

## "HEAVEN'S WILL AND MAN'S FAULT": THE RISE OF THE WEST AS A SOUTHEAST ASIAN DILEMMA

In choosing this theme I do not mean to suggest that it is peculiar to Southeast Asia. The dilemma of a person or a people confronted with superior strength is universal and timeless. No people and no part of the world is especially prone to react to it in particular ways—with heroism, with pragmatism, with ingenuity, or with "oriental" fatalism. All of these possible reactions have of course been found in Southeast Asia, and in each of its major cultures, as they have elsewhere.

The reason I choose to bring together here some Southeast Asian responses to Western power and wealth is primarily because I want to emphasize how dominant an intellectual and psychological problem it has been, and continues to be, for that part of the world.

I do not wish to enter the important controversy about the point in time when European power became in reality the major problem for Southeast Asia. What is important in this context is that it has been so perceived by Southeast Asian leaders for about the past century. King Rama III of Siam prophesied on his deathbed in 1851:

I personally think . . . that there will be no more wars with Vietnam and Burma. We will have them only with the West. Take care, and do not lose any opportunity to them (translated in Wyatt 1969, 30).

Within a generation of this remark the most intense period of European imperial conquest in Southeast Asia was under way, corresponding to the "great European peace" of 1870–1914. No Southeast Asian leader could escape the threat, which was at once military, economic, political and intellectual. Whether this *annus mirabilis*, 1975, has seen the end of Southeast

Asia's "wars with the west" remains to be seen.<sup>1</sup> The dilemma nevertheless loses none of its urgency, as the economic gulf between rich and poor nations grows ever wider. We may not succeed in seeing this problem from the other side of the fence, but let us at least begin to try.

The anonymous Vietnamese reaction to French conquest which I took as my text—"All these things came about because of Heaven's will but also because of man's fault"—expresses an important dichotomy. Many Southeast Asians must have understood their predicament in terms of "Heaven's will", as a product of circumstances beyond their control or comprehension. Yet not even among the most "traditional" or the most oppressed was there a lack of restless voices, demanding change, arguing that it was the remediable weaknesses in their own societies which had invited defeat. Neither in Southeast Asia nor anywhere else can we expect a society to accommodate itself passively to relative weakness and poverty.

### PRE-NINETEENTH CENTURY

Prior to the nineteenth century the Western presence does not appear to have forced any Southeast Asian state to make a fundamental reassessment of its place in the world. European military skills were certainly appreciated. Portuguese mercenary soldiers were in great demand by the courts, while guns were for centuries the only European export of serious interest to Southeast Asians. Numerous examples could be cited of statesmen with a keen practical interest in European military and naval technology, like Karaeng Pattin-galloang, the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking prime minister of Makasar around 1650, with his fine library of European books (Boxer 1967, 4). Yet in technical matters the Europeans must have appeared so mediocre, if not barbarous, that they were not seen as a danger of an altogether new type.

During these centuries of gradual Western commercial penetration, only two important Southeast Asian states were defeated and destroyed in an overt contest with Europeans. Melaka was seized by the Portuguese in 1511, and Makasar by the Dutch in 1669. Since each of these disasters is treated in an important Malay work, it is worth pausing to see how they were perceived in the respective courts.

The *Sja'ir Perang Mengkasar* is a true battle epic written by the court writer of Makasar within a year or two of the events. It faces the fact that the Makasarese were beaten, but in a good fight which might have turned out differently had they not been "defeated by hunger" (Skinner 1963, 18, 217). The "Dutch devils" play no bigger part than their Indonesian allies, the "accursed Bugis", and both are denounced and ridiculed in a spirit similar to

that which appears in reverse in contemporary Dutch writing (Skinner 1963, 10). The only suggestion that Dutch villainy might be of a different order to the usual kind comes in the line: "never make friends with the Dutch; they behave like devils and no country is safe with them" (Skinner 1963, 214).

The *Sejarah Melayu* or Malay annals is a much more elaborate court chronicle of the Melaka/Johor dynasty. One of the major reasons it was written, or as some would have it rewritten, in the early sixteenth century was the need to explain the cataclysmic loss of the dynasty's great capital to the Portuguese. The text of course mentions the Portuguese cannonballs "falling like rain" (Brown 1952, 167), but the real explanation for defeat was within, in Melaka's failure to heed the basic rules which governed its existence. At the founding of the Malay dynasty and in the dying testament of each of its great rulers, the contractual basis of the state is made plain: if the ruler humiliates his subjects unnecessarily they will not be bound by their oath of absolute loyalty (Brown 1952, 26, 44; Walls 1974).

The ruler who eventually loses Melaka, Sultan Mahmud, has been told by his dying father: "If you put them [your Malay subjects] to death when they have done no wrong, your kingdom will be brought to naught." The nemesis of Melaka follows relentlessly from Mahmud's crimes against the rules of kingship—in particular the murder of his loyal *Bendahara* (chief minister), Sri Maharaja. In terms of a distinction I want to make below, this was the analysis of a "revitalizer", who believed the kingdom could have been saved by a more faithful adherence to its own moral norms.

In other words, the perspective of these two Malay texts would have been the same if Melaka had fallen to the Siamese or Makasar to the Bugis alone. The worst the Europeans could do was still interpreted within the local context.

In the centuries that followed, the Western impact was still more muted in most of Southeast Asia. The Dutch and Spanish, who alone had substantial colonial footholds in the region, grew weaker while the European countries which first felt the industrial revolution were more interested in India and China. The Southeast Asian kingdoms themselves contributed to delaying a more intense confrontation with Europe by a more cautious attitude towards foreign commerce in general and Europeans in particular. From the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century the agrarian countries for whom this was practicable—Burma, Siam, and to a lesser extent Vietnam—kept Europeans as much as possible at arm's length. I have not been able to find evidence which might show this isolation to have been a deliberate policy, rather than an involuntary consequence of the loss of profitable trade to foreigners. At a time when isolationism was becoming dangerously counter-productive, however, we have Vietnam's proud emperor Minh-Mang (1820–

41) insisting that it had saved his country from the fate China suffered in the Opium Wars:

The Ming [Chinese] people allowed [the barbarians] to live at random in various places. All the places that the barbarians came to, they sketched maps of. Of the strategic points of the entire sea coast of the Ming country there were none that the barbarians did not know . . . As to our court's relationship with Westerners, we do not resist their coming and do not chase them away . . . When transactions are finished, we immediately order them to sail away. We have never allowed them to live in residence ashore. Our people everywhere are not permitted to enter into private reciprocal trading relations with them (translated in Woodside 1971, 291–2).

On the other hand Mongkut, the king who ended this arm's-length attitude to Westerners in Siam, was naturally very critical of it. In 1867 he explained to the Siamese ambassador to France the superiority of his European policy to that of Cambodia, which had quickly been seduced by France, and that of the Vietnamese, who

on the other hand, have been as deaf, dumb, and stubborn as the Siamese in previous reigns. Their stubbornness caused them to turn small incidents into serious ones, with the result that their country became a French colony in the end (translated in Pramoj and Pramoj 1958, 190).

Mongkut's more flexible policy should not, incidentally, be equated with an affection for the West. His well-founded scepticism was expressed in the same letter: "They seem to hold fast to the idea that all foreigners are animals, and as such they deserve no pity when they are abused" (Pramoj and Pramoj 1958, 191, 187).

## JAVA

In the many maritime states of Island Southeast Asia, trade was the basic state resource and could not be simply turned off. These port-states remained always open to Westerners, and the nearest parallel to the relative isolationism of the agrarian states was a strong antipathy to allowing foreigners to build in stone.<sup>2</sup> (Boxer 1967, 30–1; B. Andaya 1975, 30; Milburn 1825, 327; Wright 1961, 254). The Javanese provide a unique case. Like the mainland societies they did turn away from trade and the sea in the seventeenth century, but were not thereby able to avoid involvement with the Dutch in Batavia.

Most conflicts with the Dutch occurred in the coastal *pasisir* of Java, which

could be regarded as peripheral by the inland courts which now became the centres of Javanese life. The setback which was inescapable was the partition of the heart of Java between Jogjakarta and Surakarta, formalized by the Gianti Treaty of 1755. The existence of two kings in Java, recognizing each other's equality and legitimacy, and living in harmony, was to remain completely at odds with Javanese proprieties. The settlement was a product of Dutch minds, it was solemnized by strange Dutch rituals like quaffing a glass of beer together (Ricklefs 1974, 74), and it was ultimately only made possible by a Dutch force just strong enough to prevent either of the Javanese rivals getting the better of the other. Both Javanese courts saw the arrangement as artificial and temporary, yet gradually learned to live with it and rationalize it.

In a fascinating study, Merle Ricklefs has shown with reference to Jogjakarta how warfare was gradually abandoned as the means to reunite Java in favour of more esoteric devices. Dutch envoys were frequently entertained by fights staged between a *banteng* (buffalo), the symbol of Java, and a tiger, representing the foreigner. The *banteng* was always victorious in this symbolic duel, if not in the diplomatic bargaining (Ricklefs 1974, 274-5, 303). Similarly the most sacred court chronicles composed in the aftermath of the division appear to be devoted to overcoming it by magical or prophetic means. One written by the crown prince of Jogjakarta in 1774, corresponding to the end of a Javanese era (A.J. 1700), shows in an allegory how the Dutch ruler avoids certain destruction by the forces of a reunited Java when he miraculously receives illumination, converts to Islam, and thereafter enters a mystical dialogue with the ruler of Java (perhaps the author of the chronicle) (Ricklefs 1974, 188-218). Another *babad* from about the same period relates the extraordinary adventures of Baron Sakendar, who embodies within him elements of the Alexander the Great legend, the sixteenth century Spanish imperium, the Islamic conquest of Java, and the contemporary reality of the Dutch presence. The Dutch role in Batavia appears to be legitimated by a complex genealogy giving them sacral authority over the western (non-Javanese) portion of the island (Ricklefs 1974, 219; and see chapter 8).

Ricklefs' harsh judgement is that the Javanese courts "turned to traditional ideas to explain and to justify the irregular situation instead of attempting to correct it" (Ricklefs 1974, 219). Even though European power was still marginal, and its effects indirect, unplanned, and to a considerable extent unperceived, the responsibility for challenging it was already sidestepped by imputing cosmic power to Batavia. "Heaven's will" was indeed being preferred as an explanation to "man's fault". In terms of the *wayang* imagery beloved of Javanese, the gross, comical, unmannerly Europeans may have begun to be identified less with the giants and demons who huff and puff

but are eventually defeated, and more with the *punakawan*—comical, misshapen and outrageously improper but at the same time possessing a supernatural wisdom and magic which is indispensable to the victorious Pendawas.<sup>3</sup>

The above chronicles were written in the late eighteenth century when the Dutch Company was physically weak and socially embedded in an Indonesian milieu. Some nineteenth century *babad* continued the desire to legitimate and domesticate European power, like the *Babad Inggris*, which gave Raffles half-Javanese ancestry (Kumar 1969, 500). The events of the nineteenth century, however, increasingly cast the Dutch in the role of both alien and master. The eighteenth century court chronicles were rewritten in terms of less harmonious relations between European and Javanese. Instead of accepting Islam and living in spiritual harmony with the Javanese courts, the Europeans are annihilated in a sea of blood (Ricklefs 1974, 210-11).<sup>4</sup> Whether the earlier texts were intended as prophecy or a magical reordering of reality is open to debate, but the growing colonial pressure seems to shift their character increasingly clearly in the direction of the prophetic and millenarian. As this becomes typical of late colonial responses elsewhere, I will return to it later.

### THE "REVITALIZERS"

In the half-century which followed 1860, isolationism in any form proved useless, and all of Southeast Asia was humbled by the stark fact of European power. The choice between military defeat and political accommodation in practice meant only the difference between direct and indirect rule. The intellectual responses to this predicament were of course legion, and any categorization runs a grave risk of oversimplification. As a basis for analysis, however, I want to suggest a broad distinction between what I will call "revitalizers" and "borrowers". Both tendencies were reforming, seeking a way out of the powerlessness to which they had been reduced. The revitalizers however tended to see the problem as moral and religious, and the solution in a truer adherence to established norms; the borrowers to see the problem as primarily technical, and the solution in learning the tricks of the West.

Many of those who inspired their people most heroically to resist Western aggression were true revitalizers, sustained by a confidence that righteousness would prevail—on earth as in the cosmos. My examples are very different—the Confucian morality of Vietnam's scholar-mandarins on the one hand and the religious faith of Muslim *ulama* on the other. The Vietnamese patriot scholars drew their lessons from history, as in an anonymous 1864 appeal:

even in times of confusion, there remain books  
that teach us how to overcome disorder.

Past generations can still be for us examples of right and wrong

(translated in Truong Buu Lam 1967, 76).

One anonymous appeal for resistance, written in southern Vietnam in 1864, cited Chinese history to show the triumph of (Chinese) righteousness over barbarian invasion. As for the French, it went on:

Although they were very confident in their copper battleships surmounted by chimneys; although they had a large quantity of steel rifles and lead bullets; these things did not prevent the loss of some of their best generals in these last years, when they attacked our frontier in hundreds of battles. The sun and moon have always shown us the right way

(translated in Truong Buu Lam 1967, 77).

Twenty years later in northern Vietnam the royalist mandarin Phan Dinh Phung presented a similar argument, but from Vietnamese rather than Chinese righteousness:

I have concluded that if our country has survived these past thousand years when its territory was not large, its army not strong, its wealth not great, it was because the relationships between kings and subjects, fathers and children, have always been regulated by the five moral obligations. In the past, the Han, the Sung, the Yuan, the Ming, time and again dreamt of annexing our country and of dividing it up into prefectures and districts within the Chinese administrative system. But never were they able to realize their dream. Ah! if even China, which shares a common border with our territory, and is a thousand times more powerful than Vietnam, could not rely upon her strength to swallow us, it was surely because the destiny of our country had been willed by Heaven itself. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Classics and of the Rites upon which we base our behaviour was thereby demonstrated (translated in Truong Buu Lam 1967, 125).

A similar confident determination was being demonstrated at the same time at the height of Aceh's guerrilla war against the Dutch in northern Sumatra. At a time (1885) when the Dutch were in serious difficulty retaining their position, the great Islamic leader of resistance, Teungku Cik di Tiro, appealed to his weaker fellow countrymen:

Do not let yourself be afraid of the strength of the *kafir* [infidels], their fine

possessions, their equipment, and their good soldiers, in comparison with our strength, our property, our equipment and the Muslim people, for no-one is strong, no-one is rich, and no-one has fine armies but the great God . . . and no-one gives victory or defeat than God . . . the Lord of the Universe.

For we, his creatures, there is no movement, no peace, no life, no death, no honour, no humiliation, no victory and no defeat, except through the power of God . . . Thus these kafirs too can be overcome according to the promise of God (Zentgraaf 1938, 16-17).

Even the infidels themselves were not outside the scope of God's mercy. Teungku di Tiro appealed to the Dutch Resident in the same strong terms:

Verily, if you were all to accept Islam and follow the law of the prophet, that would be the best thing for you. You would thereby obtain security in this world; you would no longer have to run hither and thither in fear of being killed . . . while the greatest possible disgrace possibly now awaits you through the omnipotence of the Lord of the universe—namely that the [Dutch] *Kompeni* should be forced to leave Aceh altogether, that the soldiers and other servants of the *Kompeni* should be taken captive . . . and all at the hands of the Acehnese muslims, who are poor and weak.

The most serious thing of all that awaits you is however the punishment of the next world, in Hell, according to the law of Almighty God (Zentgraaf 1938, 18-19).<sup>5</sup>

In the event, even such sublime confidence eventually saw defeat staring it in the face. Some felt that the only way they could then keep faith with their convictions was a form of suicide, an implicit acknowledgment that the light by which they had lived and fought no longer corresponded with reality. Those for whom they had felt intellectually responsible would have to find their own new way. Phan Thanh Gian, a southern mandarin at the very centre of Vietnam's encounter with the West, expressed his choice this way:

The French have huge battleships, full of soldiers and armed with powerful cannons. Nobody can resist them . . . I, therefore, wrote to all the civilian and military officials to lay down their arms . . . But, if I have followed Heaven's will in averting calamities from the people's heads, I am a traitor to my King in surrendering without resistance the provinces that belong to him. I deserve death. You, officials and people, you may continue to live under the command of the French—who are ruthless only in battle—but their flag should not fly over a fortress where Phan Thanh Gian still lives

(translated in Truong Buu Lam 1967, 87-8).

Still more dramatic and effective as a release of followers from a heroic but tragically costly resistance was the *puputan* or ritual suicide of the Balinese ruling caste. After a defiant resistance to Dutch invasion the ruling families first of Lombok (1894), and later of South Bali (Badung and Klungkung, 1908), dressed in white and advanced on the Dutch guns to be slaughtered in hundreds—to the last child. The *puputan* was sanctioned by tradition as the honourable end for the defeated *ksatriya*. In this case, it also marked with dramatic suddenness the end of traditionally-inspired resistance to Western domination.

Islamic resistance seldom came to such a sudden and complete end, because moral responsibility for resistance lay squarely on the whole community rather than a military or intellectual elite. In practice, at least in the Malay world, the increasing hopelessness of the struggle caused a shift in the nature of revitalizer appeals from collective to individual salvation.<sup>6</sup> As the war turned against Aceh in the 1890s, the *ulama* who continued to resist abandoned their argument that the faithful would triumph in this world, in favour of depicting the superior advantages of the world to come.

to die as a *shahid* [martyr] is nothing. It is like being tickled until we fall and roll over . . .

Then comes a heavenly princess,

Who cradles you in her lap and wipes away the blood,

Her heart all yours . . .

If the heavenly princesses were visible,

everyone would go to fight the Dutch.<sup>7</sup>

This type of appeal from the verse epic, *Hikayat Perang Sabil*, inspired Acehese attacks on the Dutch which became increasingly individual, desperate, and suicidal as the colonial regime became better established. As late as the Japanese occupation it was still a powerful stimulus to such attacks.

A similar, and roughly contemporary, experience was that of the Tausug and Balanguingui of the Sulu archipelago against first Spanish and then American occupation. In some of the early pitched battles there was heroic and total resistance, like the "scene of horror" described by the Spanish at Balanguingui in 1848, where "The Moros fight like wild beasts . . . piles of corpses, and dark flames devouring the huts. . . . More than 340 bodies are burned to forestall an epidemic" (cited in Costa 1965, 207–8).

One of the few survivors (Camarang) described the mood of sacrifice in the Muslim camp:

The chief Olangcaya therefore said: Let us all bear witness together by our deaths, for now is the appointed end of our faithful observance . . . And Bintu replied: My father, there is nothing to hold us back; let us die fighting, and not part company ever again (Costa 1965, 208).

In the first decade of this century the Americans took fort after fort littered with the bodies of desperate Muslim defenders, just as Van Daalen's Dutch expedition did among the Gayo of North Sumatra at the same period and with the same gruesome photographic record (see figure 10). Once American rule was established, Tausug resistance tended to become individual and suicidal, inspired by the same type of salvation literature as the *Hikayat Perang Sabil* (Kiefer 1973, 108–23; Majul 1973, 353–60).

This kind of heroic preference for the next world over this one did not in itself answer the intellectual dilemma. Why was wrong prevailing over right; idolatry over faith? Some of the revitalizers caught in the inevitability of defeat could only conclude that the world was approaching its promised end.

The world is going to end,

The promise of God will be manifest,

The fate that is fore-ordained.




Fig. 10 Dutch documentation of the last stand of Aceh resistance at Benteng Kuto Reh, June 1904. A total of 561 Sumatrans fell in the defence of this fort. (KITLV, Leiden)

Already the heavens are in disorder,  
 Various signs are clear,  
 The Dajjal [Anti-Christ] is roaming about the world,  
 Going hither and thither . . .

Religion is in decline; there are no more blessings,  
 The world is approaching its end,  
 The ulama do nothing but think,  
 And pray over the dead to get a share in the inheritance . . .  
 Let them roast in Hell

(Hasjmy 1971, 70, 235; my translation)

Thus again the Acehnese *Hikayat Perang Sabil*, which used the argument to urge martyrdom before it was too late. The same argument could however be used by those who abandoned the struggle, to emphasize the impossibility of victory. The Acehnese leaders who submitted to the Dutch in 1903 pointed out to the *ulama* still in the hills that Muslims everywhere were being defeated and humiliated "because the world is in its last phase":

There are many who, like us, all fought before against the Dutch *Kompeni*. But once all options were exhausted and we had no more strength to fight it was right for us to submit to the *Kompeni* . . .

It is certainly not we who began this practice; on the contrary it has occurred very often above the wind, for example the whole of India has submitted to the rule of the English *Kompeni*, the Maghrib has all submitted to French rule, and Egypt has allied its government with the English . . . and finally all of those beneath the wind submitted . . .

All of these submitted because they were weak and they feared they would be finished, their religion and their country destroyed. Once they had submitted they could each cultivate their religion, so that not everything was lost (Letter from Pangla Polem, Tuanku Mahmud and Tuanku Raja Keumala in Zentgraaf 1938, 35).

This particular eschatology was of course a Semitic one mediated through Islam, presupposing a linear view of history with a distinct beginning and an approaching end. An older and in some cultures stronger historical perception was cyclical, derived at least in part from the Hindu belief in a succession of periods from the good *Kṛta-Yuga* to the evil *Kali-Yuga* and back again. That the latter could be used in a similar way to the Islamic argument above, as an explanation of European domination, is demonstrated by the early twentieth century Balinese *Babad Buleleng*:

After some time, as if ordained by God Almighty, as the time of good fortune was complete, the dispensation of the one who regulates the unknown according to the division of the world into periods of years, gave rise to a time in which the world was agitated, when everyone acted in accordance with his own way of thinking and when there were many intrigues against the king. It was fitting that the Dutch ruler, who desired to protect the world, should take his own measures. Subsequently a way was found to punish and exile Ki Gusti Nruah Ketut Jlantik . . . After that, the Dutch ruler continued as the supreme head of the land of Buleleng. There were no kings any more (translated in Worsley 1972, 205).

### MILLENARIANISM

Much has been written on the influence of cyclical views of this type on the propensity for millenarian expectations exhibited by the Javanese in particular. The present evil and disturbed times seemed always about to be replaced by a golden age when

there will be no more conflicts, injustice and suffering; people will be freed from paying burdensome taxes, and performing compulsory services. There will be neither sickness nor theft; there will be abundance of food and clothes; everyone will possess a house; people will live in peace (cited in Kartodirdjo 1973, 8; see also Moertono 1968, 681-2; B. Anderson 1972, 19-22).

There is I think a distinction to be made, however, between the pre-nineteenth century versions of this expectation, which tended to focus on a new ruler or dynasty emerging to unify and strengthen Java; and the versions which followed the assertion of European control in the early nineteenth century. After the Diponegoro war (1825-30) the reality of alien domination could no longer be evaded. The humiliation this entailed could not be explained simply in terms of a changing cycle of Javanese dynasties. The courts which had made their profitable peace with the Dutch gradually ceased to provide a focus for popular expectations, which took on an increasingly millenarian character. No doubt the Islamic linear type of eschatology had an influence on this change of emphasis, but I believe colonialism itself was much more significant.<sup>8</sup>

Millenary hopes appear to have been most at home by the late nineteenth century in those areas which had been longest under European domination, so that the memory of any other state of things had faded to a remote and mysterious "golden age". Though differing in many other respects, Java and

Luzon both shared this predicament. What had to be explained was not military defeat but a long period of weakness and humiliation. One Filipino response to this dilemma was the Tagalog folk hero Bernardo Carpio, imprisoned in a mountain, but ready to stir one day to free his oppressed people (Ileto 1974, 130-1).<sup>9</sup> During the Philippine revolution Bonifacio's *Katipunan* was able to reach Tagalog peasants because it understood and even shared this popular longing for deliverance. The hope was beautifully put in this allegory by Emilio Jacinto, which I cite from Rey Ileto's thesis. A Philippine youth encounters a shadowy stranger, who is disappointed not to be recognized:

But I am not surprised, for it has been more than three hundred years since I visited your land. It is the will of your people to adore false gods of religion and men, your fellow-creatures, that is why my memory has been erased from your minds.

. . . I am the origin of all things great, most beautiful and praiseworthy, precious and dignified, that is possible for humanity . . . For my cause men unite, each one forgetting his selfish interests; seeing nothing but the good of all; because of me slaves are rescued and lifted up from the mire of degradation and shame, the pride and malice of their cruel masters broken . . . My name is Liberty.

In the early days, when the good customs of your ancestors were not sunk in cowardice and isolation or imprisonment, the Tagalog . . . people lived in the shade of my protection, and in my bosom she was happy and breathed the air that gave her life and strength.

. . . But one day, which must be execrated and accursed, Slavery arrived saying that she was Virtue and Justice, and promised Glory to all who would believe in her . . .

But now your sighs have reached me (translated in Ileto 1974, 112-14).

The Javanese predicament could be approached in similar ways. A text of the 1870s, *Serat Dermagandul*, represents one type of response which cast Islam in the invidious role occupied by Spanish Christianity in the quotation above. As soon as the Majapahit King embraced Islam the Javanese had ceased to be true men and begun to be ruled by foreigners. The guardian spirits of Java "retired into concealment" after prophesying that they would return after four centuries, when the Javanese again abandoned the alien religion in favour of true knowledge (Drewes 1966, 359-62).<sup>10</sup>

More widespread in Java, however, at least from the late nineteenth century, were the varied and elaborate prophecies attributed to King Jayabaya. In one version which assumed written form in the early nineteenth

century, the reader/listener appears to be offered a choice between two prophetic expressions of the present time of darkness. In the first, foreigners come to Java to trade, but make war and divide the kingdom, inaugurating a time of increasing woe:

The rulers are cruel to their people, who in turn are of an evil nature. Truth is in decline, only lies are spoken . . . The jurisdiction of the ruler is uncertain, wavering, and weak. The taxation he demands is erratic, but always increases . . . Gold and English coins are taken out of the country . . . Where the ruler lives is unclear. His commands bring ruin to the people. In short the government is worthless, it is as though devils ruled (*Serat Jayabaya* paraphrased by Wiselius 1872, 185-6).

This dark period is ended by the coming of the messianic ruler, Si Tanjung Putih, Ratu Adil, or Erucakra, who inaugurates a reign of righteousness, peace, and plenty.

There follows, however, as if offered by a later hand as an alternative scenario, a second period of more explicit foreign rule. The King of Peringgi (the Europeans) takes advantage of Javanese disunity to send a great army and conquer the island.

This king rules Java tyrannically, and makes his power felt. Once a year he returns to Peringgi . . . This conquest and oppression finally comes to the ear of the exalted king, the bupati of Ngrum [Rum or Rome, identified with Turkey in the nineteenth century but also as the empire of antiquity from which Java was settled]. He is very angry and summons his minister. He says, "Minister, I hear that Java has been conquered by the men of Peringgi . . . Moreover their king has created chaos there, robbing the merchants and taking the inhabitants away to Peringgi as captives, each year 1000 men. Java however is my property (Wiselius 1872, 185-6; see also Brugmans 1960, 143-4; Mataram 1954).

Java is quickly liberated and the Peringgi annihilated by this foreign power, which withdraws after three years in favour of a restored king of Java.

Rural movements against the Dutch in Java were frequently inspired by Jayabaya prophecies, with many claiming to see the messianic *ratu adil* in their midst. In this century the foreign deliverer gained increasing popularity, with Japan gradually replacing Turkey as the major focus of hope.

Like the *Katipunan* leaders, Sukarno understood this popular longing and responded warmly to it:

What is the reason the people are forever believing in and awaiting the coming of the Ratu Adil? What is the reason the words of King Jayabaya still keep people's hopes alight? . . . Only that the heart of the people . . . never ceases to wait for the coming of help . . . Whoever understands the deeper basis for this popular belief . . . will also weep when he hears again and again the lament of the people: when, when will the Ratu Adil come (Sukarno 1956, 75)?

Like the *Katipunan* leaders too, he had enough of the same passion in his own veins to know how to use it for modern purposes. As he explained in 1930, the only way to make Indonesian nationalism a powerful force in the popular mind was to convey a three-stage view of Indonesian history: "the PNI arouses and revitalizes the people's consciousness that they have a 'glorious vanished past'; 'a time of darkness'; and 'the promise of a beckoning, glittering future'" (Sukarno 1956, 118).<sup>11</sup>

### THE "BORROWERS"

Most of the above discussion has been limited to the perceptions of the men I have called revitalizers, seeking solutions within their own cultural and religious traditions. From the earliest contacts there have also been some, however, who put greater emphasis on the need to beat the West at its own game—my borrowers. The problem of course has always been what was the West's game? How much of the alien lifestyle had to be borrowed?

The technology of guns and steamships was the obvious outer sign of Western dominance, and was eagerly copied even by many of those who in other respects I would class as revitalizers. All the more significant Southeast Asian monarchs tried to obtain steamships as quickly as possible. Vietnam had them in the 1830s, Siam and Burma in the 1850s; while the subsequent attempts by Aceh and Lombok to purchase and deploy steamers were a source of conflict with the Dutch. The Vietnamese emperor Minh-Mang, mentioned above for keeping the Europeans firmly at arm's length, was foremost in attempting to reproduce the steam engines, building a special factory outside Hue in 1839 for the purpose (Woodside 1971, 283).

The secrets of the steamship proved intractable, and the next generation saw the need to go further. Throughout the nineteenth century, however, while there were still traditional monarchies to be saved, their elites were primarily concerned with a selective borrowing over a short term, to "catch up" with the technological knowledge in which Europe had got ahead. This was still the strategy behind an 1898 plan for sending Siamese students to Europe (Wyatt 1969, 202). As usual this option had already been clearly outlined by an early Vietnamese borrower, Nguyen Truong To, in 1866:

our best strategy now would consist in cutting off a portion of our territory on the frontier area and giving it to the French. They will then defend these frontier regions for us . . .

Then, while our population is enjoying its peace, we will send young students to foreign countries. They shall try to penetrate the secrets of their defenses and attacks, and they shall also study whatever the foreign countries have to teach them regarding technical civilisation . . . We will then accumulate our strength, waiting for the day when we shall go into action. Under these circumstances, we shall be completely sure of recovering in the evening what we lost in the morning (translated in Truong Buu Lam 1967, 90-1).

Greater experience with the West appeared to expose more and more aspects of the Western "secret" that might have to be borrowed. The debate between revitalizers and borrowers continued throughout the colonial period, but its ground shifted in favour of the latter. In the first decades of this century the borrowers were everywhere in full cry, and their opponents were frequently now themselves highly Westernized men trying to rediscover a lost heritage. Among the many specific borrowings which were demanded, two areas appear to demand at least a brief discussion—government reform and education.

### REFORM OF GOVERNMENT

The ruling court circles which had either been defeated or co-opted by the Europeans were natural targets for blame by the reformers. A critical anti-monarchic tradition of this type began as early as the first half of the nineteenth century—though from the immunity of the colonial port-cities of Singapore and Batavia, rather than from the "inside". It was businesslike, cosmopolitan, Islamic, and almost as harsh on the "indolence" of Malays and Javanese, especially their rulers, as were the Europeans themselves. The successors of this tradition at the beginning of the twentieth century grouped around the reformist Muslim journal, *Al-Imam*, which Roff portrays indulging in "an orgy of self-vilification and self-condemnation" of Malay society (Roff 1967, 57). *Al-Imam* was particularly hard on the Malay rulers:

They are the seed of all evil and the cause of all distress. They are the great experts in throwing away money, and the kings of foolishness . . . All their wealth is obtained by squeezing blood out of the poor . . . Most of it runs straight back to the pockets of the Europeans.<sup>12</sup>



If the early Malay critics went on to make comparisons with European government, it was naturally with the relative efficiency or predictability of colonial autocracy, not with the inscrutable liberality of representative institutions. In his *Hikayat Mareskalk* written about 1815, Abdullah bin Mohammad al-Misri set out deliberately "to explain the ability and cunning of the white men in organizing their administration and drawing a profit for themselves, in other words stealing in an agreeable way (*merampas dengan manis*)" (Linden 1937, 128). The regime in question was that of Daendels and Janssens in Java, and what impressed Abdullah most about it was its thoroughness and attention to detail, and its ability to exploit everybody without actually driving them away (cited in Linden 1937, 129-33).

The most incisive borrower among Malay writers was however Munshi Abdullah, whose exceptional closeness to and fondness for British rule led him to make a more careful study of it. In his view the arbitrariness of the Malay rajas was the primary cause of the weakness and backwardness of their states. In closing his very critical report of his journey to the east coast of Malaya in 1837-8, he analysed the deficiencies of Malay rule in comparison to that of the British in Singapore as follows:

Firstly, there is no security in the Malay states for property, person, or anything at all: whereas in English states there is security, in the form of protection from every danger.

Secondly, peace: this exists in English states but not in Malay ones.

Thirdly, in the Malay states the Raja's bondsmen can commit whatever offences they like to God's creatures, because if a Raja's bondsman is killed, seven men are executed in retaliation. Whereas in English states it is not so: if a son of the white ruler or even the ruler himself killed someone unlawfully, he would be sentenced to death.

Further, in the Malay states there are too many people spending day and night in laziness and indolence . . . [The British] encourage hard workers: but in the Malay states the custom is quite different. When someone is seen to become rich, with much property and a good life, one accusation after another is manufactured against him, until he is ruined, his property exhausted, and perhaps his very life taken from him (Kassim Ahmad 1962, 124-5).<sup>13</sup>

Few Southeast Asians of the colonial era were privileged to see the workings of parliamentary democracy in Europe, and fewer still appear to have seen in it the key to European dominance. One group who did were the handful of Siamese aristocrats and princes educated in Europe who advised King Chulalongkorn in 1886 that Siam could only survive the European challenge on the basis of this type of constitutional change. Chulalongkorn, still in the

happy position of being able to control the pace of change as an enlightened despot, revealed much of his pragmatic style in his careful reply:

When I reached my majority I founded the Legislative Council (*Rata Montri*) wherein I became myself the Leader of the Opposition against my own ministers which was why the Council was at first so strong. As the work became more difficult to cope with, the old ministers began to fail; I had to take over more and more responsibility in the executive until I alone am the Government, and without my active support the Council was losing its influence and prestige . . .

That we need in this country a reform of the whole system of government I entirely agree, but then members of an effective legislative council must be independent men. Where are we to find such men? . . . We must first of all see that we can get the right kind of people to be our future legislators, or we are better off without them (translated in Chakrabongse 1960, 262-3).

For Southeast Asians under European colonial rule, who had lost faith in the capacity to lead of the traditional ruling class, European constitutional models generally seemed remote from the real issues. Many nationalists were prepared to campaign for "Indonesia berparlemen", or ministerial responsibility in Burma, but as a short-term tactic rather than a real solution to the problem of foreign domination. More meaningful than these constitutional models was the revolutionary populism of Mazzini, Garibaldi or the Sinn Fein. Since the colonized peoples had no source of power except their numbers, an identification with the masses in some sense or another was inescapable. Populism was one of the meeting grounds of revitalizers and borrowers, and it could also be a transition stage from one to the other. Phan Boi Chau was in such a stage when he penned these lines in 1906:

Why was our country lost? I submit the following: First the monarch knew nothing of popular affairs; Second the mandarins cared nothing for the people; . . . State matters to the King, other affairs to the mandarins, the people said. Hundreds of thousands, millions together worked To build the foundations of our country. The bodies, the resources are from the people; The people are in fact the country, the country is the people's (translated in Marr 1971, 129).

## EDUCATION

The other great item on the agenda of the borrowers, the item most widely shared in the first decades of this century, was education. The earliest

borrowers like Munshi Abdullah (1955, 157–9) had already insisted on the importance of education, but the colonial caste system of the twentieth century enormously increased its attractiveness. Those with European education immediately acquired status and a kind of modest power, while the “tutelage” argument of the colonizers could be answered by the growing number of Western-educated lawyers and doctors. Throughout Indonesia in particular it became a cliché for those who enjoyed secondary education that they were the harbingers of a new age, experiencing an unprecedented moment of progress, of “awakening from a long sleep”, of “awareness”. Those who did not share this confidence, like the Malays who sensed themselves dropping behind in the race, showed no less conviction that education was the answer: “There, and only there, can we find our salvation, there is no other way” (Za’ba 1928, 185).

The earliest enthusiasts for education were emphatically borrowers. As education became universally accepted as part of the solution, however, we begin to discern new lines of demarcation and debate between revitalizers and borrowers. A whole range of fascinating experiments in education began, whereby the “soul” of traditional values would be retained within the shell of modern learning. In Siam the balance was of course defined by the monarchy itself, and a relatively unified educational system was built on the basis of the Buddhist monastic schools. Wyatt professes to hear a “cry of relief” in Chulalongkorn’s declaration after his visit to Europe in 1897 that there was a limit to the process of borrowing:

I have convinced myself in Europe of the great benefit which Asiatic nations may derive from the acquisition of European science, [but] I am convinced also that there exists no incompatibility between such acquisition and the maintenance of our individuality as an independent Asiatic nation (translated in Wyatt 1969, 232, 379).

Both Vietnamese Confucianism and Islam could look overseas, to the heartland of these two traditions in China and the Middle East, for legitimation in the borrowing process. After reading the Chinese reformers K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, for example, the Vietnamese educational reformer Nguyen Quyen became immensely excited:

The more I read the more I became aware that the things we studied, our examination system, were wrong—indeed the real reasons for our having lost our country. From that point on I was determined to seize upon our country’s literature and on modern learning to awaken our citizenry (translated in Marr 1971, 93).

Similarly the great reformist voices in Cairo—Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida—encouraged Southeast Asian Muslims to believe that the previous generation had got its “revitalism” wrong. As Hamka put it, the older *ulama* had responded to defeat by “cursing the world altogether, both what was good and what was bad in the world, all of it they looked at with eyes full of hatred” (Hamka 1961, 13). Islamic reformism was the primary example of saying that “revitalism” and “borrowing” were in fact the same thing—that true Islam demanded the most thorough and modern education; the most effective administration and technology.

How much original thought of their own Southeast Asian reformers added to these overseas models it is not my purpose to assess. They do however appear to have felt the dilemma of Western dominance more keenly and more widely than their mentors in Egypt or China. Perhaps the most explicit Islamic discussion of the theme of this essay, Shakieb Arsalan’s “Why have the Muslims declined?”, was prompted by a letter of enquiry sent to Rashid Rida by an Indonesian *ulama* in West Borneo in the 1920s. The question ran roughly as follows:

What are the reasons the Muslims are weak and backward—especially the Muslims in Indonesia and Malaya—whether in worldly or religious matters? We Muslims have become the lowliest group, without wealth or strength, whereas God stated in the commands of His Holy Book “that glory will be for God, for His prophet, and for his faithful people” . . .

What are the reasons for the progress of the Europeans, Americans, and Japanese, at such an astonishing rate? Is it possible for the Muslims to achieve the same progress, if the Muslims follow the same steps they have taken without transgressing the bounds of religion, or not? (Shakieb Arsalan 1954, 6–7)

The answer of Arsalan, echoed by a growing army of reformers throughout Indonesia and Malaysia, was that the Muslims had declined because they had been untrue to their calling, and would rise again by devoting themselves unstintingly and sacrificially to building a revitalized Islamic society—especially through education and study.

Modernist Islam undoubtedly provided one structure within which a great deal of borrowing took place—the paradox of the most Islamic elements in Indonesia being also the most susceptible to western ideas has often been remarked. Others, including those Indonesians on whom Islam rested more lightly, experienced greater difficulty defining the inalienable national “soul” which would remain when the borrowing was done. One example of such an attempt by a Western-educated Javanese nationalist, writing in Dutch, was the following:

What is our [Javanese] national culture? A culture which aims at the intensification of *feeling (rosa)* to achieve conscious life. What is its summit? To attain [inner] power—the *sabda pandita ratu*. What is the contrary western spirit? That in which *intellect* forms the basis of conscious life . . . What is its summit? Completely to master the skies and the seas through technology. (Soeriokoesoemo 1918, 3)

In the Indonesian intellectual debate of the 1920s and 1930s, this dichotomy became typified as a conflict between Arjuna, hero of the *Mahabharata* and embodiment of the Javanese virtues of calm inner control, and the Western Faust. The new Westernized revitalizers like Soeriokoesoemo tended to place heavy emphasis on this dichotomy, identifying materialism and individualism as the vices of Faust which could only lead Indonesia astray. At an intellectual level the pre-war debate was focused at the first Indonesian congress of education in 1937, which provided a platform for the many educationists who were calling for schooling with more moral, traditional, and “family” character than the Dutch model. Takdir Alisjabahna reacted with a counterblast which proved to be one of the pre-war landmarks of the borrower case:

The negative voice of the Educational Congress -Anti-intellectualism anti-individualism anti-egoism anti-materialism, must be changed into positive, enthusiastic, and fiery slogans: The Indonesian intellect must be sharpened until it resembles the western intellect! The individual must be brought to vigorous life! Consciousness of individual worth must be emphasized to the utmost! Indonesians must be exhorted to accumulate all the material wealth they can (Mihardja 1954, 41–2; see also Alisjabahna 1966, 126–32).

For Takdir no limits could be set to the borrowing; and although at the time nationalist reactions to his challenge were largely negative, it is fair to add that these have tended to weaken with the eclipse of colonialism.

## UNITY

Most of the debates and prescriptions we have discussed thus far have been the concern of a fairly narrow elite—the elite which had lost a battle, a country, or a cultural heritage, and was painfully aware of the fact. How widely their feelings were shared by the masses, it is much more difficult to say. It seems reasonable to assume that most became aware of Western domination much more slowly—especially through the imposition by

twentieth century colonial bureaucracies of taxes, regulations, and unwanted “welfare” measures, which were easy to connect causally with an experience of increasing poverty.

I have mentioned already government reform and education as two prominent items on the agenda of borrowers. A third popular key to unlock the chains of weakness was unity. The special significance of unity, I believe, was that it was not the property of the borrowers, nor even of the educated elite, but appeared to be a sentiment shared in some way by all sections of Southeast Asian societies. For the true borrowers unity was to be found in the organizational methods of the West, the political parties and modern associations. For the modern revitalizers it meant re-emphasizing a unity of thought or belief. Even modernist Muslims like Agus Salim, for example, were tireless in emphasizing that society would become whole if the Muslims would “hold fast together to the rope of God, without separating” (Salim 1954, 3–4; see also Siegel 1969). For nationalists who were both borrowers and revitalizers the populism mentioned above was a natural attempt to create a unity of the many against the colonial oppressors. Indeed the fact that the alien rulers were few, and the Asians poor but many, was not lost on any section of society.

Among the rural masses of Southeast Asia, however, unity was more than a political weapon. It appeared to be sought as a direct mystical experience of brotherhood, transcending and replacing the vertical allegiances undermined by the colonial process. There has been too little sympathetic attention to the beliefs of what the French called “secret societies” and magical movements in the Mekong delta, to the Saya San rebellion in Lower Burma, the “holy man’s rebellion” in northern Siam, and many other manifestations of peasant enthusiasm. The externals do suggest, however, that we may find similar rituals of initiation, oaths of mutual solidarity, and readiness to face death in confidence of victory which we see in some movements of Island Southeast Asia—and indeed much more widely. In the Filipino Katipunan initiates were told to remember “that the way travelled by this Katipunan is the way of unity, mutual caring and mutual *damay* (compassion) that will not perish even unto death . . . the object of our journey is the purest and most immaculate existence that can ever be attained” (Ileto 1974, 127). In diverse areas of Indonesia the rural response to the first decade of Sarekat Islam (c.1912–22) demonstrated the same religious revival, high moral expectations from members and the community at large, and absolute loyalty to other members of the group, who represented both protection and social security to each other (Kartodirdjo 1973, 159). Journals and organizations sprang up with names like “Islam will become one” (*Islam menjadi satu*), “the union of the Indies” (*Hindia Sepakat*), “the equality of the Indies on the march” (*Same*

*rata Hindia bergerak*) and so forth. No slogan was more popular than *sama rasa sama rata*, which could be inadequately rendered as "brotherhood and equality". One such exhortation to *Rasa sama merasa* ("feel as one") went as follows:

promote a passion for togetherness (*sama-bersama*). Let the force of togetherness be seen. Implement the rationality of togetherness. Take on the thought of togetherness. Use the (secret) knowledge of togetherness. Face the future with togetherness.<sup>14</sup>

A Sarekat Islam political speech in rural Aceh made the point a little differently:

Formerly we became *muslimin* [Muslims, but used in Aceh for the guerrillas who carried on the Muslim resistance] carrying a rifle, but now that is no longer necessary, now *sepakat* (accord, harmony) is enough. If we are in accord we are already numerous, and whatever we want to achieve will take place; and moreover what the Assistant Resident or Governor want will not take place, because they are simply individuals without numbers. From here as far as Java *sepakat* has been achieved among the descendants of Islam. Whoever does not join rejects brotherhood (*tidak bersaudara*).<sup>15</sup>

The leadership of Sarekat Islam, like elite politicians elsewhere, quickly recoiled from this sort of peasant longing, so prone to transform solidarity into action. It may be only the communist movements of the region that have continued to speak consistently to this popular need for brotherhood and regeneration.

## MARXISM

This brings us to the newest and most systematic Southeast Asian explanation for the rise to power of the West—that provided by Marxism through Lenin's *Imperialism—the Last Stage of Capitalism*. The West rose through capitalism, and subordinated Asia to its economic interests through the requirements of that same capitalism. But capitalism was in its last phase, facing collapse from its own internal contradictions. The point I want to stress here is that this basic Marxist formula was influential among a far wider circle of Southeast Asians than members of communist parties, intellectuals with a serious interest in the nature of capitalism, or social revolutionaries. Its attraction lay in the fact that it could be used to provide an answer to the dilemma which is the

subject of this lecture; and a promise that Western dominance could be overcome. In the words of Nguyen Khac Vien (n.d., 12):

the Confucian scholar on the execution block repeated "I die, but I have fulfilled my duty". The militant communist, facing a firing squad, said, "I die, but you will be defeated", and thought, "When the contradictions come to a head, we will be there and we will win."

In their economic, political, and educational programmes the communist parties of Southeast Asia have been arch borrowers, international in spirit and impatient of outmoded values and practices. I do not wish to underrate that factor in their past and present strength in Southeast Asia. I do suggest, however, that wherever they have succeeded in obtaining enthusiastic peasant support in Southeast Asia they have ministered to three requirements discussed above, nearer in spirit to the emphases of the revitalizers, by: 1) their confidence that the problem of Western dominance *can* and *will* be overcome; 2) the intense moral regeneration they have demanded (Nguyen Khac Vien n.d., 15-52); 3) the sense of unity and brotherhood they have transmitted.

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I hope that the examples of Southeast Asian thinking sketched here have demonstrated the centrality of "the problem of the West" over a considerable period. A few of the responses quoted have suggested resignation to "Heaven's will"—to events taken to be cosmically ordained and therefore inescapable. But the great majority of commentators were not prepared to leave the matter there; in all times and places during the last century the powerlessness of Southeast Asians was seen as an unacceptable aberration which demanded change of one sort or another if it was to be overcome. It was man's fault, and man could not rest until he had identified and corrected that fault.

As perhaps befits a cautious historian I have not continued my story beyond the second world war and the retreat of overt European colonialism from the region. I would not like you to think, however, that this issue is of purely esoteric interest, an historical problem in the psychology of colonized peoples. It is true that the direct racial humiliation which was a feature of colonialism has faded with independence; but independence has also dampened many hopes of quickly "catching up". The economic gap between the industrialized countries and Southeast Asia shows no sign of narrowing, even if the polarization is becoming North-South rather than East-West. Dependence on Western technology, industry, ideas and models grows more rather than less intense. Most serious of all, it grows ever more difficult for the nations of Southeast Asia to think their own thoughts and establish their own priorities,

so pervasive are "international" consumption patterns and the international market of ideas. Some countries have sought to minimize these pressures by attempting once again to retreat into relative isolation. Others have allowed or encouraged their elites to join the "international superculture", transforming the gulf into an internal one between these elites and the rural mass. I think, however, we would be unwise to believe the problem has gone away.

## NOTES

1. These words were written in the year when American involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia ended.

2. For this attitude in Makasar, see Boxer (1967, 30-1); for Perak, B. Andaya (1975, 30); for Aceh and the reasons for this ban more generally, Reid (1988, 1:72-3).

3. Identification of *seberang* (overseas) characters with monsters and demons was natural in the *wayang* context, if only because they did not conform to Javanese norms of refined, restrained conduct. An example of this imagery for Dutchmen in an eighteenth century Javanese text is in Kumar (1969: 412, 550-1). The possibility of an analogy with the *punakawan* is discussed in Ricklefs (1974: 27-9).

4. See also the paraphrase in Praag (1947: 228-34) of a *Serat Achir-ing-jaman*, alternative endings of which have the kings of England, France, Holland and Bengal either perishing in defeat, or accepting the alternative of forced conversion.

5. Though the Dutch East India Company had been dissolved in 1800, the term *Kompeni* remained popular in the Archipelago to designate Dutch authority.

6. The usual doctrinal position is that holy war is *fard 'ala 'i kifaya*, obligatory on the whole community, and not *fardhu' ain*, obligatory for each individual muslim, *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, 89.

7. This is the delightful translation of James Siegel (1969: 76) from a fragment of the *Hikayat Perang Sabil* captured by the Dutch in 1903 and published by Damsté in 1928. The *Hikayat* existed in many versions; the fullest published version to date is that of Hasjmy (1971).

8. Pigeaud (1967, 1: 97, 155-6) discusses this Islamic influence and also the possibility of more ancient messianic tendencies in Java. While Pigeaud seeks the origins of Jayabaya millenarianism (unconvincingly) in the turbulent centuries which preceded the blessings of the nineteenth century *pax Neerlandica*, he confirms that no prophecies of the Jayabaya type have been found in pre-eighteenth century sources. For the association of millenary movements with 'deprivation' and disaster see Thrupp (1970: esp. 26, 32-3, 44-7, 209-14) and Worsley (1970: esp. 233-9).

9. The fact that this particular Tagalog legend was derived from a Spanish model is a reminder that such themes are by no means limited to Southeast Asia. Compare also the sleeping Arthur of Welsh legend (Thrupp: 1970: 207).

10. See also Soeriokoesoemo (1919: 7) in the Java-nationalist *Wederopbouw*: "the beginning of this [foreign] domination was only made possible by the confusion which Islam introduced to the original conception of life of the Javanese people."

11. See Ito (1974: 118) where an almost identical consciousness of these three stages was demanded of *Katipunan* initiates.

12. Sayyid Shaykh b. Ahmat Al-Hadi in *Al-Imam* II, 1 (July, 1907). I owe this source, in translation, to W. R. Roff.

13. In his autobiography (Hill 1955: esp. 235-40) Abdullah again compares Malay tyranny with British justice, concluding with the cry "God save Queen Victoria".

14. From the lengthy leading article entitled "Sama rasa," in *Hindia-Sepakat* (Sibolga), 2, 2 September 1920.

15. Speech of Abdoelmanap as reported in testimony of Nja'Gam, 23 April 1921, Mailr. 1259\*/21, Netherlands Colonial Archives. I owe this source to James Siegel.