human resources7

Reframing the Business Case for Diversity: A Values and Virtues Perspective

Hans van Dijk • Marloes van Engen •

Jaap Paauwe

Received: 10 June 2011 / Accepted: 28 July 2012 / Published online: 16 August 2012

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract We provide an ethical evaluation of the debate

on managing diversity within teams and organizations

between equality and business case scholars. Our core

assertion is that equality and business case perspectives on

diversity from an ethical reading appear stuck as they are

based on two different moral perspectives that are difficult

to reconcile with each other. More specifically, we point

out how the arguments of equality scholars correspond with

moral reasoning grounded in deontology, whereas the

foundations of the business case perspective are crafted by

utilitarian arguments. We show that the problems associ-

ated with each diversity perspective correspond with the

traditional concerns with the two moral perspectives. To

resolve this stalemate position, we argue that the equality

versus business case debate needs to be approached from a

third, less well-known moral perspective (i.e. virtue ethics).

We posit that a focus on virtues can enhance equality by

reducing prejudice and illustrate this by applying it to the

HRM domains of recruitment and selection and of per-

formance management. Subsequently, we argue that values

are key to aligning virtues with each other and with cor-

porate strategy, delineate our values and virtues perspective

on diversity, and argue why and how it can enhance

organizational performance.

Keywords (Managing) diversity � Equality � HRM � Deontology � Utilitarianism � Virtue ethics

The most striking feature of contemporary moral

utterance is that so much of it is used to express

disagreements; and the most striking feature of the

debates in which these disagreements are expressed is

their interminable character. I do not mean by this

just that such debates go on and on and on—although

they do—but also that they apparently can find no

terminus. There seems to be no rational way of

securing moral agreement in our culture—MacIntyre

(2007, p. 6).

The past two decades have witnessed a huge amount of

attention to managing diversity that comes from two dif-

ferent streams of research. Inspired by the question whether

differences between co-workers in member characteristics

(e.g. age, gender, functional background etc.) lead to

increased creativity, higher quality decisions, more inno-

vative solutions and various other positive team- and

organizational level outcomes, proponents of the business

case for diversity (i.e. supporting diversity as a means to

achieve, ultimately, organizational profit) conducted and

published numerous studies aimed at providing verification

for the so-called value-in-diversity hypothesis (for recent

meta-analytical reviews, see Bell et al. 2011; Joshi and Roh

2009; van Dijk et al. 2012). At the same time, a distinctive

group of scholars oppose this instrumental take on diversity

that the business case for diversity represents (Jones and

Stablein 2006; Noon 2007; Zanoni and Janssens 2004;

Zanoni et al. 2010). These scholars depart from the per-

spective that power inequalities in societies exist in orga-

nizations too and that, as a consequence, organizations

should pursue diversity in order to empower minority

groups and transform these inequalities (Noon 2007).

At surface level it appears as if the equality as well as

the business case perspective on managing diversity posits

H. van Dijk (&) � M. van Engen � J. Paauwe

Department of Human Resource Studies, Tilburg University,

Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands

e-mail: [email protected]

123

J Bus Ethics (2012) 111:73–84

DOI 10.1007/s10551-012-1434-z

that diversity is good and that organizations thus should

pursue having a diverse workforce. Moreover, Tomlinson

and Schwabenland (2010) recently suggested that in prac-

tice the contrast between the two perspectives is less strong

than in theory (see also Liff and Dickens 2000; Kirton et al.

2007). However, 15 years of debate between equality and

business case proponents have not yet lead to a theoretical

perspective on dealing with diversity in organizations that

adequately integrates the main arguments of the equality

and the business case perspective (Syed and Kramar 2009).

In a recent review of critical diversity studies, Zanoni et al.

(2010, p. 19) argue that the business case perspective is

unable to sufficiently represent and defend the rights of

minorities as it does not compensate minority group

members for their—often—reduced access to resources

and, in fact, may ‘even contribute to its reproduction’.

Moreover, because the business case perspective ignores

the historically rooted and today still persisting inequalities

in society and organizations, Noon (2007, p. 781) suggests

that the business case perspective does not constitute an

ethical approach to managing diversity:

The argument for the moral case based on the human

rights of all employees and job seekers must not be

abandoned for the current fashion of diversity and the

business case.

Consequently, Zanoni et al. (2010, p. 19) plea that equality

scholars ‘next to formulating critique’ should ‘examine and

develop practices and interventions reflecting an affirma-

tive, engaged and pragmatic ethos on diversity’, which

entails that equality scholars are encouraged to develop a

viable alternative for the business case perspective on

managing diversity.

In this article, we advance such an alternative perspec-

tive. We do not, however, opt for one of the two (i.e. the

equality or the business case) perspectives as a starting

point of reference. Instead, we consider and evaluate the

equality and the business case perspectives from a moral

point of view and assert that equality and business case

proponents are (implicitly) stuck in a stalemate position as

their foundations are grounded in two moral perspectives

(i.e. deontology and utilitarianism, respectively) that do not

only differ but also oppose each other. As a solution to this

stalemate position, we propose a novel approach to man-

aging diversity that is grounded in virtue ethics.

In the following, we discuss the shift from the equality

to the business case rationale in terms of a shift from a

deontological to a utilitarian perspective on dealing with

diversity in organizations. In drawing from theory on moral

difficulties with deontological and utilitarian perspectives,

we outline the negative (moral) ramifications when orga-

nizations would exclusively adopt either an equality or

business case approach to diversity. After introducing

virtue ethics, which posits that morality ought to be

assessed based on the character of a person, we illustrate

how virtue ethics may enhance equality in selection and

assessment procedures. Subsequently, we advance our

‘values and virtues’ perspective and argue why we consider

that a more (morally) benign approach to managing

diversity within organizations.

Issues of Morality with Current Perspectives on Dealing

with Diversity

The first advocates for diversity on the work floor based

their arguments on the (moral) conviction that excluding a

person based on demographic or non-task-related charac-

teristics essentially constitutes discrimination and hence is/

should be illegal (Ferner et al. 2005). In the USA, this led

to equal employment opportunity (EEO) and affirmative

action (AA) policies and programs in the 1960s, which

proved to be effective means to increase the representation

of minority groups in the workforce (Crosby et al. 2006). In

the 1980s, several scholars pointed to the negative conse-

quences of EEO and AA programs (Gilbert et al. 1999;

Litvin 2006). Among others, a time of job insecurity,

backlash effects for beneficiaries of AA policies, anti-

affirmative action groups, and complaints of and law suits

involving reverse discrimination initiated a decline in EEO

and AA policies in the USA (Graham 1998; Kelly and

Dobbin 1998).

Threatened by losing their jobs, advisors and consultants

of EEO and AA programs in the USA responded to these

developments by reframing the anti-discrimination policies

into the business case rationale (Kelly and Dobbin 1998;

Litvin 2006). Consequently, the transformation from

equality to business case rationales appeared to be rather

natural and, if anything, a step forward. Indeed, USA-based

scholars–consultants like Cox (1991) and Thomas (1991)

argued that the business case perspective on diversity

represents a better argument for increasing the represen-

tation of minorities by reasoning that EEO and AA pro-

grams lead to legal compliance, whereas practices based on

the business case involve voluntary commitment to creat-

ing a diverse workforce (cf. Ely and Thomas 2001; Gilbert

et al. 1999). This business case rhetoric was quickly

adopted by international companies world-wide and thus

found a way in European countries as well (Lorbiecki and

Jack 2000; Mor Barak 2011).

The emergence of the business case perspective on

diversity led to a surge of research focussing on the

question whether diversity in work groups and organiza-

tions relates to positive outcomes (e.g. competitive

advantage, group and organizational performance, crea-

tivity), which in particular thrived after Milliken and

74 H. van Dijk et al.

123

Martins (1996) and Williams and O’Reilly (1998) con-

cluded in their narrative reviews that the available empir-

ical evidence yielded inconclusive results (Harrison and

Klein 2007). Numerous conceptual and empirical studies

followed that have greatly advanced our insights into the

consequences of diversity for group and organizational

processes and performance. However, whereas among

practitioners the business case for diversity and hence the

belief that diversity enhances business performance is

upheld (Edelman et al. 2001; Heres and Benschop 2010),

the empirical, scientific studies point more and more to the

contingent nature of diversity’s benefits (Kochan et al.

2003; van Dijk et al. 2012). The business case for diversity

thus appears not as unequivocal as it sounds, and even

diversity management practices aimed at enhancing

diversity’s positive effects have been found to occasionally

cause more harm than good (Pendry et al. 2007; Roberson

et al. 2003; Von Bergen et al. 2002).

Meanwhile, various scholars from widely different

domains have criticized the business case rationale in argu-

ing that it does not substitute the need for affirmative action

and equal employment opportunity policies as business case

perspectives do not (sufficiently) empower minorities in the

workplace (Zanoni et al. 2010). The inconclusive findings

with regard to the validation of the business case add fuel to

the fire as they weaken the arguments of the business case

and provide equality scholars with an additional argument to

warrant against an instrumental take on diversity. Indeed, the

contingent nature of the business case perspective can easily

turn into an argument against diversity the moment diversity

appears to have a negative impact on organizational per-

formance (Noon 2007).

Consequently, whereas in the past scholars have

attempted to reconcile the business case and the equality

perspective with each other (e.g. Liff and Dickens 2000),

nowadays it becomes increasingly clear that they may be

incongruent (cf. Lorbiecki and Jack 2000). In the follow-

ing, we explain this incongruence by pointing out that the

shift from EEO and AA legislation and policies to the

business case-philosophy in the USA corresponds to a

radical change in thinking and actually represents a shift

from a deontological to a utilitarian ethical paradigm. We

will show how the differences between equality and busi-

ness case rationales correspond with the classic binary

between deontology and utilitarianism and how the prob-

lems associated with the equality and with the business

case perspectives reflect the shortcomings of deontological

and utilitarian approaches, respectively.

The Deontological Versus the Utilitarian Paradigm

In (business) ethics, the different ethical theories that are

discussed are often limited to the deontological, or

principle-based, paradigm on the one hand, and the utili-

tarian paradigm on the other (Ladkin 2006; Macdonald and

Beck-Dudley 1999). According to deontology, behaviour is

moral when it is based on certain established moral prin-

ciples, for acting based on such principles indicates that the

person’s intentions are sound (i.e. the good will). In con-

trast, according to utilitarianism the morality of an act is

determined by the extent to which it produces the greatest

proportion of good over evil (Macdonald and Beck-Dudley

1999). In opting for a course of action when confronted

with several alternatives, the utilitarian paradigm thus

indicates that the morally superior alternative is that which

overall yields the most positive consequences.

As the ultimate indicators of morality according to

deontology are the person’s intentions (regardless of the

consequences) but according to utilitarianism are the con-

sequences (regardless of the intentions), the two paradigms

are generally considered to be mutually exclusive. For

example, based on the principle that all people are equal

and thus ought to have equal opportunities, deontologists

typically would defend individual development programs,

mentoring programs and coaching trajectories reserved for

underrepresented groups, such as women and minorities,

with only a limited regard for the consequences for busi-

nesses. In contrast, utilitarians typically depart from the

perspective that when businesses prosper, society prospers

(de Woot 2005), and hence would never invest in activities

if they do not clearly contribute to business results.

A necessary first step to settle a dispute that has its

underpinnings in contrasting moral arguments is to

understand the flaws of each perspective. To start with

deontology, a first concern of addressing moral dilemmas

from a purely deontological perspective is that rules rep-

resent general guidelines of what is good (e.g. it is good to

pursue diversity). As a consequence, a deontological per-

spective tends to be inflexible when contextual details (e.g.

the availability of minority members in a certain region, the

extent to which members of one group might have a dis-

position or more relevant experience to perform better on a

certain task than members of the other group) alter the

outcome of the question ‘what is good?’. Second, good

intentions do not always lead to equally good outcomes and

may even contribute to evil consequences. What if, for

example, the costs of trajectories for minorities are not

earned back? To what extent could that be considered as a

reasonable loss? A strict deontological perspective would

consider such a question irrelevant as it does not seek the

answer to a normative question in the potential conse-

quences (for business).

There are, however, also several objections to adopting

utilitarianism as the moral point of reference. One of these

concerns is that the utilitarian principle of the greatest

amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people may

Reframing the Business Case for Diversity 75

123

include disadvantaging a minority for the benefit of the

majority. Examples may be restricting immigrants’ access

to work or education to prevent them from ‘taking’ jobs, or

ensuring that minorities can only have jobs that are not

popular among majority members. In societies where the

law is based on utilitarianism only, it can therefore be that

inequality, suppression, prejudice and discrimination can

be judged to be morally benign when it leads to the most

positive consequences for the majority.

Second, a more fundamental difficulty with utilitarian-

ism is the extent to which people can predict what the

consequences of their actions will be. There is a quantita-

tive and a qualitative side to this. First of all, our bounded

rationality limits our ability to understand the extent (i.e.

quantity) of the consequences of our actions: We tend to

have only a limited regard for the outgroup in considering

the potential consequences of alternative courses of action.

Second, in utilitarianism there is generally no regard for the

extent to which advantages and disadvantages may be

qualitatively different: To what extent does an advantage

for one person outweigh the disadvantage of another, and

how do the merits of justice, equality, profit, sustainability

etcetera compare to each other? Utilitarianism does not

provide an answer to these questions that are critical in

the application of utilitarianism to real-life situations.

Indeed, despite the fact that in the past decades a common

consciousness of the equality of all people has been

established, in the Western world and in Western organi-

zations—which are primarily governed by utilitarian

lines of thought (cf. Edelman et al. 2001)—inequality,

suppression and discrimination still exist (Plaut 2010).

Deontological Versus Utilitarian Arguments

for Diversity

The differences between the deontological and the utili-

tarian moral paradigms provide the foundation of the dif-

ference between the equality and the business case

perspectives on diversity. Although equality and business

case proponents both advocate an increase in the repre-

sentation of minorities in the workplace, the underlying

arguments are fundamentally different. From a deonto-

logical principle it is wrong to recruit, select and hence

discriminate based on member characteristics1. In contrast,

the business case perspective essentially entails an argu-

ment that is based on the utilitarian conviction that diver-

sity yields better consequences than homogeneity for teams

and organizations, i.e. that there is value in bringing

together people who differ from each other on whatever

characteristics. Consequently, according to the business

case for diversity it actually can be beneficial to recruit and

select based on exactly those characteristics that according

to the no-discrimination principle ought not to be selected

upon.

Just as the arguments favouring diversity of the equality

and the business case scholars reflect (moral) reasoning

based on deontology and utilitarianism, the arguments in

opposition to the equality and the business case perspec-

tives reflect arguments against deontology and utilitarian-

ism. A first concern with the business case argument for

diversity is that it actually does not celebrate diversity in

itself, but that diversity is supported only if and as long as it

drives competitive advantage and organizational profit

(Noon 2007). The business case rationale thus represents a

contingent argument that considers minority members to be

a means to an end, thereby violating the deontological

principle that people ought not to be treated merely as a

means (Greenwood 2002). Second, the business case per-

spective on diversity appears to depart from the perspective

that the single most important consequence that justifies all

means is competitive advantage and that it is an established

notion that diversity leads to competitive advantage.

Indeed, as Joshi and Roh (2007, p. 2) rhetorically

wondered:

If researchers are unable to provide definitive answers

regarding the benefits and overall performance gains

from diversity, why would companies continue to

invest in and implement diversity management

practices?

The current empirical evidence, however, indicates that

it is anything but an established notion that diversity leads

to competitive advantage (e.g. van Dijk et al. 2012). Fol-

lowing the contingent argument of the business case for

diversity that organizations should pursue diversity as it is

presumed to lead to competitive advantage, from a utili-

tarian perspective Joshi and Roh (2007) are right in sug-

gesting that findings that show that diversity does not

enhance performance (or that diversity might even dimin-

ish performance) provide organizations with a (moral)

justification for pursuing homogeneity rather than

diversity.

1 This is under the assumption that such discrimination leads to

ingroup favoritism and thus advantages for majority group members.

Equality scholars differ in the extent to which they would favor

affirmative action or positive discrimination policies (cf. Liff 1997;

Liff and Dickens 2000). Equality scholars who emphasize ‘differ-

ence’ generally favor such policies because they compensate minority

group members for (structural) inequalities (i.e. emphasizing colour-

ful approaches). In contrast, equality scholars who emphasize

‘sameness’ generally reject such policies based on the argument that

Footnote 1 continued

all people are essentially the same and hence should be treated the

same (i.e. emphasizing colour-blind approaches).

76 H. van Dijk et al.

123

This is not to say that there are no problems with the

equality perspective on diversity. First, one may argue that

the equality perspective tends to assume that (the compo-

sitions of) member characteristics do not bear any conse-

quences and that recruitment and selection based on those

characteristics thus constitutes discrimination. One of the

major outcomes of research to the consequences of diver-

sity in work groups is that diversity does have conse-

quences, but that those are contingent on the task

characteristics (van Dijk et al. 2012). Consequently, in

crafting diversity management strategies a context sensi-

tivity may be needed that deontological principles by their

nature have difficulty to live up to (Clegg et al. 2007).

Second, a more fundamental problem with the equality

perspective is its axiom that inequality is wrong and hence

is to be avoided. Arguably, organizations are embedded in

a utilitarian context where the highest goods are competi-

tive advantage, shareholder value, and profitability. Con-

sequently, equality does not rank highest on the priority list

of most organizations (see, for example, the uptake in

modern Human Resource Management thinking on dis-

tinguishing different staff categories based on their added

value, Huselid et al. 2005; Lepak and Snell 1996). From a

deontological perspective that stresses the worth of each

human being irrespective of race, gender, colour etcetera,

such a prioritization of business results over defeating

inequality may come across as immoral, but in a business

context where employees are commonly referred to as

‘resources’ or ‘asset’ and hence solely as means to an end,

it constitutes a reality that is not likely to be sensitive to

deontological principles and arguments.

The Necessity of a Novel Perspective on Managing

Diversity

In light of the concerns raised above, we argue that neither

the equality nor the business case perspective for diversity

yields a sustainable or viable framework for managing

diversity in the workplace. The problems we identified are

probably less apparent in practice because managing

diversity practices tend to represent more of a blend of both

perspectives and thus are not exclusively based on deon-

tological or utilitarian principles (Gagnon and Cornelius

2000; Kirton et al. 2007; Tomlinson and Schwabenland

2010). However, we argue that there are two reasons why

blended diversity practices ultimately may cause more

harm than good.

First, the lack of understanding of ethical theory

underlying arguments in favour or against specific diver-

sity practices can easily lead to rhetoric and practices that

are not aligned with each other and/or that are not aligned

with the company strategy. Pendry et al. (2007, p. 44)

name the example of employees who undergo training

aimed at improving gender relations and improving equal

opportunities:

…should they step back into a working environment

where, for example, there are subtle but institution-

alized pressures dictating that women should place

career before children, or the converse, then equal

opportunities have not in truth been achieved. (…)

effects may be hampered by an incompatible orga-

nizational ethos.

Deontology and utilitarianism are only compatible inas-

much as they yield the same implications. In fact, an

assumption underlying the business case for diversity is

that equality leverages business results and hence that there

is utilitarian (financial) merit in deontological reasoning.

The moment that this ceases to be true, a blend of more

deontology- and of more utilitarianism-based diversity

practices and strategies are likely to be ill-aligned and

hence ineffective.

Second, we fear that the current status-quo in theory and

practice about perspectives on managing diversity may

lead to the perils of (a) diversity scepticism and (b) diver-

sity opportunism. Diversity scepticism refers to a disbelief

of the pro-diversity claims that are characteristic of the

current business case rhetoric (e.g. Hansen 2003) and that

can easily translate into (hidden) anti-diversity practices.

Less-extreme and more likely to emerge is the attitude of

diversity opportunism, which can be conceptualized as

openly supporting diversity when it is proven to be

advantageous but (secretly) avoiding diversity when the

consequences are likely to be less beneficial. In fact, from a

short-term utilitarian point of view such diversity oppor-

tunism may even represent the morally superior perspec-

tive on managing diversity as it entails that diversity is

pursued when it is advantageous for business and that it is

avoided when it is disadvantageous. The interesting fact

here is that it is indeed such an attitude of diversity

opportunism that is promoted in several studies to the

consequences of diversity: when findings show positive

relationships between homogeneity and (various indicators

of) performance, managers are recommended to invest in

diversity management practices (e.g. Ancona and Caldwell

1992; Jehn and Bezrukova 2004). In contrast, when find-

ings show positive relationships between (certain dimen-

sions of) diversity and (various indicators of) performance,

these findings are broadly quoted and exhibited in order to

promote diversity (e.g. Catalyst 2004).

Such utility-driven recommendations suggest that we

should pursue a situation where, depending on the question

whether they still add value to the business, minority

members and diverse groups can be celebrated the one day

yet disposed of the next. Derry (1996, p. 105) illustrates

this point from a feminist ethics perspective:

Reframing the Business Case for Diversity 77

123

…it is not a great step forward to say that women

have terrific value in the workplace because now we

recognize that female skills could do us some good.

Women’s redemptive role will last only as long as the

current wave of management theory holds sway.

Not only from a feminist or deontological (e.g. Noon

2007) perspective such a future scenario sounds horren-

dous, from a business perspective the contingent attitudes

towards minority members and diverse groups (and, actu-

ally, towards all employees) closely resembles the incon-

sistency that Collins refers to as ‘‘the signature of

mediocrity’’ (2009, p. 92), i.e. characteristic of companies

that will never become really successful. Collins (2009,

p. 92) describes such utility-driven companies as trying out

‘all sorts of new programs, new fads, new strategies (…).

And when one silver bullet fails, they search for another

and then yet another’. Surely there must be room for a

better, more sustainable perspective on managing diversity

in the workplace.

In the next section, we develop such a perspective based

on virtue ethics. First, we introduce virtue ethics theory;

subsequently, we outline what a virtue ethics perspective

on diversity entails.

Virtue Ethics and Diversity

Virtue ethics has originally been advanced by Aristotle in

his Nicomachean Ethics, but gained renewed attention after

MacIntyre (1981, 2007) modernized the concept and

argued that the virtue ethics perspective is superior to

moral perspectives such as deontology and utilitarianism

(cf. González 2003). In his historical account of how the

different moral perspectives emerged, MacIntyre (2007)

posits that deontology as well as utilitarianism suffered

from the failed quest in the enlightenment period to iden-

tify an objective purpose or ‘telos’ in life that could justify

morality. Albeit the deontological and the utilitarian per-

spectives differ in their emphasis on the intentions or the

wishes/aspirations of people and individuals, both have in

common that their justification of what is good is based on

properties of people void of context (Clegg et al. 2007).

And this is exactly where virtue ethics is radically differ-

ent, for virtue ethics is grounded in the notion that morality

can only be properly understood and assessed when the

context in which the moral issue takes place is taken into

account.

Virtue can be defined as ‘excellence of any kind’

(MacIntyre 2007, p. 122). Because the ability to excel is

grounded in a person’s character, virtues are generally

denoted in terms of character traits that can be enacted

upon. What kinds of virtues are considered virtuous is

contingent on (a) the situational demands and (b) the

position or role of the actor(s) involved. We first explain

what is meant with the latter before we turn to the former.

Role theory posits that human beings are members of

social positions or roles (e.g. parent, fire-fighter, passenger,

student) and hold expectations about their own and other

people’s behaviours based on those roles (Biddle 1986).

These expectations are based on the conceptions, or, more

specifically, ideal types that people have of what is

required by specific social roles. MacIntyre argues that

virtues are those character traits or qualities which ‘enable

an individual to do what his or her role requires’ (2007,

p. 128). For example, an ideal-type nurse is someone who,

among others, promotes the interests and dignity of those in

their care (Gallagher 2004). In order to become such an

exemplary nurse, practicing the virtue of compassion

would be an example of a quality that enables a nurse to

meet the expectations raised by his or her role. Hence, with

each role comes an ideal type that delineates the more or

less perfect normative description of how that role ought to

be fulfilled, and the actual virtuous fulfilment of a role by a

person can only be done by exercising those virtues that

lead to acting according to the ideal type. This not only

entails that different roles may require the exercise of

different virtues, it also implies that an act (e.g. washing a

patient) can be regarded as virtuous when it is done by one

person (e.g. a nurse) but as vicious when done by another

(e.g. a hospital manager).

Context is of crucial importance for what specific virtues

are required. The situational demands of feeding a patient

or assisting in an operation room do not change a nurse’s

role membership, but they do alter what is expected of him

or her. Virtue ethics thus posits that with a role or social

position comes a certain responsibility and that context

defines what that responsibility is. People can be held

(morally) accountable for the extent to which they fulfil

their responsibilities, and the actual fulfilment is done by

exercising or practicing those virtues that match the nor-

mative prescriptions or expectations as denoted in the

ideal-type fulfilment of the role.

Consequently, in assessing the morality of an action,

virtue ethics asks the question whether the actor has

practiced the virtue that was required in the given situation

(MacIntyre 2007). In doing so, virtue ethics overcomes the

deontological problem of acting based on a rule that in

some contexts may be completely inappropriate, while the

consistency of the virtues overcomes the potential incon-

sistency and possibly even contradiction in behaviours and

actions that can result from utilitarianism. Moreover, peo-

ple’s limited ability to predict the consequences of their

actions easily causes a utilitarian approach to result in

acting based on the anticipation of what enhances the

happiness of the actor—or at most the overall happiness of

78 H. van Dijk et al.

123

the ingroup (e.g. team, organization) of the actor. Virtue

ethics, however, in the words of MacIntyre (2007, p. 150):

…presupposes a crucial distinction between what any

particular individual at any particular time takes to be

good for himself and what is really good for him as a

man[kind]. It is for the sake of achieving this latter

good that we practice the virtues (…).

Hence, in practicing those virtues that belong to the

social position or role that a person occupies, virtue ethics

posits that ultimately the good of the society or community

that the actor is embedded in will be established. What that

‘good’ exactly constitutes is completely contingent on the

situational demands, which causes virtue ethics to be richer

and more capable of addressing and balancing different

needs or demands (e.g. equality, profit) than deontology or

utilitarianism.

Now that we have introduced virtue ethics and con-

trasted it to deontology and utilitarianism, we are ready to

apply virtue ethics to the question of how to approach and

manage diversity in organizations.

A Virtue Perspective on Diversity

As virtues refer to excellence or qualities of any kind that

enable an individual to do what his or her role requires, the

heart of a virtue ethics perspective on managing diversity

lies in identifying and denoting those qualities that are

considered pivotal to a job role or function. For issues

concerning diversity such a focus on excellence in char-

acter and in qualities bears the important implication that

other personal characteristics (including age, gender and

ethnicity) are relevant only inasmuch they are undisputedly

related to those qualities. There are two HRM domains

where this is particularly pertinent and that serve well as

illustrations, namely recruitment and selection and perfor-

mance management.

Recruitment and Selection

Despite decades of research and attention to discrimination

in recruitment and selection, present-day it is still wide-

spread (Agars 2004; Davison and Burke 2000; Plaut 2010).

The causes of discrimination in the recruitment and selection

process are often contingent on the specific circumstances

and the type of job (e.g. demographic characteristics of the

recruiter, perceived fit between job type and demographic

characteristics of the applicant). One common denominator,

however, is that when discrimination in recruitment and

selection occurs, it generally has to do with stereotypes being

held by the recruiter. As has been substantially demonstrated

for instance, the female gender stereotype is often at odds

with stereotypes we have of the ‘typical’, and particularly the

‘ideal’ worker (Burgess and Borgida 1999; Eagly and Karau

2002; Heilman 2001). Consequently, gender stereotypes

have been shown to bias, among others, hiring and promotion

decisions (Heilman et al. 2004; Rudman and Glick 2001;

Vinkenburg et al. 2011).

We suggest that a virtue ethics approach to recruitment

and selection could help in battling these persisting

inequalities, not only to the benefit of minority group

members but also to the benefit of the organization. A focus

on virtues as the prime recruitment criteria entails that before

job applicants are assessed; those virtues that they will be

evaluated upon need to be identified. This requires discuss-

ing and describing the virtues that are possessed by the ideal

type of person in the role or position that is vacant. During

this process, stereotypes can be addressed and corrected in

order to create the profile of the ideal type (cf. Dortants

2010). To use the nurse example again, virtues that may be

mentioned are compassion, courage and respectfulness

(Armstrong 2006). As it may be hard to assess to what extent

a candidate possesses those virtues, the identification of the

ideal-type virtues needs to be followed by describing suitable

indicators or criteria. It is here where some may suggest that

positive patient ratings is an indicator of respectfulness and

that being female is an indicator of compassion. The expli-

cation of these two proposed indicators provides other

recruitment and selection committee members to address the

accuracy of these (stereotypical) expectancies and, if nec-

essary, disapprove of them.

Consequently, a focus on virtues that the ideal-type

candidate possesses in order to successfully conduct his or

her role can help recruitment and selection committee

members in distinguishing an ideal type from a stereotyp-

ical candidate. Not only can this result in a less biased

recruitment and selection process and hence in reduced

prejudice, discrimination and inequality but also it can help

the recruitment and selection committee members in

engaging in a recruitment and selection process that is

focused more on only those criteria that are highly relevant

to performing well in the role of a nurse.

Performance Management

Discrimination, prejudice and stereotyping do not stop

once people are employed by the organization. There is

ample evidence that minority group members face dis-

crimination in the different phases of the performance

management process too. Performance management refers

to the measurement and management of employee perfor-

mance and includes the creation of performance standards,

methods to measure and evaluate performance based on

those standards, and providing feedback through, e.g.

(formal) performance reviews (Armstrong and Baron 2005;

Den Hartog et al. 2004).

Reframing the Business Case for Diversity 79

123

Because majority members tend to have more voice in

creating performance standards, it is likely that the per-

formance standards will be more considerate towards

majority members than towards minority members (e.g. not

taking maternity leave into account when compiling a list

of best performing employees based on, e.g. number of

media appearances or amount of sales). With regard to

measuring and evaluating performance, there’s a long track

record of bias in performance evaluations against minority

members (Eagly et al. 1992; Hekman et al. 2010; Kraiger

and Ford 1985; Stauffer and Buckley 2005).

Just as in the recruitment and selection process, we

suggest that a virtue ethics approach could reduce the

inequalities that are caused by these biases and, conse-

quently, be beneficial to the organization and its members.

This requires the identification of the (prime) virtues nee-

ded for each role in the organization, and subsequently the

creation of performance indicators in order to assess the

extent to which a person possesses and correctly practices

those virtues. Next to reducing bias in performance eval-

uations, we believe such a virtues-based performance

management process may result in more focus on those

performance criteria that relate to sustainable, long-term

business results (cf. the literature on the importance of

setting mastery or development goals instead of perfor-

mance goals (e.g. Butera et al. 2011; Dewettinck 2008;

Jawahar and Williams 1997): as a virtues-based perfor-

mance management process would focus on the extent to

which individuals master the virtues that are required for

performing on a certain role, it more or less automatically

emphasizes the importance of acquiring and developing

competencies over demonstrating that competence in

comparison to others).

Having denoted what a virtue perspective on diversity

within organizations entails and how it can be applied to

two highly relevant HRM domains, we discuss how a

virtue perspective can be embedded within the larger

organizational context.

A Values and Virtues Perspective on Diversity

What we find is that the enduring great enterprises are

driven by purpose beyond money and success. That

purpose is rooted in core values that they will not

compromise—Collins (2010, in a seminar).

A pending question that remains is whether a virtue

approach to diversity is limited to focussing on the core

virtues of the individual employees, or whether it also has

implications on a more aggregate or general level. If not, a

plausible concern could be that the individual focus might

result in incompatible profiles for different job positions

and that, as a consequence, the organization operates more

as a collection of individuals than as a collective whole (cf.

Collins 2009; Meglino et al. 1989).

We propose that this is where the importance of (core)

business values comes in. Business values can be regarded as

normative aspects of the (corporate) culture that defines how

to do business (Agle and Caldwell 1999; Barney 1986). More

specifically, values can be defined as ‘‘concepts or beliefs

about desirable end states or behaviours that transcend spe-

cific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour

and events, and are ordered by relative importance’’ (Sch-

wartz and Bilsky 1987, p. 551). Whereas virtues thus rep-

resent individual qualities that can be enacted upon, values

denote what virtues are valued as most important. For

example, in the health care sector virtues represents those

qualities that are needed in order to pursue excellence in

caring, whereas values guide the physician into what he or

she should give priority: cost effectiveness or quality of care

(cf. van der Wal et al. 2011). This entails that values may

change: over time the focus of an organization may develop

and hence alter. Virtues, on the other hand, are stable: no

matter if and to what extent quality of care is preferred; when

a physician is spending time with patients there is a given set

of virtues that will enable him or her to excel in that practice.

In her inventory of more than 20 years of research to high

performance companies, Kirby (2005) denoted that a strong

set of values is one of the characteristics that such companies

have in common (cf. Collins and Porras 1997). Values related

to equality (e.g. inclusiveness) could play an important role in

fostering diversity. Indeed, Pless and Maak (2004, p. 130)

argue that the potential of workforce diversity can only be

unleashed when a culture of inclusion is established:

Diversity is first and foremost, a cultural question and

thus a question of norms, values, beliefs and expec-

tations. As such, it is an ethical question and deter-

mined by some very essential founding principles of

human coexistence. Not before this is taken into

consideration, acknowledged and institutionalized,

can ‘‘diversity management’’ be successful.

We therefore coin the approach to managing diversity

that we have advanced in this article the ‘‘values and vir-

tues perspective’’. Virtues represent the core aspects of our

perspective and involve excellence to be pursued by indi-

vidual employees witshin the organization. Values bring

focus to and create coherence among the virtues and hence

involve excellence to be pursued by the organization (cf.

Ibarra-Colado et al. 2006).

Rebuttals to Arguments Against our Values and Virtues

Perspective

Thus having denoted what our values and virtues per-

spective entails, it is likely that several questions linger.

80 H. van Dijk et al.

123

More specifically, one might wonder if our perspective will

lead to less prejudice and stereotyping, if it can really

enhance equality, and if it really contributes to the bottom

line of organizational performance.

To start with the first, one might argue that ideal types

can easily be influenced by stereotypes and hence be biased

in favour of majority members. Role congruity theory

(Eagly and Karau 2002), for example, proposes that pre-

judice is likely to occur when inconsistencies exist between

member characteristics (e.g. being female) and the char-

acteristics that are (stereo)typically associated with a cer-

tain role or ideal type (e.g. being male for leaders). This

illustrates a common criticism against virtue ethics about

the likelihood that ideal types are subject to prejudice and

bias (e.g. Derry 1996).

Whereas we agree that such biases may be apparent, we

name two reasons why we contend that our values and

virtues perspective could reduce prejudice. First, we

believe that virtues are less clearly associated with member

characteristics than roles—or at least may be more

ambiguous in their associations with member characteris-

tics (cf. Kirton and Healy 2009). In the example of the

nurse—which stereotypically is depicted as a feminine

role—the virtue of compassion may be categorized as

feminine, but the virtue of courage will likely be catego-

rized as masculine. Likewise, the role of an engineer will

be easily categorized as masculine, but what about virtues

that belong to being an engineer like sensitivity to risk or

respect for nature (Harris 2008)? We do not deem those to

be gendered virtues—or, if anything, more feminine than

masculine.

Second, the main problem with stereotypes and pre-

judice is that they generally operate on a sub-conscious

level. In order to eradicate stereotypes, we thus first must

become aware of the fact that we have stereotypes and that

they influence the decision-making process. The process of

delineating virtues forces people to make any beliefs about

potential indicators of certain virtues salient, thereby cre-

ating better opportunities to falsify stereotypes and focus

on individuating information instead. Nevertheless, in the

process of identifying the prime virtues and their respective

performance indicators for each ideal type, it is of vital

importance that not only the dominant coalition but also a

wide range of employees are involved.

From a deontological stance, a problem with our values

and virtues perspective might be that it represents a liberal

approach to equality: if inclusiveness or equality is not one

of the organization’s core values, then how does our per-

spective enhance the position of minority members?

Next to less bias in selection and appraisal procedures,

we believe that there are two other ways in which our

perspective can enhance equality. First, with its emphasis

on delineating an organization’s core values, our

perspective forces the (top) management team to be more

outspoken in whether or not they endorse equality and to

align their strategy accordingly (cf. Pless and Maak 2004).

This is all the more important because (top) management

support has been found pivotal in enhancing equality in

organizations (Kalev et al. 2006). Our perspective thus can

help (top) managers to create an inclusive organization if

they want to. Second, our values and virtues perspective is

not necessarily a substitute for more progressive policies

and practices endorsing equality. Indeed, one of the

advantages of virtue ethics is that it does not conflict with

deontology or utilitarianism and thus can easily be used for

complementing, for example, deontological rules and/or

requirements (MacIntyre 2007; cf. González 2003). Con-

sequently, our values and virtues perspective can be

adopted regardless of whether country legislation enforces

them to pay attention to equality, and it can be combined

with other approaches aimed at promoting equality (e.g.

threshold selection, Noon 2012).

Finally, it may be unclear how exactly our values and

virtues perspective may enhance organizational perfor-

mance. First, we have argued how virtues-centred selection

and appraisal procedures may reduce bias. This entails that

the assessments of candidates and employees may be less

influenced by task-irrelevant criteria but focus more on

qualities that contribute to their (potential) job perfor-

mance. Second, the centrality of an organization’s values in

our perspective may enhance the alignment of an organi-

zation’s diversity policy with their strategic aims (cf.

Dickens 1999). In turn, ample research—among others

research in HRM—has shown that strategic alignment

enhances organizational performance (Becker et al. 2001;

Paauwe 2004). Third, pro-diversity values are likely to

enhance the social legitimacy of an organization, which

refers to ‘‘a generalized perception or assumption that the

actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate

within some socially constructed system of norms, values,

beliefs, and definitions’’ (Schuman 1995, p. 574). As such,

pro-diversity values may increase the societal support and

trust that is needed in order to perform well.

Consequently, in everything it is of utmost importance

that organizations carefully ‘rethink’ the values that guide

their choices (Albert et al. 2000). When practiced accord-

ingly, we argue that the organizational actors’ enactment of

those values by means of practicing virtues could lead to

outcomes that are aspired by equality as well as by business

case scholars. Note, however, that such prospects about the

practical consequences of our values and virtues perspec-

tive are tentative. The contribution of this article is theo-

retical: empirical research is needed to substantiate—or

falsify—the value of our perspective. In addition, the merit

of our perspective is likely to be contingent on the extent to

which it diverges from existing practices. Legislative

Reframing the Business Case for Diversity 81

123

differences across countries have created a wide variety of

organizational practices aimed at managing diversity (Mor

Barak 2011). The consequences of our values and virtues

perspective will probably be more noticeable when its

implications diverge more from current practices.

Final Remarks

In this article, we have discussed the contrasts between the

equality and the business case perspective on diversity

from a moral perspective and reasoned that they are stuck

in a stalemate position because they are built on opposing

moral perspectives. In practice—and sometimes also in

research—the binary between the equality and the business

case perspective is often less strong (Tomlinson and

Schwabenland 2010). One of the reasons for this may be

that business case scholars sometimes use deontological

principles (e.g. in arguing that profitability is a business

imperative) and that equality scholars sometimes use util-

itarian arguments (e.g. in quoting studies that show that

diversity enhances business performance) in building their

case (cf. Kirton et al. 2007). We introduced virtue ethics

and advanced our values and virtues perspective as a more

congruent, context-sensitive, and consequently, more sus-

tainable approach to managing diversity. We posit that our

perspective can enhance equality as well as business out-

comes. Obviously, these claims need to be put to the test.

Our perspective thus opens up venues for empirical

research that hopefully push the field forward.

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