, conveys the notion of success and of perceived value from various economic actors (e.g. customers), as well as differentiation from existing solutions (Tidd & Bessant, 2009). It is also considered as a process (e.g. search-select-strategy-implementation) and as a necessary mind set to produce novelty. From the perspective of innovation as a process, it is quite common for creativity to be considered as a component of innovation (Tidd & Bessant, 2009; Damanpour & Aravind, 2012; Boly, 2008).

Like innovation, creativity can be seen from different perspectives: some authors would describe it as a mindset, others as a process, and some as a result. Several definitions have been proposed in the literature. In a problem-solving context, the most common definition of creativity is the ability to achieve a new and adapted production of concepts (Lubart, 2003), or the ability to produce something original and appropriate to a context (Howard, Culley, & Dekoninck, 2008). In other words, creativity is a balance between concept novelty and usefulness (Puccio & Cabra, 2012) or appropriateness (Zeng, Proctor, & Salvendy, 2011; Howard et al., 2008) that is achieved by using existing knowledge (Ogot & Okudan, 2007).

These definitions of creativity have a lot in common with the concept of designing a solution. In this case, there are three relevant interpretations of ‘design’: design as a tangible outcome (Von Stamm, 2008), design as a creative activity (Von Stamm, 2008; Warr & O’Neill, 2005), and design as a process of transforming information into outcomes (Von Stamm, 2008). The third definition, which is the most commonly used according to Von Stamm, can be defined as a “conscious decision- making process by which information (an idea) is transformed into an outcome, be it tangible (product) or intangible (service).̈ (Von Stamm, 2008, p. 17). Von Stamm also suggests that creativity takes place within the design process. From this perspective, design as a process can be divided into three different types: conceptual design, in which concepts are generated to fulfil an objective; embodiment design, which is the structured development of the selected concept; and detailed design, which precisely defines every individual element of the outcome (Von Stamm, 2008). Thus, it appears that conceptual design concerns the generation of ideas/concepts, while embodiment design and detailed design concern creativity in the generation of new technical solutions.

In many cases, the distinction between innovation, conceptual design and creativity is blurred for the benefit of an overall process. For example, (Von Stamm, 2008) argues that innovation is composed of the creativity process plus the (successful) implementation of the idea in the form of a product, process or service. On the other hand, other authors consider implementation to be part of the creativity process. This view suggests that the innovation and design processes do overlap. Based on the authors’ experience concerning creative session facilitation, implementation will be considered as the stakeholders’ concern and not as part of the creative process. However, a link will be made between conceptual design and creativity. As highlighted by Howard et al. (2008) review, there is a slight difference in the scopes and the concepts considered, but design remains a creative process which is generally applied to domain-specific problems (e.g. engineering).

2.2. Influencing factors

Beyond the issue of defining creativity, multiple directions have been proposed to scientifically investigate the creativity domain. There are several perspectives for understanding the phenomenon of creativity. Creativity can be broken down into six main strands (Long, 2014): process, product, person, place, persuasion, and potential. Another structure for breaking down and understanding creativity comprises three different levels (Mumford, 2012): individual, collective (team), and

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A. Gabriel et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 109–122 111

rganizational. The third perspective is often considered as belonging to innovation rather than creativity, according to Damanpour & Aravind, 2012). These breakdowns are a way to observe creativity, determine and classify the influencing actors. Those described here are only some examples:

At the individual level, which corresponds to the person, the influential factors most often cited include domain-specific expertise, motivation and cognitive abilities (Damanpour & Aravind, 2012). Cognitive abilities include ease with open- ended problems, personal cognitive processes established to generate ideas, and even experience and personal history.

From the collective perspective, the focus is on interactions between individualities and how they affect creativity. Accord- ing to (Glăveanu, 2010), social creativity is more than constraints on individual creativity. Creativity is social, as ‘its mere nature is relational since it could not exist outside of cultural resources and dialogical relations’ (Glăveanu, 2010, p. 88). The most famous inhibiting factors of brainstorming are social (Ray & Romano, 2013; Warr & O’Neill, 2005): production blocking (waiting for one’s turn to talk), evaluation apprehension (fear of judgment from others participants), free riding (relying on others’ idea production).

As for the organizational perspective, influential factors include the processes, the environment, and the culture provided by the organization, but also its available knowledge and the ability to create motivation. Other elements associated with organizational structure have also been studied to determine the nature of their impact on innovation and creativity (Damanpour & Aravind, 2012), such as communication (internal or external), actors’ specialization, technical knowledge resources and numerous other factors that impact specific innovation approaches.

As presented above, process is often referred to at the various levels of analysis: individual, collective, and organizational. ach level refers to something slightly different. For example, the individual level is associated with the cognitive process. ifferent aspects can be seen as part of this level. The creative process described by Helmholtz-Poincaré-Getzels (Lubart, 003) or Wallas (Ogot & Okudan, 2007) can be considered as the first process theorization of creativity. It introduces the oncepts of incubation and insight, which are based on “individuality, insight and outstanding ability”. Another aspect of ognitive creativity could be those concerning the association of ideas and analogies based on several criteria, such as emantic, structural, and pragmatic (Boden, 1994) or function, behaviour, and structure (Gero & Kannengiesser, 2004).

Concerning the collective level of creativity, the focus is on facilitating a person in the exchange of their knowledge and xpertise. The notion of idea generation is preferred to incubation and insight. This evolution was introduced through the reative Problem Solving (CPS) approach and by the world-renowned brainstorming method (Osborn, 1963).

Finally, there is the organizational level, which tends to consider the various factors that affect creativity to improve the rganization’s effectiveness (Soriano de Alencar, 2012). The processes described at this level remain overall, as each firm has ts own specificity, the focus can be on creativity, and is more or less inspired by a problem-solving approach (Amabile, 1988; asadur, Basadur, & Licina, 2012; Soriano de Alencar, 2012) or integrated into the entire production process of the firm (Sorli

Stokic, 2009). However, the basis and interpretation of these processes on different levels depend on the creativity school onsidered. There are at least three different schools concerning creativity (Shneiderman, 2007): structuralist, inspirational- st, and situationalist. “Structuralists believe people can be creative if they follow an orderly method. [. . .] Inspirationalists rgue that breaking away from familiar structures elicits creative solutions. [. . .] Situationalists recognize that creative work s social.(̈Shneiderman, 2007, p. 25)

In the present paper, attention is focused on the collective level, and more particularly on the CPS process, which is made up f four recursive phases: problem analysis, ideation, evaluation and communication/implementation (Howard et al., 2008). mplementation is a fourth step, even though it relates more broadly to innovation, rather than creativity specifically (Zeng t al., 2011; Von Stamm, 2008). Problem analysis initiates the process, allowing people to define the ‘problem space’. The aim f this step is to understand the problem, gather and reorganize information, and then frame the problem by reformulating t. The second step is ‘the production of original mental images and thoughts that respond to important challenges’ (Puccio

Cabra, 2012, p. 195) by applying a variety of (creative) methods. In order to sustain idea generation, in the third step the dea is assessed according to a set of criteria specified earlier in the process (goal definition), with the aim of developing

orkable solutions. The last stage is the implementation of the selected ideas. In this paper, these steps will be the basis or the observation of the creative process on a high level, as opposed to the operational level, which describes creativity

ethods or activities (Browning, Fricke, & Negele, 2006).

.3. Collaboration

As introduced previously, creativity is individual, collective, and organizational. The collective and organizational level is irectly related to the notion of collaboration. Since one person cannot have all the knowledge to solve a problem, he or she ust collaborate with somebody who can provide the expertise (Sorli & Stokic, 2009). There are two modes of collaboration:

1) traditional co-located collaboration, where all actors are in the same place at the same time; and (2) remote collaboration, hich implies virtual teaming, whereby members do not often interact in person due to distance or time lags, and thus can

nly communicate with information and communication technologies (Nemiro, 2004; Wilson, Scalise, & Gochyyev, 2015). The literature clearly shows that distributed projects are more challenging than traditional projects. They introduce new

ariables such as ‘physical and geographic separation among teams, social and cultural differences among people, time one differences, etc. which impact communication and collaboration, problem solving, trust, and several other factors that

112 A. Gabriel et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 109–122

influence project success’ (da Silva, Costa, Franca, & Prikladinicki, 2010, p. 87). In the case of remote collaboration, virtual platforms are vital for ensuring communication among team members. This can be achieved synchronously, as in natural communication, which implies that people need to be connected at the same time regardless of the time lags that exist between them. It can also be achieved through asynchronous communications, whereby a delay between the transmission of the information and its receipt occurs (e.g. e-mails). Whatever the collaboration mode, the way communication is processed greatly influences the success of collaboration. The challenge of the different collaboration modes is to be able to create the atmosphere necessary for any creative process; this challenge is even more important in the case of remote collaboration, as this atmosphere should be created through a digital environment (Sorli & Stokic, 2009). The means of communication are a factor in the success of the collaboration. Concerning creative collaboration, learning preferences (Nemiro, 2004), creative styles (Ray & Romano, 2013) and the characteristics of the work process are other examples of factors.

2.4. Different types of systems to support creativity

There is a wide range of approaches to support creativity by means of digital devices. Lubart (2005) classified these approaches in four metaphorical categories: a creativity support can be considered as a coach that gives advice and helps to implement and apply techniques; as a pen pal that provides support for collaboration; as a nanny that monitors the work’s progress and provides a framework; or as a colleague with which the computer generates its own ideas and solutions. Each of these classes represents a specific approach to creativity via digital devices which address different issues and use different vocabularies.

In the category of the monitoring software and framework provider (the nanny systems), the corresponding systems could be the Idea Management System (IMS). The function of the IMS is to collect and share the idea generated. “The goal of the Idea Management Systems (IMS) is to build tools for assessment of the collected ideas and selection of the best ones to implement” (Westerski, 2011, p. 1). The most modest support collects the ideas generated during a creative workshop such as the ‘48 h Innovation Maker’ platfrom3; whereas the most sophisticated permit evaluation is through different approaches such as up and down voting or presenting the similarity4 and relationships5 between ideas (Westerski, 2013).

The systems that support collaboration (pen pal systems) are known as Group Support Systems (GSS), Computer- Supported Cooperation Work (CSCW) or Single Display Groupware (SDG). “The process of collaboration support can be divided into two parts: communication and coordination. Communication is subdivided into explicit communication and information gathering. [. . .] Coordination consists of shared, access and transfer” (Gutwein, 2013, p. 15). Strictly speaking, the systems that assist communication and coordination do not support creativity. However, these tools are essential, notably in remote collaboration, as creativity requires communication between the actors and the way it is done influences the result (Nemiro, 2004), and coordination to manage the progress and the creative techniques. Two examples of a co-located collaboration environment can be cited: iLounge (Sundholm, Artman, & Ramberg, 2004) and iRoom (Gutwein, 2013) which use many different digital devices such as wall display, interactive tabletop, interactive whiteboard, camera, mobile device, etc. to permit a workgroup to work individually, in subgroups or collectively. The SDG refers more specifically to collective devices, where the team is gathered around the device, working on it together. “Interactive tabletops enable fully collab- orative work, engendering diverging conversations, idea exploration and information sharing equally amongst the group members” (Jones, Kendira, Lenne, Gidel, & Moulin, 2011, p. 156).

Concerning assistance with implementing creative techniques (coach systems), there are the Computer-Assisted Creativ- ity (CAC) systems or Creative Support Tools (CST) (Bao, Gerber, Gergle, & Hoffman, 2010), which can be considered as the Computer-Assisted Design (CAD) software of creativity. These systems are specifically designed to help the application of creativity methods by providing all the information and assistance needed to facilitate its application, including dedicated forms, a database, and data processing. The most commonly assisted method may be brainstorming, which is so common that it accounts for a subcategory of CAC: Electronic Brainstorming Systems (EBS) or E-Brainstorming. These systems tend to counteract the main weaknesses of ‘pen and paper’ brainstorming, namely group pressure, social loafing, and production blocking (Gutwein, 2013; Puccio & Cabra, 2012). Some tools are dedicated to defining the subject of a brainstorming exercise, such as Momentum (Bao et al., 2010). Although brainstorming is the best-known creativity method and has been widely studied, it is not the only method targeted by assistance tools. The inventive problem-solving method called TRIZ also has its tools, such as the accessible TRIZ 406 or expert-oriented TRIZAquisition (Zanni-Merk, Cavallucci, & Rousselot, 2009).

The digital system seen as a colleague corresponds to a system that becomes actively involved in the creative task and is able to suggest new ideas to humans. This corresponds to the computational creativity approach (Boden, 2009; Wiggins, 2006) and involves the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to model human creativity. Creativity is considered as a

conceptual space (Boden, 2009), even as a complex conceptual space, which means that ‘enumeration of that [. . .] space, especially when guided by heuristics, can be a valid simulation of human creativity’ (Wiggins, 2006, p. 221). The intent of introducing AI into creativity support is not necessarily to generate ideas instead of the human team members; it can also

3 48 h innovation maker: http://www.48h-innovation-maker.com/?language=en. 4 IdeaStream similarity: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i-ca2sP8QJs. 5 Gi2 MO relationship visualizer: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uwvIZn0mqjE. 6 TRIZ 40: http://www.triz40.com/TRIZ Fr.php.

A. Gabriel et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 109–122 113

Table 1 Semantic group of keywords used for the review.

Keyword group 1 (Collaboration . . .) Keyword group 2 (Methodology. . .) Keyword group 3 (Technology. . .)

Collaboration Brainstorming Application Distant collaboration Creative problem solving Computer-aided Groupware Creativity Computer support Open Creativity challenge Data support Virtual team Creative design Data systems Work group Creative design method Devices

Creativity workshop Electronic Design E-brainstorming Early stage innovation Interactive surface Ideation Interactive whiteboard Innovation Software Preliminary design Support

Support system Support tools System Tabletop

b e a

b t i

3

w e i o

3

f g g c p t

3

o D fi o t a a e s o s

Tools Wall display

e the monitoring of humans’ cognitive process (López-Ortega, 2013) to provide better assistance with creative tasks. For xample, CACDP (Liu, Li, Pan, & Li, 2011) integrates cognitive considerations into the design of a system that assists with the pplication of TRIZ.

Despite the different support perspectives, all these systems that are explicitly dedicated to supporting creativity can e considered a Creative Support System (CSS), which is a “class of information systems encompassing diverse types of IS hat share the purpose of enhancing creativity” (Voigt, Niehaves, & Becker, 2012, p. 153). Based on the different concepts ntroduced, the next section will present how the CSS of the literature will be reviewed.

. Materials and methods

As has been introduced previously, there are different natures of CSS. The objective of this mapping study is to determine hat kind of support these systems provide and which technologies they deploy to do that. The intent is to cover the main

lements described in the research field of creativity in terms of the different phases covered (problem analysis, ideation, dea evaluation) and the different creativity methods assisted by the digital system. As creativity is also collaboration, the bservations also focus on different modes of collaboration and the digital devices used to apply them.

.1. Search terms

In order to collect the materials of the study, it was first necessary to define the keywords. These keywords were defined rom a preliminary review of the literature on creativity and creativity support. The different keywords of interest were athered according to their relatedness to the same concept (collaboration; methodology; technology) into three distinct roups and expanded by several synonyms (Table 1) that were used to create the research terms. The research terms were reated by joining groups using the Boolean operators OR and AND; and by using wild cards like * to avoid the syntactic roblem of the plural. The research terms formed by the keywords and the operators was submitted to the different database o get the document.

.2. Materials

The documents considered in this study are essentially limited to journal articles and conference proceedings, although fficial work reports might also be included. The main databases used in this study were Web Of Science and EI Compendex. espite the combination of keywords in the request of the databases, it can however produce several thousand of results. A rst cleaning was done by eliminate article that are not related to innovation or creativity and digital system. Finally, based n the reading of the kept articles, the eventual system presented or used was included in the study. The addition of a system o the study was however dependant of the quantity of information provided by the article. We extended the search to some rticles that were cited in the first batch of articles if they were likely to provide additional details about a system. All the rticles were written in English. No start and end dates were set on the search; because it concerned digital technologies,

ven the older papers did not date back very far. A digital system cited in a document has to be explicitly mentioned as a ystem that is designed or used to support and foster creativity. The only criterion for rejecting a reference was the quantity f information. If information was missing from observation based on the criteria, the system was not considered in the tudy. As the study does not concern experimentation results, the quality/validity of the articles selected was not evaluated.

114 A. Gabriel et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 109–122

3.3. Observation criteria

As mentioned previously, the focus is mainly on the phase of the creative process and the collaboration mode. However, further details should be given to understand the meaning of this study.

On each system ascertained, different types of information were collected, such as the name of the system, the associated university if any, the years of publication, and the status (academic or research work vs. commercial systems). Concerning the observation done on the various systems encountered, a large number of elements were observed, from the domain of application of the system to the technology used to create the CSS. For this study, three of these were studied: the creativity process phases supported, the collaboration settings, and the technologies used.

– The creative process phases covered by the system are based on the creative process presented previously. These phases can be the problem analysis, the ideation, and the evaluation. Regarding the difference from the process suggested previ- ously, the implementation phase was out of the scope of the conceptual design phase. The phases covered by the system were determined according to the declaration of the documentation and also the nature of the deliverable collected and generated by the system. To cover the problem analysis, the CSS has to manage the problem formalization, at least request an explicit formulation of the problem. To be associated with the ideation, the system has to support a creative technique and thus collect the trace generated by the application of this technique, which could be an idea or general concept for brainstorming, a figure for mind mapping, picture for other techniques. . . It could also suggest inspirational material to facilitate divergence during idea generation. Concerning the idea evaluation phase, the CSS has to assist the task of sorting or ranking or provide a way to easily retrieve the idea. Operationally, the solution can be of a different nature, could be the manual definition of a group, application of criteria, mathematical processing of quantitative criteria, or a semantic analysis. A system covers at least one of these phases or it is not a CSS.

– Several things can be observed concerning the collaboration settings briefly introduced previously, notably the inclusion of collaboration in the system, the nature of the use of the system (individually, collectively), the dispersion of the collab- oration (co-located, virtual), and the communication (synchronous, asynchronous). The evaluation of these criteria was done according to the auto declaration of the document. In the case where nothing was specified, a CSS was declared as collaborative if communication was made through the system or if several people used it around the same device simul- taneously. The case where the system is not collaborative corresponds to a system that supports individual creativity. The nature of the use determines if the device is conceived to be used by one person, and so in the case of virtual collaboration constitute a sum of individual, or in contrast permits collective use and thus a collaboration of the group. The dispersion of the collaboration tends to evaluate if the CSS is designed to help users at the same place working simultaneously or if it is designed to support users distant in space and time. In regard to communications, they exclusively concern the CSS that support virtual collaboration as the co-located use a synchronous communication. There are thus four criteria to characterize the collaboration within the CSS, but the communication will not be considered for this study.

– Concerning the technology used, the focus is on the categories of devices used to implement the system. The information was collected from the system observed and then the categories of devices were created. It produced this list of device categories: web service, interactive tabletop, desktop computer, interactive whiteboard, mobile/individual device, wall display, augmented object, digital sketching instrument, interactive floor. From this list, there is the exception of the web service, which does not refer to devices but to a technology as a certain amount was cross-channel.

To summarize the elements observed over the Creative Support System encountered in the literature based on the keywords previously presented, five criteria were observed: the creativity phases covered, the inclusion of collaboration, the nature of the use of the system, the dispersion of the collaboration, and the technology used.

4. Results of the systematic mapping study

According to the methodology described above, of the 75 systems cited in the literature, only 49 were accompanied by enough information to be considered in this review. Appendix A presents the 49 CSS considered in this study with the different criteria observed. They all have different approaches to supporting creativity. For instance, Computer-Assisted Creativity systems such as Calico (Mangano & van der Hoek, 2012) and IdeaVis (Geyer, Budzinski, & Reiterer, 2012) simplify the formalization of ideas and participants’ contributions by using natural expressions such as sketches or diagrams (e.g. UML); TRENDS can even provide assistance with inspiration by broadcasting images (Setchi & Bouchard, 2010).

4.1. Creativity phases supported

Table 2 shows that the great majority of the CSS studied support only one phase (57%); 93% of this subsample is dedicated to the ideation phase. Overall, the supports that exclusively cover the ideation phase represent nearly half of those listed

in Appendix A. Nevertheless, this also means that 43% of the supports are designed to support more than one phase of the creativity process. The most covered pair of phases is ideation and evaluation; concretely, this means that the support receives the ideas and automatically or manually generates a classification or a ranking. Six CSS that cover more than two phases were also identified: Innovation Assistant (McCaffrey & Spector, 2011), BrainDump (Brade, Heseler, & Groh, 2011),

A. Gabriel et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 109–122 115

Table 2 Phases of the creativity process covered by the supports.

No. of phases covered Phases Number of supports (total: 49) Proportion of category (%) Proportion of total (%)

1 (57%)

Problem analysis 2 7 4 Ideation 26 93 53 Evaluation 0 0 0

2 (31%)

Problem analysis and ideation 1 7 2 Problem analysis and evaluation 6 40 12 Ideation and evaluation 8 53 16

3 (12%)

Problem analysis, ideation and evaluation 5 83 10 Ideation, evaluation and implementation 1 17 2

Table 3 Collaboration capabilities of CSS.

Collaboration Number of CSS Remote collaboration Proportion of category Proportion of total (%)

Yes 38 (78%)

Yes 21 (55%) 43 No 17 (45%) 35

No 11 (22%) 22

Table 4 Remote collaboration capabilities and use of collaborative systems.

Remote collaboration Number of CSS Use Number of supports Proportion of category (%) Proportion of total (%)

Yes 21 (43%)

Individual 16 76 33 Collective 5 24 10 Both 0 0 0

No 17 (35%)

Individual 0 0 0 Collective 12 71 24 Both 5 29 10

Table 5 Global distribution of modes of using over the CSS.

Use CSS Total (%)

Individual 27 55 Collective 17 35

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Both 5 10

ogniStreamer (“CogniStreamer”, n.d.), i-Land (Streitz et al., 1999), InnovationCast (“InnovationCast,” n.d.), and Laboranova “Laboranova,” 2014). It is interesting to note that very few of the surveyed articles focused on the detailed study of problem nalysis and evaluation.

.2. Collaboration settings and tools

Most of the CSS listed in this review (78%) were designed to allow collaboration between users/participants, as Table 3 hows. More than half of these collaborative creativity supports (55%) were designed to support remote collaboration. owever, according to Table 4, a majority of these are limited to individual-to-individual remote collaboration. The systems

hat do not support remote collaboration but are still considered to be collective systems provide functionalities to enable group of participants to interact locally, such as interactive tabletops or a mix of individual and collective devices such as martphones and interactive tabletops.

Without considering remote collaboration (Table 5), the supports that are individually oriented represent more than alf of the CSS ascertained (55%). Only 10% permit the possibility to work on one’s own and collectively, such as Caretta Sugimoto, Hosoi, & Hashizume, 2004), ModLab + SeeMe (Herrmann & Nolte, 2010), Tatin-Pic (Jones et al., 2011), TeamStorm Hailpern, Hinterbichler, Leppert, Cook, & Bailey, 2007), and the unnamed system proposed by (Friess, Kleinhans, Klügel, & roh, 2012).

.3. Technologies dedicated to the system and their use

According to Table 6, the most widely used type of technology is the web service, which makes it possible to access infor- ation on various web-enabled devices such as tablets, smartphones, personal computers, and even interactive tabletops. eb services are also used to centralize information and allow each device to exchange data on a single web platform.

116 A. Gabriel et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 109–122

Table 6 Distribution of the types of technology used by collaborative CSS.

Support technology Number of supports that use it Proportion of total (%)a

Web service 22 45 Interactive tabletop 17 35 Computer software 11 22 Interactive whiteboard 7 14 Mobile/individual device 5 10 Wall display 4 8 Augmented object 3 6 Digital sketching instrument 2 4 Interactive floor 1 2

a Percentages do not add up to 100 because some supports use more than one technology.

Table 7 Detailed distribution of types of technology according to the use orientation of the support.

Use Number of supports Device used Number of supports that use the device Proportion of category (%)

Individual 27 (55%) Web service 15 56 Computer software 9 33 Both 2 7

Collective 17 (35%) Interactive tabletop 13 76 Interactive whiteboard 6 35 Web service 3 18 Wall display 2 12 Computer software 2 12 Digital sketching instrument 2 12 Augmented object 2 12 Interactive floor 1 6

Both 5 (10%) Mobile/individual device 5 100 Interactive tabletop 4 80 Web service 3 60 Wall display 2 40

Interactive whiteboard 1 20 Augmented object 1 20

To gain a better understanding of the use of technology, the details in Table 7 are useful. The individual supports used, which represent half of the systems in the present study, are mainly based on web services. This is because a significant proportion of these individual supports are remote collaboration systems. Among CSS that are exclusively intended for collective use, interactive tabletops are the most widely used. In the case of complete environments, the most popular are once again interactive tabletops, in association with interactive whiteboards or other accessories: BrainStorm (Hilliges et al., 2007), Envisionment and Discovery Collaboration (Andrew Warr & O’Neill, 2007), ThinkTank (“ThinkTank,” n.d.), IdeaVis (Geyer et al., 2012), i-Land (Streitz et al., 1999), iLounge (Sundholm et al., 2004), iRoom (Jones et al., 2011), and Tatin (Jones et al., 2011). It is not surprising that all five of the systems that are designed to integrate individual and collective use are based on smartphones or tablets (PDAs for the oldest experiments) for individual input and interactive tabletops or whiteboards for collective input.

5. Discussion

In contrast to what was expected at the beginning of this study, a significant number of digital supports exist to assist creativity. The majority of them cover only one phase of the creative process, mainly the ideation phase. This is no doubt due to decades of promotion of divergent thinking and ideation in the literature (Puccio & Cabra, 2012). However, six supports seem to cover all three phases observed: Innovation Assistant (McCaffrey and Spector, 2011), BrainDump (Brade et al., 2011), CogniStreamer (CogniStreamer”, n.d.), i-Land (Streitz et al., 1999), Laboranova (“Laboranova,” 2014), and InnovationCast (“InnovationCast,” n.d.). Working in organizations implies collaboration; the systems which do not integrate collaborative functionalities are certainly interesting for studying creativity through digital tools but do not promise extensive use of it. With the evolution of working habits, the increase in virtual collaboration, and the remaining natural importance of ‘real’ collaboration (in contrast to virtual collaboration), the system should be thought of as a “hybrid real-virtual environment”

(Sorli & Stokic, 2009), including these two collaboration modes. From the CSS of the present study, five of them support both co-located and remote collaboration: C4CI (Bellandi, Ceravolo, Damiani, Frati, & Maggesi, 2012), ThinkTank (“ThinkTank,” n.d.), Idea Storming Cube (Huang, Li, Wang, & Chang, 2007), iLounge (Sundholm et al., 2004), and i-Land (Streitz et al., 1999). Over time, the evolution of technologies permits this transformation of collaboration. The use of technology is evolving

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A. Gabriel et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 109–122 117

nd the popularity of personal computers is decreasing, whereas the reliance on personal devices such as smartphones nd tablets is increasing. This evolution could explain the use of web services, which is cross-channel, and also collective evices for information gathering. The emergence of this approach also encourages alternating the individual and collective hases, which are complementary in terms of creativity. From the corpus studied, five supports cover both individual and ollective use: Tatin-Pic (Jones et al., 2011), ModLab (Herrmann & Nolte, 2010), TeamStorm (Hailpern et al., 2007), Caretta Sugimoto et al., 2004), and the unnamed system from (Friess et al., 2012). If the three perspectives observed are matched, one of the systems support the entire three creativity phases for individual and collective activities in co-located and distant ollaboration.

The contribution of this work is to provide an overall vision of the systems dedicated to creativity, the main conclusions eing the imbalance in coverage of the different phases of the creative process and the lack of systems that use technologies o provide a hybrid environment throughout the different phases of creativity. Examination of the articles about the CSS also evealed a limited diversity of the creative techniques supported. Goel and his colleagues suggested the four C’s for cognitive, ollaborative, conceptual, and creative in order to design the future CAD (Goel, Vattam, Wiltgen, & Helms, 2012). The intention s first design of the support system according to the known cognitive pattern of the user. The lack of consideration for the verall iterative creative process confirms the importance of also addressing new perspectives on designing CSS. Further esearch certainly has to be done concerning creativity and innovation (Shneiderman, 2007) but this could be achieved by mproving the way that the tools, which are the CSS, are designed. To design these CSS of the future, two perspectives are ossible: create an integrated system that covers the entire creative process with a large library of activities and creative echniques, capitalizing the information generated by the different actors, or have a modular approach where the different ools used for communication, application of creative techniques, and creation of the artefact “speak” the same language to e able to capitalize and reuse the information generated as suggested by (Voigt, Bergener, & Becker, 2013) with the concept f Creativity-Intensive Process Support System (CPSS). Whatever the preferred approach, in order to reach a certain level of ntelligence and assistance in creativity, several fields must be explored, notably ontology. The use of ontology in innovation nd creativity would permit interoperability of the different systems supported by standardization at the semantic level Sorli & Stokic, 2009).

. Conclusion

This paper presents a study of 49 Creative Support Systems cited in the literature. These systems have been observed ccording to the phases of the creative process supported, the collaboration setting supported, and the different technologies sed. The main conclusions from this study are:

Very few CSS provide assistance with problem analysis, ideation, and idea evaluation. The majority of these systems are dedicated to ideation phases.

No system from this study is able to cover the three phases mentioned above for individual and collective use in a co-located and virtual collaboration.

The question of a unique system to support the entirety of the creative process throughout the various perspectives can be iscussed. The fact is that creativity, as well as innovation in general, is a critical aspect for a company and should be managed roperly. The results highlight the necessity to more properly orient the design of the CSS to cover the different phases of reativity across the different collaboration settings. To do so in the most adapted way, the cognitive pattern and behaviour f the actors have to be considered. Addressing this question by offering advanced functionalities, such as adaptation of he system to the behaviour and cognitive patterns of individuals, implies the introduction of artificial intelligence into the reativity support. The future research to improve CSS can be the design of ontology related to the creativity process to rovide assistance throughout the different phases of the process based on the actors involved and the knowledge required.

The present study has several limits, notably the method used. Even if the intention was to be as exhaustive as possible, he approach does not permit coverage of a company’s initiatives, very few of which are documented anyway. Concerning he systems, the efficiency of the CSS considered was not evaluated and the creativity-influencing factors entailed by the

ystem were not observed.

ppendix A.

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References Name Digital device Collective/ Individual

Collaborative Remote collaboration

Phase covered Nature of the assistance

(Brocco, Forster, & Frieß, 2011)

360◦ Web service Individual Yes Yes Ideation IT systems to support open creativity

(48h Innovation Maker, 2013)

48 h Innovation Maker

Web service Individual Yes Yes Ideation Collect the ideas of different teams that are working on the same subject.

(McCaffrey & Spector, 2011)

Innovation assistant

Computer software Individual No No Problem analysis, ideation, evaluation

Define the subject by redefining techniques, analyse the unexplored features of a solution

(Brade et al., 2011) BrainDump Computer software Individual No No Problem analysis, ideation, evaluation

Information gathering and organizing (cluster)

(Gutwein, 2013; Hilliges et al., 2007)

BrainStorm Interactive table, wall display

Collective Yes No Ideation, evaluation

Support co-located collaborative creativity

(Liu et al., 2011) CACDP Computer software Individual No No Problem analysis, evaluation

Requirements analysis, design problem analysis, design problem solving, solutions management

(Mangano & van der Hoek, 2012)

Calico Interactive whiteboard

Collective Yes No Problem analysis, ideation

Support designers sketching on the interactive whiteboard

(Warr & O’Neill, 2007; Sugimoto et al., 2004)

Caretta Sensing board (interacts with physical objects), projector, and PDA

Collective Yes No Ideation Integrate personal and shared spaces to support face-to-face collaboration

(Bellandi et al., 2012)

Catalyst for Collaborative Innovation (C4CI)

Web service Collective Yes Yes Ideation Pervasive, intelligent environment that can proactively stimulate collaboration between innovation team members

(CogniStreamer, n.d.)

CogniStreamer Web service, computer software

Individual Yes Yes Problem analysis, ideation, evaluation

Support the idea management process, stimulate collective creative minds

(Bhagwatwar, Massey, & Dennis, 2013)

Creative virtual environment

Computer software Individual Yes Yes Ideation Immersive environment to interact with remotely located persons and brainstorm

(Vattam, Wiltge, Helms, Goel, & Yen, 2011)

Dane Web service Individual No No Problem analysis, ideation

Interactive knowledge-based design environment, provides access to a design case library containing Structure-Behaviour-Function (SBF) models of biological and engineering systems

(Schmitt, Buisine, Chaboissier, Aoussat, & Vernier, 2012; Buisine, Besacier, Aoussat, & Vernier, 2012)

DiamonSpin Tabletop Collective Yes No Ideation Graphical interface to support brainwriting and mindmapping

(Warr & O’Neill, 2007)

Envisionment and Discovery Collaboratory

Interactive tabletop, physical object, ultrasonic sketching tools

Collective Yes No Problem analysis, ideation

Support social creativity by creating shared understanding among various stakeholders, contextualizing information to the task at hand, and creating objects-to-think-with in collaborative design activities

(Clayphan, Collins, Ackad, Kummerfeld, & Kay, 2011; Gutwein, 2013)

Firestorm Tabletop Collective Yes No Ideation, evaluation

Tabletop computer interface has the potential to support idea generation by a group using the brainstorming technique

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(Gutwein, 2013) GADjet Tabletop Collective Yes No Ideation Interactive meeting table based on a multitouch surface which should transfer the technological advantages of a normal working place to the working area of a whole group

(Wang & Ohsawa, 2013)

Galaxy + ideaGraph Computer software Individual No No Ideation Support the dynamic process of idea discovery

(Westerski, 2013) Gi2 MO Web service Individual Yes Yes Ideation, evaluation

Set up Semantic Web technologies in the environment of Idea Management Systems

(ThinkTank, n.d.; Yuan, 2008)

ThinkTank Web service, complete digital environment

Collective Yes Yes Ideation, evaluation

Collaborative structure for the way people work together; transform process performance and create culture of innovation and engagement

(Jones et al., 2011) Ide Rummet (the idea room)

Web service Individual Yes Yes Ideation Asynchronous distributed collaborative idea generation platform

(Wang, Cosley, & Fussell, 2010)

Idea Expander Computer software Individual Yes Yes Ideation Tool to support group brainstorming by intelligently selecting pictorial stimuli based on the group’s conversation

(Huang et al., 2007) Idea Storming Cube Web service Collective Yes Yes Ideation Game-based collaborative creativity support system to support creative thinking and help a user form a perspective-shift thinking habit

(Chakrabarti, Sarkar, Leelavathamma, & Nataraju, 2005)

Idea-Inspire Computer software Individual No No Problem analysis, ideation

Software for automated analogical search of relevant ideas from the databases to solve a given problem

(Forster, Frieß, Brocco, & Groh, 2010)

IdeaStream Web service Individual Yes Yes Ideation Chat communication on computer-supported idea generation processes

(Geyer, Pfeil, Höchtl, Budzinski, & Reiterer, 2011; Geyer et al., 2012)

IdeaVis Custom tabletop, wall display, Anoto digital pen

Collective Yes No Ideation Novel approach for supporting co-located sketching sessions

(Streitz et al., 1999; Warr & O’Neill, 2005)

i-Land Augmented object, interactive wall, interactive tabletop, computer chair

Collective Yes Yes Problem analysis, ideation, evaluation

An interactive landscape for creativity and innovation

(Gutwein, 2013; Sundholm et al., 2004)

iLounge Interactive whiteboard, tabletop, computer software

Collective Yes Yes Problem analysis, ideation

Support co-located collaborative work

(Bellandi et al., 2012)

PIT Idea Management Software

Computer software, web service

Individual Yes Yes Ideation Built-in social intelligence ensures that all relevant knowledge within the organization is captured to create great ideas

(InnovationCast, n.d.; Bellandi et al., 2012)

InnovationCast Web service Individual Yes Yes Ideation, evaluation, implementation

Pose challenges, capture and evolve ideas and work collaboratively on opportunities and projects, to translate investments in innovation into value

(Gutwein, 2013; Jones et al., 2011)

iRoom Interactive whiteboard, tabletop, computer software

Collective Yes No Ideation Create a collaborative environment for complete civil engineering teams

(Laboranova, n.d.) Laboranova Web service Individual Yes Yes Problem analysis, ideation, evaluation

Team building, information gathering, idea formalization, evaluation

(Gardoni, Blanco, & Rüger, 2005)

MICA-graph Web service Individual Yes Yes Ideation Graphical formalization of the idea (prototype)

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(Herrmann & Nolte, 2010)

ModLab + SeeMe Interactive tabletop, web service, smartphone

Individual & collective

Yes No Ideation, evaluation

Special facilitation collaboratory (ModLab) where laptops and a large interactive screen can be linked to produce collaborative modelling

(Gutwein, 2013; Bao et al., 2010)

Momentum Web service Individual Yes Yes Problem analysis Tool that elicits topic-oriented responses prior to a group brainstorming session

(Friess et al., 2012) Not named Tabletop, web service, smart phone

Individual & collective

Yes No Ideation, evaluation

Generic model for creativity-technique-based problem-solving processes and discussions (group), collaboration and interaction on multi-touch tabletop displays

(Patent Inspiration, n.d.)

PatentInspiration Web service Individual No No Problem analysis, ideation

Intelligent data mining tool to leverage the creative performance of engineers and innovation managers

(Hartmann, Morris, Benko, & Wilson, 2010)

Pictionaire Interactive tabletop Collective Yes No Ideation An interactive tabletop system that enhances creative collaboration across physical and digital artefacts. It offers capture, retrieval, annotation and collection of visual material

(Yuan & Chen, 2008)

SILA + CBDS Computer software Individual Yes Yes Ideation, evaluation

Environment where an inference mechanism of a Semantic Ideation Learning Agent (SILA) that performs idea associations and generation can learn and share knowledge

(Jones et al., 2011) TATIN Interactive whiteboard, tabletop

Collective Yes No Ideation Increase the creativity of brainstorming meetings, and help make the group’s output more effective

(Jones et al., 2011) Tatin-Pic Interactive whiteboard, tabletop, smartphone, web service

Individual & collective

Yes Yes Ideation A multi-modal collaborative work environment for teams performing preliminary design

(Hailpern et al., 2007)

TeamStorm Tablet PC, wall display

Individual & collective

Yes No Ideation Collaborate by providing mechanisms to integrate tablet- or PC-based input on a large display in front of a group of designers

(Van Dijk & Vos, 2011)

Traces Interactive floor Collective Yes No Ideation Save the ‘traces’ (intermediate artefacts) of creativity, build a consensus/common imaginary between participants

(Setchi & Bouchard, 2010)

TRENDS Computer software Individual No No Ideation Software tool that supports the inspirational stage of design by providing various sources of inspiration

(Zanni-Merk et al., 2009)

TRIZAcquisition Computer software Individual No No Problem analysis Assistance with elementary knowledge acquisition, problem formulation, knowledge structuring or problem reformulation

(Lopes, Alvarez- Napagao, Vazquez-Salceda, 2009)

USE (Uplift Seek Engine)

Web service Individual No No Ideation System that can lead creative professionals on an individual brainstorm by using images to relate semantic concepts

(Alvarez & Su, 2012)

Virtual Reality Mechanism Design Studio (VRMDS)

Virtual reality and computer software

Individual No No Ideation Rapid 3D modelling and prototyping

(Tan, Tripathi, Zuiker, & Soon, 2010)

VisuaPedia Web service Individual Yes Yes Ideation Generate and collect data on creativity, knowledge contribution and sharing as well as the context in which people network to build their social capital

(Ardaiz-Villanueva et al., 2011)

Wikideas + creativity connector

Web service Individual Yes Yes Ideation, evaluation

Enhance creative skills, especially the generation of ideas and originality in university students

(Gutwein, 2013) WordPLay Tabletop Collective Yes No Ideation Interactive tabletop platform for finding and organizing ideas in a group.

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  • Creativity support systems: A systematic mapping study
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Overview on creativity and some associated concepts
      • 2.1 Innovation vs. design vs. creativity
      • 2.2 Influencing factors
      • 2.3 Collaboration
      • 2.4 Different types of systems to support creativity
    • 3 Materials and methods
      • 3.1 Search terms
      • 3.2 Materials
      • 3.3 Observation criteria
    • 4 Results of the systematic mapping study
      • 4.1 Creativity phases supported
      • 4.2 Collaboration settings and tools
      • 4.3 Technologies dedicated to the system and their use
    • 5 Discussion
    • 6 Conclusion
    • References
    • References

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Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

ifferences in creative mindset between Germany and oland: The mediating effect of individualism and ollectivism�

in Tang a, Christian Werner a, Maciej Karwowski b,∗

University of Applied Management, Germany The Maria Grzegorzewska University, Poland

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 23 January 2016 eceived in revised form 27 March 2016 ccepted 11 May 2016 vailable online 13 May 2016

eywords: reative mindset ixed and growth mindset ndividualism ollectivism oland ermany

a b s t r a c t

This study provides the first examination of cross-national differences in the creative mindsets, measured by the Creative Mindset Scale (Karwowski, 2014) and provides an explanation for these differences in terms of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, measured by the Cultural Orientation Scale (Triandis & Gelfland, 1998). Pol- ish students (n = 429) perceived creativity as more fixed and less malleable than German students (n = 332). Drawing on previous theorizing that individualism is related to higher intensity of fixed theories, while collectivism is positively related rather to growth-type mindset, we hypothesized that cross-national differences in horizontal and vertical indi- vidualism and collectivism were able to explain the relationship between country and both mindsets. This hypothesis was confirmed—vertical and horizontal individualism and collec- tivism fully mediated the differences between countries in the growth versus fixed mindset preferences. The findings were discussed in relation to the creativity and cross-cultural research.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Creativity, understood as a human capacity to produce ideas which are both novel and appropriate (Amabile, 1996; ternberg & Lubart, 1999; Zhou & Shalley, 2003), drives not only cultural (Sawyer, 2006) but also economic development Florida, 2002). Hence, the striving towards creativity development is observed across the world (Florida, 2005), driven by he belief that being more creative will be an advantage in global economy.

However, to manage with the effort that creative activity requires, people should be convinced that their creative potential an be enhanced or trained. One of the most pervading creativity myths, not only in the field of education (Plucker, Beghetto,

Dow, 2004) but also shared across disciplines (Sawyer, 2006) is that creativity is an inheritable trait, which cannot be eveloped. This assumption is in contrast to the scientific evidence that several interventions were highly successful in

timulating the creative potential (e.g., Dziedziewicz, Gajda, & Karwowski, 2014; Dziedziewicz, Oledzka, & Karwowski, 013; Hu et al., 2013; Karwowski & Soszyński, 2008) and meta-analyses confirm the effectiveness of the enhancement of

� Polish part of the study presented in this article was possible thanks to a grant 0193/IP3/2015/73 (Iuventus Plus Program) for Maciej Karwowski. ∗ Corresponding author at: Creative Education Lab, Department of Educational Studies, The Maria Grzegorzewska University, Szczesliwicka St., 40,

2-353 Warsaw, Poland. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] (M. Karwowski).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.004 871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

32 M. Tang et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 31–40

creative abilities (Scott, Leritz, & Mumford, 2004a, 2004b). However, laypeople often endorse a fixed creativity mindset (Karwowski, 2014), believing that one’s level of creativity is stable and unchangeable.

In this paper, we address the question of cross-national differences between growth and fixed creative mindsets and examine the potential role of intercultural characteristics as variables explaining these differences. More precisely, we build on previous works on creative mindsets and examine the possible influence of cultural orientations on growth vs. fixed cre- ative mindset. To our knowledge, this is the first study in the creativity literature which focuses on cultural explanations for creative mindsets. Previous analyses of the creative mindsets, understood as “the beliefs about the stable-versus-malleable character and the nature of creativity” (Karwowski, 2014, p. 62), focused on the structure of the mindset and their individual- level predictors. Karwowski (2014) has demonstrated that growth and fixed mindsets form two relatively independent (albeit negatively correlated) factors, rather than one continuum with two ends. The fact that creativity may be simultaneously perceived as both stable and changeable is very likely a consequence of the complex nature of the creativity phenomenon (Kaufman, 2016). As people are able to spontaneously recognize different types and forms of creativity (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2015; Karwowski, 2009; Kaufman and Beghetto, 2013; Puente-Diaz, Maier, Brem, & Cavazos-Arroyo, 2016) they may spon- taneously ascribe different mindsets to different levels of creativity. People with higher expertise and the awareness that creativity is not only the Big-C characteristic, but mini-, little- or Pro-C as well (Kaufman and Beghetto, 2009) may hold growth mindset for lower level of creativity, but at the same time have quite a fixed Big-C creativity mindset.

The two-factor structure of the creativity mindset was recently demonstrated with a Polish sample (Karwowski, 2014), as well as with samples from Germany, Spain, UK, Latvia, and China (Karwowski, Werner, & Tang, 2015). Importantly, a recent study (Karwowski, Werner et al., 2015) has also demonstrated the measurement invariance of the Creative Mindset Scale (Karwowski, 2014) across Poland and Germany, allowing for a direct comparison of latent means of these constructs in these countries.

Several individual-level attributes of both mindsets were tested to date. It was demonstrated that the growth mindset was strongly positively related to creative self-beliefs (Karwowski, 2014), like creative self-efficacy (Beghetto, 2006; Karwowski, 2011) and creative personal identity – constructs explaining creative behavior as well (Jaussi, Randel, & Dionne, 2007; Karwowski, 2012; Tierney & Farmer, 2002). It was also positively associated with the effectiveness in solving insight tasks, while the fixed mindset was a negative predictor of these abilities (Karwowski, 2014, Study 3). In another study (O’Connor, Nemeth, & Akutsu, 2013) growth mindset was positively associated with creative potential (i.e. fluency and originality of thinking), the interests in creative activity, and creative achievement. Importantly, even quite subtle priming with fixed mindset decreased creative thinking (O’Connor et al., 2013, Study 3).

Thus, the malleable (or growth) mindset seems to be especially beneficial for creative activities and, subsequently, future creative achievements as well. It was found to be positively related to academic risk-taking behavior and lower school- related stress (Yamazaki & Kumar, 2013). On the contrary, there are convincing empirical arguments, that the fixed mindset is positively associated with a “creative mortification”, i.e. “the loss of one’s willingness to pursue a particular creative aspiration following a negative performance outcome” (Beghetto, 2014, p. 266, see also Beghetto & Dilley, 2016).

Despite the growing interest in the creative mindsets in creativity literature, little is known about potential cultural factors that may shape them. As creative mindsets fit into the wider category of “creative beliefs” (Karwowski and Barbot, 2016), there are good reasons to believe that creative mindsets develop under social and cultural influences as other self-beliefs do (Karwowski, Gralewski, & Szumski, 2015). More precisely, in one of the early discussions about the possible cultural differences about mindset in general (not specifically creative mindset) (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a), it was proposed that the concept of the fixed mindset is much more typical for individualistic cultures and societies, while the growth mindset, strongly related to the effort, is not only highly valued, but also much more present in collectivist societies (see also Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Heine et al., 2001; Lillard, 1998). There is extensive cross- cultural research (e.g., Stevenson & Lee, 1990; Stevenson & Stigler, 1992) showing that in the collectivistic Asian culture the focus on the possibility of growth and treating cognitive traits as malleable is stronger than in the West, which is characterized by higher individualism. Hence our study takes into account the individualism vs. collectivism dimension as a promising candidate factor explaining cross-cultural differences in creative mindsets.

1. Individualism-collectivism and creative mindsets

Individualism and collectivism are “cultural syndromes,” based on which various social and psychological processes are organized (Triandis, 1995). This dimension of culture has been used extensively on a wide range of topics in psychological and social sciences (for a review, see Hamamura, 2012) and has been used very often to explain the differences between the East and the West in creativity studies as well (e.g., Niu and Sternberg, 2003; Werner et al., 2010; Yi, Hu, Plucker, & McWilliams, 2013).

By definition, individualism is a social pattern of loosely linked individuals who see themselves as independent rather than interdependent individuals. Primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, and rights, such individuals give priority to their personal goals over the goals of others, and emphasize rational analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of

associating with others. In contrast, collectivism is a social pattern of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives. Primarily motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives, such individuals are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals, and emphasize their connectedness to members of these collectives (Triandis, 1995).

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M. Tang et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 31–40 33

While there are abundant studies comparing the cultural dimensions of the participants from the Eastern and Western ountries, it is rare to compare countries such as Germany and Poland, which fall into the same regional categories. Among he few studies which have compared Poland and Germany, very few differences were found. For example, in their meta- nalysis of 50 studies involving 46 countries about individualism in comparison to the U.S. and Canada, Oyserman Coon, and emmelmeier (2002) found that Germany is fairly as individualistic as the USA (d = 0.01) and that Poland is a bit less indi- idualistic than USA (d = 0.16). In terms of collectivism, Germany and Poland scored similarly and both are not significantly ifferent from the U.S. It is interesting, however, that this meta-analysis also demonstrated that generally Central-European ountries were more individualistic and less collectivist than Western European countries, a finding contrary to the classic ofstede (1980) results. In another study, Meeuwesen, van den Brink-Muinen, and Hofstede (2009) did not reveal significant ifferences between the German and Polish participants in the individualism-collectivism dimension, with Germany scoring 7 and Poland 60 in individualism on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.

However, culture is dynamic and caution should be taken in generalizing results of older studies. As early as in 1980s, in is seminal book about cultural dimensions, Hofstede (1980) already warned that his country-level analysis of individualism ould not explain individual behavior, as the cultural orientation is shaped by the economic and historical circumstances of he 1970s when the study was conducted. Indeed, a recent large-scale meta-analysis (Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2012) based n 451 studies representing over half a million individuals from 49 countries and regions about the cultural dimensions ound that the precision of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimension scores have been decreasing over time. While these scores orrelated remarkably strongly with theoretically relevant indicators from the 1980s, the correlations typically weakened for ach subsequent decade thereafter (Taras et al., 2012). The modernization theory that elucidates the increase in individualism uring a steady period of economic growth (Inglehart, 1997; Kashima et al., 2004) can be used to explain this difference. The

ink between societal and economic modernization and individualism is robust and is found across cultures (Hamamura, 012). For example, even in China the personality profile of Chinese people has shifted towards individual orientation over he years (Yang, 1986) and a rise of individualism over the past decades has also been observed in Japan (Yamagishi & amagishi, 1994).

To understand better the interplay of culture and people’s feelings, perceptions or behaviors, it’s necessary to update our nowledge of the continuum of individualism-collectivism, including the refinement of the conceptualization of the two oncepts (Brewer & Chen, 2007). Among others, the decomposition of the individualism and collectivism on the horizontal s. vertical social relationships provides one promising solution (Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). The horizontal atterns assume that one self is more or less similar to other selves versus vertical patterns emphasize hierarchies and aintain that one self is different from other selves. Combined with individualism and collectivism, these social relationship

atterns produce four distinct cultural orientation dimensions: The horizontal individualistic (HI) people want to be unique nd distinct from groups, but are not particularly interested in becoming distinguished; the vertical individualistic (VI) eople, in contrast, want to become distinguished and acquire status. The horizontal collectivist (HC) people see themselves s being similar to others and emphasize common goals, interdependence, and sociability. The vertical collectivistic (VC) eople emphasize the integrity of the in-group, and are ready to sacrifice their personal goals for the in-group goals.

To our knowledge, there are no such studies that examine people’s perceptions of creativity (e.g., creative mindset) taking nto consideration of the influence of cultural dimensions. Our study aims at filling this gap. Although we are interested n the cross-national (Poland vs. Germany) differences in the creative mindsets, we focus on the role the individualism nd collectivism may play in explaining these differences. Synthesizing the previous discussions on the possible cultural nfluences on the mindsets (Dweck et al., 1995b), with the research on horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism imensions, we hypothesize collectivism to be related to the growth rather than fixed creative mindset. By analogy, we expect

ndividualism to be related to the fixed rather than the growth mindset, but this is expected especially in the case of the ertical individualism.

. The present study

This cross-national study was driven by two research questions. First, what are the cultural differences in the intensity f growth vs. fixed creativity mindset between Germany and Poland? Second, what is the role of horizontal vs. vertical ndividualism and collectivism as possible mediators, accounting for cross-national differences in mindsets? Cultures differ n complexity (Chick, 1997) and though Poland and Germany are neighboring countries in Europe, these two countries differ ubstantially in many perspectives such as history, language, the influence of religion, and the current stages of economic evelopment and modernization. These differences make it interesting and meaningful to compare the two countries in ultural dimensions and explore the possible effect of the cultural differences on people’s beliefs (such as mindset). As revious studies have already established the cross-national measurement invariance and construct equivalence of both rowth and fixed mindsets in Poland and Germany (Karwowski, Werner et al., 2015), we focus on the cultural differences

n creative mindset and the possible mediating effect of individualist vs. collectivist cultural orientations. Although we ypothesize that culture shapes creative mindsets, while aspects of individualism and collectivism mediate this relationship, ue to the cross-sectional design of our study, we avoid excessively causal explanations. We maintain that our theorizing ssumes cultural syndromes (vertical vs. horizontal individualism vs. collectivism) to mediate the relationship between

34 M. Tang et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 31–40

culture and creative mindsets, rather than moderate this relationship – a line of theorizing which could be considered as well.1

3. Method

3.1. Participants

In total, 761 Polish and German students participated in our study. The sample included more females (n = 470; 62%) than males (n = 291, 38%) with the age ranging from 17 to 50 (M = 23.18, SD = 3.92). The Polish sample consisted of 429 students (281 females, 66%) with the age ranging from 18 to 40 (M = 23, SD = 3.22). The German sample consisted of 332 students (189 females, 57%) with the age ranging from 17 to 50 (M = 23.41, SD = 4.66). There were no age differences between the Poles and Germans, F(1,760) = 1.95, p = 0.16, while the percentage of females in the Polish sample was higher than in the German sample, �2 = 5.86, p = 0.02. Polish students were recruited mainly from social sciences (35%), humanities (28%), sci- ence/engineering (21%) and medicine (17%). German students represented mainly social science (51%), science/engineering (14%) or humanities (10%) and medicine (7%). Due to gender and study field differences, all analyses presented below were conducted twice, with and without the control of gender and study field effects. As virtually no differences were found, analyses with gender and major as covariates are not presented here.

3.2. Measures

3.2.1. The creative mindset We used the Creative Mindset Scale (CMS; Karwowski, 2014) to measure participants’ perceptions of the nature of

creativity (creative mindsets). This scale consists of 10 items with five measuring the fixed creative mindset (e.g., “You either are creative or you are not – even trying very hard you cannot change much”) and five measuring the growth creative mindset (e.g., “Anyone can develop his or her creative abilities up to a certain level”). Karwowski (2014) demonstrated stable factor structure of this scale and appropriate properties estimated using the item response theory methodology. The recent cross-cultural study (Karwowski, Werner et al., 2015) has confirmed the measurement invariance of the CMS across cultures. A five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = definitely not to 5 = definitely yes was used for the CMS.

3.2.2. Horizontal and vertical individualism/collectivism To measure vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism we used the Culture Orientation Scale (COS; Triandis &

Gelfland, 1998). This 16-item scale covers the four dimensions of the cultural orientation, including Horizontal Individualism (HI; e.g., “I’d rather depend on myself than others”), Vertical Individualism (VI; e.g., “Competition is the law of nature.”), Horizontal Collectivism (HC; e.g., “I feel good when I cooperate with others”), and Vertical Collectivism (VC; e.g., “Parents and children must stay together as much as possible”) with four items measuring each of the sub-dimensions. A 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = never or definitely no to 9 = always or definitely yes was used for the COS. The descriptive statistics, inter- correlations and reliabilities of the COS scales in the whole sample and among Polish and German students are presented in Table 1.

3.3. Procedures

This study is part of a large-scale research project about implicit theories of creativity, which took the students 20 min on average (SD = 10) to finish. The CMS (Karwowski, 2014), originally developed in Polish, was translated into German and the COS (Triandis & Gelfland, 1998), originally in English, was translated into German and Polish. In both countries, back translation technique was used to guarantee the quality of the translation. The whole data collection process was conducted online, using a dedicated platform, created for the purpose of this study. Participants were treated in accordance with the ethical guidelines set out by the American Psychological Association. They were not rewarded for participating and were informed that they could withdraw at any time.

4. Results

The data were analyzed in two steps. Firstly, we focused on the cross-country comparisons in creative mindsets. The descriptive statistics of all variables measured, the inter-correlations between variables as well as the results of the cross- country comparisons are presented in Table 1 . Secondly, we created a structural equation model to examine whether and to what extent, the observed differences in the creative mindsets are attributable to the differences in horizontal and vertical

individualism and collectivism.

Consistent with our hypothesis, the German students held stronger growth and lower fixed mindset than the Polish stu- dents. Although significant, these differences were small in terms of the effect size when observed variables were compared

1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

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Ta n

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/ Th

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g Skills

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rea tivity

2 1

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5

Table 1 Descriptive statistics, cross-cultural comparisons and intercorrelations between variables used in the study.

Variable Poland (N = 429) Germany (N = 332) t (df = 759) Cohen’s d 1 2 3 4 5 6

M (SD) � M (SD) �

1 Growth mindset 3.77 (0.61) 0.66 3.89 (0.55) 0.60 −2.66** 0.19 (0.63) −0.41*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.23*** 0.20*** 2 Fixed Mindset 2.50 (0.86) 0.85 2.36 (0.72) 0.76 2.52** 0.18 −0.34***

−0.51*** (0.82) 0.02 0.22*** −0.08* 0.03

3 Horizontal Individualism 6.81 (1.19) 0.68 6.53 (1.16) 0.61 3.24** 0.24 • 0.21∗∗∗ • 0.12∗

0.06 −0.06

(0.65) 0.41*** −0.04 0.09*

4 Vertical Individualism 5.52 (1.47) 0.74 5.03 (1.41) 0.66 4.68*** 0.34 • 0.07 • 0.00

• 0.27*** • 0.12*

• 0.53*** • 0.23***

(0.71) −0.15*** 0.03

5 Horizontal Collectivism 5.81 (1.31) 0.66 7.01 (1.12) 0.66 −13.40*** 0.97 • 0.21*** • 0.20***

−0.00 −0.11

0.08 −0.09

0.06 −0.30***

(0.72) 0.45***

6 Vertical Collectivism 6.11 (1.45) 0.76 6.70 (1.19) 0.64 −6.02*** 0.44 • 0.23*** • 0.11*

0.09 −0.04

• 0.19*** • 0.00

0.17***

−0.10 • 0.44*** • 0.33***

(0.72)

Note. Values in parentheses in the brackets on the diagonal are Cronbach’s �s. Correlations between variables obtained in the whole sample are presented above the diagonal. Correlations between variables obtained in the each country are presented below the diagonal – the higher value was obtained in the Polish sample, the lower in the German sample.

* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01.

*** p < 0.001.

36 M. Tang et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 31–40

Fig. 1. Structural equation model explaining cross-country differences in the growth and the fixed mindsets, using vertical and horizontal individualism

and collectivism characteristics as predictors. Note. HI = horizontal individualism; VI = vertical individualism; HC = horizontal collectivism; VC = vertical collectivism. P1, P2 = Parcel 1, Parcel 2, It1–It5 = Item1–Item5. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

(Cohen’s ds 0.19 and 0.18, respectively). The Polish students were characterized by stronger horizontal (d = 0.24) and vertical individualism (d = 0.34), while German students were significantly more collectivistic. The difference in vertical collectivism was moderate (d = 0.44), while there was a large difference in horizontal collectivism (d = 0.97).

In the whole sample, the growth creative mindset correlated positively with both horizontal (r = 0.23) and vertical (r = 0.20) collectivism, but also (albeit weakly) with horizontal individualism (r = 0.16). This pattern of the relationship was well- replicated across both countries. Despite the differences in the exact values of the correlation coefficients, the directions of the associations were the same. The fixed mindset in the whole sample correlated positively with the vertical collectivism (r = 0.22), but negatively with horizontal collectivism (r = −0.08). Interestingly, although the positive relationship between vertical collectivism and the fixed mindset was stable across both countries, the marginally significant, negative association with vertical collectivism was observed only among German students (r = −0.11, p = 0.056).

The reliabilities of the individualism and collectivism scales were modest, likely due to the low number of items per scale. To properly control for measurement error, we conducted structural equation modelling (SEM) using Mplus 7.1. (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015) with country as independent variable, growth and fixed mindsets as dependent variables and horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism as mediators. We modelled horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism latent variables using parcels (each formed of an average of two items). Growth and fixed mindsets were modelled as measured on ordinal scale. Hence, the weighted least squares with mean and variance adjustment (WLSMV) estimator were applied (Brown, 2006) (Fig. 1).

The model fits reasonably well accordingly to commonly used fit indices (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2011), CFI = 0.92, TLI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.061, 90% CI: 0.055, 0.066, and explained 19% of the variance of the growth mindset and 13% of the variance of the fixed mindset. Reliabilities of latent variables, estimated by composite reliability index (H, see Silvia, 2011), were acceptable or high, ranging from H = 0.69 in vertical individualism, H = 0.71 in horizontal individualism and H = 0.73 in growth mindset, to H = 0.80 in horizontal collectivism, H = 0.89 in fixed mindset and H = 0.93 in vertical collectivism.

As previously reported, country significantly differentiated the level of individualism and collectivism, with higher hori-

zontal (� = −0.14) and vertical (� = −0.21) individualism being observed among Poles, and higher horizontal (� = 0.49) and vertical (� = 0.26) collectivism of Germans (all ps < 0.001). Horizontal individualism translated positively into growth mind- set (� = 0.34) and negatively into fixed mindset (� = −0.23), whereas the opposite pattern was observed in the case of vertical individualism: it was negatively related to growth mindset (� = −0.14), but positively to fixed mindset (� = 0.42, all coeffi-

M. Tang et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 31–40 37

Table 2 Summary of indirect effects obtained in the SEM.

IV Mediator DV Unstandardized Specific Indirect Effect (SE)

Standardized Specific Indirect Effect (95% bootstrap corrected CI)

Country HI Growth Mindset −0.02 (0.009) −0.05** (−0.09, −0.01) Country HI Fixed Mindset 0.03 (0.01) 0.03** (0.004, 0.06) Country VI Growth Mindset 0.01 (0.007) 0.03 (−0.01, 0.07) Country VI Fixed Mindset −0.07 (0.02) −0.09*** (−0.15, −0.03) Country HC Growth Mindset 0.05 (0.01) 0.11*** (0.05, 0.17) Country HC Fixed Mindset −0.05 (0.02) −0.06** (−0.12, −0.001) Country VC Growth Mindset 0.02 (0.008) 0.04** (0.01, 0.08) Country VC Fixed Mindset 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (−0.02, 0.05)

Note: IV = independent variable, DV = dependent variable; SE = standard error; HI = horizontal individualism; VI = Vertical individualism; HC = horizontal collectivism; VC = vertical collectivism. *

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ients being statistically significant). Both horizontal (� =0.22) and vertical (� = 0.17) collectivism were positively related to he growth mindset, but only horizontal collectivism was weakly and negatively related to the fixed mindset (� = −0.13).

To examine if horizontal vs. vertical individualism and collectivism mediate the relationship between country and growth s. fixed mindset, we estimated the indirect effects. More specifically, using the SEM approach with the four cultural orien- ations as latent mediators, we estimated specific indirect effects of cultural orientations on creative mindsets (Muthén & sparaouhov, 2015). Mplus uses bootstrap-corrected confidence intervals (in our study, we used 1000 bootstrap samples) to ssess whether confidence intervals around indirect estimates contain zero. Results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.

Consistent with our expectations, all indirect effects except the mediation of the vertical collectivism on the fixed mindset nd vertical individualism on the growth mindset were statistically significant. More importantly, the direct effect of country n growth vs. fixed mindset which was significant when the effect of individualism and collectivism were not controlled � = 0.10; p = 0.03 in the case of growth and � = −0.12, p = 0.003 in the case of fixed mindset) was no longer significant after ontrolling the effect of individualism and collectivism (� = −0.05; p = 0.34 in the case of growth and � = −0.09; p = 0.07 in he case of fixed mindset). These results show the full mediation of individualism and collectivism in the model. Although tandardized indirect effects were generally small (ranging from 0.02, ns to 0.11, p < 0.001), they were not only statistically ignificant but also consistent with the effects presented in Fig. 1.

. Discussion

This study is the first attempt of a cross-national comparison of creative mindsets and provides an explanation for the ifferences using classic categories of the cross-cultural psychology: vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism Triandis & Gelfland, 1998). Based on the previous works (Dweck et al., 1995b; Lillard, 1998; Stevenson and Lee, 1990; tevenson and Stigler, 1992), we hypothesized that collectivism would be positively related to the growth creative mindset, hile individualism will be associated with the fixed creative mindset.

With samples from Poland and Germany, two European countries which are geographically close to each other but istorically, politically, and religiously quite different, we did find relatively weak, yet significant difference in their creative indsets: The Polish students tended to perceive creativity as a fixed trait, whereas the German students were more likely

o see creativity as malleable. As we demonstrated, this difference can be fully attributed to the “cultural syndromes”: the evels of individualism and collectivism, which fully mediated the effect of country on the creative mindset. Polish students

ho were found significantly more individualistic (both vertically and horizontally) held stronger fixed and weaker growth indset than German students, who were found more collectivistic in our study. In particular, the German students scored

ignificantly higher in the horizontal collectivism than the Polish students (d = 0.97). Although surprising at the very first sight, hese differences are consistent with the existing empirical findings (e.g., Kemmelmeier et al., 2003; Oyserman et al., 2002) nd the predictions of the modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997). With samples from seven countries including Germany nd Poland, Kemmelmeier et al. (2003) found that vertical individualism was correlated positively with authoritarianism nd horizontal individualism was unrelated to authoritarianism except in post-Communist societies like Poland. This result an help explain the more fixed mindset of the Polish students on creativity. Another study showed that cultures high in orizontal individualism tend to be egalitarian, with individuals being independent and of comparable power and status, hereas cultures high in vertical individualism tend to launch competition between individuals, resulting in acceptable

nequality between individuals (Oyserman et al., 2002). Some scholars maintained that the distinction of horizontal vs.

ertical cultural orientation resembles the power distance dimension of Hofstede (1980) (e.g., Oyserman, 2006; Shavitt, alwani, Zhang, & Torelli, 2006). Indeed, in many cross-cultural studies, the Poles scored higher in power distance than the ermans (e.g, Hofstede, 1980; Shavitt, Torelli, & Riemer, 2011; Taras et al., 2012). More inequality-accepting, competition- ased vertical individualism, which is close to stereotypically perceived individualism (Oyserman et al., 2002) and also

38 M. Tang et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 31–40

the power distance (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfland, 1995), is more closely related to the perception of creativity as stable and non-changeable characteristic (fixed mindset). The more equality-accepting, horizontal individualism was able to predict both the growth mindset (positively) and the fixed mindset (negatively). Hence there are good reasons to believe that the horizontal-vertical dimension is as important in explaining creative mindsets as the individualism-collectivism dimension.

While our hypothesis was quite clearly confirmed in the case of the collectivism – both vertical and horizontal collectivist orientations were positively related to the growth mindset and less systematically related to the fixed mindset – even more interesting pattern was found in the case of the individualism. We have observed that, while vertical individualism was a strong positive (� = 0.42) predictor of the fixed mindset (consistently with our expectations), the horizontal individualism was a moderate (� = −0.23) negative predictor of the fixed mindset. Interestingly, horizontal individualism was a positive and robust (� = 0.34) predictor of the growth mindset. Hence, while the role of the collectivism seems to be quite clear and unequivocal, in the case of the individualism the situation is more complex. Our results suggest that the type of the individualism (vertical vs. horizontal) plays a crucial role in understanding its relations with different creative mindsets.

5.1. Limitations and future directions

The results of our study should be read in light of its limitations. At least three of them should be pointed out and addressed in future studies. First, despite the differences between Polish and German participants in terms of both mindsets and cultural orientations, both these groups are relatively similar and belong to widely defined “Western world”. Hence, our results should be replicated and extended to more differentiated samples from different parts of the world. Nevertheless, the observed differences are still meaningful and consistent with the hypotheses deduced from the existing literature.

The limited reliability of the measures we have used may be considered as the second limitation of our study. We have to acknowledge, that the internal consistency of both measures we used (the CMS and the COS) was not very high (albeit still acceptable). Nevertheless, this limitation does not form a serious threat to the validity of our findings. Usually the scales comprising of limited number of items have not achieved high internal consistency (Karwowski, Lebuda, Wiśniewska, & Gralewski, 2013). The fact that the reliabilities we have obtained are similar to those from previous studies (Karwowski, 2014; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) and the confirmed validity of the measures through this study, allows us to trust the findings we have obtained.

Last but not least, the third limitation of our study lies in its cross-sectional design which makes decisive causal claims premature. Although we did hypothesize that culture may influence creative mindsets, similarly as it influences self-beliefs in general (Heine et al., 1999), correlational study demonstrating cross-national differences is for obvious reasons insufficient to conclude about causal relationship. Even more importantly, our analyses have demonstrated that cross-national differences between Polish and German students in creative mindsets were generally small, and cultural syndromes – vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism – played much more prominent role in explaining the differences in perceiving creativity as fixed or malleable. Hence, even if culture (or country) indeed plays a role here, its effect is in large part indirect and influence the perception of creativity via building individual or collectivist orientations. We recommend that the effects of horizontal and vertical individualism on growth and fixed mindsets we have observed in our study should be replicated and extended in future experimental studies. If manipulation with vertical versus horizontal individualistic cues would change the level of growth versus fixed mindset, it could not only form an important area of future theorizing but also be useful for practitioners (e.g., teachers or managers) interested in fostering growth creative mindsets.

6. Conclusion

The conclusion of our study is quite straightforward – culture indeed accounts for the creative mindsets. Culture’s influence, however, is not necessarily direct. Quite the opposite: culture may shape creative mindsets via its influence on horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. Individualistic attitudes and orientations, especially those asso- ciated with the vertical level, are very likely to result in a fixed perception of creativity. Motivational consequences of such implicit theory are well-known as being detrimental for creativity (Amabile, 1996). On the other hand, a more collectivist orientation with effort-based explanations of the performance seems to be especially fruitful for the growth mindset. In spite of the overall consistent results suggested by the current study, more research is needed to further examine the role of culture on creative mindset, including involving more substantially different countries in the comparison and taking more cultural dimensions into the analysis.

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  • Differences in creative mindset between Germany and Poland: The mediating effect of individualism and collectivism
    • 1 Individualism-collectivism and creative mindsets
    • 2 The present study
    • 3 Method
      • 3.1 Participants
      • 3.2 Measures
        • 3.2.1 The creative mindset
        • 3.2.2 Horizontal and vertical individualism/collectivism
      • 3.3 Procedures
    • 4 Results
    • 5 Discussion
      • 5.1 Limitations and future directions
    • 6 Conclusion
    • References

Related Articles/Examining-teacher-perceptions-of-creativity--A-syste_2016_Thinking-Skills-an.pdf

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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

xamining teacher perceptions of creativity: A systematic eview of the literature

ianna R. Mullet a,∗, Amy Willerson b, Kristen N. Lamb a, Todd Kettler a

Department of Educational Psychology, University of North Texas, United States Department of Teacher Education and Administration, University of North Texas, United States

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 1 June 2015 eceived in revised form 28 April 2016 ccepted 2 May 2016 vailable online 7 May 2016

eywords: reativity ducation eacher conceptions eacher perceptions eacher beliefs mplicit theories

a b s t r a c t

As an increasingly globalized society creates knowledge-based economies, the need for schools to foster creativity in students intensifies. Teachers have much to gain by fostering creativity in the classroom, but are teachers’ conceptions of creativity accurate or mis- guided? There is a need to investigate perceptions of creativity held by teachers to better understand how to actualize classroom environments rich in creative thinking and practice. The current study explores K-12 teachers’ perceptions of creativity through a systematic review and thematic analysis of the current literature. Selected studies included empirical quantitative and qualitative investigations published in high quality journals from 1999 to 2015. The thematic findings of this review afford a deeper understanding of teach- ers’ perceptions of creativity both for research and for practice. Our analysis revealed that although teachers value creativity, their conceptions of creativity are uninformed by the- ory and research on creativity. Teachers feel unprepared to foster or identify creativity in their classrooms; they equate creativity with the arts; and personal and cultural beliefs affect their perceptions of creativity and creative students. Implications for future research indicate a need for qualitative research that seeks to understand teacher perceptions of creativity in depth as they relates to both the classroom context, teachers’ backgrounds in education and training, and the overall discourse of creativity in education.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

. Introduction

In recent years, interest in creativity has expanded into the educational realm. The development of creativity is increas- ngly regarded as an educational imperative (Skiba, Tan, Sternberg, & Grigorenko, 2010). Two forces that drive the growing mphasis on creativity in schools are students’ individual fulfillment and their future success as participants in a knowledge- ased economy (Craft, 2003). Creativity enhances life success, healthy psychological functioning, positive conflict resolution, nd amplifies the construction of knowledge (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Plucker et al., 2004Plucker, Beghetto, & Dow,

004).

Educational strategies for developing creativity have failed to keep pace with advancements in the understanding of reativity (Plucker et al., 2004). Narrow standards of accountability for teachers and schools diminish the value of creative pproaches to learning and problem solving (Sternberg, 2006). The prominence of standardized assessment encourages

∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Educational Psychology, University of North Texas, 1155 Union Circle #311335, Denton, Texas 76203, United tates.

E-mail address: [email protected] (D.R. Mullet).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.001 871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

10 D.R. Mullet et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 9–30

teachers to promote student conformity (Kim, 2008). What is more, research has produced few practical approaches for fostering creativity or for incorporating theory into educational practice (Makel, 2009). Some educators view creativity as a distraction to be deferred, or even view it as a behavior problem (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2010).

In an educational system that assigns priority to traditional teaching approaches, understanding teachers’ perceptions of creativity must precede attempts to develop a pedagogy of creativity (Skiba et al., 2010). Developing an accurate under- standing of teacher perceptions of creativity is necessary to inform practice on how to incorporate creativity effectively in the classroom (Skiba et al., 2010). The purpose of the current study is to explore teacher perceptions of creativity by means of a systematic literature review. The following research questions guided our review:

1. How do teachers perceive creativity? 2. What are teachers’ implicit theories of creativity? 3. How do teachers believe that creativity manifests in students? 4. How are teacher perceptions of creativity related to teachers own characteristics?

2. Background

One factor limiting the educational implementation of creativity is the lack of a widely agreed-upon and coherent def- inition of creativity (Plucker et al., 2004). Creativity is a complex construct and scholars have yet to achieve consensus on how to define creativity. Explicit definitions of creativity vary among researchers, and while definitions may be clear, they are rarely consistent (Plucker et al., 2004). Scholars’ definitions of creativity generally fall into one of four major categories: personal creativity, creative product, creative process, and environments that foster creativity (Runco, 2004). Beyond those four categories, some scholars conceive of creativity as a complex system that includes sociocultural and historical compo- nents (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). These varied models and definitions of creativity precipitate confusion among both educators and educational researchers (Skiba et al., 2010).

Teachers are influential in mitigating the effects of standardization on creative thinking and learning in the classroom (Beghetto, 2005). Regrettably, teachers may believe they are fostering creativity when in fact they are suppressing it (Skiba et al., 2010). Without proper training, teachers who value creativity are left to rely on instructional approaches of their own design (Skiba et al., 2010). Some teachers opt out of creativity development entirely and leave that charge to teachers of the fine arts and creative writing (Skiba et al., 2010). When teachers understand the nature of creativity, they are better equipped to avoid negative myths and stereotypes surrounding creativity (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2010). Teachers need an awareness of the variety of theories and definitions of creativity when selecting teaching and assessment tools (Fishkin & Johnson, 1998). Teachers who misperceive creativity could unwittingly suppress creative expression in the classroom; negative or erroneous perceptions of creativity may prevent teachers from recognizing opportunities for developing creative potential in students (Beghetto, 2009).

Prior research indicates that teachers’ perceptions of creativity and creative behaviors often run counter to the theories that guide creativity research (Dawson, Andrea, Affinito, & Westby, 1999; Skiba et al., 2010; Westby & Dawson, 1995). Contrary to researchers’ explicit theories that require novelty and appropriateness (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010), teachers perceived creative products as novel, but not necessarily appropriate (Diakidoy & Kanari, 1999). Regardless of content area, judging creative ability by products confuses potential with accomplishment (Sternberg & Lubart, 1996). A heavily product-oriented focus neglects the developmental aspect of creativity and may prevent teachers from seeing opportunities to develop students’ everyday insights into more comprehensive creative products (Cohen, 1989). Some teachers preferred less creative students in the classroom because they associate creativity with problem behaviors such as impulsivity and disruptive behavior (Dawson, 1997). Similarly, teachers incorrectly associated socially desirable personality characteristics with creativity (Runco, Johnson, & Bear, 1993). When teachers rated their most and least favorite students on personality characteristics, judgments for favorite students were negatively associated with prototypical creativity characteristics, while least favorite students were positively associated with creativity (Westby & Dawson, 1995). Even teachers who valued creativity often had unclear conceptions of what creativity meant; students identified as creative by teachers scored high on a verbal creativity task, low on a figural creativity task, and did not display personality traits traditionally associated with creativity (Dawson et al., 1999).

3. Methods

3.1. Search parameters

Our search for literature on teacher perceptions of creativity encompassed the domains of education, educational psychol- ogy, psychology, the arts, and linguistics. Electronic databases searched in this review included Academic Search Complete,

Education Source, Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC), Google Scholar, JSTOR, Linguistics and Language Behav- ior Abstracts (LLBA), Professional Development Collection, Project MUSE, and PsycINFO. Each search was limited to empirical studies in peer-reviewed journals, published in English from 1999 to 2015. All searches were performed against the article abstracts, with the exception of the Google Scholar search, which was performed against article titles. In addition, supple-

D.R. Mullet et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 9–30 11

Table 1 Search parameters and initial results.

Search Terms Database Search Limiters Hits

teacher AND perception AND creativity Academic Search Complete Peer Reviewed Journals 103 teacher AND conception AND creativity Document Type: Article teacher AND implicit theories AND creativity Publication Type: Periodical teacher AND beliefs AND creativity Education Source Peer Reviewed Journals 133 teacher AND attitudes AND creativity Publication Type: Academic

Journal teacher AND views AND creativity Document Type: Article teacher AND perception AND creative student ERIC Peer Reviewed 104 teacher AND conception AND creative student Educational Level: K − 12 teacher AND implicit theories AND creative student Publication Type: Journal

Articles teacher AND beliefs AND creative student Google Scholar Perform search with all the

words occurring in the title. 18

teacher AND attitudes AND creative student Exclude case law, citations, and patents.

teacher AND views AND creative student JSTOR Item Type: Articles 11 Discipline: Arts, Education, Linguistics, Music, Psychology

LLBA Limit to peer reviewed 38 Source Type: Scholarly Journals Document Type: Journal Article

Professional Development Collection

Limit to peer reviewed journals 37

Publication Type: Periodical Document Type: Article

Project MUSE Journal Articles 6 PsycInfo Publication Type: Peer

Reviewed Journal 70

Publication Status: Fully Published Population Group: Human Document Type: Journal Article Exclude Dissertations

Initial Total 520

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3

s t t f R o

ote: Unless otherwise specified, all searches were limited to publications in English since 1999.

entary searches were conducted using the bibliographies of relevant articles. Our database search concluded in February 015.

.2. Search terms

The process of compiling a list of search terms involved three steps. First, we drew upon an informal review of relevant iterature to formulate a list of terms describing the concepts of perception and creativity. Terms related to perception ncluded attitude, conception, implicit theory, perception, and view. Terms related to the concepts of creativity included creative, reativity, and creative student. Second, we devised a central list of combined terms. Terms on the central list were selected nd combined in order to align the search with our primary research question. Third, we performed a systematic search of ach combined term. Table 1 lists the number of articles found in each database. Our initial search identified 520 studies. owever, many of the studies were duplicated across database searches and after resolving duplications, a relatively small umber of the studies met our criteria for inclusion in the review.

.3. Inclusion criteria

A number of criteria were specified to narrow the list of studies located in the initial database search. First, only empirical tudies (qualitative and quantitative) were included. Second, studies had to be related to in-service K-12 teachers’ percep- ions of creativity. Studies of pre-service teachers were included if and only if the study sample also included in-service eachers. Third, inclusion required publication in a journal with a 1-year impact factor of 1.00 or greater. Setting the impact actor threshold at 1.00 captured approximately the upper 50% of established journals indexed in the 2014 Journal Citation

eports®. Fourth, inclusion required alignment between the article’s purpose and our research goals. Fifty-three articles met ur inclusion criteria and were identified as relevant to the current review.

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Table 2 Quality rubric.

Criterion 5—Exemplary 4—Good 3—Adequate 2—Poor 1—Inadequate 1 Purpose All applicable elements are

present and clearly articulated: problem, intent/goal, objectives, rationale, research questions, and hypotheses.

All elements are present but one or two elements are poorly articulated.

All elements are present but three or more elements are poorly articulated.

One or more elements are missing. Purpose can be determined, but requires interpretation on the reader’s part.

Elements are missing or lack clarity to the extent that the purpose cannot be determined.

2 Literature review Very informative, highly organized by theme or issue, excellent selection of relevant literature. Inconsistencies, critical issues and gaps are identified.

Informative, well organized, good selection of relevant literature. Inconsistencies, critical issues and gaps are identified.

Informative, but organization needs improvement. Needs additional sources. Identifies some inconsistencies, critical issues and gaps.

Somewhat informative, but lacks a logical organization. Inadequate selection of sources. Incomplete attention to inconsistencies, critical or gaps.

Incomplete and unorganized. Fails to address inconsistencies, critical issues or gaps.

3 Participants All elements are clearly and completely described: population, sample, sampling strategy, selection bias.

All elements are described somewhat clearly and completely.

Most elements are described, but lack either clarity or completeness.

Some elements are described, but lack both clarity and completeness.

Many elements are missing.

4 Study setting Setting is described in rich detail to enable readers to generalize findings to other settings.

Setting is described in sufficient detail to help readers generalize findings to other settings.

Setting is described but is missing one or two key attributes that would help readers generalize findings.

Setting is described in minimal detail. Readers may find it difficult to generalize findings.

Description of setting is basic and lacks adequate detail to allow readers to generalize findings.

5 Research design Clearly articulated and described in detail. Design is complete and aligns with study purpose.

Articulated, but lacks clarity or detail in a few areas. Design is complete and aligns with study purpose.

Articulated, but lacks clarity or detail in many areas. Design is incompletely described or aligns poorly with purpose.

Articulated, but lacks both clarity and detail throughout. Design is incompletely described and aligns poorly with purpose.

An attempt is made to articulate a design, but description is incoherent.

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6 Data collection and instrumentation

Instrument clearly and completely described; appropriate for study purpose; quality control clearly described.

Instrument described; appropriate for study purpose; quality control described.

Instrument described; appropriate for study purpose; missing quality control description.

Instrument described; inappropriate for study purpose.

Instrument mentioned by name only.

7 Operational definitions of criterion variables

Clear, complete definition. Includes detailed description or characteristics, and measurement method.

Clear definition. Includes description and measurement method.

Clear definition. Excludes description or measurement method.

Definition lacks clarity. Excludes description or measurement method.

Unclear definition. Excludes description and measurement method.

8 Operational definitions of outcome variables

Clear, complete definition. Includes detailed description or characteristics, and measurement method.

Clear definition. Includes description and measurement method.

Clear definition. Excludes description or method.

Definition lacks clarity. Excludes description and method.

Unclear definition. Excludes description and method.

9 Reliability (quantitative) or dependability (qualitative)

Reliability estimate reported for study sample and instrument. Estimation method described in detail to permit replication.

Reliability estimate reported for study sample and instrument. Method of estimation lacks detail to permit replication.

Reliability estimate is reported for sample and instrument. Method of estimation is not described.

Reliability estimate is reported only for the sample. Method of estimation is not described.

Reliability estimate is reported only for the instrument. No other information given.

10 Validity (quantitative) or credibility (qualitative)

Quantitative studies use controls effectively; “best practice” sample size to support inferences. Qualitative studies describe methods and analyses completely and transparently with detail and examples.

Quantitative studies use controls; adequate sample size to support inferences. Qualitative studies describe methods and analyses in detail but fail to include examples.

Quantitative studies use controls; inadequate sample size to support inferences. Qualitative studies description of methods and analyses are somewhat transparent but fail to include detail and examples.

Quantitative studies fail to use controls; inadequate sample size to support inferences. Qualitative studies description of methods and analyses are incomplete and raise concerns or questions.

Qualitative studies lack controls; inadequate sample size. Qualitative studies describe methods and analyses superficially; transparency is lacking.

11 Generalizability or transferability

Findings generalize widely to different contexts, settings, economic groups, ages, and grade levels.

Findings are generalizable to similar contexts, similar settings, similar ages, and similar grade levels.

Findings are generalizable to a specific set of settings, ages, and grade levels.

Findings are generalizable to one specific setting, age group, or grade level.

Generalizability is implied but cannot be determined with confidence.

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12 Data analysis and presentation

Analyses are described completely. Limitations are explained completely. Data are presented in highly coherent visual displays.

Analyses are described sufficiently. Limitations are addressed. Data are presented in visual displays.

Analyses are described adequately but lack detail. Limitations are incompletely addressed. Some data are presented in visual displays.

Analyses are inadequately described. Limitations are not addressed. Visual displays of data are inadequate.

Analyses are mentioned by name but not described. Limitations are not addressed. Visual displays of data are missing.

13 Discussion and interpretation

Clear, coherent, complete interpretations that link all findings to literature review. Alternative interpretations are considered; researcher perspective discussed where relevant. Findings answer research questions.

Clear, coherent interpretations. Interpretations link key findings to literature review. Author overlooks a possible alternative interpretation. Interpretations answer research questions.

Interpretations are stated. Interpretations link some findings to literature review. Author overlooks more than one possible alternative interpretation. Interpretations answer research questions.

Interpretations are stated incompletely. Links between findings and literature review are weak. Alternative interpretations are not considered. Unclear whether interpretations answer research questions.

Interpretations are incoherent. Links are not made between findings and literature review. Alternative interpretations are not considered. Interpretations fail to answer research questions.

14 Relevance to current study Purpose, context, sample, and design are relevant to our research questions.

N/A One of purpose, context, sample, or design lack relevance.

N/A More than one aspect (purpose, context, sample, or design) lack relevance.

15 Trustworthiness Complete, accurate citations; ethical safeguards explained completely; accurate data; content is complete.

Complete citations; ethical safeguards explained; accurate data; content is complete.

Complete citations; ethical safeguards incompletely explained; minor inaccuracies in data; content is complete.

Incomplete citations; ethical safeguards incompletely explained; major inaccuracies in data; content is somewhat incomplete.

Incomplete citations; ethical safeguards not explained; major inaccuracies in data; content is incomplete.

Note: A score of zero is assigned if the criterion is unmet.

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.4. Quality of the studies

To assess the quality of the included articles, each article was judged on the 15 quality criteria listed in a quality rubric Table 2). Each criterion was judged on a 5-point scale (1 = poor quality and 5 = high quality). A score of zero was assigned n cases where the criterion was unmet. Two experienced raters carried out scoring of the articles independently, then onferred on problematic ratings and resolved discrepancies. The total score for each article was calculated by summing he scores over the 15 dimensions. Possible scores ranged from 0 to 75 (M = 48). Our quality assessment eliminated 33 rticles. We excluded articles with a score of zero on any criterion or an overall quality score less than 45. The cut score of 5 corresponds to an overall “good quality” score and resulted in the elimination of only “poor” and “inadequate” studies. fter the quality assessment, our final sample included 18 articles.

.5. Data analysis

Data were analyzed using thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is a qualitative analytic method for “identifying, analyzing, nd reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006; p. 79). A thematic analysis proceeds through six phases. he first phase involves becoming familiar with the data; in the current study, familiarity with the data was accomplished uring the quality assessment. The second phase entails generating initial codes, which in our study comprises the data xtraction process. The next three phases involve searching for themes, reviewing themes, and defining themes. Finally, the rocess culminates in a concise account of the themes.

To generate the initial codes, we developed a protocol to extract key data from the 18 included articles. Extracted variables ncluded country in which the study was conducted, participant attributes (e.g. mean experience, grade level and subject aught, in-service or pre-service status), study purpose, research design, variables measured, data collection methods, reli- bility and validity estimates, researchers’ definition of creativity, and key findings. Two authors independently reviewed ach article and coded the variables. Inter-rater agreement for the extracted data was determined by dividing the number f agreements by the number of decisions. The initial inter-rater agreement was 96%. Where dissension occurred, the two uthors who reviewed the article and a third author negotiated discrepancies until consensus was achieved. Reasons for dis- repancies were due primarily to vague definitions of creativity found in the articles or ambiguous descriptions of research esigns. A brief summary of the extracted data is presented in Table 3.

A theme “captures something important about the data in relation to the research questions and represents some level f patterned response or meaning within the data set” (Braun & Clarke, 2006; p. 82). As a rule, we included themes that were dentified by two or more authors. Themes with less support were included if the theme captured an important element of r novel perspective on our topic. Two authors selected themes independently. Inter-rater agreement was 100% on all but ne of the initial themes. The authors negotiated the discrepancy and achieved consensus.

. Results

Articles reviewed for this synthesis ranged in publication dates from 1999 to 2015, the majority from 2013. The research as conducted globally in China, Finland, Greece, Israel, Korea, Poland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States ith the majority of studies originating in the United States. Participants in the reviewed studies were practitioners or re-service teachers of kindergarten through grade 12, with varying degrees of professional experience. Table 4 summarizes he participant characteristics for each study. Ten themes appeared across the reviewed articles. These themes described he majority of beliefs held by teachers regarding their perceptions of creativity. Table 5 summarizes the themes and their requencies.

.1. Major themes

.1.1. Researchers and teachers have different definitions and conceptions of creativity and creative behaviors in students Ten of the reviewed research papers highlighted the broad spectrum of teachers’ definitions of creativity and how cre-

tive behavior in students may appear. Teacher conceptions differed from researcher conceptions, contributing to teacher ifficulty in recognizing and encouraging creativity in classrooms.

In general, researchers defined creativity as a mental or physical process (Kampylis, Berki, & Saariluoma, 2009; Liu & Lin, 014; Odena & Welch, 2009; Zbainos & Anastasopoulou, 2012) that takes the environment (Lee & Seo, 2006; Liu & Lin, 2014; dena & Welch, 2009; Vedenpää & Lonka, 2014), and the students’ or teachers’ personality (Gralewski & Karwowski, 2013; ee & Seo, 2006; Liu & Lin, 2014; Odena & Welch, 2009; Runco & Johnson, 2002; Sak, 2004) into account. Several researchers eferenced particular models in their definitions of creativity such as Urban’s Componential Model (Lee & Seo, 2006), the 4-C odel (Beghetto, Kaufman, & Baxter, 2011), and Wallace’s 4 Stage Model (Park, Lee, Oliver, & Cramond, 2006). Sociocultural

nd constructivist learning theories were cited as part of the creative process and environment (Chan & Chan, 1999; Kampylis

t al., 2009; Myhill & Wilson, 2013; Rubenstein, McCoach, & Siegle, 2013; Sak, 2004; Zbainos & Anastasopoulou, 2012). Ten tudies noted that creativity results in products or ideas that are novel, useful or of worth to society (Aljughaiman & Mowrer- eynolds, 2005; Beghetto et al., 2011; Kampylis et al., 2009; Lee & Seo, 2006; Levenson, 2015; Newton & Beverton, 2012; yhill & Wilson, 2013; Park et al., 2006; Runco & Johnson, 2002; Zbainos & Anastasopoulou, 2012).

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Table 3 Summary of reviewed studies.

Author/Year Purpose Country Grade Level Research Design Methods Major Findings

Aljughaiman and Mowrer-Reynolds (2005)

To identify teachers’ definitions of creativity and descriptions of creative students.

US Elementary Cross-sectional Questionnaire Teachers believed creativity could be developed, teachers should understand creativity, and that creativity is essential in school. Teachers believed that they fostered creativity and their schools emphasized creativity. A majority believed classroom teachers were not responsible for developing creativity. In defining creativity, most teachers mentioned originality, aesthetic or linguistic products, and intelligence. Others mentioned divergent thinking, inventiveness, or creative writing. Most teachers perceived creative students as “thinks differently,” imaginative, risk-taking, or artistic. Others mentioned rich vocabulary, enthusiasm for learning, intelligent, humor, or curiosity.

Beghetto et al. (2011) To examine the relationship between students’ judgments of their creative self-efficacy and teachers’ judgments of students’ creative expression across the domains of math and science.

US Elementary Cross-sectional Questionnaire Teachers’ ratings of science and math creativity agreed with students’ self-assessments of creative self-efficacy, but students’ creative self-efficacy accounted for a very small proportion of variance in teacher’s ratings. Teachers tended to rate white and female students as more creative in science than nonwhite and male students. Teachers’ ratings were consistent across grade levels, but students’ self-ratings declined with grade level. While students distinguished between their own creative self-efficacies in math and science, teachers failed to detect a difference.

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Chan and Chan (1999) To identify Chinese teachers’ implicit theories regarding the characteristics of creative and noncreative students and to compare those findings with findings in other cultural settings.

China Primary and Secondary Cross-sectional Questionnaire Teachers described creative students as curious, imaginative, quick to respond, active, intellectually superior, original, observant, expressive, cheerful, liking to think. Teachers described noncreative students as: conventional, timid, lacking confidence, conforming, lacking initiative, unwilling to think, dependent, imitative, introverted, obedient. Primary and secondary teachers similar on most characteristics. Male and female teachers were similar on most characteristics. Chinese teachers associated creative characteristics and intellect more often. Chinese teachers viewed socially undesirable traits as characteristic of creative students, while North American teachers assigned unfavorable characteristics to noncreative students.

Gralewski and Karwowski (2013)

To examine the accuracy of teachers’ ratings of students’ creativity and the extent to which teacher ratings are related to intelligence and school functioning.

Poland Secondary Cross-sectional Questionnaire Psychometric tests Transcripts

Teachers associated good grades and behavior with creativity. The accuracy of teacher ratings was moderated by gender. In this study, male students were creatively active in science while female students were creatively active across the arts.

Kampylis et al. (2009) To examine teachers’ implicit theories of creativity and teachers’ confidence to develop creativity in students.

Greece Elementary Cross-sectional Questionnaire A majority of teachers believed that most students have creative potential. Two thirds of teachers believed that creativity could be taught. Most teachers believed that schools fail to develop creativity in students. Half of the teachers believed they were poorly prepared to teach for creativity.

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Author/Year Purpose Country Grade Level Research Design Methods Major Findings

Lee and Seo (2006) To examine Korean teachers’ understandings of creativity, particularly those who teach gifted students.

Korea Elementary Cross-sectional Questionnaire A minority of teachers accurately perceived of creativity. Less-experienced teachers seemed to have a more balanced view of creativity than teachers with more experience.

Levenson (2015) To explore how one teacher’s perspectives of math creativity changed after participation in a professional development course on math creativity.

Israel Secondary Case study Observation Interview Initially, the participant viewed creativity as innate and possessed only by some students, and creative thought as a moment of sudden insight. During creativity training, the subject began to perceive creativity as flexibility, originality, leaving stereotypes behind, and finding connections between math domains. At the end of the training, the subject recognized that creativity might be promoted among all students and saw creativity as a long-term process.

Liu and Lin (2014) To explore teachers’ beliefs about scientific creativity.

Taiwan Primary Descriptive Questionnaire Interview Teachers’ perceptions of scientific creativity fell into 3 categories: divergent thinking, autonomy, and curiosity. Scientifically creative students were characterized as divergent, adventurous, non-conforming, and having wide interests. Teachers recognized the importance of scientific knowledge as a basis for generating and evaluating ideas. Teachers overlooked some aspects of creativity noted in contemporary research. They equated creativity with divergent thinking and failed to recognize the role of convergent thinking and mentioned problem solving but not problem-finding as an aspect of creativity.

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Myhill and Wilson (2013) To describe the creativity beliefs, attitudes, and values of English teachers in England.

UK Secondary Mixed methods Randomized controlled trial Observation Interview

Teachers had a limited conceptualization of creativity. Many teachers indicated a deficit model of the creative process and habit of mind and believed that some students are creative while others are not. Teachers seemed cautious towards making judgments about the value of creative products. Teachers believed that creative techniques could be taught, but creativity could not.

Newton and Beverton (2013)

To determine pre-service teachers’ conceptions of creativity within the curriculum for English.

UK Elementary Descriptive Interview Focus group Teachers’ limited conceptions of creativity were confused. Conceptions of creativity in English focused mainly on naïve views of story writing and dramatic activity. Responses indicated that they were often unable to distinguish clearly between the concept of creativity, examples of creative occurrences, and what aspects of an example made it creative.

Odena and Welch (2009) To examine music teachers’ perceptions of creativity.

UK Secondary Case study Observation Interview

Most teachers believed that all students had a capacity for creativity. Teachers subscribed to the “little c” view. Teachers identified both “adaptor” and “innovator” types of creativity among their students.

Park et al. (2006) To investigate how and why teachers’ perceptions of creativity in science change as a result of participating in an international professional development program.

Korea Secondary Phenomenology Questionnaire Interview Initially, the majority of the science teachers believed that only a few students were creative. After the end of the professional development experience, teachers believed that everyone has creative potential but to differing extents. They believed diversity in creative ability could be supported through inquiry based problem-centered science instruction.

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Author/Year Purpose Country Grade Level Research Design Methods Major Findings

Rubenstein et al. (2013) To design an instrument that would measure teachers’ implicit beliefs that affect their ability to teach for creativity.

US Not reported Cross-sectional Questionnaire Factor analysis

Teachers believed creativity is valuable to society, that most students could grow in creativity, and that they as teachers could develop students’ creativity. Teachers mentioned a discrepancy between valuing creativity and being able to place an educational emphasis on developing creativity.

Runco and Johnson (2002) To compare parents’ and teachers’ implicit theories of creative children across two cultures.

US Grade-level Cross-cultural Questionnaire Parents and teachers from two cultures both viewed characteristics of creative children as desirable. American parents and teachers assigned higher ratings to traits associated with creativity than Indian parents and teachers did. American teachers gave higher ratings to attitudinal and intellectual traits than Indian teachers did.

Sak (2004) To explore what a teacher of gifted students believes about students’ creativity.

US Elementary Case study Observation Interview

The participant considered creativity a three-component construct comprised of perception, action, and impact. She differentiated between creatively gifted and academically gifted students. She perceived creatively gifted students as unique, original, innovative, unusual, expressive, and interesting and described their thinking as non-linear and insightful.

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Scott (1999) To examine how teachers perceive behavior characteristics of children described as creative.

US Elementary Cross-sectional Checklists Vignettes

Teachers perceived creative children more disruptive than noncreative children. On average, girls were rated as more creative than boys, and overall, boys were seen as significantly more disruptive than girls. However, no differences in disruptiveness were seen between creative boys and creative girls.

Vedenpää and Lonka (2014)

To explore teachers’ and pre-service teachers’ conceptions of creativity.

Finland Elementary and secondary Mixed methods Questionnaire Teachers believed creativity could be improved with time and practice. Teachers focused more on creative process than product, but they believed that both creative process and product could be developed. Most teachers perceived creativity as individual and recognized a connection between learning and creativity.

Zbainos and Anastasopoulou (2012)

To examine how Greek music perceive creativity and the teaching conditions that enhance or inhibit creativity.

Greece Grade-level Cross-sectional Questionnaire Greek teachers perceived creativity as a natural gift that could be developed in some students and could be only partly taught in the music classroom. Teachers lacked an explicit understanding of music creativity and assessment.

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Article Number and Demographic Characteristics

Educational Attainment Level of Experience Grades Taught Subjects Taught

Aljughaiman and Mowrer-Reynolds (2005)

36 teachers in northern Idaho, 34 female and two male. Three 29 years or under, six 30–39 years, 10 40–49 years, and 17 50–59 years.

33 held Bachelor degree, three held Masters.

Not provided. Grades 1–6. Not provided.

Beghetto et al. (2011) 50 teachers (two studies with 33 and 17) in the Pacific Northwest. Age and sex not provided.

Not provided. Average 14 years in the first study; average of 16 years in the second study.

Grades 3–6 in the first study; grades 3–5 in the second study.

Not provided.

Chan and Chan (1999) 204 teachers in Hong Kong. Sample A: 113 teachers, 45 male and 68 female, average 38 years. Sample B: 91 teachers, 31 male and 60 female, average 33 years.

Sample A: 23 teachers with no teacher certificate nor university degree; 46 with teacher certificate; 44 with university degree or higher. Sample B: 7 teachers with no teacher certificate nor university degree; 52 with teacher certificate; 32 with university degree or higher.

Average 14.26 years. 71 primary and 42 secondary teachers in sample A. 59 primary and 32 secondary teachers in sample B.

Not provided.

Gralewski and Karwowski (2013)

178 teachers in central Poland, 154 male and 24 female, average 43 years.

Not provided. Not provided. Secondary (specific grades not provided).

Not provided.

Kampylis et al. (2009) 132 teachers in Greece, 70 in-service (44 female, 26 male, majority 30–50 years) and 62 prospective (55 female, 7 male, majority 20–30 years).

Not provided. 12 in-service teachers with 1–5 years, 16 with 6–10 years, 16 with 11–15 years, and 25 with more than 15 years.

Elementary (specific grades not provided).

Not provided.

Lee and Seo (2006) 42 teachers in Korea, 11 female and 31 male. Age not provided.

Not provided. Six teachers with less than 6 years, eight teachers with 6–10 years, eight with 11–15 years, and 20 teachers with more than 15 years.

Elementary (specific grades not provided).

Science.

Levenson (2015) One female teacher from Israel, age not provided.

University degree. 27 years. Secondary (specific grades not provided).

Math.

Liu and Lin (2014) 16 teachers from a metropolitan city in southern Taiwan, eight female and eight male. Age not provided.

Not provided. Ranged from eight to 41 years; average 22 years.

Grades 3–6. Science.

Myhill and Wilson (2013) 32 teachers in the United Kingdom. Sex and age not provided.

Not provided. Not provided. Comprehensive (students age 11–12).

Language arts.

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48 prospective teachers in the United Kingdom, majority female. Age not provided.

Not provided. Average less than one year. Primary. All subjects.

Odena and Welch (2009) Six teachers in the UK. Age and sex not provided.

Teachers held university degrees in Music or Music and Drama.

Not provided. Secondary (specific grades not provided).

Music.

Park et al. (2006) 35 teachers in Korea, 22 male, 13 female. Age not provided.

Not provided. Average 17 years. Middle school (grades 7–9) and high school (grades 10–12).

Science.

Rubenstein et al. (2013) Study 1: 308 teachers; study 2: 366 teachers. Teachers in both studies from across the United States, majority female.

Majority in both groups held at least a Master’s degree.

Majority in both groups had at least 10 years.

Not provided. Not provided.

Runco and Johnson (2002) Study 1: 41 teachers from Delhi, India, 38 women and two men (one unknown), 21–40 years. Study 2: 30 teachers from United States (Georgia, Nebraska, and California), 24 women and six men, 20–52 years.

Not provided. Average 4 years in the first study; average 6 years in the second study.

Not provided. Not provided.

Sak (2004) One teacher, female, southwest region of the U.S. Age not provided.

B.A. in secondary education with a major in history and endorsement in gifted education.

20 years. Third and fourth grade students.

Gifted pullout program.

Scott (1999) 144 teachers from California, majority female, 25–60 years.

Not provided. Not provided. K—6. All subjects.

Vedenpää and Lonka (2014)

89 teachers from Finland, 77 female, 12 male, 20–54 years.

11 teachers held a Bachelor degree, 63 held a Masters, one held a PhD, 13 were high school graduates completing a Bachelor degree, and one was unknown.

Average 9 years. Grades 1–6 (primary) and grades 7–9 (secondary).

Special education (10 teachers), all subjects (28), subject specialist (28; specific subjects not provided).

Zbainos and Anastasopoulou (2012)

112 teachers from Greece, 89 female and 23 male, majority under 40 years.

77 with a university degree in music, 35 with a first degree in music, five with Masters, and two with PhD.

Not provided. Primary and secondary. Music.

24 D.R. Mullet et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 9–30

Table 5 Themes.

Theme Prevalence

Teachers and researchers have different definitions and conceptions of creativity and creative behaviors in students. 11 Creativity can be cultivated in all students, to a point. 7 Teachers felt unprepared to teach creative strategies, design creative activities, or encourage creativity in their students. 5 There are different perceptions of creativity within cultures. 5 Teachers confuse creativity with intellect. 4 Teacher beliefs regarding personal creative ability play an important role. 3 Teachers view creativity as synonymous with the arts. 3

Teachers may display gender bias when identifying creative students. 3 There is a “creativity gap” between teachers’ verbal support for creativity and actual classroom practice. 4 Teachers believe creativity is important. 4

Teachers defined creativity in broad strokes. Teachers (pre-service and in-service) noted the importance of creativity in schools and society, but struggled to specifically define it. While they recognized that innovative products are a part of the creative process, they could not further define that this product must be useful. They equated higher intellectual capabilities with creativity, and while some realized that the environment and personality of a student plays a role in the creative process, they could not further define in what manner personality or environment cultivated creativity. The overall definition of creativity from the teachers’ perspective is one of a subject-specific experience or activity (Kampylis et al., 2009; Odena & Welch, 2009; Park et al., 2006) that requires imagination (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Newton & Beverton, 2012; Zbainos & Anastasopoulou, 2012), intelligence (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Gralewski & Karwowski, 2013; Lee & Seo, 2006; Liu & Lin, 2014; Zbainos & Anastasopoulou, 2012), and results in a product (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Newton & Beverton, 2012; Sak, 2004). This experience is affected by the classroom environment (Kampylis et al., 2009; Odena & Welch, 2009; Rubenstein et al., 2013) and the personality of the student (Chan & Chan, 1999; Liu & Lin, 2014; Myhill & Wilson, 2013). There was a large consensus that this creative product requires original or innovative ideas (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Lee & Seo, 2006; Levenson, 2015; Liu & Lin, 2014; Newton & Beverton, 2012; Sak, 2004; Zbainos & Anastasopoulou, 2012), and utilizes multiple searches for solutions to a problem (Lee & Seo, 2006; Levenson, 2015; Liu & Lin, 2014; Newton & Beverton, 2012; Park et al., 2006; Vedenpää & Lonka, 2014).

There were further discrepancies between researcher and teacher perceptions of what constitutes creative behavior in students. Even when teacher-identified creative behaviors aligned with those of researchers, teachers often empha- sized different behaviors than researchers (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Liu & Lin, 2014). Frequently, teachers tended to emphasize or positively perceive attributes that reflected a more “teacher-friendly” student personality, and viewed researcher-recognized creative behavior as misbehavior (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Chan & Chan, 1999; Gralewski & Karwowski, 2013; Sak, 2004; Scott, 1999). The most common descriptors of creative students given by teachers from the reviewed articles were imaginative (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Chan & Chan, 1999; Runco & Johnson, 2002; Sak, 2004), artistic (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Chan & Chan, 1999; Kampylis et al., 2009; Runco & Johnson, 2002), intellectual (Chan & Chan, 1999; Gralewski & Karwowski, 2013; Runco & Johnson, 2002; Sak, 2004), independent or unique (Chan & Chan, 1999; Liu & Lin, 2014; Runco & Johnson, 2002; Sak, 2004), and curious (Chan & Chan, 1999; Liu & Lin, 2014; Runco & Johnson, 2002; Sak, 2004; Scott, 1999). In contrast, researchers described creative behaviors as exhibited by fluency (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Levenson, 2015; Plucker et al., 2004), flexibility (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Lee & Seo, 2006; Levenson, 2015; Liu & Lin, 2014; Plucker et al., 2004), the use of elaboration (Plucker et al., 2004), playfulness (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005), open to new experiences (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Lee & Seo, 2006; Liu and Lin, 2014), critical, emotional, stubborn (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005), risk takers, curious, impulsive (Kampylis et al., 2009; Runco & Johnson, 2002), adventurous, and non-conformist (Kampylis et al., 2009; Liu & Lin, 2014; Sak, 2004). These discrepancies reflect teachers’ difficulties in recognizing an authentically creative student or experience in the classroom.

4.1.2. Creativity can be cultivated in all students, to a poin A study of Greek teacher’s perceptions of creativity (Kampylis et al., 2009) found that 55% of teachers overall agreed, or

strongly agreed, that creativity can be developed in all students. Interestingly, within that 55%, pre-service and in-service teachers had different opinions. Fifty-eight percent of pre-service teachers agreed with the statement that “creativity can be taught” (p.21) while 62% of in-service teachers agreed. Kampylis et al. (2009) interpreted this difference as teachers making a distinction between “creative learning and creative thinking” (p. 25). Researchers purported that pre-service teachers were recognizing “little-c” creativity, or the general creative ability in all students that can be practiced and strengthened. Myhill and Wilson’s (2013) participants expressed similar perceptions of the presence or absence of creativity in students. English teachers in the study felt that while one can learn strategies for creativity, one cannot be taught creativity. “You can prompt it” (p. 106) but you cannot create it. Again, this suggests that teachers may be distinguishing between creative learning

and thinking in these studies. Teacher participant data in Rubenstein et al.’s (2013) study strongly supported the idea that teachers were capable of developing and strengthening creativity in students. Data in Zbainos et al.’s (2012) study illustrated Greek music teachers’ belief that teachers can motivate students to think creatively up to a certain point. In their view, some children were more innately creative than others were. These data suggest a teacher perception that creativity can be

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ultivated in all students through teacher-directed strategies, but how well a student performs is dependent upon their nnate level of creativity.

Teachers are generally unprepared to design creative curriculum activities, teach creative strategies, or clearly define and ecognize creativity in order to cultivate it in students. Aljughaiman and Mowrer-Reynolds (2005) noted that this feeling of eing ill prepared reflected a lack of training in the pre-service phase. High stakes testing has created additional burdens on eachers, making it more difficult for them to identify and cultivate creative behaviors in students. According to Gralewski nd Karwowski’s (2013) study, even when teachers value creativity, a wide variation in their conceptualizations adds to heir inability to recognize creativity in students. Kampylis et al. (2009) found a significant disconnect between pre-service nd in-service teachers’ perceptions of creativity and their perceived efficacy toward cultivating creativity in students. While he majority of both in-service (56.5%) and pre-service (51.6%) teachers responded that they did not feel prepared, almost ll acknowledged that it was a teacher’s responsibility to facilitate creativity in the classroom. Newton and Beverton (2012) ocused on creativity in elementary school English classes where pre-service teachers connected their perceived inability to each or design creative activities to the subject matter. Teachers felt that certain subjects lent themselves more appropriately o the creative curriculum than others. These teachers linked creativity solely with product production without the need for ognitive skills and were unable to define creativity in the English curriculum beyond very general responses. This finding peaks to the lack of preparation in pre-service training for defining, understanding, and cultivating creativity in students. nterestingly, Rubenstein et al. (2013) found that even though teachers’ may feel prepared to support and encourage creative kills in their students, their school environments (specifically the creation and implementation of standards) might impede

teacher’s ability and personal belief that they are able to do so. This suggests that even if a teacher is capable of cultivating reativity, he or she may be prevented from doing so. These studies highlight the need for better preparation of pre-service eachers to enhance their understanding and identification of creative acts and behaviors in students in addition to improving eachers’ ability to design and implement creativity cultivating curriculum.

.1.3. Different cultures have different conceptions of creativity and creative behavior Cultural beliefs and norms affect teachers’ perceptions of creative student attributes, and shape teachers’ pedagogy and

he lens through which they view creativity. Kampylis et al. (2009) frequently referenced the Greek culture in their findings, uch as noting a negative response to the idea that students have the means and opportunity to express creativity in school hich researchers felt resulted from the Greek pedagogical style of lecture and recitation. Culture has also been noted as a

imitation on creativity-centered curriculum as Park et al. (2006) found when Korean teachers prepared to return to Korea o implement creativity-centered science curriculum learned in an American professional development workshop. Teachers hared concerns regarding the different educational environments in Korea and the United States; however, the majority of eachers felt confident that they could adapt this American curriculum to fit into their Korean curriculum. Zbainos et al.’s 2012) study also underscores the difference between cultural realities and the ideal curriculum, highlighting disconnects etween researchers’ conceptions of creativity, the official Greek music curriculum, and the lived experiences of Greek music eachers. The researchers noted that the majority of Greek schools lacked instruments or music rooms, and textbooks had ot been revised in twenty years. Greek teachers found it highly challenging to implement a creative music curriculum ithout the basic music supplies.

Runco and Johnson’s (2002) study of cultural differences affecting U.S. and Indian teachers’ perceptions of creative behav- ors in students revealed significant differences between the two countries. Parents and teachers in the U.S. rated intellectual nd attitudinal attributes higher than Indian teachers and parents. According to Runco and Johnson, these data reflect India’s ocial norm of conformity. For example, researchers noted the higher rating of the word ‘cautious’ by Indian parents/teachers, hich is viewed as a moderately creative student attribute. “. . .Societal traditions and expectations influence the common

hinking about the acceptability of creative behavior in children” (p. 437). Chinese culture’s negative view of non-conformist r expressive behavior is implicated by Chan and Chan (1999) as the reason Chinese teachers saw those traits as creative ehaviors, but did not value them. Chinese teachers rated attributes associated with intellectual functioning more highly han did American teachers. Chan and Chan (1999) associated this with the Chinese societies’ general educational concern ith student academic performance. The findings of these studies suggest a strong connection between cultural norms and

alues and teachers’ conceptions of creativity and creative behaviors.

.1.4. Teachers confuse creativity with intellectual ability Chan and Chan (1999) found that when asked to list attributes of creative students, Chinese teachers tended to include

ntellectual characteristics such as “ high verbal ability,” “ quick in responding,” or “ like/willing to think” (p. 194). “High chievers who possessed creative traits” (p. 11) were frequently cited as attributes of creative students by teachers Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005). Teachers in that particular study lumped gifted students together with creative

nes. Gralewski and Karwowski (2013) noted that teachers “mistake creativity for efficiency of school functioning” (p. 301). eachers in Runco and Johnson’s (2002) study also placed equal importance on intellectual and attitudinal attributes when escribing creativity in students. These findings suggest that teachers perceive creative students as those who are gifted, igh achievers, or effective in their school lives.

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4.1.5. Teacher beliefs regarding personal creative ability play an important role Results from Rubenstein et al.’s (2013) study found a high correlation between teacher self-efficacy and self-perception of

creative abilities. This indicates that teachers’ beliefs about their own creativity influence the value they place on creativity. Moreover, teachers’ self-perceptions may affect their creative pedagogy and curriculum. Sak’s (2004) case study of one teacher’s creative beliefs further supports this theme. The participant’s beliefs regarding creativity directly influenced her pedagogy, leading Sak to note, “one’s beliefs are very important in shaping classroom practices” (p. 222). Interestingly, Beghetto et al. (2011) noted that positive efficacy beliefs are not as impactful as negative ones on creative performance. These findings indicate that more attention be directed toward teachers’ negative beliefs within their perceptions of creativity.

4.1.6. Teachers view creativity as synonymous with the arts Aljughaiman and Mowrer-Reynolds (2005) found that 35% of teachers associated creativity with artistic products. Art

production and artistic qualities were the most frequently cited attributes, which, in Aljughaiman and Mowrer-Reynolds’ view, limited teachers in their perceptions of creativity. Newton and Beverton (2012) also noted the “strength of their belief that creativity is synonymous with doing art” (p. 173) and alluded to how constraining it was in terms of curriculum for teachers to view creativity stereotypically. That constrained view created missed opportunities to design an engaging and creatively stimulating curriculum. Both pre-service and in-service teachers connected creativity with arts subject areas in Kampylis et al.’s (2009) study citing, in particular: theatre, music, and the visual arts. These data support the theme that there is a widespread belief held by both pre-service and in-service teachers that creativity mainly takes place in the arts.

4.1.7. Teachers may display a gender bias when identifying creative students Beghetto et al. (2011), Gralewski and Karwowski (2013), and Scott (1999) all reported data supporting teacher gender

biases when rating creativity in students; however, the results were mixed. In their study containing two separate studies of math and science creativity, Beghetto et al. (2011) found that teachers had a gender bias in the first study by rating white and female students as more creative than non-white or male students. The second study, however, was free of bias. The authors nevertheless reported findings similar to other studies; that is, a teacher bias toward viewing white and female students as more creative than non-white and male students. One study found that although teachers’ ratings of creativity did not differ significantly for male and female students, their ratings were more accurate for male than for female students (Gralewski & Karwowski, 2013). Scott’s (1999) study of pre- and in-service teachers’ creativity biases found that while both practicing and in-service teachers tended to rate female students as more creative than males, pre-service teachers tended to select a higher creativity rating for students in general than in-service teachers. Researchers hypothesized that in-service teachers expected males to be more disruptive than female students did. If a teacher recognized these “disruptive” behaviors as indicators of creativity, then those behaviors could lead them to view female students as more creative than they actually are. These studies indicate a need for further research into potential gender biases held by teachers regarding student creativity. Teachers’ inability to accurately identify creative students may lead to a suppression of student creative ability in highly creative students, and an expectation of creativity in students who are not.

4.1.8. There is a “creativity gap” between teachers’ verbal support for creativity and actual classroom practice Makel (2009) refers to the space between teachers valuing creativity and putting it into pedagogical practice as the

“creativity gap.” In the majority of the studies reviewed, teachers recognized that creativity is an important skill for students and has significance for society. However, there is a discrepancy between that recognition and actual classroom practice. Aljughaiman and Mowrer-Reynolds (2005) posited that creativity is a lower priority when teachers are faced with increased “academic burden[s]” (p. 14). Conflicting conceptions of creativity widened the creativity gap according to Kampylis et al.’s (2009) study. Researchers saw these conflicts as “inhibiting factors” (p. 25) that prevent teachers from becoming agents of creativity cultivation. Myhill and Wilson (2013) noted a gap in perception and action in their study of English teachers. Data showed that although teachers perceived creativity as an activity that takes place in a judgment-free zone, grades were still assigned to creative products. Described as “. . .binary in their worldview” (p.105) of creativity by researchers, the remarks made by teachers defined creativity as a place of freedom and expression, without placing value on products. Despite that, teachers still assigned value to products amid concern for “accuracy” (p.105). Rubenstein et al. (2013) cited the school environment as a contributing factor to the creativity gap. The push for standardization and assessment testing prevents teachers who want to cultivate creativity from doing so, which can lead to a “cognitive dissonance” (p. 332) and frustrated teachers. These results reflect a persistent creativity gap that exposes not only the serious need for training and support, but also the need for an educational environment that allows for creativity. A teacher may be well prepared to recognize and cultivate creativity, but the environment within schools must allow for it in order for creative practices to take root and flourish.

4.1.9. Teachers believe creativity is important Teachers in Kampylis et al. (2009), Park et al. (2006), and Rubenstein et al. (2013) verbalized their support of the need for

creativity and its importance in school and society. Eighty-four percent of teachers in Kampylis et al.’s (2009) study believed that “creativity is a key factor for personal and social progress” (p.21). Interviews in Park et al.’s (2006) study revealed support for creativity by recognizing, in the words of a participant that “. . .everyday creativity is also important because it must be useful for everybody to enrich their lives. . .” (p. 46). Similarly, Rubenstein et al.’s (2013) data indicated the value that

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eachers in that study placed on creativity for society. This theme reflects the ongoing concern found in this synthesis, and utside creativity research, showing that while teachers may support and value creativity in students and society, they have ifficulty defining and identifying creativity in students. The ability to define and recognize creativity is crucial to cultivating

t in students through curriculum and pedagogy.

. Discussion

The intention of this review is to further the field’s understanding of teacher perceptions of creativity by means of a ystematic synthesis of the literature. We reviewed and synthesized recent empirical studies on teachers’ perceptions of reativity published in high-impact, peer-reviewed journals.

.1. Teacher conceptions, beliefs, and implicit theories of creativity

Our first research question concerned teachers’ conceptions, beliefs, and implicit theories of the concept of creativity. his question is important because to foster creativity in students, teachers need a clear understanding of the creative per- onality, process, products, and environmental factors that promote creativity. Overall, we found that teachers’ conceptions f creativity were limited, vague, or confused.

Several patterns emerged across the studies to support our findings. Above all, research indicated that teachers and esearchers disagree on their understandings and conceptualizations of creativity. Creativity scholars have generally con- eptualized creativity as a multifaceted construct that includes creative process, creative product, person attributes, and nvironmental characteristics (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2010; Feldhusen & Goh, 1995; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Plucker t al., 2004). Teachers, however, had difficulty recognizing creativity among students. Furthermore, the multifaceted nature f creativity went virtually unrecognized by teachers. Some teachers included creative product in their conceptualizations, ut environmental factors went virtually unrecognized. The sociocultural aspect of creativity recognized by researchers was irtually unacknowledged by teachers.

Teachers’ conceptions of creativity were generally naïve or incomplete. Many teachers believed that all students had some egree of creative potential and that creativity could be developed in everyone. On the other hand, a substantial number of ther teachers subscribed to a deficit model, viewing creativity as an innate quality that can be developed in some students ut not others. Conflictingly, some teachers who held the deficit view believed that while creativity was innate only in some tudents, all students could learn creative skills and strategies. Teachers often misconceived creativity as a single moment of nsight. When creative products were mentioned, teachers lacked the understanding requisite to evaluating those products; or instance, some teachers were hesitant to judge the value of creative products for fear of disturbing the creative process. In eachers’ definitions of creativity, certain qualities surfaced repeatedly. Teachers mentioned intellectual ability most often, ollowed closely by divergent thinking. Less often mentioned were inventiveness, originality, curiosity, flexibility, autonomy, nd the ability to make connections. Notably, training had a substantial effect on teachers’ definitions of creativity. Teachers’ onceptualizations became more mature and closer to researchers’ definitions after participation in training or professional evelopment programs. After training, teachers who believed creativity was innate began to believe that all students had reative potential. Overall, teachers’ conceptualizations of creativity were vague and limited to a little-c view of creativity hat focused on creativity as an individual ability.

.2. Teacher perceptions of how creativity manifests in students’ characteristics

Our second research question asked how teachers perceive creativity manifests in students’ characteristics. Teachers requently perceived creative behaviors and characteristics as those that reflect social conformity, high intellectual ability, rtistic ability, maturity, imagination, and curiosity. Creativity scholars, on the contrary, tended to nominate behaviors that eflect openness, risk-taking, critical thinking, flexibility, sensitivity, questioning of authority, and nonconformity. While eachers’ and scholars’ perceptions overlapped somewhat, teachers frequently interpreted many scholar-designated creative ehaviors (e.g. impulsivity or stubbornness) as misbehaviors, especially when those behaviors were less classroom-desirable.

The volume of research on creative personality traits allows for researcher consensus on general behaviors displayed by reative persons (Dawson et al., 1999). The difference between teacher and researcher perceptions of creative characteristics ay be reflective of the current state of education. Under tremendous pressure to achieve objectives and show improvement

n standardized test leaves little room for a student fitting the researcher profile of creative traits. The encouragement and ewarding of conformity and academically efficient behavior is symptomatic of a highly structured, nationalized education Beghetto, 2009; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). There is no space in standardized curriculum for questioning the status quo, ollowing one’s passion, or swimming upstream.

Teachers disagreed on whether creativity is an innate quality; some teachers perceived creativity as a trait possessed y some students and not others, while scholars recognize creativity as a universal potential (Cohen, 1989; Sweller, 2009;

ygotsky, 1967/2004). This divergence from researcher perceptions centers on the difference between teaching creativity kills to all students, and those students who instinctively think in creative ways. Some teachers believe creativity skills ay be taught to all students, but not all students will be able to successfully use them. This reflects a division within

he creativity research paradigm between those who believe that people are creative in specific domains, and those who

28 D.R. Mullet et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 9–30

believe that people are generally creative. Most researchers have settled in the middle, allowing for general creativity that is most evident in specific domains (Baer, 2011; Beghetto & Kaufman, 2010; Sternberg, 2005, 2006). Teachers are then misinterpreting a student’s lower creative ability in a specific domain as a lack of general creative ability.

5.3. Teacher perceptions of creative product

Our third question focused on understanding teachers’ perceptions of creative products. Overall, teachers lacked the skills and training necessary to assess creativity and often were unable to distinguish clearly between the concept of creativity and creative products. Some teachers seemed to conceive of the creative product as a moment of sudden insight. Other teachers were cautious toward judging the value of creative products for fear of upsetting the creative process. Many teachers saw creative products as aesthetic or linguistic products. Interestingly, there was virtually no mention of creative products in domain-specific terms, such as dramatic, mathematical, or musical products. On the other hand, teachers of gifted students seemed to place more emphasis on the general quality of creative products; one such teacher described high-quality creative products as those with the potential for impact or to make an impression. A conceptions of creativity constrained to the arts results in missed opportunities to design and implement creative curricula in content areas outside the arts.

5.4. Relationship between teachers’ perceptions and the teacher’s individual characteristics

Our fourth question sought to understand the relationship between teachers’ perceptions of creativity and the individual teacher’s characteristics. Unfortunately, few studies examined or reported evidence on this relationship. A teacher’s belief about his or her own creativity, or creativity self-efficacy, influences both classroom practices and the value he or she places on creativity (Rubenstein et al., 2013; Sak, 2004). Because negative efficacy beliefs have a marked negative impact on creative production, more emphasis must be directed toward mitigating teachers’ negative creative self-efficacy (Beghetto et al., 2011). Interestingly, some evidence supports a relationship between teachers’ perceptions of creativity and the extent of a teacher’s experience; less-experienced teachers seemed to have a more balanced, sophisticated view of creativity than teachers with more experience (Lee & Seo, 2006). Contradictorily perhaps, other evidence suggests that perceptions of creativity are similar among pre-service and in-service teachers (Scott, 1999). This question essentially remains unanswered and warrants future research.

5.5. Limitations

We identified a number of weaknesses, gaps, and limitations in the surveyed studies. As a whole, the field seems still in the exploratory phase. A major issue is the lack of consensus on an operational definition or model of creativity across the literature (Plucker et al., 2004). The variation in research conceptions of creativity makes it nearly impossible to compare findings meta-analytically. An equally serious issue was an overall weakness in the quality of research designs. Experimental designs were nonexistent with one exception, and most of the studies failed to employ control or comparison groups. Repli- cation and longitudinal studies were notably missing. Few studies were conducted in controlled environments, particularly in classroom settings. The use of convenience samples was common, and a representative sample was used only in one study. There was a general overdependence on self-report measures.

The literature offered little information on how teacher perceptions vary by content area or domain. Similarly, little is known about how teachers’ perceptions of creativity vary by context and setting; for example, nothing is known about how teacher perceptions vary across urban, suburban, and rural school settings, or whether teacher perceptions are different in wealthy districts versus those of lower socioeconomic status.

Interestingly, the synthesis failed to find focused qualitative studies examining teachers who have a strong grasp of creativity, in other words, teachers whose perceptions of creativity are grounded in theory and research. This is a major gap in the research base. Much could be learned by studying teachers who “get” creativity and uncovering what it is about those teachers that sets them apart. Indeed, statistical investigations of creativity, such as factor analytical studies, seem premature without a grounded, qualitative understanding of the construct.

5.6. Implications

The purpose of the current study was to summarize the results of recent empirical research on teachers’ perceptions of creativity. Based on our findings, we propose several areas for future research. First is the need for studies that address gaps and limitations in research design. Future studies should seek to validate and replicate prior findings across different population groups and settings. There is also a call for longitudinal designs that explain how teachers’ perceptions of creativity change over the course of their careers, from training into service. Longitudinal studies will help to understand the short and

long-term outcomes of professional development programs in creativity. The studies reviewed were subject to the typical limitation of small samples and cross-sectional designs. However, rather than recommend larger sample sizes and better statistical power, we believe the need is more compelling for qualitative studies that seek to understand teacher perceptions of creativity in more depth, as it relates to the classroom context and the discourse of creativity in education.

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The second suggestion is a need for studies of teacher perceptions within broader contexts. Future studies could compare eachers’ perceptions of creativity across nations or cultures. Little is known about how variations in school setting relate o teachers’ perceptions; future studies might examine perceptions of creativity across varying school settings (high versus ow socioeconomic status or urban versus rural, for example). There also exists a need for studies comparing teachers’ erceptions across content domains, especially in the areas of science, math, and technology.

Finally, a number of issues implore future study. Future research should examine the relationship between teachers’ erceptions of creativity and students’ achievement outcomes. Such research might, for example investigate how teachers’ erceptions affect the creative expressions of students. Similarly, future studies should explore how teachers’ perceptions f creativity affect their classroom behaviors. Another area for future study might explore the overlap between teachers’ erceptions of creativity and perceptions of intelligence. Perhaps most important, future research should work to under- tand associations between teachers’ backgrounds in education and training and their perceptions of creativity. Little is nown about how teacher perceptions of creativity vary with teacher characteristics such as educational attainment, per- onality traits, intelligence, and the teacher’s own creative ability. Does advanced education and training change teachers’ erceptions, or merely override them?

The findings of this review offer a deeper understanding of teachers’ perceptions of creativity both for research and for ractice. Teachers are trapped in a void between the demands of a high-stakes system and their own beliefs in the value of reativity. To successfully negotiate the conflict, teachers need rigorous preparation and training that develops conceptions f creativity informed by contemporary theory and research.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15326934crj0801 1 Zbainos, D., & Anastasopoulou, A. (2012). Creativity in Greek music curricula and pedagogy: n investigation of Greek music teachers’ perceptions. Creative

Education, 3, 55–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ce.2012.31009

  • Examining teacher perceptions of creativity: A systematic review of the literature
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Background
    • 3 Methods
      • 3.1 Search parameters
      • 3.2 Search terms
      • 3.3 Inclusion criteria
      • 3.4 Quality of the studies
      • 3.5 Data analysis
    • 4 Results
      • 4.1 Major themes
        • 4.1.1 Researchers and teachers have different definitions and conceptions of creativity and creative behaviors in students
        • 4.1.2 Creativity can be cultivated in all students, to a poin
        • 4.1.3 Different cultures have different conceptions of creativity and creative behavior
        • 4.1.4 Teachers confuse creativity with intellectual ability
        • 4.1.5 Teacher beliefs regarding personal creative ability play an important role
        • 4.1.6 Teachers view creativity as synonymous with the arts
        • 4.1.7 Teachers may display a gender bias when identifying creative students
        • 4.1.8 There is a “creativity gap” between teachers’ verbal support for creativity and actual classroom practice
        • 4.1.9 Teachers believe creativity is important
    • 5 Discussion
      • 5.1 Teacher conceptions, beliefs, and implicit theories of creativity
      • 5.2 Teacher perceptions of how creativity manifests in students’ characteristics
      • 5.3 Teacher perceptions of creative product
      • 5.4 Relationship between teachers’ perceptions and the teacher’s individual characteristics
      • 5.5 Limitations
      • 5.6 Implications
    • References

Related Articles/IFC--Editorial-Board--amp--Aims-and-Scope_2016_Thinking-Skills-and-Creativit.pdf

THINKING SKILLS AND CREATIVITY

Editor-in-Chief Rupert Wegerif, Graduate School of Education, University of Exeter, Heavitree Road, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

Associate Editors Ann Hui, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong. E-mail: [email protected]

Shirley Larkin, Graduate School of Education, University of Exeter, Heavitree Road, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

Nasser Mansour, Graduate School of Education, University of Exeter, Heavitree Road, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

Editorial Board

Aims and Scope Thinking Skills and Creativity was initiated in 2006 to provide a peer-reviewed forum for communication and debate for the community of researchers interested in teaching for thinking and creativity. Papers may represent a variety of theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches and may relate to any age level in a diversity of settings: formal and informal, education and work-based.

Research articles

The journal particularly welcomes several types of research article.

• studies of teaching and learning processes directly relevant to teaching thinking and fostering creativity; • reports of research evaluating the effi cacy of programmes, approaches, and innovations in teaching for thinking and creativity; • synthetic review articles; and • critical theoretical and methodological studies.

The major criteria for acceptance of a research article will be its relevance, its importance to the fi eld of teaching for thinking and creativity, and its analytical quality.

Reviews We welcome reviews of relevant books and web-sites.

Vivienne Baumfi eld, University of Glasgow, UK Veronica Boix-Mansilla, Harvard University, USA Pam Burnard, University of Cambridge, UK Kerry Chappell, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK Vivian Mo Yin Cheng, Hong Kong Institute of Education,

Hong Kong, China Guy Claxton, Centre for Real-World Learning, University of

Winchester, UK Teresa Cremin, The Open University, UK David Cropley, University of South Australia, Adelaide,

South Australia, Australia Beno Csapo, Szeged University, Hungary Edward de Bono, The World Centre for New Thinking, Malta Carmel Diezmann, Queensland University of Technology, Australia Sibel Erduran, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland Kieran Egan, Simon Fraser University, Canada Victor Forrester, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon,

Hong Kong, China Howard Gardner, Harvard University, USA Vlad Glaveanu, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark Yoram Harpaz, Beit Berl College, Israel Steve Higgins, Durham University, UK Michael Hogan, National University of Ireland, Ireland Anna Hui, City University of Hong Kong, China Shereen Abdel Kader, New Mexico Highlands University at

Las Vegas, USA Maciej Karwowski, Academy of Special Education, Poland James C. Kaufman, California State University, USA

Sing Lau, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong Li Li, University of Exeter, UK Zhaocun Li, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China Haiying Long, Florida International University, Miami, Florida, USA Carol McGuinness, Queen’s University Belfast, UK Erica McWilliam, National Institute of Education, Singapore Tim John Moore, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn,

Australia Doug P. Newton, Durham University, UK Mary Oliver, The University of Nottingham, Nottingham,

England, UK Jonathan Plucker, University of Connecticut, Storrs,

Connecticut, USA Sylvia Rojas-Drummond, Universidad Nacional Autónoma

de México, Mexico R. Keith Sawyer, Washington University in St. Louis, USA Baruch Schwarz, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel Bharath Sriraman, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, USA Robert Sternberg, Oklahoma State University, USA Ai Girl Tan, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore,

Singapore Oshin Vartanian, Defence Research and Development Canada,

Toronto, Ontario, Canada Marcel Veenman, Institute for Metacognition Research, Hillegom,

The Netherlands Yu-Chu Yeh, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC Li-Fang Zhang, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Anat Zohar, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

Founding Editors Anna Craft Rupert Wegerif

Processed at Thomson Digital, Gangtok (India)

The impact of three kinds of identity on research and development employees’ incremental and radical creativity C. Tang and S.E. Naumann 123

Sympathy fuels creativity: The benefi cial effects of sympathy on originality H. Yang and S. Yang 132

The relationship among teachers’ classroom practices for teaching thinking skills, teachers’ self-efficacy towards teaching thinking skills and teachers’ teaching styles Y. Dilekli and E. Tezci 144

On the relationship between cultural diversity and creativity in education: The moderating role of communal versus divisional mindset L. Vezzali, M. Gocłowska, R.J. Crisp and S. Stathi 152

Closing the assessment loop on critical thinking: The challenges of multidimensional testing and low test-taking motivation D.A. Bensley, C. Rainey, M.P. Murtagh, J.A. Flinn, C. Maschiocchi, P.C. Bernhardt and S. Kuehne 158

(Contents continued from OBC)

Related Articles/Investigating-the-creative-processes-and-outcomes-of-an-ope_2016_Thinking-Sk.pdf

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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

nvestigating the creative processes and outcomes of an open nded design task: A qualitative study on two days practicum or architecture students

rulmalar Ramaraj a,∗, Jothilakshmy Nagammal b

Research scholar & Associate Professor, Sathyabama University, Chennai, India Professor and Head, Department of Architecture, Sathyabama University, Chennai, India

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 23 July 2014 eceived in revised form 7 October 2015 ccepted 18 November 2015 vailable online 28 April 2016

eywords: rocesses utcomes riangulation o-evolution roblem oriented nnovative

a b s t r a c t

Empirical data on processes and outcomes were obtained from a non routine open ended task introduced to the students of Architecture. The emergent manifestations were judged by two intraraters and seven independent skilled assessors in the presence and absence of the participants respectively. We explored the processes and the quality of the physical outcomes from perspectives of both participants and evaluators. Continuous observations and comments obtained from students confirm the partial structuring of problem solu- tion spaces in Maher’s model. Multimethod triangulation is applied to examine validity. We have established reliability through intensive engagement with the data and findings. Investigation shows that problem driven approach results in innovative outcomes.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

. Introduction

Creativity is the development of a novel and appropriate response, product or solution to open ended tasks. Open ended asks require creative thinking and heuristic strategies in finding a way to solve the problem. In architecture, ‘creativity’ is een in totality, parts and details (Antoniades, 1992, p. 20). The level of creativity is determined by diverse aspects operating t a given point of time (Amabile, 2012). With respect to the outcomes in complex situations, the critical factor is the matter of pinion (Lawson, 2006, p. 185). Akin (2008) established that identification and breaking the appropriate frames of references n design problem, followed by a synchronous operation of the functions leads to potential yet creative solutions. Unique olutions are generated by individuals sharing basic beliefs (Catmull, 2008; Paulus & Yang, 2000). According to the expanded heory as put forth by Amabile, creativity is the highest when intrinsically motivated persons with high domain expertise; ich creative skills occur simultaneously. Harvey (2014) established that process relying on synthesis yield breakthroughs.

Fostering creativity in young minds pursuing architecture is multidimensional and challenging (Lawson, 2006, p. 58).

Learning by making or doing’ is both educational and solution seeking. In design pedagogy, problems or tasks are open r close ended, well stated or ill structured, authentic or rich, designed for individuals or groups. Design problems are redominantly underdetermined, partly determined and undetermined (Dorst, 2003). Interpreting the design problem is

mportant in design exercises (Cross, 2001; Dorst & Cross, 2001; Lawson, 2006, p. 117). It is a common practice in architectural

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Ramaraj), [email protected] (J. Nagammal).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2015.11.005 871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

2 A. Ramaraj, J. Nagammal / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 1–8

Table 1 Characteristics of the three dimensional elements.

Point Line Plane Volume

Conceptual Magnified points

Bundled PET bottles, plywood reapers Rolled news papers, cartons

Rigid Flexible Linear (vertical, horizontal, slanting) curvilinear

Plywood Rope Rolled paper

Opaque, Transparent, Translucent Flat, Curved Regular, Irregular, Flexible Hard

Carton Newspaper Defined by ropes Plywood

Heavy Internally hallowed Translucent Not defined

Wooden blocks Cartons PET bottles Defined by interconnected frames and ropes

Shape Size Colour Texture

Visual Regular, Irregular Flexible, rigid Translucent

Cartons Frames defined by ropes PET bottles

Similar Varying

Cartons Wooden blocks Recycled paper tubes PET bottles Paper and plastic cups

Natural Artificial (colours, stucco)

Original paints

Adorned (glossy, matt, smooth) Unadorned

Crushed news paper, Tapes on cartons

Position Direction Space Gravity

Relational Equal Varying Hybrid

Cartons Wooden blocks Recycled paper tubes PET bottles Paper and plastic cups

Rotation (Horizontal, vertical planes) Repetition (horizontal, vertical and slopping planes)

Carton, Recycled paper tubes PET bottles Paper and plastic cups inserted in woven ropes

Internally hallowed Translucent Continuous spaces

Cartons PET bottles Defined by ropes

Cantilever Anchored Suspended Self weight

Normal/Eccentric transfer of load

Vertex (Point) Edge Face Joints

Constructional Projection (inwards, outwards)

Plywood reapers

Projection (inwards, outwards)

Plywood reapers Ropes

Opaque, slits Translucent Defined by 2D

Cartons PET bottles Cups inserted

Rotatable joints Firm

Ropes Nails, ropes, Adhesives

Rigid, Flexible Parallel

Cartons or 3D elements in woven ropes Tapes

pedagogy to introduce open ended design tasks for the students to internalise the experience and spirit for future use in real contexts. Smith (1982) introduced ‘boat building’ exercise in architectural design studio to develop a sensitivity towards materials, design and construction techniques. An exercise on making models with an intention to make the students understand the relationship between built form and structure in monuments was framed by Yeomans (1982). Acquaintance with clay in design studio was explored by Yamacli, Ozen, and Tokman (2005). Ersoy (2011) related dance movements and the built forms to incorporate spatial experiences in design. In this context, a unique task was introduced to investigate the associated processes and the outcomes with reusable and recyclable materials.

2. Method

The task was about designing an ephemeral structure in 7.2 square metres of area. Evolving appropriate concepts relevant to the theme and erecting the designed three dimensional forms in the allocated predetermined test field was the challenge. As the resultant outcome was a matrix of architecture, art and design, the study focused on exploring the processes and the products (Harpe et al., 2009).

The objective of this research paper is to examine the quality of the outcomes from the evaluators’ perceptions, compre- hend the processes involved in defining the problem from the participants’ perspectives and determine the various design approaches on creativity.

According to Reid and Petocz (2004), evaluation is identified as a criterion to enhance creativity. Two experts with twenty five years of experience in practice judged the physical models at end of the second day. We briefed the judges about the theme, the test fields, the materials, the duration and ideas evolved. Even though a template of holistic rubrics was predesigned, the judges insisted on an oral presentation by the participants while evaluating the outcomes. The created models were judged on the level of understanding and synthesis from the designers’ perception.

As we were interested in the overall quality the outcomes were evaluated by a team of skilled assessors independently, following the method designed by Dorst & Cross (2001). In interpreting the overall quality, domain analysis, a systematic approach for analysing the observational data was applied (Leydens, Moskal, & Pavelich, 2004). Seven faculty members with a minimum of five years of experience from the Department of Architecture, Sathyabama University assessed the completed

A. Ramaraj, J. Nagammal / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 1–8 3

ephemeral structures based on the concept, test field integration, new materials, construction techniques, silhouette, height, spatial and visual expressions. The pictures were randomly shown, followed by the criterions along scoring scale was dis- cussed. The pictures taken at different views were shown twice in 20 s. The arithmetic mean for the scores obtained on six point scale was calculated. Finally, the evaluators were asked to give an overall impression score, based on the integrated approach on a 10 point scale which was converted to 6 point scale. The change in scale was introduced purposefully to ensure an unbiased assessment. Correlation between the criterions and total judgement score was determined.

To explore the processes, we used the simplified explicitation process in phenomenology (Groenewald, 2004). In the beginning informal interactions on diverse perceptions on the design task, difficulties in handling the materials and the test fields were obtained from the participants randomly to understand the overall situation. As the time passed, we identified individuals in different groups immersed in the task to understand the directions they adopted in evolving the approach. On the second day, we identified groups with less progress in finding the causes for not effectively working. At the end of the second day, details on approaches, concept and innovative applications of the materials were collected from the oral presentations by the respective groups were noted.

Qualitative methodology is appropriate to construct knowledge on diverse aspects in unique open ended task, (Groat & Wang, 2002, p.179; Creswell, 2006 p.18). In such studies, researcher is the primary data gathering instrument (Brick, 1993; Krefting, 1991) and creativity plays a significant role in analysing data qualitatively (Hoepfl, 1997). For investigating conceptual approaches, philosophies of architects like Aalto and Ando, thematic analysis was adopted (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Miller, 1976; Mills, Durepose & Wiebe, 2010; Shirazi, 2012). The preliminary sketches collected from the groups were used to interpret the transition of ideas from two dimensions to three dimensional forms (Purcell & Gero, 1998). In the process, the outcomes were described, themes were identified, coding schemes were developed, data was coded and the finding were grouped and regrouped suitably till we gained an insight (Bricki, 2007; Patton, 1999; Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Thorne, 2000). With respect to deductive analysis, we applied the cook’s, the prospector’s and the nomad’s approaches (Gang, 2010) and reuse B and C (Pena, 2007; Will, 1997). Content analysis is similar to thematic analysis (Oxman, 2005; Vasirmodi, Turnen, & Bondas, 2013). Quantification of data by measuring the frequency of different techniques and themes is possible in content analysis. The counts can be seen as both the end of a descriptive process and the beginning of an interpretative process (Morgan, 1993). Mayring (2000) insisted the need to be combine content analysis with other qualitative procedures in open ended and explorative studies. The content analysis was limited to counts differentiating the common and unique ideas.

Compound, plu ral Opaque, translucent Heavy, li ghtweight

Visible , enclos ed Anchored, suspended, cantilevered Normal, ec centri c Bundled, roll ed

Poin t

Line

Plan e

Volume

Conceptual

Visu al

Shape

Size

Colour

Textu re

Position

Directio

Space

Gravity

Relational

Vertex

Edg e

Face

Construction al

Form

Structure and transfer of loa d

Skin / Envelop e

Finish

Inse rted or mounted Hard, flexible Opaque, transluce nt

Visual textu re, Physically mod ified

Fig. 1. Relationship between three dimensional elements and the building components.

4 A. Ramaraj, J. Nagammal / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 1–8

Form Structure Skin Finish

Test fiel ds

Integrated approach

Fragmented approach

Part to the whole relation ship is hig h

Part to the whole relationship is less

Task successfull y comple ted

Analog y

Metapho r

Nature

Built for m

Cook’s app roac h

Prospect or’ s app roac h

Nomad’s approach

Exceptional imagi nati on

Hybrid Dyna mic transfo rmation

Conceptual Visual Relational Constructional

Fig. 2. Approaches and the emergent outcomes.

To get an overall picture of the task from the perspectives of the participant, experts and us, multimethod triangulation is applied to ensure validity (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Kopinak, 1999; Mathison, 1998; Meijer, Verloop, & Beijaard, 2002). We have established reliability by continuous observations (Golafshani, 2003; Krefting, 1991) and intensive engagement with the data for interpretation (Roberts, Priest, & Treymor, 2006).

2.1. Open ended task

With an intention to explore the role of post consumer waste materials in creativity, an opened ended task was formulated to design ephemeral structure (see Appendix A) with a duration of sixteen hours in two consecutive days. The ‘test field’ with an area of 7.2 square metres was proactively designed as surprising elements. With forty sexpartite test fields, a labyrinth covering an area 926 square metres was created with ‘Re’ as the shortest route to enter and exit. The test fields were allotted to each team by lot system. A quadripartite module was integrated in the labyrinth for the volunteers to work (Amabile, 1998).

The introduction of the design task was done in two phases. The theme was introduced four weeks prior to the event and the participants were informed to collect a recyclable material of their choice. The second phase was during the workshop.

2.2. Participants

A total of two hundred and forty participants (age 18–23 years; 148 girls and 94 boys) from forty schools of Architecture in South India participated voluntarily in this practicum. In addition, there were four volunteers (ages 18–19 years; 2 girls and two boys) worked along with other participants on both days in the quadripartite module.

2.3. Materials

Cartons used for packing computers, answer books, pencils, erasers, cutters, scales, set squares, pro circles, calculators etc, PET bottles, waste paper strips, newspapers, plywood reapers, wooden blocks available in various sections within the University were the materials identified for the task. Each group was provided with 15 kg of cartons, 10 kg of newspapers, 20 kg of 3 cm thick wooden blocks, 12 plywood reapers with lengths ranging from 1 to 2 m and 40 PET bottles. To facilitate the creative processes, resources like ropes, nails, glue, cutters, scissors and hammers were provided. Three carpenters assisted all the groups on both the days.

2.4. Data collection

On the first day, the predesigned test fields were allotted to the groups by a lot system. As soon as the groups settled down in their respective sexpartite modules after collecting the materials, duration of one hour was allotted to sketch the preliminary ideas on the theme. Still pictures of the outcomes were taken every two hours to monitor the progress.

A. Ramaraj, J. Nagammal / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 1–8 5

Table 2 Correlation between the ratings of the design concepts on different aspects and the total judgement of the interraters.

Correlation Appropriate concepts

Integration with test fields

Unique materials Construction techniques

Silhouette Height Visual and spatial quality

O p e c a

3

3

t i w e a b b r a

F w T

s t

3

t

m a a e

p “ B d o

i a a

fi “ t o

Overall judgement 0.87 0.76 0.64 0.76 0.72 0.63 0.64

n both the days at 10:00 am and 2:00 pm, the overall event was recorded lively in order to understand the construct of acing (Gersick, 1988), involvement (Smith, 1982), material, structure and form (Yeomans, 1982), two and three dimensional lements (Wong, 1993), learning style (Demirbas & Demirkan, 2003). We physically observed the tangible creative processes ontinuously on both the days. Details on structuring the problem were collected through open ended feedbacks. Each group’s pproach, concept and design strategy were obtained during the oral presentation at end of the second day.

. Results

.1. The outcomes

At end of the second day, even though only twenty groups had completed the task, all the outcomes were evaluated by he external members. Six outcomes were shortlisted based on approach, concept, integration with the test fields, elements, nnovative application of materials as reflected by the participants. The judges appreciated the ‘the pyramidal matrix’, which

as described as “. . .a contemporary approach to bizarre architecture using the skew planes providing a variety of visual xperiences. . .”. The ephemeral structures constructed with recycled carton tubes exhibiting a new material was standing lone with unique characteristics and was called as “the massive fort”. The replica of a bizarre building – the piano and guitar uilding; the victorious cups with splashed colours and the carton trees in a park were identified. Even though the “recyclable in” was irrelevant, it was noted for the inbuilt kinetic aspect. We described the outcomes inductively by deciphering the elationship between the components of the ephemeral structures and the three dimensional elements (Wong, 1993, p. 240) s in Fig. 1. The characteristic of each element was coded as found in Table 1.

In the assessment by seven skilled assessors, twelve models secured an average score greater than three in six point scale. ive out of the six outcomes shortlisted by the judges were found to be recognized by the interraters also. When compared ith the summative scoring by the interaters, sixteen models secured more than six in the respective ten point scale grading.

he sixth model recognized by the judges was not shortlisted. Pearson’s coefficient is calculated between the converted overall judgement score and the mean of the scores by the

even evaluators. The coefficients found in Table 2 show strong and moderate correlations establish the appropriateness of he identified criteria.

.2. The processes

Participants were posed with questions like “What are the challenges in the task?”, “What are you planning to do with he materials?”, “What is your approach?”, “How is working in a group?”.

In exploring the process, we were focused on how the participants perceived the challenges in the task. From the com- ents like “we are perplexed after receiving the materials”, “we are confused, we do not know how to proceed”, “materials

re difficult to handle”, “the area is big”, “what is the theme all about?”, “it is a huge task”, “clueless”, “how can we build structure with these materials?”, “why are podiums arranged in different patterns?”, “height, a criteria in evaluation”, xhibit that problem understanding was the priority among the participants.

All the groups took around two to three hours to understand the design task. From remarks like, “We are exploring the roperties of the materials and the bonding techniques”, “can the behavioural properties of the materials be modified?”, working on a bizarre approach”, show that developing methods to modify the strengths of the materials was the focus. undling, rolling of flexible materials with hollow or solid sections, principles of tensile structures, cantilevers, anchors were eveloped through trial and error methods. When cartons were used as the building blocks, the envelope was either adorned r unadorned with colours and textures create a variety.

“Truthfulness to the materials is the agenda”, “minimalism is our approach”, “symbolic representation of a bizarre build- ng”, “the heaviest structure with the lightest material”, “maximum height is our goal”, “visual transparency”, were the nnotations by the groups in the second half of the day. Diverse concepts related to symbolism, metaphor, essence, spirit nd ideals were evolved.

“Structure is erected in only in two podiums and the PET bottles are filled with coloured water arranged in a curve”, “we nalised the concept and we are building three towers with reapers, PET bottles and cartons simultaneously to save time”,

our concept did not suit the arrangement of podiums in L shape”, “did not develop ideas in relation to the shape”, portray hat the groups developed ideas without addressing the profile of the test fields. However, among the twenty completed utcomes, only nine groups depicted an integrated approach in finding design solutions.

6 A. Ramaraj, J. Nagammal / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 1–8

Dyna mic transfo rmations (Profiles deri ved from rectangles of 2:4 units)

Exceptional imagination (Profiles derived from

rectangles of 1:6, 2:5, 3:4 , 3:3 units )

Successful completion (Profiles deri ved from rectangles of 1:6, 2:4 ,

2:5, 3:4, 3:3 units )

Fig. 3. Emergent outcomes and the respective test fields.

From the responses like “Cooperation and coordination is difficult”, “difficult to work together”, “integration is a chal- lenge”, we found that there were difficulties in working together and simultaneously there was a curiosity about the ideas developed by the other.

In case of ‘the abstract pyramidal matrix’, the theme was interpreted; the concept was evolved with the test field in focus, identification of materials for different components, bonding techniques, three dimensional skin invested with a multitude of thoughts were observed. The group which collected recycled carton tubes, techniques in using the material was the priority, followed by integration with the test field.

Even though the responses were random, observations confirm the partial structuring of problem and solution spaces of Maher’s co-evolution model (Dorst & Cross, 2001; Maher & Poon, 1996). Each group tried to find alternatives or solutions in diverse ways to complete the task according to their respective understanding.

Nearly fifty percentages of the outcomes were incomplete. When once the concept was evolved some groups divided the modules amongst themselves to create the model, whereas a several groups were finding it difficult to integrate the ideas in the allotted profile and a few groups lost interest during the task when they saw the others’ processes.

The key points noted from the oral presentations were “a contemporary bizarre architecture”, “a fort wall”, “a ship made of recyclable materials”, “a paradoxical paper bridge”, “skyscraper made of PET bottles”, “a forbidden city made of gold”, “ a symbolic representation”, “ a rotating tower”, “a recyclable park”, “a universal shrine”. We were able to classify the concepts as metaphor, analogy, ideal and essence.

3.3. Triangulation

Findings and observations by the intraraters, interraters and rich description by us along with participants’ and evaluator’s perspectives were compiled graphically in a flow chart while classifying the outcomes. When the approach is ‘a hybrid’, the outcomes were classified as dynamic transformations as in Fig. 2. When a sign of any one postulate by Gang (2010) is visible, the emergent outcomes were classified as exceptional imagination.

4. Discussion and conclusion

Forty sexpartite modules with 7.2 square metres were decided based on the number of individuals per group and the duration. The ‘Re’ labyrinth was designed incorporating three broad themes for collaborative practices such as externaliza- tion, use of physical space and body space (Vyas, Heylen, Nijholt, & Gerit, 2009). We took six weeks to construct the design task. Each and every move was reasoned out logically while doing so. This phase explored various dimensions like partici- pants, primary and secondary materials, tools kit, the labyrinth, the test fields, material distribution, time, cost, assistance, extrinsic motivation, surprises etc along with preliminary mental imageries of the physical outcomes.

As a thumb rule it is observed that the profiles enclosed in rectangles of width to length ratio 2:4 were used creatively as the profiles were compact. However, such rectangles of width to length ratio 1:6, 2:5, 4:3, 4:2 and 3:3 units were occurring in excellent imagination and task completion categories. It is observed that predesigned test field played an intangible role in

influencing appropriate structure; however degree of influence on creativity was difficult to determine. The simplest profile with ratio 1:6 units is too simple and monotonous even though the area occupied by it is the least as found Fig. 3. Proximity between the test fields with dynamic transformation and the quadripartite module where the volunteers were working is observed. We speculate that incorporating one or two more quadripartite modules additionally as external motivation at

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trategic locations and an increase in number of members per team would have facilitated the task completion. In general, ost of the groups adopted solution oriented approaches. According to the participants, inbuilt level of “complexity” in the

ask is high. It will be interesting to explore the processes and outcomes when the test field is a constant. From our observations and analysis, only two outcomes were problem driven. The group which worked on “the pyramidal

atrix” displayed abstractness in problem structuring whereas the “massive fort” was the outcome of following the collection f a specific recyclable material. The former was simple, light weight, interesting, dynamic principles of architectonics, play of ight and shade, skew planes and unique in diverse aspects. The latter was simple, heavy and opaque. All the other outcomes

ere solution driven. The ‘dynamic outcome’ was appreciated by intraraters and interaters. It was unique in diverse perspectives. The ephemeral

tructure displayed synthesis at all levels. The relationship between part to the whole and vice versa was observed to be igh. These contradict the findings by Kruger and Cross (2006) which is to be examined as the dynamic outcome scored high

n creativity and overall impression score. Primarily, the groups adopted problem or solution oriented approach. Irrespective of the approach, problem structuring

ccurs (Goel & Pilrolli, 1992). In case of solution driven approach, the ability to generate relevant solution is crucial (Dorst, 006). According to Restrepo and Christiaans (2003), if the design problem is abstracted, the outcomes are higher in creativity. indings reveal that the model evolved through problem oriented approach was ‘recognized’ as the dynamic outcome by ntatraters and interaters. We also posit that problem driven design is strongly focused and the strategy is knowledge about efining the problem. From our study we have found that problem oriented approach is rooted in context. In architecture, e would like to term the problem oriented approach as the ‘context oriented approach’.

cknowledgement

We would like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers foe their helpful comments.

ppendix A

An open ended non routine task ‘BIZARRCH = BIZARRE + ARCHITECTURE’ focussed on an eco centric approach where immaterial materializes’. Each team with six members were provided with six modules, each covering area 1.2 square

etres. Predesigned sexpartite modules and post consumer packing waste, waste from carpentry, PET bottles, newspapers nd waste papers etc are the identified materials. The challenge is to create a physical three dimensional model in two days.

eferences

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[http://www.creativity and cognition.com/cc conferences/./25RestrepoDTRS6.pdf. (accessed on 1.10.15.)] Roberts, P., Priest, H., & Traymor, M. (2006). Reliability and validity in research. Nursing Standards, 20(44), 41–45. Ryan, G. W., & Bernard, H. R. (2003). Techniques to identify themes. Field Methods, 15(1), 85–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1525822x02239569 Shirazi, M. (2012). An Investigation on Tadao Ando’s phenomenological reflections. Armanshahr Architecture & Urban Development, 4(8), 21–31. Smith, R. A. (1982). Boat building design and construction techniques in the architectural design studio? Journal of Art & Design Education, 1(1), 115–122. Thorne, S. (2000). Data analysis in qualitative research. Evidence Based Nursing, 3(3), 68–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/ebn.3.3.68 Vasirmodi, M., Turunen, H., & Bondas, T. (2013). Content analysis and thematic analysis: implications for conducting a qualitative descriptive study.

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[http://www.promare.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/EL-Will-1977-The-Ancient-Commercial-Amphora.pdf, (retrieved 12.02.14.).] Wong, W. (1993). Principles of form and design. John Wiley & Sons. Yamacli, R., Ozen, A., & Tokman, L. Y. (2005). An experimental study in an architectural design studio: the search for three dimensional form and aesthetics

through clay. pp. 308–314. Blackwell Publishing Limited. Yeomans, D. (1982). Structural models for design education. Journal of Art & Design Education, 1(2), 279–294. Purcell, A. T., Gero, J. S. (1998). Drawings and the design process, 19, 389–430, DOI. P11:S0142-694X(98)00015-5. Bricki, M. (2007). A guide to using qualitative research methodology. (accessed on 4.05.15.).

Arulmalar Ramaraj, B.Arch; M.T.P, has done the Bachelor of Architecture and Masters in Town and Country Planning from School of Architecture and Planning, Anna University in 2001 and 2002 respectively. Her area of interest has been published in various conferences. She has more than ten years of teaching and practice in architecture. Currently pursuing her research at Sathyabama University under the supervision of Dr. Jothilakshmy Nagammal.

Dr. Jothilakshmy Nagammal, B.Arch; M.T.P; Ph D; A.I.I.A; A.I.T.P, has done the Bachelor of Architecture from College of Engineering, Thiruvanantha- puram in 1990 and Masters in Town and Country Planning from School of Architecture and Planning, Anna University in 2000. Her research from Anna University, Chennai was on the topic “Evaluation of Form Based Codes and the Image of Chennai, Tamilnadu”. She has a presented and published more than forty papers in various National and International Conferences and Journals related to her area of research. She has more than twenty years of teaching and practice in architecture.

  • Investigating the creative processes and outcomes of an open ended design task: A qualitative study on two days practicum ...
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Method
      • 2.1 Open ended task
      • 2.2 Participants
      • 2.3 Materials
      • 2.4 Data collection
    • 3 Results
      • 3.1 The outcomes
      • 3.2 The processes
      • 3.3 Triangulation
    • 4 Discussion and conclusion
    • Acknowledgement
    • Appendix A
    • References

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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

s object imagery central to artistic performance?

aría José Pérez-Fabello a,∗, Alfredo Campos b, Diego Campos-Juanatey c

University of Vigo, Faculty of Fine Arts, Spain Department of Psychology, University of Santiago de Compostela, University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain Deparment of Architectural Representation and Theory, University of A Coruña, Spain

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 6 May 2015 eceived in revised form 11 March 2016 ccepted 15 May 2016 vailable online 17 May 2016

eyword: reativity ognitive style patial imagery bject imagery rtistic performance ine art students ental imagery

a b s t r a c t

The aim of this study was to examine the type of cognitive style of Fine Art students, and assess the weight of cognitive style in artistic production. A three-dimensional model of cognitive style that distinguishes between object imagery, spatial imagery, and verbal processing was used. The sample consisted of 125 Fine Art students (65 women and 60 men). Participants were administered the Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Question- naire (OSIVQ), and two imagery tests. Moreover, undergraduates completed a plastic art assignment that was assessed by an artist and lecturer in drawing, and by a professor in the Psychology of Art. Fine Art undergraduates exhibited object rather than verbal or spatial types of processing. The weight of object imagery type was found to be significant on tech- nical skill and visual impact, which were precisely the variables most related with visual processing in the plastic art assignment. Thus innovative lines of research are proposed.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

. Introduction

Traditionally, the term cognitive style has referred to the individual’s consistent manner of cognitive functioning, par- icularly in relation to acquiring and processing information (Ausburn & Ausburn, 1978). The construct of cognitive style as attracted interest given its ability to predict behaviour in complex tasks, in real-life situations, as well as in academic nd educational performance (e.g., Bernardo, Zhang, & Callueng, 2002; Sadler-Smith & Badger, 1998; Sternberg & Zhang, 001). Cognitive styles are known to be relatively stable (e.g., Messick, 1976) given that they are not the product of habit, but re shown to develop gradually from life experience (Hayes & Allinson, 1998; Leonard & Straus, 1997; Sternberg, 1997), or aught (López & Martín, 2010), and can be adapted to meet environmental demands (Dunn, Dunn, & Price, 1989; Schmeck, 988; Zhang & Sternberg, 2005).

.1. Cognitive style: spatial and object imagery

Paivio (1971) and Richardson (1977) established two cognitive styles: verbal and visual styles. The preference for either isual or verbal information processing was the criterion for classifying subjects as visualizers i.e., individuals who rely

rimarily on images to undertake cognitive activities, or verbalizers, individuals who rely primarily on verbal strategies. An lternative to the traditional two-dimensional model is the recently developed three-dimensional model of cognitive style roposed by Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, and Shephard (2005), which is grounded in modern theories of cognitive science that istinguish between object imagery, spatial imagery, and verbal processing.

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (M.J. Pérez-Fabello).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.006 871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

68 M.J. Pérez-Fabello et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 67–74

Drawing from research in neuroscience which shows that visual areas of the brain are divided into two different streams i.e., the dorsal or spatial, and the ventral or object (Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992; Smith et al., 1995), current theories of cognitive science distinguish between object imagery, spatial imagery, and verbal processing. Moreover, distinct patterns of neural activation by spatial and object visualizers have been found during the processing of spatial and visual information (Motes, Malach, & Kozhevnikov, 2008). The object stream is responsible for processing the visual appearance of objects in terms of color, detail, shape, and size. The spatial is responsible for processing spatial attributes such as location, movement, spatial transformations, and spatial relations (Haxby et al., 1991; Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992; Mazard, Tzourio-Mazoyer, Crivello, Mazoyer, & Mellet, 2004; Motes et al., 2008; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982).

The assertion that cognitive styles are to a certain degree dependent on experience has spurred a number of studies examining cognitive styles in a variety of professions. Several studies have hypothesized that visual artists, the focus of the present study, rely on object visualization rather than on spatial visualization; visual artists tend to create holistic, global images that are enduring, spontaneous, and offer a multiplicity of meanings (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2006). A study on 3800 participants found that spatial and object processing preferences were independent of each other and without correlation; moreover, preferences in processing style differed according to gender and experience. Thus, men, science majors, and individuals experienced in video-games preferred spatial visualization, whereas women, humanities majors, and individuals experienced in visual arts preferred object visualization (Chabris et al., 2006). Likewise, a study on a sample of college students from an array of non-artistic disciplines, has recently confirmed the moderating role of gender in visual information processing i.e., females are better at activating object visualization (Yoon, Choi, & Oh, 2015). Kozhevnikov, Blazhenkova, and Becker (2010) have found the ability to visualize an object can be related to specialization in the visual arts.

Furthermore, the results of qualitative interviews in a wide array of professions reveal that (a) the visualization process and experience of visual artists in undertaking their creations is unique and differs from information processing in the sciences and humanities in all stages of image processing (generation, inspection, maintenance, and transformation), and (b) the imagery of visual artists can be characterized as pictorial, integrated, and spontaneous. In addition, the results showed that visual artists who rely on the visual processing of objects were able to create abstract representations of abstract visual art, whereas individuals employing visual-spatial processing (scientists) were unable to create these abstract representations of abstract visual art (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010). Although different studies have corroborated these results; we think further research on imagery cognitive style is required to substantiate the theory in other specific areas and in different countries. Bearing in mind that participants were second-year undergraduates at the Faculty of Fine Arts with experience in the visual arts and the findings of previous studies, Hypothesis 1 (H1) conjectured that Fine Arts undergraduates of both genders would prefer the object visualization style in comparison to the spatial visualization or verbal style.

1.2. Spatial and object imagery and creative achievements

Current research in psychology has focused on exploring the relationship between creativity and mental imagery in line with the view that imagination is a fundamental pillar for developing creativity (Miller, 2000; Shepard, 1978). Several studies (Allen, 2010; Kay, 1996; Pérez-Fabello & Campos, 2007; Pérez-Fabello, Campos, & Meana, 2014; Shaw & Belmore, 1982; Winner, Casey, DaSilva, & Hayes, 1991) have examined the relationship between an array of imagery tests (ranging from measures of spatial visualization to measures of mental imagery vividness and control) and creative achievement (mainly by assessing prominent members from specific professions, academic achievement in creativity, normally in the field of art) or psychometric measures of creativity. Notwithstanding, the results of these studies have not been as conclusive as research based on the reports of professional artists and scientists that underscored the impact of mental imagery on their professional performance (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009, 2010; Rosenberg, 1987).

In academic spheres, Campos and coworkers (Campos & González, 1994a, 1994b; Campos, González, & Pérez, 1996; Campos, González, & Pérez-Fabello, 2001; Pérez-Fabello, Campos, & Gómez-Juncal, 2007) assessed the relationship between imagery tasks and the academic performance of Fine Art students. Though the influence of different imagery tasks on aca- demic performance was small, the results showed the influence varied according to the type of imagery task under evaluation. The relationship between imagery control and academic performance increased according to the different curricula (draw- ing, painting, sculpture, and complementary subjects), the greatest relationship being observed in drawing, painting, and sculpture in comparison to the complementary subjects of the history of art, and the psychology of art (Pérez-Fabello et al., 2007). These results suggest that specific types of imagery are related to a given type of activity i.e., there are different types of imagery and a broad spectrum of creativity, thus the need for determining which type of cognitive style is associated to each specific creative field e.g., spatial visualizers have been found to better at mental rotation tasks and visual maze navigation, whereas object visualizers were better at image recognition tasks (Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1988). Moreover, an individuals’ preferences to or self-assessments of object and spatial imagery has been found to correlate highly with measured performance in object and spatial ability, respectively (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009).

Forisha (1983) considers cognitive style to be essential to the imagery creativity relationship. Few studies have assessed cognitive style in relation to an ad hoc product of artistic creativity evaluated by experts. In order to associate cognitive style to creative achievement, Hypothesis 2 (H2) was advanced i.e., the object visualization style of Fine Arts undergraduates from both genders has a significant weight on the resolution of artistic production.

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.3. Present study

The evidence overwhelmingly supports the view that cognitive style is related to profession and experience. A key omponent of studies in Fine Arts is visualization; therefore, in order to confirm the role of mental imagery in relation to he visual arts, this study assessed the type of cognitive style (object imagery, spatial imagery, and verbal processing) used y Fine Art undergraduates (males and females). In order to determine the cognitive style of imagery associated to creative chievement, the impact of mental imagery on artistic production was assessed using a plastic art assignment evaluated by wo judges: an artist and a lecturer in drawing; and a professor of Psychology of Art, art expert. To assess the role of mental magery, an ad hoc test specific for the Fine Arts is here reported.

. Method

.1. Participants

A total of 125 second-year students were selected from the Faculty of Fine Arts of the University of Vigo (65 women and 0 men), mean age 20.41 years, (SD = 2.21), and age range 18–29 years. All students freely volunteered to participate in the tudy and were assured their results would remain anonymous and confidential.

.2. Materials

Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire (OSIVQ; Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009). The questionnaire consists f three scales (Likert type, 1–5), the object imagery scale, spatial scale, and the verbal scale. This questionnaire consists of 45 tems, 15 items assessing visual–object cognitive style (e.g., ‘My mental pictures are very detailed precise representations of he real things’), 15 items assessing visual–spatial cognitive style (e.g., ‘I can easily imagine and mentally rotate 3-dimensional eometric figures’), and 15 items assessing verbal cognitive style (e.g., ‘I would rather have a verbal description of an object r person than a picture’). Cronbach’s alphas obtained by Campos and Pérez-Fabello (2011) were 0.72, 0.77, and 0.81 for the erbal, object imagery, and spatial imagery scales, respectively.

Measure of the Ability to Form Spatial Mental Imagery (MASMI; Campos, 2009, 2013). The test consists of an unfolded ube that the participants must mentally reassemble prior to answering 23 questions related to the cube. Each question has our responses: two correct, and two incorrect ones (see Appendix). The total score is obtained by adding all of the correct esponses and subtracting the incorrect responses. The internal consistency of the MASMI, as measured by Cronbach alpha as 0.93 (Campos, 2009).

Mental Rotation Test (MRT; Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978). The test consists of ten items, each of which contains a 3-D drawing f small figure of a cube. Each item consists of a figure and four responses: two correct, and two incorrect ones. The figures ust be rotated prior to responding to the questions (see Appendix). Vandenber and Kuse (1978) obtained a test–retest

eliability of .83. Atistic performance. The plastic art assignment was undertaken in the painting class at the Faculty of Fine Arts of the

niversity of Vigo in Pontevedra (Spain). The assignment proposed by a lecturer in drawing, Marina Núñez, required partic- pants to create and then deconstruct a subjective stereotype, for example, a representation of infancy as innocent, tender, nd sweet might then be transformed into a representation with macabre, violent, and perverse characters. Once students ad formulated their concept, they then designed and photographed a theatrical set or scene of its deconstruction. There- fter, using a free-technique, participants created a large format picture (minimum 1.80 m high and wide) derived from the hotographic material (see Appendix).

The art assignment was evaluated by two judges: a professional art expert (Marina Nuñez, artist and lecturer in drawing), nd a professor in Psychology of Art, art expert, and one of the authors of this article. We considered this to be an adequate ethod for assessing creative work. The Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) used in the present study was developed

y Amabile and has been validated in several studies (Amabile, 1982, 1996; Hekkert, & van Wieringen, 1996; Kaufman, Baer, ropley, Reiter-Palmon, & Sinnett, 2013; Yi, Plucker, & Guo, 2015). The judges agreed on the criteria prior to independently valuating the assignments. The plastic art assignment was evaluated prior to the imagery tests and the OSIVQ. Three factors ere evaluated: Formulation of the idea, Formal production, and Technical skill.

. Formulation of the Idea. Entailed two factors: Relevance and Discursive Complexity. Relevance was scored from 0 to 10 points (according to whether the deconstruction of the stereotype was adequate in terms of being contemporary and significant, and the degree to which the idea was obvious; 0 “not very adequate and very obvious,” and 10 “very adequate and not very obvious”). The Pearson correlation between the inter-judge rating was 0.61 (p < 0.01). Discursive complexity was scored from 0 to 10 (according to its originality and the power of evocation; 0 “not very complex,” and 10 “very complex”). The Pearson correlation between the inter-judge rating was 0.72 (p < 0.01). The Formulation of the Idea was scored using

personal interviews where students were required to explain their rationale concerning the stereotype of their choice.

. Formal Production. Entailed two factors: Visual Impact and Formal Complexity. The score for Visual Impact ranged from 0 to 10 according to the emotional impact of the work of art, 0 “little emotional impact,” and 10 “strong emotional impact.” The Pearson correlation between the inter-judge rating was 0.74 (p < 0.01). The score for Formal Complexity ranged from

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0 to 10 (according to the degree of complexity in the representation, 0 “little Formal Complexity,” and 10 “great Formal Complexity”). The Pearson correlation between the inter-judge rating was 0.72 (p < 0.01). Formal Production was evaluated on the basis of the theatrical set or scene that was photographed and the final work of art i.e., the large format picture.

3. Technical Skill was scored from 0 to 10, according to the technical skill in terms of mastery of color, form, gesture, volumes, perspective, etc.; 0 “little technical skill,” and 10 “great technical skill.” The Pearson correlation between the inter-judge rating was 0.82 (p < 0.01). Technical skill was evaluated in terms of the work of art i.e., the large format picture. The Total score of the plastic art assignment was obtained by adding the scores for Relevance, Discursive Complexity, Visual Impact, Formal Complexity, and Technical skill”. The Pearson correlation between the inter-judge rating was 0.69 (p < 0.01).

2.3. Procedure

This study was undertaken in the usual classrooms of Fine Art undergraduates. The participants were distributed into 5 small groups according to the alphabetical order of surnames. The groups of 20–30 participants worked on their assignment for four hours per week for a four-month period during their painting classes. Prior to beginning the plastic art assignment participants were administered the Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire (OSIVQ), the Measure of the Ability to Form Spatial Mental Imagery (MASMI), and the Mental Rotation Test (MRT). The tests were administered in counterbalanced order. The plastic art assignment was evaluated at the end of the course by two judges according to previously established criteria.

2.4. Research design

In this study we analysed the cognitive style variable with three levels: spatial imagery, object imagery, and verbal style, in order to assess cognitive style of Fine Arts undergraduates. Also we used as independent variables the ability to form spatial mental imagery, and the ability to rotate mental imagery; and the dependent variables were the relevance, the discursive complexity, the visual impact, the formal complexity, and the technical skill.

3. Results

3.1. Cognitive style: spatial and object imagery

First the mean and standard deviation for each of the variables were obtained for both female and male students as well as for the entire sample (see Table 1). Thereafter, the prevalence of cognitive style (verbal, spatial, and object) among Fine Art students was ascertained for female students, male students, and the entire sample. For female Fine Art students the Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed significant difference between the three styles, F(1, 64) = 133.19, p < 0.001, �2p = 0.56, power = 1. Later analysis with the Least Significant Difference test found significant differences (p < 0.001) between object imagery scores (M = 52.85, SD = 10.13), and spatial imagery scores (M = 36.30, SD = 8.46). Female students obtained higher scores in object imagery than in spatial imagery. Similarly, significant differences (p < 0.001) were observed between object imagery scores and verbal scale scores (M = 38.06, SD = 9.79) on the OSIVQ. However, no significant differences were observed between the scores obtained by women students on the spatial imagery scale and the verbal scale.

As for male students, the Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), revealed significant differences between the mean scores of the three styles, F(1, 59) = 121.07, p < 0.001, �2p = 0.69, power = 1. The Least Significant Difference test found significant differences (p < 0.001) between object imagery scores (M = 54.29, SD = 7.72) and spatial imagery scores (M = 43.91, SD = 6.90). Fine Art students tended to use object imagery in contrast to spatial imagery. Significant difference (p < 0.001)

Table 1 Means and standards deviations for female students, male students, and the entire sample as a whole in the three different tests.

Variables Women Men Total

M SD M SD M SD

Object 52.85 10.13 54.29 7.72 53.25 9.54 Spatial 36.30 8.46 43.91 6.90 38.23 9.27 Verbal 38.06 9.79 39.50 7.37 38.45 9.17 MRT 8.32 3.93 10.23 4.06 8.97 4.14 MASMI 25.49 12.56 30.47 13.46 26.32 12.96 Relevance 7.46 0.85 7.44 0.91 7.42 0.88 D. C. 7.52 1.01 7.31 1.15 7.43 1.08 V. I. 7.40 1.45 7.13 1.51 7.30 1.49 F. C. 7.25 1.50 6.64 1.64 7.07 1.56 T. S. 6.88 1.68 6.48 1.95 6.77 1.73 Total 36.49 5.60 35.00 6.43 36.00 5.91

Object = Object Scale of the OSIVQ. Spatial = Spatial Scale of the OSIVQ. Verbal = Verbal Scale of the OSIVQ. MRT = Mental Rotation Test. MASMI = Measure of the Ability to Form Spatial Mental Imagery. D.C. = Discursive Complexity. V.I. = Visual Impact. F.C. = Formal Complexity. T.S. = Technical Skill.

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ere also found between the object scale scores and the verbal scale scores (M = 39.50, SD = 7.37). Likewise, Fine Art students ended to use object mental imagery in comparison to verbal information processing. Finally, significant difference (p < 0.001) ere found between spatial imagery scores and the verbal scale scores i.e., Fine Art students obtained higher spatial scale

cores than verbal scale scores. The Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for the entire sample revealed significant differences between

he mean scores of the three scales of the OSIVQ, F(1, 124) = 254.07, p < 0.001, �2p = 0.63, power = 1. The results of the Least ignificant Difference test showed significant differences (p < 0.001) between the object scale (M = 53.25, SD = 9.54) and he spatial scale (M = 38.23, SD = 9.27), and between object scale and the verbal scale (M = 38.45, SD = 9.17). No significant ifferences were observed between the spatial scale scores and the verbal scale scores.

.2. Spatial and object imagery and artistic production

Given the relevance of object imagery for Fine Art students, its weighting was assessed in relation to artistic production, nd the different types of imagery: object scale, spatial scale, and verbal scale of the Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal uestionnaire, the Mental Rotation Test, and the Measure of the Ability to Form Spatial Mental Imagery. In order to assess

he art assignment the following were measured: Relevance, Discursive Complexity, Visual Impact, Formal Complexity, nd Technical Skill, and the Total Score for all these measures. To assess the weight of imagery scores on each of the easures of the art assignment a stepwise linear regression analysis was performed with the results of the different tests as

ndependent variables and the different measures of the art assignment as dependent variables. Regression analyses were arried according to gender of participant i.e., first female students and then male students, and then for the entire sample s a whole.

A stepwise linear regression analysis was undertaken for the group of female students with the scores for imagery obtained rom the three tests (the Object, Spatial, and Verbal Scales of the Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire, the Mental otation Test, and the Measure of the Ability to Form Spatial Mental Imagery) as independent variables and the different easures of the art assignment (Relevance, Discursive complexity, Visual Impact, Formal Complexity, Technical Skill, and the

otal Score of all of these measures) as dependent variables. The results obtained for female students are shown in Table 2. ormal Complexity was not related to any of the variables indicating that none of the image types measured had any weight n Formal Complexity. As for the other variables (Skill Technical, Visual Impact, Discursive Complexity, Relevance, and Total core), only the Object Scale of the Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire was weighted, but only scarcely. Object magery explained 6% of the variance of Technical Skill, 6% of the variance of Visual Impact, 5% of the variance of Discursive omplexity, 5% of the variance of Relevance, and 7% of the variance of Total Score; the remaining imagery types were not

ncluded in the final equation. Thereafter, the weight of mental imagery on the art assignment of male Fine Art students was analysed. None of the

easures of imagery were found to be significantly related to measures of artistic performance. A stepwise linear Regression nalysis was undertaken on the total scores for the entire sample as a whole with the scores for the three tests (the Object,

patial, and Verbal Scales of the Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire, the Mental Rotation Test, and the Measure f the Ability to Form Spatial Mental Imagery) as independent variables, and the measures of the art assignment (Relevance, iscursive Complexity, Visual Impact, Formal Complexity, Skill Technical, and the Total Score for all of these measures) as the ependent variables. Object imagery was significantly related to Technical Skill, Visual Impact and Discursive Complexity

able 2 esults of the stepwise linear regression analysis on the sample of female fine art students.

Variables ̌ R2 t p

Dependent Independent

T.S. Object 0.24 0.06 2.21 0.03 V.I. Object 0.24 0.06 2.22 0.03 D.C. Object 0.22 0.05 2.00 0.04 Relevance Object 0.23 0.05 2.13 0.04 Total Object 0.25 0.07 2.34 0.02

.S. = Technical Skill. V.I. = Visual Impact. D.C. = Discursive Complexity.

able 3 esults of the stepwise linear regression analysis on the group total.

Variables ̌ R2 t p

Dependents Independents

T. S. Object 0.27 0.07 2.95 0.01 V. I. Object 0.21 0.05 2.30 0.02 D.C. Object 0.20 0.04 2.15 0.03 Total Spatial 0.23 0.05 2.42 0.02

.S. = Technical Skill. V.I. = Visual Impact. D.C. = Discursive Complexity.

72 M.J. Pérez-Fabello et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 67–74

(see Table 3), and explained 7% of the variance of Technical Skill, 5% of the variance of Visual Impact, and 3% of the variance of Discursive Complexity. Spatial imagery was related to Total score and explained 5% of the variance.

4. Discussion

The cognitive style (object imagery, spatial imagery, and verbal processing), of Fine Art students, and the impact of mental imagery on artistic performance as measured by a plastic art assignment were assessed. The results revealed that female and male Fine Art students tended to use object imagery in comparison to spatial imagery or verbal processing, a finding that corroborated by Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, (2006, 2010); Kozhevnikov et al. (2005; 2010) who assert that Fine Art students tend to use object imagery. It is worth noting that differences were observed between spatial imagery versus verbal processing in male Fine Art students, but this was not the case for female students. Across all participants, a central role was observed for object imagery both between spatial imagery and verbal processing. This central role for object imagery in these Fine Art students corroborates findings reported elsewhere with participants from other countries (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2006, 2010; Chabris et al., 2006; Kozhevnikov et al., 2010; Yoon et al., 2015).

The analysis of the relationship between mental imagery and the artistic performance of female students showed that object imagery explained a small proportion of the variance of Technical Skill, Visual Impact, Discursive Complexity, Rel- evance and Total score. As for male students, none of the imagery scores were weighted with the measures of artistic performance. Notwithstanding, object imagery for the entire sample was significantly weighted in Technical Skill, Visual Impact, and Discursive Complexity. These results coincided with other studies on academic performance in that the weight of imagery was significant but small (Campos & González, 1994a, 1994b; Campos et al., 1996, 2001; Pérez-Fabello et al., 2007). However, the overall percentage of variance explained was higher than in the study of LeBoutillier and Marks (2003), who reported only 3% of the variance explained by imagery, and came close to the 11% of variance of imagery in artistic creativity (Kozhevnikov, Kozhevnikov, Yu, & Blazhenkova, 2013). Moreover, the relationship between mental imagery and artistic performance was high in women but not in men. Thus the creativity of women was associated to imagery, but not so for men, which is in line with previous studies, (Forisha, 1983; Pérez-Fabello & Campos, 2007).

Though object imagery appears to play a crucial role in artistic performance, its weight in the assessment of artistic performance is yet to be ascertained. In line with Kozhevnikov et al. (2013), we understand that artistic creativity cannot be assessed by testing general creativity, but requires specific evaluation of performance. This study is but another step in the same direction, therefore, further research is required to design and develop measuring instruments of artistic creativity. Likewise, the evaluation of mental imagery required specific evaluation that was related to the cognitive style of the sample under. Further research is required to design an art assignment capable of assessing the relationship between mental imagery and artistic performance in the visual arts. Further research is also required to study the relationship between mental imagery and artistic performance in men, since in our study none of the imagery scores were related to any measures of artistic performance.

The most obvious limitation concerns the sample under study i.e., restricted to Fine Arts students from Vigo University (Spain), thus the results cannot be generalized to other populations. The results indicated that the impact of mental imagery on artistic production was low, and lower than expected. Further research is required to assess specific measures of artistic creativity in the field of plastic arts, and to examine different types of mental imagery in order to unravel the relationship between both variables.

In this study both women and men preferred a cognitive style based on object imagery, which was the only type of imagery that had an impact on artistic production. Future research focusing on the impact of gender and experience on the preferred type of cognitive processing in the Fine Arts would be valuable in order to compare data with other disciplines. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to replicate this study and compare the results with a group of non-Fine Arts students as a control group.

Appendix A.

MRT example item

MASMI example item Below is the unfolded image of the cube with different signs on each side of the cube:

T

R

A

A

A A

B

B

B

B

C

C

C

C

C

M.J. Pérez-Fabello et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 67–74 73

Question.-Which figures on the right (A, B, C, D) correspond to the right and left side of the cube?

A x B C x D

he plastic art assignment. Example

Imaginary child.

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  • Is object imagery central to artistic performance?
    • 1 Introduction
      • 1.1 Cognitive style: spatial and object imagery
      • 1.2 Spatial and object imagery and creative achievements
      • 1.3 Present study
    • 2 Method
      • 2.1 Participants
      • 2.2 Materials
      • 2.3 Procedure
      • 2.4 Research design
    • 3 Results
      • 3.1 Cognitive style: spatial and object imagery
      • 3.2 Spatial and object imagery and artistic production
    • 4 Discussion
    • MRT example item
      • MASMI example item
        • The plastic art assignment. Example
      • References
    • References

Related Articles/Large-scale-implementation-of-higher-order-thinking--HOT--in_2016_Thinking-S.pdf

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Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 85–96

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

arge scale implementation of higher order thinking (HOT) in ivic education: The interplay of policy, politics, pedagogical eadership and detailed pedagogical planning

nat Zohar ∗, Adar Cohen chool of Education, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 29 October 2015 eceived in revised form 1 May 2016 ccepted 10 May 2016 vailable online 12 May 2016

eywords: igher order thinking (HOT) ivic studies arge scale implementation nstructional leadership

a b s t r a c t

Educational policy documents from around the globe currently highlight the goal of teach- ing higher order thinking (HOT). Yet, most classrooms worldwide are still predominately characterized by a pedagogy of knowledge transmission, focusing on lower-order cognitive levels. This discrepancy points to the need to study issues of large scale implementation of HOT. The goal of this paper is to address this issue by examining two decades of implement- ing HOT in civic education in Israel, adopting a dual approach: first, the paper provides a historical analysis of relevant policies and political transformations, showing what happens to a policy decision to foster HOT over the years. The analysis shows that the way from a policy paper to what actually had taken place in classrooms is long and bumpy. The policy did cause several practical changes, but for more than 10 years, impacts were slim, some- times causing unexpected (and undesirable) consequences. Then, the paper zooms-in on one specific period in which more elaborate implementation efforts took place. Significant hallmarks of the process were an emphasis on developing instructional leadership, detailed pedagogical planning, a blend of tight “top down” processes with “bottom up” processes characterized by growing freedom and autonomy, and modelling the culture of thinking.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

. Introduction

.1. Civics education and learning to think

Educational policy documents from around the globe currently highlight the goal of teaching higher order thinking (HOT) ven more prominently than in earlier times. This trend is reflected in numerous curricular and standards documents (Zohar, 013). Yet, most classrooms worldwide are still predominately characterized by a pedagogy of knowledge transmission that ocuses on lower-order cognitive levels. Numerous studies show that despite decades of efforts to implement HOT, it is still far rom being a predominant way of teaching and learning. It seems that the combination of the challenges involved in scaling p educational innovations in general with the challenges involved with teaching thinking in particular, is immense. Several

esearchers therefore note that scaling up the “thinking curriculum” is a huge challenge that is still awaiting educational ystems all over the world (e.g., Osborne, 2013; Fullan & Watson, 2011; Resnick, 2010; Zohar, 2013). Accordingly, despite bundance of research about small-scale efforts to teach thinking, there is still a gap in the research literature about how to

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (A. Zohar).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.003 871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

86 A. Zohar, A. Cohen / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 85–96

scale up these efforts across many schools and whole educational systems. This article aims to address this gap by analyzing a specific case of large scale implementation of HOT in civic education.

Education for citizenship and democracy is increasingly viewed all over the world as an important and central role of education, consisting of three components: knowledge and understanding, civics dispositions and attitudes and intellectual skills (Crick, 1998). Fostering students’ intellectual abilities is viewed by many as a crucial factor in preparing future citizens for sound participation in a democracy (Goodlad, 1984; Cogan, 1999; Westheimer, 2008; Paul, 1992; Paul & Elder, 2000; Scheffler, 1973; Siegel, 1988; Gutman, 1987; Branson & Quigley, 1998). For instance, the British final report of the advisory group on citizenship (“The Crick Report”) stated that ‘Open and informed debate is vital for a healthy democracy. . . . Civics education should thus develop skills of reflection, enquiry and debate. It should help young people learn to argue soundly and effectively, think for themselves, solve problems and make decisions effectively’ (Crick, 1998). Although the terms used by various educators when addressing this issue vary widely, applying terms such as critical thinking skills, argumentation, deliberation, decision-making, problem-solving and more, by and large these terms fall within the range of what is meant by the term higher order thinking (HOT, Zohar, 2013). One of the hallmarks of education for thinking is active learners. In this context active learners mean students who are active in their minds, engaging with tasks that require them to perform vigorous intellectual activities. A second meaning of active learners applies to the idea of political activism characterizing the goals of civic education.

The literature however, also points to a probable gap that is being created in many countries between the goals declared in policy documents and the actual situations in many schools. While the intent is to build a more intellectually active and demanding curriculum, the long lists of prescribed content that crowd the curriculum often prevents teachers from engaging students in active thinking. There is in effect an absence of empirical research on the extent to which civics intellectual skills are actually being taught in schools all over the world. There is also no systematic identification of how to overcome the barriers standing in the way of implementation of effective approaches for teaching such intellectual skills (MacKinnon, 2008). The fragmented evidence that does exist indicates that in many countries transmission of facts is more prevalent in civic education than the cultivation of intellectual skills (e.g., Paul & Elder, 2000; Westheimer, 2008; Yang & Chung, 2009; IES, 2007; Davies & Issitt, 2005). For instance, the results from the IEA 1999 Civics Education study conducted across 28 countries showed a gap between the stated curricula in many countries in which long lists of factual knowledge are to be conveyed but only an hour or two a week of classroom study is allotted to them. This study also showed that the required factual knowledge is often not related to concepts that are meaningful to students (Torney-Purta, Schwille, & Amadeo, 1999).

An analysis of the US results from this international study show that the U.S. international standing was stronger in civics skills than in civics content, with the performance of U.S. students on the civics skills subscale higher than that of students in every other country (National Center for educational statistics, 2001). However, the NAEP 2006 study conducted in the US showed different outcomes. In this study a larger percentage of students demonstrated basic-level knowledge of civics than knowledge that requires higher order thinking (i.e., answering civics questions requiring analysis, evaluation or taking and defending a position) (IES, 2007). The disparity between the two tests can be explained by the fact that the IEA Civics Skills items are rather limited in their intellectual demands while the demands posed by NAEP are more complex. Taken together these findings show that even the US students who did well on the IEA Civics Skills items compared to students from other countries, do not do well in civics test items requiring demanding intellectual abilities.

More recently, the 2009 International Civics and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) set out to investigate civics knowl- edge, attitudes, and engagement among lower secondary school students in 38 countries, as well as their teachers’ and school principals’ beliefs (Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010). The findings show that most of the teachers and school principals regarded the development of knowledge and skills as the most important aim of civics and citizenship education. This component of knowledge and skills included, among other things, the promotion of students’ critical and independent thinking. The students’ ICCS assessment of civics knowledge showed that on average, across participating coun- tries, only 28% of students were at Proficiency Level 3, characterized by the application of knowledge and understanding to evaluate or justify policies, practices, and behaviors based on students’ understanding of civics and citizenship (Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010). In sum, although we do not yet have an accurate picture of how much teaching for thinking actually does take place in civics classes, the data indicate that this issue still requires additional attention from practitioners and researchers.

1.2. Research goals, questions and context

The goal of this paper is to address the issue of wide scale implementation of teaching HOT in high school civics by looking at a specific case of implementing HOT on a national scale in civic education in Israel. The paper centers on civic studies, i.e., on the part of civic education taught as a formal school subject. The goal is to analyze the implementation process, adopting a dual approach: first, a historical analysis of relevant policy making and political transformations will be provided. Then, the paper will zoom-in on one specific period in which elaborate implementation efforts took place, with the goal of analyzing the pedagogical processes involved in scaling up HOT in civic studies. The leading question of this paper is:

what can we learn from the specific case of wide scale implementation of HOT in civic education in Israel about large scale implementation of teaching thinking? In order to understand the significance of the processes described in this article some background information about the relevant educational context is required. The Israeli educational system is centralized. The curriculum prescribed by the Ministry of Education covers a large percentage of what is in fact taught in most schools.

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t the end of high school students take matriculation exams in seven mandatory core subjects: language (Hebrew/Arabic), nglish (as a second language), mathematics, history, bible, literature and civics.

The structure of the pedagogical organization in the MOE is graphically presented in Fig. 1. For each subject there is National Subject’s Superintendent (NSS) who is responsible for policy-making and for the practical sides of teaching in his particular subject, including curriculum development, teachers’ professional development and student assessment. SSs report to the Director of Pedagogy and work with a team of instructors who are part-time teachers. Instructors are onsidered “the long arm of the NSS” because they are the means by which the policy formulated by the NSS can actually ake its way to individual teachers through school visits and frequent meetings with small groups of teachers to discuss

nstructional issues (Fig. 1). The methodology used for this paper is a reflective analysis of processes that took place across the school system. A large

cale, system-wide implementation process of introducing changes to learning, teaching and assessment took place in civic tudies (see detailed description in subsequent sections). The two authors of this paper collaborated in leading the change rocess: Zohar as Director of Pedagogy in the Ministry of Education and Cohen as the civic NSS. Unfortunately the process as not accompanied by formal assessment. Yet, it seems shameful to let such a wide scale, innovative process go by without

eflecting on it to gain insights that might be helpful for future similar endeavors. Our clear advantage as authors of this paper are based on our deep knowledge of the topic under investigation and on

ur ability to provide first hand testimony about the pedagogical and organizational processes we are addressing. Our deep nvolvement indicates that our interpretation of the events we are describing is clearly subjective. It is therefore important o emphasize that this paper is not an attempt to evaluate the process. The goal is to carry out a reasoned reflection, i.e., eflection that creates a dialogue with the literature in the field, in order to document, analyze and explain the complex rocesses that took place in the field. We argue that this analysis, and especially the insights we had gained through an intense iscourse with the literature we had read, can be valuable to educational researchers, to policy makers and to practitioners.

. Historical analysis

.1. Civic education in Israel between 1995 and 2010 from the perspective of teaching thinking

An overview of the main historical periods in civic education between 1995 and 2010 is presented in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2. Main historical periods in civics education.

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2.1.1. The Kremnitzer report and instruction of HOT (1995–1996) Until 1995 the civics curriculum in Israel was mostly fact-based (Ichilov, 2013). In 1995, an important policy–making

event took place in the context of civics education. The Minister of Education appointed a public committee (“The Kremnitzer Committee” − nicknamed after the name of the committee’s chair) to suggest a new policy for citizenship education. In those years the Ministry of Education was characterized by liberal views that were expressed by its pedagogical policy on many issues. The murder of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995 had put civic education at the center of public discourse because of a common feeling that Israeli society needed to enhance education for democracy and tolerance. The Kremnitzer Committee wrote a detailed report consisting of multiple recommendations in several areas (Israel Ministry of Education, 1996). The report defined the goals of citizenship education as multi-dimensional, emphasizing the same three dimensions mentioned earlier, i.e., not only knowledge but also attitudes and values, as well as skills, including an emphasis on education for active and responsible citizenship: “acquisition of knowledge, understanding, making judgments, and decision on social and political issues, internalization of the values of the state, the formation of a commitment to a democratic regime and willingness to protect it, the capability and desire to be an active, involved responsible citizen” (Israel Ministry of Education, 1996, Section 4, p. 12).

A note about the relationship between facts, values and critical thinking in civic education is in place here. The purposes of civic education are complex, and particularly prone to be influenced by political ideology (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). This general assertion is particularly true for the Israeli school system that is characterized by diverse ideological groups and sectors. In addition to universal debates about the nature of education for democracy (such as whether the emphasis should be on educating a Personally Responsible Citizen, a Participatory Citizen, or a Justice Oriented Citizen, see Westheimer and Kahne, 2004 for more detail), there is a stormy debate in the Israeli society about the extent to which civic education should reflect universal versus national- particular values. This debate becomes especially turbulent because the school system consists of several ideological streams, each with its own notion of citizenship and democracy: secular Jewish, orthodox Jewish, ultra-orthodox Jewish and Arabic. The Israeli civic curriculum is therefore often at the center of hot public debates characterized by severe value conflicts. A review of the content of these debates and the ways they have been affecting the civic curriculum over the years have been reported elsewhere (e.g., Avnon, 2013). More recently, while the present paper is being written, another wave of hot public debate about these issues is taking place. A description and analysis of these debates are well beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the focus upon the critical component of civic education (Avnon, 2013) that is highlighted in this paper through the notion of higher order thinking, is embedded within rich and quite stormy debates concerning what needs to be taught in terms of values and facts in the civic curriculum. These debates and the politics that surrounds them have strongly affected civic education over the years.

Despite these debates, the Kremnitzer report attempted to capture a consensus that was agreed upon by most sectors for the duration of the period reported in this article. The report’s practical recommendations concerning the formal high school civic curriculum included several elements: curricular changes in terms of concepts, facts and ideas; more hours added to the teaching of civics, adding weight to civics in the matriculation exam (increasing its weight from a “one unit subject” to a subject that is worth “two units”); a requirement to engage students in an active citizenship project whose final grade will be calculated as one third of the final grade; and a requirement that instruction will be organized around a list of thinking goals, such as the following:

• “The ability to analyze social or political issues. . .. This involves encouraging rational and moral thinking . . .” • “Ability to analyze an issue reflecting the tension between the various human rights or between a human right and a public

interest. . .” • “Ability to adopt a position on an issue in a controlled, reasoned, responsible manner. . .” • “Ability to render well-based, reasoned criticism.” • “Ability to debate issues in a civilized manner.”

(Israel Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 20)

2.2. The bumpy road from policy and practice in the area of implementing HOT in face of political shifts (1996–2005)

Subsequent sections of this paper center on the two latter recommendations of the Kremnitzer report: to engage students in an active citizenship project and to organize instruction around a list of thinking goals. As shown earlier, policy documents world −wide state the need to foster students’ intellectual skills as part of preparing them for participation in a democratic society. However, the road from the policy advocating the implementation of HOT to the daily interactions between students and teachers was extremely bumpy in this context. In addition to common difficulties that always exist while attempting to bridge the gap between policy and practice, two specific factors were at play here. One concerns the inherent difficulties pertaining to any transition from a pedagogy centering on knowledge transmission to a pedagogy centering on fostering students’ thinking and deep understanding. The second is that, as explained earlier, policy in civic education may be even more susceptible to political transformations than in other subjects (Fischer, 2014).

Immediately after its publication in 1996, the Ministry of Education adopted the Kremnitzer report. It was decided to increase the number of hours for studying civics, to increase the weight of the matriculation exam, to write a new curriculum and a new textbook, to do a pilot of the active citizenship inquiry project, and to increase the frequency of HOT questions in the matriculation exam. However, as explained in what follows, these decisions were only partially implemented.

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The implementation of some of these decisions took a long time. For example, although drafts of the new curriculum had een published earlier, the updated civic curriculum was finally completed and published only in 2002 (Israel Ministry of ducation, 2002). Following the report’s recommendations, the new curriculum indeed elaborated issues pertaining to the eaching of thinking strategies. For example, according to the curriculum document, “students should be able to:

“· · ·Apply the principles and concepts they had learned for an examination and an evaluation of the political and social reality. · · ·Understand and analyze graphs tables etc., present findings and draw conclusions from data. · · ·Process information, categorize, compare, analyze and find connections. · · ·Distinguish between facts and hypotheses and between facts and positions. · · ·Formulate justified positions based on information. · · ·Formulate supported and justified criticism.”

(Israel Ministry of Education, 2002, pages 10–11)

The new curriculum and the new textbook were written under the assumption that the increase in number of hours nd in the weight of the matriculation exam are guaranteed. The new textbook (based on drafts of the new curriculum) as published in 2000. In order to adapt it to the ideas of the new curriculum it consisted of a large foundation of facts,

ut also of a variety of thinking questions, mainly questions requiring students to analyze primary sources in a critical way, pplication questions (applying civics concept to current events) and questions that require students to make comparisons. he curriculum and textbook (designed for the scope of a “two unit subject” taught over two years) were designed in a piral way, i.e., in order to improve students’ deep understanding, complex concepts were re-visited several times in the ourse of learning. During this period the matriculation exam was indeed changed to include more HOT questions requiring omparisons, analysis of current events and texts taken from daily newspapers.

Political changes are abundant in Israel and took place several times between 1996 and 2006. One of them however was specially crucial for the implementation process described here. In 2001 a new minister of education made new policies nd announced new priorities that shifted away from civic education and from education for HOT. Consequently, between 001 and 2006, pedagogy across the curriculum (not specifically civics) explicitly embraced a “back to basics” approach. The egime in which the new curriculum was about to be implemented was therefore quite different from the one in which the eport was initially written. This obviously affected the implementation of the report’s recommendations. Although they ere never officially rejected, their implementation was partial.

The new book had been in use since 2000, and new contents, concepts and ideas were indeed taught in schools. The atriculation exam was indeed changed to include more questions requiring HOT. However, the shifting policies of the OE blocked the large budget required for doubling the number of hours for civic studies and it remained a “one unit”

ubject taught over one year only. Also, pedagogical support for the implementation of the new curriculum and for preparing eachers for the changes in the matriculation exam was limited.

.2.1. Pedagogical difficulties These circumstances created major pedagogical difficulties in the schools. One crucial issue was a very “crowded” cur-

iculum. Because the recommended addition of hours was never realized, there was a need to adapt the new curriculum to he smaller number of hours. Consequently, the number of chapters of the new curriculum that schools were required to each was reduced by approximately 50%. However, there was still insufficient time for teaching for deep understanding of

any of the concepts in the new curriculum which were abstract, complex and hard to understand. As mentioned earlier, he original curriculum was (wisely) constructed in a spiral way: many concepts were supposed to be revisited several times. owever, in effect, because only half of the intended hours were allocated, the reduction of the number of chapters broke own the sophisticated spiral structure of the intended curriculum. Consequently, it was difficult for students to digest the omplex concepts required for the exam. In addition, the budget for professional development was cut down and most of the limited) resources that were allocated to professional development were used for developing teachers’ content knowledge. he resources addressing the curriculum’s HOT goals were scarce, and even those usually did not address ways for teaching OT in an explicit and systematic way. The pressure on teachers to cover a crowded curriculum while preparing students for

he matriculation exam, made them feel that they could not afford the time to engage students in deep thinking. Together ith teachers’ lack of proficiency in teaching thinking, this state of affairs meant that only a few of the thinking goals actually

eached the classroom. Yet, it should be noted that during this period, an active citizenship “performance assessment inquiry ask” (PAIT) was developed and piloted in 16 schools.

Despite this situation, as mentioned earlier, thinking objectives did make their way into the matriculation exam. The fact hat the exam required HOT that was not addressed properly in the classrooms, together with the large amount of required ontent and complex concepts that students did not have enough time to digest, made the exam extremely difficult. As

result, for several years the civic matriculation exam had the lowest mean score and highest rate of failure among all andatory matriculation exams. Students began to think of civics as a “difficult” and frightening subject. This unintended

onsequence is clearly not a recommended formula for increasing students’ motivation to engage with this subject nor for ivics to become a popular topic.

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In sum, a large gap existed between the intended and enacted curriculum, and little instruction of thinking actually took place in classrooms. Civics was perceived as an extremely “difficult” subject which in turn produced low students’ motivation. This state of affairs demonstrates significant gaps between the educational policy that addressed HOT in an explicit way and the actual educational practice that reached the classrooms.

2.2.2. New policies and focused implementation of HOT in civics (2006–2009) Then, in 2006, new elections once again brought about a new government and a new Minister of Education. Consequently,

two new relevant policy decisions were made: the first pertained to strengthening civic studies and the second to teaching thinking across the curriculum. The new Labor Party Minister of Education made a decision to strengthen the school discipline of civics. So the recommendation made ten years earlier, to increase the number of hours for high school civics was finally adopted and financed, and a large budget for civics teachers’ professional development was secured (see below).

The second policy decision consisted of adopting the “Pedagogical Horizon- Teaching for Thinking” across the curricu- lum. Implementation of pedagogies geared towards developing students’ HOT took place in twenty subjects (Zohar, 2008; Gallagher, Hipkins, & Zohar, 2012). In all these subject, HOT strategies were incorporated into curriculum and learning materials, professional development programs and assessment. In civics this process enjoyed an especially strong momen- tum because it joined forces with the decision to strengthen the subject. The implementation of the “Pedagogical Horizon” (PH) could therefore be executed in civics in a particularly comprehensive way due to the extra funding and large scale professional development processes that followed the minister’s decision.

2.2.3. Specific pedagogical activities that took place as part of a large scale implementation process In order to implement the PH in civics learning and instruction, that is, to enhance the frequency and quality of thinking

activities, several specific pedagogical actions took place between 2007 and 2009 (Office of Pedagogic Affairs, 2009).

1. Reducing the scope of the curriculum: In order for teachers to be able to devote time for extensive thinking activities in the classroom, there was a need to reduce the substantive scope of the curriculum. Although the number of hours was multiplied the extent of the original curriculum was reduced by 20%.

2. Developing a leadership team that consisted of the civics NSS and six senior instructors. That team had led PD for twenty two additional instructors, who had in turn led the professional development of all civics teachers in the country and took leading roles in developing new learning materials and assessments.

3. Teachers’ professional development: Most high school civics teachers (N = 2200) participated in PD designed to help teachers address HOT in their classrooms.

4. Constructing a website: An elaborate website was developed. All the resources developed for the professional development courses (the course’s curriculum, lesson plans and Ppts) were loaded onto the website, along with many additional instructional resources. The website was used for supporting instructors, teachers and students.

5. Designing model learning activities: The leading team assisted by additional experts developed a set of learning activities and lesson plans that modeled how to integrate specific thinking strategies with specific topics in the civic curriculum, according to the infusion approach (Zohar, 2004, 2013). Working as a team, they collaboratively negotiated the form and content of HOT materials for civic studies. The first goal of these materials was to serve as learning materials for the instructors’ and teachers’ courses. Further goals were to help teachers implement these lessons in their classrooms, and, learn how to develop similar learning activities and lesson plans for additional topics. The activities surrounding the development of these materials had created a sense of ownership of all those involved as well as the development of the “language of thinking” (Tishman et al., 1995).

6. Changes in the written matriculation exams: The leading team analyzed matriculation exams of previous years to deter- mine the cognitive levels of its questions. Following the findings from that analysis, gradual changes were made in the formulation of questions, in the cognitive level of the questions, and in the rubrics designed for scoring students’ replies.

7. Implementing a Performance Assessment Inquiry Task (PAIT): One of the most significant changes, however, was the implementation of the PAIT—an inquiry project addressing a practical civic problem that students carry out in small groups. The PAIT is a newer version of the active citizenship project recommended by the Kremnitzer committee. Although it had been piloted in 16 schools for several years, scaling it up to all high schools across the country was a major endeavor.

A detailed description of the implementation of all these activities is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, in order to get an idea of the main principles of the implementation process, three activities will be described in what follows in more detail: the development of a leadership team, teachers’ PD, and the implementation of the PAIT.

3. The development of pedagogical leadership

3.1. The NSS’s workshop

A significant step in implementing HOT in civics was the development of pedagogical leadership by creating widening platforms for civics leaders’ PD. The first platform consisted of the participation of the civics NSS in a long-term PD workshop designed for NSSs from many subjects. The idea to invest in long-term PD that centers on pedagogy for a group of such senior

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rofessionals was new to the system and quite revolutionary. The rational was to create a group of leaders among those who ave already been working in key positions in the MOE, who would become knowledgeable about teaching and learning of OT and would also be motivated to devote time and energy to take on leadership roles during the implementation process. he workshop consisted of 150 academic hours, spread over three consecutive years. The number of participants in each ear was approximately 25. Seven participants held a PhD degree and all others held a master’s degree.

Participants took an active part in shaping the course’s curriculum: they brought up topics they wished to learn, shared heir own work experiences and led many of the sessions. This was done in order to accommodate the need of the participants o create a community of learners that have the time and the opportunity to reflect on their own practice and share the nsights they had gained from it. Approximately 55% of the course’s hours were led by academic experts and 45% of the hours

ere led by the participants who presented cases taken from their work, bringing dilemmas from the field to share with their olleagues. The intense discourse that followed had gradually fostered the “language of thinking”, i.e., a vocabulary describing nd calling for thinking processes (Tishman, Perkins, & Jay, 1995). This had gradually created a shared new language and eaning among participants. The workshop addressed the following main topics: what are HOT strategies?; the general versus the infusion approaches

o instruction of HOT; thinking and knowledge construction; teaching for understanding; metacognition; practical ways for pplying metacognition in the classroom; teaching for transfer; learning about a variety of programs for teaching HOT; ostering specific thinking strategies (such as argumentation; posing questions; making comparisons); instruction of HOT to tudents with low academic achievements; educational technology and teaching HOT; inquiry learning; assessment of HOT; igh stakes testing and teaching HOT; teaching thinking across the curriculum; principles of designing in-service PD for OT; and finally- a peer workshop in which NSSs presented models that they designed and implemented in their respective

chool subjects as a means for receiving feedback and for mutual brainstorming (Office of Pedagogical Affairs, Israel Ministry f Education (MOE), 2009).

.2. Blend of tightness and looseness

One of the major characteristics of the process was a unique blend of tightness and looseness. Fullan (2007) addresses his issue as he discusses motivation for change (p. 43):

“All change solutions. . . face the too-tight/too loose dilemma. If a situation is loosely formulated. . . the natural reaction is to tighten things. Command −and control strategies do get results in these circumstances, but only for a short time and only for a degree. If we then say that we need to give people more leeway- give them resources and trust them to do the right thing- the press for change is lost. In general terms, the solution to motivating people is to establish the right blend of tightness and looseness. . . to build both into the interactive culture of the organization”.

In the case of the NSS workshop, the overall goal of the PH was presented in a rather tight and non- compromising way: ransforming instruction in order to engage less in rote learning and more in tasks requiring thinking and deep understanding. nother aspect of “tightness” and control was that in order to keep to the stated goal, plans for implementation and requests

or funding submitted by the participants were carefully screened. Only plans that aligned well with the overall goal of eaching HOT were funded. Participants received, however, much freedom in three main areas: (a) participation in the orkshop was voluntary; b) they participated in setting the overall goals of later stages of the workshop and in designing

pecific sessions; and, (c) in effect, the specific goals for each school subject were only loosely defined. Consequently, NSSs ere free to analyze the initial state of teaching thinking in their subject, to choose among diverse possibilities those thinking

oals that they believed to be relevant and suitable to the overall needs of their subject, and to design suitable specific mplementation plans (see below). The workshop thus presented a theoretical framework, a general practical orientation nd practical skills in a rather tight way, but the specific practical orientation and detailed plans were left to the discretion f each participant. This contributed to the participants’ overall motivation and in particular to their sense of ownership, as ill be demonstrated in more detail in the following sections focusing on civics.

Fullan (2007) and Hargreaves and Fink (2006) argue that most externally imposed reforms never get implemented roperly because their designs are too inflexible to accommodate to the specific and varying needs of specific educational ircumstances. Another benefit of NSS’s freedom to plan their own idiosyncratic implementation plan was the participants’ bility to tailor the change process to the multiple, specific contexts characterizing each school subject. According to Har- reaves and Fink, participants’ freedom to adapt the change process to their specific needs potentially contributed to the ongevity and sustainability of the educational change under consideration.

.3. The medium is the message- modeling the culture of thinking

Another characteristic of the workshop was that it modelled the culture of thinking. In a “thinking classroom” the teacher’s

ole changes from transmitting information to initiating, facilitating and guiding students’ thinking processes. Rather than eing an information source, the teacher becomes an active participant in her students’ quest for knowledge and under- tanding. In order for students to feel comfortable to express their views and to experiment with tentative ideas, the class tmosphere must feel “safe”. These characteristics of the culture of thinking were modelled during the workshop. This

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workshop culture served as the model for many additional workshops that NSSs later led for their senior staff and teachers (including the civics workshop).

3.4. Capacity building across multiple levels to increased fidelity

The risk in wide scale pedagogical change processes is what Spillane calls “the telephone game”, namely, that until the message travels through the various levels to reach the classroom, it becomes so diffused and distorted that it is no longer useful. The difficulty, then, is how to transport the message of an innovation in learning and instruction through the system with high fidelity. This can be done by leaders who develop other leaders (“the long lever of leadership”, Fullan, 2005, p. 27): i.e., careful attention needs to be paid to developing the leadership of others in the organization. Rather than happening automatically, this process needs careful planning.

Because the Israeli school system is rather centralistic with respect to curricula, policy changes made by NSSs actually reach most schools in some form or other. Yet, in order not to fall into the trap of schools adopting external facets of the change process while abandoning its deep essence, it was precisely the illusion of a quick and “easy fix” transmitted in a top down authoritarian manner that the PH tried to avoid by the careful development of pedagogical leadership. From an organizational point of view, the NSS workshop was not an end in itself but a link in a carefully planned implementation process focused on PD of educators on various levels. This allowed a transmission of the messages involved in the PH in an accurate way across the system, to increasingly widening circles (Spillane, 2004; Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Fullan, 2005, 2007). The NSS workshop served as the basis for an “implementation fan” by preparing a group of informed and motivated key leaders (tier 1) of learning and instruction in diverse school subjects. In addition, four other professional development courses (of 56 h) for more junior leaders took place in order to create a pool of approximately 100 potential instructors in diverse school subjects (tier 2). In the next implementation phase, NSSs and the instructors who participated in the 2nd tier workshop (with additional help from external experts), formed a leadership team. This team designed the specific implementation plan for each school subject, including the development of content-specific learning materials and model thinking lessons. Another role of each leadership team was to develop PD for additional instructors and leading teachers who would eventually be able to work with teachers (tier 3). Finally, all those who had participated in the PD of tiers 1, 2 and 3 were responsible for the PD of a large number of teachers (tier 4). Various elements from the NSS workshop (activities, guest lectures, power-point presentations, video clips, and additional learning materials) were passed on to tiers 2–4. In this sense the “spirit” of the NSSs’ workshop as well as many of its specific activities served as a model that was replicated across the system, thereby contributing to preserving the fidelity of the PH message throughout the system. This description fits all school subjects, one of which is civics. A more detailed description of the widening platforms for PD of civics leaders is described in the following section.

3.5. Capacity building for civics pedagogical leaders on all levels

The civics NSS had participated in the intensive NSS’s PD workshop for three years (tier 1). In addition, six leading instructors had participated in a one year long professional development course that was designed for leading instructors from several school subjects (tier 2). The NSS and the additional six leaders then formed a leading team that engaged in developing new learning materials and assessments that combined the principles of teaching HOT with the specific contents of the civics curriculum. The civics leading team (with some assistance from external experts) also led a PD workshop for additional twenty-two civics instructors (tier 3). Units from the PD workshops of tiers 1 and 2, as well as the subject- specific civics learning materials developed by the civics leading team were applied in the tier 3 PD, thereby “preserving the coherence of the message” across leadership levels.

Following the PD that took place in tiers 1–3, these 29 civics leaders (the NSS, 6 leading instructors and 22 additional instructors) became qualified to work on issues related to teaching HOT in civic studies. As noted earlier, instructors also teach part time. Their practical teaching experiences had contributed to their ability and motivation to adapt the teaching of thinking to diverse school environments in a flexible way. The leaders’ PD therefore harnessed pre-existing pedagogical expertise and administrative functions to create a pedagogical leadership infra-structure that would facilitate the scaling up of PD addressing HOT to all civics high school teachers in the country.

3.6. Civics teachers’ PD

As explained in the previous section, the 29 civics leaders formed the pedagogical infra-structure for PD of all high school teachers. In one year, a total of 1100 teachers participated in 34 PD courses of 28 academic hours (tier 4) that took place all over the country. In addition, an on-line course of 56 h was developed. The instructors also visited schools and supported teachers in their classrooms. In the following years the same leaders’ infrastructure was used for deepening the learning of the first cohort of 1100 teachers as well as to run courses for a new cohort of a similar number of teachers. Following this

process, four years after the beginning of the development of the leadership team, almost all civics teachers in the country had participated in one of the civics HOT PD courses.

Teachers were motivated to participate in these courses by several incentives: first, participation in PD grants teachers in Israel points which, eventually accumulate towards the qualification for pay raise. Second, the PD was part of a more holistic

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mplementation process involving public discussion about the value of teaching thinking for 21st- century school graduates. any teachers felt it was a valuable move and wanted to take part in this process. Third, part of the implementation process

onsisted of changes in the matriculation exam, including the introduction of the PAIT that consisted of 20% of the final ivics grade (see below). Teachers believed that they needed the PD course in order to prepare their students for the new ssessment (which was announced to become mandatory in three years).

In sum, numerous activities on both the structural-administrative and pedagogical levels took place as part of imple- enting the HOT curriculum in civics. In terms of PD, a 4 tier structure was developed. Rather than bringing in external

xperts to lead teachers’ PD, great care was taken to develop capacities of leaders who had already been in the system. In his sense, the implementation process benefited from pre-existing administrative and pedagogical resources and was able o involve a relatively stable group of leaders from within the system, thereby increasing the sustainability of the change rocess. Together with the fact that elements from the NSS workshops were reproduced in the PD workshops of tiers 2–4, his detailed plan of 4 tiers of PD contributed to transporting the message of the HOT innovation in learning and instruction hrough the various levels of the system with high fidelity. Careful attention to developing the leadership of three levels of eaders (i.e., the NSS, the 6 leading instructors and the 22 additional instructors) was a prominent component in this process Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Fullan, 2005, 2007). Rather than happening automatically, this process indeed needed careful nd detailed planning both in terms of the structural sides of the widening platforms for PD, and in terms of the elaborate edagogical body of knowledge addressed in all levels of the PD. Yet, the careful and detailed planning left plenty of room o the participators’ independent initiatives and creativity. Starting from the level of the NSS who led the implementation rocess, leaders on all levels, as well as teachers were free to shape thinking rich learning and instruction in civics as they aw fit. In this sense the implementation process was indeed a blend of tightness and freedom. Another expression of the rinciple blending of tightness and freedom will be analyzed in the following section describing the implementation of the AIT.

. Implementing the PAIT

.1. General description

One of the most significant changes in civic studies was the implementation during 2008–2012 of the “performance ssessment inquiry task” (PAIT)-an inquiry project addressing a practical problem that students carry out in small groups. he PAIT needs to address a civic problem that is anchored in real life (taken from either the student’s local community, or rom a wider sphere such as district, town or state) but also needs to be connected to some of the formal concepts anchored in he civic curriculum. Each group of students is required to define a concrete civic problem, to investigate it by using written ources and by collecting empirical data, to suggest several possible solution, and to perform a process of decision making o select the best solution. Examples of problems students had investigated in the PAIT are illegal employment conditions f part-time working teenagers, disabled people accessibility to public institutions, or equal gender representation in public ositions in the local administration. The final grade for this task constitutes 20% of the final civics matriculation score. The coring is carried out by teachers according to a rubric developed by the civics leadership team. Assessment is therefore chool-based, but to maintain quality control, a sample of 5% of the schools is also scored each year by representatives from he MOE.

The goals and characteristics of the PAIT transformed the nature of traditional civics learning and instruction in a fun- amental way. Rather than transmitting information and drilling students to the test, the teacher had become a guide who

s leading students’ inquiry processes. The PAIT requires a considerable amount of HOT and students were encouraged to ecome active and creative learners. Learning and instruction no longer consists of a linear, “one lesson for all”, but of dia-

ogical learning, in which each group of students constructs a unique body of knowledge. The traditional strong control of he MOE with respect to the content of learning and assessment had to give way to a large degree of teachers’ and students’ utonomy. In order to facilitate such a transformation on a national scale it was necessary to carry out detailed pedagogical lanning.

.2. Detailed planning

Many resources and much attention to detailed planning on both the pedagogical and structural level were devoted to enerate suitable PD workshops and school- based support for teachers. Deep and time-consuming discussions addressed he knowledge and skills teachers need in order to be able to guide students through the PAIT. Much time was also devoted o discussing issues concerning meaningful teachers’ learning. Detailed pedagogical planning was required for additional omponents of the change process such as crystalizing the guidelines for the PAIT learning process and for its assessment.

Although a pilot project for 16 schools had already been on its way for 5 years, there was still a huge gap between declaring he goals of the PAIT in policy documents, and clarifying the goals on a detailed level that would enable each teacher to know

hat and how she actually needs to do in her classroom. The process of pedagogical planning required months of intense and etailed efforts, addressing questions such as: What should be the characteristics of the PAIT? What would be considered

desirable end product? What are the criteria for a low level, medium level and high level product? What is the advisable cale of the project in terms of the literature review and the required empirical work? What should be the length of the

94 A. Zohar, A. Cohen / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 85–96

written paper? Which thinking strategies should be taught explicitly so that students would be able to apply them in their project? What should be the optimal number of students in each students’ group?

Some of the deepest pedagogical discussions focused around the most appropriate means to assess the PAIT. In particular, much attention was devoted to the structure of the rubrics − to its categories and to the relative weight of the various parts of the project. The adaptation of rubrics was especially challenging to all parties involved in this process due to its level of openness and flexibility which were new to the system. This discussion connected to the previous questions regarding the characteristic of the task and the criteria for its quality, as well as to the planning of the PD (because of the need to prepare teachers for using the rubrics). In addition, it should be noted that planning was an on-going process, because when the leading team had begun to receive feedback from the field, prior decisions were re-considered and plans were changed, sometimes considerably. For example, following the feedback from the field, the official mandatory rubrics has been updated three times in three years.

The discussions around these issues took place in several forums. The NSS with the six leading instructors led the process, but involved numerous additional participants: additional instructors, teachers, the MOE director of pedagogy, represen- tatives from the MOE divisions of curricula and of matriculation exams, representatives from the teachers’ union, and representatives from the National Center for Evaluation and Assessment. The NSS and the leading team who were involved in all the discussions devoted much of their time to these discussions.

In sum, the implementation of the PAIT on a national scale required precise and meticulous pedagogical planning of the details of various facets of the task.

4.3. “Letting go”

Despite the detailed planning, implementation of the PAIT involved a considerable degree of freedom and autonomy on all levels. Although the administrative culture of the educational system typically involves strict top down instructions that employees on all levels are used to obey, it became clear to all those involved, that in this case commends and obedience will not work. The goal of teaching for free thinking required a considerable degree of “letting go”. It turned out that “letting go” was not easy for many of those involved in the process.

As explained earlier, for the NSS and leading team autonomy meant that they were encouraged to design the civic change process as they saw fit, tailoring it in a creative way to the specific goals, needs, and contexts of their subject. “Letting go” on additional levels of the system was facilitated by a conscious decision of the NSS and the leading team to adopt a supportive rather than the traditional authoritative approach towards their subordinates in order to help them in the difficult transition they were expected to make.

Instructors, school principals and teachers were invited to participate in “thinking tanks” addressing various issues in the implementation of the PAIT, to express out loud the difficulties they had encountered, as well as the insights they had gained from their field experiences, or to send-in their comments in writing. Following dozens of such meetings that took place all over the country, guidelines were changed considerably. The general direction of all changes was increasing flexibility, allowing teachers growing pedagogical freedom and autonomy.

An examination of the regulations for the PAIT learning process and assessment rubrics provides several examples for this tendency. For instance, following the feedback received from the field, more flexibility was granted to teachers to be autonomous in deciding the number of students in each group, or the time and duration of the project. In the assessment rubrics the increased flexibility was expressed by simplifying the criteria thereby making the rubrics more user-friendly, and by issues such as granting teachers more autonomy to change the relative weight of various criteria, to give students bonuses according to teachers’ judgements, or to allow teachers to increase the differentiation among the final grade of students working in the same group.

Interestingly, many instructors, leading teachers and teachers were at first reluctant to use the autonomy they had received, either because they were not used to it or because they felt insecure in their ability to carry out the required change processes. This was evident when at the initial part of the implementation instructors, leading teachers and teachers expressed a wish for clearer and more detailed guidelines and tighter control in many areas. They had repeatedly turned to the leading team with clarification questions and requests for tighter control.

For instance, instructors expressed a wish for very detailed and binding instructions for assessment, expressing a fear that in the absence of such instructions teachers will not engage in “serious” assessment, thereby compromising the quality of learning. After a while, they became more relaxed and accepted the need to leave a wider space to teachers’ discretion.

Teachers’ need for clear and detailed guidelines were often expressed by a request to get clearer definitions for what is it exactly that they are expected to teach, how to do it, and how to assess it. When the leading team had published documents that aimed to help teachers by suggesting various ideas for instruction, teachers kept coming back to the leading team with questions about how to carry out the smallest details of these suggestions. Teachers did not feel confident to interpret the suggestions on their own, to adapt them to their own needs or to initiate new ideas. As time went by and they had gained experience with the PAIT, they became more relaxed, and generated more and more original interpretations and new ideas.

A good example for this concerns model lessons that were presented in the PD workshop. Although the model lessons were developed initially as exemplary suggestions rather than as a mandatory curriculum that teachers were requested to follow, it turned out that at first most teachers adapted them verbatim. Consequently, in the first two years, the topic of the PAIT in many classrooms all over the country was the conditions for teenage labor, because this was the topic of the model PAIT

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nit developed as an example for the PD workshops. However, after they had taught the PAIT once or twice, teachers had egun to innovate by developing their own independent tasks in a variety of topics, or even to encourage students to come p with topics that interest them. It seems that only when they had more experience and confidence, teachers were able to se the freedom and autonomy they had received to interpret the principles presented by the MOE and to adapt them to he context of individual schools in a creative way.

. Discussion and conclusions

The goal of this paper is to examine the process of large scale implementation of HOT in civic education. The first part of he paper provides a historical analysis and related issues, showing the fate of a policy decision to foster HOT across time. he second part of the chapter focuses on one period in which extensive activities to implement that decision took place. ogether, the two parts may give a broad and long-term perspective of what it takes to actually scale-up changes involved n instruction of HOT across a whole school system.

The historical analysis shows that the way from the Kremnitzer report policy declaration to what actually took place n classrooms across the system had been long and bumpy. The analysis presented here is a private case showing how olitical, ideological, cultural and bureaucratic factors interact in determining an educational policy’s short and long-term ustainability (Ball, 1994; Fullan, 2009; Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Levin, 2008). In the case of teaching thinking in civics, like in ther aspects of this curriculum, political ideologies may play a more prominent role than in other school subjects (Mathias

Sabar, 2014). The policy did cause several practical changes (e.g., a new curricula, a new textbook, a few changes in PD nd matriculation exam, a pilot of the PAIT), but for more than 10 years, impacts were slim, sometimes causing unexpected and undesirable) consequences such as in the case of making civics a difficult and frightening subject. In 2006, two separate olicy decisions (intensifying civic studies and the “Pedagogical Horizons- teaching for thinking”) supported each other to acilitate increased implementation of HOT in civic education. The decisions were supported by an increased budget for dditional hours for PD and for students’ learning. If any of these two decisions would not have taken place, it is reasonable o predict that the implementation of the Kremnitzer report’s recommendations would have continued to limp, as so often appens to policy decisions regarding instruction of HOT. The intense implementation of the report’s recommendations egarding instruction of HOT that had taken place 10 years after it was published had therefore taken place due to reasons hat are quite incidental to the report itself.

Nevertheless, the strong impact of political and ideological factors does not mean that these factors are determinis- ic and that hard work on the pedagogical level can or should be ignored. Although in 2006 the political conditions for mplementing HOT were favorable, the implementation process did not develop by itself. In addition to the planning of the tructural-strategic dimension of the change process that is always needed for the success of any educational endeavor, he implementation of HOT required rigorous and detailed planning and execution on the pedagogical dimension. Scaling p HOT across the whole school system required specific and elaborate knowledge of HOT, pedagogical knowledge in the ontext of teaching HOT (Zohar, 2004, 2008) and deep subject matter knowledge (of civics) that needed to be tailored into he implementation design in numerous points. Weaving that sophisticated knowledge into the design of the PD workshop as crucial for generating a focus on coherent teaching of thinking throughout the system.

A fundamental component of the implementation process revolved around the development of instructional leadership hrough intense PD on all levels. The analysis shows that starting from the NSS, through the leadership team, instructors, eading teachers and last but not least- teachers, the PD process provided a focused goal, a theoretical framework and ractical instructional tools that had initiated “top down” learning processes. Despite these “top down” processes, the nalysis also shows growing freedom and autonomy. A key feature of the implementations was that educators on all levels xpressed creativity and generated initiatives in “bottom up” processes. Increasing the democratic spirit of “teaching for hinking” throughout the organization was crucial. Deep learning combined with a message of autonomy generated intense edagogical discourse (that was rather new to the culture of the MOE) among educators on all levels. This provided an ngine for creating and sharing new teaching ideas. In addition, autonomy was necessary for the ability of civics educators o attend to the context-specific cultural and educational circumstances that were unique to each school and classroom, nd to adapt the change process to their highly idiosyncratic conditions. Without such adaptation the change process would ave collapsed. The blend of “tightness” and increased autonomy were also demonstrated in the analysis of the process of he PAIT implementation.

On the face of it, the tight “top down” initiative seems to contradict the encouragement of the more relaxed “bottom p” initiatives. But similar to Fullan (2007) and to Hargreaves and Fink (2006) our argument is that in the complex reality f implementing a system-wide pedagogical change, these two seemingly contradictory trends facilitated and supported ach other. In effect, we view the case of implementing HOT in civic studies as a specific example of the general principles ut forward by these researchers and argue that these principles are crucial for scaling up the thinking curriculum: the “top

own” processes are necessary to generate and maintain a coherent message while the “bottom up” processes are necessary o generate motivation, creativity, adaptation to individual circumstances and harmony with “the spirit” of teaching thinking. wo additional significant hallmarks of the process were an emphasis on developing pedagogical leadership, and detailed edagogical planning.

96 A. Zohar, A. Cohen / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 85–96

In sum, this paper shows the intricacy of factors that had combined to form a change in the state of teaching HOT in one school subject. Assessing the depth and sustainability of this change process are still waiting for future research. Yet, this account gives an idea of what it may take to induce a system-wide change in this direction across all school subjects.

References

Avnon, D. (Ed.). (2013). Civic education in Israel. In. Tel Aviv: Am Oved. Ball, S. J. (1994). Education reform: a critical and post-structural approach. Buckingham, UK: The Open University Press. Branson, M. S., & Quigley, C. N. (1998). The role of civic education. , retrieved June 2010. http://www.civiced.org/articles role.html Cogan, J. J. (1999). Multidimensional citizenship as educational policy for the millennium: putting research into practice. Momentum, 30, 73–82. Crick, B. (1998). Education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools. London: Qualification and Curriculum Authority. Davies, I., & Issitt, J. (2005). Reflections on citizenship education in Australia, Canada and England. Comparative Education, 41(4), 389–410. Fischer, S. (2014). The crises of liberal citizenship—religion and education in Israel. In A. B. Seligman (Ed.), Religious education and the challenge of pluralism

(pp. 14–119). New York: Oxford University Press. Fullan, M., & Watson, M. (2011). The slow road to higher order skills. Report to Stupski Foundation. [Retrieved April 2015].

http://gelponline.org/resources/slow-road-higher-order-skills Fullan, M. (2005). Leadership and sustainability. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin press. Fullan, M. (2007). The new meaning of educational change (4th ed.). NY and London: Teachers College Press. Fullan, M. (2009). Large-scale reform comes of age. Journal of Educatinal Change, 10, 101–113. Goodlad, J. (1984). A place called school’ Prospects for the future. New York: McGraw-Hill. Gutman, A. (1987). Democratic education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hargreaves, A., & Fink, D. (2006). Sustainable leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. IES (Institute of Education Sciences). (2007). The nation’s report card: civics 2006, U.S department of education, NCES 2007-476. , retrieved June 2010.

http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2006/2007476.pdf Ichilov, O. (2013). Nation-Building, collective identities, democracy and citizenship education in Israel. In O. Ichilov (Ed.), Citizenship and citizenship

education in a changing world (8207) (pp. 69–82). Routledge. Israel Ministry of Education. (1996). On being a citizen—civics education for all in Israel. Jerusalem, Israel: Ministry of Education. Israel Ministry of Education. (2002). The high school civics curriculum. Jerusalem, Israel: Division for Curricular Planning and Development. Levin, B. (2008). How to change 5000 schools: a practical and positive approach for leading change at every level. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press. MacKinnon, M. P. (2008). Talking politics, practicing citizenship. Education Canada, 48, 64–66. Mathias, Y., & Sabar, N. (2014). Curriculum planning from the national to the glocal: the israeli case. In W. F. Pinar (Ed.), International handbook of

curriculum research (pp. 253–268). New-York: Routledge. National Center for educational statistics. (2001). What democracy means to ninth graders: US results from the international IEA civic education study. pp.

2001–2096. US Department of Education, Office for Educational Research and Improvement, NCES. Office of Pedagogical Affairs, Israel Ministry of Education (MOE). (2009). Teaching thinking report (Pedagogical Horizon): 2006–2009. Jerusalem, Israel:

Israel Ministry of Education. Osborne, J. (2013). The 21st century challenge for science education: assessing scientific reasoning. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 10, 265–279. Paul, R., & Elder, L. (2000). . pp. 10–15. Critical thinking: the path to responsible citizenship (vol. 7) High School Magazine. Paul, R. (1992). Critical thinking. Santa Rosa, CA: The Foundation for Critical Thinking. Resnick, L. (2010). Nested learning systems for the thinking curriculum. Educational Researcher, 39, 183–197. Scheffler, I. (1973). Reason and teaching. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Schulz, W., Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Kerr, D., & Losito, B. (2010). ICCS 2009 international report: civic knowledge, attitudes, and engagement among lower

secondary school students in 38 countries. Amsterdam: the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). Siegel, H. (1988). Educating reason: rationality, critical thinking and education. New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc. Spillane, J. P. (2004). Standards deviation: how schools misunderstand education policy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tishman, S., Perkins, D., & Jay, E. (1995). The thinking classroom. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Torney-Purta, J., Schwille, J., & Amadeo, J. A. (1999). Mapping the distinctive and common features of civic education in twenty-four countries. In J.

Torney-Purta, J. Schwille, & J. A. Amadeo (Eds.), Civic education across countries: twenty-four national case studies from the IEA civic education project. Amsterdam: The International Association for the Assessment of Education Achievements (IEA).

Westheimer, J., & Kahne, J. (2004). What Kind of Citizen? The politics of educating for democracy. Retrieved February 2016. http://engagestudiothinking.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/threekindsofcitizenship excerpt.pdf

Westheimer, J. (2008). What kind of citizen?: Democratic dialogues in education. Education Canada, 48, 6–11. Yang, S. C., & Chung, T. Y. (2009). Experimental study of teaching critical thinking in civic education in Taiwanese junior high school. British Journal of

Educational Psychology, 79, 29–55. Zohar, A. (2004). Higher order thinking in science classrooms: students’ learning and teacher’ professional development. The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic

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Zohar, A. (2008). Teaching thinking on a national scale: Israel’s pedagogical horizons. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 3, 77–81. Zohar, A. (2013). Challenges in wide scale implementation efforts to foster higher order thinking (HOT) in science education across a whole school

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  • Large scale implementation of higher order thinking (HOT) in civic education: The interplay of policy, politics, pedagogic...
    • 1 Introduction
      • 1.1 Civics education and learning to think
      • 1.2 Research goals, questions and context
    • 2 Historical analysis
      • 2.1 Civic education in Israel between 1995 and 2010 from the perspective of teaching thinking
        • 2.1.1 The Kremnitzer report and instruction of HOT (1995–1996)
      • 2.2 The bumpy road from policy and practice in the area of implementing HOT in face of political shifts (1996–2005)
        • 2.2.1 Pedagogical difficulties
        • 2.2.2 New policies and focused implementation of HOT in civics (2006–2009)
        • 2.2.3 Specific pedagogical activities that took place as part of a large scale implementation process
    • 3 The development of pedagogical leadership
      • 3.1 The NSS’s workshop
      • 3.2 Blend of tightness and looseness
      • 3.3 The medium is the message- modeling the culture of thinking
      • 3.4 Capacity building across multiple levels to increased fidelity
      • 3.5 Capacity building for civics pedagogical leaders on all levels
      • 3.6 Civics teachers’ PD
    • 4 Implementing the PAIT
      • 4.1 General description
      • 4.2 Detailed planning
      • 4.3 “Letting go”
    • 5 Discussion and conclusions
    • References

Related Articles/Learning-to-relax-versus-learning-to-ideate--Relaxation-f_2016_Thinking-Skil.pdf

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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

earning to relax versus learning to ideate: elaxation-focused creativity training benefits introverts ore than extraverts

eter J. O’Connor a,∗, Elliroma Gardiner b, Chloe Watson c

School of Management, Queensland University of Technology, Queensland, Australia School of Applied Psychology, Griffith University, Queensland, Australia School of Psychology and Counselling, Queensland University of Technology, Queensland, Australia

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 20 August 2015 eceived in revised form 16 March 2016 ccepted 29 May 2016 vailable online 2 June 2016

eywords: ersonality reativity xtraversion reativity training elaxation training

a b s t r a c t

This study compared the short-term effectiveness of two creativity training programs (ideational skills vs relaxation), and assessed whether training effectiveness in each pro- gram was dependent on participant personality. Participants comprised 163 volunteers who were allocated to one of three experimental conditions (ideation training, relaxation training, and no training control). All participants completed several self-report question- naires, as well as tests of creative performance both before and after training. Consistent with previous research, results indicated that Extraversion and Openness were predictors of creative performance overall. More interestingly, however, results revealed a three-way interaction between Extraversion (introverts vs. extraverts), training type (ideation skills training vs. relaxation training), and time (pre- vs. post-training), suggesting that relax- ation training is particularly beneficial for introverts whereas ideation skills training is more effective for extraverts. Our results offer new evidence that the expected utility of creativ- ity training program-types may vary according the personality of trainees. On a practical note, our research has implications for organizations looking to tailor creativity-training programs in order to maximize the benefit of such programs on individual performance.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

. Introduction

Creative thinking remains an important determinant of success in a variety of domains, such as education, the workplace, nd leadership performance. In education, creative students have been shown to outperform less creative students in general, nd particularly on tasks requiring long-term and sustained attention (e.g., Chamorro-Premuzic, 2006). Similarly in the orkplace, employee creativity has been shown to enhance job satisfaction (Robinson & Beesley, 2010; Shalley, Gilson, & lum, 2000) and, more broadly, the likelihood of ongoing organizational success (Baer & Oldham, 2006), with many business

eaders emphasizing the importance of continuous change and reinvention to long-term success (Thomke, 2003; Thompson, 003). In terms of leadership performance, research has demonstrated that creative leaders tend to be more effective overall Gumusluoğlu & Ilsev, 2009; Shin & Zhou, 2003) and particularly effective at leading change (Matthew, 2009). It is no surprise, hen, that many individuals and organizations have sought to foster creative thinking, with organizations in particular having

∗ Corresponding author at: Queensland University of Technology, 2 George St, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, Queensland 4001, Australia. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] (P.J. O’Connor).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.008 871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

98 P.J. O’Connor et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 97–108

spent large sums of money on programs designed to enhance creative thinking in employees (Oldham, 2003; Scott, Leritz, & Mumford, 2004; Solomon, 1990).

The current study had two primary goals. Our first goal was to empirically assess whether two brief forms of creativity training, namely, ideation skills and relaxation training, would produce short-term improvements in creative performance. Our second goal was to investigate whether the efficacy of these two forms of creativity training was dependent on partici- pant personality traits (Extraversion, Openness). We focused on ideation training and relaxation training because both are empirically supported forms of training, appropriate for brief, instructor led programs. Additionally, these forms of training target certain cognitive processes that theoretically might be more effective for some individuals than others (as outlined in detail later). We specifically investigated Extraversion and Openness in terms of training efficacy, because both traits have been shown to predict creativity (Sung & Choi, 2009) as well as trainability in cognitive tasks (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Dean, Conte, & Blackenhorn, 2006). Our study is the first to individually compare these two forms of creativity training and to investigate the impact of personality on the effectiveness of these two programs.

2. Creativity and creativity training

Creativity is most commonly defined as a cognitive process involving the generation of an idea, action, or object that is both novel and useful (Amabile, 1996; Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Wiseman, Watt, Gilhooly, & Georgiou, 2011). Individuals who engage in creative behavior therefore tend to approach problems and tasks with an open and uninhibited mind, and ultimately generate a range of novel and sometimes unorthodox ideas that tend to result in positive outcomes.

Agogué and colleagues (Agogué, Poirel, Pineau, Houdé, & Cassotti, 2014, p. 33) argue that “creativity is not an innate quality”, and as such, requires developing cognitive skills in order to reason, problem-solve, and generate ideas. The concep- tualization of creativity as primarily a cognitive process lends credibility to the idea that creativity can be trained (see Runco, 2004). Such training can take the form of tailored programs (e.g., in the workplace), as well as other well-known programs, such as De Bono’s (2009) lateral thinking program, Buzan’s (1991) mind-mapping techniques, and Isaksen and Treffinger’s (2004) Creative Problem Solving Process (CPS). However, not all training programs are equivalent. A meta-analysis by Scott et al. (2004) evaluated the effectiveness of a range of different creativity training programs as well as their underlying com- ponents (i.e., theoretical approach, processes, techniques, design, use of media, and opportunity for practice). Overall, they concluded that creativity training does tend to enhance subsequent creative behavior, and that the most effective programs are those that include activities targeting the cognitive processes underlying creativity.

Clapham (1997) described an interesting study where the efficacy of a “full” creativity training program was compared with a single-component creativity training program. The aim was to determine whether the two training programs would be comparable in terms of creative improvement. The full creativity training program covered a number of techniques used in empirically-supported techniques, such as idea generation, relaxation, applied problem solving, and visualization (Birdi, Leach, & Magadley, 2012; Kabanoff & Bottger, 1991; Scott et al., 2004). In contrast, the more specific, but less comprehensive, single-component training program focused only on ideation skills (i.e., idea generation) training. Results showed that both types of training programs predicted improvements in creativity and that ideation was as effective as general creativity training in increasing participants’ creative behavior.

Other research supports the notion that specific training in ideation can improve creative behavior. For example, Baruah and Paulus (2008) found that participants trained in idea generation performed significantly better in a brainstorming task than participants in a control condition. Specifically, they found that exposing participants to a short (75 min) training program resulted in enhanced performance in terms of both quantity and quality of ideas. Consistent with previous research then, and considering that ideation is a key component to creativity (Basadur, Graen, & Green, 1982; Runco & Albert, 1990), we believe that well-constructed and delivered ideation training will generally result in enhanced creative performance in the short-term. We therefore hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1a. Participants trained in ideational skills will experience greater average improvements in creative perfor- mance than untrained participants.

A second form of creativity training we investigate in this study is known as “relaxation training”. In this paper, we utilize a broad definition of relaxation training, whereby we consider it to involve techniques designed to relax trainees (e.g. stretching techniques, breathing techniques) and reduce anxiety in trainees (e.g. freeing the mind from negative thoughts). Relaxation has many known benefits for improving health and well-being, and there is growing research suggesting that relaxation and related constructs (such as imagery, meditation, and hypnosis) can also have positive effects on creativity (e.g., Karwowski & Soszyński, 2008; Krampen, 1997). Indeed a recent meta-analysis on mindfulness and creativity (Lebuda, Zabelina & Karwowski, 2015) revealed a moderate relationship (r = 0.22) between creativity and mindfulness. Importantly the authors reported similar results for correlational and experimental studies, leading them to suggest that the relationship between mindfulness and creativity is likely to be causal (Lebuda et al., 2015).

Our conceptualization of creativity as a cognitive construct provides grounds for a theoretical perspective on why

relaxation training might improve creativity. Specifically relaxation training, which involves techniques such as controlled breathing, brief meditation, and stretching, is likely to produce a state of self-awareness and mindfulness, which research has shown enhances emotional and cognitive functioning (Carson & Langer, 2006; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Sedlmeier et al., 2012). Theoretically, it has been suggested that a state of mindfulness fosters sustained focused attention as well as

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ttention switching − the ability to switch focus between stimuli − which should enhance cognitive functioning (Chambers, o, & Allen, 2008). Additionally, the focus on reducing anxiety in relaxation training is likely to further benefit creative erformance. We suggest that replacing negative self-talk with positive self-talk is likely to enhance creative self-efficacy rainees, which is a known predictor of creativity (Gong, Huang, & Farh, 2009; Tierney & Farmer, 2002).

Recently, more focused research exploring the cognitive basis of creativity have integrated dual process models of cog- ition (see Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora, 2015). Briefly, Dual Process models of cognition differentiate between two types f cognitions, termed “type 1 processes” and “type 2 processes”. Type 1 processes refer to rapid, automatic cognitive pro- essing related to associative conditioning, and type 2 processes refer to conscious, structured thinking and evaluation (see vans, 2008; Frankish, 2010; Sowden et al., 2015). In the context of creative performance, type 1 processing occurs in the nitial, idea generation stage, whereas type 2 processes occur when ideas are evaluated, refined, and selected (Gabora, 2005; oward-Jones, 2002). According to a recent review (Sowden et al., 2015), optimal creative performance not only requires ffective type 1 and type 2 processing, but perhaps more importantly, the ability to shift between these modes of thinking i.e., temporarily suppress idea generation for evaluation processes and vice-versa) (see also Gabora, 2005; Nijstad, De Dreu, ietzschel, & Baas, 2010). It follows, therefore, that enhancing such “shifting” abilities in people will have positive effects on heir creativity.

There is a lack of consensus in the literature relating to how to enhance effectively shifting between the two processes; owever, some research suggests that mindfulness might play a role. In particular, Langer (1992) differentiates between indlessness (not thinking) and mindfulness (focused thinking), and has found that mindfulness enhances creative per-

ormance, possibly because being focused on the present moment allows individuals to rapidly utilize their instincts and valuate such instincts in light of new information (see Langer, Russell & Eisenkraft, 2008). Indeed, this explanation seems lausible, because effectively shifting between type 1 and type 2 processing has been related to attention (Bristol & Viskontas, 006; Vartanian, Martindale, & Matthews, 2009), and mindfulness has known benefits on attention (Chambers et al., 2008), nd as outlined previously, is known to directly predict creativity (Lebuda et al., 2015). Overall, then, because relaxation raining should enhance a state of mindfulness and enhance self-efficacy in participants, we believe relaxation focused raining will enhance creative performance in the short term:

ypothesis 1b. Participants trained in relaxation skills will experience greater average improvements in creative perfor- ance than untrained participants.

.1. Personality

When considering the effects of personality on creative performance, an appropriate starting point is the Big Five model f Personality (Goldberg, 1990) because this model represents the most empirically supported taxonomy of personality raits validated across a range of populations (see Gurven, von Rueden, Massenkoff, Kaplan, & Lero Vie, 2013). According o the Big Five model, variation in personality can be largely accounted for by variation in the five traits of Extraversion, euroticism, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. Research using the Big Five model to explore

he relationship between personality and creativity has consistently found that Extraversion and Openness positively predict reativity (e.g., Furnham, Monsen, & Ahmetoglu, 2009; Sung & Choi, 2009; Walker & Jackson, 2014). Furnham and Bachiar 2008), for example, found Extraversion and Openness to be important predictors of one popular measure of creativity divergent thinking), reporting that the two personality variables accounted for 47% of the variance in divergent thinking.

Extraversion reflects the degree to which individuals are sociable, assertive, and active (Eysenck, 1981). Recent theories ave linked Extraversion to heightened reward sensitivity (Smillie, 2013) and proactive behavior in seeking out potential ewards (Sung & Choi, 2009). Because creativity requires proactive behavior in initiating novel methods of solving problems Sung & Choi, 2009) as well as some level of stimulation-seeking and risk-taking (Batey & Furnham, 2006), it is unsurprising hat Extraversion has consistently been identified as a predictor of creativity. Empirically, Extraversion has been positively ssociated with verbal creativity (King, Walker & Broyles, 1996), self-rated creativity (Furnham, Batey, Anad, & Manfield, 008), divergent thinking, and artistic talent (Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008). Therefore, we expect Extraversion to be related to reativity in this study:

ypothesis 2a. Extraversion will be a positive predictor of creativity.

Openness is associated with inquisitiveness, nonconformity, imagination, tolerance, and independent thought (Goldberg, 992; McCrae & Costa, 1986). Individuals high in this trait are attracted towards new ideas and situations, which enable them o have novel experiences and perceptions (Goldberg, 1990). In contrast, individuals low in Openness tend to be reserved and autious, and find comfort in familiarity because of the reduced uncertainty (Choi, 2004; George & Zhou, 2001). Openness as been linked to artistic preference (Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004), divergent thinking (George & Zhou, 2001; uthrich & Bates, 2001), flexible problem solving (Watson & Hubbard, 1996), and self-assessed creative ability (Kaufman &

aer, 2002). Longitudinal research has also demonstrated positive associations between Openness and objective measures f creativity (Soldz & Vaillant, 1999). Therefore, we expect Openness to be related to creativity in this study:

ypothesis 2b. Openness will be a positive predictor of creativity.

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2.2. Personality and trainability

There is some research demonstrating that personality is related to training proficiency across a range of domains. In a seminal paper, Barrick and Mount (1991) found that both Openness and Extraversion were valid predictors of training proficiency across a sample of five occupational groups. However, results have been mixed regarding exactly which traits and situations foster individual differences in training proficiency. For instance, Dean and colleagues (2006) reported positive associations between Openness and Extraversion on performance in a simulation-based training exercise but not on pen and paper tests. Further, reviews by Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp and McCloy (1990) and Salgado (1997) identified links between training proficiency and Openness but not Extraversion. Others have found that Extraversion is associated with learning, but only in the context of potential reward (Robinson, Moeller, & Ode, 2010). In this study, we test whether the dimensions of Openness and Extraversion influence the efficacy of different types of creativity training.

Arguably, the most well-known and influential theory of Extraversion was proposed by Eysenck (1967, 1994). Eysenck suggested that introverts and extraverts operate at different levels of cortical arousal, with introverts generally experiencing higher levels of arousal than extraverts. According to this theory, arousal level is related to the pleasantness of the experience. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this means that for extraverts, a low level of arousal is associated with an unpleasant expe- rience, and for introverts, a high level of arousal is associated with an unpleasant experience. Therefore, where introverts seek environments that are quiet and generally non-arousing, extraverts seek out stimulating environments that increase their arousal. Although empirical support for Eysenck’s theory has been mixed (see for example, Anderson & Revelle, 1994; Revelle, 1995), it has nevertheless had substantial empirical success. Indeed, one of the strongest findings from biological personality research to date is that arousal moderates the relationship between Extraversion and stimuli-response (see Matthews & Gilliland, 1999).

A more contemporary theory of extraversion was proposed by Depue and colleagues (e.g., Depue & Collins, 1999; Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005). According to this theory, trait extraversion reflects individual differences in the brain’s process- ing of reward (i.e., the behavioral activation system or BAS; Gray, 1991) arising from functional variations in dopaminergic activity (Depue & Collins, 1999). Ultimately, the theory argues that extraverts are more sensitive to signals of reward, and experience greater positive affect upon attaining rewards than introverts. The theory has been influential in personality neuroscience (see Smillie, 2013) and has influenced current, integrative theories of personality (e.g., DeYoung, 2015). In contrast to Eysenck’s (1967, 1994) theory then, which focuses on arousal, Depue and Collins’ (1999) reward-processing theory of extraversion focuses on neurobiological systems related to underlying incentive motivation. Nevertheless, the two models are not completely inconsistent, given that cortical arousal tends to co-occur with sensory simulation (Stelmack, 1990).

Applying these theoretical perspectives to the current research, we hypothesize that introverts will respond better to relaxation-focused creativity training, whereas extraverts will respond better to ideation-based training. We argue that introverts will respond better to relaxation training because it should reduce arousal, which should enhance performance for introverts but not extraverts (Eysenck, 1967, 1994). Additionally, being in a state of mindfulness is likely to be particularly beneficial for introverts, because introverts have more difficulty with divided attention (Matthews, Deary & Whiteman, 2003), which likely affects their ability to shift between type 1 and type 2 processes. As noted above, mindfulness seems to enhance this shifting process. Related to this, it follows that introverts will have particular difficulty in shifting from type 1 (analytical) thinking to type 2 (associative) thinking, because introverts have a bias towards analytical thinking (Allinson & Hayes, 1996). Theoretically, individuals with biases towards analytical thinking will benefit from interventions enabling them to shift to associative thinking (Howard-Jones, 2002).

Similarly, we argue extraverts will respond better to ideation-based training because it is likely to increase arousal (it is more stimulating and cognitively demanding than relaxation training) which is the preferred state of extraverts (consistent with Eysenck, 1967, 1994). Additionally, the ideation-based training contains more novelty and is more outcome-focused than relaxation training, and extraverts are highly motivated by novelty and reward (Consistent with Depue & Collins, 1999). Therefore we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3a. Extraverts will be more responsive to ideation training, whereas introverts will be more responsive to relaxation training.

As noted previously, Openness has been shown to predict training proficiency across a variety of groups (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Theoretically this makes sense because, as Barrick and Mount (1991) pointed out, individuals high in Openness are curious thinkers who have a disposition to seek out new and unconventional experiences. Individuals high in openness seem to possess the ability to discriminate between creative ideas (Silvia et al., 2008). It seems likely, therefore, that those high in Openness will respond best to ideation-based creativity training, as open individuals should theoretically respond best to training focusing on expanding knowledge and developing new ways of thinking.

Those low in Openness, on the other hand, tend not to be particularly curious and tend to show little motivation to seek

out new and unconventional experiences. Indeed, thinking creatively, or thinking “out of the box”, would likely present an unusual and possibly anxiety-provoking situation for such individuals. Such individuals might simply benefit from reducing their anxiety and removing barriers preventing them from thinking creatively. For this reason, it is suggested that individuals low in Openness will respond better to relaxation-focused creativity training rather than ideation-based training:

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ypothesis 3b. Participants high in Openness will respond better to ideation training, whereas those low in Openness will espond better to relaxation training.

. Methods

.1. Participants

Participants comprised 111 female and 52 male volunteers recruited from a first-year participant pool at a large Australian niversity. The age of participants ranged from 17 to 50 (M = 22.5; SD = 6.01). Participation was voluntary and each participant as offered course credit in exchange for his/her time. The majority of the participants (76%) were employed, either on a

asual (79), part-time (25), or full-time (20) basis.

.2. Measures

.2.1. Creativity We collected two pre- and post-training measures of creative performance, namely adapted versions of the Welch Reor-

anization Test (Welch, 1946) and Guilford’s (1967) alternate uses divergent thinking test. Guilford’s alternate uses test easures creativity in terms of divergent thinking and Welch’s Reorganization Test measures creativity in terms of creative

roblem solving. Our use of such measures was likely cognitively demanding for participants because of the time-based indi- idual nature of the task. Such challenging conditions are ideal in tests of creative performance where cognitive efficiency s important (see Hong, Hwang, Chen, Chen, & Liu, 2012; Hong, Hwang, & Tai, 2013).

Guilford’s (1967) alternate uses test is a widely used measure of creativity (see Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007), hich requires participants to think of as many unusual alternate uses for common objects (e.g., newspaper, paperclip) as ossible in two minutes. The test is scored by assessing how participants perform on the four criteria of fluency (number of esponses), flexibility (range of ideas), originality (unusual responses), and elaboration (level of detail). Responses are scored ut of 10 on each criterion, and summed to form a score out of 40, such that higher scores are indicative of greater creativity. nter-rater reliability in this study across two expert raters was consistently high, ranging from � = 0.84 (pre-training) to

= 0.88 (post-training). The Welch Reorganization Test (Welch, 1946) measures creative problem solving. In this task, participants recombine

ommon ideas according to four unfamiliar patterns. The premise is that the ability to readily rearrange and recombine deas in adherence to a pattern or plan is essential to creative thinking. The test comprises four subtests in which written

aterials are used in the first three subtests, and blocks are used in the fourth subtest. Due to time restrictions, only subtests ne and three were utilized in this study. In the first subtest, participants were presented with 10 groups of 10 words and ere instructed to create as many meaningful grammatical sentences as possible in 10 min. In the third subtest, participants ere presented with a list of 20 words and were instructed create a grammatically correct and logical story utilizing these ords. Responses in both tests were rated on the criteria of fluency, flexibility, and originality. Inter-rater reliability of two

xpert raters was sufficient, ranging from � = 0.69 (pre-training) to � = 0.76 (post-training). Responses were summed with esponses from Guilford’s (1967) test in order to create an overall creativity index. To minimize the impact of practice effects, he first subtest was used in the pre-test stage and the third subtest was used in the post-test stage.

.2.2. Personality Openness and Extraversion were measured using the International Personality Item Pool, 5 NEO Domains, (Goldberg

t al., 2006). This 50-item questionnaire measures Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and onscientiousness on a 50-item, five-point likert-type scale. Example statements include “I feel comfortable around people” Extraversion) and “I have a vivid imagination” (Openness). Coefficient alpha reliabilities for the current sample are reported n Section 4.2.

.2.3. Control variables We controlled for intelligence using the Wonderlic Cognitive Ability Test (Wonderlic Inc., 2000) and affect using the

ositive And Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). We controlled for these variables as previous esearch has shown these constructs to influence creativity (e.g., Batey & Furnham, 2006; Clapham, 2001; Furnham & hamorro-Premuzic, 2004; Furnham, Crump, Batey, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Kim, 005).

.3. Creativity training

Participants were randomly assigned into one of the two experimental conditions: ideational skills training (n = 50) nd relaxation training (n = 62). A further 50 participants were assigned to a control condition once sufficient numbers ere obtained in each of the experimental conditions. Training was presented in the format of videos, which opened with

102 P.J. O’Connor et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 97–108

an introduction (i.e., what is creativity and why is it important), followed by the training content of each program (e.g., techniques, examples), and concluded with a summary.

3.3.1. Ideational skills training The ideational skills training video was eight minutes in duration, and consisted of an instructor explaining and providing

examples of idea-generating techniques. The instructor was filmed in person and used a number of embedded slides to assist explanation. The techniques discussed included brainstorming (i.e., allowing all ideas to be considered without criticism), forced relation (i.e., utilizing items in one’s immediate surroundings to generate or develop ideas), checklist (i.e., considering a checklist of three terms − “maximize”, “minimize”, and “rearrange” − to enhance components of an existing idea, by asking oneself “Can an idea be improved by enlarging, rearranging, or reducing any of its components?”), and catalogue (i.e., referencing a catalogue to stimulate or expand ideas). These techniques were utilized in accordance with research findings demonstrating the effectiveness of these techniques in enhancing ideational thinking ability (Bull, Montgomery, & Baloche, 1995; Clapham, 1997; Smith, 1998; Warren & Davis, 1969).

3.3.2. Relaxation training The relaxation training video ran for 10 min in total. The instructor from the ideation video was again used, and the video

was presented in the same format (i.e., filmed instructor with slides). In this video the instructor focused on tasks designed to reduce barriers to creative thinking. Tasks included relaxation, meditation, stretching, breathing exercises (breathing deeply and slowly), and enhancing awareness of personal factors which may inhibit creative performance (such as stress, anxiety, and worry). For example, at one point during the video, participants were briefly taken through guided meditation, where they were shown an image of someone meditating and instructed on how to do this themselves. They were told to focus their attention on their breathing (feel the air flowing in and out of their lungs) while allowing distracting thoughts to fade away. At another point, participants were told about progressive muscular relaxation, and briefly guided through this technique. The instructor also trained participants in positive self-talk, goal setting, and visualization in order to further assist participants in overcoming potential stress, anxiety, and worry. These techniques were utilized in accordance with published studies on relaxation-based creativity training (e.g., Clapham, 1997; Constantino, Kellam, Cramond, & Crowder, 2010; Domino, 1977; Krampen, 1997).

Consistent with theories of effective learning (e.g. transfer of learning theory; Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999), the relaxation focused creativity training video (as well as the ideation training video) included segments where participants were asked to engage in specific techniques while watching the video (i.e., practice). Additionally, also consistent with transfer of learning theory, the videos emphasized understanding concepts and methods, rather than simply memorizing what these methods are.

3.3.3. Control condition The control condition included an educational video created in a similar format to the training videos; however, it focused

on the topic “Emotional Intelligence” (nine minute video) and did not cover any content related to creativity. Please note that our emotional intelligence video was purely educational and not designed to train participants in emotional intelligence.

3.4. Procedure

At time one (pre-training), participants completed the personality, intelligence, and affect questionnaires. Participants were then administered the pre-training creativity measures. Upon completion of these measures, participants were shown either the ideation video, relaxation video, or Emotional Intelligence video. After viewing the respective videos participants were then presented with the post-training creativity measures.

3.4.1. Design and analysis The study utilized a mixed-subjects design. The within-subjects factor was “time” with two levels (pre-training and post-

training). There was one manipulated between-groups factor (creativity training condition) with three levels (ideational skills training, relaxation training, and control). The present study incorporated two measured between-subjects variables (low vs high Extraversion and low vs high Openness to Experience), and two covariates (intelligence and affect). Data were analyzed via SPSS as two Repeated Measures ANOVAs (multivariate method) with affect and intelligence included as covariates in each analysis.

4. Results

4.1. Diagnostics and assumptions

To check assumptions associated with the present analyses, a range of tests were conducted for outliers, multicollinearity, and homogeneity of variance. First, the possible presence of within-group outliers was assessed by converting observed scores (within groups) to z scores, and then inspecting whether any of these scores fell beyond the p < 0.001 cut off (i.e., z-scores of ±3). Based on this criterion, no within-group outliers were identified. Second, homogeneity of variance was

P.J. O’Connor et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 97–108 103

Table 1 Pre- and post-training means and standard deviations for creativity index scores for the ideational skills training and relaxation training.

Control Relaxation Training Ideational Skills Training

Pre-Training M(SD)

Post-Training M(SD)

Pre-Training M(SD)

Post-Training M(SD)

Pre-Training M(SD)

Post-Training M(SD)

Extraversion (Low) 65.36 (22.73) 69.24 (20.65) 69.54 (18.90) 89.95 (15.61) 70.79 (27.05) 81.08 (30.57)

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Extraversion (High) 74.48 (23.71) 78.68 (20.44) 79.97 (22.41) 95.34 (21.89) 74.12 (21.97) 94.75 (23.16) Openness (Low) 66.00 (19.67) 70.63 (20.35) 68.57 (22.39) 86.59 (20.37) 65.49 (24.07) 79.91 (28.72) Openness (high) 73.53 (27.89) 77.04 (22.73) 81.01 (17.99) 98.91 (15.20) 80.42 (22.02) 97.00 (21.84)

ssessed using Box’s M statistics for each of the Repeated Measures ANOVAs. All Box’s M statistics were not significant, ndicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variance–covariance was met in the present case. Finally, sphericity, lthough an assumption of the Repeated Measures ANOVA, was not assessed here because there were fewer than three evels in the repeated measures factor (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Additionally, since the Repeated Measures ANOVA via MANOVA) is robust to violations of this assumption, potential problems with sphericity posed no threat to the current nalyses.

.2. Data preparation and hypotheses testing

Scores from the two measures of creativity were highly correlated (0.57 in the pre-test, 0.50 in the post-test) and were onsequently combined to form a measure of “general creativity”. Median splits were conducted on measures of Openness nd Extraversion to allow for these variables to be used as categorical variables in the Repeated Measures ANOVAs, and onsequently be used in tests of three-way interactions. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for pre- and ost-training creativity index scores for the ideational skills training and relaxation training groups at high and low levels f Extraversion and Openness.

To assess the hypotheses in the present study, two Repeated Measures ANOVAs (multivariate) were conducted. Both NOVAs comprised a 2 (time) × 3 (training condition) × 2 (personality trait) design, enabling the key research question to e assessed (i.e., does Extraversion/Openness impact the extent to which training improves performance?). Intelligence and ffect (positive and negative) were controlled in each of these analyses.

.3. Extraversion

The Repeated Measures ANOVA (multivariate) revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 153) = 5.02, p = 0.02, p

2 = 0.03, indicating that, overall, creative performance was significantly higher at Time 2 compared with Time 1. There as a significant main effect of the covariate Intelligence F(1, 153) = 4.00, p = 0.04, �p2 = 0.03, but neither positive affect, F(1,

53) = 0.22, p = 0.64, �p2 < 0.01 nor negative affect, F(1, 153) = 0.42, p = 0.52, �p2 < 0.01 was significant. There was a main effect of training condition, F(2, 153) = 3.41, p = 0.04, �p2 = 0.04, and a significant two-way interaction

etween training condition and time F(2, 153) = 21.27, p < 0.001, �p2 = 0.22, indicating a differential change in performance ver time based on training conditions. Follow-up tests of simple effects revealed highly significant increases in perfor- ance for both relaxation, F(1, 153) = 147.29, p < 0.001 (mean difference = 17.94, 95% CI [15.02, 20.86]) and ideation, F, (1,

53) = 88.35, p < 0.001 (mean difference = 15.47, 95% CI [12.21, 18.72]), and a lesser, but still significant, increase in the control

ondition, F(1, 153) = 5.60, p = 0.02 (mean difference = 3.93, 95% CI [0.65, 7.21]). The significant two-way interaction there- ore seems to be due to the greater increase in performance in the training conditions compared with the control condition see Fig. 1). In support of both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, then, participants in both relaxation and ideation training onditions experience greater improvements in performance compared with the control condition.

Improvement Extraverts Improvement Introverts

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ig. 1. Improvement in creativity performance for extraverts and introverts over the three conditions. It was hypothesized that extraverts would benefit ost from ideation training and introverts would benefit most from relaxation training.

104 P.J. O’Connor et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 97–108

In terms of the specific hypotheses relating to Extraversion, as predicted, tests of between-subjects effects revealed a significant main effect of Extraversion, F(1, 153) = 4.27, p = 0.04, �p2 = 0.03, supporting Hypothesis 3 and demonstrating that as Extraversion increased, so too did creative performance. The hypothesized three-way interaction between time, training condition, and Extraversion was significant, F(2, 153) = 6.21, p = 0.003, �p2 = 0.08, demonstrating that, consistent with Hypothesis 5, training program effectiveness over the three conditions was differentially affected by participants’ levels of Extraversion (see Fig. 1). This test was then replicated without the control condition to ensure this interaction was not caused by the presence of this condition. This test revealed a more significant three-way interaction between training condition, Extraversion, and time, F(1, 104) = 10.96, p < 001 �p2 = 0.10.

Overall, Fig. 1 indicates that, while both types of training are beneficial for introverts and extraverts, introverts get more benefit from relaxation training (EMM difference = 20.42, 95% CI [16.26, 24.57]) than ideational skills training (EMM differ- ence = 10.18, 95% CI [5.57, 14.80]), whereas extraverts get more benefit from ideational skills training (EMM difference = 20.75, 95% CI [15.93, 25.56]) than relaxation training (EMM difference = 15.47, 95% CI [11.23, 19.70]). Consistent with this, a simple main effect analyses for time revealed a highly significant increase in creative performance for introverts in the relaxation training condition (EMM difference = 20.42, p < 0.001, �p2 = 0.38) and a highly significant increase in creative performance for extraverts in the ideational skills training condition (EMM difference = 20.75, p < 001, �p2 = 0.32.)

4.4. Openness

Consistent with the findings for Extraversion, the Repeated Measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 153) = 4.16, p = 0.04, �p2 = 0.03, indicating that, overall, creative performance was significantly higher at Time 2 compared with Time 1. Again, there was a significant main effect of the covariate Intelligence F(1, 153) = 4.30, p = 0.04, �p2 = 0.03, but neither positive affect, F(1, 153) = 2.99, p = 0.09, �p2 < 0.01, nor negative affect, F(1, 53) = 0.001, p = 0.97, �p2 < 0.01, was significant. Again, consistent with the results for Extraversion, there was a main effect of training condition, F(2, 153) = 4.01, p = 0.02, �p2 = 0.04, and a significant two-way interaction between training condition and time F(2, 153) = 19.38, p < 0.001, �p2 = 0.20, indicating a differential change in performance over time based on training conditions.

In terms of the specific hypotheses relating to Openness, tests of between-subjects effects revealed a significant main effect of Openness, F(1, 153) = 9.37, p = 0.003, �p2 = 0.06, supporting Hypothesis 4 and demonstrating that individuals with higher levels of Openness tended to have higher scores for creative performance. The hypothesized three-way interaction between time, training condition, and Openness, however, was not significant, F(2, 153) = 0.12, p = 0.89, �p2 < 0.01, demonstrating that training program effectiveness over the three conditions was not differentially affected by participants’ levels of Openness; Hypothesis 6 was therefore not supported.

4.5. Robustness check

In order to run the analyses detailed above, we conducted a median split on Extraversion and Openness. We note that conducting median splits of continuous variables is sometimes problematic, and we therefore checked the robustness of our key findings by re-running the analysis using hierarchical multiple regression. This involved the creation of dummy variables for the categorical IV (condition), mean centering predictors, and calculating four interaction terms (the two dummy variables multiplied by each personality IV). Interaction terms were assessed at the final stages of two hierarchical multiple regressions (one conducted for Extraversion, one conducted for Openness). Results of this analysis supported our key finding; the increase in performance across the three training conditions did not depend on Openness (R2 change = 0.008, F change (2, 150) = 0.78, p = 0.46), but did depend on Extraversion (R2 change = 0.05, F change (2, 150) = 5.09, p = 0.007). Simple slopes analysis of this interaction was consistent pattern of results illustrated in Fig. 1; extraverts benefited more from ideation training whereas introverts benefited more from relaxation training.

5. Discussion

This study investigated the differential impact of personality characteristics on the effectiveness of two different types of creativity training programs. Results revealed support for the efficacy of both ideation and relaxation training for short- term increases in creativity. Consistent with previous research, results also demonstrated that those high in Extraversion and Openness tend to be more creative than those low in these traits. Importantly, key results demonstrated that the effectiveness of different types of training programs is somewhat dependent on a participant’s personality. Specifically, results indicated that relaxation training tended to benefit individuals low in Extraversion more than those high in Extraversion. Ideational skills training, on the other hand, tended to benefit those high in Extraversion more than those low in Extraversion. Results did not support a similar effect for Openness.

These findings hold both theoretical and practical implications. First, enhanced creative performance of participants on

post-measures of creative performance is consistent with the idea that individuals can be trained − at least in the short term − in the metacognitive processes involved in creativity. In the current study, both training programs brought about an immediate increase in creative performance when compared to the control condition. Therefore, it seems that individuals can be taught to actively apply the concepts discussed in training and consequently improve their creative performance.

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Second, the pattern of results obtained here suggests that Extraversion and Openness are important characteristics in he prediction of creative performance. Results for Openness are consistent with previous findings by Feist (1998), McCrae 1987) and, more recently, Sung and Choi (2009) and Lin, Hsu, Chen, and Wang (2012), who similarly found that individuals igh in openness tend to score more highly on creative performance. Considering that Openness represents the degree to hich a person is imaginative and unconventional (Mount & Barrick, 1995) these results are not surprising. Similarly, results

or Extraversion are not surprising, as extraverts tend to score more highly in measures of creativity than introverts. Taken ogether, these findings add additional weight to existing empirical evidence that shows that Openness and Extraversion redict creativity.

The key finding in this study is the significant three-way interaction between time, Extraversion, and training type in redicting creativity. Extraverts tended to respond better to ideation training, whereas Introverts tended to respond better o relaxation training. Consistent with the rationale used to develop this hypothesis, it is likely that Extraverts are more uited to ideation training, because ideation training focuses on teaching novel skills and ideas rather than relaxation. It is herefore more stimulating and cognitively demanding than the relaxation condition, and therefore more likely to increase rousal in participants. Conversely, it is possible that introverts are particularly suited to relaxation training, because this ype of training is particularly likely to help them reduce arousal and also assist them in shifting between the two types f cognitive processes. As outlined in the introduction, there is good reason to believe that introverts have difficulty with hifting between the two types of cognitive processes due to their known difficulty with divided attention (Matthews t al., 2003). Additionally, introverts who tend to have a bias towards analytical thinking (Allison & Hayes, 1996) likely eceived enhanced benefit from relaxation and mindfulness training, because such tasks probably served to encourage type

processes in introverts, or put more colloquially, ‘get them out of their heads’. Numerous practical implications stem from these findings. Firstly, based on the obtained results, it is argued that organi-

ations and practitioners with limited financial and human resources may reduce the cost of lengthy creativity programs by elivering brief, online programs, like those utilized here, to successfully enhance creative performance. Indeed, although

mprovements in creativity performance might only be short-term (as was assessed here), short-term improvements are evertheless important. For example, a 10-min training program may only improve creative performance for 24 h, but if

mplemented at the start of a planning-day, short-term improvements in creativity can nevertheless translate into long-term rganizational benefits.

Further to this, differential effectiveness of relaxation training for levels of Extraversion suggest that organizations and rainers may benefit from initial personality assessment as a means of assigning trainees to different creativity programs. n this way, businesses can enhance the effects of creativity training and, by doing so, may further enhance the creative erformance of their employees. However, our recommendations can only extend to training programs similar to those escribed here (i.e., short-term ideational and relaxation training programs). The possible relevance of personality in the fficacy of other popular creativity training programs is yet to be investigated.

.1. Limitations and future research

There were three main limitations in this study. First, by conducting this experiment on a sample of university students it is ossible that the results may not be entirely generalizable to the population of working adults. Second, it is likely that practice ffects played a role in the overall pattern of results. However, we believe that our use of different pre- and post-test items, s well as the inclusion of a control condition, minimized the likely impact of such effects. Third, our ideation training video eight minute’s duration) was two minutes shorter than our relaxation training video (10 min duration). Although not ideal, his limitation probably did not impact the key finding in our study (that ideation training is more effective for extraverts, hereas relaxation training is more effective for introverts). This is because if video length enhanced the effectiveness of

reativity training, then this should result in a main effect of training (i.e., relaxation training resulting in better creativity erformance overall) rather than the conditional effects that we found (i.e., the efficacy of training depending on participant ersonality). Although there was a main effect of training, this was due to the two training conditions scoring higher than he control condition, rather than being different from each other.

In the current study, we focused on Openness and Extraversion in prediction of creativity because research has con- istently found these two traits relate to creativity (e.g., Carson & Langer, 2006; Furnham & Bachiar, 2008; King et al., 996; McCrae, 1987; Walker & Jackson, 2014) as well as training proficiency in general (Barrick & Mount, 1991). How- ver, it is plausible that other dimensions from the five factor model (i.e., Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism) ight predict responsiveness to training under some conditions. In particular, it seems likely that individuals high in Neu-

oticism (the tendency to feel fear, anxiety, and worry) might benefit from relaxation focused creativity training. Indeed,

onsistent with this possibility, a recent study by Walker & Jackson (2014) demonstrated that trait fear measured using ray’s Fight/Fright/Freezing system predicts divergent thinking when controlling for Extraversion and Openness. Future

esearch could therefore assess the potentially beneficial effects of relaxation focused creativity training for individuals high n Neuroticism

106 P.J. O’Connor et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 97–108

6. Conclusion

The present study sought to determine the role of personality in creative performance in general, as well as the increment in creative performance due to different, brief training programs. The empirical analyses conducted in this study revealed that: 1) both ideation and relaxation training are beneficial overall; 2) that Openness and Extraversion predict creativity overall; and 3) that ideation training is particularly beneficial for extraverts whereas relaxation training is particularly beneficial for introverts. These results enhance our current understanding of creativity performance by offering a more fine- grained understanding of when and why creativity training is likely to be successful. Although several limitations in this research were identified, results of this study nonetheless provide some support for the idea that personality characteristics may interact with types of creativity training to bring about differential creative outcomes. It is recommended that, following further investigation of this topic, professionals involved in creativity training take into account participants’ personalities when designing creativity programs.

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  • Learning to relax versus learning to ideate: Relaxation-focused creativity training benefits introverts more than extraverts
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Creativity and creativity training
      • 2.1 Personality
      • 2.2 Personality and trainability
    • 3 Methods
      • 3.1 Participants
      • 3.2 Measures
        • 3.2.1 Creativity
        • 3.2.2 Personality
        • 3.2.3 Control variables
      • 3.3 Creativity training
        • 3.3.1 Ideational skills training
        • 3.3.2 Relaxation training
        • 3.3.3 Control condition
      • 3.4 Procedure
        • 3.4.1 Design and analysis
    • 4 Results
      • 4.1 Diagnostics and assumptions
      • 4.2 Data preparation and hypotheses testing
      • 4.3 Extraversion
      • 4.4 Openness
      • 4.5 Robustness check
    • 5 Discussion
      • 5.1 Limitations and future research
    • 6 Conclusion
    • References

Related Articles/On-the-relationship-between-cultural-diversity-and-creativ_2016_Thinking-Ski.pdf

Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 152–157

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

On the relationship between cultural diversity and creativity in education: The moderating role of communal versus divisional mindset

Loris Vezzali a,∗, Małgorzata A. Gocłowska b, Richard J. Crisp c, Sofia Stathi d

a University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy b University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands c University of Aston, United Kingdom d University of Greenwich, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 17 February 2016 Received in revised form 29 June 2016 Accepted 16 July 2016 Available online 18 July 2016

Keywords: Flexible thinking Creativity Cultural diversity Intergroup contact Intergroup processes Diversity climate Diversity in education

a b s t r a c t

We conducted an experimental study with the aim of testing certain conditions under which engaging with cultural diversity increases creativity among schoolchildren. Results obtained from a sample of 149 Italian elementary schoolchildren revealed that engaging with cultural diversity, operationalized by asking Italian children to work with immigrant children on a cooperative task, led to an increase in creativity. Furthermore, we found that this effect was only present when a communal but not a divisional mindset (emphasiz- ing group distinctions) was present. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of findings.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Creative products are novel and useful (Amabile, 1983), and creativity emerges when people think in a flexible or per- sistent way (Schank & Abelson, 1977; for a review, see Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010) and are highly motivated (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994). Creativity is essential in organizations (Lombardo & Roddy, 2010), and the fos- tering of creative thinking in some educational systems, such as in England, is encouraged from a young age (Education, 1999). Recent evidence suggests that creativity can be encouraged through social diversity (Crisp & Turner, 2011), but while well tested in adult population, this idea is yet to be investigated with regard to schoolchildren. The aim of this study was to examine whether diversity increases creativity among schoolchildren, and what boundary conditions may eventually prevent the positive effects of diversity on creativity.

1. Diversity and creativity

Diversity disrupts the extent to which people use stereotypes and cognitive schemas during problem solving (for reviews, see Crisp & Turner, 2011; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013), allowing people to engage in more generative thought (Gocłowska, Crisp,

∗ Corresponding author at: Dipartimento di Educazione e Scienze Umane, Viale Allegri 9, 42121, Reggio Emilia, Italy. E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Vezzali).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.07.001 1871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Labuschagne, 2013). It can also increase the amount of ideas that are available for input (Leung & Chiu, 2010), and helps ndividuals to see the same problems from multiple perspectives (for an overview see Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu, 008; Tadmor & Tetlock, 2009).

The benefits of diversity have been observed across various levels of analysis. Archival studies indicated that the influx f foreign ideas and people stimulated country-level innovation two generations later (Simonton, 1997), and that eminent ndividuals, more often than their contemporaries, came from immigrant families, or have themselves experienced migration Simonton, 1997). A study of 20th century eminent personalities found that 20% of the analyzed creators were either first- r second-generation immigrants (Goertzel, 1978). And although foreign-born individuals comprise only 13% of the U.S. opulation, they account for 30% of all the patents granted, and for 25% of all the U.S. Nobel Laureates (Peri, 2012).

In cross-sectional studies biculturalism (Tadmor & Tetlock, 2009), bilingualism (Benet-Martinez, Lee, & Leu, 2006) and ven membership in multiple social groups were associated with greater creativity (Steffens, Gocłowska, Cruwys, & Galinsky, 016). For instance, the ideas of bicultural individuals (vs. those who identify with one culture only) tend to be more novel nd original (Fee & Gray, 2012; Kharkhurin, 2011; Tadmor, Galinsky, & Maddux, 2012), their negotiation solutions are more reative (Maddux & Galinsky, 2009), and their work performance is rated as more innovative (Tadmor et al., 2012).

In experimental studies, thinking of diverse individuals (e.g., gender counter-stereotypes, Gocłowska et al., 2013) and xposure to symbols and ideas from multiple cultures were found to elicit greater creative performance (Leung & Chiu, 010). Finally, longitudinal research has confirmed that the effects of social diversity on creativity are causal: international id workers from Australia and New Zealand, who were delegated to work in another country (measured against the pre- eparture baseline, and against non-expatriates), experienced an increase in creative ability 12 months following departure Fee & Gray, 2012). Taken together, these studies suggest that engaging with diversity can lead to enhanced creative perfor-

ance (see Crisp & Turner, 2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2015 for reviews). These findings generate Hypothesis 1: that diversity n an educational classroom promotes pupils’ creativity.

.1. Moderators of the diversity-creativity link

It is important to note that despite the growing support for a diversity-creativity link, the effects of diversity are not nmoderated. For instance, diversity is less likely to benefit creative idea generation when need for structure is high Gocłowska, Baas, Crisp, & De Dreu, 2014; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013), when people are closed for new experiences (Leung

Chiu, 2008), hold negative diversity beliefs (Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007) or feel pressured for ime, or threatened (Leung & Chiu, 2010). In addition, a social categorization perspective on diversity would argue that imilarities and differences between group members, that are used to categorize self and others into “us” and “them,” can isrupt the beneficial effect of social diversity. This is because people typically like and trust ingroup members more than utgroups members (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and a perception of salient ntergroup divisions may lead them to take a more resistant and defensive stance, a “divisional mindset” that undermines ognitive functioning (Richeson & Trawalter, 2005; van Knippenberg, De Dreu & Homan, 2004). Such a divisional mindset, hich is focused on group distinctions, may disrupt the beneficial effects of diversity, by activating intergroup differentia-

ion processes which are at odds with the original way of thinking prompted by diversity. Because of this, the salience of iversity faultlines, that is, clear intergroup divisions, may block the beneficial effects of group diversity on creativity. We herefore posit Hypothesis 2a: we should observe greater creativity when a communal mindset (which does not mention roup differences) is salient, and Hypothesis 2b: that exposure to diversity will not produce more original ideas when a ivisional mindset is activated.

. The present research

The aim of this study was to test whether diversity promotes creativity among children (Hypothesis 1), and whether his positive effect of creativity would be observed when a communal (Hypothesis 2a) but not when a divisional mindset

Hypothesis 2b) is salient. To test these hypotheses, we ran an experimental intervention with Italian elementary school hildren, assigned to work in diverse cultural groups (together with immigrant peers), or in homogeneous groups (com- osed only of Italians) on a cooperative task requiring them to create a story. Orthogonal to the diversity manipulation, we anipulated the prevailing mindset. Participants in each small group were asked to imagine being affiliated to one of two

istinct minimal categories (thus activating a divisional mindset focused on group differences), or co-operating with one nother within the same minimal group (thus activating a co-operative, communal mindset, where group distinctions were ess salient). Children took part in three intervention sessions; one week after the last session, they were administered a

easure of creativity (i.e. originality).

154 L. Vezzali et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 152–157

3. Method

3.1. Participants and experimental design

Participants comprised 149 Italian elementary school children (73 males, 76 females); mean age was 9 years 11 months.1

Participants were randomly allocated to one of the four cells of a 2 (Diversity: present vs. absent) × 2 (Mindset: divisional vs. communal) between-subjects experimental design.

3.2. Procedure

Children were randomly allocated by experimenters to form same-sex groups each comprising 3–6 children. The choice to consider same-sex groups was taken in order to avoid potential effects of an additional group variable (gender), which would be beyond the scope of this research. Participants were asked to imagine a story where they impersonated characters whose aim was to cooperate in order to survive in a fantasy scenario. To manipulate diversity, we varied the ethnic composition of small groups: in the condition where diversity was present, children were both Italian and immigrant; in the condition where diversity was absent, children were all Italian.

The manipulation of mindset was orthogonal to the diversity manipulation. In the communal mindset condition, partic- ipants imagined impersonating characters from the fictional planet Astra. Participants were told that inhabitants of Astra had blue skin, were generous, nice, respecting Nature; they were athletic and two meters tall. According to the background story, Astra was a green planet that was sufficient for everyone’s survival. However, suddenly terrible things happened on the planet Astra: the waters, trees and flowers were poisoned. The task of participants was to create a story in which the inhabitants worked to identify the cause of what was happening to Astra, counter-act the disaster, and travel around the planet to experience new adventures. The story was identical in the communal and in the divisional mindset condition except that in the divisional mindset condition participants imagined the story featuring two groups, Sun and Moon, who had a different skin color (yellow for the Sun and blue for the Moon), and distinct magic powers.

Each small group met once a week for three consecutive weeks to enact the roles of the blue (in communal mindset con- dition) or blue and yellow (in divisional mindset condition) inhabitants of Astra. One week after the last session, participants were administered the dependent measure.2

3.3. Measure

Creativity Participants were asked to work on an individual task that required them to identify alternative uses for an object; a

method aimed at measuring divergent thinking (Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Guilford, 1967; Kharkhurin, 2009). Specifically, each child was asked to write down all the different uses of a plastic bottle that came to their mind. Two raters (students enrolled in educational academic courses at a Northern Italian university) blind to our hypotheses coded participants’ responses into 10 different categories (e.g., recycling, playing, container, etc.). Originality was then inferred by calculating the percentage of participants mentioning the same use of the plastic bottle (see Amabile, 1983; De Dreu, Nijstad, & Baas, 2011; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2012; Guilford, 1967; Torrance, 1974). To obtain originality scores, we used the following equation (see Gocłowska & Crisp, 2012): 1 − (percentage of participants who generated the same idea/100). For instance, if 80% of participants mentioned that a plastic bottle can be used to drink, the resulting originality score is 0.20 (20%). For each participant, frequency scores for each idea were summed and then divided by the number of ideas generated by that participant. Scores thus can range from 0.0 (low originality) to 1.0 (high originality).3

4. Results

To test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2 (Diversity: present vs. absent) × 2 (Mindset: communal vs. divisional) between- subjects ANOVA. Means and standard deviations of creativity in the four cells of the experimental design are presented in Table 1. Creativity was square-root transformed to approximate normality (Field, 2013); for ease of presentation, the means

and the standard deviations presented in the text and in Table refer to nontransformed data.

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, stating that diversity should promote greater creativity, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of Diversity, F(1, 50) = 5.84, p = 0.017, �2p = 0.04: creativity was higher among participants in the condition where

1 There also were 51 immigrants. The distinction between Italian and immigrant children was performed on the basis of the schools’ indications, taking into account the family background of children (i.e. whether children had immigrant parents). However, due to the small number of immigrant children and the unfeasibility to reach an acceptable sample size in the four experimental cells, analyses for immigrant children were not performed.

2 The results reported in this manuscript are derived from a larger dataset design to assess the impact of intergroup contact on a range of dependent measures. Results for other measures included in this dataset are not relevant to the hypotheses tested in the current article so we do not discuss them further. A description of some of these measures and a detailed account of the procedure can be found in Vezzali, Stathi, Crisp, and Capozza (2015).

3 Since at least one participant mentioned each idea, both 0 and 1 are ideal points. The participants’ actual scores in this study ranged from 0.19 to 0.77 (M = 0.53, SD = 0.10).

L. Vezzali et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 152–157 155

Table 1 Means of dependent variables in the four cells of the experimental design (standard deviations are reported in parentheses).

Condition

Measure Diversity present/Communal mindset

Diversity present/Divisional mindset

Diversity absent/Communal mindset

Diversity absent/Divisional mindset

N n

d M t c b

5

d w m w ( w m

i b a

T o m o c i c f

W i a g 2 t w fi m f o

i a a o p b

T f

Creativity 0.58 (0.07) 0.54 (0.08) 0.50 (0.12) 0.53 (0.12)

ote: Creativity was square-root transformed to approximate normality; for ease of presentation, the mean and the standard deviation refer instead to ontransformed data.

iversity was present (M = 0.56; SD = 0.08) than among those in the condition where diversity was absent (M = 0.51; SD = 0.12). oreover, the two-way interaction was significant, F(1, 145) = 4.68, p = 0.032 �2p = 0.03. Analyses of simple effects showed

hat, consistent with Hypothesis 2a, the presence of diversity increased creativity when participants were exposed to a ommunal mindset, F(1, 145) = 10.06, p = 0.002, �2p = 0.06; in line with Hypothesis 2b, however, when the mindset was ased on divisions, the effect of diversity was nonsignificant, F < 1 (see Table 1).

. Discussion

In this article we present an experimental study aimed at testing whether diversity increases creativity among schoolchil- ren. Our first hypothesis was that diversity would promote greater creativity. Taking into account individuals’ mindset, e also hypothesized that diversity would increase creativity when a communal (Hypothesis 2a) but not when a divisional indset (Hypothesis 2b) was salient. Results were consistent with our hypotheses. First, in line with Hypothesis 1, creativity as higher for participants working in diverse cultural groups, compared to participants working with ingroup members

i.e. Italians). Second, participants’ mindset moderated the effect of diversity, such that the effect of diversity only emerged hen a communal mindset was salient (Hypothesis 2a); in contrast, diversity did not affect creativity when a divisional indset, focusing on group differences, was activated (Hypothesis 2b). To our best knowledge, these findings provide first direct experimental evidence that exposure to cultural diversity

ncreases creativity among schoolchildren. By doing so, our study contributes to the growing body of evidence showing the eneficial effects of social diversity (Crisp & Turner, 2011; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2014; Leung et al., 2008), and extends the pplication of these findings to educational contexts.

Importantly, rather than using preexisting diverse or homogenous groups, as is common in diversity research (Davies, ropp, Aron, Pettigrew, & Wright, 2001), exposure to diversity in our study was manipulated, allowing for the elimination f potential confounding variables, such as pre-selection. In other words, we can exclude the alternative explanation that ore creative children seek out more diverse friends, since participants were randomly allocated to conditions of presence

r absence of diversity. In addition, our study used a novel, highly engaging manipulation. We did not simply allocate hildren to a diverse environment; rather, children were asked to work on a cooperative task. There is indeed evidence that nterventions are more effective when participants are actively engaged (Oskamp, 2000). Moreover, positive effects of cross- ultural experiences are more likely to emerge when they happen under optimal conditions, such as working cooperatively or a superordinate goal in a supportive environment (Allport, 1954).

The second relevant finding is that the positive effect of diversity was nullified when a divisional mindset was salient. e argue that such a divisional mindset has activated differentiation processes typical of intergroup relations, whereby

ndividuals favor ingroup members at the expense of outgroup members and rely to a greater extent on group stereotypes nd pre-existing biases (Tajfel, 1982; Turner et al., 1987). Since these processes are at odds with the original way of thinking enerated by diversity, which instead exerts its effects by disrupting stereotypes (Crisp & Turner, 2011; Gocłowska & Crisp, 013), our results suggest that reminding participants of group divisions blocked the positive effects of diversity. In con- rast, when a communal mindset was active (mindset manipulation), and participants actively and cooperatively worked ith outgroup members (group diversity manipulation), the generation of novel and original ideas increased. This is the rst study, to our knowledge, that experimentally tested whether a mindset focused on communalities versus divisions oderates the effects of diversity on creativity in children. Future studies should test whether other factors, such as need

or structure (Gocłowska et al., 2014) or openness to new experiences (Leung & Chiu, 2008), moderate the effect of diversity n schoolchildren’s creativity.

It is worth noting that the disruptive effects of the divisional mindset were evident even though the story used to activate t featured a positive, co-operative outcome (i.e. working together to resolve a planetary disaster). This suggests that simply ctivating a divisional mindset, focused on salience of group distinctions, is sufficient to give rise to negative consequences ssociated with group categorization (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), independently of its valence and of the positivity f the diverse experience. A further prediction is that the disrupting effects of a divisional mindset would be even more ronounced if salience of group distinctions was negative; for example, if individuals were reminded of competitive relations

etween groups.

One implication of our findings is that, in order for diversity to benefit creativity, group distinctions should not be salient. his finding is in contrast to research on prejudice reduction, where group salience is thought as a necessary precondition or diversity to reduce prejudice (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Importantly, however, the requirement for group salience

156 L. Vezzali et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 152–157

in intergroup contact research is to reduce the identity threat associated with losing ingroup distinctiveness (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Here, we are not concerned with attitudinal outcomes that may be moderated by identity concerns, but the cognitive reconstrual processes that can elicit different ways of thinking beyond intergroup relations. Examining the interplay of identity, distinctiveness and diversity for different dependent measures (and for eliciting positive outcomes in different domains) may be an important focus for future work.

The present study has relevant practical implications. Educational interventions could take advantage of multicultural settings in order to foster creative thinking among schoolchildren. Importantly, our findings suggest that participants should be actively engaged in cooperative activities with members of different cultural groups, rather than being simply “exposed” to them. Moreover, we argue for the importance of communal mindset that does not make group differences salient.

We acknowledge a limitation of our experimental design. Although we believe that random allocation of participants to experimental condition should have reduced possible influences of initial differences between experimental groups, the fact that the dependent variable was only measured after the manipulation does not totally exclude this possibility. We note that administering the same task before the manipulation would have probably primed some responses on the potential use of a bottle (dependent variable) among participants, thus somewhat invalidating its use as a dependent variable. The alternative option of using a different creativity task before the manipulation would have been subject to limited comparability with the measure we used. In any case, we acknowledge that our experimental design could indeed have included a carefully designed pre-test measure.

Another weakness of the present study is that it does not provide evidence on the creative processes that lead to increased originality. Creativity is a function of multiple processes: people are creative when they think in a flexible manner (Gocłowska et al., 2013), when they persist on finding solutions to a concrete problem (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011), when they feel greater intrinsic motivation (Amabile et al., 1994), or want to avoid unpleasant events (Baas et al., 2011). Since our study uncovered effects specifically to originality of ideas, it is not clear from the present set of results whether, as in other diversity research, this is caused by cognitive flexibility (i.e. the exploration of ideas across many semantic categories), or another process. Future studies focusing on constructs more closely related to flexibility – for instance integrative complexity, or cognitive complexity (Benet-Martinez et al., 2006; Tadmor & Tetlock, 2009) – may resolve this issue. However, one important concern is that these measures must be adapted in a way that makes them suitable for administration to children.

In conclusion, we demonstrated that diversity can have positive effects on the development of creativity, and that the salience of intergroup divisions constitutes a boundary condition of these effects. School environments are critical for fos- tering children’s creativity (Barak & Mesika, 2007), and with increased social mobility and immigration, these environments are becoming increasingly culturally diverse. Thus, it is surprising that research on diversity and creativity among children is still nascent. More studies are needed to further explore the diversity-creativity link among children of various develop- mental ages, and to understand what mindsets and attitudes of students, as well as of teachers, are helpful in reaping the benefits of classroom diversity.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Paola Spagnol and the other teachers for their help in the organization of the study. A special thank is for Omayra Prampolini and Diletta Ronzoni, who worked as research assistants. We are also grateful to the Institutes Frank, Giotto and Pertini (Carpi) for allowing us to run the study and collect data.

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  • On the relationship between cultural diversity and creativity in education: The moderating role of communal versus divisio...
    • 1 Diversity and creativity
      • 1.1 Moderators of the diversity-creativity link
    • 2 The present research
    • 3 Method
      • 3.1 Participants and experimental design
      • 3.2 Procedure
      • 3.3 Measure
        • Creativity
    • 4 Results
    • 5 Discussion
    • Acknowledgments
    • References

Related Articles/Predicting-creative-problem-solving-in-enginee_2016_Thinking-Skills-and-Crea.pdf

Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

Predicting creative problem solving in engineering design

Denis Dumas a,∗, Linda C. Schmidt b, Patricia A. Alexander a,c

a Department of Human Development and Quantitative Methodology, University of Maryland, United States b Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Maryland, United States c Development, Learning and Professional Practice University of Auckland, New Zealand

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 19 February 2015 Received in revised form 15 March 2016 Accepted 3 May 2016 Available online 12 May 2016

Keywords: Creative problem solving Engineering design Relational reasoning

a b s t r a c t

Developing students’ creative problem solving (CPS) is widely considered to be an impor- tant goal in engineering design education. However, the cognitive processes required for CPS are not currently well understood, limiting educators’ capacity to support this ability in students. This study used three cognitive abilities: divergent thinking, working mem- ory, and relational reasoning to predict CPS in engineering design graduate students both before and after they learned to use the TRIZ ideation method. TRIZ, a Russian acronym meaning Theory of Inventive Problem Solving, is a method for improving the originality of the designs that engineers generate. In this study, relational reasoning is conceptualized as a construct encompassing analogical, anomalous, antinomous, and antithetical reasoning. In this study, master’s level engineering design students were given a creative design task before and after they were instructed on the TRIZ method. Then, their performance before and after instruction was compared. Using paired sample t-tests, it was found that partici- pants produced significantly fewer design ideas after TRIZ instruction than they had before. But, TRIZ informed designs were significantly more original than those produced before. In a sequence of linear regression models, relational reasoning was found to be the strongest predictor of the originality of designs both before and after TRIZ instruction. Antinomous reasoning in particular was implicated in the production of original designs using TRIZ.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The design engineers of today are confronted with a number of important and extraordinary challenges. For example, engineers are pushed to create new products that will at once be lucrative and helpful to humankind. However, fundamen- tal constraints and contradictions, such as the need to be environmentally conscious while being cost effective, minimizing energy requirements while still providing adequate operating power, increasing device accessibility to all users while sim- plifying manufacturing activities, and promoting sustainability complicate this endeavor. In recognition of these important endeavors, The National Academy of Engineering has posed “grand challenges” to the engineering community designed to motivate innovation in today’s complex world (NAE, 2014). For example, engineers are tasked with designing new solar

energy technology to surpass current conversion efficiencies of roughly 30%, while simultaneously reducing the cost of solar energy production (NAE, 2014).

As the engineering design community continues its focus on challenges such as these, a critical question has been posed: how can engineering design students be adequately prepared to engage effectively with today’s engineering challenges? In

∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Human Development and Quantitative Methodology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-1131, United States.

E-mail address: [email protected] (D. Dumas).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.002 1871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66 51

esponse to this question, numerous scholarly (e.g., Passig & Cohen, 2014; Vargas Hernandez, Schmidt, & Okudan, 2013) and opular publications (e.g., Boss, 2012; Wagner, 2012), governmental policy reports (National Science and Technology Council, 013), and even presidential addresses (Obama, 2011) have given this general response: cultivate creative problem solving. his general call for creative problem solving in engineering design education is driven by the observation that few of today’s ajor engineering challenges (e.g., producing technologies to combat climate change) can be solved through the simple

pplication of existing processes or equipment. Therefore, novel technology, materials, and systems must be engineered. rucially, without the development of creative problem solving, the next generation of engineers may be unprepared to reate novel designs. In this way, creative problem solving is deeply important for engineering designers.

Despite the widely acknowledged importance of creative problem solving in engineering design, the actual effectiveness f engineering design education in fostering the creative potential of students is relatively understudied (Charyton, 2014). oday, many design methods exist with the explicit purpose of improving the creativity of designs (e.g., Theory of Inventive roblem solving [TRIZ]; Altshuller, 1996; WordTree; Linsey et al., 2012), but their effectiveness has rarely been systematically xamined. Further, the cognitive capacities that predict students’ ability to benefit from such design methods, or to think reatively about engineering design problems in general, is severely underexamined. Here, we examine the effectiveness of ne widely used engineering design method, TRIZ (Altshuller, 1996), and investigate the predictive relation of three cognitive bilities (i.e., divergent thinking, working memory, and relational reasoning) to two components of creative problem solving i.e., fluency and originality) in the performance of graduate students enrolled in an engineering design course.

.1. Components of creative problem solving

Creative problem solving is often measured in terms of a number of interrelated processes or components (Silvia, Martin, Nusbaum, 2009). Two of the most commonly measured components are fluency, which refers to the quantity of ideas

hat a participant is able to generate, and originality, which refers to the comparative novelty of each of those generated deas (Hocevar, 1979; Hokanson, 2007; Runco & Mraz, 1992; Silvia, 2008). Fluency can be relatively easily and objectively ssessed in performance by simply counting the number of distinct ideas individuals generate (Benedek, Fink, & Neubauer, 006; Torrance, 1972).

Originality, on the other hand, has historically been operationalized in variety ways, including by means of multiple raters e.g., Sternberg, 2006), semantic networks (Dumas & Dunbar, 2014), and relative originality algorithms, which measure how riginal a given idea is within a given sample (Silvia, 2008). Importantly, such an operationalization of originality stems from a heoretical orientation rooted in the history of psychometric investigations of creativity (e.g., Hocevar, 1979; Torrance, 1972), n which originality is theorized to represent the unlikeliness that a given idea will be put forward by a given participant rawn from a particular sample. Therefore, based on this theoretical standpoint, those ideas that are common in a dataset are onsidered less original than those ideas that are uncommon. When examining creative problem solving within a particular omain, such as engineering design, relative originality algorithms may be the most valid, because they allow for a high egree of objectivity in scoring (Shah, Smith, & Vargas-Hernandez, 2003; Vargas Hernandez et al., 2013), and approximate he way originality is conceptualized in the professional practice of engineering, where ideas are original only if they are arely generated in a given professional context (Passig & Cohen, 2014).

Moreover, relative originality algorithms are particularly suited to scoring the originality of creative problem solutions ithin the domain of engineering design, because designs can be coded based on the physical and working principles utilized

Shah et al., 2003; Vargas Hernandez et al., 2013). Here, a physical principle refers to the general aspect of a design that allows or a problem to be solved. For example, mechanical and chemical physical principles, among others, may be utilized. Further,

working principle refers to the particular way in which a psychical principle is instantiated in a given design. For example, echanical solutions for preventing snow accumulation on a surface may be instantiated by a number of particular working

rinciples including; covers, vibration, or wipers. (See Table 1 for a full list of physical and working principles utilized in his study.) This method for modeling designs is consistent with the functional representation system popularized by Pahl, eitz, Feldhusen, and Grote (2007) and serving as a foundation for a function-based modeling system in engineering design Hirtz, Stone, McAdams, Szykman, & Wood, 2002).

While previous research has investigated the efficacy of the TRIZ method in terms of the creative performance of designers, hat creative performance was frequently assessed in terms of only one component of creative problem solving, such as uency or originality (e.g., Nordstrom & Korpelainen, 2011). Indeed, studies of changes in fluency and originality in response o TRIZ instruction have been limited (Dumas & Schmidt, 2015). In this study, we examined changes in the performance f engineering design students associated with the TRIZ method in terms of both of these components of creative problem olving.

.2. TRIZ method

TRIZ is an acronym for the Russian Teoriya Resheniya Izobretatelskikh Zadatch, meaning theory of inventive problem solving.

he TRIZ method is a systematic process that has been used for decades to support design engineers’ creative problem solving, rst formulated by Soviet naval engineer Genrich Altshuller. In the TRIZ method, Altshuller (1996) sought to objectively escribe the creative process, and construct a mechanism for the systematic support of human designing of invention. herefore, Altshuller posited the TRIZ method, which includes application of inventive principles in appropriate design

52 D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66

Table 1 Complete physical and working principle counts.

Physical Principle Working Principle Count Relative Originality Score

Mechanical Controller of Light (Flash or Blink) 3 9.923 Cover (stationary) 22 9.437 Cover + Geometry 14 9.642 Cover + Motion 15 9.616 Geometry 38 9.028 Geometry + motion 8 9.795 Geometry + Sweeping 1 9.974 Material 2 9.949 Material + Cover 2 9.949 Motion 9 9.77 Pressure 23 9.412 Sweeping (e.g. wiper) 37 9.054 Vibration 30 9.233 Cover + Motion + Sweep 1 9.974 Wash (Liquid) 7 9.821 Sweeping (e.g. wiper) + cover 2 9.949 Cover + Pressure 1 9.974 Geometry + Controller of Light 1 9.974 Geometry + Motion + Sweep 1 9.974

Heat Electrical Resistance 69 8.235 Incandescent Source 8 9.795 LED Source 3 9.923 Incandescent + LED Sources 13 9.668 Laser Source 3 9.923 Microwave Source 1 9.974

Mechanical + Heat Geometry + Electrical Resistance 1 9.974 Pressure + Electrical Resistance 6 9.847 Sweeping + Electrical Resistance 2 9.949 Vibration + Electrical Resistance 1 9.974 Cover + Electrical Resistance 4 9.898 Wash+Electrical Resistance 1 9.974

Tribology Microgeometry (coatings) 23 9.412 Mechanical + Tribology Geometry + Microgeometry 1 9.974

Cover + Microgeometry 6 9.847 Chemical Antifreeze 11 9.719

Heat Generation 4 9.898 Optical Reflection 2 9.949

Added Light Configuration 6 9.847 Separate LEDS into Smaller Units 1 9.974 Use New Colors w/Lights or Filters 1 9.974

Mechanical + Optical Geometry + Reflection 2 9.949 Geometry + Cover + Reflection 2 9.949

Cover + Added Light Configuration 1 9.974

Mechanical + Chemical Wiper + Antifreeze 2 9.949 Heat + Chemical Electrical Resistance + Antifreeze 1 9.974

situations. TRIZ inventive principles are generalized from the analysis of millions of patents from around the world (Cascini & Russo, 2007). Some examples of TRIZ inventive principles are segmentation (No. 1), change dimensionality (No. 17), feedback (No. 23), and phase transitions (No. 36; Shulyak & Rodman, 1998).

Importantly, these TRIZ principles are designed to be highly generalizable, and designers must relate them to the particular tasks or problems at hand. Moreover, the TRIZ inventive principles are explicitly formulated to help designers solve what Altshuller (1996) termed design technical contradictions, which occur when an improvement in one engineering aspect of a design creates or exacerbates another engineering problem. In the TRIZ method, technical contradictions are represented as a conflict between two of a set of 39 engineering parameters (e.g., weight of a non-moving object, temperature, speed) defined by Altshuller. TRIZ materials include a contradiction matrix, a table of possible design trade-offs which designers use to identify the inventive principles that have been found to be applicable to a given design contradiction. Therefore, the TRIZ method requires designers to discern both the salient design contradictions, and the relation of the relevant inventive principles to a given problem. Further, the principal goal of TRIZ is to improve the creative problem solving of engineers by helping them confront existing problems in previously unthought-of ways (Altshuller, 1996; Mann, 2001).

There is evidence in the engineering design literature that the TRIZ method accomplishes this goal, especially in terms of the originality of concepts generated for a design task and the number of new patents professional engineers are able

to produce (Birdi, Leach, & Magadley, 2012; Cascini & Russo, 2007; Vargas Hernandez et al., 2013). However, important questions remain about how the TRIZ method triggers creative problem solving in the mind of an engineer. For instance, what aspects of creative problem solving change when using the TRIZ method? And what cognitive abilities can predict engineering design students’ ability to be successful when applying the TRIZ method? In this investigation, we sought to

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D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66 53

nswer these questions by measuring inventive problem solving before and after engineering design students learned the RIZ method, and by using cognitive abilities such as divergent thinking, working memory, and relational reasoning to redict the outcomes of those problem solving efforts.

.3. Predictors of creative problem solving

Given the importance of creative problem solving to the engineering design process, and the high value placed on inno- ative performance both in engineering education (e.g., Charyton, 2014; Passig & Cohen, 2014) and professional practice Christensen & Schunn, 2007), this study sought to identify cognitive abilities that might predict performance outcomes. he three predictors of creative problem solving utilized here were (a) divergent thinking, (b) working memory, and (c) elational reasoning. Each of these variables will be briefly described.

.3.1. Divergent thinking In the literature, perhaps the most widely measured predictor of creative problem solving is divergent thinking (Plucker

Makel, 2010), which involves the generation a variety of ideas (Hudson, 1968; Torrance, 1972). Importantly, divergent hinking tasks are almost always domain-general, meaning they rely as little as possible on knowledge that is specific to any articular topic or field of learning (Guilford, 1950; Silvia, 2011). Despite their domain-general character, divergent thinking asks have also been shown to be good predictors of innovative problem solving in domain-specific contexts. For example, unco, Millar, Acar, and Cramond, (2010) found that scores on a divergent thinking test taking during childhood predicted dults’ professional creative activities (e.g., publications) even 50 years later.

In the domain of engineering design, divergent thinking tasks have been used to predict ideation (Charyton, Jagacinski, errill, Clifton, & DeDios, 2011; Noguchi, 1997), but results from this endeavor have been mixed. For example, Charyton et al.

2011) determined that divergent thinking was closely linked to creative problem solving in engineering design. In contrast, pedoe and Schunn (2013) concluded that domain-specific knowledge, including design strategies, was more predictive of esign success. Interestingly, some in the engineering community (e.g., Shah et al., 2012a, 2012b) are working to develop omain-specific tests of divergent thinking that would indicate engineering student skill at ideation. However, validation of hese measures is ongoing. In the current examination, we aimed to parse the effect of domain-general divergent thinking rom that of other cognitive abilities in order to understand better its unique contributors to creative problem solving within he domain of engineering design.

.3.2. Working memory The cognitive system that allows for the temporary storage and manipulation of multiple pieces of information is often

ermed working memory (Baddeley, 1992). In the literature, working memory has been strongly linked to a host of mental unctions such as learning (e.g., Schweppe & Rummer, 2014), intelligence (e.g., Unsworth, Fukuda, Awh, Vogel, 2014), reading omprehension (Kendeou, Papadopoulos, & Spanoudis, 2012), and academic success in a wide array of domains, including ngineering (Baddeley, 2003). However, the role of working memory in creative problem solving is not yet well understood Fugate, Zentall, & Gentry, 2013; Vartanian et al., 2013). Some researchers have argued that working memory capacity is nrelated or even negatively related to domain-general divergent thinking ability (e.g., Fugate et al., 2013; Takeuchi et al., 011). However, domain-specific innovative processing, such as engineering design ideation, requires the simultaneous onsideration of many pieces of information for successful idea generation (Charyton, 2014; Shah et al., 2013). Therefore, orking memory may play an important role in engineering design. Moreover, because working memory capacity can affect

ndividuals’ ability on a range of cognitive tasks, it is widely included in cognitive investigations as a control variable (Conway Kovacs, 2013). In this investigation, working memory will be incorporated in predictive models of creative problem solving

n engineering design.

.3.3. Relational reasoning The role of analogical reasoning, or the ability to discern patterns of relational similarity among multiple pieces of

nformation, in the creative process has long been of interest in the creative problem solving literature generally (Johnson- aird, 1989), and the engineering design literature specifically (Chan et al., 2011; Linsey, Markman, & Wood, 2012; Vargas ernandez et al., 2013). Analogical reasoning has been positively linked to creative problem solving not only psychologically

e.g., De Acedo & Closas, 2011) but also neurologically, in terms of the brain regions (e.g., the rostrolateral pre-frontal cortex) ssociated with both processes (e.g., Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang, & Dunbar, 2012).

Moreover, in engineering design, a number of methods that explicitly utilize analogies to support designers’ creative roblem solving have emerged. For example, the Synectics method has long utilized four different types of analogies (i.e., irect, fantasy, personal, and symbolic) to support design success (Gordon, 1961). More recently, the WordTree method as developed to aid designers in identifying salient analogies that may support the development of an original design

Linsey et al., 2012). Further, the bio-inspired design movement has encouraged designers to analogically map attributes rom a biological system onto their designs (e.g., Chakrabarti, 2013; Vattam, Helms, & Goel, 2010). For example, Sartori, al, and Chakrabarti (2010) have developed the SAPPhiRE model that includes four steps (i.e., formulate search objectives, earch for biological analogs, analyze biological analogs, and transfer) for successfully mapping a biological analogy onto

54 D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66

an engineering design problem. While Synectics, WordTree, and SAPPhiRE differ in important ways, they share an explicit reliance on analogical reasoning to support creative problem solving the engineering design.

The TRIZ method has also been described as being implicitly reliant on analogical reasoning, because relations of similarity inherently play a part in the TRIZ-supported design process (Jeong & Kim, 2014; Vargas Hernandez et al., 2013). However, unlike explicitly analogical design methods such as those just described, the TRIZ method requires a variety of relations to be mapped between the source material and the problem at hand (Altshuller, 1996; Shulyak & Rodman, 1998). For instance, analogy and relational similarity may not strongly pertain to the use of the TRIZ contradiction matrix, which explicitly requires a relation of incompatibility to be mapped between multiple ideas. Interestingly, recent work by Arlitt et al. (2012) has explored the impact of the selection of such technical contradiction parameters on the process of ideation. Therefore, a broader construct that includes a variety of relational mappings may be more appropriately linked to design success using the TRIZ method.

In the educational psychology literature, where analogy and the discernment of similarities it requires are perennially linked to creative problem solving, a variety of other types of structural relations (e.g., deviance, incompatibility, and opposi- tion) have also been implicated as critical for complex thought (Chi, 2013; Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Holyoak, 2012). Therefore, analogical reasoning may best be conceptualized as a form of a larger construct termed relational reasoning, which comprises the human ability to discern meaningful patterns of any type, not just similarity, within any informational stream (Alexander & the DRLRL, 2012; Alexander, Dumas, Grossnickle, List, & Firetto, 2015; Dumas, Alexander, & Grossnickle, 2013).

In addition to analogy, relational reasoning has been conceptualized as including anomaly, or any deviation from an established pattern (Klahr & Dunbar 1988; Tricket, Trafton, & Schunn, 2009). For example, when designers are conceptu- alizing potential weaknesses or flaws in a design, they are likely to be reasoning with anomalies by looking for systematic deviations in the product’s performance data (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990).

Similarly, engineering designers are required to discern salient contradictions or trade-offs within a product or system (Altshuller, 1996). For example, in the design of any type of flying vehicle there is a natural tradeoff between the weight of the vehicle and the strength to withstand impact. Such a realization constitutes recognition of an antinomy, which is predicated on a relation of incompatibility or mutual exclusivity among multiple sets of information (Dumas, Alexander, Baker, Jablansky, & Dunbar, 2014).

Finally, engineering design frequently requires the management of two (or more) opposing forces (Shulyak & Rodman, 1998). For example, the change to a thinner-walled plastic water bottle will increase the chance of failure by buckling which was never a significant failure mode prior to the change. Therefore, antitheses, or relations based on directly opposing ideas (Bianchi, Savardi, & Kubovy, 2011; Sinatra & Broughton, 2011) may also play an important role in the design process. These four types of relational reasoning (i.e., analogy, anomaly, antinomy, and antithesis) have jointly been implicated as critical in a wide variety of complex academic domains including reading (Rapp & Kendeou, 2009), chemistry (Bellocchi & Ritchie, 2011), and medicine (Dumas et al., 2014). In this examination, we aim to empirically investigate the predictive potential of relational reasoning and its forms to creative problem solving in engineering design.

Therefore, although the aforementioned forms of relational reasoning have yet to be explicitly linked to engineering design; there is reason to hypothesize that they should individually and collectively play an important role in creative problem solving within engineering design. It was the purpose of this investigation to investigate those potential roles in relation to the TRIZ intervention, as well as other relevant cognitive factors. As such, we formulated the following questions to be investigated in this study:

1. How does creative problem solving performance on an engineering design task differ in terms of fluency and originality before and after TRIZ instruction?

2. What are the relative contributions of divergent thinking, working memory, and relational reasoning, to performance on an engineering design task?

3. Do the four forms of relational reasoning independently contribute to creative performance on an engineering design task?

2. Method

2.1. Participants

Participants for this study were 44 graduate students at a large mid-Atlantic American university (32 male; 72.7%). At the time of their participation, students were enrolled in a mechanical engineering graduate design course at the university. Participants ranged in age from 22 to 33 years old, with a mean age of 25.36 years old (SD = 2.48). The sample was diverse, with 38.6% (n = 17) of the students reporting their ethnicity as White, 9.1% of students reporting their ethnicity as African

American/Black (n = 4); 18.2% of students reporting their ethnicity as Hispanic/Latino (n = 8); and 34.1% reporting their ethnicity as Asian (n = 15). Also, 75% of the sample reported English as their first language (n = 33). Participants reported a mean grade point average of 3.28 (SD = 0.41) on a four point scale, with GPAs ranging from 3 to 4. 34.1% (n = 15) of the sample reported working full-time as engineers at the time of the study, while the remainder were full-time graduate students.

D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66 55

2

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Fig. 1. A snow-covered LED traffic light, such as the one included in the traffic light problem.

.2. TRIZ instruction

This study investigated participants’ creative problem solving before and after TRIZ instruction in the use of the TRIZ ontradiction Matrix. TRIZ materials are designed to be able to be effectively utilized with minimal instruction, so long as he designer has adequate engineering background knowledge (Shulyak & Rodman, 1998). Because our participants were raduate level engineering students who had demonstrated success at the undergraduate level, this necessary level of ackground knowledge was assumed. However, previous studies (e.g., Okudan, Ogot, & Shirwaiker, 2006; Vargas Hernandez t al., 2013) have shown that TRIZ materials may require some specific explanation in order to be used effectively, even by nowledgeable engineers.

Therefore, TRIZ instruction for this study not only included the dissemination of official TRIZ materials, including the ontradiction matrix, list of 39 engineering parameters and list of 40 inventive principles (Altshuller, 1996), but also a etailed explanation of the structure, purpose, and meaning of these materials. The instructor also presented examples of ow design problems could be modeled as technical contradictions between engineering parameters, and demonstrated he use of the contradiction matrix and list of inventive principles. Instruction did not end until all of participants’ questions bout the TRIZ method and materials were answered, and they felt comfortable using the method for creative problem olving. TRIZ instruction took approximately 50 min of class-time.

.3. Outcome measure

In order to measure students’ creative design process adequately, the fluency and originality of solutions to a particular esign problem-solving task was utilized as our outcome measure. Participants’ generated design solutions to the task both efore and after TRIZ instruction, focusing on an existing problem in colder climates in the US – complications with the use f LED traffic lights.

Because of detrimental environmental effects associated with wasting energy, one of the most important aspects of mod- rn engineering design is energy efficiency. However, sometimes energy-efficient designs have unintended consequences. or example, many towns and cities in the U.S. have recently replaced older incandescent light bulbs traditionally used in raffic lights with newer, more efficient light emitting diodes (LEDs). LEDs use much less energy than traditional incandes- ent bulbs, partly because they produce much less heat. Unfortunately, because of this reduced heat production, ice and now can accumulate on LED traffic lights making travel dangerous during winter months. This situation made national ews because of the traffic accidents that occurred, and one such news article (i.e., Ramde, 2009) was adapted for use in this tudy, and is hereafter referred to as the traffic light problem. Fig. 1 is an image associated with the traffic light problem—an ce and snow covered traffic light. The experimental task involved recording solutions to resolve the traffic light problem.

.3.1. Scoring fluency and originality Solutions to the traffic-light problem were scored in two ways to create separate variables for analysis. First, participants’

ritten responses were scored for the total number of non-redundant solutions offered. In this case, non-redundant refers o ideas that a participant generated that were each different from one another, with no two ideas being precisely the same esign repeated. This count became the measure of fluency.

Next, all responses were scored using a specific formula developed by Shah et al. (2003) to calculate the relative originality f each generated problem solution, based on the other solutions produced by the sample of participants. That algorithm as:

( N of all ideas generated − N of particular idea generated )

Originality = N of all ideas generated

× 10

he equation above describes the a posteriori method of calculating originality (or novelty, Shah et al., 2003). Specifically, this ormula assessed originality of a given idea or generated design using a calculation relative to the existence of similar ideas

56 D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66

in a sample. Formulas such as this one have been utilized for decades in the creative problem solving literature (Silvia, 2008; Torrance, 1972). In fact, this originality metric was developed from creativity work by Torrance (1962, 1964) and Jansson and Smith (1991), by Shah et al. (2003). Ideation metrics such as these are commonly used in engineering design literature pertaining to creative problem solving (e.g., Vargas Hernandez et al., 2013). In this investigation, the originality values of each idea that a given participant produced was averaged to produce a mean originality score for each participant. Further, each participant’s maximum originality score was also saved in the dataset

2.3.2. Coding physical and working principles Physical and working principles are related to the well-established functional decomposition process of representing

mechanical designs and have been fruitfully utilized previously in many published examinations of the engineering design process (e.g., Hirtz et al., 2002; Pahl et al., 2007; Shah et al., 2003; Vargas Hernandez et al., 2013). In this study, generated ideas were first coded based on the physical principle at work, and then further based on the working principle on which a physical device would be based.

The physical principles that participants utilized to solve the traffic light problem were (a) mechanical (e.g., using a windshield wiper to wipe away the snow), (b) heat (e.g., using electrical resistance coils to melt the snow), (c) tribology (e.g., lubricating the bulbs so snow will slide off), (d) chemical (e.g., spraying antifreeze on the bulbs), and (e) optical (e.g., adding more LEDs so light will be bright enough to shine through snow). Combinations of each of these physical principles (e.g., mechanical and chemical) were also observed and coded.

Then, ideas representing each of these physical principles were further coded according to the working principle they utilized. Importantly, problem solutions based on the same physical principles, may not share the same working principle. For example, ideas using a mechanical physical principle used a variety of working principles including wipers, vibrating traffic lights, and spinning traffic lights to combat the snow. An example of one of these ideas is depicted in Fig. 2, where a participant put forward an idea for a spring-loaded light cover for each bulb of a traffic light. Ideas using the heat physical principle utilized a variety of working principles to generate that heat including electrical resistance, incandescent bulbs, and microwaves. An example of the heat physical principle is also available in Fig. 2, where a participant conceptualized resistance-coils affixed to the traffic light. Moreover, tribological solutions used a variety of lubricants and application methods, and chemical solutions utilized a variety of chemicals. Finally, optical solutions used working principles, such as reflection, to generate or redirect light with mirrors. Combinations of working principles were also coded.

In accordance with previous work in the engineering design literature (e.g., Shah et al., 2003), ideas were only designated as the same if both their physical and working principles were shared. A total of 45 separate ideas were identified in our sample, with the single most popular being the use of electrical resistance coils to heat the traffic light and melt snow. A total of 20% of the problem solutions were independently coded by both the first and second author with a high level of reliability (� = 0.89). Therefore, the second author coded the remainder of the problem solutions. A complete count of physical principles and working principles coded in our sample is available in Table 1.

2.4. Predictive measures

2.4.1. Divergent thinking As our measure of divergent thinking, we administered the Uses of Objects Task (UOT), a psychometric test that requires

participants to generate multiple original uses for a given every day object, was utilized in this study (Guilford, 1950). The UOT has been widely used for the measurement of divergent thinking for many years (Guilford, 1950; Hudson, 1968; Torrance, 1972). In this study, the UOT was administered to the students in class, and the object they were asked to consider was a tin can. Specifically, the engineering design students were directed to: “list as many interesting or unusual uses for a tin can as you can think of.”

Participants were given 10 min to complete the task. Afterward, the number of uses each participant produced was tallied, and the total count was used as their score for the UOT. In this way, the UOT was scored in terms of fluency.

2.4.2. Working memory In this investigation, we measured working memory capacity with the Shapebuilder task (Sprenger et al., 2013). The

Shapebuilder task requires participants to maintain a mental representation of serially presented shapes (e.g., circle, square, or triangle) and recall those shapes in sequential order. In addition to order of presentation, the various shapes differed in number displayed, their color, and their location on a grid. Each participant has 15 min to be presented with varying serially presented strings of shapes. Each shape in a string correctly recalled earns a participant a certain number of points, calculated based on the number of varying dimensions associated with that shape, and the length of the strong of shapes being recalled. Because of its interactive nature, Shapebuilder is necessarily administered to participants on a computer. In this investigation, participants completed the Shapebuilder task outside of class via the Internet. A screenshot of the Shapebuilder task is included in Fig. 4.

2.4.3. Test of Relational Reasoning In order to assess the participants’ ability to discern meaningful patterns within given information, we administered the

TORR (Alexander et al., 2015). The TORR (� = 0.83) is a 32-item reasoning test, designed to limit the need for participant prior

D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66 57

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b

Fig. 2. Example solutions to traffic light problem using mechanical and heat physical principles respectively.

nowledge, and language through the use of graphical, non-linguistic items. This reasoning measure is comprised of four cales representing each of the four forms of relational reasoning previously described (i.e., analogy, anomaly, antinomy, nd antithesis). Each scale consisted of two practice items followed by eight test items. A sample item from the antinomy cale is included in Fig. 3. In this item, a participant is required to decide which of the answer sets is mutually exclusive with he given set. In this study, the TORR was administered during class time, in paper and pencil form. Students were given as

uch time as they needed to complete the TORR, with no participant taking longer than 1 h. On the TORR, each item was orth 1 point, and the therefore the total number of items that a participant answered correctly on either the whole test or

n individual scale was their score on the TORR or a scale, respectively.

.5. Procedure

Prior to receiving TRIZ instruction and completing the traffic light problem, participants completed the TORR, Shape- uilder, and the UOT. As previously mentioned, the TORR and the UOT were both administered to participants during class

58 D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66

Fig. 3. Sample item from the TORR antinomy scale.

Fig. 4. Screenshot of Shapebuilder task.

in paper and pencil form, while Shapebuilder was completed outside of class via the internet. Then, the traffic-light problem and TRIZ instruction were administered. In the engineering design literature pertaining to TRIZ, between-subjects exper- iments exist (Okudan et al., 2006), however, investigations of the cognitive changes associated with TRIZ instruction are more rare. Because the changing cognitive processes of students are of paramount interest here, and within-subjects study designs are uniquely suited for capturing such changes (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2013), a within-subjects design was adopted for this study.

Specifically, the graduate students first completed the traffic light problem individually without the aid of any text or instructional tool, using their own intuition and experience, and engineering knowledge. They were given 20 min for this ideation period with most finishing much sooner than 20 min and then their ideas were collected. The participating students were then given a 50-min lecture on the use of the TRIZ Contradiction Matrix with official TRIZ materials, and a copy of the lecture materials including a worked example. Finally, the students revisited the traffic light problem with explicit instructions to apply the TRIZ method to their individual ideation process. Thirty minutes were allotted for this ideation session and participant ideas were collected at the end of the period.

Importantly, applying the TRIZ Contradiction Matrix strategy is much more time consuming than using one’s intuition and experience to generate ideas. Users must first represent the design problem as one or more valid technical contradictions using the TRIZ set of 39 engineering parameters. Earlier implementations of this experiment showed that few participants

were able to generate multiple ideas to solve the LED traffic light problem in a 30-min ideation period, and some students did not get any solutions. Therefore, the graduate students were asked to apply the TRIZ method to the design task (without the benefit of their in-class work) as a homework assignment with a two-hour time limit. Participants submitted their work one-week later. The homework assignment results were coded for this analysis. It should be noted that the procedures

D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66 59

Table 2 TRIZ-related outcome variables before and after instruction.

Variable Sample Mean (SD) t p d

Pre-TRIZ Post-TRIZ

Fluency 5.09 (2.65) 4.11 (2.02) −2.26 .029* 0.389

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Originality (Mean) 9.17 (.32) 9.31 (.26) 2.15 .038* 0.413 Originality (Max) 9.69 (.41) 9.77 (.21) 1.58 0.121 0.210

ote: * p < 0.05.

ollowed in this study were approved by our university Institutional Review Board, and all of the ethical guidelines of the merican Psychological Association were followed during the collection and analysis of these data.

.6. Results and implications

.6.1. Creative problem solving before and after TRIZ instruction In general, this work is situated within an empiricist, or positivist, tradition, in which the understanding of psychological

henomena (e.g., creative problem solving) is driven by the collection of reliable empirical data. Therefore, the data collected hrough this described procedure was analyzed, and inferences concerning the nature of creative problem solving were rawn from that analysis. Therefore, means, standard deviations, and paired-sample t-test values for fluency and originality both mean and maximum), as well as associated effect sizes (d), are depicted in Table 2. Significant differences form pre o post instruction were found both in terms of fluency and average originality of ideas. However, these differences were n opposite directions. Specifically, the participating students produced significantly fewer ideas after TRIZ instruction, but he ideas they did produce were significantly more original on average.

This finding suggests that, prior to TRIZ instruction, the graduate students were using a basic individually-based ideation trategy: searching for problem solutions in a non-systematic way and putting forward each of the ideas that crossed their ind. However, because many participants thought of ideas with the same few physical and working principles, these pre-

RIZ ideas received significantly lower originality scores on average. These findings suggest that post-TRIZ participants’ use f the TRIZ Contradiction Matrix enabled the production of ideas with a greater variety of physical and working principles, nd less redundancy among the ideas in the sample. Therefore, the ideas received significantly greater originality scores on verage. Interestingly, while maximum originality scores did rise from pre to post-TRIZ, they did not differ significantly. This nding may imply that, because of the greater number of ideas produced pre-TRIZ, participants were somewhat likely to chieve a high level of originality with at least one idea.

.7. Predictors of creative problem solving

Next, the predictive relations among the individual difference and TRIZ-related outcome variables were examined. A full ivariate correlation matrix with each collected variable, including a breakdown of the TORR by scale, is available in Table 3. he ability of each collected individual difference variable (i.e., relational reasoning, working memory capacity, and divergent hinking) to predict fluency and originality before and after TRIZ was examined using multiple regression. Specifically, six

ultiple regression models were run, each predicting a different outcome variable associated with creative problem solving n engineering design before or after TRIZ, and using scores on the TORR, Shapebuilder, and the UOT as predictor variables. ll of these models significantly predicted their respective outcome variable. R2 and F-test values associated with each of

hese six regression models are available in Table 4. Interestingly, our three predictor variables accounted for the greatest roportion of variance when predicting post-TRIZ average originality, the same outcome variable that significantly increased fter TRIZ instruction. This finding implies that the cognitive abilities tapped by our individual difference measures are related n an important way to the cognitive processes required for the successful application of the TRIZ method to engineering esign.

.7.1. Differences among predictor variables While each of the already mentioned multiple regression models significantly predicted its outcome variable, the pre-

ictive ability of each of the individual predictor variables (i.e., TORR, Shapebuilder, and UOT) differed depending on the utcome variable. Beta values associated with each predictor variable for each regression model are available in Table 5. or example, after controlling for both relational reasoning ability and working memory capacity, the UOT significantly redicted fluency both pre and post-TRIZ, but did not significantly predict originality (mean or max) either before or after

nstruction. Moreover, the UOT predicted fluency best before TRIZ, implying that the divergent thinking ability tapped by he UOT is most strongly related to pre-TRIZ ideation. Importantly, because the UOT was itself scored in terms of fluency in

his investigation, its predictive relation to fluency on the traffic-light problem makes theoretical sense.

Further, the Shapebuilder task was not a significant predictor of any of the outcome variables after controlling for relational easoning ability and divergent thinking in our multiple regression models, despite being significantly correlated to many f the outcome variables bivariately (Table 3). This pattern of relations may imply that much of the variance in fluency and

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Table 3 Bivariate correlation matrix.

TORR Analogy Scale

Anomaly Scale

Antinomy Scale

Antithesis Scale

Shapebuilder UOT Pre-TRIZ Fluency

Pre-TRIZ Original- ity (Mean)

Pre-TRIZ Original- ity (Max)

Post-TRIZ Fluency

Post-TRIZ Original- ity (Mean)

Post-TRIZ Original- ity (Max)

TORR 1.00 Analogy Scale 0.899** 1.00 Anomaly Scale 0.891** .727** 1.00 Antinomy Scale 0.817** 0.633** 0.622** 1.00 Antithesis Scale 0.883** 0.719** 0.750** 0.602** 1.00 Shapebuilder 0.487** 0.419** 0.354** 0.419** 0.503** 1.00 UOT 0.341* 0.322* 0.275 0.280 0.310* 0.319* 1.00 . Pre-TRIZ Fluency 0.350* 0.291 0.341* 0.382* 0.207 0.346* 0.575** 1.00 Pre-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.590** 0.517** 0.510** 0.457** .566** 0.473** 0.347* 0.337* 1.00 Pre-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.433** 0.428** 0.417** 0.385** 0.276 0.173 0.233 0.292 0.433** 1.00 Post-TRIZ Fluency 0.586** 0.571** 0.468** 0.476** 0.522** 0.405** 0.530** 0.489** 0.366* 0.220 1.00 Post-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.678** 0.489** 0.616** 0.670** 0593** 0.443* 0.320* 0.346* 0.518** 0.282 0.413** 1.00 Post-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.684** 0.559** 0.618** 0.647** 0.560** 0.363 0.257 0.327 0.392** 0.548** 0.322* 0.799** 1.00

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66 61

Table 4 R-square values for regression models.

Outcome Variable R2 F p

Pre-TRIZ Fluency 0.37 7.83 <0.001 Pre-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.41 9.13 <0.001 Pre-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.23 3.92 0.015 Post-TRIZ Fluency 0.47 11.93 <0.001 Post-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.48 12.40 <0.001 Post-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.46 11.77 <0.001

Table 5 Beta values for regression models.

Outcome variable Predictor Variables

TORR Shapebuilder UOT

Pre-TRIZ Fluency 0.12 0.13 0.50** Pre-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.44** 0.22 0.12 Pre-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.49** 0.21 0.3 Post-TRIZ Fluency 0.42** 0.08 0.36** Post-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.59** 0.13 0.08 Post-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.66** 0.03 0.01

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table 6 R-square values for scale-score regression models.

Outcome Variable R2 F p

Pre-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.36 5.42 0.001 Pre-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.24 3.10 0.026

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Post-TRIZ Fluency 0.36 5.58 0.001 Post-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.54 11.29 <0.001 Post-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.49 9.72 <0.001

riginality post-TRIZ that was accounted for by Shapebuilder was also explained by the TORR or the UOT, leaving Shapebuilder ith little predictive power after these other variables were entered into the model. However, because working memory

apacity has been strongly implicated as relevant to both relational reasoning ability and divergent thinking (Fugate et al., 013; Waltz et al., 1999), it remains important in these models as a control variable.

In our regression models, the TORR was the only variable to significantly predict the originality of ideas, both before and fter TRIZ instruction. This finding suggests that relational reasoning may crucially relate to an individual’s ability to produce deas that utilize original physical and working principles, even when working memory capacity and divergent thinking bility are controlled for. Moreover, while both the UOT and Shapebuilder predicted the outcome variables better before RIZ instruction, the TORR predicted more strongly after TRIZ instruction. These findings suggests that relational reasoning, bove and beyond the other variables included in this investigation, was critically related to the cognitive processes required or the successful application of the TRIZ method to engineering design. The TORR also significantly predicted fluency post- RIZ, although it did not significantly predict fluency pre-TRIZ. This finding may imply that relational reasoning ability is ssociated with the observed significant reduction in total ideas produced post-TRIZ, perhaps because relational reasoning llows for the conceptualization of the potentially contradictory relations between elements of problem solutions, causing hem to be discarded in favor of more effective and original ideas.

.7.2. Forms of relational reasoning Because this investigation is the first study of which we are aware to bring the TORR, and the four forms of relational

easoning it measures, to bear on creative problem solving in engineering design, questions pertaining to the differential redictive power of the forms of relational reasoning remain. In order to address these questions, each of the outcome ariables of which the TORR was a significant predictor were regressed on participants’ scores on the four subscales of he TORR. Each of these 5 models significantly predicted its outcome variable, with R2 and F values available in Table 6. eta weights associated with each of the forms of relational reasoning are available in Table 7. Each of these Beta values ere likely attenuated due to the high level of collinearity among the scales of the TORR, and therefore only rarely reach

ignificance individually (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2013). However, the magnitude of particular values and the specific betas hat do reach significance reveal an interesting pattern. For instance, the analogy scale is the strongest predictor of fluency

ost-TRIZ, implying that an analogical process may underlie a participants’ ability to produce a greater quantity of ideas sing the TRIZ method.

Conversely, the anomaly scale was the weakest predictor of fluency, but predicted originality more strongly than the nalogy scale did. The antithesis scale predicted each outcome variable relatively equally, implying the ability to concep-

62 D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66

Table 7 Standardized beta values for scale-score regression models.

Outcome Variable Predictor Variables

Analogy Anomaly Antinomy Antithesis

Pre-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.326 0.090 0.113 0.146 Pre-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.291 0.175 0.287 0.255 Post-TRIZ Fluency 0.357 0.036 0.151 0.200 Post-TRIZ Originality (Mean) 0.176 0.284 0.471** 0.223

Post-TRIZ Originality (Max) 0.051 0.275 0.397* 0.178

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

tualize oppositional relations may be associated similarly with both fluency and originality before and after TRIZ. Perhaps most importantly, the only scale that significantly predicted an outcome variable after each of the other scales were con- trolled for was the antinomy scale. Specifically, the beta values associated with the antinomy scale reached significance when predicting originality, both mean and maximum, post-TRIZ. The finding suggests that the ability to recognize relations of mutual exclusivity or incompatibility may be particularly strongly linked to a participant’s ability to produce ideas using the TRIZ method that utilize relatively original physical and working principles. Given that the TRIZ method is predicated on the need for engineering designers to recognize and eliminate contradictions or trade-offs, which are conceptually similar to the relational incompatibilities present on the antinomy scale of the TORR, it makes theoretical sense that an ability to reason with antinomies would be strongly linked to success using the TRIZ method.

3. Conclusion

This study represents a systematic examination of the efficacy of the TRIZ method for engineering design in terms of the fluency and relative originality of engineering problem solutions. Further, the predictive relations among fluency, originality, and cognitive abilities such as relational reasoning, working memory capacity, and divergent thinking were examined. The ability of individual forms of relational reasoning to predict fluency and originality before and after TRIZ instruction were also investigated. As such, three main conclusions can be drawn from this investigation that can be widely applied to engineering design education and practice: (a) when using the TRIZ method, designers produce significantly fewer ideas, but those ideas are significantly more original on average, (b) relational reasoning ability is a strong predictor of a designer’s ability to be fluent and original with the TRIZ method, and (c) antinomous reasoning, more than any other form of relational reasoning is a good predictor of a designer’s ability to produce ideas using relatively original physical and working principles. Each of these conclusions will now be further discussed.

3.1. Changes in fluency and originality

In the creative problem solving literature, the relation between fluency and originality is much debated (Dumas & Dunbar, 2014). Most modern examinations of the relation between these two components of creative problem solving have argued that fluency and originality are positively related, in some cases very strongly so (Silvia, 2008). Indeed, this investigation did uncover uniformly positive correlations between originality and fluency. However, one important way that these two constructs diverge was also uncovered in this study. Specifically, fluency and originality were both observed to change significantly after TRIZ instruction, but those changes were in opposite directions, with participants becoming significantly less fluent and more original when using the TRIZ method. Because the TRIZ method explicitly strives to make it easier for designers to eliminate problem solutions with an inherent contradiction or trade-off, the observed decrease in produced ideas post-TRIZ could mean that such ideas were being rejected by the designer.

Nonetheless, the observed increase in originality also implies that the TRIZ method allows designers to tap more rarely used physical and working principles for their ideas, therefore broadening the body of potential problem solutions. Because the TRIZ method has been previously found to increase the effectiveness of designers working in professional settings, especially in terms of the originality of ideas (Shah et al., 2003; Vargas Hernandez et al., 2013), we may conclude that this observed effectiveness is related to the increase in the originality of ideas. Of course, if a designer produces a solution to a given problem that utilizes never before tapped physical and working principles, they may apply for a patent to protect their idea. Yet, no matter how many already-thought-of ideas a designer produces, no new patents can be filed. Therefore, the current research supports previously published findings about the efficacy of the TRIZ method, but adds specific information as to how and why TRIZ works.

3.2. Relational reasoning predicts creative problem solving

In this investigation, we found that, even after all the other variables in our models were controlled for, the TORR was a consistently significant predictor of fluency and originality using the TRIZ method. This finding suggests that relational reasoning ability may be crucially linked to creative ability in cognitively demanding domains such as engineering design.

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D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66 63

urther, this finding highlights the potential to use the TORR, a culture-fair psychometric measure of relational reasoning bility, to identify students with a high potential to benefit from the TRIZ method, and to succeed in engineering design by irtue of their high relational reasoning ability. Finally, explicit instruction in relational reasoning strategies for engineering esign students may support design success and creative problem solving. Instruction of strategies for relational reasoning as demonstrated success in other cognitively demanding domains such as mathematics (Richland & McDonough, 2010), nd may be an important next step for research in engineering design education.

.3. Antinomous reasoning and TRIZ success

Of the four forms of relational reasoning included on the TORR, antinomous reasoning was the strongest predictor of TRIZ uccess. Specifically, even after each of the other forms of relational reasoning were controlled for, antinomous reasoning ignificantly predicted originality (both mean and maximum) post-TRIZ. Importantly, antinomous reasoning requires the apping of a relation of incompatibility or exclusivity among ideas. As such, antinomous reasoning is conceptually similar

o the identification of engineering design performance trade-offs or contradictions, which the TRIZ method is specifically eant to support (Altshuller, 1996). Therefore, antinomous reasoning may play a special role in the design process. Because

ntinomous reasoning, to our knowledge, has never before been brought to bear on engineering design, this finding repre- ents the identification of an important and potentially open area for research on the cognitive abilities underlying design uccess. Of the four forms of relational reasoning included on the TORR, analogical reasoning has received the greatest atten- ion in the literature (e.g., Vattam et al., 2010). However, our findings suggest a focus on antinomous reasoning within the ngineering design community may be more warranted.

Interestingly, findings in a variety of cognitively demanding domains of learning have revealed a differing pattern of mportance for the forms of relational reasoning. For example, in a recent investigation in the domain of medicine, it was ound that medical residents relied most heavily on anomalies when reasoning about a patient’s diagnosis (Dumas et al., 014). In contrast to that finding, the current study has revealed that graduate level engineering design students appear o rely most heavily on their antinomous reasoning ability when producing original problem solutions. As a fuller picture f the forms of relational reasoning and their varying importance in different domains of learning emerges in the research iterature, the field’s understanding of how these reasoning forms support human cognition and education grows—and the otential for systematically supporting each of the forms of relational reasoning in all students grows with it.

.4. Limitations and future directions

It should be noted that this investigation utilized a quasi-experimental repeated measures design, and as such, cannot e the final word on the nature of creative problem solving in engineering design. On the contrary, this study represents a reliminary foray into the predictive relation between relational reasoning and engineering design success and a number f future research endeavors are apparently worthwhile given the results of this study. For example, a fully experimental tudy, incorporating random selection and assignment, as well as a control group, would serve to fruitfully parse apart the ffects observed here. Unfortunately, fully experimental designs are often both ethically and practically impossible in the lassroom, so a laboratory study may need to suffice in that regard. Moreover, a greater number of covariates and predictor ariables could potentially be entered into a follow-up analysis. For instance, it may be interesting to ascertain which of the any other available divergent thinking tasks also predict creative problem solving in mechanical engineering, and which do

ot. Further, do other variables associated with academic success in general such as achievement motivation or intelligence lay a significant role in creative problem solving with the engineering domain?

Further, the present study was conducted entirely with individual tasks, including all of the predictive measures, and the raffic light problem itself. This individual-measurement paradigm is helpful in research, because it simplifies the structure f data for analysis; however, the individual measurement utilized in this study may also be an important limitation. This s because, in many professional engineering design contexts, designers work in teams rather than individually. Although ome group-level studies of relational reasoning in engineering design have been conducted (Chan & Schunn, 2015), the ower of relational reasoning to predict engineering design ability in teams remains largely an open question. Therefore, uture investigations into the engineering design process generally, and the role of relational reasoning within that process pecifically, may need to focus on group-level measurement of creative problem solving.

Moreover, while this investigation focused on predicting the originality and fluency of engineering design students’ cre- tive problem solutions using mainly cognitive abilities (i.e., relational reasoning, working memory, divergent thinking), on-cognitive psychological traits (e.g., personality, motivation, or emotions) may also be highly predictive of design cre- tivity. Moreover, background variables related to professional or educational experience (e.g., number of years working or tudying in a particular field) may also be meaningfully utilized as predictor variables in future research within this line of nquiry. For this reason future work on engineering design and CPS may focus more specifically on such non-cognitive traits,

ith the goal of uncovering all of the psychological variables—not only the cognitive abilities—that support engineering

esign.

Finally, while this investigation unfolded entirely quantitatively, using psychometric measures to account for variance in quantitatively coded outcome variable, qualitative or mixed-methods approaches may be fruitfully utilized in the future o explain the meaning of the quantitative findings observed here. For example, as has been pioneered by those within

64 D. Dumas et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 50–66

the literature on scientific thinking and reasoning (e.g. Chan & Schunn, 2015; Dumas et al., 2014), teams of engineering designers may be audio or video recorded while they produce design ideas. Then, those recordings may be coded for process and outcome related variables, in order to better understand precisely how relational reasoning, as a process, contributes to the process of engineering design. Indeed, only through such nuanced qualitative or mixed-methods analyses may the process of engineering design, and the psychological traits that support it, be fully understood.

In the research literature on creative problem solving and engineering design, the identification of cognitive abilities that predict creative performance is of high importance. This investigation has been a systematic investigation linking relational reasoning, working memory capacity, and divergent thinking to creative problem solving in engineering design using one of the most popular engineering design methods: TRIZ. With the growing emphasis being placed on creative problem solving and innovation from with the scientific literature (Passig & Cohen, 2014; Silvia, 2011; Vargas Hernandez, Schmidt, & Okudan, 2013), as well as governmental policy (National Science and Technology Council, 2013), it may be more important now than ever before to continue focusing engineering design education on creative problem solving. With an empirically based understanding of the cognitive abilities that underlie the design process, such as we examined in this investigation, the engineering community may develop an enhanced ability to support students’ creative problem-solving performance.

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  • Predicting creative problem solving in engineering design
    • 1 Introduction
      • 1.1 Components of creative problem solving
      • 1.2 TRIZ method
      • 1.3 Predictors of creative problem solving
        • 1.3.1 Divergent thinking
        • 1.3.2 Working memory
        • 1.3.3 Relational reasoning
    • 2 Method
      • 2.1 Participants
      • 2.2 TRIZ instruction
      • 2.3 Outcome measure
        • 2.3.1 Scoring fluency and originality
        • 2.3.2 Coding physical and working principles
      • 2.4 Predictive measures
        • 2.4.1 Divergent thinking
        • 2.4.2 Working memory
        • 2.4.3 Test of Relational Reasoning
      • 2.5 Procedure
      • 2.6 Results and implications
        • 2.6.1 Creative problem solving before and after TRIZ instruction
      • 2.7 Predictors of creative problem solving
        • 2.7.1 Differences among predictor variables
        • 2.7.2 Forms of relational reasoning
    • 3 Conclusion
      • 3.1 Changes in fluency and originality
      • 3.2 Relational reasoning predicts creative problem solving
      • 3.3 Antinomous reasoning and TRIZ success
      • 3.4 Limitations and future directions
    • References

Related Articles/Sympathy-fuels-creativity--The-beneficial-effects-o_2016_Thinking-Skills-and.pdf

Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

Sympathy fuels creativity: The beneficial effects of sympathy on originality

Hwajin Yang a,∗, Sujin Yang b,∗

a School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Level 4, 90 Stamford Road, 178903, Singapore b Department of Psychology, Ewha Womans University, South Korea

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 23 June 2015 Received in revised form 22 April 2016 Accepted 12 June 2016 Available online 16 June 2016

Keywords: Induced sympathy Trait empathy Creativity Originality Flexibility Fluency

a b s t r a c t

Sympathy is usually evoked by heightened awareness of and concern for others’ suffering by perceiving or reacting to their distress or need. Sympathetic contexts appear to spur cre- ative solutions, because those who react sympathetically to others’ suffering tend to seek novel, desirable, and prosocial solutions that alleviate suffering and promote well-being. We conducted two studies to investigate whether sympathy enhances creativity. Study 1 tested the feasibility of using images of distressed elderly as an unobtrusive method to induce sympathy. Study 2 sought to determine whether induced sympathy promotes cre- ativity, and whether individual differences in trait empathy moderate this effect. Results demonstrate that sympathy fosters creative originality – but not creative fluency or flex- ibility – as assessed by either content-general or content-specific creativity measures. In addition, the beneficial effect of sympathy on originality is moderated by individual differ- ences in trait empathy. The potential mechanisms that underlie these effects are discussed.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Sympathy1 is usually evoked by heightened awareness of and concern for others’ suffering by perceiving or reacting to their distress or need (Chismar, 1988; Decety & Michalska, 2010; Wispé, 1991). Sympathy has been regarded as one of the most valuable emotions, because it is intimately tied to prosocial and moral behaviors such as low discrimination, cooperation, sharing, helping, supporting, and protecting others (Batson, 1991, 1998; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; de Waal, 2004; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988; Holmgren, Eisenberg, & Fabes,

1998). Considerable attention has therefore been paid to the behavioral consequences of sympathy (e.g., various prosocial behaviors), while surprisingly little has been given to the cognitive consequences of sympathy. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that sympathy influences our thinking and problem-solving skills. For instance, a group of medical professionals who joined several medical mission trips to underdeveloped countries felt sympathy for the critical shortages of supplies in

∗ Corresponding authors. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (H. Yang), [email protected] (S. Yang).

1 It is noteworthy that although sympathy and empathy are often used interchangeably, they are not identical (Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986). Sympathy is sorrow for a distressed or needy person without sharing the other’s relevant emotion, while empathy also seeks to share the person’s emotional state (Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Gladstein, 1983; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010). Therefore, sympathy occurs in an emotionally negative context (e.g., pity, sorrow, or concern), whereas empathy can occur in both positive and negative emotional contexts (Wispé, 1991). For the purposes of this study, we limit our focus to sympathy and its impact on creativity.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.06.002 1871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143 133

hose countries, and was inspired to collect unused but clean surgical supplies (e.g., gloves. sutures, and drapes) that would therwise be disposed of in U.S. hospitals. Similarly, Robbins et al. (1994) found that physicians who are more sympathetic o their patients’ psychological distress tend to be more accurate in their assessments and diagnoses. These findings suggest hat the experience of sympathy may improve the ability to produce distinctive and constructive ideas, which are linked to mportant aspects of creative cognition (Ward, Smith, & Fink, 1999).

Given the lack of studies that seek to understand the cognitive outcomes of sympathy, we set out to examine the effects f sympathy on creativity—that is, the ability to generate novel and useful ideas by exploring a range of possible solutions Amabile, 1996; Decety & Michalska, 2010). A link between sympathy and creativity is plausible for several reasons. First, ympathy may foster creativity through its affective route. In general, a situation that engenders sympathy is usually linked o undesirable events; therefore, sympathetic emotions are considered to be negative emotions. Regarding the link between egative emotions and creativity, the feelings-as-information model suggests that negative emotions signal problems that equire greater effort and improvement, and therefore stimulate creativity when making changes or seeking adequate olutions (Frijda, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 2003). In a related vein, the mood-as-input model suggests that negative emotions ignal problems or danger in a given context and evoke more effortful and systematic strategies to tackle the problem (Martin

Stoner, 1996). Similarly, growing evidence indicates that the effect of negative emotions on creativity is largely context ependent (George & Zhou, 2002; Leung et al., 2014). This contextual view suggests that negative emotions can be beneficial o creativity, especially in a context in which negative emotions are clearly identified, and their perceived recognition and ewards for creative solutions are highly regarded (George & Zhou, 2002). Noting that sympathy induced by one person’s uffering can be the catalyst for strategies to end the suffering of others in a similar plight (Lee & Dow, 2011; Lyubomirksy, heldon, & Schkade, 2005; Piliavin, Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981; Wispé, 1991), sympathetic contexts appear to pur creative solutions. Lastly, in consideration of the dual-pathway model—which assumes that negative emotions influence reativity via the persistence pathway, which refers to the degree of sustained, task-directed cognitive effort—it is plausible hat sympathy’s affective influence fosters creative action (Martin & Stoner, 1996).

Second, sympathy’s motivational route may enhance creativity. When people are intrinsically motivated, they tend to ngage in an activity for their own enjoyment or the challenge it presents. The literature suggests that intrinsic motivation s conducive to creative performance because it facilitates exploration, spontaneity, flexibility, persistence, and interest—all f which are linked to creative processes (Amabile, 1996; Deci, Koestner, &, Ryan, 1999; Elsbach & Hargadon, 2006; Grant

Berry, 2011; Reeve & Deci, 1996; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004). Given this literature, the link between sympathy and ntrinsic motivation is credible: Those who react sympathetically to others’ suffering tend to be motivated to alleviate uffering and seek novel, desirable, and prosocial solutions that promote well-being. This, in turn, may afford the greatest pportunities for learning and exploration (Hepach et al., 2012; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In support of this view, Grant and Berry 2011) demonstrate that intrinsic motivation with other-focused, prosocial motives fosters the production of novel ideas i.e., originality). Sympathy, therefore, likely promotes creativity through its motivational route.

Third, sympathy may foster creativity through perspective taking. Sympathy is largely evoked by affective perspective aking, which often promotes a shift from a self-centered view to an other-centered view and, in turn, facilitates the inte- ration of diverse views in a meaningful way (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). In favor of this notion, Grant and Berry (2011) ropose that other-focused psychological processes play an important role in entertaining ideas that are not only novel but lso valuable, because they may be useful in addressing others’ problems or needs (Mohrman, Gibson, & Mohrman, 2001). iven that perspective taking is thought to be one of the most important psychological forces underlying creativity (Decety

Jackson, 2004; Lamm et al., 2007; Parker, Atkins & Axtell, 2008), sympathy – which promotes this ability – is likely to nhance the flexibility aspect of creativity.

In light of the credible link between sympathy and creativity, our primary research goal was to determine whether nduced sympathy improves creativity. We also employed a rather unobtrusive method to induce sympathy. As stated arlier, sympathy involves feelings of pity or sorrow for another’s distress. Unlike empathy, however, it does not require that e share the other’s relevant experiences or emotions (Lee, 2009; Wispé, 1991). Therefore, caution should be exercised when

nducing sympathy that does not implicate empathy. The literature, for instance, has often induced sympathy by asking a articipant to envision how a person who is described as experiencing tragic circumstances must feel (e.g., Harmon-Jones, aughn-Scott, Mohr, Sigelman, & Harmon-Jones, 2004). Despite the assumed effectiveness of these methods, it is possible

hat they may inadvertently induce empathic feelings. In Study 1, therefore, we tested the feasibility of using images of istressed elderly as an unobtrusive method of inducing sympathy for the elderly.

Study 2 aimed to determine whether participants in whom sympathy had been induced would outperform participants n the control group in creative performance, as assessed by (a) two domain-general tests of creativity, the Unusual Uses Test Guilford, 1959) and the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (Wallach & Kogan, 1965), and (b) one domain-specific test, the Floor lan Test, which asks the participant to generate ideas that can help the elderly. We examined creative performance across our dimensions: originality, fluency, flexibility, and elaboration. In view of the three potential routes that can facilitate reativity (affective, motivational, and perspective taking), we hypothesized that sympathy would particularly benefit two spects of creativity – originality and flexibility – but not necessarily the third, fluency.

We also sought to determine whether individual differences in trait empathy – the general ability to perceive, understand, eel, and share another’s feelings and sensations – would modulate the impact of sympathy on creativity. It is probable that hose who have a greater tendency to feel empathic are also more likely to experience sympathy for others’ troubles. Given the

134 H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143

Table 1 Critical measures as a function of induced sympathy in Study 1.

Study 1 Induced Sympathy (n = 38) Control (n = 37) t

Demographics Age 21.3 (1.91) 21.7 (1.81) −0.93 Gender (male: female)a 11:27 14:24 0.67

Ageism as a manipulation check Avoidance 2.48 (0.43) 2.73 (0.43) 2.48* Antilocution 2.43 (0.59) 2.64 (0.48) 1.67 Discrimination 2.21 (0.42) 2.18 (0.47) 0.29

Mood and arousal Pleasant 4.03 (2.3) 3.73 (2.0) 1.65 Unpleasant 1.76 (1.9) 1.76 (1.6) 0.04 Tense 2.13 (2.5) 2.08 (2.1) 0.21

Energetic 3.76 (2.0) 3.38 (1.6) 1.71

Note: SDs are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.05. a Chi-square test was performed instead of an independent-samples t-test.

close link between sympathy and empathy, therefore, it is important to elucidate potential interactions between trait-level empathic abilities and state-level sympathetic feelings.

2. Study 1

We had two goals in Study 1. First, we investigated whether sympathy could be induced through exposure to images of distressed elderly without directly asking participants to sympathize with them. Given the literature suggesting that the experience of sympathy begins by giving attention to a person or group in need (Dickert & Slovic, 2009), we tested whether paying sufficient attention to images of people who were suffering could induce sympathy without a concomitant effort to sympathize with them. Second, we examined whether sympathy that had been inconspicuously induced could be checked by an unobtrusive manipulation check instead of an explicit self-report measure. This is because directly asking participants to rate the extent to which they feel sympathetic might dispel the induced emotional state by causing them to be suspicious of the study’s purpose (Yang, Yang, & Isen, 2013). Therefore, we reasoned that if participants feel sympathetic at the sight of suffering elderly, they will be more willing to approach and help them, and therefore less likely to avoid social interactions with the elderly (Batson et al., 1997). To this end, we employed the avoidance subscale of ageism – which measures prejudice against the elderly based on negative attitudes toward and stereotypes about aging – as an implicit manipulation check on induced sympathy (Fraboni, Saltstone, & Hughes, 1990). We expected that if sympathy had been successfully induced, the sympathy condition would report lower avoidance tendency toward the elderly.

2.1. Participants

Seventy-five undergraduates participated in the study in exchange for extra course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to either the control condition (n = 37; male = 11; Mage = 21.7, SD = 1.81) or the sympathy condition (n = 38; male = 14; Mage = 21.3, SD = 1.91; for details, see Table 1). There were more females than males in each condition, but their ratios did not differ significantly.

2.2. Materials

2.2.1. Pictures of afflicted elderly Thirty-three images of elderly persons who appeared ill, poor, hungry, feeble, unhealthy, pathetic, or exhausted were

selected from publicly available online sources and edited to highlight their suffering.

2.2.2. The Fraboni Ageism Scale (FAS) The avoidance subscale of the FAS – which is known to measure negative attitudes toward and stereotypes about the

elderly – was employed as an implicit manipulation check on induced sympathy toward the elderly (Fraboni et al., 1990). The FAS consists of 29 items in three subscales: antilocution (antagonism based on misconceptions about elderly people), dis- crimination (discriminatory opinions regarding the political rights, segregation, or activities of elderly people), and avoidance (withdrawal from social contact with elderly people).

2.3. Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to either the sympathy condition or control condition. Both groups were first asked to rate their current mood (pleasant or unpleasant) and arousal (energetic or tense) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1

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very much disagree) to 5 (very much agree). Participants in the sympathy condition were then shown 33 pictures of afflicted lderly and asked to rate (a) the extent of the person’s need, (b) the feelings (negative, neutral, or positive) the person was xperiencing, and (c) the person’s vulnerability. This was done not only to examine the images’ effectiveness, but to ensure hat participants were paying attention to the elderly person in each image. In contrast, participants in the control condition atched a 7-min slide show (a total of 30 slides) on strategies for promoting health that was purely text-based (i.e., without

ny images of the elderly) and were told to focus on the text and remember it for a later memory test. Immediately after his, both groups completed the 29-item ageism scale (FAS) – which was combined with 29 unrelated filler items to avoid articipants’ suspicion of the scale’s purpose – as an implicit manipulation check on induced sympathy. Participants were hen debriefed and thanked.

. Results

.1. Induced sympathy and manipulation check

A series of independent-samples t-tests showed that the two groups were equivalent in their reported mood (pleasant, npleasant) and arousal (tense, energetic) at the outset, all ps > 0.09 (see Table 1).

Participants’ sympathetic judgments of the images of distressed elderly were examined by a series of one-sample t-tests or a difference between mean rating scores and the midpoint of the 5-point Likert scale, (i.e., zero), which indicates either eutrality or abstinence. Overall, the older adults in the images were judged to be experiencing significantly greater need nd negative emotion – t(37) = 2.27, p = 0.029 and t(37) = −3.2, p = 0.003, respectively – and marginally greater vulnerability, (37) = 1.82, p = 0.07. Given that sympathy arises from acknowledging others’ need, emotional distress, or vulnerability, this uggests that the pictures were effective in inducing sympathetic judgments, i.e., heightened awareness of the need, negative eelings, and vulnerability of the elderly in images.

We examined whether exposure to the images of afflicted elderly induced sympathetic feelings toward the elderly. If so, uch exposure would evoke prosocial attitudes about approaching or interacting with the elderly, i.e., reduced avoidance endency (Batson et al., 1997). We found that those in the sympathy condition scored significantly lower for avoidance endency (e.g., less reluctance to make eye contact or converse with elderly people) than those in the control condition who atched a slide show, instead of images of the afflicted elderly, t(73) = 2.48, p = 0.015, Cohen’s d = 0.57. Group differences ere not present in overall ageism, p = 0.094, or the other subscales of ageism, antilocution and discrimination, ps > 0.14,

uggesting discriminant validity that induced sympathy facilitates prosocial attitudes (i.e., lower avoidance), but does not lleviate other subscales of general discrimination against the elderly. Taken together, our findings suggest that the use of mages of the afflicted elderly is effective for unobtrusively eliciting sympathy; in addition, the avoidance subscale can serve s an implicit manipulation check on induced sympathy toward the elderly.

. Study 2

We had two goals for the second study. First, we sought to determine whether induced sympathy promotes creativity. econd, since a sympathetic response is more likely to be elicited when one’s trait level of empathic concern is high (Davis, 009; Eisenberg, 2000), we aimed to determine whether individual differences in dispositional empathy would moderate he effect of sympathy on creativity.

To make our sympathy condition comparable to the control condition, both groups viewed the same slide show about trategies for promoting health that the control group in Study 1 watched. The only difference between the two groups was hat while the control group watched the text-only version, the sympathy group watched a version that contained both text nd images of the afflicted elderly.

. Methods

.1. Participants

One hundred and seventeen undergraduates took part in the study for extra course credit (for details, see Table 2). articipants were told that the study’s purpose was to examine individual differences in memory performance and randomly ssigned to either the sympathy (n = 62, male = 14; Mage = 21.5, SD = 1.9) or the control condition (n = 55, male = 17; Mage = 21.1, D = 1.87).2

.2. Materials

.2.1. Sympathy induction

The same 7-min slide show that was used with the control group in Study 1 was used with both groups in Study 2, but

ach group viewed a different version. As described previously, each of 30 slides contained useful strategies for maintaining ealth, which were used for a later memory test. The control condition watched the text-only version of the slide show (i.e., ithout any images), while the sympathy condition watched a version that included images of the distressed elderly. For

136 H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143

Table 2 Demographics and critical measures as a function of induced sympathy in Study 2.

Induced Sympathy (n = 62) Control (n = 55) t

Demographic variables Age 21.5 (1.91) 21.1 (1.87) −1.09 Gender (male: female)a 14:48 17:38 0.31 Family type a,b 12:49 6:48 1.59 Frequency of visiting grandparentsc 3.4 (2.95) 2.7(2.85) −1.32

Ageism as a manipulation check Avoidance 2.37 (0.51) 2.56 (0.46) 2.08* Antilocution 6.68 (1.23) 7.05 (1.09) 1.74 Discrimination 2.09 (0.37) 2.08 (0.41) −0.12

Mood and arousal Pleasant 4.37 (2.1) 4.0 (2.19) −0.94 Unpleasant 3.39 (2.46) 3.27 (2.51) −0.25 Tense 2.68 (2.1) 2.38 (1.98) −0.79 Energetic 2.84 (1.75) 2.89 (1.91) 0.88

Trait empathy General empathy 3.74 (0.51) 3.77 (0.38) −0.27 Empathetic suffering 4.06 (0.51) 4.08 (0.59) 0.23 Positive sharing 4.15 (0.55) 4.05 (0.73) −0.88 Responsive crying 3.4 (1.1) 3.35 (1.1) −0.22 Emotional attention 3.75 (0.43) 3.67 (0.59) −0.82 Feeling for others 3.39 (0.65) 3.19 (0.66) −1.68 Emotional contagion 3.43 (0.62) 3.35 (0.84) −0.59

Note: SDs are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. a Chi-square was performed instead of an independent-samples t-test. b

Family type: 0 = extended family; 1 = nuclear family. c Frequency of visiting grandparents: 1 = once a month; 2 = once every 1–2 months; 3 = once every 3–4 months; 4 = once every 5–6 months; 5 = once

every 7–8 months; 6 = once every 9–10 months.

instance, a slide on the importance of exercise was accompanied by the image of an elderly person suffering from severe joint pain while exercising. That is, our two conditions were comparable in encoding health-related information as the primary task, which in turn rendered our sympathy-induction procedure more unobtrusive. As in Study 1, the avoidance subscale of ageism was used as an implicit manipulation check for induced sympathy (Fraboni et al., 1990).

5.2.2. The Unusual Uses Task (UUT) The UUT has been widely employed to assess the ability to generate unusual uses for a common object, such as a garbage

bag (Guilford, 1959; Torrance, 1974). Participants were told to list as many uses for common objects as possible without limiting themselves to uses they had previously seen or heard about. Responses on the UUT were coded on dimensions of orig- inality, fluency, flexibility, and elaboration. Given the literature that suggests that objective scoring technique seems optimal for scoring originality on abstract tasks (Plucker et al., 2014), a statistical-infrequency technique was used to assess original- ity in terms of the uniqueness and rarity of the given response relative to the range of ideas generated by all participants.2

Specifically, 1 point was assigned to responses given by at least 5% of the participants and 2 points to those given by 1% or less of the participants; these scores were summed across items for each creativity task and used as an index of orig- inality. Fluency was measured by the total number of responses the participant generated. We also calculated corrected originality scores by dividing the originality score by the fluency score (i.e., corrected originality = originality/fluency). We did this because the literature suggests that fluency influences originality (e.g., Plucker, Qian, & Schmalensee, 2014; Runco & Dow, 2004; Silvia, 2008), such that participants generate more novel responses as they list more responses. Flexibility was measured by the total number of distinct categories of unusual uses. To reliably score flexibility, we developed our own category-coding schemes based on a database comprising approximately 300 participants. Specifically, for the unusual task our coding scheme delineated 12 categories for a newspaper and 9 categories for a cup. Lastly, we assessed elaboration,

which indicates how detailed a participant’s response is. One point was assigned for more nuanced responses, with details that specify a given category (e.g., a mold to make a sandcastle for one use of a cup). Scores were then summed to generate a total elaboration score for each participant. All ratings were performed by two independent raters, and their inter-rater reli-

2 Previous studies suggest that although it is more common to assess originality by counting responses provided by less than 20% of the sample, its reliability estimation does not differ from the technique of counting responses provided either 5% or 10% of the sample, suggesting that the degree of infrequency does not greatly influence reliability evidence (e.g., Plucker, Qian, & Wang, 2011). We also assessed originality by following the percentage scoring method which is known as the most appropriate strategy (e.g., Plucker et al., 2011). In this method, we calculated percentage scores by dividing the number of original ideas by the total number of ideas generated. Our results did not differ from the pattern of results based on a statistical infrequency method: The sympathy condition generated significantly more original ideas than the control condition in the three creativity tasks, all ps < .05.

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H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143 137

bility, measured by intra-class correlation coefficients, was significant for fluency (r = 0.99), originality (r = 0.98), flexibility r = 0.98), and elaboration (r = 0.97), all ps < 0.01.

.2.3. The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT) Similar to the UUT, the WKCT requires the participant to come up with as many items as possible that contain a certain

eature specified by the task (e.g., things that are round). Responses on the WKCT were scored on four dimensions of creativity: riginality (and corrected originality), fluency, flexibility, and elaboration. Flexibility was scored based on 18 categories of hings that are round and 16 categories of things that make noise. All ratings were performed by two independent raters, nd their inter-rater reliability was significant for originality (r = 0.96), fluency (r = 0.98), flexibility (r = 0.98), and elaboration r = 0.97), all ps < 0.01.

.2.4. The Floor Plan Task (FPT) In the FPT, which served as a domain-specific measure of creativity, participants were given a simplified floor plan of a

ypical office reception area and asked to modify the floor plan to make it a friendlier place for the elderly. For example, articipants might propose replacing a solid door with one that has a window, so that older adults would be able to see omeone approaching on the other side and react accordingly. Participants were strongly encouraged to generate as many deas as possible. Responses on the FPT were again scored on originality (and corrected originality), fluency, flexibility –

hich was scored based on 6 categories – and elaboration. All ratings were performed by two independent raters, and their nter-rater reliability was significant for fluency (r = 0.99), flexibility (r = 0.92), originality (r = 0.96), and elaboration (r =0.98), ll ps < 0.01.

.2.5. Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) Given the postulated link between sympathy and individual differences in trait-level empathic concern, trait-level empa-

hy was measured using the EES (Caruso & Mayer, 1998). The EES consists of six subscales: empathic suffering (e.g., “The uffering of others deeply disturbs me”), positive sharing (e.g., “Seeing other people smile makes me smile”), responsive cry- ng (e.g., “I cry easily when watching a sad movie”), emotional attention (e.g., “I don’t give others’ feelings much thought”), eeling for others (e.g., “It’s easy for me to get carried away by other people’s emotions”), and emotional contagion (e.g., “When ’m with other people who are laughing, I join in”). The scale consists of 30 items scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging rom 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree). A previous study (Caruso & Mayer, 1998) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78.

.3. Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to either the sympathy or control condition. Participants in the sympathy condition atched the 7-min slide show designed to induce sympathy (i.e., the version with images of afflicted elderly), while those

n the control condition watched the same slide show without any images. All participants were then asked to complete the voidance subscale, which served as a manipulation check on induced sympathy. Working at their own pace, participants hen took the UUT (for two items, newspapers and cups), the WKCT (for two items, things that are round and things that

ake noise), and the FPT to assess creativity. The order of those creativity tasks was counterbalanced. Lastly, participants ompleted a background survey (e.g., age, family type, frequency of visiting grandparents), the trait-empathy scale, and a hort mood questionnaire that asked participants to rate their current feelings and arousal (i.e., pleasant, unpleasant, tense, nergetic) using a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so). Finally, participants completed a funnel uestionnaire about what they believed the study’s purpose to be. They were then debriefed and thanked.

. Results

.1. Manipulation check

Consistent with previous results, the sympathy condition had significantly lower scores on the avoidance scale (M = 2.37) han the control condition (M = 2.56), t(115) = 2.08, p = 0.04, Cohen’s d = 0.39 (see Table 2). The sympathy group’s lower endency to avoid the elderly indicated that they felt more sympathetic toward the afflicted elderly than their counterparts n the control group. Further analyses revealed that the two groups did not differ in demographic variables, self-rated arousal,

ood states, or trait-level empathy, ps > 0.15.

.2. Effect of sympathy on creativity

Table 3 presents an overall correlation matrix for all variables. Table 4 presents scores for three different types of creativity asks as a function of induced sympathy. We report separate results for each creativity task below.3

3 Our chi-square analysis showed that both sympathy and control conditions had similar gender ratios, with more females than males (see Table 2). owever, a series of independent t-tests (adjusted by Bonferroni correction) indicates that males and females did not differ in terms of their performance

138 H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143

Table 3 Pearson Correlations among Various Indicators of Creativity.

1a 2a 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

1. Sympathy group – 2. Gender 0.09 –

The Unusual Uses Task (UUT) 3. Originality 0.09 −0.14 – 4. Fluency 0.001 −0.07 0.53** – 5. Flexibility −0.09 −0.12 0.53** 0.89** – 6 Elaboration 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.26** 0.18* –

The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT) 7. Originality 0.23* 0.03 0.40** 0.46** 0.39** 0.26** – 8 Fluency 0.01 0.09 0.25** 0.51** 0.48** 0.34** 0.63** – 9. Flexibility −0.06 0.11 0.31** 0.54** 0.52** 0.31** 0.57** 0.87*** – 10. Elaboration 0.03 −0.06 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.32** 0.23* 0.21* 0.27* – The Floor PlanTask (FTP) 11. Originality 0.22* 0.03 0.31** 0.41** 0.42** −0.03 0.23* 0.11 0.16 −0.01 – 12. Fluency 0.04 0.02 0.26** 0.54** 0.49** 0.05 0.31* 0.20* 0.29** 0.01 0.60** – 13. Flexibility −0.07 −0.01 0.14 0.24* 0.25** −0.09 −0.11 0.08 0.20* 0.06 0.45** 0.68** – 14. Elaboration 0.25** 0.33** 0.26** 0.15 0.13 0.29** 0.20* 0.15 0.16 0.32** 0.40** 0.23* 0.15 – 15. Feasibility 0.06 0.02 0.28** 0.56** 0.51** 0.07 0.32** 0.22** 0.31** 0.07 0.57** 0.94*** 0.63** 0.24** –

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. a Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients were computed for categorical variables, i.e., gender and sympathy condition.

Table 4 Creativity measures as a function of induced sympathy in Study 2.

Induced Sympathy (n = 62) Control (n = 55) t

The Unusual Uses Task (UUT) Originality 2.27 (2.70) 1.44 (1.51) −2.04* Corrected Originality 0.34 (0.39) 0.18 (0.18) −2.84** Fluency 12.4 (4.4) 12.9 (6.7) 0.44 Flexibility 8.32 (2.36) 9.04 (3.67) 1.27 Elaboration 2.18 (2.36) 1.96 (2.32) −0.49

The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT) Originality 3.5 (3.2) 2.24 (2.64) −2.32* Corrected Originality 0.38 (.32) 0.21 (0.19) −3.43** Fluency 17.3 (8.3) 18 (10.2) 0.39 Flexibility 10.2 (3.3) 10.9 (4.01) 1.17 Elaboration 0.63 (1.22) 0.47 (0.92) −0.78

The Floor Plan Task (FPT) Originality 1.23 (1.4) 0.73 (1.4) −1.97* Corrected Originality 0.24 (0.28) 0.10 (0.15) −3.35** Fluency 4.8 (1.7) 5.2 (3.1) 0.91 Flexibility 2.4 (.99) 2.7 (1.4) 1.36 Elaboration 2.79 (2.30) 1.67 (1.48) −3.08**

Feasibility 4.44 (1.71) 4.62 (2.68) 0.45

Note: SDs are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.

6.2.1. The Unusual Uses Test (UUT) Independent-samples t-tests revealed that sympathy significantly improved originality, t(115) = −2.04, p = 0.04, Cohen’s

d = −0.39. Participants in the sympathy condition showed greater originality than those in the control condition. A more pronounced effect was observed when originality scores were corrected for fluency (i.e., corrected originality), t(115) = −2.84, p = 0.005, Cohen’s d = −0.65. However, sympathy did not influence fluency, flexibility, or elaboration, with all ps > 0.21. When we also examined the content of participants’ responses, none of the participants generated uses that were related to the elderly in particular.

6.2.2. The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT)

Independent-samples t-tests were performed on creativity scores on the WKCT. Consistent with the results reported

above, sympathy significantly improved originality, t(115) = −2.32, p = 0.02, Cohen’s d = −0.43, and corrected originality,

on creativity tasks, all ps = ns. In the same vein, our regression analysis also showed that gender did not predict any dimension of performance on creativity tasks (see Table 4), suggesting that gender did not influence the relation between sympathy and creativity.

H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143 139

Fig. 1. The theoretical model that mediates between sympathy conditions and originality, as assessed by the Floor Plan Task. The overall amount of e w d

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laboration per category was assessed as a proxy measure of persistence. a, b, c, and c-prime are the path coefficients (unstandardized regression weights, ith standard errors in parentheses). Path coefficient c represents the total effect of induced sympathy on originality. Path coefficient c-prime refers to the irect effect of sympathy on originality. Asterisks indicate significant regression paths * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.05.

(115) = −3.4, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = −0.64, but did not influence fluency, flexibility, or elaboration, all ps > 0.25. Notably, the wo groups did not differ in responses that were related to the elderly, t(115) = −0.94, p = 0.35.

.2.3. The Floor Plan Task (FPT) Independent-samples t-tests revealed that induced sympathy significantly enhanced originality, t(115) = −1.97, p = 0.05,

ohen’s d = −0.37, corrected originality, t(115) = −3.35, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = −0.63, and elaboration, t(115) = −3.08, p=0.003, ohen’s d = −0.58. It did not, however, influence fluency t(115) = 0.91, p = 0.36 or flexibility, t(115) = 1.36, p = 0.18. We further xamined feasibility for ideas generated in the FPT to examine whether the idea can be implemented for a moderate cost;

point was assigned to a moderately to highly feasible idea. Sympathy did not affect the feasibility of ideas, t(115) = 0.45, = 0.66, suggesting that increased originality under sympathetic feelings is not necessarily attained at the expense of an dea’s feasibility.

In sum, induced sympathy facilitated more original ideas, demonstrating sympathy’s robust effects on originality. This bserved effect held true even when fluency was taken into account, and was observed across three different measures of reativity that require either domain-general knowledge (i.e., the UUT and WKCT) or domain-specific knowledge (i.e., the PT). Moreover, induced sympathy facilitated elaboration but this effect was found in the content-specific creativity task i.e., FPT) only. In contrast, induced sympathy did not affect the other dimensions of creativity, i.e., fluency and flexibility.

.3. The mediating role of persistence

We tested the prediction of the dual-pathway model (Nijstad et al., 2010), which postulates that activating negative mood tates increases originality via persistence. Although Nijstad et al. operationalized persistence as an increased category depth i.e., the tendency to generate ideas within the same category), our dataset was not coded to index persistence in the same

anner. Therefore, we approximated persistence by the average amount of spontaneous elaboration per category, since reater elaboration is likely driven by persistence in providing details. Consistent, in part, with the dual-pathway model, we ound that persistence fully mediated the effect of sympathy on originality, whereas flexibility did not (Fig. 1). The direct ffect of sympathy on creative originality was reduced to nonsignificance (� = 0.25, p > 0.05) when persistence was included n the analyses, and persistence was a significant predictor of originality (� = 3.14, p < 0.05). This mediation effect was not ound in the domain-general creativity tasks, i.e., the unusual uses and Wallach-Kogan tasks.

.4. Individual differences in trait empathy

To examine the relationship between induced sympathy and trait empathy, multiple moderation analyses were per- ormed using the regression model with respect to originality scores obtained from three kinds of creativity tasks. In these nalyses, sympathy was entered as an independent variable, trait empathy as a moderator, and originality scores as an utcome variable (Hayes, 2013).

Regarding originality scores assessed by domain-general tests of creativity (UUT and WKCT), the moderating effect of trait mpathy was significant: for UUT, � = 2.71, p = 0.004, 95% confidence interval (.89–4.53); for WKCT, � = 3.17, p = 0.01, 95% onfidence interval (.73–5.61). Further analyses revealed that sympathy facilitated originality, especially among participants igh in trait empathy: for UUT, � = 2.02, p < 0.001; for WKCT, � = 2.68, p < 0.001. However, this effect was not found among hose low in trait empathy: for UUT, � = −0.38, p = 0.50; for WKCT, � = −0.14, p = 0.86.

On the other hand, trait empathy did not moderate the effect of sympathy on originality measured by the domain-specific

est of creativity (FPT). Further analyses, however, revealed patterns similar to those shown above. The conditional effects f induced sympathy on originality were still significant when participants’ empathy trait was high – � = 0.91, p = 0.01, 95% onfidence interval (0.20–1.61) – or moderate – � = 0.51, p = 0.04, 95% confidence interval (0.02–1.00) – but not when it was ow, � = 0.11, p = 0.75, 95% confidence interval (−0.59–0.82). Together, our moderation analyses showed that the beneficial

140 H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143

Table 5 Results of hierarchical regression analyses in Study 2.

Hierarchical step Originality Corrected originality Fluency Flexibility

�R2 ̌ t �R2 ̌ t �R2 ̌ t �R2 ̌ t

The Unusual Uses Task S1: Gender 0.009 −0.09 −0.99 0.003 −0.06 −0.61 0.012 −0.11 −1.18 0.03 −0.16 −1.77 S2: Trait Empathy 0.012 0.16 1.55 0.02 0.16 1.52 0.014 −0.13 −1.3 0.014 −0.13 −1.29 S3: Induced Sympathy 0.039 0.19 2.18* 0.07 0.27 2.95** 0.001 −0.03 −0.35 0.01 −0.11 −1.14 The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test S1: Gender 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.001 −0.01 −0.05 0.01 0.15 1.49 0.011 0.16 1.55 S2: Trait Empathy 0.01 −0.08 −0.82 0.00 0.002 0.02 0.01 −0.12 −1.23 0.009 −0.11 −1.03 S3: Induced Sympathy 0.04 0.21 2.29* 0.09 0.31 3.39** 0.002 −0.05 −0.52 0.014 −0.12 −1.29 The Floor Flan Task S1: Gender 0.00 0.08 0.81 0.015 0.14 1.41 0.009 −0.02 −0.21 0.001 0.02 0.23 S2: Trait Empathy 0.04 −0.21 −2.1* 0.01 −0.11 −1.09 0.02 −0.16 −1.56 0.01 −0.11 −1.08

S3: Induced Sympathy 0.03 0.18 1.96* 0.08 0.29 3.23** 0.006 −0.08 −.85 0.02 −0.13 −1.34

Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.

effect of sympathy on originality was most evident among those with high trait empathy, which highlights the moderating role of individual differences in one’s empathic characteristics (i.e., trait empathy).

6.5. Predictive relationship between induced sympathy and creativity

Multiple hierarchical regression analyses were performed to examine the predictive relationship of induced sympathy and creativity, as assessed by three measures (Table 5). We entered gender, trait empathy, and induced sympathy, in that order, into the hierarchical regression model with respect to originality, fluency, and flexibility scores as the dependent variables, respectively. We found that when the effects of both gender and trait empathy were controlled for, only induced sympathy emerged as a significant predictor of originality, as assessed by all measures of creativity. When corrected originality was entered as a dependent variable, sympathy emerged as a more pronounced predictor across all creativity tasks. However, when the same regression model was applied with respect to either fluency or flexibility as a dependent variable, induced sympathy predicted neither fluency nor flexibility. Together, this suggests that induced sympathy is particularly beneficial for originality in creative performance.

7. Discussion

Sympathy has typically been acknowledged to be, and has been widely studied as, a prosocial and moral emotion in a social domain. Little is known, however, about its cognitive benefits; it will therefore be valuable to gain a better understanding of the potential benefits of sympathy in a cognitive domain. Given the lack of studies of the cognitive consequences of sympathy, our most noteworthy finding is that regardless of the content domain, sympathy influences originality but does not affect fluency or flexibility. In addition, our findings demonstrate an important interaction between state sympathy and trait-level empathy in influencing originality in creative performance. Consistent with the feeling-as-information model and the mood-as-input model (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2003; see also the mood-as-input model, Martin & Stoner, 1996), our results suggest that sympathy – as a discrete negative emotion that is construed as socially desirable and adaptive in a given context – promotes creativity.

It is important to consider potential mechanisms for the link between sympathy and originality. We believe that the most plausible pathways may be related to both affective and motivational routes. Because sympathy arises from sorrow or concern for a person who is suffering (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978), sympathy is considered to be a negative emotion that stresses a situation’s drawbacks and stimulates heightened attention to a socially desirable and altruistic solution. As a result, sympathy is likely to enhance intrinsic motivation to pursue a creative and original solution that helps alleviate others’ distress (Eisenberg et al., 1989; Watt, 2005). The literature consistently suggests that other-oriented emotions such as sympathy tend to promote prosocial tendencies and moral and altruistic actions such as helping, comforting, and sharing, all of which are driven by intrinsic motivation (e.g., Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012). Moreover, consistent in part with the dual-pathway model (Nijstad et al., 2010), our preliminary analysis suggests that cognitive persistence partially mediates the effect of sympathy on creative performance especially in the content-specific creativity task (i.e., FPT). A solid link, therefore, appears to exist between sympathy and intrinsic motivation, which in turn promotes creativity via exploration and persistence (Amabile, 1996; Grant & Berry, 2011; Shalley et al., 2004).

Moreover, sympathy may implicate regulatory controls that are conducive to creativity; research has documented a positive association between sympathy and self-regulation. For example, sympathetic reactions are linked to high attentional and emotional regulation and coping behaviors (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Okun, Shepard, & Eisenberg, 2000; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994). Given the literature that has demonstrated self-regulatory behaviors as resources for achieving creative

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H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143 141

utcomes (Chiu, 2014; De Stobbeleir, Ashford, & Buyens, 2011), it is possible that sympathy facilitates creativity through its egulatory mechanisms, which help to guide and monitor goal-directed activities.

It is worthwhile to discuss why sympathy did not influence flexibility dimension of creativity. Given the literature that uggests that perspective taking promotes creativity by integrating diverse views (Gardner, Gino, & Staats, 2011; Hoever, nippenberg, van Ginkel, & Barkema, 2012), we expected that sympathy – which facilitates perspective taking – would nhance the flexibility aspect of creativity. However, given that sympathy is more usually evoked by affective perspective aking – i.e., understanding the feelings of the stimulus person – than cognitive perspective taking – i.e., the thoughts of the timulus person – sympathy’s null effect on flexibility suggests that affective perspective taking may play a less critical role n fostering flexibility in creative performance. Future studies are therefore warranted to illuminate the effects of affective s. cognitive perspective taking on creative flexibility.

Our study is not without drawbacks, which should be addressed in future work. First, it was designed to examine the mmediate effect of induced sympathy on creativity, and therefore the facilitating effect of sympathy is likely short-lived. lthough it would be intriguing to examine how long this observed effect of sympathy lasts, it is beyond our intended oal and should be pursued in future studies. Our findings, therefore, should not be generalized to the long-term effects of ympathy or trait sympathy. Second, it is possible that young college students may have felt suspicious about being asked bout ageism. It is noteworthy, however, that we tried to minimize participants’ awareness and suspicions about the scale’s urpose by adding unrelated filler items to the ageism scale. When the funnel questionnaire was administered at the end of he study – in which we asked participants what they believed the study’s purpose to be and whether any part of the study eemed suspicious – we found that none of our participants correctly guessed the hypothesis or reported feeling suspicious bout the ageism scale. Third, the typical pretest-posttest design was not employed for creativity assessment because of the onstraints associated with administering multiple domain-general and domain-specific tests of creativity within a limited ime frame. We acknowledge, however, that the pretest-posttest design will provide a clearer and more accurate view of he effect of sympathy on creativity; therefore, future studies that employ a careful pretest-posttest control are warranted. astly, although we used the avoidance subscale as a manipulation check on induced sympathy, we acknowledge that it is still n indirect measure of sympathy. Specifically, one could argue that mitigated avoidance tendency in the sympathy condition ay not necessarily stem from sympathetic feelings toward the distressed elderly. We believe that this is a legitimate concern

hat must be addressed since the images of afflicted elderly may have induced more generically negative feelings, rather than specific emotion such as sympathy. However, our data suggest that this is not the case. Specifically, if negative moods were nduced, significant group differences should have been observed in participants’ self-reported ratings of unpleasantness. nstead, we found that the two groups did not differ in reported negative mood (Table 2). In addition, we found that the mages of distressed elderly showed a discriminant validity, such that those images influenced avoidance tendency – which s viewed as a more malleable state characteristic – but not the other subscales, which are more closely related to trait-like haracteristics (i.e., antilocution and discrimination). Therefore, reduced avoidance tendency in the sympathy condition can e attributed to the experience of sympathy.

In conclusion, given that sympathy is usually evoked by heightened awareness of and concern for others’ suffering by erceiving or reacting to their distress or need, our study suggests that sympathetic feelings enhance originality, especially ia its affective and motivational routes. Although our test of the dual-pathway model suggests that sympathy enhances riginality via persistence, it is unclear why this effect was found only in the context-specific creativity task. Given that arious factors (e.g., age, gender, test item, training) influence content-specific creative ideation (Agogué, Poirel, Pineau, oudé, & Cassotti, 2014; Hong, Peng, O’Neil, Wu, 2013), future research is warranted on specific individual-difference factors hich may modulate the persistence pathway to creative performance. Importantly, more studies are needed to investigate

ognitive mechanisms (e.g., heuristics, inhibitory control, and expansion) that drive the effects of sympathy on creative rocesses (Agogué et al., 2014). Especially given that sympathy involves motivational, affective, and regulatory aspects Lamm et al., 2007), future work should identify the specific pathways by which sympathy promotes creativity. It will also e worthwhile to examine the effects of other related (empathic) feelings (e.g., compassion or pity), various distinct and pecific emotions (e.g., gratitude or anger), and the moderating role of individual differences (e.g., personality traits) on reative performance.

This study has important implications for many settings in which creativity is considered vital. Teachers, parents, and mployers strive to stimulate creativity in their students, children, and employees through various cognitive activities nd exercises. Although the effectiveness of these cognitive approaches has been widely studied, little is known about he important role emotional factors play in promoting creativity. Given that sympathy has typically been acknowledged o be a prosocial and moral emotion in a social domain, it will therefore be valuable to gain a better understanding of the otential link between sympathy and creative cognition in many areas (including education, development, and organization). pecifically, fostering sympathy toward needy individuals in the classroom or organization may facilitate one’s creative hinking. Similarly, the school curriculum that is designed to develop and promote sympathy among young children may

ake a meaningful contribution to boosting creativity in classroom practices. Given the scarcity of research on sympathy, e must continue to expand our understanding of how the emotional experience of sympathy can positively affect our

ognitive, social, and organizational lives.

142 H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by a research grant from the Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund Tier 1 Grant (C242/MSS11S005). We would like to thank our research assistants, Timothy Seow, Nai Ze Ling, Grace Chan, and Clara Chan, for their help.

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1661–1669. allach, M. A., & Kogan, N. (1965). Modes of thinking in young children: a study of the creativity intelligence distinction. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. ard, T. B., Smith, S. M., & Fink, R. A. (1999). Creative cognition. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. p189–212). Cambridge: Cambridge

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  • Sympathy fuels creativity: The beneficial effects of sympathy on originality
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Study 1
      • 2.1 Participants
      • 2.2 Materials
        • 2.2.1 Pictures of afflicted elderly
        • 2.2.2 The Fraboni Ageism Scale (FAS)
      • 2.3 Procedure
    • 3 Results
      • 3.1 Induced sympathy and manipulation check
    • 4 Study 2
    • 5 Methods
      • 5.1 Participants
      • 5.2 Materials
        • 5.2.1 Sympathy induction
        • 5.2.2 The Unusual Uses Task (UUT)
        • 5.2.3 The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT)
        • 5.2.4 The Floor Plan Task (FPT)
        • 5.2.5 Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)
      • 5.3 Procedure
    • 6 Results
      • 6.1 Manipulation check
      • 6.2 Effect of sympathy on creativity
        • 6.2.1 The Unusual Uses Test (UUT)
        • 6.2.2 The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT)
        • 6.2.3 The Floor Plan Task (FPT)
      • 6.3 The mediating role of persistence
      • 6.4 Individual differences in trait empathy
      • 6.5 Predictive relationship between induced sympathy and creativity
    • 7 Discussion
    • Acknowledgments
    • References

Related Articles/The-impact-of-three-kinds-of-identity-on-research-and-de_2016_Thinking-Skill.pdf

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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

he impact of three kinds of identity on research and evelopment employees’ incremental and radical creativity

haoying Tang a, Stefanie E. Naumann b,∗

University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, School of Economics and Management, Beijing, China Eberhardt School of Business, University of the Pacific, Stockton, CA 95219, USA

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history: eceived 14 February 2016 eceived in revised form 31 May 2016 ccepted 12 June 2016 vailable online 15 June 2016

eywords: mployee creativity eam identity xpertise identity amily identity

a b s t r a c t

Employee creativity is thought to be a source of organizational innovation which in turn is a source of competitive advantage for organizations. Little research has examined what employees’ identities are correlated with their creativity. In a sample of 383 research and design (R&D) employees and their supervisors from aerospace research and design organizations in China, we found that 241 employees’ highest identification scores were team identity, 11 employees’ highest identification scores were expertise identity, and 120 employees’ highest identification scores were family identity. Findings demonstrated that team identity and expertise identity positively affected radical and incremental creativity. Family identity did not exhibit an effect. But for the 120 employees whose family identity was the highest among the three identities, none of the identities had an effect on creativity. Implications of the findings to the employee identity and creativity management areas are discussed.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Creativity and, in particular, radical creativity is thought to be a source of competitive advantage for organizations in the echnology field (Teodorescu, Stăncioiu, Răvar, & Botoş , 2015; Amabile, 1996; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993). In the nnovation research area, researchers have distinguished between incremental innovations and radical innovations. Radical r “breakthrough” innovation entails bringing about a high degree of new knowledge (Forés & Camisón, 2016; Dewar & utton, 1986) whereas incremental innovation involves improvement rather than invention (Gilson & Madjar, 2011). Simi-

arly, researchers have distinguished between two kinds of creativity: radical creativity and incremental creativity (Gilson & adjar, 2011; Madjar, Greenberg, & Chen, 2011). Radical creativity involves doing paradigm breaking or revolutionary work, hereas incremental creativity involves doing adaptive or development work (Ekvall, 1997). These two kinds of creators

re thought to consider information in different ways. For example, research has found that radical creators combined outer timuli with inner, personal material in their construction of their perceptions and interpretations in the Creative Function est (Smith & Carlsson, 1990). In contrast, incremental creators were bound to reality and were not able to integrate original actors into their ideas.

In studying personal and contextual factors of employee creativity at work (Shin & Zhou, 2003; George & Zhou, 2002; ldham & Cummings, 1996; Woodman et al., 1993), as well as the environmental, organizational, and process factors of

ncremental and radical innovation or creativity (Koberg, Detienne, & Heppard, 2003; Madjar et al., 2011), the influence of mployee identity has received little attention. Social identity is an important part of the concept of the self (Albert, Ashforth,

Dutton, 2000). Whereas some research has begun to address the relationship between employees’ identification with their

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Tang), [email protected] (S.E. Naumann).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.06.003 871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

124 C. Tang, S.E. Naumann / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 123–131

leaders and their creativity (Gu, Tang, & Jiang, 2015; Yoshida, Sendjaya, Hirst, & Cooper, 2014), little research has examined how employees’ social identities affect creativity. In the research and design (R&D) field, the team is the basic employee organizational unit. Working in this field also involves professional expertise; thus, team identity and expertise identity are two main identifications for R&D employees.

Identification is critical in motivating employees to do their utmost for the social group to which they belong (Pearsall & Venkataramani, 2015; Foote, 1951), which might influence two kinds of creativity. In the case of team identification, some research has shown that it evokes creative behaviors at work (Carmeli, Cohen-Meitar, & Elizur, 2007). Team identity might enhance incremental creativity, in particular, through improving work efforts. However, the conformity that often accompanies high team identity might hinder radical creativity. In groups with a high level of team identity, maintaining group cohesion may be viewed as so important to the group that they do not act in ways that would disrupt the harmony of the group by considering radical ideas.

Expertise identity refers to the extent to which an individual defines him- or herself by that aspect of personal identity associated with expertise in a certain field (Herndon, 2009). It has been regarded to be helpful for individual creative task performance (Polzer, Milton, & Swarm, 2002), because it encourages individuals to exhibit more effort in investing in enhancing creative self-efficacy (Tierney & Farmer, 2002) and allows them to establish themselves in the professional community.

A third ‘identity’ strand is that of identity with the family, which has historically operated as a key kind of identity in Chinese society. Fei suggested that family was the basic social organizational unit of Chinese society (Fei, 1998; Fei & Liu, 1985). It may be that family identity decreases employee creative motivation for one of the critical components of radical creativity: being curious about an unknown area and taking risks. Spending time on exploring an unknown area and taking risks might cause conflict with an individual’s family role (Lingard & Francis, 2006).

These three strands of identity and their impact on creativity have not been examined together in the existing literature. In this paper, we examine R&D employees’ team identity, expertise identity, and family identity and their creativity. The aim of this paper is to determine the differential effects of the three kinds of identity on two kinds of creativity. An understanding of the relationship between these variables should identify ways organizations might enhance the incremental and radical creativity of their employees.

1. Team identity and employee creativity

An individual’s social identity is the “knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). This view suggests that we categorize ourselves into social groups and that we use different self-identifications in different circumstances (Fisher, 1997). In 1985, Albert and Whetten published their seminal work about organizational identity (OID) (Albert and Whetten, 1985). OID offers a kind of ‘self-referential meaning’ (Corley et al., 2006), describing, in general terms, the extent to which an organizational member defines himself/herself with reference to his/her organizational membership (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). OID has been identified as comprising psychological and social realities phenomena with antecedents and consequences for other social processes and outcomes (Haslam, Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003), such as organizational culture (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). OID has the potential to generate a range of positive employee and organizational outcomes, such as low turnover intentions, organizational citizenship behavior, and employee performance (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994).

Recent research has examined how employee OID is relevant in explaining employee creativity. Madjar et al. (2011) and Hirst, van Dick, and van Knippenberg (2009) respectively have shown that OID motivates employees to engage in a higher level of work and/or creative efforts, and doing so aligns their self-interest with the interest of the organization. A second explanation for an OID-creativity relationship involves employees’ intrinsic motivation. Creativity involves using a new approach to generate new ideas. It is thought to be difficult for an organization to control the employee’s creative process because it is driven by employees’ level of motivation, especially their intrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1993). Intrinsic motivation was observed in previous research as a key determinant of creative behavior (Tierney, Farmer, & Graen, 1999). Individuals who identify with their organization are likely to be motivated to display creative behavior as part of their sense of belongingness to a distinct group by which they enhance the self.

Now that the team has been viewed as a key organizational unit, scholars have studied identification with work units, work groups, or work teams (Solansky, 2011; Olkkonen & Lipponen, 2006). There is some research suggesting identification with a group motivates group members to be more creative. For example, in a lab study, Haslam, Adarves-Yorno, Postmes, and Jans (2013) manipulated group members’ social identity by their level of involvement in group goal setting. The researchers found that groups who were involved in the group goal-setting process (i.e., the high team identity condition) exhibited greater levels of creativity.

In contrast to the positive relationship between team identity and incremental creativity, we would not expect a positive relationship with radical creativity. Radical creativity often necessitates a rejection of pre-existing schemas and a more

bottom-up search for better ways of doing things and new ideas which has been found critical for employees’ creativity. But in groups with higher team identity, a team member’s cognitive, emotional and behavioral bond with the other team members would be high (Henry, Arrow, & Carini, 1999), and individuals’ conformity to their group’s norms would also be high (van Knippenberg & van Schie, 2000). In this context, employees’ unique ideas are more likely to be discouraged, and this

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ould be harmful to radical creativity (Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008). There is some initial evidence in the OID literature f a relationship between identity and the two types of creativity. Madjar et al. (2011) found that organizational identity ontributed less to radical creativity than incremental creativity or routine performance.

Taken together, it appears that team identity should increase incremental creativity through increasing work efforts and ntrinsic motivation, and should have no effect on radical creativity due to its limiting an employee’s autonomy and the ffering of unique ideas. Thus, we hypothesize the following:

ypothesis 1. Team identity will be positively associated with employees’ incremental creativity.

. Expertise identity and employee creativity

Expertise identity is the extent to which an individual defines him- or herself by that aspect of personal identity asso- iated with expertise in a certain field and it is thought to be established through the employee’s accumulated experience nd job awareness and by his or her tenure in the organization (Herndon, 2009). The main reason that expertise identity hould enhance creativity is that expertise identity is ego-oriented in that the main purpose is to establish an individual’s istinctiveness (Janssen & Huang, 2008). Due to self-verification theory, those individuals with a high level of expertise

dentity should have a strong desire to do something new and should perform better on creative tasks (Swann, Milton, & olzer, 2000). Some research has found that expertise identity was positively associated with individual creative task per- ormance (Polzer et al., 2002). Expertise identity is thought to facilitate scientists’ self-verification by triggering them to use nowledge, experience and perspectives to find novel solutions (Swann et al., 2000). In a student sample of study groups, wann et al. (2000) found that the extent to which targets were verified at nine weeks was positively associated with group erformance on creative tasks at the end of the semester (Swann et al., 2000).

Thus, we hypothesize the following:

ypothesis 2. Expertise identity will be positively associated with employees’ incremental creativity.

ypothesis 3. Expertise identity will be positively associated with employees’ radical creativity.

. The interactions of identity and employee creativity

We also expect that not all employees will be influenced by identity in the same way. Previous researchers have called or research on the ways that predictors of creativity interact (Haslam et al., 2013). As noted earlier, we expect that team dentity will have no effect on employees’ radical creativity. However, employees who identify with their team and also have

high level of expertise identity, should have a heightened motivation to engage in radical creativity so that they might stablish themselves. Thus, we expect that the effect of team identity on radical creativity depends on employees’ levels of xpertise identity. When high levels of expertise identity are present, high levels of team identity should be complementary n adding to the positive effect on radical creativity. Previous researchers have suggested that creativity should increase

hen individuals that are well-positioned within a relevant field (e.g., expertise identity) also enjoy support from their roup (e.g., team identity; Haslam et al., 2013). Hence, we hypothesize the following:

ypothesis 4. Expertise identity will interact with team identity to positively affect employees’ radical creativity.

. Family identity and employee creativity

As noted earlier, family is considered the basic social organizational unit of Chinese society (Fei, 1998; Fei & Liu, 1985). esearch has identified one of the components of one’s family identity as family role task performance, which refers to hose aspects of the role (e.g., being a parent, spouse, child) that are expected (Chen et al., 2014). The family task role nvolves contributing to one’s family financially (Chen et al., 2014). The second category of family identity, the relationship ole, comprises social support, including behaviors in which individuals provide emotional, evaluative, informational, and nstrumental support, as well as interactions and communication. This second category includes spending quality time with amily members (Chen et al., 2014).

It may be that family identity decreases employees’ creative motivation. One of the critical components of radical creativity s to be curious about an unknown area and take risks. Individuals with higher non-work identity have been found to afford

ore attention to their family (Rothbard & Edwards, 2003). To spend time exploring an unknown area and take risks might ause conflict with an individual’s family role (Lingard & Francis, 2006). Given the risks and lack of rewards associated with ngaging in radical and incremental creativity in organizations that do not encourage it, employees with a high family identity hould be less likely to engage in both kinds of creativity. Previous researchers have suggested that when a certain element f a person’s social identity is salient, one’s self-perception becomes depersonalized in such a way that one’s behavior is

nfluenced more by the characteristics that define their group (in this case, family) membership and less by their distinctive ndividual attributes (Haslam et al., 2013). We expect that employees with high family identity will be less likely to use their xpertise identity or team identity to generate creative ideas.

Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:

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Hypothesis 5. Family identity will be negatively associated with employees’ incremental creativity.

Hypothesis 6. Family identity will be negatively associated with employees’ radical creativity.

Hypothesis 7. When family identity is scored the highest among the three identifications, expertise identity and team identity will have no effect on employees’ incremental and radical creativity.

Taken together, the purpose of our study is to examine the different effects of three types of identity (team, expertise, and family) on two types of creativity (incremental and radical).

5. Method

5.1. Sample

The sample organizations all came from the aerospace research and design field. The industry provided a valuable oppor- tunity to examine incremental creativity and radical creativity in a field context. In our aerospace research and design sample organizations, engineers were required to do two kinds of research projects. One is the product based engineering design project, which aims to deliver the engineering design on time and with high quality. The other is the exploring research project in which institutes supply grants to engineers to do novel research related to their current jobs. Almost every engi- neer had the opportunity to work on both project types at the same time. The design project requires incremental creativity whereas the exploring research project requires radical creativity. Additionally, the design teams were quite stable in the institutes and design employees were arranged into teams based on their technology expertise. Hence, the sample afforded us the opportunity to study their team identity and expertise identity.

Study participants were employees of four Chinese national aerospace research and design institutes. 500 paired- questionnaires were sent out to the design engineers and their team leaders through their human resources departments. Design engineers were asked questions about team identity, expertise identity, and family identity. Team leaders were asked to rate the radical creativity and incremental creativity of their team members. The final sample size was 382 design engineers and 126 team leaders, with a response rate of 76.40%.

With regard to the demographic composition of our sample, 70.2% were male and 29.8% were female. 28.5% were between 20 and 30 years old, 52.7% were between 30 and 40 years old, 14.1% were between 40 and 50 years old, and 4.4% were above 50 years old. 38.9% reported a work experience of fewer than 3 years, 31.6% about 3–5 years, 20.4% about 6–8 years, 6.5% more than 8 years. 9.9% had an undergraduate degree, 49.3% had a graduate degree, and 41.5% had a Ph.D. degree.

5.2. Measures

Most of the measures were adapted from English instruments, using a back translation procedure to convert to Mandarin Chinese. Survey items appear in the Appendix A. All items used a Likert scale ranging from one (“strongly disagree”) to five (“strongly agree”).

5.2.1. Team identity Four items (� = 0.89) translated from Mael and Ashforth’s (1992) scale measured team identity (e.g., “When someone

criticizes my team, it feels like a personal insult”).

5.2.2. Expertise identity Four items (� = 0.92) created by Herndon (2009) and used by Tang, Shang, Naumann, and von Zeditwiz (2014) measured

team identity (e.g., “Being an expert in my field is an important part of who I am”).

5.2.3. Family identity Four items (� = 0.88) adapted from family identity research (Bagger & Gutek, 2008) measured family identity (e.g., “My

relationship with my family members is the most important of all relationships”).

5.2.4. Incremental creativity and radical creativity Four items from Madjar et al., (2011) scale assessed incremental creativity and radical creativity. Two leader-reported

items (� = 0.87) assessed radical creativity (“This team member is a good source of highly creative ideas”; “This team member demonstrates originality in his/her work”). Two leader-reported items (� = 0.90) assessed incremental creativity (“Uses previously existing ideas or work in an appropriate new way”; “Easily modifies previously existing work processes to suit current needs”).

6. Results

Due to the high correlations among the independent variables, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on the five variables (please see Table 1). For the identity dimensions, a principal component analysis indicated that the Kaiser-

C. Tang, S.E. Naumann / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 123–131 127

Table 1 Exploratory factor analysis.

Component

1 2 3 4 5

Team identity 3 0.89 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.23 Team identity 2 0.88 0.20 0.09 0.16 0.18 Team identity 1 0.86 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.30 Expertise identity 1 0.11 0.94 0.13 0.09 0.03 Expertise identity 2 0.23 0.91 0.10 0.11 0.08 Radical creativity1 0.09 0.11 0.90 0.30 0.05 Radical creativity2 0.18 0.19 0.76 0.46 0.07 Incremental creativity2 0.16 0.14 0.34 0.87 0.11 Incremental creativity1 0.28 0.09 0.45 0.77 0.07 Family identity 2 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.93 Family identity 1 0.43 0.07 −0.04 0.11 0.83

Table 2 Model fit statistics for confirmatory factor analyses.

�2 Df �2 /df NFI RFI IFI TLI CFI RMSEA

Model 1: One Factor 152.92 36 4.25 0.90 0.85 0.92 0.88 0.92 0.13 Model 2: Five factor 54.52 34 1.60 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.06

Table 3 Means, standard deviations, and correlations (n = 383).

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5

1 Team identity 4.34 0.63 (0.89) 2 Expertise identity 3.63 0.96 0.38** (.92) 3 Family identity 4.42 0.72 0.48** 0.14** (.88) 4 Radical creativity 4.09 0.59 0.35** 0.28** 0.21* (0.90)

*

M 1 w d

f M c o a

i c i p p

s

t w e 0 2

( i

i

5 Incremental creativity 3.77 0.62 0.28** 0.30** 0.15** 0.76** (.87)

p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tail test; Coefficient alpha reliability estimates are reported on the diagonal.

eyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy of the five factors was 0.80; the chi-square of Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 623.50 (df = 55, p = 0.00). The total variance explained was 90.17%. All indices indicated that it was acceptable to proceed ith the EFA. All items loaded on their corresponding variables, except the third item of expertise identity, which was ropped due to its overlapping into two variables.

In order to demonstrate that the study variables empirically define distinct latent factors, we conducted a confirmatory actor analysis (please see Table 2). Model 1 was a one-factor model in which the five variables were regarded as one variable.

odel 2 was a five-factor model that included team identity, expertise identity, family identity, and incremental and radical ombined creativity. The five-factor model provided the best fit to the data (RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.99), compared with the ne factor model (RMSEA = 0.13, CFI = 0.92) (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). The goodness of fit indices of the research model were s follows: RMSEA = 0.10, TLI = 0.88, IFI = 0.98, CFI = 0.98, RFI = 0.87, NFI = 0.98.

Means, standard deviations, and correlations appear in Table 3. Team identity was positively correlated with expertise dentity (r = 0.38, p < 0.01), and with family identity (r = 0.48, p < 0.01). Family identity and expertise identity were positively orrelated (r = 0.14, p < 0.01). Incremental creativity was highly correlated with radical creativity (r = 0.76, p < 0.01), team dentity (r = 0.35, p < 0.01), expertise identity (r = 0.28, p < 0.01), and family identity (r = 0.21, p < 0.05). Radical creativity was ositively correlated with team identity, expertise identity and family identity (r = 0.28, p < 0.01; r = 0.30, p < 0.01; r = 0.15,

< 0.01). Among the 383 employees, 120 employees’ highest identity scores were family identity; 241 employees’ highest identity

cores were team identity; 11 employees’ highest identity scores were expertise identity. In order to test the model and Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, we used AMOS software to analyze the path loadings of

he model. After controlling for employee gender, age, education and work experience, incremental and radical creativity ere entered at the same time (please see Fig. 1). Team identity and expertise identity both were positively associated with

mployee radical creativity (� = 0.18, p < 0.01; � = 0.23, p < 0.01, respectively), as well as incremental creativity (� = 0.25, p < 0. 1; � = 0.17, p < 0.01, respectively). Family identity had no significant effect on either kind of creativity. Thus, Hypotheses 1,

and 3 were supported; Hypotheses 5 and 6 were not supported. We used the procedure recommended by Cohen and Cohen (1983) to test the moderating effect on radical creativity

Hypothesis 4; please see Table 4). In the first step, four control variables were entered. Then, team identity and expertise

dentity were entered. A moderation effect was not detected (ß = 0.08, ns). Thus Hypothesis 4 was not supported.

Next Hypothesis 7 was tested. The 120 employees whose scores of family identity were the highest among all three dentifications were selected, and the regressions on radical creativity were carried out with the bootstrap method (with

128 C. Tang, S.E. Naumann / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 123–131

Team identity

Incremental creativity R2 = 0.151

Family identity

Expertise identity

Radical creativity R2 = 0.125

0.25**

0.18**

0.07

0.04

0.17**

0.23**

Fig. 1. Factor loadings.

Table 4 Regressions.

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Gender −0.25*** −0.21*** −0.27*** −0.24*** Age 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.24***

Education −0.12** −0.11** −0.13** −0.12** Work experience −0.24*** −0.20** −0.20*** −0.16** Team identity (TI) 0.25*** 0.18**

Expertise identity (EI) 0.12* 0.18***

Family identity (FI) 0.03 0.01 Adusted R2 0.16 0.27 0.15 0.23 �R2 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.08 F 19.37*** 18.59*** 18.30*** 13.78***

df 4, 377 3, 374 4, 377 3, 374

* p < 0.05.

** p < 0.01.

*** p < 0.001.

random sampling N = 1000). After controlling for the four demographical variables, the three identifications were entered into the model. The results indicated that the positive effects of team identity and expertise identity were no longer significant (� = 0.09, ns, 95% CI = (−0.17 to 0.36); � = 0.05, ns, 95% CI = (−0.08 to 0.18), respectively). The same finding occurred with incremental creativity (� = 0.24, ns, 95% CI = (0.01–0.55); � = 0.02, ns, 95% CI = (−0.10 to 0.15), respectively). Thus Hypothesis 7 was supported. Furthermore, for the rest of the 263 employees whose score of family identity was not the highest compared with their scores on team identity and expertise identity, both team and expertise identity were positively associated with radical creativity (� = 0.12, p < 0.05, 95% CI = (0.01–0.23); � = 0.12, p < 0.01, 95% CI = (0.06–0.19), respectively) and incremental creativity (� = 0.19, p < 0.001, 95% CI = (0.06–0.30); � = 0.15, p < 0.01, 95% CI = (0.03–0.16), respectively).

7. Discussion

The purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between three types of employee identity and employees’ incremental and radical creativity. In so doing this research responds to previous scholars’ calls for research on the interaction of the predictors of creativity (Haslam et al., 2013). Our study demonstrated that team identity and expertise identity were both positively associated with incremental as well as radical creativity. Family identity had no effect on either incremental or radical creativity. But for employees whose family identity was the highest compared with the other identities, team identity and expertise identity did not exhibit an effect on creativity.

Our findings have implications for theory development. As expected team identity exhibited a positive effect on incremen- tal creativity and, contrary to our expectations, it also exhibited a positive effect on radical creativity. Employees considering engaging in both types of creativity may perceive that being seen as “one of the group” helps counteract the uncertainty of creativity upsetting the status quo. So team identity appears to be crucial to the demonstration of creative behaviors. Our study builds on laboratory research detecting a relationship between team identity and creativity (Haslam et al., 2013).

Our study also has implications for research on expertise identity. Expertise identity was positively associated with both kinds of creativity. Our findings extend previous research indicating that ego-oriented expertise identity can improve creative

self-efficacy (Tierney & Farmer, 2002) and that employees are more likely to be creative because they aim to establish an individual’s distinctiveness (Janssen & Huang, 2008). Our study provides evidence that expertise identity not only includes a person-based identity category but also a role-based identity category (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007). The latter categorization is

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C. Tang, S.E. Naumann / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 123–131 129

nfluenced by organizational goals of radical innovation and is obtained through being recognized by another person (Petkus, 996).

Our findings also have implications for the literature on family identity. Whereas family identity was not directly related o creativity by itself, whether or not employees had a strong family identity influenced whether their team or expertise dentity would exert an effect on creativity. This finding is consistent with previous researchers’ suggestion that creativity s the product of the dynamic interaction between personal and social identity and the social norms rooted in them (Haslam t al., 2013). Those employees with a low level of family identity were more likely to use their team and expertise identity o engage in both kinds of creativity.

Previous research from the work-family area has found that those with salient career identities were willing to expend xtra effort at work for higher rewards than people with salient family identities (Lobel & Clair, 1992). It is likely that the esults reported in the current study suggest that when family identity takes the most important position in employees’ set f identifications it would prevent employees’ work immersion in their creative work. It may be that high family identity mployees believed that engaging in radical and incremental creativity would result in higher levels of work-family conflict.

More broadly, the findings suggest that future research on creativity should include the influence of the comprehensive rray of employee identities. Chinese society has historically been characterized by social norms for in-group favoritism ased on kinship derived from strong family identity (Tsui & Farh, 1997). Future research should take into account how trong cultural norms of high family identity affect creativity.

The findings of our study also have practical implications. Specifically, organizations should be aware that employees ave differing levels of identity that affect their decisions to expend efforts on creativity. First, organizations interested in oosting incremental and radical creativity should organize work around groups and conduct team-building activities to romote team identity.

Second, expertise identification is important for both types of creativity, but especially for radical creativity. Thus man- gers should give employees the chance to establish themselves, recognize distinguished employees and foster a climate that alues expertise identity. Organizations may offer opportunities to promote expertise identities by establishing a profes- ional forum or creating an expertise competition with a valued reward. Organizations that want to encourage breakthrough nnovations that give them a competitive advantage should develop a reward structure that compensates employees for uch efforts. In organizations with norms that do not encourage such radical creativity, if there are employees who identify trongly with their expertise, such efforts of using one’s expertise to establish one’s distinctiveness would be viewed as asting organizational resources.

Third, in China, some companies regard their employees’ family identity as an important part of their organizational ulture, including values such as taking care of the family. We found that family identity did not exhibit a negative effect n either incremental or radical creativity. However, managers should take actions that suggest to employees that family dentity is not the only important aspect of their identity. This would encourage employees to use their team and expertise dentity to enhance employees’ efforts at creativity and innovations.

Our paper is not without limitations. The results presented here may not be generalizable to all other organizations. articipants in our study worked at aerospace ship research and design institutes in China. This may have influenced the type f creativity that was encouraged in these types of organizations. Future research in organizations where radical creativity s expected or rewarded will help to clarify the relationship between identity and creativity.

. Conclusions

Organizations should be aware that employees have differing levels of identity that affect their decisions to expend fforts on creativity. Managers can encourage both incremental creativity and breakthrough creativity by making sure that he types of employees’ creative efforts they want to foster are rewarded.

cknowledgement

This research was supported by grants from the National Natural Science Foundation of China with the project numbers 1173214, 71473238, and 71273256.

ppendix A.

tudy items

adical creativity

. This employee is a good source of highly creative ideas.

. This employee demonstrates originality in his/her work.

130 C. Tang, S.E. Naumann / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 123–131

Incremental creativity

1. This employee uses previously existing ideas or work in an appropriate new way. 2. This employee is easily modifies previously existing work processes to suit current needs.

Team identity

1. When someone criticizes my team, it feels like a personal insult. 2. When I talk about my team, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’. 3. My team’s successes are my successes. 4. When someone praises this team, it feels like a personal compliment.

Expertise identity

1. Having expertise in my field is important to my sense of self-image. 2. Overall, being an expert has a great deal to do with how I feel about myself.

Family identity

1. No matter where I am, I am a member of the family first. 2. Family identification is my most important identification.

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  • The impact of three kinds of identity on research and development employees’ incremental and radical creativity
    • 1 Team identity and employee creativity
    • 2 Expertise identity and employee creativity
    • 3 The interactions of identity and employee creativity
    • 4 Family identity and employee creativity
    • 5 Method
      • 5.1 Sample
      • 5.2 Measures
        • 5.2.1 Team identity
        • 5.2.2 Expertise identity
        • 5.2.3 Family identity
        • 5.2.4 Incremental creativity and radical creativity
    • 6 Results
    • 7 Discussion
    • 8 Conclusions
    • Acknowledgement
    • Study items
      • Radical creativity
        • Incremental creativity
        • Team identity
        • Expertise identity
        • Family identity
        • References
    • References

Related Articles/The-relationship-among-teachers--classroom-practices-for-tea_2016_Thinking-S.pdf

Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 144–151

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Thinking Skills and Creativity

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : h t t p : / / w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / t s c

The relationship among teachers’ classroom practices for teaching thinking skills, teachers’ self-efficacy towards teaching thinking skills and teachers’ teaching styles

Yalçın Dilekli a,∗, Erdoğan Tezci b

a Aksaray University, Education Faculty, Department of Educational Sciences, Adana Yolu 7. Km., Aksaray, Turkey b Balıkesir University, Necatibey Education Faculty, Department of Educational Sciences, Balıkesir, Turkey

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 29 March 2016 Received in revised form 31 May 2016 Accepted 7 June 2016 Available online 18 June 2016

Keywords: Teaching thinking skills Self-efficacy Teaching styles Elementary teachers Regression analyses

a b s t r a c t

This paper describes the relationship among elementary teachers’ practices aiming at teach- ing thinking skills and their self-efficacy towards teaching thinking skills, teaching styles. The sample group consisted of 1003 classroom teachers. For collecting data, three different scales were administered. The fist scale was Teachers’ Classroom Practices for Teaching Thinking Scale, the second one was Teaching Thinking Skills Scale and the last one was Grasha’s Teaching Style Scale. Correlation and causal research designs were used to define the relationship among these variables. In the research, it was found that Facilitator teaching style followed by Self-efficacy. It was also seen that the predictor variable was Facilitator teaching style and the other styles had no effect on the model. Facilitator and delegator teaching styles had an effect on the model, but when self-efficacy was added on the model, it was seen that Delegator teaching style had no effect on the model. The results showed that self-efficacy was a meaningful variable on teachers’ teaching thinking practices. Moreover, teaching style was also a meaningful predictor. Facilitating model was more meaningful one than delegator, expert, authority and personal models.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

In the 21st century, knowledge has increased rapidly. This tendency is so rapid that by 2020 the knowledge we have will increase by fivefold every 72 h (Baron, 1993). Under this circumstance, the role of education has also changed because it is impossible to teach or accumulate such huge amounts of knowledge. The World Bank has also announced the same problem and OECD reports have asserted a solution. In the 1980s, the World Bank Education Reports announced that the educational aim should be to “grow up a generation who can think independently and solve problems creatively” (Klimova, 2012: 505).

After that, many countries changed their national curricula in order to find a remedy to this problem. Although, many of them applied similar programs the results were very different from each other (Onosko, 1991).

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (Y. Dilekli).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.06.001 1871-1871/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Y. Dilekli, E. Tezci / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 144–151 145

.1. Research rationale

Increasing knowledge creates new problems for all countries. The first problem is teaching everything is impossible; urthermore, for students it is extremely challenging to remember all this knowledge. The second problem is to determine hich one is true, reliable, or needed (Costa, 2001; Tezci & Gürol, 2002). Because of this, many countries have changed their

urricula and the phrase ‘to teach thinking skills’ has become the most important goal (Beyer, 2010; Nispet, 1990; Snyder Snyder, 2002). At this point, another problem has aroused about the scope of the term teaching thinking. Up to 1990, the

erm could not be precisely defined. The studies in America on defining the term reached a solution, 60 experts defined the omponents of the term thinking skill. Experts’ ideas were picked up by Costa and published in Developing Minds: A Resource ook for Teaching Thinking (Costa, 2001). According to this widely accepted idea, thinking skills have four components: reative thinking, decision making, critical thinking, and problem solving (Costa, 2001; McGuinness, 1999; McGregor, 2007; ispet, 1990; Wilks, 2005; Hashim, 2004; Tebbs, 2000; Alnesyan, 2012). These skills are needed by our century’s work force s well (Baumfield, 2006).

The first revolution in curricula for teaching thinking skills was realized by the Venezuelans with the Odessay Programme Alnesyan, 2012; Tebbs, 2000) The program also consists of teacher in-service training courses, producing new teaching

aterials and new assessment techniques. After the implementation of the program, the results were better than expected. o, similar ones were implemented in America. Later in Malaysia, Smart School Project started (Hashim, 2004). In England, he government wanted McGuinness to revise their education program (Johnson & Siegel, 2010; McGuinness, 1999). Similar adical changes appeared in Turkey as well. In 1997, new curricula have been developed on the basis of the constructivist hilosophy and the similar phrase ‘to teach thinking’ has taken its place among the goal of education (Republic of Turkey inistry of National Education [MEB], 2005). For teaching thinking, many other programs have been implemented all over the world. Nevertheless, the results are

aried from study to study because an effective educational thinking program does not only consist of written curricula Nispet, 1990). There are many other components which are as important as the program itself. Some of main components f teaching thinking skills process are classroom environment and teachers’ individual qualifications. Because, in teaching he thinking process, how you teach is more important than what you teach (Hashim, 2004; McGregor, 2007; McGuinness, 999; Nispet, 1990; Tebbs, 2000; Winch, 2010).

In this scope, Marzano (1998) analyzed 4000 research in his Meta-analyze and he found that thinking skills are teachable; owever, the success rate of each thinking skills program was very different from one another. Many new studies focused on ther variables such as teachers’ qualification, and parents’ and school administrations’ attitudes towards teaching thinking kills. These studies depicted that teachers’ individual difference was one of the most important variables in the process Alnesyan, 2012; Kamii & Lewis, 1991; Ritchhart, Palmer, Church, & Tishman, 2006). Self-efficacy and teaching styles are ccepted as the two main individual differences of the teaching thinking process (Alnesyan, 2012; Tebbs, 2000). Onosko 1991) found that teachers having low self-efficacy were less successful teacher than those having high self-efficacy. Because, aving low self-efficacy resulted in undemocratic classroom atmospheres, uncreative students, and one-way classroom

nteractions that are the main problems in teaching thinking skills (Coffman, 2013; Choy & Cheah, 2009; Othman & Mohamad, 014). Furthermore, a teacher’s teaching style is one of the determinants of their behavior patterns (Hugo, 1990). From this espect, teaching style and teachers’ self-efficacy level are also effective on ‘how you teach’.

.2. Research purpose

In this paper, the relationships among the teachers’ classroom practices for teaching thinking and their individual dif- erences, self-efficacy and teaching style, were analyzed. Because, similar to other countries, in Turkey although all schools re implementing the same curriculum, the results are different from each other. Our aim in this paper is to show whether here is such relationship in Turkey sample or not. Furthermore, when compared to European and American literature, the esearch on teaching thinking are very limited in Asian and Middle East samples (Costa, 2001; Hashim, 2004; Alnesyan, 012). Furthermore, studies defining the relationship between teachers’ thinking skills practices and their teaching styles re very rare not only in Asian and Middle East samples but also in other continents.

.3. Literature review

In fact, teaching thinking is not a new trend in the educational field. The first examples of the teaching thinking practices ere applied by Socrates and Confucius thousands of years ago (Nispet, 1990; Wilson, 2000). Furthermore, in holy books

uch as Quran and Torah there are many sentences which show the importance of being thinking individual (Alnesyan, 2012; ebbs, 2000). But, because of scholastic education, thinking was accepted as a capacity only for the people who had academic nowledge. This trend continued up to 17th century when A. Arnould wrote the book ‘Port Royal Logic’ (McGregor, 2007). ith the publication of the book, thinking skills became an important educational goal in the field. However, the behaviorist

ovement in the 18th century halted this trend. According to this movement, thinking skill was strongly connected with

Q level that suggested only intelligent individuals could think. In education, it was thought that there was no need to teach hinking. Because of this movement, education was seen as a field that only the scientific rules had to be thought (McGregor, 007; Wilks, 2005). This situation continued up to Dewey who asserted critical thinking notion (Baron, 1993). According

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to Dewey (1916), in that rapidly changing world, it was impossible to learn all the scientific rules. So people should learn how to use that knowledge. In the 20th century, the thinking movement got a new start, although it didn’t get the wanted phase (Alnesyan, 2012; Lam, Lim, Ma, & Adams, 2003; Krishan, 2010; McGregor, 2007; Sedaghat & Rahmani, 2012; Otman & Muhamad, 2014). Another turning point in teaching thinking as stated by McGrane and Sternberg’s (1992: 334) research was “even in our century our children don’t know how to think”. Meanwhile, employers were not satisfied with the typical undergraduate. Although, they employed people who graduated from the best universities, these new staff could not show the desired performance. They were very good at in their academic fields; however, they had problems with problem solving and being creative. Similar problems had aroused in academic fields. Students having high Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores were not able to show desired performance. In order to solve this problem, some items related to thinking skills were added to test such as SAT (McGregor, 2007; Tebbs, 2000).

These ideas urged countries to make a revolution in their curricula. Many countries such as Venezuela, the United King- dom, Israel, and Malaysia have developed different programs for updating their curricula (Hattie, Biggs, & Purdie, 1996). For better teaching of thinking, in different countries many teaching thinking programs have been developed; for example, in America alone, more than 100 programs have been developed (Jonhson & Siegel, 2010: 45). All programs have some mutual points, such as democratic and student-centered education, creativeness, critical thinking, problem solving and decision making. These mutual points descended from the Costa’s work. The programs developed for teaching thinking skills can be divided into 3 parts according to the approaches used while being developed (Jonhson & Siegel, 2010; McGregor, 2007; McGuinness, 1999; Wilks, 2005).

The first approach is called field-dependent thinking skills programs. In this approach, special teaching thinking programs are developed for each field. Content and teaching activities are reshaped in order to develop teaching thinking skills. Philosophy for Children by Lipman is the first example of this approach. Later, similar programs were developed based on this approach. Some of them are The Cognitive Acceleration Programme, Thinking Through Science and Thinking Through Math by Adey and Sayer, Thinking Through Art by DeSantis and Hausen (Alnesyan, 2012; DeSantis & Hausen, 2007; McGregor, 2007; Tebbs, 2000; Schoenfeld, 1985). However, these programs were criticized because learner had problems transferring their thinking skills to other academic fields; furthermore, it was impossible to apply such programs for all the fields due to lack of time. In order to decrease these criticisms, another approach appeared that was called field independent or the developing general thinking skills approach.

These programs are independent from both disciplines and academic knowledge. The main aim of this approach is to reduce the difficulties to transfer thinking skills capacity to different academic fields (Wilks, 2005; McGuinness, 1999; Swartz & Parks, 1994). Feurstein’s Instrumental Enrichment Program is accepted the first example of this kind (Kettle, 1992; Segadat & Rahmani, 2012). Somerset’s Teaching Thinking Programs, Lake and Needham’s Top Ten Thinking Tactics, De Bono’s Cognitive Research Trust (CoRT), Dawes, Mercer and Wegerif’s Thinking Together Programs are the other examples of this approach (Blagg, Ballenger & Gardner, 1996; Lake & Needham 1995). This approach was also criticized on the grounds that the importance of academic knowledge was trivialized during the education process (Fisher, 2005; Jonhson & Siegel, 2010). To solve this problem another approach, infused approach, came into agenda (Swartz & Parks, 1994).

In this approach, content or knowledge and thinking skills activities have the same importance. However, for implement- ing this approach revision of the present curriculums is not enough, curriculums should be redeveloped in order to teach the skills (Hashim, 2004; McGuinness, 1999; Swartz & Parks, 1994:3).

For all approaches, teachers are the main factor for effective teaching thinking skills process and their individual differ- ences are one of the most important variable for the process (Hattie et al., 1996; Sipe & Curlette, 1997). Teachers’ self-efficacy is one of them (Tebbs, 2000). According to Zohar (1999), teachers’ self-efficacy was one of the most effective factor that affects teacher performance in classroom activities. Likewise, Hampton (1996) indicated that teachers who have low self-efficacy were less capable at teaching thinking. The other individual difference is teaching style. Teaching style is one of the factors effecting creative classroom atmosphere (Aktan, 2012). Teaching style is defined as consistent and continuous teachers’ behavior patterns (Grasha, 2002). Grasha (1996) emphasized that teaching style has many components, such as teacher- student relations, teachers teaching methods, the way teachers giving feedback and reinforcement, asking questions or answering questions.

According to Grasha (1996, 2002) there are five main teaching styles. The first one is Facilitating Teaching Style. Teachers who fold in this group are more flexible. They try to give importance individual differences and students are responsible for their own learning. But, facilitator teachers need more time to teach. Delegator Teaching Style is second teaching style. Dele- gator teachers encourage their students to be independent. However, students studying with delegator teachers sometimes feel unsupported (Grasha, 2002; Aktan, 2012). Delegator teachers have some mutual points with facilitator teachers. Both of them try to give responsibility to their student in their learning process. Expert Teaching Style is the third style defined by Grasha. Contrary to other two styles this teaching style is teacher-centered one. Expert teachers see themselves as the source of knowledge and students are dependent on their teachers. The most important advantage of the expert teaching style is teachers need less time to teach and it is advantageous while teaching big groups. Formal Authority Teaching Style is another teacher-oriented teaching style. The teacher is the main authority of the classroom and explicitly tells this situ-

ation. Teacher fold in this group may ignore individual differences; furthermore, teachers who have this teaching style are inflexible. However, students are aware of what is expected from them. The last one is Personal Teaching Style. Teachers who prefer Personal Teaching Style are the role model for students. The disadvantage of this style is that students are always depended on teachers or try to imitate their teachers and not consider other way of solutions of the problems (Aktan, 2012;

Y. Dilekli, E. Tezci / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 144–151 147

Table 1 Teachers’ teaching styles analysis.

Styles f Percent Valid Percent Total Percent

Expert 142 14.2 14.2 14.2 Formal Authority 54 5.4 5.4 19.5 Personal 228 22.7 22.7 42.3 Facilitator 472 47.1 47.1 89.3

G l

t i

2

2

a a

2

s f w 1 t

2

( e 2 a m c b r C r c w

2

S a s t s

Delegator 107 10.7 10.7 100.0 Total 1003 100.0 100.0 100.0

rasha, 2002; Üredi & Üredi, 1997). However, Personal teaching style enables students to take responsibility to their own earning.

During teaching thinking skills, how you teach is more important than what you teach. How you teach means which eaching methods are used in classroom, how you interact with students or give feedbacks. The way depicting these behaviors s closely related to teachers’ self-efficacy and teaching style (Aktan, 2012; Grasha, 2002; Baron,1993).

. Method

.1. Research design

The research aim was to define the relationship among elementary teachers’ practices aiming at teaching thinking skills nd their self-efficacy levels, teaching styles. For defining whether there was relationship among these variables, correlation nd causal research designs were used.

.2. Participants

As teaching thinking skill is a long process (Costa, 2001; McGregor, 2007; Perkins & Ritchhart, 2004) participants were elected among the elementary teachers who are together with the same students for 4 years in Turkey. Data were collected rom 1003 classroom teachers, 559 (55.7%) of whom were male, 444 (44.3%) were female. 602 (60%) of the participants were orking city center and the rest 401 (40%) were working in rural areas. 129 (12.9%) of the teachers had 1–5-year experience,

68 (16.7%) had 6–10 years, 229 (22.8%) had 11–15 years, 254 (25.3%) had 16–20 years, 223 (22.2%) had 21 years or more eaching experience.

.3. Instruments

For collecting the data, 3 scales were used the first one is Teachers’ Classroom Practices for Teaching Thinking Scale TCPP) whose Cronbach’s alpha coefficient value was 0.84 (Dilekli & Tezci, 2015a) and the second one is Teachers’ Self- fficacy towards Teaching Thinking Skills Scale (TSTS) whose Cronbach’s alpha coefficient value was 0.95 (Dilekli & Tezci, 015b). TCCP scale had 21 items (eg: I want my students to criticize the proposed solution for the problem) and four factors s teaching activities, curriculum dependence, representing authority, supporting thinking. There were 20 items (eg: I can anage processes enabling them thinking while making an experiments or observations) and under 3 factors, academic

ompetence, Practice, and designing. The third scale, Grasha’s Teaching Style Scale (GTSS), used in the research was adopted y the researchers. GTSS was first used Üredi and Üredi (1997) and Aktan (2012) in Turkish samples. However, for this esearch, scales’ reliability and validity analyses were done again. Date taken from the pilot application KMO (.928) and hi-Square (�2 = 8560.499) values were calculated and found meaningful (p < 0.05). After the Confirmatory Factor Analysis esult (CFA), the fitting indexes found as follows, CFI 0.94, NFI 0.91, NNFI, 0.94, SRMR 0.071 and calculated Cronbach’s alpha oefficient value was 0.94, Aktan’s Cronbach’s alpha coefficient value is 0.90, degree of freedom was 930 and �2/df value as 3452.

.4. Data analysis

In order to define teachers’ teaching styles, all data were transferred to a package program, Grasha-Reichman Teaching tyle Inventory. Later, within the scope of data analysis, correlation analysis was carried out to determine the correlations mong the teachers’ teaching thinking skills practices, teachers’ self-efficacy towards teaching thinking skills and teaching

tyles. A multiple linear regression analysis was done by using the stepwise method to determine which elements of the eaching thinking skills were meaningful on teaching style; in addition, these descriptive statistics such as mean values and tandard deviations were calculated (Table 1).

148 Y. Dilekli, E. Tezci / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 144–151

Table 2 Teachers’ practices for thinking skills and teachers’ teaching styles descriptive analysis.

Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis

TCPP 1 5 3.83 0.43 −0.005 −0.493 TSTS 1 5 4.18 0.53 −1.068 1.309

Table 3 Correlation analysis.

Teaching Thinking Skills Style General Expert Formal Authority Personal Facilitator Delegator

Teaching Thinking Skills 0.155** −0.089** −0.060 −0.161** 0.234** −0.015

Self-efficacy 0.291** 0.141** −0.105** −0.140** −0.001 0.154** −0.026

** p < 0.05.

3. Findings

3.1. Descriptive statistics

According to the research results, most of the teachers fell into the ‘facilitator’ (47.1%) category. Teachers who were in the personal teaching style group were the second biggest group (22.7%). The expert teachers rate was 14.2%, the delegator was 10.6%. The smallest group was formal Authority (5.4%). In Turkey, most of the teachers’ teaching style is suitable for creating thinking classrooms. Because facilitator, personal, delegator teaching styles are student-centered styles which is the basis of creating thinking classrooms (Wasserman, 2010). The least preferred teaching style was Formal Authority. Teachers, who were in this group, prefer teacher-centered education and only aim at reaching the goals and transferring of the knowledge. For these reasons, this teaching style is not suitable for the thinking classroom. According to research by Zohar (2008), teachers’ behavior is one of the most important factor creating thinking classrooms. Teachers who follow strict rules and accept only one way to solve problems fail in creating thinking classroom atmosphere (Table 2).

According to the analysis, TCPP’s general mean value was found high (=3.83). Namely, teachers’ attitudes towards teaching thinking skills in classroom were positive and it could be asserted that teachers make activities to teach thinking skills. Hashim (2004) found similar results in Malaysia; on the other hand, he also found that teachers who work less than 20 h per week were more eager to teach thinking skills (Table 3).

3.2. Correlation statistics

According to correlation analysis results there was a low-level relation between teaching thinking skills general mean and teaching style general mean score (r = 0.155, p < 0.05). When self-efficacy and teaching style were considered together the highest correlation (r = 0.234, p < 0.05) was found between facilitator teaching style and teaching thinking skills general mean. This finding is coherent with the Heidari, Nourmohammadi, and Nowrouzi (2012) findings. There was no correlation (r = −0.015, p > 0.05) between delegator teaching style and teaching thinking skills. However, in different research it was found that there was positive correlation between these two variables (Hashim, 2004; Mansour, 2009; Pajares, 2002). There was also low-level correlation (r = 0.141, p < 0.01) between self-efficacy and teaching styles. Upon self-efficacy level and teaching style were compared, the highest correlation (r = 0.154, p < 0.01) seen was the facilitator teaching style and the lowest correlation (r = 0.001, p > 0.01, 0.05) was seen the personal teaching style. Besides, it was found that there was a medium level of correlation (r = 0.308, p < 0.01) teaching thinking skills general mean scores and self-efficacy level. This result is similar to Tebbs’ (2000) findings. As, it was seen high level of correlation (r = 0.747) among the sub-dimensions of self-efficacy and self-efficacy general means, in order not to cause multicollinearity, for regression analysis scale general marks were used in analyses instead of using sub-dimensions’ marks.

Besides, multiple regression assumptions based on overall scores were analyzed except correlation (correlation coeffi- cients among all independent variables smaller than 0.75). It was also found that there was a linear relationship (tested with scatter plots) among dependent and independent variables and all variables were normal (this assumption was checked with histogram and Q-Q −Plot). Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), Tolerance and Durbin-Watson statistics were used to check whether residuals were independent. In the analysis, tolerance statistics were calculated 1.00 and VIF was 1 in first step. Respectively, in second and third steps tolerance value was 0.894 and 977; and VIF was 1.119 and 1.024. Durbin-Watson statistic (to check there was an autocorrelations or not) value was 1.706. Finally, regression assumptions based on the overall scores were found suitable for the analyses (Table 4).

A stepwise regression analysis was conducted to determine the best predictor variable for Teaching Thinking Skills. The results showed that the predictor variable was TS Facilitator (ß = 0.22, p < 0.01) followed by Self-efficacy (ß = 0.26, p < 0.01).

It was also seen that the other styles had no effect on the model. Facilitator and delegator teaching styles had an effect on the model, but when self-efficacy was added on the model, it was seen that Delegator teaching style had no effect on the model. The results showed that self-efficacy was a meaningful variable on teachers’ teaching thinking practices. Moreover,

Y. Dilekli, E. Tezci / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 144–151 149

Table 4 Regression analysis.

Variables B Std. Error � t p

Step 1 Constant 3.136 0.013 241.880 0.000* T.S. Facilitator 0.144 0.019 0.234 7.611 0.000* R = 0.234 R2 = 0.055 �R2 = 0.054 F (1;1001) = 57.934*

Step 2 Constant 3.123 0.014 215.565 0.000* T.S. Facilitator 0.158 0.020 0.256 7.897 0.000* T.S. Delegator 0.068 0.032 0.069 2.112 0.035* R = 0.243 R2 = 0.059 �R2 = 0.057 F (1;1000) = 4.462**

Step 3 Constant 2.511 0.072 34.818 0.000* T.S. Facilitator 0.132 0.019 0.215 6.785 0.000* T.S. Delegator 0.060 0.031 0.061 1.941 0.052** Self-efficacy 0.149 0.017 0.259 8.642 0.000*

*

t a

4

t e

s a i s i e a f r 2 w s o c p a

t t r v N o t

t b

t f t t

b c o

R = 0.353 R2 = 0.124 �R2 = 0.122 F (1;999) = 74.687*

p < 0.05; **p > 0.05; Dependent variable: Teaching Thinking Skills.

eaching style was also a meaning predictor. Facilitating model was more meaningful one than delegator, expert, authority nd personal models.

. Results and discussions

The purpose of this research is to define the relationship among teachers’ teaching styles, teachers’ self-efficacy towards eaching thinking skills and teachers’ classroom practices to teach thinking skills. The research was conducted with 1003 lementary teachers working in five different cities. For the research, 3 different scales were used.

According to the correlation analysis results, it was found that there was low-level relation between teaching thinking kills general mean and teaching style general means. According to the results, when self-efficacy and teaching styles were nalyzed together, it could be asserted that there was a relationship between facilitator teaching style and teachers’ teach- ng thinking skills practices. According to the Gibson and Dembo (1984) high self-efficacy is one of the factors in achieving uccess in any field. So, when self-efficacy was added on the model, teaching style became more effective on teaching think- ng skills. There are also other research (Salem, 1995; Tebbs, 2000; Gelen, 1999) showing that self-efficacy was one of the ffective factor for teaching thinking. When the facilitating teaching style qualifications are considered, facilitator teachers re more successful at creating democratic classroom climate than the other teachers belonging to other groups because acilitator teachers prefer student-centered teaching techniques. For a better teaching thinking process, democratic class- oom climate, flexibility, giving responsibility to own learnings are inevitable necessities (Baumfield & Oberski, 1998; Costa, 001; McGregor, 2007; Wilks, 2005). Similarly, when the relationship between teaching thinking skills and teaching style ere analyzed together the highest positive correlation was seen between facilitator teaching style and teaching thinking

kills. Facilitator teachers give students responsibility of their own learning process. Therefore, students are normally part f the decision-making process. From this respect, a democratic classroom climate is naturally created. In addition, a demo- ratic classroom enables students to be more creative (Alwehaibi, 2012; Onosko, 1991; Wilson, 2000). In conclusion, having ositive correlation between the facilitator teaching style and teaching thinking skills practices can be accepted coherent nd expected result.

However, it was also found that there was a negative relationship between personal model teaching style and teaching hinking practices. In fact, when personal model features are considered, it is expected that there should be positive rela- ionship between teaching thinking skills and personal model. Because, teachers belonging personal model group are the ole model for students (Hashim, 2004; Mansour, 2009; Pajares, 2002). In this research, however, the relation was occurred ice versa. The reason for this result may be the fact that teacher themselves took teacher-centered education. According to espor (1987), teachers want to be role model for students; but their teacher-centered educational experience was a great bstacle for them. Ritchhart et al. (2006) and Özdemir (2005) asserted that teachers themselves should be thinking ones for hinking classrooms.

According to the research result, there was a positive relationship between the self- efficacy and teachers’ teaching hinking practices. Tebbs (2000) found similar results. The reason for this situation may be the fact that once an individual elieves to be successful in a field, then he/she stars to show more effort to be successful in that field (Tebbs, 2000).

Another results found in the research was that when self-efficacy and style general marks were considered together, here was a positive correlation between only facilitator teaching style and self-efficacy. Namely, facilitator teachers, who ollow student-centered education, had higher self-efficacy levels towards teaching thinking. Similar research show that eachers who feel themselves qualified in their fields create more democratic classroom atmosphere, which is essential to eaching thinking and show more effort for teaching thinking (Beyer & Ronald, 1986; Ricthhard & Perkins, 2004).

It was found that there was a negative relationship between formal authority teaching style and self-efficacy. Teachers elonging formal authority teaching style prefer teacher-centered teaching methods and this causes undemocratic classroom limate and inflexibility in classroom. In many studies, the undemocratic classroom climate was defined as one of the bstacle in teaching thinking process (Alnesyan, 2012; Alwehaibi, 2012; Baumfield & Oberski, 1998; Beyer & Ronald, 1986;

150 Y. Dilekli, E. Tezci / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 144–151

Nair & Ngang, 2012; Ritchhart et al., 2006; Wasserman, 2010). Because an undemocratic classroom climate causes one-way interaction in classroom and passive, uncreative students (Alnesyan, 2012).

In the research, a relationship between teachers’ self-efficacy towards teaching thinking skills and teaching styles was also found. That means teachers having high self-efficacy level had more practice on teaching thinking skills in classroom. Heidari, et al. (2012), reached a similar result in their research. According to the researchers, there was a relationship between teachers’ self-efficacy and preferred teaching styles. Teachers having high self-efficacy prefer student-centered teaching styles and give more importance to teaching thinking skills. Having low self-efficacy level towards teaching thinking skills may cause doing fewer activities to teaching thinking. A teacher doing less activity related to teaching thinking may have to use teacher-centered methods in classroom. So these teachers mostly belong to formal authority and expert teaching styles because of their teaching method preference.

5. Conclusion

To sum up, the research showed that there was relationship among teachers’ classroom practices for teaching thinking, preferred teaching style and self-efficacy towards teaching thinking skills. Teachers, preferring student-centered teaching styles, gave more importance to teaching thinking activities and these teachers had high self-efficacy level towards teaching thinking skills.

6. Limitations and future directions

The sample group of the study consisted of elementary teachers, making similar research with different branches may enable research different point of view. In this research, the relationship among teaching thinking skills, teachers’ self- efficacy and teachers’ teaching style were analyzed. However, making similar research with different variables will help curriculum developers and teachers for teaching thinking.

Acknowledgement

This paper is a part of PhD. dissertation by Yalç ın DİLEKLİ.

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  • The relationship among teachers’ classroom practices for teaching thinking skills, teachers’ self-efficacy towards teachin...
    • 1 Introduction
      • 1.1 Research rationale
      • 1.2 Research purpose
      • 1.3 Literature review
    • 2 Method
      • 2.1 Research design
      • 2.2 Participants
      • 2.3 Instruments
      • 2.4 Data analysis
    • 3 Findings
      • 3.1 Descriptive statistics
      • 3.2 Correlation statistics
    • 4 Results and discussions
    • 5 Conclusion
    • 6 Limitations and future directions
    • Acknowledgement
    • References