I need help conflict 3

Conflict in an Israeli Collective Community: A Case Study

Author(s): Bernard Reisman

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution , Jun., 1981, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1981), pp. 237-258

Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/173821

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Conflict in an Israeli

Collective Community

A CASE STUDY

BERNARD REISMAN

American Jewish Communal Service

Brandeis University

This article deals with social conflict in a moshav (an Israeli collective community) settled mainly by American immigrants. A model of the causes of social conflict is used to

analyze the dynamics of the case. An underlying schism among the members of the community, reflecting differential identification with American and Israeli values, was exacerbated by dissonant structural conditions. Two Israeli organizations responsible for helping new collective communities intervened and favored one of the factions in the conflict. Their bias neutralized the possibility of a conciliating role either by the members unaffiliated with the conflicting factions or by a private social agency which tried to mediate the conflict. The author was involved as a consultant in the attempted mediation.

It got to the point where I actually hated people from the other side.

When I woke up in the morning and thought of having to work with them or meet them in the street I would get upset. For the sanity of my

wife and me we just had to leave." These angry words were spoken by a mild-mannered young engineer.

He and his wife are American Jews who emigrated to Israel in 1975 to settle on a newly formed collective settlement, Moshav Avodah. I Within four years they and thirteen other families-about half the membership of the moshav-had left, disillusioned and bitter. They were victims of what had been ironically referred to as a "color war," a bitter internal conflict which rent the membership of Moshav Avodah. The two sides

1. A moshav is a collective community, similar to a kibbutz, except that a moshav allows for greater individual autonomy ("Moshav," Encyclopedia Judaica, 1971: 435-436). The name Avodah is a pseudonym, as are the names of moshav members and Israeli organizations referred to in this case study.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 25 No. 2, June 1981 237-258

) 1981 Sage Publications, Inc.

237

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238 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

to the conflict were identified as "Reds" and "Blues." (At American

summer camps, color war is an extended program activity in which the

camp population is divided into two teams, each designated by a color.

The teams vie to accumulate points in a series of contests and sporting

events. It may well have been that one of these American settlers

remembered his own childhood camp experiences and came up with the

colors Red and Blue to distinguish the two groups competing at

Avodah. At that early point, the color designations may have been

applied tongue-in-cheek, to suggest that the constant quarreling was

juvenile.)

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

Moshav Avodah was established in the early 1970s by a group of 14 young families from the United States and Canada. For several years prior to emigrating, they met in America as a garin (nucleus) preparing

for their life in the collective community in Israel. Upon settling in Israel in 1975, the garin sought other young families with similar backgrounds

and ideological views to join them. Ten other families, already living in Israel, joined Avodah so that at the end of the first year there was a total of 24 families. They had much in common. They were young (the average age of adults was 30); all had young children; almost all the

adults were college graduates (several held advanced degrees); and all

were traditional Jews, committed to Zionism.

The members made two decisions concerning the nature of their moshav which gave it a certain uniqueness. It was agreed that Avodah was to be a moshav shitufi (a cooperative moshav), one which has a more collective orientation in its work activities and social program than a regular moshav. Also, in contrast to the typical moshav in which agriculture is the major economic activity, Avodah was to be an indus- trial moshav. Most of the men were trained as scientists or engineers, and on the moshav they organized industrial enterprises in computers, electronics, and chemicals. By the end of their first year, the members of Avodah were enthusiastic and optimistic about the prospects for their pioneering community.

Some two years later, the community was split into two hostile groups, the Reds and the Blues. Relationships had become so strained that all areas of the community's functioning were adversely affected. The formal communal structures of governance had ceased to exist: the regularly scheduled communitywide business meetings and the several

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 239

committees which planned social, cultural, and religious activities

stopped functioning. The Secretariat, the committee responsible for

making the critical economic and administrative decisions of the

moshav, managed to continue meeting, but only as a result of the

intervention of the Moshav Movement (MM) a national organization

which provides technical help and ideological support to its member

moshavim. After Avodah members stopped having business meetings,

they were unable to elect their own administrative officers. Representa-

tives of the MM from other moshavim were assigned to the Secretariat

to fill the vacant positions. Despite the propping up of the Secretariat by

the MM, Avodah could- not cope with one of the major requirements for

its survival-acquiring new members. In newly developing moshavim, as was the case with Avodah, the

initial capital investment in buildings and utilities and other supportive services are provided by the Settlement Office (SO), an agency of the

government. Fifty housing units were constructed at Avodah-this size

being seen as optimal for economic viability. By the end of its first year, Moshav Avodah reached what proved to be its maximum number of member families-24. The inability to add needed new members was

one of the earliest indications of the emerging schism. The by-laws of

Avodah require a two-thirds affirmative vote to accept a new member.

The problem was not lack of applicants, but rather the inability of the members to reach consensus on any of the prospective families. The

membership split down the middle on every vote for new members, with the same people always voting as a bloc. A family which was supported by one bloc (soon to be identified as either Red or Blue) invariably was opposed by the other bloc. The result was a stagnant membership, severely limiting economic growth (to the consternation of the SO,

interested in optimizing its capital investment). Evidence of the conflict between Reds and Blues began to appear in

other phases of moshav life. Reds and Blues ceased socializing with one another. One Blue described the situation:

"We no longer have any of the Reds over to our house and they don't invite us. If I am walking on the street and I see a Red coming, I will cross

the street. We had a new baby two months ago and not one Red came to

the bris (circumcision ceremony and party). They wouldn't even extend congratulations to my husband and me."

A similar description was afforded by one of the Reds: "We have stopped trying to get together socially with any of the Blues. We used to be very friendly with most of the Blues, but they have become so

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240 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

paranoid about the problems on the moshav, that it is impossible to have a conversation which doesn't result in a major blow-up."

Members described arguments between Reds and Blues leading to

physical fights and destruction of property. The work enterprises suf- fered because of the breakdown in communication and the interper-

sonal tension. The situation had become so tense that a private

organization was asked to mediate the conflict. The organization chosen was the Social Agency (SA), a nongovernmental foundation which provides consultation services to social welfare organizations in Israel.

The SA approached me, as a visiting American professor in Israel, to

serve as the chief consultant in a three-person mediating team. When I

first visited the moshav to explore the possibilities of mediating the

conflict, the leaders of the two factions refused to meet together in the same room.

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

The conflict at Moshav Avodah offers a fruitful opportunity for the study of the dynamics of social conflict. This is a social system with a fixed, relatively small membership. In addition, as a result of the virtual geographic isolation of the moshav, the critical variables in the conflict process stand forth sharply with minimal interference. The research potential is further enhanced by the ease of access of the researcher to the key parties to the conflict. The moshav members, feeling belea- guered by the tensions of their conflict situation, were cooperative and forthcoming with regard to the inquiries of a sympathetic outsider, especially one not identified with either the MM or the SO institutions seen as operating from strong institutional biases.

The foregoing description of the social conflict at Moshav Avodah raises two basic questions. The first concerns the genesis of the conflict: Why did a conflict emerge in such an ideologically and demographically homogeneous community? Another aspect of this question is: What accounts for the rapid dissolution of the initial cohesion and its replace- ment by intense strife?

The second question addresses the process of conflict resolution. Is this conflict amenable to mediation? What are the factors which deter- mine the outcome of the conflict?

In seeking answers to these questions, it became clear that the dy- namics of the conflict at Moshav Avodah involved a combination of

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 241

structural and interpersonal tensions. Joseph Himes (1980) has recently

developed an explanatory model which accounts for the interplay of

structural and interpersonal factors in social conflict. This model syn-

thesizes earlier theoretical and empirical studies of the nature and causes

of conflict.

The applicability of the Himes framework to the Avodah case stems

from three features of the model:

(1) a systemic orientation, which accounts for the overall environment as well as the

locus of the conflict and their interaction;

(2) an action orientation, which considers change, adaptation, and the impact of inter-

ventions;

(3) a time orientation, which accounts for sequence or steps in the process of conflict,

without implying that the steps are fixed and only occur in that order. At each step,

all components of the conflict process are interacting, although one tends to be

more central and to have a more visible cause or effect relationship with the other

components.

The Himes explanatory model outlines four sets of factors which explain the nature and causes of social conflict. These are: Basic

Categories-the potential for cleavage among the members of a social system; Structural Preconditions-strains within the social system which foster conflict; Motivations-internalization by parties to the

conflict of attitudes which lead to conflict behavior; and Catalyzing

Situation-triggering event(s) in escalating the conflict. The four condi- tions of the model permit a systematic description of the key events in the conflict at Avodah, and also help explain its outcome.

BASIC CATEGORIES

Himes posits as a fact of collective life the presence of two basic categories or groups, each representing a different orientation or status within the social entity. Members of the collective tend to divide into one or the other category, and this subaffiliation serves as their frame of reference within the larger group. Examples of societal dichotomies are liberal and conservative, shepherds and farmers, northerners and sou-

therners, high caste and low caste. In organizations, examples of basic categories include professionals and academics, blue collar and white collar, process-oriented and task-oriented people. The basis of the difference can be an inherited or fixed status (i.e., class, caste, occupa-

tion, religion, geographic location); or it may stem from a different ideological perspective or personal style (i.e., politics, world view, life

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242 JOURNA L OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

style); or it might be a combination of both factors. Although the basis

for the pairings varies, the tendency of members of human collectives to

divide into two definable categories is universal.

The two groups evolve a balance of cooperation and competition in

the normal cycle of events in their social situation. Typically, tension

accompanies the interaction of the two groups as they vie for power and limited resources. Most often this tension is a source of constructive

energy focused on the pursuit of the purposes of the collectivity. In some

instances, conflict rises to a level of intensity which results in instability in the social structure. The outcome may be a breakdown in the capacity

of the two groups to continue to exist as a viable entity. In the case of Moshav Avodah, the basic categories follow the course

described in the theoretical model. Since the case study begins at the

point of the formation of the moshav, the relationship between the Reds

and the Blues can be traced from the earliest indications of two definable

categories through their emergence into a full-blown conflict. In the formative period of the moshav, the members were strongly

committed to developing a cohesive, unified community based on their

shared ideological convictions. Despite their optimism, homogeneous background, and collective ideology, the Avodah members could not sustain a cohesive community. Evidence of a cleavage began to surface

and differences between the two groups were sufficiently defined and consistent to warrant assigning names to the categories: Reds and Blues.

As noted previously, the first evidence of the split into Reds and Blues appeared as the original group of moshav settlers addressed the task of voting on new candidates for membership. The members were unable to agree on any of the candidates, even though most were suitable for membership in the moshav, and everyone understood that new

members were vital for the moshav to thrive. The process of voting on the succession of candidates made explicit the existence of the schism at Avodah. That no compromise could be reached between the two fac- tions on a matter of organizational consequence foretold a schism of serious proportions.

In analyzing the background and attitudes of the Avodah members, it is evident that, although there are consistent differences across color lines, there remain fundamental similarities (age, family situation, reli- gious orientation, education). However, as the processes of conflict mounted, these commonalities became submerged and the differences accentuated. The presence of a reservoir of commonalities was the focus for later efforts at mediating the conflict.

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 243

TABLE I

Ranking of Personal Goals for Avodah

Blue Red

Goal Average Score Rank Average Score Rank

Economic success of

moshav 1.3 1 3.5 4

Meaningful Jewish

religious experience 2.7 2 3.3 3

Pleasant relations

among members 3.1 3 2.1 2

Establish new social

institution in Israel 3.5 4 1.7 1

Creative professional/ vocational challenge 3.8 5 4.5 5

Three areas of difference between Reds and Blues are: goals for the

moshav; organizational orientation; and national orientation.

Goals for the Moshav. In a questionnaire we administered during the

mediation process, Avodah members were asked to rank their personal preferences with respect to goals for their moshav. The Blues considered the moshav's economic success most important, whereas the Reds were

most concerned with establishing a new social institution and maintain- ing good relations among the members (see Table 1). This distinction

was also cited frequently in conversations with the members. In this sense, the Blues may be deemed pragmatic and the Reds idealistic.

Organizational Orientation. Related to the differences in goals are differences in orientation toward decision-making and the allocation of

power. Reds are democratic, collectivist, and egalitarian: they seek to maximize collective decision-making and to fill positions of authority on the moshav using a system of random rotation. Blues are authorita- tive and elitist; they favor decision-making by people in authority and

want these authorities chosen on the basic of competence. Reds are process-oriented; Blues task-oriented. Reds express concern about peo- ple's feelings and "the quality of life" on the moshav. They see Blues as aggressive and unprincipled: "the end justifies the means." Blues talk about individual responsibility and economic viability. They see Reds as "immature."

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244 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

National Orientation. When asked to explain the reasons for the

differences between the two factions, both sides agreed that they are

attributable to national orientation. Reds are considered by Blues to be

American-oriented, and Blues are thought of by the Reds as Israel-

oriented. In terms of background, there is some modest evidence to

support this contention. All of the Reds were born in the United States

or Canada and are recent immigrants to Israel. Most of them were part

of the original Avodah nucleus group which was formed in America,

whereas most of the Blues, though American born, had already been

living in Israel for an average of two and one-half years when Avodah

was formed and joined the moshav during its first year. The two native-

born Israelis living on Avodah were Blues and both were viewed by their

fellow Blues as leaders.

It isn't clear whether the modest differential of time in the country

and the leadership roles of the two Blue native Israelis sufficiently

account for as significant a difference in orientation as is implied in the

subjective assessment by the two factions. Nevertheless, that such a

sharp distinction is real in the minds of the antagonists is quite clear.

Members of the two groups regularly exchanged descriptions of each other in which their behavior was considered either typically American or Israeli. For example, Blues in talking about Reds frequently used the

term "JAP" (Jewish-American Princess/Prince), which they further clarified to mean "materialistic," "lazy," "spoiled." Reds characterize

Blues in what they think of as typical qualities of Israelis: "manipulative," "aggressive," "insensitive," and "hard." A Red referring to a Blue thought to be high in these qualities spoke of him as "trying to act more

Israeli than the Israelis."

Stereotypes emerge to provide an outlet for the mounting hostility the two groups feel for one another. Subsequently, the stereotypes serve

as a rationale for the persistence of the conflict. The dynamics of

stereotyping in social conflict are explained by Kidder and Steward

(1975: 62):

We inevitably lump people into groups and assign them roles, labels, and attributes

as convenient simplifications of a complex social world.... Once attached, labels

tend to persist, in spite of their errors, for they become self-fulfilling prophecies and

thereby justify their own experience. ... Often such behavior becomes so persistent

and predictable within group members that it is assumed to be the reflection of

innate, unchangeable personality traits.

In summary, the two basic categories might be viewed as analogous to a fault line in geological terms: the potential for a schism exists; when

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 245

pressure in the system mounts beyond a certain threshold, the schism

erupts. Further understanding of the escalation of the conflict between

the Reds and the Blues requires a discussion of structural factors of the

Moshav Avodah social system, which introduces the next element in the model of social conflict: structural preconditions.

STRUCTURAL PRECONDITIONS

Conflict does not emerge in a vacuum. The potential antagonists in a

conflict have been identified in the Basic Categories. The Structural

Preconditions indicate areas of the social system which will mitigate or

exacerbate the extent of the conflict. In some instances, stress-

generating conditions exist within the boundaries of the system (internal to the moshav); in other instances structural tensions arise from interac-

tions with the external environment (Israel). Three examples of struc-

tural preconditions in the Avodah social system and their impact on the mounting conflict are pertinent.

Dissonance Between Economics and Ideology. Two decisions made

by the Avodah members in the original design of their new community appear to have generated a structural dissonance: one was related to the economic focus of the moshav, and the other concerned its ideology.

The founding members' decision to become a moshav shitufi gave

special emphasis to a collective orientation in both the economic and

social spheres of their community.

Typically the major economic activity of the Israeli collective communities the moshavim and kibbutzim has been agriculture,2 an economic focus for which a collective orientation has demonstrated its compatibility. But the Avodah founders were not interested in agricul- ture. These were individuals with specialized university training as engineers, chemists, and computer programmers. They were attracted

to the Israeli moshav by the appealing idea of being able to pursue their professions in an environment compatible with their ideals of collecti- vism and Zionism. One of the members recalled his reactions when he

was first approached in America about the prospect ofjoining the newly forming community. "I was elated. I thought this would be the best of all

2. In recent years, the Israeli moshavim and kibbutzim have been supplementing their agricultural work with industrial enterprises. This has occurred partly in response to en- couragement from the Israeli government to extend the industrial productivity of the nation, and partly in response to the interests of the members to improve their personal and collective material well-being.

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246 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

worlds-a chance to work at my profession as a chemist in a noncom- petitive, collegial setting and, at the same time, contribute to the build- ing of the State of Israel."

It wasn't long after Avodah was launched that evidence began to emerge which indicated that the traditional moshav values of coopera-

tion and egalitarianism, appropriate for agriculture, were not fully compatible with the requirements of their industrial enterprises. Highly technical electronic, computer, and chemical business ventures-

particularly ones newly established-are not apt to fare well if manage- rial personnel are rotated without regard to specialized training or

experience. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the young scientists and engineers at Avodah had little or no previous administrative experience, nor were there precedents from other mosha- vim to which they could turn for guidelines in managing their industrial moshav.

As inefficiency and the accompanying financial consequences mounted, the issue of allocating administrative responsibility increasingly became a basis of contention. Some asserted a hard line (the Blues): "Let's get the best person in the managerial jobs so we can establish the economic viability of our businesses." Others (the Reds) affirmed that they came to the moshav because they wanted to work in a low pressure, nonau- thoritarian setting. They favored rotating people in all jobs, including executive positions. The comments of one Red engineer were typical: "If

I wanted to work in a hierarchical operation, I would have remained with IBM. I decided to join Avodah because I wanted to help establish a different type of community. My professional work is important, but not to the point that it would adversely affect the overall quality of life."

The differing views concerning the management of the work enter- prises and of the general life of the moshav became a persistent source of friction at Avodah. Most of the Blues had come to the conclusion that the economic requirements of their industrial moshav were dissonant with the initial ideological conception of Moshav Avodah. The Reds acknowledged the economic problems but continued to believe, with possible modest adaptations, that their original ideals could serve as the foundation of a viable community.

The conflict within the moshav was exacerbated by pressures coming from the larger Israeli society. In the earlier settlement period of the country, the collective settlements were viewed with much favor in the society. These communities not only produced much of the needed food supply, but also epitomized the pioneering spirit and idealism of the new country. In more recent decades, the persistent threats of war have

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 247

become the major focus of the nation's attention and have affected its

economic and ideological priorities. Resultant political and economic

tensions have eroded an earlier ideological consensus.

Undoubtedly the members of Avodah, and their internal problems,

have been affected by the tensions in the country. First, Avodah's physi-

cal location (on the frontier of the conflict with the Arabs) offers a

constant reminder of the precariousness of their situation. Second, since

Moshav Avodah is a developing community, largely dependent in its

early years on government subsidies, it inevitably experiences the eco-

nomic adversity which confronts the nation. Finally, the proliferation of

ideological differences and schisms in the country has a disillusioning

impact on the citizenry in general, but in particular on idealists such as

the settlers on Avodah.

Intensity. Moshav life is all-encompassing, affecting all phases of

life work, leisure, family, and religion. Members are involved with

each other around the clock. They have little contact with people other than the members of their moshav. Privacy is a rare commodity. The

result is an intensive social atmosphere, one which can be supportive, but also has the potential to become oppressive. As Kriesberg (1973: 89)

notes in his analysis of the factors giving rise to social conflict, "the more groups have to do with each other, the more they have to quarrel about.

If they have nothing to do with each other, they have no basis for a social

conflict."

In most collective communities, one way members cope with the intensity of their life is to form informal subgroups or cliques which

afford them a respite from the pressures to conform. In these small unofficial groups, they can complain about their life, gossip about other members, relax, and experience a sense of intimacy. The subgroups serve as an important safety valve for dissipating tensions in the com-

munity and afford a sense of psychological security to individuals. At least two criteria must be met for subgroups to emerge within a

community: a sufficiently large number of people to allow for a range of

small groups representing the spectrum of values and personalities; and

a tolerance for diversity, so that subgroups are not viewed as a threat to

the community's stability. Neither criterion was met at Avodah: it is

relatively small and carried a legacy from its founding members which

valued a single, cohesive community. From their early formative years

together in America, the original members had established close inter- personal ties. Everyone was expected to be friendly with everyone else-

cliques were strongly discouraged. In the process of preparing for

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248 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

emigration and in the early months of accommodating to their new

home, the strong sense of community was a source of support for the

members. But as tensions stemming from the managing of the moshav began to affect social relationships, the pressure to sustain a single,

cohesive community became onerous. There was no tolerance for con-

flict nor sanction for the formation of subgroups. Tensions simmered

for a while and were confined to areas of work and moshav manage-

ment. Soon, however, these tensions spread to social relationships and

the conflict became full blown. The sense of a unitary community and its

social controls were no longer operative.

Coser (1956: 151-152), in his classic study of conflict, comments on

the process of escalation of conflict in intimate groups.

Closely knit groups in which there exists a high frequency of interaction and high

personality involvement of the members have a tendency to suppress conflict.

While they provide frequent occasions for hostility (since both sentiments of love

and hatred are intensified through frequency of interaction), the acting out of such

feelings is sensed as a danger to such intimate relationships, and hence there is a

tendency to suppress rather than to allow expression of hostile feelings.

Isolation. The intensity of social relationships was heightened by the physical location of Moshav Avodah. The moshav is situated in occu- pied territory, an area in which the population is mainly Arab, requiring constant security arrangements. The moshav borders are ringed by a high chain link fence topped with barbed wire. The moshav members take turns at around-the-clock guard duty. Furthermore, the moshav is physically isolated. It is located in a sparsely settled area with no immediately accessible neighbors, with the nearest city being 25 miles away. Bus service to the Avodah area is erratic. The only practical means of travel outside the moshav is to wait one's turn for one of the two cars owned by the moshav.

Prior to the Red-Blue conflict, the lack of access to the outside world was offset by a full program of diverse recreational, social, religious, and cultural activities organized by an active network of Avodah commit- tees. As the schism widened, these programs ceased functioning. By the end of the moshav's second year, no planned activities were taking place. The unavailability of distractions, both within the moshav and from outside, combined with the pressures of the security problems, caused the internal conflict to loom larger in the lives of the people at Avodah.

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 249

MOTIVATIONS

The interaction of the first two elements of the Himes model, Basic

Categories and Structural Preconditions, sets the stage for the escalation of the conflict. The next element in the causation of conflict concerns the process by which people develop attitudes and behavior conducive to

conflict. The process escalates as the members of the two basic categories

become more conscious of themselves as members of one or the other

faction in conflict. Attitudes and feelings are generated which build up

factional loyalties while heightening hostility to the opposing faction. The effect is to motivate the members to intensify the conflict. By

impugning the "enemy," parties to the conflict become more closely tied to their own faction and have valid reasons for attacking and withdraw-

ing contact from the opposing group (Rummel, 1975: 253).

As the individuals in the situation begin to internalize attitudes

supportive of the conflict, their behavior contributes additional fuel to the conflict. The thinking of the members undergoes a change: instead of viewing their frustrations as due mainly to general problems in their social situation, they now attribute their frustrations to the opposing faction in the conflict. "The problems at Moshav Avodah are due to the

selfishness, laziness, stupidity, and so on of the Reds (Blues)." The conflict changes from "constructive" or "legitimate" conflict, defined as "functional for the social structure" (Coser, 1956: 151-152) to "destruc-

tive" or "nonlegitimate" conflict conflict of such intensity that it "exceeds the limits imposed by societal consensus" (Coser, 1968: 234).

Destructive conflict achieves a momentum of its own and the issues

which originally stirred up antagonisms now fade in importance. The combination of allegiance to one's faction and dislike of the adversaries assumes greater influence. It is unclear whether people support or oppose an issue as a result of ideological conviction or because of group pressure. Deutsch (1973: 351) aptly summarizes the process: "Conflict often becomes independent of its initiating causes and is likely to continue after these have become irrelevant or have been forgotten."

CATALYZING SITUATION

"Over time, a series of variable conditions converge in the causal process at a point and in a way that is decisive in initiating conflict. This cluster of factors . . . functions to release the accumulated conflict

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250 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

potential and to transform it into nonlegitimate conflict" (Himes, 1980:

196-197).

In the conflict situations Himes describes (strikes, racial violence,

war), it is relatively easy to identify a particular event or incident which

triggers the conflict. At Moshav Avodah, the pervasiveness and persist-

ence of the conflict over time, because of the ongoing involvement of the

parties in residential and work relationships with one another, makes it

difficult to identify one catalytic event. However, if one looks beyond a

single, time-bound incident, it is possible to point to a factor which was

decisive in galvanizing the conflict at Moshav Avodah: the role of the

government Settlement Office (SO) and the Moshav Movement (MM).

Thus far, the analysis of the causes of the conflict at Avodah has

focused on a series of malignant conditions within the moshav social system which converged and resulted in the emergence of the conflict.

Another important line of inquiry is to consider the role of possible

conciliators or third parties-individuals or groups within or related to

Moshav Avodah who might have intervened and helped deal with the problems at a point at which they were amenable to resolution. In the

Moshav Avodah social system there were two sets of potential concilia- tors, one internal and one external. Within the moshav itself were the

neutral or nonaligned members-those individuals who were neither

Reds nor Blues and were called "Purples." Outside of the moshav were

the two Israeli organizations, the MM and SO, both of which could have

functioned in the role of conciliator. The roles of these organizations are

considered first, since they not only shunned the conciliating role for themselves, but effectively vitiated the potential of the Purples as a conciliating force.

Roles of the Moshav Movement and Settlement Office

When the first families moved into Avodah in 1975, they were con- fronted with a series of significant adjustments. They were immigrants

in a new country, obliged to accommodate to an unfamiliar language,

climate, food, customs, and rhythm of life, while lacking access to family

and friends. The settlers at Avodah had the additional challenge of building a new community in an isolated area and with few available precedents or guidelines.

The MM and the SO are the Israeli organizations whose function it is to help newly formed communities like Avodah. The former provides technical help and ideological support to its member moshavim. The

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 251

SO, in addition to providing financial subsidies to newly developing communities, also bears legal responsibility until the communities can

become financially self-sufficient and self-governing. Neither organization was helpful to the Avodah community once the

conflict emerged. Their Middle Eastern style of bureaucratic function- ing would have been problematic for the Americans at Avodah even under the best of circumstances; it became intolerable as the tensions mounted. The relevant officials were generally inaccessible, erratic in following up on matters agreed upon, and arbitrary in their decisions.

Personnel of both organizations seemed to become less sympathetic as the problems and complaints from Avodah members increased. But

more serious than this inefficiency was an institutional bias on the part

of both organizations which, in view of the power of these organiza- tions, proved decisive to the outcome of the conflict. It became clear to

me in retrospect, as it was understood earlier by the Moshav members, that the MM and the SO did not want to resolve the differences between

the Reds and Blues but rather sought a resolution in which the Blues would be victorious.

The MM responded to the emerging crisis at Avodah by sending a veteran moshav couple to live there. The plan was for these experienced moshav members to exercise the necessary administrative leadership to bring the moshav through the crisis. Whether it was a consequence of the particular couple, the intractability of the conflict, or a combination, their efforts were ineffective. The only credentials the movement couple brought to their task were many years of living on a moshav plus a commitment to moshav ideology and an eagerness to help. It is quite likely that these credentials in fact were counterproductive, in that they led the couple to emphasize their own experience and ideas and to be insufficiently attentive to the concerns and perspective of the Avodah members. Their approach to virtually every issue was to prescribe solutions in the vein of: "This is how we do it on our moshav." They neither understood nor took seriously the cultural background and values of the young settlers and had little empathy for their plight. They often expressed the view that the conflict was "silly" and that many of the Avodah members, particularly the Reds, were "spoiled children."

The SO had as its primary objective restoring a pattern of governance at Avodah so that new members could be brought in and the full economic potential of the moshav realized. They were single-minded in this goal. They favored the Blues because of their hard-line position on economic production and efficiency and were impatient with the Reds and their constant calls for process and meetings.

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252 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Wolfe (1973: 44) points out that it is not uncommon in conflict situations involving a government body for the power of the govern-

ment body to be used to support one party while using sanctions to

coerce or harass the less favored party. The bias of the SO officials was

not concealed. In the midst of the conflict they selected Avi, one of the

most outspoken Blue leaders, for a training program for managers of

collective settlements. At about the same time, the Settlement officials

used their legal and financial sanctions to expel David, considered the

most extreme member of the Reds, from Avodah. The strategy was

typified by a statement made by one of the officials to me and my Israeli

colleagues involved in the mediation effort. He said, "Let us settle the

membership. We'll do the surgery, then you guys can treat those who are

left." Their goal was not to reconcile the differences between the two

factions but to drive out "the complainers" (Reds), retain "the hard

workers" (Blues), and recruit new compatible members.

The Conversion of the Purples

In virtually all instances of conflict, in addition to the two conflicting parties there is a third group, the "neutrals." The neutrals can keep the conflict within manageable limits by moderating extreme positions of

the conflicting parties and supporting compromise efforts. The neutrals are what Turner and Killian (1972: 224) label a "mediating public," who seek a resolution to the conflict based on "fair play" or "public interest."

In the early months of the conflict at Avodah, eight families defined themselves as neutrals. They were referred to as Purples. Within two years almost all of the Purples had become partisans they joined the Blues. There is little evidence to suggest that the Purples became Blues because of ideological or personality affinities. Rather it appears they sensed that the Blues were in the ascendancy and they wanted to be on the winning side. Such a response is a common outcome among neutrals in conflict situations. Writing about third parties or neutrals, Eckstein (1966) notes they "are likely to see some advantage accruing to them by the victory of one side rather than the other and unless constrained by other considerations will try to aid the preferred victors." Once the bias of the MM and SO became apparent, the prospects of a victory by the Blues were enhanced significantly.

The conversion of the Purples eliminated any serious internal force

which might have contained the spiraling conflict. One hope remained: the mediating effort of the Social Agency.

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 253

Mediation

By spring of 1978, all hope had vanished for a resolution of the conflict from within the Avodah system. The two factions were not communicating with each other, except in hostile, and occasionally violent, exchanges; the MM couple, while still living at Avodah, acknowledged the futility of their effort, with the woman describing the effects of her work: "All I've achieved in the several months I've been at Avodah is to become a nervous wreck"; and the SO was becoming increasingly impatient with the lack of progress.

The Reds, sensing that their position was becoming precarious, made several requests of the SO to take a more active role in seeking to improve conditions at Moshav Avodah. The SO responded by sending a sociologist on their staff to do a survey of the moshav members. The survey results were never shared with the members of the moshav. The Reds increased their demands for action by the SO to deal with the conflict. It was at this point that the nongovernmental Social Agency

was called and asked to try to ameliorate the conditions at Avodah. The expectations of the SO regarding the role of the Social Agency were never made explicit; the assumption of the Agency consultants was that their task was to mediate the conflict.

I was hired as the primary staff consultant for this project and worked with two Israelis who were full-time staff members of the Agency.

Despite the intensity of the conflict at the time the mediation began, we succeeded in enlisting the support of most of the moshav members in the mediating process. Of the 24 families, 20 participated. A number of individual visits and small group meetings were followed by three meetings for the total moshav membership. We used a series of struc- tured human relations activities to open up lines of communication and to instill a minimal level of trust. By focusing on the members' common religious background and familial status we managed, initially, to enlist their participation in the process of meeting together. In time, the focus of the mediating efforts switched to addressing the problem areas of life at Moshav Avodah. By the end of August, four task forces, each composed of Reds and Blues, were meeting. The function of the task forces was to analyze and provide recommendations for new approaches in four realms of life at Avodah: Organization and Management, Work, Interpersonal Relations, and Goals and Ideology. Each of the task forces met several times and produced impressive written reports.

It was at this juncture in the mediating process that I concluded my sabbatical and had to leave Israel. As the only American on the staff, the

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254 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

senior consultant for the project, and the individual most actively and consistently involved with the Avodah members, my departure was a significant blow to the process. Neither of the other staff members had established the same level of rapport with the Avodah members, nor did this venture have the same level of meaning for them-personal or

professional-'as it had for me. However, it is doubtful that even if I had remained this would have significantly altered the course of events. In the end, it was the action of the SO which determined the outcome of the conflict.

There was evidence early in the process that the SO had little regard for our mediating effort. The SO staff shared none of their plans and actions with the staff from the mediating agency. While it is doubtful that the SO consciously sought to undermine the mediation effort, the effect of their policies was clearly in that direction. The SO never

publicly acknowledged or supported the work of the Social Agency. In view of the power of the SO, their lack of legitimation of the Social Agency conveyed a message to the members of Avodah that the Agency and its efforts were not to be taken seriously. A dramatic example occurred on the eve of the first meeting planned to bring together the full Avodah membership. As a result of a series of separate meetings with individuals and small groups of each of the factions, we felt enough progress had been made to schedule an overall moshav membership meeting. It had been months since the members of the Reds and the Blues had sat together in the same room.

As we entered the moshav that evening, a delegation of Reds was waiting at the gate for us. They were incensed. David, one of the leaders of the Reds, had just returned from Jerusalem where he had been given the news of his expulsion from Avodah by the SO. The Reds felt they had been betrayed and announced that none of them would attend the evening meeting. The mediating process barely survived this onslaught.

Evaluating efforts to mediate social conflicts, Himes (1980) notes that a basic requisite for such efforts to succeed is the "widespread belief in the legitimacy of the managing agent." The lack of support by the SO for our mediation stripped our effort of legitimacy. Himes points out an additional and related problem: "The management agent that does not have the authority or finances to initiate and carry through fundamental changes runs the risk of aggravating the conflict situation."

Everyone in the Moshav Avodah system knew that it was the SO which controlled the basic legal and financial factors which bore upon the conflict. As the members came to recognize that we did not have the support of the SO, our credibility was limited to our good personal

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 255

relations with the moshav members. The members continued to engage

in the mediating process, but at that point it was seen essentially as a

human relations effort. Most experienced conflict mediators agree "that

conflict resolution involves more than handling process issues. The

conflict must be resolved . . . dealing solely with process treats symp- toms, not the disease itself' (Levi and Benjamin, 1977: 406-407). The SO

kept us from getting at causal issues.

The first evidence of the decline of the mediating process came with the disenchantment of the Blues. Several of their hard-line members

stopped attending the mediating sessions. In the questionnaire we

administered midway through the mediating process, we asked the

moshav members to indicate their preferred outcome to the conflict.

Only 20% of the Blues as compared to 80% of the Reds favored the

alternative: "The two groups find a way to communicate and work

together better." The preferred outcome for half of the Blues was:

"Relations between the two groups get progressively worse and most

families of one group leave."

By this point in the conflict, the Blues recognized that not only did

they have the support of the SO, but that the mediating effort did not.

Research in social conflict has established that, as one party in the

conflict senses that the balance of power has tipped in their favor, they become more intransigent and less inclined to mediate differences (Mack and Snyder, 1957: 15). The Blues now realized they did not need to give up anything in a mediated compromise, for by waiting they would in time achieve an alternative conflict outcome: "to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals" (Coser, 1968: 234).

Indeed, within a year, all but one of the Reds left Moshav Avodah.

SUMMARY

I have presented a case study of social conflict on an Israeli moshav, using a model of the causes of social conflict as a framework for systematically describing and analyzing the relevant factors in the con- flict process. Incipient differences between two basic categories of the moshav membership became increasingly more acute because of struc- tural tensions in the social system. Some tensions arose because of dissonances within the moshav; others were attributable to political and economic problems facing Israel. The interaction of these elements caused the conflict to escalate. It developed its own momentum and the

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256 JOURNA L OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

members of the two factions became more polarized. This process is

described by Nye (1973: 100).

Conflicts, once begun, tend to increase the number and intensity of the conflict- promoting characteristics of the persons involved. Also, the extent and intensity of

competition, domination, and provocation are likely to be increased. These condi- tions, in turn, increase the intensity of conflict.

The escalation of the conflict at Avodah might have been arrested if,

early in the process, there had existed in the social system an effective force, capable of and concerned with conciliating the differences between the adversaries. Mack and Snyder (1971: 15) conclude, after a review of the social conflict literature, that the prospects for solutions

"become very difficult . . . partly because there are no available neutral

conciliators or mediators and partly because no one has a vested interest

in the cessation of conflict."

There were four potential sources of conciliation or mediation in the

Moshav Avodah social system, none of which effectively fulfilled that role: the MM which lacked both the competence and the conviction to

pursue a resolution of the differences between the Reds and Blues; the originally neutral Purples, who, sensing that circumstances were favor- ing a Blue victory, joined that faction; the Social Agency, which had the

competence and the conviction to mediate the conflict but lacked the legitimacy to achieve any significant structural change; and finally, the key element, the SO, which chose to avoid the path of mediation and

instead engineered a victory for its favored faction, the Blues.

How should the resolution of the conflict at Moshav Avodah be evaluated? My own judgment is that the SO functioned in an arbitrary and narrowly institutional fashion, and thereby blocked the possibility of mediating the differences between the Reds and Blues. Based on the progress made during the mediating process, I believe it would have been possible to find a way for the Reds and the Blues to live and work together productively, and perhaps amicably. Perhaps this is a naive position and one which fails to take into sufficient account the broader range of implications of the Avodah conflict which are likely to have guided the SO. On one level, the SO may have accurately assessed a basic incompatibility between the Reds and the Blues and the unsuita- bility of Red attitudes for life on an industrial moshav. If that was indeed an accurate assessment, the SO's decisive actions avoided generating false expectations and expending time and energy in a prolonged and futile endeavor. On a broader societal level, the SO is responsible each

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Reisman / CONFLICT IN ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 257

year for assisting dozens of new Israeli settlements to become estab-

lished and to contribute to meeting the economic and security require-

ments of the nation. A responsible resolution of the Avodah conflict

should consider implications for the larger society. Deutsch (1973: 7)

highlights the importance of a broad perspective in evaluating conflict

resolution. It is not enough to assess "the gains or losses relating to the immediate issue of conflict," nor should one overlook "the precedent

established ... (and) the reputation that each party develops in the eyes

of the various interested audiences." The perspective of the SO extends

beyond the boundaries of Moshav Avodah; it must be attentive to the

needs of many Israeli communities, the economic and security needs of

the nation, and its own limited time and resources. It is likely that in

determining its policy approach to the Red-Blue conflict at Avodah, the

thinking of the SO staff was partly guided by the prospect that the

precedent of the Avodah resolution would have a bearing on countless

other conflicts which occur in its domain of responsibility. Accordingly,

the SO staff was likely to have assessed carefully both the long-range

consequences and the relative costs of the two alternative plans for resolving the Avodah conflict: mediating the differences between the adversaries, or aiding the faction perceived to be more stable. The SO

decided the latter was the optimal option. The SO does not want to

encourage its communities to turn to mediation when conflict emerges.

This would be an expensive and slow process, and one promising no clear results. By taking a hard line, the SO communicated a message to its constituents which in effect said: "Work out your differences or we'll

settle them for you."

POSTSCRIPT

I visited Israel in the summer of 1980 and interviewed Tzvi, the

husband of the one remaining Red family at Avodah. At that time, there were a total of 19 families living at Avodah. The exodus of the Reds other than Tzvi and his family was completed by spring 1979. Since then, five new families had joined the moshav and three others were expected to join. This would mean a total of 22 families, still below the high of 24 families at the height of the conflict and far below the SO's hoped-for 50 families. Tzvi reported that the current economic situation of the moshav was not as good as it was previously. New industries were being developed, but all of the business enterprises were suffering from

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258 JO URNA L OF CONFLIC T RESOL UTION

inadequate manpower. The decision-making procedures at the moshav

are returning to normal. The Secretariat and other administrative com-

mittees are meeting, as is the full membership. People are visiting each

other, although social relations seem to occur mainly in small, nonideo-

logical clusters. Tzvi described the current flavor of moshav life as "quiet

and cautious."

Now, two years after the breakdown in the Social Agency's mediating effort and a Blue victory in the color war at Avodah, can we say that the

SO engineered an effective resolution to the conflict? Are the postcon- flict developments indicative of a newly emerging stable community, built on a more solid nucleus of members and with a more realistic sense of its future? Or does the evidence suggest a depressed group of survi- vors, too demoralized by the legacy of their bitter conflict to rebuild? And what precedent has been established by the SO for responding to future conflict in the collective settlements of the country?

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ECKSTEIN, H. [ed.] (1966) Internal War: Problems and Approaches. New York: Mac- millan.

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