Analytical Framework 7
fadoo
The Classic Leadership Resource Now In Its 4th Edition!
FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1984, Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal’s best-selling book has become a classic in the fi eld. Its four-
frame model examines organizations as factories, families, jungles, and theaters or temples:
• The Structural Frame: how to organize and structure groups and teams to get results
• The Human Resource Frame: how to tailor organizations to satisfy human needs, improve human resource
management, and build positive interpersonal and group dynamics
• The Political Frame: how to cope with power and confl ict, build coalitions, hone political skills, and deal with
internal and external politics
• The Symbolic Frame: how to shape a culture that gives purpose and meaning to work, stage organizational
drama for internal and external audiences, and build team spirit through ritual, ceremony, and story
This new edition contains a wealth of new examples from both the private and the nonprofi t sectors. In addition, the book
offers updated content and expanded discussions of self-managing teams, dramaturgical and institutional theory, change
theory, the “blink” process, “black swans,” and gay rights. There is an Instructor’s Guide available online.
The Authors
Lee G. Bolman holds the Marion Bloch Missouri Chair in Leadership
at the Bloch School of Business and Public Administration at the
University of Missouri–Kansas City. He consults worldwide to
corporations, public agencies, universities, and schools. He lives in
Kansas City, Missouri.
Terrence E. Deal is the retired Irving R. Melbo Clinical Professor at the
University of Southern California’s Rossier School of Education. He now
writes and makes wine in San Luis Obispo, California. He is the coauthor
of sixteen books, including the best-selling Corporate Cultures (with
A. A. Kennedy, 1982) and Managing the Hidden Organization (with W. A.
Jenkins, 1994). He lives in San Luis Obispo, California.
Reframing Organizations
R efra
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n iza
tio n
s
Fourth Edition
LEE G. BOLMAN
TERRENCE E. DEAL Best-sel l ing authors of LEADING WITH SOUL
B O
LM A
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E A
L
Artistry, Choice, and Leadership Artistry, Choice, and Leadership
Fourth Edition
www.josseybass.com
MANAGEMENT/LEADERSHIP
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F O U RT H E D I T I O N
Reframing Organizations
Artistry, Choice, and Leadership
Lee G. Bolman • Terrence E. Deal
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Copyright © 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.
Published by Jossey-Bass A Wiley Imprint 989 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94103-1741—www.josseybass.com
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permit- ted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400, fax 978-646- 8600, or on the Web at www.copyright.com. Requests to the publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, 201-748- 6011, fax 201-748-6008, or online at www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
Credits are on page 528.
Readers should be aware that Internet Web sites offered as citations and/or sources for further information may have changed or disappeared between the time this was written and when it is read.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or com- pleteness of the contents of this book and specifi cally disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fi tness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives or written sales materials. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a professional where appropriate. Neither the publisher nor author shall be liable for any loss of profi t or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bolman, Lee G. Reframing organizations : artistry, choice, and leadership / Lee G. Bolman, Terrence E. Deal.—4th ed. p. cm.—(The Jossey-Bass business & management series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7879-8798-5 (cloth) ISBN 978-0-7879-8799-2 (pbk.) 1. Management. 2. Organizational behavior. 3. Leadership. I. Deal, Terrence E. II. Title. HD31.B6135 2008 658.4'063—dc22
2008022738
Printed in the United States of America fourth edition HB Printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 PB Printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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The Jossey-Bass Business & Management Series
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An updated online Instructor’s Guide with test bank
is available at www.wiley.com/college/bolman
Available in spring 2009: New with this fourth edition of Reframing Organizations
is an online assessment program that runs in Blackboard, WebCT, and Vista. Each
chapter includes 15–20 multiple choice, true/false, matching, and essay questions
designed to assess understanding of the key concepts presented in the text. Multiple
choice, matching, and true/false questions will include detailed feedback for incor-
rect answers, and students will also be provided references to the text for incorrect
answers. Please consult your sales representative for further details.
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v
C O N T E N T S
Preface vii
PART ONE Making Sense of Organizations
ONE Introduction: The Power of Reframing 3
TWO Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 23
PART TWO The Structural Frame
THREE Getting Organized 45
FOUR Structure and Restructuring 71
FIVE Organizing Groups and Teams 99
PA R T T H R E E The Human Resource Frame
SIX People and Organizations 119
SEVEN Improving Human Resource Management 139
EIGHT Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 165
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Contentsvi
PA R T F O U R The Political Frame
NINE Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 191
TEN The Manager as Politician 211
ELEVEN Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents 229
PA R T F I V E The Symbolic Frame
TWELVE Organizational Symbols and Culture 251
THIRTEEN Culture in Action 279
FOURTEEN Organization as Theater 293
PA R T S I X Improving Leadership Practice
FIFTEEN Integrating Frames for Effective Practice 311
SIXTEEN Reframing in Action: Opportunities and Perils 327
SEVENTEEN Reframing Leadership 341
EIGHTEEN Reframing Change in Organizations: Training, Realigning, Negotiating, and Grieving 373
NINETEEN Reframing Ethics and Spirit 397
TWENTY Bringing It All Together: Change and Leadership in Action 411
TWENTY-ONE Epilogue: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership 435
Appendix: The Best of Organizational Studies: Scholars’ Hits
and Popular Best-Sellers 439
References 445
The Authors 481
Name Index 483
Subject Index 494
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vii
P R E F A C E
This is the fi fth release of a work that began in 1984 as Modern Approaches to Understanding and Managing Organizations. We ’ re grateful to readers around the world who have told us the
book gave them ideas that make a difference — at work and else-
where in their lives.
It is time for an update, and we ’ re gratifi ed to be back by popular demand. Like
everything else, organizations and their leadership challenges have been chang-
ing rapidly in recent years, and scholars have been running hard to keep up. This
edition tries to capture the current frontiers of both knowledge and art.
The four - frame model, with its view of organizations as factories, families,
jungles, and temples, remains the book ’ s conceptual heart. But much else has
changed. We have updated our case examples extensively to keep up with the lat-
est developments in managerial practice. We have updated a feature we inaugu-
rated in the third edition, “ greatest hits in organization studies. ” These features
offer pithy summaries of key ideas from the some of the most infl uential works
in the scholarly literature (as indicated by a citation analysis, described in the
Appendix at the end of the book). As a counterpoint to the scholarly works, we
have also added occasional summaries of recent management best - sellers.
Life in organizations has also produced many new examples, and there is new
material throughout the book. At the same time, we worked zealously to mini-
mize bloat by tracking down and expunging every redundant sentence, mar-
ginal concept, or extraneous example. We are proud that, despite new material in
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viii
every chapter, this edition is actually a bit shorter than the last one. At the same
time, we ’ ve tried to keep it fun. Collective life is an endless source of examples
as entertaining as they are instructive, and we ’ ve sprinkled them throughout the
text. We apologize to anyone who fi nds that an old favorite fell to the cutting -
room fl oor, but we think most readers will fi nd the book an even clearer and
more effi cient read.
As always, our primary audience is managers and future leaders. We have
tried to answer the question, What do we know about organizations and lead-
ership that is genuinely relevant and useful to practitioners? We have worked
to present a large, complex body of theory, research, and practice as clearly and
simply as possible. We tried to avoid watering it down or presenting simplistic
views of how to solve managerial problems. Our goal is to offer not solutions but
powerful and provocative ways of thinking about opportunities and pitfalls.
We continue to focus on both management and leadership. Leading and man-
aging are different, but they ’ re equally important. If an organization is overman-
aged but underled, it eventually loses any sense of spirit or purpose. A poorly
managed organization with a strong, charismatic leader may soar briefl y — only
to crash shortly thereafter. Malpractice can be as damaging and unethical for
managers and leaders as for physicians. Myopic managers or overzealous lead-
ers usually harm more than just themselves. The challenges of modern organiza-
tions require the objective perspective of managers as well as the brilliant fl ashes
of vision that wise leadership provides. We need more people in managerial roles
who can fi nd simplicity and order amid organizational confusion and chaos.
We need versatile and fl exible leaders who are artists as well as analysts, who can
reframe experience to discover new issues and possibilities. We need managers
who love their work, their organizations, and the people whose lives they affect.
We need leaders and managers who appreciate management as a moral and ethi-
cal undertaking. We need leaders who combine hard - headed realism with pas-
sionate commitment to larger values and purposes. We hope to encourage and
nurture such qualities and possibilities.
As in the past, we have tried to produce a clear and readable synthesis and
integration of the fi eld ’ s major theoretical traditions. We concentrate mainly on
organization theory ’ s implications for practice. We draw on examples from every
sector and around the globe. Historically, organization studies have been divided
into several intellectual camps, often isolated from one another. Works that seek
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ix
to give a comprehensive overview of organization theory and research often
drown in social science jargon and abstraction and have little to say to practitio-
ners. We try to fi nd a balance between misleading oversimplifi cation and mind -
boggling complexity.
The bulk of work in organization theory has focused almost exclusively on
either the private or the public sector, but not both. We think this is a mistake.
Managers need to understand similarities and differences among all types of
organizations. The public and private sectors increasingly interpenetrate one
another. Public administrators who regulate airlines, nuclear power plants, or
pharmaceutical companies face the problem of “ indirect management ” every day.
They struggle to infl uence the behavior of organizations over which they have
very limited authority. Private fi rms need to manage relationships with multiple
levels of government. The situation is even more complicated for managers in
multinational companies coping with the subtleties of governments with very
different systems and traditions. Across sectors and cultures, managers often har-
bor narrow, stereotypic conceptions of one another that impede effectiveness on
both sides. We need common ground and a shared understanding that can help
strengthen public and private organizations in the United States and throughout
the world. The dialogue between public and private, domestic and multinational
organizations has become increasingly important. Because of their generic appli-
cation, the frames offer an ecumenical language for the exchange. Our work with
a variety of organizations around the world has continually reinforced our con-
fi dence that the frames are relevant everywhere. Political issues, for example, are
universally important, even though the specifi cs vary greatly from one country
or culture to another.
The idea of reframing continues to be a central theme. Throughout the book,
we show how the same situation can be viewed in at least four ways. In Part Six ,
we include a series of chapters on reframing critical organizational issues such as
leadership, change, and ethics. Two chapters are specifi cally devoted to reframing
real - life situations.
We also continue to emphasize artistry. Overemphasizing the rational and
technical side of an organization often contributes to its decline or demise. Our
counterbalance emphasizes the importance of art in both management and
leadership. Artistry is neither exact nor precise; the artist interprets experience,
expressing it in forms that can be felt, understood, and appreciated. Art fosters
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x
emotion, subtlety, and ambiguity. An artist represents the world to give us a
deeper understanding of what is and what might be. In modern organizations,
quality, commitment, and creativity are highly valued but often hard to fi nd.
They can be developed and encouraged by leaders or managers who embrace the
expressive side of their work.
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK The fi rst part of the book, “ Making Sense of Organizations, ” tackles a perplex-
ing question about management: Why is it that smart people so often do dumb
things? Chapter One , “ The Power of Reframing, ” explains why: Managers
often misread situations. They have not learned how to use multiple lenses to
get a better sense of what they ’ re up against and what they might do. Chapter
Two , “ Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations, ” uses several famous cases (9/11,
Hurricane Katrina, and a friendly - fi re tragedy in the skies over Iraq in 1994) to
show how managers ’ everyday thinking and theories can lead to catastrophe. We
explain basic factors that make organizational life complicated, ambiguous, and
unpredictable; discuss common fallacies in managerial thinking; and spell out
criteria for more effective approaches to diagnosis and action.
Part Two , “ The Structural Frame, ” explores the key role that social architecture
plays in the functioning of organizations. Chapter Three , “ Getting Organized, ”
describes basic issues managers must consider in designing structure to fi t an
organization ’ s goals, tasks, and context. It demonstrates why organizations —
from Harvard University to McDonald ’ s — need different structures in order
to be effective in their unique environments. Chapter Four , “ Structure and
Restructuring, ” explains major structural pathologies and pitfalls. It presents
guidelines for aligning structures to situations, along with several cases illustrat-
ing successful structural change. Chapter Five , “ Organizing Groups and Teams, ”
shows that structure is a key to high - performing teams.
Part Three , “ The Human Resource Frame, ” explores the properties of both
people and organizations, and what happens when the two intersect. Chapter
Six , “ People and Organizations, ” focuses on the relationship between organiza-
tions and human nature. It shows how a manager ’ s practices and assumptions
about people can lead either to alienation and hostility or to commitment and
high motivation. It contrasts two strategies for achieving effectiveness: “ lean
and mean, ” or investing in people. Chapter Seven , “ Improving Human Resource
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xi
Management, ” is an overview of practices that build a more motivated and
committed workforce — including participative management, job enrichment,
self - managing workgroups, management of diversity, and organization develop-
ment. Chapter Eight , “ Interpersonal and Group Dynamics, ” presents an example
of interpersonal confl ict to illustrate how managers can enhance or undermine
relationships. It also discusses how group members can increase their effective-
ness by attending to group process, including informal norms and roles, inter-
personal confl ict, leadership, and decision making.
Part Four , “ The Political Frame, ” views organizations as arenas. Individuals
and groups compete to achieve their parochial interests in a world of confl ict-
ing viewpoints, scarce resources, and struggles for power. Chapter Nine , “ Power,
Confl ict, and Coalition, ” analyzes the tragic loss of the space shuttles Columbia
and Challenger, illustrating the infl uence of political dynamics in decision mak-
ing. It shows how scarcity and diversity lead to confl ict, bargaining, and games
of power; the chapter also distinguishes constructive and destructive political
dynamics. Chapter Ten , “ The Manager as Politician, ” illustrates basic skills of
the constructive politician: diagnosing political realities, setting agendas, build-
ing networks, negotiating, and making choices that are both effective and ethi-
cal. Chapter Eleven , “ Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents, ”
highlights organizations as both arenas for political contests and political actors
infl uencing broader social, political, and economic trends. Case examples such as
Wal - Mart and Ross Johnson explore political dynamics both inside and outside
organizations.
Part Five explores the symbolic frame. Chapter Twelve , “ Organizational
Symbols and Culture, ” spells out basic symbolic elements in organizations:
myths, heroes, metaphors, stories, humor, play, rituals, and ceremonies. It
defi nes organizational culture and shows its central role in shaping performance.
The power of symbol and culture is illustrated in cases as diverse as Harley -
Davidson, the U.S. Congress, Nordstrom department stores, the Air Force, and
an odd horse race in Italy. Chapter Thirteen , “ Culture in Action, ” uses the case of
a computer development team to show what leaders and group members can do
collectively to build a culture that bonds people in pursuit of a shared mission.
Initiation rituals, specialized language, group stories, humor and play, and cer-
emonies all combine to transform diverse individuals into a cohesive team with
purpose, spirit, and soul. Chapter Fourteen , “ Organization as Theater, ” draws on
dramaturgical and institutional theory to reveal how organizational structures,
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xii
activities, and events serve as secular dramas, expressing our fears and joys,
arousing our emotions, and kindling our spirit. It also shows how organizational
structures and processes, such as planning, evaluation, and decision making, are
often more important for what they express than for what they accomplish.
Part Six , “ Improving Leadership Practice, ” focuses on the implications of the
frames for central issues in managerial practice, including leadership, change,
and ethics. Chapter Fifteen , “ Integrating Frames for Effective Practice, ” shows
how managers can blend the frames to improve their effectiveness. It looks at
organizations as multiple realities and gives guidelines for aligning frames with
situations. Chapter Sixteen , “ Reframing in Action, ” presents four scenarios,
or scripts, derived from the frames. It applies the scenarios to the harrowing
experience of a young manager whose fi rst day in a new job turns out to be far
more challenging than she expected. The discussion illustrates how leaders can
expand their options and enhance their effectiveness by considering alternative
approaches. Chapter Seventeen , “ Reframing Leadership, ” discusses limitations in
traditional views of leadership and proposes a more comprehensive view of how
leadership works in organizations. It summarizes and critiques current knowl-
edge on the characteristics of leaders, including the relationship of leadership
and gender. It shows how frames generate distinctive images of effective leaders
as architects, servants, advocates, and prophets.
Chapter Eighteen , “ Reframing Change in Organizations, ” describes four fun-
damental issues that arise in any change effort: individual needs, structural
alignment, political confl ict, and existential loss. It uses cases of successful and
unsuccessful change to document key strategies, such as training, realigning, creat-
ing arenas, and using symbol and ceremony. Chapter Nineteen , “ Reframing Ethics
and Spirit, ” discusses four ethical mandates that emerge from the frames: excel-
lence, caring, justice, and faith. It argues that leaders can build more ethical organi-
zations through gifts of authorship, love, power, and signifi cance. Chapter Twenty ,
“ Bringing It All Together, ” is an integrative treatment of the reframing process. It
takes a troubled school administrator through a weekend of refl ection on critical
diffi culties he faces. The chapter shows how reframing can help managers move
from feeling confused and stuck to discovering a renewed sense of clarity and con-
fi dence. The Epilogue (Chapter Twenty - One ) describes strategies and characteris-
tics needed in future leaders. It explains why they will need an artistic combination
of conceptual fl exibility and commitment to core values. Efforts to prepare future
leaders have to focus as much on spiritual as on intellectual development.
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xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS As we noted in our fi rst edition, “Book writing often feels like a lonely process,
even when an odd couple is doing the writing.” This odd couple keeps getting
older (both closing in on seventy)—and, some would say, even odder and more
grumpy. Yet the process seems less lonely because of our close friendship and our
contact with many other colleagues and friends. The best thing about teaching is
that you learn so much from your students. Students at Harvard, Vanderbilt, the
University of Missouri–Kansas City, and the University of Southern California
have given us invaluable criticism, challenge, and support over the years. We’re
grateful to the many readers who have responded to our invitation to write and
ask questions or share comments. Their input has made the book better in many
ways. (The invitation is still open—our contact information is in “The Authors”
section.) We wish we could personally thank all of the leaders and managers from
whose experience we have profi ted in seminars, workshops, and consultations.
Their knowledge and wisdom are the foundation and touchstone for our work.
As in the past, we owe much to our colleagues. Thanks again to all who helped
us in the prior editions; your contribution still lingers in this work. But we par-
ticularly want to mention those who have made more recent contributions.
We have learned much from collaboration with a number of teaching fellows
and graduate assistants at the University of Missouri–Kansas City; in particular,
we are very grateful for the help of Mary Yung, Hooilin Chan, Vera Stoykova,
and Zhou Yongjie. They all did an outstanding job helping us develop the cita-
tion analysis that appears in the Appendix, and Vera did excellent work on devel-
oping a test bank.
We wish we could thank all the colleagues and readers in the United States
and around the world who have offered valuable comments and suggestions, but
the list is long and our memories keep getting shorter. Elena Granell de Aldaz of
the Institute for Advanced Study of Management in Caracas collaborated with
us on developing a Spanish-language adaptation of Reframing Organizations as
well as on a more recent project that studied frame orientations among manag-
ers in Venezuela. We are proud to consider her a valued colleague and wonderful
friend. Bob Marx, of the University of Massachusetts, deserves special mention as
a charter member of the frames family. Bob’s interest in the frames, creativity in
developing teaching designs, and eye for video material have aided our thinking
and teaching immensely. Cdr. Gary Deal, USN; Maj. Kevin Reed, USAF; Dr. Peter
Minich, a transplant surgeon; and Jan and Ron Haynes of FzioMed all provided
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xiv
valuable case material. The late Peter Frost of the University of British Columbia
continues to inspire our work. Peter Vaill of the Antioch Graduate School has
been a continuing source of ideas, support, and inspiration. Kent Peterson,
University of Wisconsin at Madison, and Sharon Conley, University of California
at Santa Barbara, are continuing sources of ideas and support. A number of indi-
viduals, including many friends and colleagues at the Organizational Behavior
Teaching Conference, have given us helpful ideas and suggestions. We apolo-
gize for any omissions, but we want to thank Anke Arnaud, Carole K. Barnett,
Max Elden, Kent Fairfi eld, Olivier Hermanus, Jim Hodge, Earlene Holland, Scott
Johnson, Mark Kriger, Larry Levine, Hyoungbae Lee, Mark Maier, Magid Mazen,
Thomas P. Nydegger, Dave O’Connell, Lynda St. Clair, Susan Twombly, and Pat
Villeneuve. We only wish we had succeeded in implementing all the wonderful
ideas we received from these and other colleagues.
Bill Eddy, dean emeritus of the Bloch School at the University of Missouri–
Kansas City, gets special thanks for nurturing an environment that helps scholar-
ship fl ourish. His successors on the leadership team at the Bloch School, including
Al Page, Homer Erekson, Karyl Leggio and Lanny Solomon, have kept that tra-
dition alive. Other current or former Bloch School colleagues who have helped
more than they know are Dave Bodde, Nancy Day, Dick Heimovics, Bob Herman,
Doranne Hudson, Deborah Noble, Stephen Pruitt, David Renz, Beth Smith, and
Marilyn Taylor. Lee’s colleagues in the Department of Organization, Leadership,
and Marketing at the Bloch School have done their part, and he is grateful to Raj
Arora, Gene Brown, Rita Cain, Pam Dobies, Mark Parry, Michael Song, and Rob
Waris. Colleagues Carl Cohn, Stu Gothald, and Gib Hentschke of the University
of Southern California offer both intellectual stimulation and moral support.
Others to whom our debt is particularly clear are Chris Argyris, Sam
Bacharach, Cliff Baden, Estella Bensimon, Margaret Benefi el, Bob Birnbaum,
Barbara Bunker, Tom Burks, Ellen Castro, Norma Saba Corey, Carlos Cortés,
Linton Deck, Jim Honan, Tom Johnson (always a source of creative ideas), Bob
Kegan, Grady McGonagill, Judy McLaughlin, John Meyer, Harrison Owen,
Michael Sales, Dick Scott, Joan Vydra, Roy Williams, and Karl Weick. Thanks
again to Dave Brown, Phil Mirvis, Barry Oshry, Tim Hall, Bill Kahn, and Todd
Jick of the Brookline Circle, now in its third decade of searching for joy and
meaning in lives devoted to the study of organizations.
Outside the United States, we are grateful to Poul Erik Mouritzen in
Denmark; Rolf Kaelin, Cüno Pumpin, and Peter Weisman in Switzerland;
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xv
Ilpo Linko in Finland; Tom Case in Brazil; Einar Plyhn and Haakon Gran in
Norway; Peter Normark and Dag Bjorkegren in Sweden; Ching-Shiun Chung
in Taiwan; Anastasia Vitkovskaya in Russia; and H.R.H. Prince Philipp von und
zu Lichtenstein.
Closer to home, Lee is very grateful to physical therapist Scott Knoche, whose
intervention in a debilitating case of cervical radiculopathy produced near-
miraculous results. Lee also owes more than he can say to Bruce Kay, whose
genial and unfl appable approach to work, coupled with high levels of organi-
zation and follow-through, have all had a wonderfully positive impact since he
took on the challenge of bringing a modicum of order and sanity to Lee’s pro-
fessional functioning. We also continue to be grateful for the long-term support
and friendship of Linda Corey, who still serves as our resident representative at
Harvard, and Homa Aminmadani, who now lives part-time in Teheran.
Couples of the Edna Ranch Vintners Guild—the Schnackenbergs, Pescatores,
Hayneses, and Beadles—link efforts with Terry in exploring the ups, downs, and
mysteries of the art and science of wine making. Three professional wine makers,
Bob Schiebelhut of Tolosa, Romeo “Meo” Zuech of Piedra Creek Winery, and
Brett Escalera of Consilience and TresAnelli, offer advice that applies to leader-
ship as well as wine making. Meo reminds us, “Never overmanage your grapes,”
and Brett prefaces answers to all questions with “It all depends.”
We’re delighted to be well into the third decade of our partnership with
Jossey-Bass. We’re grateful to the many friends who have helped us over the
years, including Bill Henry, Steve Piersanti, Lynn Lychow, Bill Hicks, Debra
Hunter, Cedric Crocker, Byron Schneider, and many others. In recent years,
Kathe Sweeney has been a wonderful editor and even better friend, and we’re
delighted to be working with her again. Rob Brandt has done superb work keep-
ing us organized enough for the editorial process to move forward. Beverly
Peavler’s keen eye, editorial judgment, and willingness to crack the whip gently
have made for a much stronger manuscript.
We received many valuable suggestions from a diverse, knowledgeable, and
talented team of outside reviewers: Hannah Carter (University of Florida),
Matthew Eriksen (University of Tampa), James “Jae” Espey (Clemson), Chris Foley
(University of Pennsylvania), Frank Hamilton (Eckerd College), Robert “Bob” Innes
(Vanderbilt), and Kristi Loescher (University of Texas, Austin). We did not succeed
in implementing all of their many excellent ideas, and they did not always agree
among themselves, but the manuscript benefi ted in many ways from their input.
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xvi
Lee’s six children—Edward, Shelley, Lori, Scott, Christopher, and Bradley—all
continue to enrich his life and contribute to his growth. He still wishes he could
give them as much as they have given him. Brad has become a creative source
of new ways to think about reframing, and Chris served as our consultant on
contemporary music. Janie Deal Rice has delighted her father in becoming a fas-
cinating and independent entrepreneur, running (with husband Jake, also mayor
of Hagerman, Idaho) a catering business and bed and breakfast, Ein Tisch Inn.
Janie has a rare talent of almost magically transforming simple ingredients into
fi ne cuisine. Special mention also goes to Terry’s parents, Bob and Dorothy Deal.
His father is deceased and his mother is now in her nineties, but both lived long
enough to be pleasantly surprised that their oft-wayward son could write a book.
We dedicate the book to our wives, who have more than earned all the credit
and appreciation that we can give them. Joan Gallos, Lee’s spouse and closest
colleague, combines intellectual challenge and critique with support and love.
She has been an active collaborator in developing our ideas, and her teaching
manual for previous editions was a frame-breaking model for the genre. Her
contributions have become so integrated into our own thinking that we are no
longer able to thank her for all the ways that the book has gained from her wis-
dom and insights.
Sandy Deal’s psychological training enables her to approach the fi eld of orga-
nizations with a distinctive and illuminating slant. Her successful practice pro-
duces examples that have helped us make some even stronger connections to the
concepts of clinical psychology. She is one of the most gifted diagnosticians in
the fi eld, as well as a delightful partner whose love and support over the long run
have made all the difference. She is a rare combination of courage and caring,
intimacy and independence, responsibility and playfulness.
To Joan and Sandy, thanks again. As the years accumulate, we love you even
more.
June 2008 Lee G. Bolman
Kansas City, Missouri
Terrence E. Deal
San Luis Obispo, California
Preface
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PA RT O N E
Making Sense of Organizations
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3
Introduction The Power of Reframing
Bob Nardelli expected to win the three - way competition to succeed management legend Jack Welch as CEO of General Electric. He was stunned when Welch told him late in 2000 that he ’ d
never run GE. The next day, though, he found out that he ’ d won the
consolation prize. A director of Home Depot called to tell him, “ You
probably could not feel worse right now, but you ’ ve just been hit in
the ass with a golden horseshoe ” (Sellers, 2002, p. 1).
Within a week, Nardelli hired on as Home Depot ’ s new CEO. He was a big
change from the free - spirited founders, who had built the wildly successful
retailer on the foundation of an uninhibited, entrepreneurial “ orange ” culture.
Managers ran their stores using “ tribal knowledge, ” and customers counted
on friendly, knowledgeable staff for helpful advice. Nardelli revamped Home
Depot with a heavy dose of command - and - control management, discipline,
and metrics. Almost all the top executives and many of the frontline managers
were replaced, often by ex - military hires. At fi rst, it seemed to work — profi ts
improved, and management experts hailed the “ remarkable set of tools ” Nardelli
used to produce “ deep, lasting culture change ” (Charan, 2006, p. 1). But the last-
ing change included a steady decline in employee morale and customer service.
Where the founders had successfully promoted “ make love to the customers, ”
Nardelli ’ s toe - the - line stance pummeled Home Depot to last place in its industry
for customer satisfaction.
O N E
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations4
A growing chorus of critics harped about everything from the declining
stock price to Nardelli ’ s extraordinary $245 million in compensation. At Home
Depot ’ s 2006 shareholders ’ meeting, Nardelli hoped to keep naysayers at bay by
giving them little time to say anything and refusing to respond to anything they
did say: “ It was, as even Home Depot executives will concede, a 37 - minute fi asco.
In a basement hotel ballroom in Delaware, with the board nowhere in sight and
huge time displays on stage to cut off angry investors, Home Depot held a hasty
annual meeting last year that attendees alternately described as ‘ appalling ’ and
‘ arrogant ’ ” (Barbaro, 2007, p. C1). The outcry from shareholders and the busi-
ness press was scathing. Nardelli countered with metrics to show that all was well.
He seemed unaware or unconcerned that he had embarrassed his board, enraged
his shareholders, turned off his customers, and reinforced his reputation for arro-
gance and a tin ear. Nardelli abruptly left Home Depot at the beginning of 2007
(Grow, 2007).
Nardelli ’ s old boss, Jack Welch, called him the best operations manager he ’ d
ever seen. Yet, as talented and successful as he was, Nardelli fl amed out at Home
Depot because he was only seeing part of the picture. He was a victim of one
of the most common affl ictions of leaders: seeing an incomplete or distorted
picture as a result of overlooking or misinterpreting important signals. An exten-
sive literature on business blunders attests to the pervasiveness of this lost - at - sea
state (see, for example, Adler and Houghton, 1997; Feinberg and Tarrant, 1995;
Ricks, 1999; Sobel, 1999).
Enron ’ s demise provides another example of fl oundering in a fog. In its hey-
day, Enron proclaimed itself the “ World ’ s Leading Company ” — with some justi-
fi cation. Enron had been a perennial honoree on Fortune ’ s list of “ America ’ s Most
Admired Companies ” and was ranked as the “ most innovative ” six years in a row
(McLean, 2001, p. 60). Small wonder that CEO Kenneth W. Lay was among the
nation ’ s most admired and powerful business leaders. Lay and Enron were on a
roll. What could be wrong with such a big, profi table, innovative, fast - growing
company?
The trouble was that the books had been cooked, and the outside auditors
were asleep at the switch. In December 2001, Enron collapsed in history ’ s then -
largest corporate bankruptcy. In the space of a year, its stock plunged from
eighty dollars to eighty cents a share. Tens of billions of dollars in shareholder
wealth evaporated. More than four thousand people lost their jobs and, in many
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Introduction 5
cases, their savings and retirement funds. 1 The auditors also paid a steep price.
Andersen Worldwide, a hundred - year - old fi rm with a once - sterling reputation,
folded along with Enron.
What went wrong? After the cave - in, critics offered a profusion of plausible
explanations. Yet Enron ’ s leaders seemed shocked and baffl ed by the abrupt
free fall. Former CEO Jeffrey K. Skilling, regarded as the primary architect of
Enron ’ s high - fl ying culture, was described by associates as “ the ultimate con-
trol freak. The sort of hands - on corporate leader who kept his fi ngers on all the
pieces of the puzzle ” (Schwartz, 2002, p. C 1). Skilling resigned for unexplained
“ personal reasons ” only three months before Enron imploded. Many wondered
if he had jumped ship because he foresaw the iceberg looming dead ahead. But
after Enron ’ s crash, he claimed, “ I had no idea the company was in anything
but excellent shape ” (p. C 1). Ultimately, in October 2006, both he and Lay
were convicted of multiple counts of fraud for their role in Enron ’ s disintegra-
tion. During their trials both steadfastly contended that they had done nothing
wrong. Enron, they insisted, had been a sound and successful company brought
down by forces they either weren ’ t aware of or couldn ’ t control. Despite public
opinion to the contrary, both seemed to genuinely believe that they were victims
rather than villains.
Skilling and Lay were both viewed as brilliant men, yet both sought refuge in
cluelessness. It is easy to argue they claimed ignorance only because they had no
better defense. Even so, they were out of touch at a deeper level. Lay and Skilling
were passionate about building Enron into the “ World ’ s Leading Company. ”
They staunchly believed that they had created a mold - breaking company with
a revolutionary business model. They knew risks were involved, but you have
to bend or break old rules when you ’ re exploring uncharted territory. Investors
bought the stock, and business professors wrote articles about the management
lessons behind Enron ’ s success. The snare was that Lay and Skilling had misread
their world and had no clue that they were destroying the company they loved.
The curse of cluelessness is not limited to corporations — government pro-
vides its share of examples. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated New
Orleans. Levees failed, and much of the city was underwater. Tens of thousands
of people, many poor and black, found themselves stranded for days in desperate
circumstances. Government agencies bumbled aimlessly, and help was slow to
arrive. As Americans watched television footage of the chaos, they were stunned
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Reframing Organizations6
to hear the nation ’ s top disaster offi cial, the secretary of Homeland Security, tell
reporters that he “ had no reports ” of things viewers had seen with their own
eyes. It seemed he might have been better informed if he had relied on CNN
rather than his own agency.
Homeland Security, Enron, and Home Depot represent only a few examples
of an endemic challenge: how to know if you ’ re getting the right picture or
tuning in to the wrong channel. Managers often fail this test. Cluelessness is a
fact of life, even for very smart people. Sometimes, the information they need
is fuzzy or hard to get. Other times, they ignore or misinterpret information at
hand. Decision makers too often lock themselves into fl awed ways of making
sense of their circumstances. For Lay and Skilling, it was a mistaken view that
“ we ’ re different from everyone else — we ’ re smarter. ” For Nardelli, it was his con-
viction that his metrics gave him the full picture.
In the discussion that follows, we explore the origins and symptoms of clue-
lessness. We introduce reframing — the conceptual core of the book and our basic
prescription for sizing things up. Reframing requires an ability to think about
situations in more than one way. We then introduce four distinct frames —
structural, human resource, political, and symbolic — each logical and powerful
in its own right. Together, they help us decipher the full array of signifi cant clues,
capturing a more comprehensive picture of what ’ s going on and what to do.
VIRTUES AND DRAWBACKS OF ORGANIZED ACTIVITY Before the emergence of the railroad and the telegraph in the mid - nineteenth
century, individuals managed their own affairs — America had no multiunit
businesses and no need for professional managers (Chandler, 1977). Explosive
technological and social changes have produced a world that is far more inter-
connected, frantic, and complicated than it was in those days. Humans struggle
to catch up, at continual risk of drowning in complexity that puts us “ in over our
heads ” (Kegan, 1998). Forms of management and organization effective a few
years ago are now obsolete. S é rieyx (1993) calls it the organizational big bang:
“ The information revolution, the globalization of economies, the proliferation
of events that undermine all our certainties, the collapse of the grand ideologies,
the arrival of the CNN society which transforms us into an immense, planetary
village — all these shocks have overturned the rules of the game and suddenly
turned yesterday ’ s organizations into antiques ” (pp. 14 – 15).
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Introduction 7
The proliferation of complex organizations has made most human activities
collective endeavors. We grow up in families and then start our own families.
We work for business or government. We learn in schools and universities. We
worship in synagogues, churches, and mosques. We play sports in teams, fran-
chises, and leagues. We join clubs and associations. Many of us will grow old and
die in hospitals or nursing homes. We build these human enterprises because of
what they can do for us. They offer goods, entertainment, social services, health
care, and almost everything else that we use, consume, or enjoy.
All too often, however, we experience a darker side. Organizations can
frustrate and exploit people. Too often, products are fl awed, families are dysfunc-
tional, students fail to learn, patients get worse, and policies backfi re. Work often
has so little meaning that jobs offer nothing beyond a paycheck. If we can believe
mission statements and public pronouncements, every company these days aims
to nurture its employees and delight its customers. But many miss the mark.
Schools are blamed for social ills, universities are said to close more minds than
they open, and government is criticized for red tape and rigidity. The private
sector has its own problems. Automakers drag their feet about recalling faulty
cars. Producers of food and pharmaceuticals make people sick with tainted
products. Software companies deliver bugs and “ vaporware. ” Industrial accidents
dump chemicals, oil, toxic gas, and radioactive materials into the air and water.
Too often, corporate greed and insensitivity create havoc for individual lives and
communities. The bottom line: we seem hard - pressed to manage organizations
so that their virtues exceed their vices. The big question: Why?
The Curse of Cluelessness Year after year, the best and brightest managers maneuver or meander their way
to the apex of enterprises great and small. Then they do really dumb things.
How do bright people turn out so dim? One theory is that they ’ re too smart for
their own good. Feinberg and Tarrant (1995) label it the “ self - destructive intelli-
gence syndrome. ” They argue that smart people act stupid because of personality
fl aws — things like pride, arrogance, and unconscious desires to fail. It ’ s true that
psychological fl aws have been apparent in such brilliant, self - destructive individ-
uals as Adolph Hitler, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton. But on the whole, intel-
lectually challenged people have as many psychological problems as the best and
brightest. The primary source of cluelessness is not personality or IQ. We ’ re at sea
whenever our sense - making efforts fail us. If our image of a situation is wrong,
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Reframing Organizations8
our actions will be wide of the mark as well. But if we don ’ t realize our image is
incorrect, we won ’ t understand why we don ’ t get what we hoped for. So, like Bob
Nardelli, we insist we ’ re right even when we ’ re off track.
Vaughan (1995), in trying to unravel the causes of the 1986 disaster that destroyed
the Challenger space shuttle and killed its crew, underscored how hard it is for peo-
ple to surrender their entrenched mental models: “ They puzzle over contradictory
evidence, but usually succeed in pushing it aside — until they come across a piece
of evidence too fascinating to ignore, too clear to misperceive, too painful to deny,
which makes vivid still other signals they do not want to see, forcing them to alter
and surrender the world - view they have so meticulously constructed ” (p. 235).
All of us sometimes construct our own psychic prisons, and then lock our-
selves in. When we don ’ t know what to do, we do more of what we know. This
helps explain a number of unsettling reports from the managerial front lines:
Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan (1994) estimate that the skills of one - half to
three - quarters of American managers are inadequate for the demands of their
jobs. But most probably don ’ t realize it: Kruger and Dunning (1999) found
that the more incompetent people are, the more they overestimate their per-
formance, partly because they don ’ t know what good performance looks like.
About half of the high - profi le senior executives companies hire fail within
two years, according to a 2006 study (Burns and Kiley, 2007).
In 2003, the United States was again the world ’ s strongest economy, yet cor-
porate America set a new record for failure with two of history ’ s top three
bankruptcies — WorldCom at $104 billion and Conseco at $61 billion. Charan
and Useem (2002) trace such failures to a single source: “ managerial error ” (p. 52).
Small wonder that so many organizational veterans nod assent to Scott
Adams ’ s admittedly unscientifi c “ Dilbert principle ” : “ the most ineffective work-
ers are systematically moved to the place where they can do the least damage —
management ” (1996, p. 14).
Strategies for Improving Organizations: The Track Record We have certainly made an effort to improve organizations. Legions of managers
report to work each day with that hope in mind. Authors and consultants spin
out a fl ood of new answers and promising solutions. Policymakers develop laws
and regulations to guide organizations on the right path.
•
•
•
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Introduction 9
The most common improvement strategy is upgrading management. Modern
mythology promises that organizations will work splendidly if well managed.
Managers are supposed to have the big picture and look out for their organiza-
tion ’ s overall health and productivity. Unfortunately, they have not always been
equal to the task, even when armed with computers, information systems, fl ow-
charts, quality programs, and a panoply of other tools and techniques. They go
forth with this rational arsenal to try to tame our wild and primitive workplaces.
Yet in the end, irrational forces too often prevail.
When managers cannot solve problems, they hire consultants. Today, the
number and variety of advice givers is overwhelming. Most have a specialty:
strategy, technology, quality, fi nance, marketing, mergers, human resource man-
agement, executive search, outplacement, coaching, organization development,
and many more. For every managerial challenge, there is a consultant willing to
offer assistance — at a price.
For all their sage advice and remarkable fees, consultants have yet to make
a signifi cant dent in problems plaguing organizations — businesses, public agen-
cies, military services, hospitals, and schools. Sometimes the consultants are
more hindrance than help, though they often lament clients ’ failure to imple-
ment their profound insights. McKinsey & Co., “ the high priest of high - level
consulting ” (Byrne, 2002a, p. 66), worked so closely with Enron that managing
partner Rajat Gupta sent his chief lawyer to Houston after Enron ’ s collapse to see
if his fi rm might be in legal trouble. The lawyer reported that McKinsey was safe,
and a relieved Gupta insisted bravely, “ We stand by all the work we did. Beyond
that, we can only empathize with the trouble they are going through. It ’ s a sad
thing to see ” (p. 68).
When managers and consultants fail, government frequently responds with
legislation, policies, and regulations. Constituents badger elected offi cials to
“ do something ” about a variety of ills: pollution, dangerous products, hazard-
ous working conditions, and chaotic schools, to name a few. Governing bod-
ies respond by making “ policy. ” A sizable body of research records a continuing
saga of perverse ways in which the implementation process distorts policymak-
ers ’ intentions (Bardach, 1977; Elmore, 1978; Freudenberg and Gramling, 1994;
Peters, 1999; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Policymakers, for example, have
been trying for decades to reform U.S. public schools. Billions of taxpayer dol-
lars have been spent. The result? About the same as America ’ s switch to the
metric system. In the 1950s Congress passed legislation mandating adoption
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Reframing Organizations10
of the metric standards and measures. To date, progress has been minimal (see
Chapter Eighteen ). If you know what a hectare is, or can visualize the size of
a three - hundred - gram package of crackers, you ’ re ahead of most Americans.
Legislators did not factor into their solution what it would take to get their deci-
sion implemented.
In short, diffi culties surrounding improvement strategies are well docu-
mented. Exemplary intentions produce more costs than benefi ts. Problems
outlast solutions. It is as if tens of thousands of hard - working, highly moti-
vated pioneers keep hacking at a swamp that persistently produces new growth
faster than the old can be cleared. To be sure, there are reasons for optimism.
Organizations have changed about as much in the past few decades as in the
preceding century. To survive, they had to. Revolutionary changes in tech-
nology, the rise of the global economy, and shortened product life cycles have
spawned a fl urry of activity to design faster, more fl exible organizational forms.
New organizational models fl ourish in companies such as Pret à Manger (the
socially conscious U.K. sandwich shops), Google (a hot American company), and
Novo - Nordisk (a Danish pharmaceutical company that includes environmen-
tal and social metrics in its bottom line). The dispersed collection of enthusiasts
and volunteers who provide content for Wikipedia and the far - fl ung network of
software engineers who have developed the Linux operating system provide dra-
matic examples of possibilities in the digital world. But despite such successes,
failures are still too common. The nagging key question: How can leaders and
managers improve the odds for themselves as well for their organizations?
FRAMING Goran Carstedt, the talented executive who led the turnaround of Volvo ’ s French
division in the 1980s, got to the heart of a challenge managers face every day:
“ The world simply can ’ t be made sense of, facts can ’ t be organized, unless you
have a mental model to begin with. That theory does not have to be the right
one, because you can alter it along the way as information comes in. But you
can ’ t begin to learn without some concept that gives you expectations or
hypotheses ” (Hampden - Turner, 1992, p. 167). Such mental models have many
labels — maps, mind - sets, schema, and cognitive lenses, to name a few. 2 Following
the work of Goffman, Dewey, and others, we have chosen the label frames. In
describing frames, we deliberately mix metaphors, referring to them as windows,
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Introduction 11
maps, tools, lenses, orientations, fi lters, prisms, and perspectives, because all
these images capture part of the idea we want to convey.
A frame is a mental model — a set of ideas and assumptions — that you carry in
your head to help you understand and negotiate a particular “ territory. ” A good
frame makes it easier to know what you are up against and, ultimately, what you
can do about it. Frames are vital because organizations don ’ t come with comput-
erized navigation systems to guide you turn - by - turn to your destination. Instead,
managers need to develop and carry accurate maps in their heads.
Such maps make it possible to register and assemble key bits of perceptual
data into a coherent pattern — a picture of what ’ s happening. When it works fl u-
idly, the process takes the form of “ rapid cognition, ” the process that Gladwell
(2005) examines in his best - seller Blink. He describes it as a gift that makes it
possible to read “ deeply into the narrowest slivers of experience. In basketball,
the player who can take in and comprehend all that is happening around him or
her is said to have ‘ court sense ’ ” (p. 44).
Dane and Pratt (2007) describe four key characteristics of this intuitive
“ blink ” process:
It is nonconscious — you can do it without thinking about it and without
knowing how you did it.
It is very fast — the process often occurs almost instantly.
It is holistic — you see a coherent, meaningful pattern.
It results in “ affective judgments ” — thought and feeling work together so you
feel confi dent that you know what is going on and what needs to be done.
The essence of this process is matching situational clues with a well - learned
mental framework — a “ deeply - held, nonconscious category or pattern ” (Dane
and Pratt, 2007, p. 37). This is the key skill that Simon and Chase (1973) found
in chess masters — they could instantly recognize more than fi fty thousand con-
fi gurations of a chessboard. This ability enables grand masters to play twenty -
fi ve lesser opponents simultaneously, beating all of them while spending only
seconds on each move.
The same process of rapid cognition is at work in the diagnostic categories
physicians rely on to evaluate patients ’ symptoms. The Hippocratic Oath —
“ Above all else, do no harm ” — requires physicians to be confi dent that they know
what they ’ re up against before prescribing a remedy. Their skilled judgment
•
•
•
•
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Reframing Organizations12
draws on a repertoire of categories and clues, honed by training and experience.
But sometimes they get it wrong. One source of error is anchoring: doctors, like
leaders, sometimes lock on to the fi rst answer that seems right, even if a few
messy facts don ’ t quite fi t. “ Your mind plays tricks on you because you see only
the landmarks you expect to see and neglect those that should tell you that in
fact you ’ re still at sea ” (Groopman, 2007, p. 65).
Treating individual patients is hard, but managers have an even tougher chal-
lenge because organizations are more complex and the diagnostic categories
less well defi ned. That means that the quality of your judgments depends on
the information you have at hand, your mental maps, and how well you have
learned to use them. Good maps align with the terrain and provide enough
detail to keep you on course. If you ’ re trying to fi nd your way around downtown
San Francisco, a map of Chicago won ’ t help, nor one of California ’ s freeways. In
the same way, different circumstances require different approaches.
Even with the right map, getting around will be slow and awkward if you have
to stop and study at every intersection. The ultimate goal is fl uid expertise, the
sort of know - how that lets you think on the fl y and navigate organizations as
easily as you drive home on a familiar route. You can make decisions quickly and
automatically because you know at a glance where you are and what you need to
do next.
There is no shortcut to developing this kind of expertise. It takes effort, time,
practice, and feedback. Some of the effort has to go into learning frames and
the ideas behind them. Equally important is putting the ideas to use. Experience,
one often hears, is the best teacher, but that is only true if you refl ect on it and
extract its lessons. McCall, Lombardo, and Morrison (1988, p. 122) found that
a key quality among successful executives was an “ extraordinary tenacity in
extracting something worthwhile from their experience and in seeking experi-
ences rich in opportunities for growth. ”
Frame Breaking Framing involves matching mental maps to circumstances. Reframing requires
another skill — the ability to break frames. Why do that? A news story from the
summer of 2007 illustrates. Imagine yourself among a group of friends enjoying
dinner on the patio of a Washington, D.C., home. An armed, hooded intruder
suddenly appears and points a gun at the head of a fourteen - year - old guest.
“ Give me your money, ” he says, “ or I ’ ll start shooting. ” If you ’ re at that table,
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Introduction 13
what do you do? You could try to break frame. That ’ s exactly what Cristina “ Cha
Cha ” Rowan did.
“ We were just fi nishing dinner, ” [she] told the man. “ Why don ’ t you
have a glass of wine with us? ”
The intruder had a sip of their Chateau Malescot St - Exup é ry and
said, “ Damn, that ’ s good wine. ”
The girl ’ s father . . . told the intruder to take the whole glass, and
Rowan offered him the bottle.
The robber, with his hood down, took another sip and a bite of
Camembert cheese. He put the gun in his sweatpants . . . .
“ I think I may have come to the wrong house, ” the intruder said
before apologizing. “ Can I get a hug? ”
Rowan . . . stood up and wrapped her arms around the would - be
robber. The other guests followed.
“ Can we have a group hug? ” the man asked. The fi ve adults
complied.
The man walked away a few moments later with a fi lled crystal
wine glass, but nothing was stolen, and no one was hurt. Police were
called to the scene and found the empty wine glass unbroken on the
ground in an alley behind the house [Associated Press, 2007].
In one stroke, Cha Cha Rowan redefi ned the situation from “ we might all
be killed ” to “ let ’ s offer our guest some wine. ” Like her, artistic managers
frame and reframe experience fl uidly, sometimes with extraordinary results.
A critic once commented to C é zanne, “ That doesn ’ t look anything like a sunset. ”
Pondering his painting, C é zanne responded, “ Then you don ’ t see sunsets the way
I do. ” Like C é zanne and Rowan, leaders have to fi nd new ways to shift points of
view when needed.
Like maps, frames are both windows on a territory and tools for navigation.
Every tool has distinctive strengths and limitations. The right tool makes a job
easier, but the wrong one gets in the way. Tools thus become useful only when
a situation is sized up accurately. Furthermore, one or two tools may suffi ce for
simple jobs, but not for more complex undertakings. Managers who master the
hammer and expect all problems to behave like nails fi nd life at work confus-
ing and frustrating. The wise manager, like a skilled carpenter, wants at hand
a diverse collection of high - quality implements. Experienced managers also
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Reframing Organizations14
understand the difference between possessing a tool and knowing when and how
to use it. Only experience and practice bring the skill and wisdom to take stock
of a situation and use suitable tools with confi dence and skill.
The Four Frames Only in the last half century have social scientists devoted much time or atten-
tion to developing ideas about how organizations work, how they should work,
or why they often fail. In the social sciences, several major schools of thought
have evolved. Each has its own concepts and assumptions, espousing a particu-
lar view of how to bring social collectives under control. Each tradition claims a
scientifi c foundation. But a theory can easily become a theology that preaches
a single, parochial scripture. Modern managers must sort through a cacophony
of voices and visions for help.
Sifting through competing voices is one of our goals in writing this book. We
are not searching for the one best way. Rather, we consolidate major schools of
organizational thought into a comprehensive framework encompassing four per-
spectives. Our goal is usable knowledge. We have sought ideas powerful enough to
capture the subtlety and complexity of life in organizations yet simple enough
to be useful. Our distillation has drawn much from the social sciences — particularly
sociology, psychology, political science, and anthropology. Thousands of managers
and scores of organizations have helped us sift through social science research to
identify ideas that work in practice. We have sorted insights from both research and
practice into four major frames — structural, human resource, political, and sym-
bolic (Bolman and Deal, 1984). Each is used by academics and practitioners alike
and found on the shelves of libraries and bookstores.
Four Frames: As Near as Your Local Bookstore Imagine a harried exec- utive browsing in the management section of her local bookseller on a brisk
winter day in 2008. She worries about her company ’ s fl agging performance and
fears that her job might soon disappear. She spots the black - on - white spine of
The Last Link: Closing the Gap That Is Sabotaging Your Business (Crawford, 2007).
Flipping through the pages, she notices chapter titles like “ Data, ” “ Discipline, ”
and “ Linking It Together. ” She is drawn to phrases such as “ It all comes down to
one thing, doesn ’ t it. Are you making your numbers? ” and “ a new formula for
21st - century business success. ” “ This stuff may be good, ” the executive tells her-
self, “ but it seems a little stiff. ”
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Introduction 15
Next, she fi nds The SPEED of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything
(Covey and Merrill, 2006). Glancing inside, she reads, “ Take communication. In
a high - trust relationship, you can say the wrong thing and people will still get
your meaning. In a low - trust relationship, you can be very measured, even pre-
cise, and they ’ ll still misinterpret you. ” “ Sounds nice, ” she mumbles, “ but a little
touchy - feely. Let ’ s look for something more down to earth. ”
Continuing her search, she picks up Secrets to Winning at Offi ce Politics: How
to Achieve Your Goals and Increase Your Infl uence at Work (McIntyre, 2005).
She scans chapter titles: “ Forget Fairness, Look for Leverage, ” “ Political Games:
Moves and Countermoves, ” “ Power, Power, Who Has the Power? ” She chews over
the book ’ s key message — that we all engage in politics every day at work, even
though we don ’ t like to admit it. “ Does it really all come down to politics? ” she
wonders. “ It seems too cynical. Isn ’ t there something more uplifting? ”
She spots The Starbucks Experience: 5 Principles for Turning Ordinary into
Extraordinary (Michelli, 2006). She ponders the fi ve basic principles the
book credits for the success of Starbucks: Make it your own. Everything mat-
ters. Surprise and delight. Embrace resistance. Leave your mark. She reads that
these principles “ remind all of us — you, me, the janitor, and the CEO — that we
are responsible for unleashing a passion that ripples outward from behind the
scenes, through the customer experience, and ultimately out into our communi-
ties ” (p. 1). She wonders if such fervor can be sustained for long.
In her local bookstore, our worried executive has rediscovered the four
perspectives at the heart of this book. Four distinct metaphors capture the
essence of each of the books she examined: organizations as factories, families,
jungles, and temples or carnivals.
Factories The fi rst book she stumbled on, The Last Link, provides counsel on how to think clearly and get organized, extending a long tradition that treats
an organization as a factory. Drawing from sociology, economics, and man-
agement science, the structural frame depicts a rational world and emphasizes
organizational architecture, including goals, structure, technology, specialized
roles, coordination, and formal relationships. Structures — commonly depicted
by organization charts — are designed to fi t an organization ’ s environment and
technology. Organizations allocate responsibilities ( “ division of labor ” ). They
then create rules, policies, procedures, systems, and hierarchies to coordinate
diverse activities into a unifi ed effort. Problems arise when structure doesn ’ t line
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Reframing Organizations16
up well with current circumstances. At that point, some form of reorganization
or redesign is needed to remedy the mismatch.
Families Our executive next encountered The SPEED of Trust, with its focus on interpersonal relationships. The human resource perspective, rooted in psy-
chology, sees an organization as an extended family, made up of individuals with
needs, feelings, prejudices, skills, and limitations. From a human resource view,
the key challenge is to tailor organizations to individuals — fi nding ways for peo-
ple to get the job done while feeling good about themselves and their work.
Jungles Secrets to Winning at Offi ce Politics is a contemporary application of the political frame, rooted in the work of political scientists. It sees organizations
as arenas, contests, or jungles. Parochial interests compete for power and scarce
resources. Confl ict is rampant because of enduring differences in needs, perspec-
tives, and lifestyles among contending individuals and groups. Bargaining, nego-
tiation, coercion, and compromise are a normal part of everyday life. Coalitions
form around specifi c interests and change as issues come and go. Problems
arise when power is concentrated in the wrong places or is so broadly dispersed
that nothing gets done. Solutions arise from political skill and acumen — as
Machiavelli suggested centuries ago in The Prince ([1514] 1961).
Temples and Carnivals Finally, our executive encountered The Starbucks Experience, with its emphasis on culture, symbols, and spirit as keys to organi-
zational success. The symbolic lens, drawing on social and cultural anthropol-
ogy, treats organizations as temples, tribes, theaters, or carnivals. It abandons
assumptions of rationality prominent in other frames and depicts organizations
as cultures, propelled by rituals, ceremonies, stories, heroes, and myths rather
than rules, policies, and managerial authority. Organization is also theater:
actors play their roles in the drama while audiences form impressions from what
they see on stage. Problems arise when actors don ’ t play their parts appropri-
ately, symbols lose their meaning, or ceremonies and rituals lose their potency.
We rekindle the expressive or spiritual side of organizations through the use of
symbol, myth, and magic.
The FBI and the CIA: A Four - Frame Story A saga of two squabbling agencies illustrates how the four frames provide differ-
ent views of the same situation. Riebling (2002) documents the long history of
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Introduction 17
head - butting between America ’ s two intelligence agencies, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. Both are charged with com-
bating espionage and terrorism, but the FBI ’ s authority is valid within the United
States, while the CIA ’ s mandate covers everywhere else. Structurally, the FBI is
housed in the Department of Justice and reports to the attorney general. The
CIA reported through the director of central intelligence to the president until
2004, when a reorganization put it under a new director of national intelligence.
At a number of major junctures in American history (including the assassina-
tion of President John F. Kennedy, the Iran - Contra scandal, and the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks), each agency held pieces of a larger puzzle, but coordination snafus
made it hard for anyone to see all the pieces, much less put them together. After
9/11, both agencies came under heavy criticism, and each blamed the other for
lapses. The FBI complained that the CIA had known, but had failed to inform
the FBI, that two of the terrorists had entered the United States and had been
living in California since 2000 (Seper, 2005). But an internal Justice Department
investigation also concluded that the FBI didn ’ t do very well with the informa-
tion it did get. Key signals were never “ documented by the bureau or placed in
any system from which they could be retrieved by agents investigating terrorist
threats ” (Seper, 2005, p. 1).
Structural barriers between the FBI and the CIA were exacerbated by the enmity
between the two agencies ’ patron saints, J. Edgar Hoover and “ Wild Bill ” Donovan.
When he fi rst became FBI director in the 1920s, Hoover reported to Donovan, who
didn ’ t trust him and tried to get him fi red. When World War II broke out, Hoover
lobbied to get the FBI identifi ed as the nation ’ s worldwide intelligence agency. He
fumed when President Franklin D. Roosevelt instead created a new agency and
made Donovan its director. As often happens, cooperation between two units was
chronically hampered by a rocky personal relationship between two top dogs who
never liked one another.
Politically, the relationship between the FBI and CIA was born in turf con-
fl ict because of Roosevelt ’ s decision to give responsibility for foreign intelligence
to Donovan instead of Hoover. The friction persisted over the decades as both
agencies vied for turf and funding from Congress and the White House.
Symbolically, different histories and missions led to very distinct cultures. The
FBI, which built its image with the dramatic capture or killing of notorious gang
leaders, bank robbers, and foreign agents, liked to pounce on suspects quickly
and publicly. The CIA preferred to work in the shadows, believing that patience
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Reframing Organizations18
and secrecy were vital to its task of collecting intelligence and rooting out foreign
spies.
Senior U.S. offi cials have recognized for many years that the confl ict between
the FBI and CIA damages U.S. security. But most initiatives to improve the rela-
tionship have been partial and ephemeral, falling well short of addressing the full
range of issues.
Multiframe Thinking The overview of the four - frame model in Exhibit 1.1 shows that each of the
frames has its own image of reality. You may be drawn to some and repelled by
others. Some perspectives may seem clear and straightforward, while others seem
puzzling. But learning to apply all four deepens your appreciation and under-
standing of organizations. Galileo discovered this when he devised the fi rst tele-
scope. Each lens he added contributed to a more accurate image of the heavens.
Exhibit 1.1. Overview of the Four-Frame Model.
FRAME
STRUCTURAL HUMAN RESOURCE POLITICAL SYMBOLIC
Metaphor for organi- zation
Factory or machine
Family Jungle Carnival, temple, theater
Central concepts
Rules, roles, goals, policies, technology, environment
Needs, skills, relationships
Power, confl ict, competition, organiza- tional politics
Culture, meaning, met- aphor, ritual, ceremony, stories, heroes
Image of leadership
Social architecture
Empowerment Advocacy and political savvy
Inspiration
Basic lead- ership challenge
Attune struc- ture to task, technology, environment
Align organi- zational and human needs
Develop agenda and power base
Create faith, beauty, meaning
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Introduction 19
Successful managers take advantage of the same truth. Like physicians, they
reframe, consciously or intuitively, until they understand the situation at hand.
They use more than one lens to develop a diagnosis of what they are up against
and how to move forward.
This claim about the advantages of multiple perspectives has stimulated a
growing body of research. Dunford and Palmer (1995) found that management
courses teaching multiple frames had signifi cant positive effects over both the
short and long term — in fact, 98 percent of their respondents rated refram-
ing as helpful or very helpful, and about 90 percent felt it gave them a competi-
tive advantage. Other studies have shown that the ability to use multiple frames
is associated with greater effectiveness for managers and leaders (Bensimon,
1989, 1990; Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman and Deal, 1991, 1992a, 1992b; Heimovics,
Herman, and Jurkiewicz Coughlin, 1993, 1995; Wimpelberg, 1987).
Multiframe thinking requires moving beyond narrow, mechanical approaches
for understanding organizations. We cannot count the number of times man-
agers have told us that they handled some problem the “ only way ” it could be
done. Such statements betray a failure of both imagination and courage and
reveal a paralyzing fear of uncertainty. It may be comforting to think that failure
was unavoidable and we did all we could. But it can be liberating to realize there
is always more than one way to respond to any problem or dilemma. Those who
master reframing report a sense of choice and power. Managers are imprisoned
only to the extent that their palette of ideas is impoverished.
Akira Kurosawa ’ s classic fi lm Rashomon recounts the same event through
the eyes of several witnesses. Each tells a different story. Similarly, organizations
are fi lled with people who have their own interpretations of what is and should
be happening. Each version contains a glimmer of truth, but each is a product
of the prejudices and blind spots of its maker. No single story is comprehensive
enough to make an organization truly understandable or manageable. Effective
managers need multiple tools, the skill to use each, and the wisdom to match
frames to situations. 3
Lack of imagination — Langer (1989) calls it “ mindlessness ” — is a major cause
of the shortfall between the reach and the grasp of so many organizations — the
empty chasm between noble aspirations and disappointing results. The gap is
painfully acute in a world where organizations dominate so much of our lives.
The commission appointed by President George W. Bush to investigate the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concluded that the strikes “ should not have
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Reframing Organizations20
come as a surprise ” but did because the “ most important failure was one of
imagination. ” Taleb (2007) depicts events like the 9/11 attacks as “ black swans ” —
novel events that are unexpected because we have never seen them before. If
every swan we ’ ve observed is white, we expect the same in the future. But fateful,
make - or - break events are more likely to be situations we ’ ve never experienced
before. Imagination is our best chance for being ready when a black swan sails
into view, and multiframe thinking is a powerful stimulus to the broad, creative
mind - set imagination requires.
Engineering and Art Exhibit 1.2 presents two contrasting approaches to management and leadership.
One is a rational - technical mind - set emphasizing certainty and control. The
other is an expressive, artistic conception encouraging fl exibility, creativity, and
Exhibit 1.2. Expanding Managerial Thinking.
HOW MANAGERS THINK HOW MANAGERS MIGHT THINK
They often have a limited view of organizations (for example, attributing almost all problems to individuals’ fl aws and errors).
They need a holistic framework that encourages inquiry into a range of signifi cant issues: people, power, structure, and symbols.
Regardless of a problem’s source, managers often choose rational and structural solutions: facts, logic, restructuring.
They need a palette that offers an array of options: bargaining as well as training, celebration as well as reorganization.
Managers often value certainty, ratio- nality, and control while fearing ambiguity, paradox, and “going with the fl ow.”
They need to develop creativity, risk taking, and playfulness in responses to life’s dilemmas and paradoxes, focusing as much on fi nding the right question as the right answer, on fi nding meaning and faith amid clutter and confusion.
Leaders often rely on the “one right answer” and the “one best way”; they are stunned at the turmoil and resistance they generate.
Leaders need passionate, unwav- ering commitment to principle, combined with fl exibility in under- standing and responding to events.
c01.indd 20c01.indd 20 6/30/08 12:55:57 PM6/30/08 12:55:57 PM
Introduction 21
interpretation. The fi rst portrays managers as technicians; the second sees them
as artists.
Artists interpret experience and express it in forms that can be felt, under-
stood, and appreciated by others. Art embraces emotion, subtlety, ambiguity. An
artist reframes the world so others can see new possibilities. Modern organiza-
tions often rely too much on engineering and too little on art in searching for
quality, commitment, and creativity. Art is not a replacement for engineering
but an enhancement. Artistic leaders and managers help us look beyond today ’ s
reality to new forms that release untapped individual energies and improve
collective performance. The leader as artist relies on images as well as memos,
poetry as well as policy, refl ection as well as command, and reframing as well as
refi tting.
SUMMARY As organizations have become pervasive and dominant, they have also become
harder to understand and manage. The result is that managers are often nearly as
clueless as the Dilberts of the world think they are. The consequences of myopic
management and leadership show up every day, sometimes in small and subtle
ways, sometimes in organizational catastrophes. Our basic premise is that a pri-
mary cause of managerial failure is faulty thinking rooted in inadequate ideas.
Managers and those who try to help them too often rely on constricted models
that capture only part of organizational life.
Learning multiple perspectives, or frames, is a defense against thrashing
around without a clue about what you are doing or why. Frames serve multiple
functions. They are fi lters for sorting essence from trivia, maps that aid naviga-
tion, and tools for solving problems and getting things done. This book is orga-
nized around four frames rooted in both managerial wisdom and social science
knowledge. The structural approach focuses on the architecture of organization —
the design of units and subunits, rules and roles, goals and policies. The human
resource lens emphasizes understanding people, their strengths and foibles, rea-
son and emotion, desires and fears. The political view sees organizations as com-
petitive arenas of scarce resources, competing interests, and struggles for power
and advantage. Finally, the symbolic frame focuses on issues of meaning and
faith. It puts ritual, ceremony, story, play, and culture at the heart of organiza-
tional life.
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Reframing Organizations22
Each of the frames is both powerful and coherent. Collectively, they make it
possible to reframe, looking at the same thing from multiple lenses or points
of view. When the world seems hopelessly confusing and nothing is working,
reframing is a powerful tool for gaining clarity, regaining balance, generating
new options, and fi nding strategies that make a difference.
NOTES 1. Enron ’ s reign as history ’ s greatest corporate catastrophe was brief. An even
bigger behemoth, WorldCom, with assets of more than $100 billion, thun-
dered into Chapter 11 seven months later, in July 2002. Stock worth more
than $45 a share two years earlier fell to nine cents.
2. Among the possible ways of talking about frames are schemata or schema
theory (Fiedler, 1982; Fiske and Dyer, 1985; Lord and Foti, 1986), repre-
sentations (Frensch and Sternberg, 1991; Lesgold and Lajoie, 1991; Voss,
Wolfe, Lawrence, and Engle, 1991), cognitive maps (Weick and Bougon,
1986), paradigms (Gregory, 1983; Kuhn, 1970), social categorizations
(Cronshaw, 1987), implicit theories (Brief and Downey, 1983), mental
models (Senge, 1990), defi nitions of the situation, and root metaphors.
3. A number of scholars (including Allison, 1971; Bergquist, 1992; Birnbaum,
1988; Elmore, 1978; Morgan, 1986; Perrow, 1986; Quinn, 1988; Quinn,
Faerman, Thompson, and McGrath, 1996; and Scott, 1981) have made
similar arguments for multiframe approaches to groups and social
collectives.
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c h a p t e r
T W O
23
Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations
America ’ s East Coast welcomed a crisp, sunny fall morning on September 11, 2001. For airline passengers in the Boston – Washington corridor, the perfect fall weather offered prospects of
on - time departures and smooth fl ights. The promise would be bro-
ken for four fl ights, all bound for California. Like Pearl Harbor, 9/11
was a day that will live in infamy, a tragedy that changed America ’ s
sense of itself and the world. If we probe the how and why of 9/11,
we fi nd determined and resourceful terrorists, but we also fi nd vul-
nerability and errors in organizations charged with detecting and
preventing such catastrophes.
American Airlines fl ight 11 was fi rst in the air, departing from Boston on time
at 8:00 am. United 175 followed at 8:15, ten minutes behind schedule. American
77, after a twenty - minute delay, left Washington - Dulles at 8:20 am. Delayed forty
minutes by congestion at Newark, United fl ight 93 departed at 8:42 am.
The fi rst sign that something was amiss for American 11 came less than fi fteen
minutes into the fl ight, when pilots stopped responding to input from air traf-
fi c controllers. For United 175, signs surfaced when the aircraft changed beacon
codes, deviated from its assigned altitude, and failed to respond to New York air
traffi c controllers. American 77 departed from its assigned course at 8:54 am , and
attempts to communicate with the plane were futile. The last fl ight, United 93,
c h a p t e r
c02.indd 23c02.indd 23 7/1/08 3:36:29 PM7/1/08 3:36:29 PM
Reframing Organizations24
followed a routine trajectory until the aircraft dropped precipitously. The cap-
tain radioed “ Mayday, ” and controllers heard sounds of a violent struggle in the
cockpit.
All four planes had been hijacked by teams of Al Quaeda terrorists who had
managed to board the planes in spite of a security checkpoint system aimed
at preventing such occurrences. In a meticulously planned scheme, the terror-
ists turned commercial aircraft into deadly missiles. Each aircraft was aimed at
a high - profi le target — New York ’ s World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the
nation ’ s Capitol. One by one, the planes slammed into their targets with dev-
astating force. Only United 93 failed to reach its objective. A heroic passenger
effort to regain control of the plane failed but thwarted the terrorists ’ intentions
to ram the White House or Capitol building.
Why did no one foresee such a catastrophe? In fact, some had. As far back
as 1993, security experts had envisioned an attempt to destroy the World Trade
Center using airplanes as weapons. Such fears were reinforced when a suicidal
pilot crashed a small private plane onto the White House lawn in 1994. But the
mind - set of principals in the national security network was riveted on prior
hijacks, which had almost always ended in negotiations. The idea of a suicide
mission, using commercial aircraft as missiles, was never incorporated into
homeland defense procedures.
America ’ s homeland air defense system fell primarily under the jurisdiction
of two government agencies: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). As the events of 9/11
unfolded, it became clear that these agencies ’ procedures to handle hijackings
were inadequate. The controller tracking American 11, for example, began to
suspect a hijacking early on and relayed the information to regional FAA head-
quarters, which began to follow its hijack protocol. As part of that protocol, a
designated hijack coordinator could have requested a military fi ghter escort for
the hijacked aircraft — but none was requested until too late.
At the same time, communication channels fell behind fast - moving events.
Confusion at FAA headquarters resulted in a delay in informing NORAD about
United 93. An interagency teleconference to provide coordination between the mil-
itary and the FAA was hastily put together, but technical delays kept the FAA from
participating. When NORAD asked for FAA updates, they got either no answer
or incorrect information. Long after American 11 crashed into the World Trade
Center, NORAD thought the fl ight was still headed toward Washington, D.C.
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Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 25
In the end, nineteen young men were able to outwit America ’ s homeland
defense systems. We can explain their success in part by pointing to their fanati-
cal determination, meticulous planning, and painstaking preparation. Looking
deeper, we can see a dramatic version of an old story: human error leading to
tragedy. But if we look deeper still, we fi nd that even the human - error explana-
tion is too simple. In organizational life, there are almost always systemic causes
upstream of human failures, and the events of 9/11 are no exception.
The nation had a web of procedures and agencies aimed at detecting and mon-
itoring potential terrorists. Those systems failed, as did procedures designed to
respond to aviation crises. Similar failures have marked other well - publicized
disasters: nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, for example,
and the botched response to Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast in 2005. Each
event illustrates a chain of error, miscommunication, and misguided actions.
Events like 9/11 and Katrina make headlines, but similar errors and failures
happen every day. They rarely make front - page news, but they are all too famil-
iar to people who work in organizations. The problem is that organizations
are complicated, and communication among them adds another tangled layer.
Reading messy situations accurately is not easy. In the remainder of this chap-
ter, we explain why. We discuss how the fallacies of human thinking can obscure
what ’ s really going on and lead us astray. Then we describe some peculiarities of
organizations that make them so diffi cult to fi gure out and manage.
COMMON FALLACIES IN EXPLAINING ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS Albert Einstein once said that a thing should be made as simple as possible, but
no simpler. When we ask students and managers to analyze cases like 9/11 they
often make things simpler than they really are. They do this by relying on one of
three misleading, oversimplifi ed one - size - fi ts - all concepts.
The fi rst and most common is blaming people. This approach casts everything
in terms of individual blunders. Problems result from bad attitudes, abrasive
personalities, neurotic tendencies, stupidity, or incompetence. It ’ s an easy way
to explain anything that goes wrong. Once Enron went bankrupt, the hunt was
on for someone to blame, and the top executives became the target of reporters,
prosecutors, and talk - show comedians. One CEO said, “ We want the bad guys
exposed and the bad guys punished ” (Toffl er and Reingold, 2004, p. 229).
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Reframing Organizations26
As children, we learned it was important to assign blame for every broken
toy, stained carpet, or wounded sibling. Pinpointing the culprit is comforting.
Assigning blame resolves ambiguity, explains mystery, and makes clear what
must be done next: punish the guilty. Enron had its share of culpable individu-
als, some of whom eventually went to jail. But there is a larger story about the
organizational and social context that set the stage for individual malfeasance.
Targeting individuals while ignoring larger system failures oversimplifi es the
problem and does little to prevent its recurrence.
G R E A T E S T H I T S F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T U D I E S
Hit Number 10: James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958)
March and Simon ’ s pioneering 1958 book Organizations sought to
defi ne a new fi eld by offering a structure and language for studying
organizations. It was part of the body of work that helped to earn
Simon the 1978 Nobel Prize for economics. 1
No brief summary can cover the range of topics March and Simon
considered. They offered a cognitive, social - psychological view of orga-
nizational behavior with an emphasis on thinking, information process-
ing, and decision making. The book begins with a model of behavior
that presents humans as continually seeking to satisfy motives based on
their aspirations. Aspirations at any given time are a function of both
individuals ’ history and their environment. When aspirations are unsat-
isfi ed, people search until they fi nd better, more satisfying options.
Organizations infl uence individuals primarily by managing the informa-
tion and options, or “ decision premises, ” that they consider.
March and Simon followed Simon ’ s earlier work (1947) in critiquing
the economic view of “ rational man, ” who maximizes utility by consid-
ering all available options and choosing the best. Instead, they argue
that both individuals and organizations have limited information and
restricted ability to process what is available. They never will know all
the options. Instead, they gradually alter their aspirations as they search
for alternatives. Instead of looking for the best option, “ maximizing, ”
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Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 27
individuals and organizations “ satisfi ce, ” choosing the fi rst option that
is good enough.
Organizational decision making is additionally complicated because
the environment is complex. Resources (time, attention, money, and so
on) are scarce, and confl ict among individuals and groups is constant.
Organizational design happens through piecemeal bargaining that holds
no guarantee of optimal rationality. Organizations simplify the envi-
ronment to reduce the pressure on limited information - processing and
decision - making capacities. They simplify by developing “ programs ” —
standardized routines for performing repetitive tasks. Once a program is
in place, the incentive is to stay with it as long as the results are margin-
ally satisfactory. Otherwise, the organization is forced to expend time and
energy to innovate. Routine tends to drive out innovation, because indi-
viduals fi nd it easier and less taxing to devote limited time and energy to
programmed tasks (which are automatic, well practiced, and more certain
of success). Thus, a student facing a term - paper deadline may fi nd it easier
to “ fritter ” — make tea, rearrange the desk, check e - mail, and browse the
Web — than to fi gure out how to write a good opening paragraph. A man-
ager may sacrifi ce quality to avoid changing a well - established routine.
March and Simon ’ s book falls primarily within the structural and
human resource views. But their discussions of scarce resources, power,
confl ict, and bargaining recognize the reality of organizational poli-
tics. Although they do not use the term framing, March and Simon
reaffi rm its logic as an essential component of choice. Decision mak-
ing, they argue, is always based on a simplifi ed model of the world.
Organizations develop unique vocabulary and classifi cation schemes,
which determine what people are likely to see and respond to. Things
that don ’ t fi t an organization ’ s mind - set are likely to be ignored or
reframed into terms the organization can understand.
When it is hard to identify a guilty individual, a second popular option is
blaming the bureaucracy. Things go haywire because organizations are stifl ed by
rules and red tape — or because a lack of clear goals and roles creates chaos. One
or the other explanation almost always applies. If things are out of control, then
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Reframing Organizations28
the system needs clearer rules and procedures, as well as tighter job descriptions.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks could have been thwarted if agencies had had better
protocols for such a terrorist attack. Tighter fi nancial controls could have pre-
vented Enron ’ s free fall. The problem is that piling on rules and regulations typ-
ically leads to bureaucratic rigidity. Rules inhibit freedom and fl exibility, stifl e
initiative, and generate reams of red tape. Could Enron have achieved its status
as America ’ s most innovative company if it had played by the old rules? When
things become too tight, the solution is to “ free up ” the system so red tape and
rigid rules don ’ t stifl e creativity and bog things down. But many organizations
vacillate endlessly between being too loose and too tight.
A third fallacy attributes problems to thirsting for power. In the case of Enron,
key executives were more interested in getting rich and expanding their turf than
in advancing the company ’ s best interests. The various agencies dealing with
9/11 all struggled prior to the disaster for their share of scarce federal resources.
This view sees organizations as jungles teeming with predators and prey. Victory
goes to the more adroit, or the more treacherous. Political games and turf wars
cause most organizational problems. You need to play the game better than your
opponents — and watch your backside.
Each of these three perspectives contains a kernel of truth but oversimplifi es a
knottier reality. Blaming people points to the perennial importance of individual
responsibility. Some problems are caused by personal characteristics: rigid bosses,
slothful subordinates, bumbling bureaucrats, greedy union members, or insen-
sitive elites. Much of the time, though, condemning individuals blocks us from
seeing system weaknesses and offers few workable options. If, for example, the
problem really is someone ’ s abrasive or pathological personality, what do we do?
Even psychiatrists fi nd it hard to alter character disorders, and fi ring everyone
with a less - than - ideal personality is rarely a viable option. Training can go only so
far in preparing people to carry out their responsibilities perfectly every time.
The blame - the - bureaucracy perspective starts from a reasonable premise:
organizations are created to achieve specifi c goals. They are most effective when
goals and policies are clear (but not excessive), jobs are well defi ned (but not
constricting), control systems are in place (but not oppressive), and employees
behave prudently (but not callously). If organizations always behaved that way,
they would presumably work a lot better than most do. In practice, this perspec-
tive is better at explaining how organizations should work than why they often
don ’ t. Managers who cling to facts and logic become discouraged and frustrated
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Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 29
when confronted by intractable irrational forces. Year after year, we witness the
introduction of new control systems, hear of new ways to reorganize, and are
dazzled by emerging management methods and gurus. Yet old problems persist,
seemingly immune to every rational cure we devise. As March and Simon point
out, rationality has limits.
The thirst - for - power view highlights enduring, below - the - surface features of
organizations. Its dog - eat - dog logic offers a plausible analysis of almost anything
that goes wrong. People both seek and despise power but fi nd it a convenient
way to explain problems. Within hours of the 9/11 terror attacks, a senior FBI
offi cial called Richard Clarke, America ’ s counterterrorism czar, to tell him that
many of the terrorists were known members of Al Quaeda. “ How the f__k did
they get on board then? ” Clarke exploded. “ Hey, don ’ t shoot the messenger. CIA
forgot to tell us about them. ” In the context of the long - running battle between
the FBI and CIA, the underlying message of blame was clear: the CIA ’ s self -
interested concern with its own power caused this catastrophe.
The tendency to blame what goes wrong on people, the bureaucracy, or the
thirst for power is part of our mental wiring. But there ’ s much more to under-
standing a complex situation than assigning blame. Certain universal peculiari-
ties of organizations make them especially diffi cult to sort out.
PECULIARITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS Human organizations can be exciting and challenging places. At least, that ’ s how
they are often depicted in management texts, corporate annual reports, and fan-
ciful managerial thinking. But in reality they can be deceptive, confusing, and
demoralizing. It is a mistake to assume that organizations are either snake pits
or rose gardens (Schwartz, 1986). Managers need to recognize characteristics of
life at work that create opportunities for the wise as well as traps for the unwary.
A case from the public sector provides a typical example:
D E C E P T I O N A T W O R K
Helen Demarco arrived in her offi ce to discover a clipping from the local
paper. The headline read, “ Osborne Announces Plan. ” Paul Osborne
had arrived two months earlier as Amtran ’ s new chief executive. His
mandate was to “ revitalize, cut costs, and improve effi ciency. ” After
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Reframing Organizations30
twenty years, Demarco had achieved a senior management position
at the agency. She had little contact with Osborne, but her boss
reported to him. Along with long - term colleagues, Demarco had been
waiting apprehensively to learn what the new chief had in mind. She
was startled as she read the newspaper account. Osborne ’ s plan made
technical assumptions directly related to her area of expertise. He might
be a change agent, she thought, but he doesn ’ t know much about our
technology. She saw immediately the new plan ’ s fatal fl aws. If he tries
to implement this, it ’ ll be the worst management mistake since the
Edsel, she thought to herself.
Two days later, Demarco and her colleagues received a memo
instructing them to form a committee to work on the revitalization
plan. When the group convened, everyone agreed the plan was crazy.
“ What do we do? ” someone asked.
“ Why don ’ t we just tell him it won ’ t work? ” said one hopeful soul.
“ He ’ s already gone public! You want to tell him his baby is ugly? ”
“ Not me. Besides, he already thinks a lot of us are deadwood. If we
tell him it ’ s no good, he ’ ll just think we ’ re defensive. ”
“ Well, we can ’ t just go ahead with it. We ’ d be throwing away money
and it ’ ll never work! ”
“ That ’ s true, ” said Demarco thoughtfully. “ But what if we tell him
we ’ re conducting a study of how to implement the plan? ”
Her suggestion was approved overwhelmingly. The group informed
Osborne that a study was under way. They even got a substantial bud-
get to support their “ research. ” No one mentioned the study ’ s real
purpose: buy time and fi nd a way to minimize the damage without
alienating the boss.
Over time, the group developed a strategy. Members assembled a
lengthy technical report, fi lled with graphs, tables, and impenetrable
jargon. The report offered Osborne two options. Option A, his original
plan, was presented as technically feasible but expensive — well beyond
anything Amtran could afford. Option B, billed as a “ modest down-
scaling ” of the original plan, was projected as a more cost - effective
alternative.
When Osborne pressed the group on the huge cost disparity between
the two proposals, he received a barrage of technical language and
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Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 31
complicated cost - benefi t projections. No one mentioned that even
Option B offered few benefi ts at a very high cost. Osborne argued and
pressed for more information. But given the apparent facts, he agreed
to proceed with Option B. The plan required several years to imple-
ment, and Osborne moved on before it became operational. Even so,
the “ Osborne plan ” was widely heralded as another instance of Paul
Osborne ’ s talent for revitalizing ailing organizations.
Helen Demarco came away with deep feelings of frustration and fail-
ure. The Osborne plan, in her view, was a wasteful mistake, and she had
knowingly participated in a charade. “ But, ” she rationalized to herself,
“ I really didn ’ t have much choice. Osborne was determined to go ahead.
It would have been career suicide to try to stop him. ”
Demarco had other options, but she couldn ’ t see them. She and Paul Osborne
both thought they were on track. They were tripped up in part by human fal-
libility, but even more important, by how hard it can be to understand orga-
nizations. The fi rst step in managerial wisdom and artistry is to recognize key
characteristics of organizations. Otherwise, managers are persistently surprised
and caught off guard.
First, organizations are complex. They are populated by people, whose behav-
ior is notoriously hard to predict. Large organizations in particular include a
bewildering array of people, departments, technologies, and goals. Moreover,
organizations are open systems dealing with a changing, challenging, and erratic
environment. Things can get even more knotty across multiple organizations.
The 9/11 disaster resulted from a chain of events that involved several separate
systems. Almost anything can affect everything else in collective activity, gener-
ating causal knots that are hard to untangle. After an exhaustive investigation,
our picture of 9/11 is woven from sundry evidence, confl icting testimony, and
conjecture.
Second, organizations are surprising. What you expect is often not what you
get. Paul Osborne saw his plan as a bold leap forward; Helen and her group con-
sidered it an expensive albatross. In their view, Osborne made matters worse by
trying to improve them. He might have achieved better results by spending more
time with his family and leaving things at work alone. And imagine the shock
of Enron ’ s executives when things fell apart. Until shortly before the bottom fell
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Reframing Organizations32
out, the company ’ s leadership team appeared confi dent they were building a
pioneering model of corporate success. Many analysts and management profes-
sors shared their optimism.
The solution to yesterday ’ s problems often creates future obstacles. A friend
of ours was president of a retail chain. In the fi rm ’ s early years, he had a problem
with two sisters who worked in the same store. To prevent this from recurring,
he established a nepotism policy prohibiting members of the same family from
working for the company. Years later, two key employees met at work, fell in love,
and began to live together. The president was stunned when they asked if they
could get married without being fi red. As in this case, today ’ s sensible choice
may turn into tomorrow ’ s regret. Taking action in a cooperative venture is like
shooting a wobbly cue ball into a scattered array of self - directed billiard balls.
Balls career in so many directions that it is impossible to know how things will
eventually sort out.
Third, organizations are deceptive. They camoufl age mistakes and surprises.
After 9/11, America ’ s homeland defense organizations tried to conceal their lack of
preparedness and confusion for fear of revealing strategic weaknesses. Enron raised
fi nancial camoufl age to an art form with a series of sophisticated partnerships (car-
rying Star Wars names like Chewco, Jedi, and Kenobe). Helen Demarco and her
colleagues disguised obfuscation as technical analysis in hopes of fooling the boss.
It is tempting to blame deceit on individual character fl aws. Yet Helen
Demarco disliked fraud and regretted cheating — she simply believed she had
no other alternative. Sophisticated managers know that what happened to
Paul Osborne happens all the time. When a quality initiative fails or a promis-
ing product tanks, subordinates often either clam up or cover up. They fear that
the boss will not listen or will punish them for being insubordinate. Thus early
warnings that terrorists might commandeer commercial airliners went unvoiced
or unheeded. Internal naysayers at Enron were silenced until dissenters “ blew the
whistle ” publicly. A friend in a senior position in a large government agency put
it simply: “ Communications in organizations are rarely candid, open, or timely. ”
Fourth, organizations are ambiguous. Complexity, unpredictability, and decep-
tion generate rampant ambiguity, a dense fog that shrouds what happens from
day to day. Figuring out what is really going on in businesses, hospitals, schools,
or public agencies is not easy. It is hard to get the facts and, if you pin them
down, even harder to know what they mean or what to do about them. Helen
Demarco never knew how Paul Osborne really felt, how receptive he was to other
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Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 33
points of view, or how open he was to compromise. She and her peers piled on
more mystery by conspiring to keep him in the dark. As the 9/11 case illustrates,
when you incorporate additional organizations into the human equation, uncer-
tainty mushrooms.
Ambiguity has many sources. Sometimes available information is incom-
plete or vague. Different people may interpret the same information in a variety
of ways, depending on mind - sets and organizational doctrines. At other times,
ambiguity is intentionally manufactured as a smoke screen to conceal problems
or steer clear of confl ict. Much of the time, events and processes are so intri-
cate, scattered, and uncoordinated that no one can fully understand — let alone
control — the real truth. Exhibit 2.1 lists some of the most important sources of
organizational uncertainty.
Exhibit 2.1. Sources of Ambiguity.
We are not sure what the problem is.
We are not sure what is really happening.
We are not sure what we want.
We do not have the resources we need.
We are not sure who is supposed to do what.
We are not sure how to get what we want.
We are not sure how to determine if we have succeeded.
Source: Adapted from McCaskey (1982).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING How can lessons be extracted from surroundings that are complex, surprising,
deceptive, and ambiguous? It isn ’ t easy. Yet turbulent, rapidly shifting situa-
tions require organizations to learn better and faster. Michael Dell, founder and
CEO of Dell Computer Corporation, explained it this way: “ In our business, the
product cycle is six months, and if you miss the product cycle, you ’ ve missed
the opportunity. In this business, there are two kinds of people, really: the quick
and the dead ” (Farkas and De Backer, 1996).
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Reframing Organizations34
With stakes so high, how organizations learn from experience has become a
timely topic. Decades ago, scholars debated whether the idea of organizational
learning made sense: Could organizations actually learn, or was learning inher-
ently individual? That debate lapsed as experience verifi ed instances where indi-
viduals learned and organizations didn ’ t, or vice versa. Complex fi rms such as
Microsoft, Toyota, and British Airways have “ learned ” capabilities far beyond
individual knowledge. Lessons are enshrined in acknowledged protocols and
shared cultural codes and traditions. At the same time, individuals often learn
when systems cannot.
From the late 1980s onward, senior offi cials in China recognized that the
nation was heading in two contradictory directions, promoting capitalism eco-
nomically while defending communism politically. Behind the scenes, party
members began an urgent search for a way to bridge the gap between rival ideol-
ogies. Publicly, though, the party tamped down dissent and argued that capital-
ism was one more sign of socialist progress (Kahn, 2002). Most knew the party
was on the road to perdition, but the system obscured that reality.
Several perspectives on organizational learning are exemplifi ed in the work
of Peter Senge (1990), Barry Oshry (1995), and Chris Argyris and Donald Sch ö n
(1978, 1996). Senge sees a core learning dilemma: “ We learn best from our experi-
ence, but we never directly experience the consequences of many of our decisions ”
(p. 23). Learning is relatively easy when the link between cause and effect is clear. But
complex systems often sever that connection: causes remote from effects, solutions
detached from problems, and feedback delayed or misleading (Cyert and March,
1963; Senge, 1990). At home, you fl ip a switch and the light goes on. In an organi-
zation, you fl ip the switch and nothing happens — or a toilet may fl ush in a distant
building. You are still in the dark, and the user of the toilet is unpleasantly surprised.
To understand what is going on, you need to master the system ’ s circular causality.
Senge emphasizes the value of “ system maps ” that clarify how a system works.
Consider the system created by “ Chainsaw Al ” Dunlap, CEO of Scott Paper in the
early 1990s. Dunlap was proud of his nickname and his turnaround at Scott. He
raised profi ts and market value substantially by slashing head count and cutting
frills such as research and development. But he rarely acknowledged Scott ’ s steady
loss of market share (Byrne, 1996). It is one of many examples of actions that look
good until long - term costs become apparent. A corresponding systems model
might look like Exhibit 2.2 . The strategy might be cutting training to improve
short - term profi tability, drinking martinis to relieve stress, offering rebates to
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Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 35
entice customers, or borrowing from a loan shark to cover gambling debts. In each
case, what seems to work in the moment creates long - term costs down the line.
Oshry (1995) agrees that system blindness is widespread but highlights
causes rooted in troubled relationships between groups that have little grasp of
what ’ s above or below their level. Top managers feel overwhelmed by complex-
ity, responsibility, and overwork. They are chronically dissatisfi ed with subordi-
nates ’ lack of initiative and creativity. Middle managers, meanwhile, feel trapped
between contradictory signals and pressures. The top tells them to take risks but
then punishes mistakes. Their subordinates expect them to shape up the boss and
improve working conditions. Top and bottom tug in opposite directions, causing
those in between to feel pulled apart, confused, and weak. At the bottom, workers
feel helpless, unacknowledged, and demoralized. “ They give us lousy jobs and pay,
and order us around — never telling us what ’ s really going on. Then they wonder
why we don ’ t love our work. ” If you cannot step back and see how system dynam-
ics create these patterns, you muddle along blindly, unaware of better options.
Both Oshry and Senge argue that our failure to read system dynamics traps us
in a cycle of blaming and self - defense. Problems are always caused by someone
Exhibit 2.2. Systems Model with Delay.
Short-term strategy
Short-term gains
Long-term costs
Delay
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Reframing Organizations36
else. Unlike Senge, who sees gaps between cause and effect as primary barriers
to learning, Argyris and Sch ö n (1978, 1996) emphasize individuals ’ fears and
defenses. As a result, “ the actions we take to promote productive organizational
learning actually inhibit deeper learning ” (1996, p. 281).
According to Argyris and Sch ö n, our behavior obstructs learning because we
avoid undiscussable issues and tiptoe around organizational taboos. Our actions
often seem to work in the short run because we avoid confl ict and discomfort,
but we create a double bind. We can ’ t solve problems without dealing with prob-
lems we have tried to hide, but tackling them would expose our cover - up. Facing
that double bind, Helen Demarco and her colleagues chose to disguise their
scheme. The end result is escalating games of sham and deception. This is what
happened at Enron, where desperate maneuvers to obscure the truth made the
day of reckoning more catastrophic.
COPING WITH AMBIGUITY AND COMPLEXITY Organizations deal with a complicated and uncertain environment by trying
to make it simpler. One approach to simplifi cation is to develop better systems
and technology to collect and process information. Another is to break complex
issues into smaller chunks and assign slices to specialized individuals or units.
Still another approach is to hire or develop professionals with sophisticated
expertise in handling thorny problems. These and other methods are helpful but
not always suffi cient. Despite the best efforts, unanticipated — and sometimes
appalling — events still happen. The key in dealing with these events is develop-
ing better mental maps to anticipate complicated and unforeseeable problems.
You See What You Expect On April 14, 1994, three years after the fi rst Gulf War ended, two U.S. F - 15C
fi ghter jets took off from a base in Turkey to patrol the no - fl y zone in northern
Iraq. Their mission was to “ clear the area of any hostile aircraft ” (Snook, 2000,
p. 4). The zone had not been violated in more than two years, but Iraqi antiair-
craft fi re was a continuing risk, and the media speculated that Saddam Hussein
might be moving a large force north. At 10:22 am , the fi ghter pilots reported
to AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) controllers that they had
made radar contact with two slow, low - fl ying aircraft. Unable to identify the air-
craft electronically, the pilots descended for visual identifi cation. The lead pilot,
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Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 37
Tiger 01, spotted two “ Hinds ” — Soviet - made helicopters used by the Iraqis. He
reported his sighting, and an AWACS controller responded, “ Copy, 2 Hinds ”
(p. 6). The fi ghters circled back to begin a fi ring run. They informed AWACS
they were “ engaged, ” and, at 10:30 am , shot down the two helicopters.
Destroying enemy aircraft is the fi ghter pilots ’ grail. Only later did the two
learn that they had destroyed two American UH - 60 Black Hawk helicopters, kill-
ing all twenty - six U.N. relief workers aboard. How could experienced, highly
trained pilots make such an error? Snook (2000) offers a compelling explana-
tion. The two types of aircraft had different paint colors — Hinds tan, Black
Hawks forest green — and the Black Hawks had American fl ags painted on the
fuselage. But the Black Hawks ’ camoufl age made them diffi cult to see against
the terrain, particularly for fi ghters fl ying very fast at high altitudes. Visual iden-
tifi cation required fl ying at a dangerously low altitude in a mountain - walled
valley. The fi ghter pilots were eager to get above the mountains as quickly as
possible. An extensive postmortem confi rmed that the Black Hawks would have
been diffi cult to identify. The pilots did the normal human thing in the face of
ambiguous perceptual data: they fi lled in gaps based on what they knew, what
they expected, and what they wanted to see. “ By the time Tiger 01 saw the
helicopters, he already believed that they were enemy. All that remained was for
him to selectively match up incoming scraps of visual data with a reasonable
cognitive scheme of an enemy silhouette ” (p. 80).
Recall that in Chapter One , we described the “ blink ” process of rapid cogni-
tion. The essence of this process is matching situational cues with a well - learned
mental model — a “ deeply - held, nonconscious category or pattern ” (Dane and
Pratt, 2007, p. 37). While necessary and useful, quick judgments are not fool-
proof. Their accuracy depends on available clues, expectations, and patterns in
the decision maker ’ s repertory. All of these presented problems for the fi ghter
pilots. The perceptual data were hard to read, and expectations were prejudiced
by a key missing clue — no mention of friendly helicopters. Even though situa-
tion analysis plays a pivotal role in their training, pilots lacked adequate diagnos-
tic schemata for distinguishing Hinds from Black Hawks. All this made it easy
for them to conclude that they were seeing enemy aircraft.
Making Sense of What ’ s Going On Some events are so clear and unambiguous that it is easy for people to agree on
what is going on. Determining if a train is on schedule, if a plane landed safely,
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Reframing Organizations38
or if a clock is keeping accurate time is straightforward. But most of the impor-
tant issues confronting managers are not so clear - cut. Solid facts and simple
problems in everyday life at work are scarce. Will a reorganization work? Was a
meeting successful? Why did a consensual decision backfi re? In trying to make
sense of complicated and ambiguous situations, we — like the F - 15C fi ghter
pilots — depend very much on our frames, or mind - sets, to give us a full reading
of what we are up against. But snap judgments work only if we have adequately
sized up the situation.
Since our interpretations depend so much on our cognitive repertoires, expec-
tations, beliefs, and values, our internal world is as important as what is outside —
sometimes more so. The fuzziness of everyday life makes it easy for people to shape
the world to conform to their favored internal schemata. As noted by DeBecker,
“ Many experts lose the creativity and imagination of the less informed. They are so
intimately familiar with known patterns that they may fail to recognize or respect
the importance of a new wrinkle ” (1997, p. 30). In such cases, snap judgments
work against, rather than for, the person who is trying to fi gure things out.
Managers regularly face an unending barrage of puzzles or “ messes. ” To act
without creating more trouble, they must fi rst grasp an accurate picture of what
is happening. Then they must move quickly to a deeper level, asking, “ What is
really going on here? ” That ’ s the main objective of teaching pilots the art of sit-
uational analysis. But this important step in reading a situation is often over-
looked. As a result, managers too often form superfi cial analyses and leap on the
solutions nearest at hand or most in vogue. Market share declining? Try strategic
planning. Customer complaints? Put in a quality program. Profi ts down? Time
to reengineer or downsize.
A better alternative is to think, to probe more deeply into what is really going
on, and to develop an accurate diagnosis. The process is more intuitive than ana-
lytic: “ [It] is in fact a cognitive process, faster than we recognize and far differ-
ent from the step - by - step thinking we rely on so willingly. We think conscious
thought is somehow better, when in fact, intuition is soaring fl ight compared to
the plodding of logic ” (DeBecker, 1997, p. 28). The ability to size up a situation
quickly is at the heart of leadership. Admiral Carlisle Trost, former chief of naval
operations, once remarked, “ The fi rst responsibility of a leader is to fi gure out
what is going on . . . . That is never easy to do because situations are rarely black
or white, they are a pale shade of gray . . . they are seldom neatly packaged. ”
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Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 39
It all adds up to a simple truth that is easy to overlook. The world we per-
ceive is, for the most part, constructed internally. The ideas, or theories, we
hold determine whether a given situation is foggy or clear, mildly interesting
or momentous, a paralyzing disaster or a genuine learning experience. Personal
theories are essential because of a basic fact about human perception: in any sit-
uation, there is simply too much happening for us to attend to everything. To
help us understand what is going on and what to do next, well - grounded, deeply
ingrained personal theories offer two advantages: they tell us what is important
and what can be safely ignored, and they group scattered bits of information into
manageable patterns.
The Dilemma of Changing or Conserving To a nonpilot, a commercial airliner ’ s cockpit is a confusing array of controls,
switches, and gauges. Yet an experienced pilot can discern the aircraft ’ s status at
a glance. Like other professionals, a pilot learns patterns that cluster seemingly
fragmented bits of information into a clear picture. The patterns take many
hours to learn, but once learned, they help the pilot size things up with ease,
speed, and accuracy. In the same way, an experienced manager can read a situa-
tion very rapidly, decide what needs to be done, and make it happen.
The good and bad news is that, right or wrong, our theories shield us from
confusion, uncertainty, and anxiety. Tiger 01, for example, knew exactly what to
do because he believed what he saw. We rely on the theories we have, and, in the
heat of the moment, it ’ s not easy to recognize when we are making a big mistake
if we feel confi dent in our judgment. But, as Gladwell writes: “ Our snap judg-
ments and fi rst impressions can be educated and controlled ” to shift the odds in
our favor (2005, p. 15).
This learning needs to happen before we fi nd ourselves in make - or - break sit-
uations. When the stakes are high, we have tried every lens we know, and noth-
ing works, we get anxious and stuck. We are caught in a dilemma: holding on
to old patterns is ineffective, but developing new mental models is diffi cult. It
is also risky; it might lead to analysis paralysis and further erosion of our confi -
dence and effectiveness.
This dilemma exists even if we see no fl aws in our current mind - set, because
our theories are self - sealing fi lters — they block us from recognizing our errors.
Extensive research documents the many ways in which individuals spin reality to
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Reframing Organizations40
protect existing beliefs (see, for example, Garland, 1990; K ü hberger, 1995; Staw
and Hoang, 1995). This helps to explain why Enron ’ s Ken Lay insisted he had
done the right thing, even though his company collapsed. Heath and Gonzalez
(1995) found that decision makers rely on others more to strengthen preconceived
thinking than to gain new information. Tetlock (2000) showed that managers ’
judgments of performance were infl uenced by cognitive preferences and political
ideologies. Extensive research on the “ framing effect ” (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) shows how powerful subtle cues can be. Relatively modest changes in
how a problem or decision is framed can have a dramatic impact on how people
respond (Shu and Adams, 1995; Gegerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinb ö lting, 1991).
Decision makers, for example, tend to respond more favorably to an option that
has a “ 70 percent chance of success ” than one that has a “ 30 percent chance of
failure, ” even though they are statistically identical.
Many of us recognize that our mental maps infl uence how we interpret the
world. Less widely understood is that what we expect often determines what we
get. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) studied schoolteachers who were told that cer-
tain students in their classes were “ spurters ” — students who were “ about to bloom. ”
The so - called spurters had been randomly selected but still achieved above - average
gains on achievement tests. They really did spurt. Somehow the teachers ’ expec-
tations were communicated to and assimilated by the students. Modern medical
science is still trying to understand the power of the placebo effect — the power of
sugar pills to make people better. Results are attributed to an unexplained change
in the patient ’ s belief system. Patients believe they will get better; therefore they
do. Similar effects have been replicated in countless reorganizations, new product
launches, and new approaches to performance appraisal. All these examples show
how hard it is to disentangle the reality out there from the models in our minds. 2
In Western cultures, particularly, there is a tendency to embrace one theory
or ideology and to try to make the world conform. If it works, we persist in our
view. If discrepancies arise, we try to rationalize them away. If people challenge
our view, we ignore them or put them in their place. Only poor results over a
long period of time call our theories into question. Even then, we often simply
entrench ourselves in a new worldview, triggering the cycle again.
Japan has four major religions, each with unique beliefs and assumptions:
Buddhism, Confucianism, Shintoism, and Taoism. Though the religions dif-
fer greatly in history, traditions, and basic tenets, many Japanese feel no need to
choose only one. They use all four, taking advantage of the strengths of each for
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Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations 41
suitable purposes or occasions. The four frames can play a similar role for man-
agers in modern organizations. Rather than portraying the fi eld of organizational
theory as fragmented, we present it as pluralistic. Seen this way, the fi eld offers a
rich assortment of lenses for viewing organizations. Each theoretical tradition
is helpful. Each has blind spots. Each tells its own story about organizations.
The ability to shift nimbly from one to another helps redefi ne situations so they
become understandable and manageable. The ability to reframe is one of the
most powerful capacities of great artists. It can be equally powerful for manag-
ers. Undergraduates at Vanderbilt University captured this in a class - initiated rap
(for best results, rap fans might imagine the rapper Common doing these lines
in a neo - soul, hip - hop style):
Reframe, reframe, put a new spin on the mess you ’ re in.
Reframe, reframe, try to play a different game. Reframe, reframe, when you ’ re in a tangle,
shoot another angle; look at things a different way.
SUMMARY Because organizations are complex, surprising, deceptive, and ambiguous, they
are formidably diffi cult to comprehend and manage. Our preconceived theo-
ries and images determine what we see, what we do, and how we judge what
we accomplish. Narrow, oversimplifi ed perspectives become fallacies that cloud
rather than illuminate managerial action. The world of most managers and
administrators is a world of messes: complexity, ambiguity, value dilemmas,
political pressures, and multiple constituencies. For managers whose images
blind them to important parts of this chaotic reality, it is a world of frustration
and failure. For those with better theories and the intuitive capacity to use them
with skill and grace, it is a world of excitement and possibility. A mess can be
defi ned as both a troublesome situation and a group of people who eat together.
The core challenge of leadership is to move an organization from the former to
something more like the latter.
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Reframing Organizations42
In succeeding chapters, we look at four perspectives, or frames, that have
helped managers and leaders fi nd clarity and meaning amid the confusion
of organizational life. The frames are grounded in cool - headed management
science and tempered by the heat of actual practice. We cannot guarantee
your success as a manager or a change agent. We believe, though, that you can
improve your odds with an artful appreciation of how to use the four lenses to
understand and infl uence what ’ s really going on.
NOTES 1. We used citation analysis (how often a work is referenced in the schol-
arly literature) to develop a list of “ scholars ’ greatest hits ” — the works that
organizational scholars rely on most. The Appendix shows our results and
discusses how we developed our analysis. At appropriate points in the book
(where the ideas are most relevant, as here), we present a brief summary of
key ideas from works at the top of our list.
2. These examples all show thinking infl uencing reality. A social constructiv-
ist perspective goes a step further to say that our thinking constructs social
reality. In this view, an organization exists not “ out there ” but in the minds
and actions of its constituents. This idea is illustrated in an old story about
a dispute among three baseball umpires. The fi rst says, “ Some ’ s balls, and
some ’ s strikes, and I calls ’ em like they are. ” The second counters, “ No, you
got it wrong. Some ’ s balls, and some ’ s strikes, and I calls ’ em the way I sees
them. ” The third says, “ You guys don ’ t really get it. Some ’ s balls, and some ’ s
strikes, but they ain ’ t nothing until I call them. ” The fi rst umpire is a real-
ist who believes that what he sees is exactly what is. The second recognizes
that reality is infl uenced by his own perception. The third is the social
constructivist — his call makes them what they are. This distinction is par-
ticularly important in the symbolic frame, which we return to in Chapter
Twelve .
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PA RT T W O
The Structural Frame
A frame, as explained in Chapter Two , is a coherent set of ideas forming a prism or lens that enables you to see and understand more clearly what goes on from day to day. In Part Two, we embark
on the fi rst stage of a tour of four different ways of making sense
of life at work—or anywhere else. Each frame is presented in three
chapters: one that introduces the basic concepts and two that focus
on key applications and extensions. We begin with one of the oldest
and most popular ways of thinking about organizations, the struc-
tural frame.
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Reframing Organizations44
If someone asked you to describe your organization — your workplace, your
school, or even your family — what image would come to mind? A likely pos-
sibility is a traditional organization chart: a series of boxes and lines depicting
job responsibilities and levels. The chart might be shaped roughly like a pyra-
mid, with a small number of authorities at the top and a much larger number
of grunts at the bottom. Such a chart is only one of many images that refl ect the
structural view. The frame is rooted in traditional rational images but goes much
deeper to develop versatile and powerful ways to understand social architecture
and its consequences.
We begin Chapter Three with two cases contrasting the structural features of
a highly disciplined aircraft carrier with the structural lapses that hampered res-
cue efforts in New York City ’ s 9/11 terrorist attacks. We then highlight the basic
assumptions of the structural view with emphasis on two key dimensions: divid-
ing work and coordinating it thereafter. We emphasize how structural design
depends on an organization ’ s circumstances, including its goals, technology, and
environment. In addition, we show why tightly controlled, top - down forms may
work in simple, stable situations but fall short in more fl uid and ambiguous ones.
In Chapter Four , we turn to issues of structural change and redesign. We
describe basic structural tensions, explore alternatives to consider when new cir-
cumstances require revisions, and discuss challenges of the restructuring process.
We close the chapter with examples of successful structural change.
Finally, in Chapter Five , we apply structural concepts to groups and teams.
When teams work poorly, members often blame one another for problems
that refl ect confi guration rather than individual failings. We begin by examin-
ing structural arrangements in fi ve - person teams. Then we contrast the games
of baseball, American football, and basketball to show how optimal structure
depends on what a team is trying to do and under what conditions. We close by
examining the architectural design of high - performance teams.
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45
Getting Organized
It might have looked like chaos, but we always knew what was going on, ” says Commander Gary Deal about his service on the aircraft carrier USS Kennedy. 1 In Commander Deal ’ s panoramic
view from the bridge, a complex, fast - moving fl ight deck was rel-
atively easy to read and manage. When fully equipped for deploy-
ment, the Kennedy was home to more than fi ve thousand men and
women. About half were assigned to the ship and half to the carrier ’ s
air wing. The ship was organized into nineteen departments, while
the air wing had nine squadrons. The fl ight deck was responsible
for the safe and effi cient launch and recovery of the aircraft. Fifty
functional roles were involved in the process. Individuals ’ functions
were immediately obvious from their uniforms: blue for “ grunts, ”
red for weapons and fi re - control personnel, brown for aircraft traf-
fi c directors, and purple for fuelers (affectionately referred to as
“ grapes ” ). Supervisory personnel wore yellow, safety personnel wore
white, and offi cers on the bridge dressed in standard khaki. The offi -
cer of the deck wore a gold - emblazoned baseball cap. The captain
had overall command of the ship, while the commander of the air
group was in charge of the pilots and aircraft.
T H R E E
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations46
In combat, the USS Kennedy ’ s primary goal was clear: bombs on target. To reach
that objective, all functions had to work together. Anyone ’ s actions could affect
everyone aboard, especially in close quarters under battle conditions. Individuals
knew their own jobs even if they were less clear about the big picture. A carrier
succeeded only if roles were clear and everybody responded to the chain of com-
mand. The performance of the carrier fl eet in the Gulf War in the early 1990s
and a decade later in Afghanistan, as well as in the more recent 2003 campaign
in Iraq, gave ample evidence that warships like the Kennedy can do their job.
A naval carrier can plan for most combat contingencies. The same was not
true for New York City ’ s fi re and police departments when they confronted the
9/11 terrorist strikes on the World Trade Center. That day saw countless inspir-
ing examples of individual heroism and personal sacrifi ce. At the risk of their
own lives, emergency personnel rescued thousands of people. Many died in
the effort. But extraordinary individual efforts were hindered or thwarted by
breakdowns in communication, command, and control. Police helicopters near
the north tower radioed that it was near collapse more than twenty minutes
before it fell. Police offi cers got the warning, and most escaped. But the word
reached very few fi refi ghters. There was no link between fi re and police radios,
and the commanders in the two departments could not communicate because
their command posts were three blocks apart. It might not have helped if they
had talked, because the fi re department ’ s radios were notoriously unreliable
in high - rise buildings. The breakdown of communication and coordination
magnifi ed the death toll — including 121 fi refi ghters who died when the north
tower collapsed. The absence of a clear, workable structure seriously impaired
the effectiveness of highly dedicated, skilled professionals who gave their all in
an unprecedented catastrophe (Dwyer, Flynn, and Fessenden, 2002).
Comparing the situation aboard the USS Kennedy with rescue efforts at the
World Trade Center points to a core premise of the structural lens: clear, well -
understood goals, roles, and relationships and adequate coordination are essen-
tial to organizational performance. This is true of all organizations: families,
clubs, hospitals, businesses, and public agencies. The right structure forms a
solid underpinning to combat the risk that individuals, however talented, will
become confused, ineffective, apathetic, or hostile. The purpose of this chapter
and the next two is to identify the basic ideas and inner workings of a perspec-
tive that is fundamental to social endeavors.
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Getting Organized 47
We begin our examination of the structural frame by highlighting its core
assumptions, origins, and basic forms. The possibilities for designing an orga-
nization ’ s structure, or social architecture, are almost limitless, but any option
must address two key questions: How do we allocate responsibilities across
different units and roles? And, once we ’ ve done that, how do we integrate diverse
efforts in pursuit of common goals? In this chapter, we explain these basic issues,
describe the major options, and discuss imperatives to consider when designing
a structure to fi t the challenges of a unique situation.
STRUCTURAL ASSUMPTIONS The assumptions of the structural frame are refl ected in current approaches
to organizational design. These suppositions refl ect a belief in rationality and
a faith that a suitable array of formal roles and responsibilities will minimize
distracting personal static and maximize people ’ s performance on the job.
Where the human resource approach (to be discussed in Chapters Six through
Eight ) emphasizes dealing with issues by changing people (through train-
ing, rotation, promotion, or dismissal), the structural perspective argues for
putting people in the right roles and relationships. Properly designed, these
formal arrangements can accommodate both collective goals and individual
differences.
Six assumptions undergird the structural frame:
1. Organizations exist to achieve established goals and objectives.
2. Organizations increase effi ciency and enhance performance through spe-
cialization and appropriate division of labor.
3. Suitable forms of coordination and control ensure that diverse efforts of
individuals and units mesh.
4. Organizations work best when rationality prevails over personal agendas
and extraneous pressures.
5. Structures must be designed to fi t an organization ’ s current circumstances
(including its goals, technology, workforce, and environment).
6. Problems arise and performance suffers from structural defi ciencies, which
can be remedied through analysis and restructuring.
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Reframing Organizations48
ORIGINS OF THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE The structural view has two main intellectual roots. The fi rst is the work of indus-
trial analysts bent on designing organizations for maximum effi ciency. The most
prominent of these, Frederick W. Taylor (1911), was the father of time - and - motion
studies; he founded an approach that he labeled “ scientifi c management. ” Taylor
broke tasks into minute parts and retrained workers to get the most from each
motion and every second spent at work. Other theorists who contributed to the
scientifi c management approach (Fayol, [1919] 1949; Urwick, 1937; Gulick and
Urwick, 1937) developed principles focused on specialization, span of control,
authority, and delegation of responsibility.
A second ancestor of structural ideas is the German economist and sociolo-
gist Max Weber. Weber wrote around the beginning of the twentieth century.
At the time, formal organization was a relatively new phenomenon. Patriarchy,
rather than rationality, was still the primary organizing principle. Patriarchal
organizations were dominated by a father fi gure, a ruler with almost unlimited
authority and boundless power. He could reward, punish, promote, or fi re on
personal whim. Seeing an evolution of new models in late - nineteenth - century
Europe, Weber described “ monocratic bureaucracy ” as an ideal form that maxi-
mized norms of rationality. His model outlined several major features:
A fi xed division of labor
A hierarchy of offi ces
A set of rules governing performance
A separation of personal from offi cial property and rights
The use of technical qualifi cations (not family ties or friendship) for selecting
personnel
Employment as primary occupation and long - term career
After World War II, Weber ’ s work was rediscovered, inspiring a substantial
body of theory and research. Blau and Scott (1962), Perrow (1986), Thompson
(1967), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), and Hall (1963), among others, ampli-
fi ed the bureaucratic model. Their work examined relationships among the ele-
ments of structure, looked closely at why organizations choose one structure
over another, and analyzed the effects of structure on morale, productivity, and
effectiveness.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Getting Organized 49
G R E A T E S T H I T S F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T U D I E S
Hit Number 4: James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967)
“Organizations act, but what determines how and when they will act?”
(p. 1). That guiding question opens Thompson’s compact, tightly rea-
soned book. He answers that “organizations do some of the basic things
they do because they must—or else! Because they are expected to pro-
duce results, their actions are expected to be reasonable, or rational”
(p. 1). As Thompson sees them, organizations operate under “norms of
rationality,” but rationality is no easy thing to achieve because of the
central challenge of uncertainty. “Uncertainties pose major challenges
to rationality, and we will argue that technologies and environments
are basic sources of uncertainty for organizations. How these facts of
organizational life lead organizations to design and structure them-
selves needs to be explored” (p. 1).
Thompson looked for a way to meld two distinct ways of thinking
about organizations. One was to see them as closed, rational systems (as
in Taylor’s scientifi c management and Weber’s theory of bureaucracy).
A second viewed them as open, natural systems in which “survival of
the system is taken to be the goal, and the parts and their relationships
are presumably determined through evolutionary processes” (p. 6). In
melding the two, he tried to build on a “newer tradition” emerging
from the work of March and Simon (1958, number 10 on our scholars’
list) and Cyert and March (1963, number 2). This tradition viewed orga-
nizations as “problem facing and problem solving” in a context of lim-
ited information and capacities.
With these premises, Thompson developed a series of propositions
about how organizations design and manage themselves as they seek
rationality in an uncertain world. The two primary sources of uncertainty,
in his view, are technology and the environment. He distinguishes three
kinds of technology—pooled, sequential, and reciprocal—each making
different demands on communication and coordination. Since demands
and intrusions from the environment threaten effi ciency, organizations
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Reframing Organizations50
try to increase their ability to anticipate and control the environment
and attempt to insulate their technical core from environmental fl uctua-
tions. Still another source of uncertainty is the “variable human.” The
more uncertainty an organization faces, the more discretion individuals
need to cope with it, but greater discretion creates a challenge of con-
trolling its use. “Paradoxically, the administrative process must reduce
uncertainty but at the same time search for fl exibility” (pp. 157–158).
STRUCTURAL FORMS AND FUNCTIONS How does structure infl uence what happens in the workplace? Essentially, it is
a blueprint for offi cially sanctioned expectations and exchanges among inter-
nal players (executives, managers, employees) and external constituencies (such
as customers and clients). Like an animal ’ s skeleton or a building ’ s framework,
structural form both enhances and constrains what an organization can accom-
plish. The alternative design possibilities are virtually infi nite, limited only by
human preferences and capacity.
We often assume that people prefer structures with more choices and latitude
(Leavitt, 1978). But this is not always the case. A study by Moeller (1968), for
example, explored the effects of structure on teacher morale in two school sys-
tems. One was structured loosely and encouraged wide participation in decision
making. The other was tightly controlled, with centralized authority and a clear
chain of command. Moeller found the opposite of what he expected: faculty
morale was higher in the district with a tighter structure.
United Parcel Service, “ Big Brown, ” provides a current example of Moeller ’ s
fi nding. In the company ’ s early days, UPS delivery employees were “ scampering
messenger boys ” (Niemann, 2007). Since then, computer technology has replaced
employee discretion, and every step from pickup to delivery is highly routinized.
Detailed instructions specify where and in what order packages are to be placed on
delivery trucks. Drivers follow computer - generated routes (which minimize mile-
age and left turns, to save time and gas). Newly scheduled pickups are automati-
cally inserted into the nearest driver ’ s route plan. If a driver sees you as he trots to
your door, you ’ ll get a friendly greeting. Look carefully and you ’ ll notice the truck
keys on the ring fi nger of the left hand. Given such a tight leash, you might expect
demoralized employees. But the technology makes the job easier and enables driv-
ers to be more productive. As one remarked with a smile, “ We ’ re happy robots. ”
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Getting Organized 51
Do these examples prove that a tighter structure is better? Not necessar-
ily. Adler and Borys (1996) argue that the type of structure is as important as
the amount or rigidity. There are good rules and bad ones. Formal structure
enhances morale if it helps us get our work done. It has a negative impact if it
gets in our way, buries us in red tape, or makes it too easy for management to
control us. Equating structure to rigid bureaucracy confuses “ two very different
kinds of machine — machines designed to de - skill work and those designed to
leverage users ’ skills ” (p. 69).
Structure, then, need not be machinelike or infl exible. Structures in stable
environments are often hierarchical and rules - oriented. But recent years have
witnessed remarkable inventiveness in designing structures emphasizing fl exibil-
ity, participation, and quality. A prime example is BMW, the luxury automaker
whose success formula relies on a combination of stellar quality and rapid inno-
vation. “ Just about everyone working for the Bavarian automaker — from the fac-
tory fl oor to the design studios to the marketing department — is encouraged to
speak out. Ideas bubble up freely, and there is never a penalty for proposing a
new way of doing things, no matter how outlandish. Detroit ’ s rigid and bloated
bureaucracies are slow to respond to competitive threats and market trends,
while BMW ’ s management structure is fl at, fl exible, entrepreneurial — and fast.
That explains why, at the very moment GM and Ford appear to be in free fall,
BMW is more robust than ever. The company has become the industry bench-
mark for high - performance premium cars, customized production, and savvy
brand management ” (Edmondson, 2006, p. 72).
Dramatic changes in technology and the business environment have rendered
old structures obsolete at an unprecedented rate, spawning a new interest in
organizational design (Nadler, Gerstein, and Shaw, 1992; Bryan and Joyce, 2007).
Pressures of globalization, competition, technology, customer expectations, and
workforce dynamics have prompted organizations worldwide to rethink and rede-
sign structural prototypes. A swarm of items compete for managers ’ attention —
money, markets, people, and technological competencies, to name a few. But a
signifi cant amount of time and attention must be devoted to social architecture —
designing structure that allows people to do their best:
CEOs typically opt for the ad hoc structural change, the big acquisi-
tion, or a focus on where and how to compete. They would be bet-
ter off focusing on organizational design. Our research convinces
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Reframing Organizations52
us that in the digital age, there is no better use of a CEO ’ s time and
energy than making organizations work better. Most companies
were designed for the industrial age of the past century, when capital
was the scarce resource, interaction costs were high, and hierarchical
authority and vertically integrated structures were the keys to effi -
cient operation. Today superior performance fl ows from the ability
to fi t these structures into the present century ’ s very different sources
of wealth creation [Bryan and Joyce, 2007, p. 1].
BASIC STRUCTURAL TENSIONS Two issues are central to structural design: how to allocate work (differentiation)
and how to coordinate diverse efforts once responsibilities have been parceled
out (integration). Even in a group as small and intimate as a family, it ’ s important
to settle issues concerning who does what, when the “ what ” gets done, and how
individual efforts mesh to ensure harmony. Every family will fi nd an arrange-
ment of roles and synchronization that works — or suffer the fallout.
Division of labor — or allocating tasks — is the keystone of structure. Every liv-
ing system creates specialized roles to get important work done. Consider an ant
colony: “ Small workers . . . spend most of their time in the nest feeding the larval
broods; intermediate - sized workers constitute most of the population, going out on
raids as well as doing other jobs. The largest workers . . . have a huge head and large
powerful jaws. These individuals are . . . soldiers; they carry no food but constantly
run along the fl anks of the raiding and emigration columns ” (Topoff, 1972, p. 72).
Like ants, humans long ago discovered the virtues of specialization. A job
(or position) channels behavior by prescribing what someone is to do — or not
do — to accomplish a task. Prescriptions take the form of job descriptions, proce-
dures, routines, protocols, or rules (Mintzberg, 1979). On one hand, these formal
constraints can be burdensome, leading to apathy, absenteeism, and resistance
(Argyris, 1957, 1964). On the other hand, they help to ensure predictability, uni-
formity, and reliability. If manufacturing standards, airline maintenance, hotel
housekeeping, or prison sentences were left solely to individual discretion, prob-
lems of quality and equity would abound.
Once an organization spells out positions or roles, managers face a second
set of key decisions: how to group people into working units. They have several
basic options (Mintzberg, 1979):
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Getting Organized 53
Functional groups based on knowledge or skill, as in the case of a university ’ s
academic departments or the classic industrial units of research, engineering,
manufacturing, marketing, and fi nance.
Units created on the basis of time, as by shift (day, swing, or graveyard shift).
Groups organized by product: detergent versus bar soap, wide - body versus
narrow - body aircraft.
Groups established around customers or clients, as in hospital wards created
around patient type (pediatrics, intensive care, or maternity), computer sales
departments organized by customer (corporate, government, education, indi-
vidual), or schools targeting students in particular age groups.
Groupings around place or geography, such as regional offi ces in corpora-
tions and government agencies or neighborhood schools in different parts
of a city.
Grouping by process: a complete fl ow of work, as with “ the order fulfi llment
process. This process fl ows from initiation by a customer order, through the
functions, to delivery to the customer ” (Galbraith, 2001, p. 34).
Creating roles and units yields the benefi ts of specialization but creates prob-
lems of coordination and control — how to ensure that diverse efforts mesh.
Units tend to focus on their separate priorities and strike out on their own, as
New York ’ s police and fi re departments did on 9/11. The result is suboptimiza-
tion, an emphasis on achieving unit goals rather than focusing on the overall
mission. Efforts become fragmented, and performance suffers.
This problem plagued Tom Ridge, who was named by President George
W. Bush as the director of homeland security in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks. Ridge struggled to pull together previously autonomous agencies. But he
was more salesman and preacher than boss — he lacked the authority to com-
pel compliance. Ridge ’ s slow progress led President Bush to create a cabinet - level
Department of Homeland Security. The goal was to cluster independent security
agencies under one central authority. Unfortunately, the new structure created
its own problems. Folding the Federal Emergency Management Agency into the
mix reduced FEMA ’ s autonomy and shifted its priorities toward more focus on
security and less on disaster management. The same agency that had responded
nimbly to hurricanes and earthquakes in the 1990s was slow and ponderous in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and lacked authority and budget to move
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Reframing Organizations54
without a formal okay from the new secretary of homeland security (Cooper
and Block, 2006).
Successful organizations employ a variety of methods to coordinate individ-
ual and group efforts and to link local initiatives with corporation - wide goals.
They do this in two primary ways: vertically, through the formal chain of com-
mand, and laterally, through meetings, committees, coordinating roles, or net-
work structures. We next look at each of these strategies in detail.
VERTICAL COORDINATION With vertical coordination, higher levels coordinate and control the work of sub-
ordinates through authority, rules and policies, and planning and control systems.
Authority The most basic and ubiquitous way to harmonize the efforts of individuals, units,
or divisions is to designate a boss with formal authority. Authorities — executives,
managers, and supervisors — are offi cially charged with keeping action aligned
with goals and objectives. They accomplish this by making decisions, resolving
confl icts, solving problems, evaluating performance and output, and distribut-
ing rewards and sanctions. A chain of command is a hierarchy of managerial and
supervisory strata, each with legitimate power to shape and direct the behavior
of those at lower levels. It works best when authority is both endorsed by subor-
dinates and authorized by superiors (Dornbusch and Scott, 1975). On the USS
Kennedy, for example, the chain of command was crystal clear and universally
accepted. It is one reason that the ultimate goal — bombs on target — was consis-
tently attained.
Rules and Policies Rules, policies, standards, and standard operating procedures limit individual
discretion and help ensure that behavior is predictable and consistent. Rules
and policies govern conditions of work and specify standard ways of completing
tasks, handling personnel issues, and relating to customers and other key players
in the outer environment. This helps ensure that similar situations are handled
in comparable ways. It reduces “ particularism ” (Perrow, 1986) — responding to
specifi c issues on the basis of personal whims or political pressures unrelated
to organizational goals. Two citizens ’ complaints about a tax bill are supposed to
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Getting Organized 55
be treated similarly, even if one citizen is a prominent politician and the other a
shoe clerk. Once a situation is defi ned as one where a rule applies, the course of
action is clear, straightforward, and, in an ideal world, almost automatic.
A standard is a benchmark to ensure that goods and services maintain a
specifi ed level of quality. Measurement against the standard makes it possible to
identify and fi x problems. During the 1970s and 1980s, American manufactur-
ing standards lagged, while Japanese manufacturers were scrupulous in ensuring
that high standards were widely known and universally accepted. In one case, an
American company ordered ball bearings from a Japanese plant. The Americans
insisted on what they saw as an unusually high standard — only twenty defective
parts per thousand. When the order arrived, it included a separate bag of twenty
defective bearings, and a note: “ We were not sure why you wanted these, but here
they are. ” Pressure for world - class quality spawned growing interest in “ Six Sigma, ”
a statistical standard of near perfection (Pyzdek, 2003). Although Six Sigma has
raised quality standards in many companies around the world, its laser focus on
measurable aspects of work processes and outcomes has sometimes hampered cre-
ativity in innovative companies such as 3M (Hindo, 2007, pp. 8 – 12). Safer, more
measurable options may crowd out the elusive breakthroughs a fi rm needs.
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) reduce variance in routine tasks that
have little margin for error. Commercial airline pilots typically fl y with a dif-
ferent crew every month. Cockpit actions are tightly intertwined, the need for
coordination is high, and mistakes can kill. SOPs consequently govern much of
the work of fl ying a plane. Pilots are trained extensively in the procedures and
seldom violate them. But a signifi cant percentage of aviation accidents occur in
the rare case that someone does. More than one airplane has crashed on takeoff
because the crew missed a required checklist item.
SOPs can fall short, however, in the face of “ black swans ” (Taleb, 2007) — freak
surprises that the SOPs were never designed to handle. In the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
pilots followed standard procedures for dealing with hijackers: cooperate with
their demands and try to get the plane on the ground quickly. These SOPs were
based on a long history of hijackers who wanted to make a statement, not wreak
destruction on a suicide mission. Passengers on United Airlines fl ight 93, who had
learned via cell phones that the hijackers were using aircraft as bombs rather than
bully pulpits, abandoned this approach. They lost their lives fi ghting to regain con-
trol of the plane, but theirs was the only one of four hijacked jets that failed to
devastate a high - profi le building.
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Reframing Organizations56
Planning and Control Systems Reliance on planning and control systems — forecasting and measuring — has
mushroomed since the dawn of the computer era. Retailers, for example, need to
know what ’ s selling and what isn ’ t. Point - of - sale terminals now yield that infor-
mation instantly. Data fl ow freely up and down the hierarchy, greatly enhancing
management ’ s ability to oversee performance and respond in real time.
Mintzberg (1979) distinguishes two major approaches to control and plan-
ning: performance control and action planning. Performance control imposes
concrete outcome objectives (for example, “ increase sales by 10 percent this
year ” ) without specifying how the results are to be achieved. Performance con-
trol measures and motivates individual efforts, particularly when targets are rea-
sonably clear and calculable. Locke and Latham (2002) make the case that clear
and challenging goals are a powerful incentive to high performance. Performance
control is less successful when goals are ambiguous, hard to measure, or of
dubious relevance. A notorious example was the use of enemy body counts by
the U.S. Army to measure combat effectiveness in Vietnam; fi eld commanders
became obsessed with “ getting the numbers up. ” The numbers painted a picture
of progress, even as the war was being lost.
Action planning specifi es methods and time frames for decisions and
actions, as in “ increase this month ’ s sales by using a companywide sales pitch ”
(Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 153 – 154). Action planning works best when it is easier to
assess how a job is done than to measure its product. This is often true of service
jobs. McDonald ’ s has very clear specifi cations for how counter employees are
to greet customers (for example, with a smile and a cheerful welcome). United
Parcel Service has a detailed policy manual that specifi es how a package should
be delivered. The objective is customer satisfaction, but it is easier to monitor
employees ’ behavior than customers ’ reactions. An inevitable risk in action plan-
ning is that the link between action and outcome may fail. When that happens,
employees may get bad results by doing just what they ’ re supposed to do.
LATERAL COORDINATION People ’ s behavior is often remarkably untouched by commands, rules, and systems.
Lateral techniques — formal and informal meetings, task forces, coordinating
roles, matrix structures, and networks — pop up to fi ll the void. Lateral forms are
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Getting Organized 57
typically less formal and more fl exible than authority - bound systems and rules.
They are often simpler and quicker as well.
Meetings Formal gatherings and informal exchanges are the cornerstone of lateral coor-
dination. All organizations have regular meetings. Boards confer to make policy.
Executive committees gather to make strategic decisions. In some government
agencies, review committees (sometimes known as “ murder boards ” ) convene to
examine proposals from lower levels. Formal meetings provide a lion ’ s share of
lateral harmonization in relatively simple, stable organizations — for example, a
railroad with a predictable market, a manufacturer with a stable product, or
a life insurance company selling standard policies.
But informal contacts and exchanges are vital to take up slack and glue things
together in fast - paced, turbulent environments. Pixar, the animation studio whose
series of hits has included Toy Story, Finding Nemo, The Incredibles, and Cars,
relies on a constant stream of informal connections among managers and engi-
neers in its three major groups. Technologists develop graphic tools, artists create
stories and pictures, and production experts knit the pieces together in the fi nal
fi lm. “ What makes it all work is [Pixar ’ s] insistence that these groups constantly
talk to each other. So a producer of a scene can deal with the animator without
having to navigate through higher - ups ” (Schlender, 2004, p. 212).
Task Forces As organizations become more complex, the demand for lateral communication
mushrooms. Additional face - to - face coordination devices are needed. Task forces
assemble when new problems or opportunities require collaboration of diverse
specialties or functions. High - technology fi rms rely heavily on project teams or
task forces to synchronize the development of new products or services.
Coordinating Roles Coordinating roles or units use persuasion and negotiation to help others dove-
tail their efforts. These are essentially boundary - spanners, individuals or groups
with diplomatic status who are artful in dealing across specialized turfs. For
example, a product manager in a consumer goods company, responsible for the
performance of a laundry detergent or low - fat snack, has what is primarily a
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Reframing Organizations58
coordinating role, spending much of the day pulling together functions essential
to the product ’ s success: research, manufacturing, marketing, and sales.
Matrix Structures Beginning in the 1960s, many organizations in unwieldy environments developed
matrix structures. By the mid - 1990s, Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), the electrical engi-
neering giant, had grown to encompass some thirteen hundred separate companies
and more than two hundred thousand employees worldwide. To hold this complex
collection together, ABB developed a matrix structure crisscrossing approximately
a hundred countries with about sixty - fi ve business sectors (Rappaport, 1992). Each
subsidiary reported to both a country manager (Sweden, Germany, and so on) and
a sector manager (power transformers, transportation, and the like). The design
carried the inevitable risk of confusion, tension, and confl ict between sector and
country managers. ABB tried to create structural cohesion at the top with a small
executive coordinating committee (thirteen individuals from eight countries), an
elite cadre of some fi ve hundred global managers, and a policy of communicating
in English, even though it was a second language for most employees.
The structure worked through the 1990s, and ABB became one of Europe ’ s
most admired companies. But the inherent tensions eventually took a toll, and
after a business downturn in 2000, ABB began to generate more bad news than
good (Reed and Sains, 2002). Nonetheless, variations on ABB ’ s structure — a
matrix with business or product lines on one axis and countries or regions on
the other — are common in global corporations.
Networks Networks have always been around, more so in some places than others.
Cochran (2000) describes how both Western and Japanese fi rms doing busi-
ness in China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had to adapt their hier-
archical structures to accommodate powerful social networks of merchants and
workers deeply embedded in Chinese culture. One British fi rm tried for years,
with little success, to limit the control of “ Number Ones ” (who headed local net-
works based on kinship and birthplace) over the hiring and wages of its work-
force. The proliferation of information technology beginning in the 1980s led
to an explosive growth of computer networks — everything from small local
grids to the global Internet. These powerful new lateral communication devices
often supplanted vertical strategies and spurred the development of network
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Getting Organized 59
structures within and between organizations (Steward, 1994). Powell, Koput,
and Smith - Doerr (1996) describe the mushrooming of “ interorganizational net-
works ” in fast - moving fi elds like biotechnology, where knowledge is so complex
and widely dispersed that no organization can go it alone. They give an example
of research on Alzheimer ’ s disease that was carried out by thirty - four scientists
from three corporations, a university, a government laboratory, and a private
research institute.
Many large global corporations have evolved into interorganizational net-
works (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). Horizontal linkages supplement and some-
times supplant vertical coordination. Such a fi rm is multicentric: initiatives and
strategy emerge from many places, taking shape through a variety of partner-
ships and joint ventures.
DESIGNING A STRUCTURE THAT WORKS In designing a structure that works, managers have a set of options for dividing
up the work and coordinating multiple efforts. Structure needs to be designed
with an eye toward desired ends, the nature of the environment, the talents of
the workforce, and the available resources (such as time, budget, and other con-
tingencies). The options are summarized in Exhibit 3.1 .
Vertical or Lateral? As noted, vertical coordination rests on top - down command and control. It is
effi cient but not always effective, and it depends on employees ’ willingness to
follow directives from above. More decentralized and interactive lateral forms
of coordination are often needed to keep top - down control from stifl ing ini-
tiative and creativity. Lateral coordination is often more effective but costlier
than its vertical counterparts. A meeting, for example, provides an opportunity
for face - to - face dialogue and decision making, but risks squandering time and
energy. Personal and political agendas often undermine the meeting ’ s purpose.
A task force fosters creativity and integration around pressing problems but may
divert attention from ongoing operating issues. The effectiveness of coordinators
who span boundaries depends on their credibility and skills in handling others.
Coordinators are also prone to schedule meetings that take still more time from
actual work (Hannaway and Sproull, 1979). Matrix structures provide lateral
linkage and integration but are notorious for creating confl ict and confusion.
Networks are inherently diffi cult to manage.
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Reframing Organizations60
Organizations have to use both vertical and horizontal procedures for coor-
dination. The optimal blend of the two depends on the unique challenges in a
given situation. Vertical coordination is generally superior if an environment
is stable, tasks are well understood and predictable, and uniformity is essential.
Lateral communications work best when a complex task is performed in a tur-
bulent, fast - changing environment. Every organization must fi nd a design that
works for its circumstances. Consider the contrasting structures of two highly
successful organizations: McDonald ’ s and Harvard University.
M C D O N A L D ’ S A N D H A R V A R D : A S T R U C T U R A L O D D C O U P L E
McDonald ’ s, the company that made the Big Mac a household word,
has been enormously successful. For forty years after its founding in the
1950s, the company was an unstoppable growth engine that came to
Exhibit 3.1. Basic Structural Options.
Division of labor: Options for differentiation Function
Time
Product
Customers or clients
Place (geography)
Process
Coordination: Options for integration
Vertical Authority
Rules and policies
Planning and control systems
Lateral Meetings
Task forces
Coordinating roles
Matrix structures
Networks
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Getting Organized 61
dominate the worldwide fast - food business. McDonald ’ s has a relatively
small staff at its world headquarters near Chicago; the vast majority of
its employees are salted across the world in more than 31,000 local out-
lets. But despite its size and geographic reach, McDonald ’ s is a highly
centralized, tightly controlled organization. Most major decisions are
made at the top.
Managers and employees of McDonald ’ s restaurants have limited
discretion about how to do their jobs. Their work is controlled by tech-
nology; machines time french fries and measure soft drinks. The parent
company uses powerful systems like its “ Global Restaurant Operations
Improvement Process ” to ensure that customers get what they expect
and a Big Mac tastes about the same whether purchased in New York,
Beijing, or Moscow. Guaranteed standard quality inevitably limits the
discretion of people who own and work in individual outlets. Cooks
are not expected to develop creative new versions of the Big Mac or
Quarter Pounder. Creative departures from standard product lines are
neither encouraged nor tolerated on a day - to - day basis, though the
company has adapted to growth and globalization by increasing its
receptivity to new ideas from the fi eld — the Egg McMuffi n was cre-
ated by a local franchisee, and burgers - on - wheels home delivery was
pioneered in traffi c - choked cities like Cairo and Taipei (Arndt, 2007).
All that structure might sound oppressive, but one of the major
McDonald ’ s miscues in the 1990s resulted from trying to loosen up.
Responding to pressure from some frustrated franchisees, McDonald ’ s
in 1993 stopped sending out inspectors to grade restaurants on service,
food, and ambience. When left to police themselves, some restaurants
slipped badly. Customers noticed, and the company ’ s image sagged. Ten
years later, a new CEO brought the inspectors back to correct lagging
standards (David, 2003).
Harvard University is also highly successful. Like McDonald ’ s, it has a
very small administrative group at the top, but in most other respects the
two organizations diverge. Even though Harvard is more geographically
concentrated than McDonald ’ s, it is signifi cantly more decentralized.
Nearly all of Harvard ’ s activities occur within a few square miles of Boston
and Cambridge, Massachusetts. Most employees are housed in the uni-
versity ’ s several schools: Harvard College (the undergraduate school),
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Reframing Organizations62
the graduate faculty of arts and sciences, and various professional
schools. Each school has its own dean and its own endowment and, in
accordance with Harvard ’ s philosophy of “ every tub on its own bottom, ”
largely controls its own destiny. Schools have fi scal autonomy, and indi-
vidual professors have enormous discretion. They have substantial con-
trol over what courses they teach, what research they do, and which
university activities they pursue, if any. Faculty meetings are typically
sparsely attended. If a dean or a department head wants a faculty mem-
ber to chair a committee or offer a new course, the request is more often
a humble entreaty than an authoritative command.
The contrast between McDonald ’ s and Harvard is particularly strong
at the level of service delivery. No one expects individual personality to
infl uence the quality of McDonald ’ s hamburgers. But everyone expects
each course at Harvard to be the unique creation of an individual pro-
fessor. Two schools might offer courses with the same title but differ-
ent content and widely divergent teaching styles. Efforts to develop
standardized core curricula founder on the autonomy of individual
professors.
Structural Imperatives Why do McDonald ’ s and Harvard have such radically different structures? Is
one more effective than the other? Or has each evolved to fi t its unique circum-
stances? In fact, there is no such thing as an ideal structure. Every organization
needs to respond to a universal set of internal and external parameters (outlined
in Exhibit 3.2 ). These parameters include the organization ’ s size, age, core pro-
cess, environment, strategy and goals, information technology, and workforce
characteristics. All these characteristics combine to dictate the optimal social
architecture.
Size and Age Size and age affect structural shape and character. Problems crop up if growth (or downsizing) is not matched with fi ne - tuning of roles
and relationships. A small, entrepreneurial organization typically has very sim-
ple, informal architecture. Growth spawns formality and complexity (Greiner,
1972; Quinn and Cameron, 1983). If carried too far, this leads to the suffocating
bureaucratic rigidity often seen in large, mature enterprises.
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Getting Organized 63
In the beginning, McDonald ’ s was not the tightly controlled company it
is today. It began as a single hamburger stand in San Bernardino, California,
owned and managed by the McDonald brothers. They virtually invented the
concept of fast food and their stand was phenomenally successful. The two tried
to expand by selling franchise rights, with little success. They were making more
than enough money, disliked travel, and had no heirs. If they were richer, said
one brother, “ we ’ d be leaving it to a church or something, and we didn ’ t go to
church ” (Love, 1986, p. 23).
The concept took off when Ray Kroc arrived on the scene. He had achieved
modest success selling milk shake machines to restaurants. When many of his
customers began to ask for the McDonald ’ s milk shake mixer, he decided to
visit the brothers. Seeing the original stand, Kroc realized the potential: “ Unlike
the homebound McDonalds, Kroc had traveled extensively, and he could envi-
sion hundreds of large and small markets where a McDonald ’ s could be located.
He understood the existing food services businesses, and understood how a
McDonald ’ s unit could be a formidable competitor ” (Love, 1986, pp. 39 – 40).
Kroc persuaded the McDonald brothers to let him take over the franchising
effort. The rest is history.
Exhibit 3.2. Structural Imperatives.
DIMENSION STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS
Size and age Complexity and formality increase with size and age.
Core process Core processes or technologies must align with structure.
Environment Stable environment rewards simpler structure; uncertain, turbulent environment requires a more complex, fl exible structure.
Strategy and goals Variation in clarity and consistency of goals requires appropriate structural adaptations.
Information technology Information technology permits fl atter, more fl exible, and more decentralized structures.
Nature of the workforce More educated and professional workers need and want greater autonomy and discretion.
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Reframing Organizations64
Core Process Structure is ideally built around an organization ’ s basic method of transforming raw materials into fi nished products. Every organization has
a core technology that includes at least three elements: raw materials, activi-
ties that turn inputs into outputs, and underlying beliefs about the links among
inputs, activities, and outcomes (Dornbusch and Scott, 1975).
Core technologies vary in clarity, predictability, and effectiveness. Assembling
a Big Mac is relatively routine and programmed. The task is clear, most poten-
tial problems are known in advance, and the probability of success is high. Its
relatively simple core technology allows McDonald ’ s to rely mostly on vertical
coordination.
In contrast, Harvard ’ s two core processes — research and teaching — are far
more complex and less predictable. Teaching objectives are knotty and amor-
phous. Unlike hamburger buns, students are active agents. Which teaching
strategies best yield desired results is more a matter of faith than of fact. Even
if students could be molded predictably, mystery surrounds the knowledge and
skills they will need to succeed in life. This uncertain technology, greatly depen-
dent on the skills and knowledge of highly educated professionals, is a key source
of Harvard ’ s loosely coordinated structure.
Core technologies often evolve, and signifi cant technical innovation calls
for corresponding structural alterations (Barley, 1990). In recent decades,
struggles to integrate new technologies have become a fateful reality for many
fi rms (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Existing arrangements often get in the way.
Companies are tempted to mold innovative technologies to fi t their existing
operations. A change from fi lm to digital photography, slide rules to calcula-
tors, or “ snail mail ” to e - mail gives an advantage to start - ups less committed to
the old ways. Christensen (1997) found this in his study of the disk drive indu-
stry from 1975 to 1994, for example. Innovation in established fi rms was often
blocked not by technical challenges but by marketers who argued, “ Our custom-
ers don ’ t want it. ”
Organizations try to insulate internal operations from outside pressures, but
changing environments are a potent force. Organizations depend on the envi-
ronment to provide raw materials and consume products and services. Stable,
mature businesses — such as railroads, furniture manufacturers, and elementary
schools — deal with slow - changing and predictable external pressures. As a result,
they rely on simpler forms of organizing. Organizations with rapidly changing
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Getting Organized 65
technologies or markets — such as high - technology electronics fi rms — confront a
much higher degree of uncertainty. New products may be obsolete in six months
or less. Uncertainty and turbulence press for new roles and more elaborate, fl ex-
ible approaches to vertical and lateral coordination.
Some organizations are more susceptible to outside infl uences than others.
Public schools, for example, are highly vulnerable to external pressures because
they have so little capacity to claim the resources they need or to shape the
results they are supposed to produce. In contrast, an institution like Harvard is
insulated from such intrusions by its size, elite status, and large endowment. The
university can therefore afford to offer low teaching loads, generous salaries, and
substantial autonomy to its faculty. A Harvard diploma is taken as suffi cient evi-
dence that instruction is having its desired effect.
Strategy and Goals Strategic decisions are future oriented, concerned with long - term direction (Chandler, 1962; Mintzberg, 1994). Across sectors, a major
task of organizational leadership is “ the determination of long - range goals and
objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and allocation
of resources necessary for carrying out these goals ” (Chandler, 1962, p. 13).
A variety of goals are embedded in strategy. In business fi rms, goals such as
profi tability, growth, and market share are relatively specifi c and easy to mea-
sure. Goals of educational or human services organizations are typically much
more diffuse: “ producing educated men and women ” or “ improving individual
well - being. ” This is another reason Harvard adopts a more decentralized, loosely
integrated system of roles and relationships.
Historically, McDonald ’ s had fewer, more easily quantifi able, and less controver-
sial goals than those of Harvard. This aligned well with the McDonald ’ s centralized,
top - down structure. But that structure has become more complex as the company ’ s
size and global reach have fostered levels of decentralization that allowed out-
lets in India to offer vegetarian cuisine and those in France to run ads attacking
Americans and American beef (Tagliabue, 1999; Stires, 2002; Arndt, 2007).
To complicate matters still further, stated goals are not the only ones an
organization pursues. Westerlund and Sjostrand (1979) suggest various others:
Honorifi c: Fictitious goals with desirable qualities.
Taboo: Goals pursued but not talked about.
•
•
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Reframing Organizations66
Stereotypical: Goals any reputable organization should have.
Existing: Goals quietly pursued even though inconsistent with stated values
and self - image.
Understanding linkages among goals, structure, and strategy requires a look
beyond formal statements of purpose. Schools, for example, are often criticized
if structure does not coincide with the offi cial goal of scholastic achievement.
But schools have other, less visible goals. One is character development, often
espoused with little follow - through. Another is the taboo goal of certifi cation
and selection, as schools channel students into tracks and sort them into careers.
Still a third goal is custody and control — keeping kids off the streets and out
from underfoot. Finally, schools often herald honorifi c goals such as excellence.
Strategy and goals shape structure, but the process is often complex and subtle
(Dornbusch and Scott, 1975).
Information Technology New technologies continue to revolutionize the amount of information available and the speed at which it travels. Once acces-
sible exclusively to top - level or middle managers, information is now easy to get
and widely shared. E - mail has made communication immediate and far reach-
ing. With the press of a key, anyone can reach another person — or an entire net-
work. All this makes it possible to move decisions closer to the action.
In the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, U.S. and British forces had an obvi-
ous advantage in military hardware. They also had a powerful structural advan-
tage because their superior information technology let them develop a much
more fl exible and decentralized command structure. Commanders in the fi eld
could change their plans immediately in response to new developments. Iraqi
forces, meanwhile, had a much slower, more vertical structure that relied on
decisions from the top. A major reason that Iraqi resistance was lighter than
expected in early weeks was that commanders had no idea what to do when they
were cut off from their chain of command (Broder and Schmitt, 2003).
Later, however, the structure and technology so effective against Iraq ’ s military
had much more diffi culty with the rising resistance movement, which evolved a
loosely connected structure of entrepreneurial local units that could adapt quickly
to U.S. tactics. New technologies like the Internet and cell phones enabled the
resistance to structure itself as a network, or “ complex adaptive system ” (Waldrop,
•
•
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Getting Organized 67
1992, p. 145) — a set of loosely connected units, each pursuing its own agenda in
response to local conditions. The absence of strong central control in such net-
works can be a virtue because local units can adapt very fast to new developments
and because the loss of any one outpost does little damage to the whole.
By increasing the fl ow of information, improved technology reduces uncertainty.
Galbraith (1973) defi nes uncertainty as the difference between the information an
organization has and the information it needs. One way that organizations reduce
this gap is by increasing their ability to process inform ation (with information sys-
tems, for example). A second alternative is to reduce the need for information by
creating self - contained units (which can work on their own using information at
hand) or by adding slack resources (extra copying machines or support staff, for
example, so that people don ’ t have to fi ght over access).
Information technology has made fl atter structures both possible and inevita-
ble because “ the information - based organization needs far fewer levels of man-
agement than the traditional command - and - control model ” (Drucker, 1989,
p. 20). As technology spread in the late twentieth century, organizations around
the world made deep cuts in both management levels and support staff, a pro-
cess that still continues.
Nature of the Workforce Human resource requirements have changed dra- matically in recent decades. Many lower - level jobs now require higher levels of
skill. A better - educated workforce expects and often demands more discretion
in daily work routines. Increasing specialization has professionalized many func-
tions. Professionals typically know more than their supervisors about technical
aspects of their work. They expect autonomy and prefer reporting to professional
colleagues. Trying to tell a Harvard professor what to teach is an exercise in futil-
ity. In contrast, giving too much discretion to a youthful, low - skilled McDonald ’ s
worker could become a disaster for both employee and customers.
Dramatically different structural forms are emerging as a result of changes in
workforce demographics. Deal and Kennedy (1982) predicted early on the emer-
gence of the atomized or network organization, made up of small, autonomous,
often geographically dispersed work groups tied together by information systems
and organizational symbols. Drucker makes a similar observation in noting that
businesses increasingly “ move work to where the people are, rather than people
to where the work is ” (1989, p. 20).
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Reframing Organizations68
Challenges of Global Organization In sum, numerous forces affecting structural design create a knotty mix of chal-
lenges and tensions. It is not simply a matter of deciding whether we should be
centralized like McDonald ’ s or decentralized like Harvard. Many organizations
fi nd that they have to do both and somehow accommodate the competing struc-
tural tensions.
Two electronics giants, Matsushita in Japan and Philips in the Netherlands,
have competed with one another around the globe for half a century. Over time,
Matsushita developed a strong headquarters, while Phillips was more decentral-
ized, with strong units in different countries. The pressures of global compe-
tition pushed both to become more alike (Bartlett, 2006). Philips struggled to
gain the effi ciencies that come from selling the same products around the world.
Meanwhile, as Matsushita gradually discovered, “ No company can operate effec-
tively on a global scale by centralizing all key decisions and then farming them
out for implementation. It doesn ’ t work . . . . No matter how good they are, no
matter how well supported analytically, the decision - makers at the center are too
far removed from individual markets and the needs of local customers ” (Ohmae,
1990, p. 87).
SUMMARY The structural frame looks beyond individuals to examine the social architecture
of work. Though sometimes equated with red tape, mindless memos, and rigid
bureaucrats, the approach is much broader and more subtle. It encompasses the
freewheeling, loosely structured entrepreneurial task force as well as the more
tightly controlled railway company or postal department. If structure is over-
looked, an organization often misdirects energy and resources. It may, for exam-
ple, waste time and money on massive training programs in a vain effort to solve
problems that have much more to do with social architecture than people ’ s skills
or attitudes. It may fi re managers and bring in new ones, who then fall victim to
the same structural fl aws that doomed their predecessors.
At the heart of organizational design are the twin issues of differentiation and
integration. Organizations divide work by creating a variety of specialized roles,
functions, and units. They must then use both vertical and horizontal procedures
to lash the many elements together. There is no one best way to organize. The right
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Getting Organized 69
structure depends on prevailing circumstances and considers an organization ’ s
goals, strategies, technology, people, and environment. Understanding the complex-
ity and variety of design possibilities can help create formal prototypes that work
for, rather than against, both people and collective purposes.
NOTE 1. The supercarrier USS Kennedy was decommissioned in May 2007 after
almost forty years of service.
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c h a p t e r
F O U R
71
Structure and Restructuring
Larry Summers took the helm as president of Harvard in 2001. An economist and former U.S. treasury secretary, Summers concluded that the venerable university needed an overhaul. From
the president ’ s offi ce, he issued a series of authoritative new direc-
tives. He attacked the undergraduate grading system, in which half
of the students received A ’ s and 90 percent graduated with honors.
He stiffened standards for awarding tenure, encouraged more for-
eign study, and asked faculty (especially senior professors) to spend
more time with students. He stepped across curricular boundaries
to call for an emphasis on educational reform and more interdis-
ciplinary courses. He proposed a center for medicine and science
to encourage more applied research. Finally, he announced a bold
move to build an additional campus across the Charles River to
house new growth and development. Summers ’ s initiatives aimed
to tighten Harvard ’ s famously decentralized structure and to imbue
the president ’ s offi ce with more clout.
How did his plans pan out? Prior experience with restructuring teaches that a
crash was likely, and, in this instance, it was a big one. Summers was forced out
after the shortest term for a Harvard president in more than a century.
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations72
Major initiatives to redesign structure and processes have often proved nei-
ther durable nor benefi cial. Moving from designing a structure to putting all the
parts in place and satisfying every interested party is diffi cult and hazardous.
The attempt after the 9/11 attacks to bring related agencies under the Homeland
Security umbrella provides another example of the perils of restructuring. We
can get an idea of the effects of this attempt by looking at one organization — the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Before 9/11, FEMA was an autonomous operation. Its main goal was to respond
to domestic disasters caused by hurricanes, earthquakes, and other whims of
Mother Nature. FEMA was created in 1979 by a stroke of President Jimmy Carter ’ s
offi cial pen. It was an effort to integrate separate emergency agencies — hurricane,
earthquake, fl ood — under a single authority. The hitch was that the blend also
included Mount Weather, a super - secret national counterespionage group that was
housed in separate quarters, replete with guards and other accoutrements shroud-
ing a clandestine operation. This self - styled elite dismissed their colleagues in the
rest of FEMA as a “ bunch of weenies who went out and chased storms ” (Cooper
and Block, 2006, p. 55). In fact, FEMA was a two - headed agency. Structurally, as a
disaster relief agency, it was itself a disaster, provoking an insider ’ s comment, “ How
can you help others when you can ’ t even take care of yourself? ” (p. 56).
Enter James Lee Witt, a political appointee tapped to head FEMA in 1993,
who promised to remake the agency into an integrated organization capable of
delivering the goods when disaster struck. He envisioned catastrophes as politi-
cal opportunities to showcase taxpayers ’ dollars at work. One of his fi rst actions
was to restructure FEMA to focus on disaster relief rather than splitting its mis-
sion to encompass national security. He also developed the agency ’ s role in pre-
paring for rather than just responding to national tragedies.
FEMA demonstrated its new confi guration in responding successfully to earth-
quakes in Seattle and in Northridge, California, as well as other national disasters of
the new millennium. But after September 11, 2001, terrorism rather than national
disasters topped the federal agenda. FEMA was folded into a new agency, the
Department of Homeland Security. Tom Ridge was appointed to head the mix of
diverse, previously independent operations. The overarching goal: stop terrorism.
Structurally, the change gave FEMA another reporting level and left its fund-
ing for disaster relief vulnerable to the new emphasis on terrorism. The fl aws in
this arrangement became evident when Hurricane Katrina scored a bull ’ s - eye on
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Structure and Restructuring 73
New Orleans. FEMA ’ s response to the unparalleled disaster sometimes looked
like an episode of the Keystone Kops or the Three Stooges. Who was in charge,
who reported to whom, and basic logistical decisions appeared more happen-
stance than planned. More could be learned from CNN than from the offi cial
chain of command.
In the usual political blame game, FEMA ’ s head, Michael Brown, took the
hit. But the real culprit was not an individual. It was a restructuring plan that
didn ’ t work out. The core assumptions of the structural frame were overlooked
or ignored. The costs in property damage and human lives were enormous, and
the reputation of a previously successful government agency was tarnished.
Reorganizing, or restructuring, is a powerful but high - risk approach to
improvement. An organization ’ s structure at any moment represents its resolu-
tion of an enduring set of basic tensions or dilemmas. We begin this chapter by
describing these dilemmas. Then, drawing on the work of Henry Mintzberg and
Sally Helgesen, we describe two unique views of the alternatives organizations
may consider in aligning structure with mission and environment. We conclude
with several case examples illustrating both opportunities and challenges man-
agers encounter when attempting to create a more workable structural design.
STRUCTURAL DILEMMAS Finding a satisfactory system of roles and relationships is an ongoing, univer-
sal struggle. Managers rarely face well - defi ned problems with clear - cut solutions.
Instead, they confront enduring structural dilemmas, tough trade - offs without
easy answers.
Differentiation Versus Integration The tension between allocating work and coordinating sundry efforts creates a
classic dilemma, as we saw in Chapter Three . The more complex a role structure
(lots of people doing many different things), the harder it is to sustain a focused,
tightly coupled enterprise. Think about the challenge facing Larry Summers as
he tried to bring a higher level of coordination to a highly decentralized uni-
versity. As complexity grows, organizations need more sophisticated — and
more costly — coordination strategies. Rules, policies, and commands have to be
augmented by lateral strategies.
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Reframing Organizations74
Gap Versus Overlap If key responsibilities are not clearly assigned, important tasks fall through the
cracks. Conversely, roles and activities can overlap, creating confl ict, wasted
effort, and unintended redundancy. A patient in a prestigious teaching hospital,
for example, called her husband and pleaded with him to rescue her before she
went crazy. At night, she couldn ’ t sleep because hospital staff kept waking her
up, often to repeat what someone else had already done. Conversely, when she
wanted something, her call button rarely produced any response.
As we have seen, the new cabinet - level Department of Homeland Security,
created in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was intended to reduce gaps
and overlaps among the many agencies responsible for responding to domestic
threats. Activities incorporated into the new department included immigration,
border protection, emergency management, and intelligence analysis. Yet, as
noted in Chapter One , the two most prominent antiterrorism agencies, the FBI
and the CIA — with their long history of mutual gaps, overlaps, and bureaucratic
squabbling — remained separate and outside the new agency (Firestone, 2002).
Underuse Versus Overload If employees have too little work, they become bored and get in other people ’ s
way. In one physician ’ s offi ce, for example, members of the clerical staff were able
to complete most of their tasks during the morning. After lunch, they fi lled their
time talking to family and friends. As a result, the offi ce ’ s telephone lines were
constantly busy, making it diffi cult for patients to ask questions and schedule
appointments. Meanwhile, nurses were swamped with clients and routine paper-
work. Too busy for informal talk with patients, they were often brusque and
curt. Patients complained about impersonal care. A better structural balance was
accomplished by reassigning many of the nurses ’ clerical duties to offi ce staff.
Lack of Clarity Versus Lack of Creativity If employees are unclear about what they are supposed to do, they often tailor
their roles around personal preferences instead of systemwide goals, frequently
leading to trouble. Most McDonald ’ s customers are not seeking novelty and sur-
prise in their burgers and fries. But when responsibilities are overdefi ned, people
conform to prescribed roles and protocols in “ bureaupathic ” ways. They rigidly
follow job descriptions regardless of how much the service or product suffers.
“ You lost my bag! ” an angry passenger shouted, confronting an airline manager.
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Structure and Restructuring 75
The manager ’ s response was to inquire, “ How was the fl ight? ” “ I asked about my
bag, ” the passenger said. “ That ’ s not my job, ” the manager replied. “ See someone
in baggage claim. ” The passenger did not leave a happy customer.
Excessive Autonomy Versus Excessive Interdependence When individuals or groups are too autonomous, people often feel isolated.
Schoolteachers working in self - contained classrooms and rarely seeing other
adults may feel lonely and unsupported. Yet efforts to create closer teamwork
have repeatedly run aground because of teachers ’ diffi culties in working together.
In contrast, if units and roles are too tightly linked, people are distracted from
work and waste time on unnecessary coordination. IBM lost an early lead in the
personal computer business in part because new initiatives required so many
approvals — from levels and divisions alike — that new products were overde-
signed and late to market. Hewlett - Packard ’ s ability to innovate in the late 1990s
was hindered by the same problem.
Too Loose Versus Too Tight A critical structural challenge is how to hold an organization together without
holding it back. If structure is too loose, people go their own way or get lost,
with little sense of what others are doing. Structures that are too tight stifl e fl ex-
ibility and cause people to spend much of their time trying to beat the system.
We can see some of the perils of too loose a structure in the former account-
ing fi rm Andersen Worldwide, indicted in 2002 for its role in the Enron scandal.
Andersen ’ s Houston offi ce shredded documents and altered memos to cover up
its role in Enron ’ s questionable accounting procedures. At its Chicago headquar-
ters, Andersen had an internal audit team, the Professional Standards Group,
which was charged with reviewing the work of regional offi ces. But unlike other
big accounting fi rms, Andersen let frontline partners closest to the clients over-
rule its internal audit team. This loose control permitted local discretion, which
was a selling point to customers, but it came back to haunt the fi rm. The lax
controls created a situation where “ the rainmakers were given the power to over-
rule the accounting nerds ” (McNamee and Borrus, 2002, p. 33).
The opposite problem is common in managed health care. Medical deci-
sions are reviewed by insurance companies, giving clerks far removed from
patient ’ s bedside the authority to approve or deny treatment. Many physicians
lament spending more time talking on the phone with insurance representatives
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Reframing Organizations76
than seeing patients. As a result of these tight controls, insurance providers
sometimes deny treatments that physicians might see as urgent. In one case, a
hospital - based psychologist diagnosed an adolescent as a likely perpetrator of
sexual assault. The insurer questioned the diagnosis and denied hospitalization.
The next day, the teenager raped a fi ve - year - old girl.
Goalless Versus Goalbound In some situations, few people know what the goals are; in others, people cling to
goals long after they have become irrelevant or outmoded. That spells trouble unless
an organization can fi nd or invent a substitute. In the sixties, for example, polio was
virtually eradicated by new vaccines. This eliminated the goal of the March of Dimes
organization, which for years championed fi nding a cure for the crippling disease.
The organization chose to shift its purpose to focus on preventing birth defects.
Irresponsible Versus Unresponsive If people abdicate their responsibilities, performance suffers. However, adhering
too rigidly to policies or procedures can be equally harmful. In public agencies,
“ street - level bureaucrats ” (Lipsky, 1980) who deal with the public are often asked,
“ Could you do me this favor? ” or “ Couldn ’ t you bend the rules a little bit in this
case? ” Turning down every request, no matter how reasonable, alienates the pub-
lic and perpetuates images of bureaucratic rigidity and red tape. But agency work-
ers who are too accommodating create problems of inconsistency and favoritism.
G R E A T E S T H I T S F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T U D I E S
Hit Number 5: Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “ Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, ” Journal of Financial Economics , 1976, 3, 305 – 360
This classic article, fi fth on our list of works most often cited by scholars,
focuses on two central questions:
What are the implications of the “ agency problem ” — that is, the
confl icts of interest between principals and their agents?
Given those confl icts, why do corporations even exist?
•
•
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Structure and Restructuring 77
An agency relationship is a structural arrangement created when-
ever one party engages another to undertake some task. Jensen and
Meckling ’ s particular focus is the relationship between a corporation ’ s
owners (shareholders) and their agents, the managers. Principals and
agents both seek to maximize utility, but their interests often diverge.
If you are a sole proprietor, a dollar of the fi rm ’ s money is a dollar of
yours as well. But if you are an employee with no ownership interest,
you have an incentive to pad your expense account or schedule a busi-
ness meeting at an expensive resort because you ’ re spending someone
else ’ s money.
One rationale for linking executive compensation to the price
of the company ’ s stock is that it reduces the agency problem, but
the impact is often marginal at best. A notorious example is Tyco ’ s
chief executive, Dennis Kozlowski, who reportedly spent more than
$30 million of company money to buy, furnish, and decorate his pala-
tial apartment in New York City (Sorkin, 2002). Nonexecutive share-
holders hate this kind of thing, but it is diffi cult for them to stay
abreast of everything management does, and they can ’ t do it with-
out incurring “ monitoring costs, ” time and money spent on things like
supervision and auditing.
One implication the authors draw is that the primary value of stock
analysts is the sentinel function they perform. Analysts ’ ability to pick
stocks is notoriously poor, but their oversight puts more heat on man-
agers to serve shareholder interests. The article also concludes that,
despite the agency confl icts, the corporate form still makes economic
sense for the parties involved — managers cost more than owners wish,
but they still earn their keep.
The authors see the agency problem as a pervasive feature of cooper-
ative activity. The relationship between a team and individual members,
or between a boss and a subordinate, is like that between principal
and agent. If members of a team share rewards equally, for example,
there is an incentive for “ free riders ” to let someone else do most of
the work. Principals face a perennial problem of keeping agents in line
and on task.
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Reframing Organizations78
STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATIONS Structural design rarely starts from scratch. Managers search for options among
the array of possibilities drawn from their accumulated wisdom or the experiences
of others. Abstract templates and frameworks can offer food for thought. Henry
Mintzberg and Sally Helgesen offer two conceptions of structural possibilities.
Mintzberg ’ s Fives As the two - dimensional lines and boxes of a traditional organization chart have
become increasingly archaic, students of organizational design have developed
a variety of new structural images. One infl uential example is Mintzberg ’ s fi ve -
sector “ logo, ” depicted in Exhibit 4.1 . Mintzberg ’ s chief contribution is clustering
various functions into groupings and showing their relative size and clout in
response to different missions and external challenges. His schema does not pro-
vide details. It is a rough atlas of the structural terrain that helps managers get
their bearings. It assists in sizing up the lay of the land before assembling a struc-
ture that conforms to the surroundings.
At the base of Mintzberg ’ s image is the operating core, consisting of people who
perform essential work. The core is made up of workers who produce or provide
products or services to customers or clients: teachers in schools, assembly - line
workers in factories, physicians and nurses in hospitals, and fl ight crews in airlines.
Directly above the operating core is the administrative component: managers who
supervise, coordinate, control, and provide resources for the operators. School prin-
cipals, factory foremen, and echelons of middle management fulfi ll this role. At the
top of Mintzberg ’ s fi gure, senior managers in the strategic apex track current devel-
opments in the environment, determine the mission, and shape the grand design.
In school systems, the strategic apex includes superintendents and school boards. In
corporations, the apex houses the board of directors and senior executives.
Two more components sit alongside the administrative component. The
technostructure houses specialists, technicians, and analysts who standardize,
measure, and inspect outputs and procedures. Accounting and quality control
departments in industry, audit departments in government agencies, and fl ight
standards departments in airlines perform such technical functions.
The support staff performs tasks that support or facilitate the work of others
throughout the organization. In schools, for example, the support staff includes
nurses, secretaries, custodians, food service workers, and bus drivers. These peo-
ple often wield infl uence far greater than their station would suggest.
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Structure and Restructuring 79
From this basic blueprint, Mintzberg (1979) derived fi ve structural confi gura-
tions: simple structure, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, divisional-
ized form, and adhocracy. Each creates its unique set of management challenges.
Simple Structure Most businesses begin as simple structures with only two levels: the strategic apex and an operating level (see Exhibit 4.2 ). Coordination
is accomplished primarily through direct supervision and oversight, as in a small
mom - and - pop operation. Mom or pop constantly monitors what is going on
and exercises total authority over daily operations. William Hewlett and David
Packard began their business in a garage, as did Apple Computer ’ s Steve Jobs
Technostructure Middle line
Strategic apex
Operating core
Support staff
Exhibit 4.1. Mintzberg’s Model.
Source: Mintzberg (1979, p. 20). Copyright ©1979. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J.
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Reframing Organizations80
and Steve Wozniak; General Electric had its humble beginnings in Thomas
Edison ’ s laboratory. The virtues of simple structure are fl exibility and adaptabil-
ity; one or two people control the entire operation. But virtues can become vices.
Authorities block as well as initiate change, and they punish capriciously as well
as reward handsomely. A boss too close to day - to - day operations is easily dis-
tracted by immediate problems, neglecting long - range strategic issues.
When a start - up company grows in size, a simple structure struggles to man-
age the accompanying complexity. Mintzberg ’ s schema offer alternative possible
routes, such as moving toward a machine or professional bureaucracy, or evolv-
ing into a divisionalized structure.
Machine Bureaucracy McDonald ’ s is a classic machine bureaucracy. Im- p ortant decisions are made at the strategic apex; day - to - day operations are con-
trolled by managers and standardized procedures. Machine bureaucracies have
large support staffs and a sizable technostructure, with many layers between the
apex and operating levels (see Exhibit 4.3 ).
For routine tasks, such as making hamburgers and manufacturing automo-
tive parts, a machinelike operation is both effi cient and effective. A key challenge
is how to motivate and satisfy workers in the operating core. People tire quickly of
Exhibit 4.2. Simple Structure.
Source: Mintzberg (1979, p. 307). Copyright ©1979. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J.
Structure and Restructuring 81
repetitive work and standardized procedures. Yet offering too much creativity and
personal challenge in, say, a McDonald ’ s outlet could undermine consistency
and uniformity — two keys to the company ’ s success.
Like other machine bureaucracies, McDonald ’ s deals constantly with tension
between local managers and headquarters. Middle managers are heavily infl u-
enced by local concerns and tastes. Top executives, aided by analysts armed with
computer printouts, rely more on generic and abstract information and pursue
corporation - wide concerns. As a result, a solution from the top may not always
match the needs of individual units. Faced with declining sales and market share,
McDonald ’ s introduced a new food preparation system in 1998 under the mar-
keting banner “ Made for you. ” CEO Jack Greenberg was convinced the new cook -
to - order system would produce the fresher, tastier burgers the company needed to
get back on the fast track. But franchisees soon complained that the new system
led to long lines and frustrated customers. Unfazed by the criticism, Greenberg
Exhibit 4.3. Machine Bureaucracy.
Source: Mintzberg (1979, p. 325). Copyright ©1979. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J.
Reframing Organizations82
invited a couple of skeptical fi nancial analysts to fl ip burgers at a McDonald ’ s out-
let in New Jersey so they could see fi rsthand that the concerns were unfounded.
The experiment backfi red. The analysts concluded that the system was too slow
and decided to pass on the stock (Stires, 2002). Greenberg was replaced at the end
of 2002.
Beginning with the precepts of scientifi c management in the early twen-
tieth century, recurring efforts have been made to improve public schools by
getting them to work more like machine bureaucracies in which teachers are
the production workers. The initiatives have included “ teacher - proof ” curricula,
incentive pay schemes, and the use of test scores or yearly performance indicators
to measure how well a school is doing. Teachers, in contrast, see themselves as
professionals who need suffi cient autonomy to use their experience and judgment
in fi nding the best way for students to learn. They often prefer to work in an orga-
nization that mirrors another of Mintzberg ’ s types, the professional bureaucracy.
Professional Bureaucracy Harvard University affords a glimpse into the inner workings of a professional bureaucracy (see Exhibit 4.4 ). Its operating core is large
relative to its other structural parts, particularly the technostructure. Each individual
school, for example, has its own local approach to teaching evaluations; there is no
university - wide profi le developed by analysts. Few managerial levels exist between
the strategic apex and the professors, creating a fl at and decentralized profi le.
Exhibit 4.4. Professional Bureaucracy.
Source: Mintzberg (1979, p. 355). Copyright ©1979. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J.
Structure and Restructuring 83
Control relies heavily on professional training and indoctrination. Professionals
are insulated from formal interference, freeing them to apply their expertise.
Freeing highly trained experts to do what they do best produces many benefi ts but
leads to challenges of coordination and quality control. Tenured professors, for
example, are largely immune from formal sanctions. As a result, universities have
to fi nd other ways to deal with incompetence and irresponsibility.
A professional bureaucracy responds slowly to external change. Waves of
reform typically produce little impact because professionals often view any
change in their surroundings as an annoying distraction. The result is a paradox:
individual professionals may strive to be at the forefront of their specialty, while
the institution as a whole changes at a glacial pace. Professional bureaucracies
regularly stumble when they try to exercise greater control over the operating
core; requiring Harvard professors to follow standard teaching methods might
do more harm than good.
In his efforts to achieve greater control over Harvard ’ s fractious faculty,
new president Larry Summers quickly ran into predictable challenges of a
professional bureaucracy. In one famous case, he suggested that superstar
African American studies professor Cornel West redirect his scholarly efforts.
Summers ’ s advice was given in private, but West ’ s pique made the front page
of the New York Times. Summers ’ s profuse public apologies failed to deter the
offended professor from decamping to Princeton. In professional bureaucra-
cies, struggles between the strategic apex and the operating core are often won
by the professionals, who are more tightly bonded to their fi eld than to any spe-
cifi c institution. This is a lesson hospital administrators learn quickly in their
dealings with physicians.
Divisionalized Form In a divisionalized organization (see Exhibit 4.5 ), the bulk of the work is done in quasi - autonomous units, as with free - standing cam-
puses in a multi - campus university, areas of expertise in a large multi - specialty
hospital, or independent businesses in a Fortune 500 fi rm (Mintzberg, 1979).
Hewlett - Packard, for example, created separate divisions organized around dif-
ferent products and engineering expertise. Its printer division cornered the mar-
ket to become a fi nancial success, while its computer division struggled against
intense competition. But the divisionalized structure gave the computer division
time, resources, and a powerful brand that it leveraged to transform itself from
also - ran to market leader.
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Reframing Organizations84
One of the oldest businesses in the United States, Berwind Corporation,
houses divisions in business sectors as diverse as manufacturing, fi nancial ser-
vices, real estate, and land management. Each division serves a distinct market
and supports its own functional units. Division presidents are accountable to
the corporate offi ce in Philadelphia for specifi c results: profi ts, sales growth, and
return on investment. As long as they deliver, divisions have relatively free rein.
Philadelphia manages the strategic portfolio and allocates resources on the basis
of its assessment of market opportunities.
Divisionalized structure offers economies of scale, resources, and respon-
siveness while controlling economic risks, but it creates other tensions. One is a
cat - and - mouse game between headquarters and divisions. Headquarters wants
oversight, while divisional managers try to evade corporate control:
Our top management likes to make all the major decisions. They think
they do, but I ’ ve seen one case where a division beat them. I received . . . a
request from the division for a chimney. I couldn ’ t see what anyone would
do with a chimney . . . . [But] they ’ ve built and equipped a whole plant
on plant expense orders. The chimney is the only indivisible item that
exceeded the $50,000 limit we put on plant expense orders. Apparently
they learned that a new plant wouldn ’ t be formally received, so they built
the damn thing ” [Bower, 1970, p. 189].
Exhibit 4.5. Divisionalized Form.
Source: Mintzberg (1979, p. 393). Copyright ©1979. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J.
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Structure and Restructuring 85
Another risk in the divisionalized form is that headquarters may lose touch
with operations. (As one manager put it, “ Headquarters is where the rubber meets
the air. ” ) Divisionalized enterprises become unwieldy unless goals are measurable
and reliable vertical information systems are in place (Mintzberg, 1979).
Adhocracy Adhocracy is a loose, fl exible, self - renewing organic form tied together mostly through lateral means (see Exhibit 4.6 ). Usually found in a diverse,
freewheeling environment, adhocracy functions as an “ organizational tent, ”
exploiting benefi ts that structural designers traditionally regarded as liabilities:
“ Ambiguous authority structures, unclear objectives, and contradictory assign-
ments of responsibility can legitimize controversies and challenge traditions.
Incoherence and indecision can foster exploration, self - evaluation, and learning ”
(Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck, 1976, p. 45). Inconsistencies and contradictions
in an adhocracy become paradoxes where a balance between opposites protects an
organization from falling into an either - or trap.
Exhibit 4.6. Adhocracy.
Source: Mintzberg (1979, p. 443). Copyright ©1979. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J.
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Reframing Organizations86
Ad hoc structures are most often found in conditions of turbulence and
rapid change. Examples are advertising agencies, think - tank consulting fi rms,
and the recording industry. In the 1970s and 1980s, Digital Equipment was a
well - known pioneer of adhocracy: “ In many ways [DEC] is a big company in
small company clothes. It doesn ’ t believe much in hierarchy, rule books, dress
codes, company cars, executive dining rooms, lofty titles, country club mem-
berships, or most trappings of ‘ corporacy. ’ It doesn ’ t even have assigned park-
ing spots. Only the top half - dozen executives have sizable offi ces. Everyone else
at the company headquarters in Maynard, Mass., makes do with dinky doorless
cubicles ” (Machan, 1987, p. 154).
Digital ’ s structural arrangements helped it become the world leader in mini-
computers. But the structural design became a problem when the market shifted
toward personal computers, where aggressive new competitors like Compaq and
Dell were dominant. “ They fl ew so high and crashed so hard, ” said one observer,
because “ at DEC, the internal mattered so much. They spent their lives playing
with each other ” (Johnson, 1996, p. F11). The strength of Digital ’ s adhocracy,
a fl owering of local creativity, became a liability when the company needed a
timely organization - wide change in direction.
Helgeson ’ s Web of Inclusion Mintzberg ’ s fi ve - sector imagery adds a new dimension to the conventional
line - staff organization chart but still retains much of the traditional portrait of
structure as a clear - cut, top - down pyramid. Helgesen argues that the idea
of hierarchy is primarily a male - driven depiction, quite different from struc-
tures created by female executives: “ The women I studied had built profoundly
integrated and organic organizations in which the focus was on nurturing good
relationships; in which the niceties of hierarchical rank and distinction played
little part; and in which lines of communication were multiplicitous, open,
and diffuse. I noted that women tended to put themselves at the center of their
organizations rather than at the top, thus emphasizing both accessibility and
equality, and that they labored constantly to include people in their decision -
making ” (Helgesen, 1995, p. 10).
Helgesen coined the expression “ web of inclusion ” to portray an organic archi-
tectural form more circular than hierarchical. The web builds from the center out.
Its architect works much like a spider, spinning new threads of connection and
reinforcing existing strands. The web ’ s center and periphery are interconnected;
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Structure and Restructuring 87
action in one place ripples across the entire confi guration, forming “ an intercon-
nected cosmic web in which the threads of all forces and events form an insep-
arable net of endless, mutually conditioned relations ” (Fritjof Capra, quoted in
Helgesen, 1995, p. 16). As a consequence, weaknesses in either the center or the
periphery of the web undermine the strength of the natural network.
One of the most famous and important examples of web organization is
“ Linux, Inc., ” the loose organization of individuals and companies that has
formed around Linus Torvalds, the creator of the open - source operating sys-
tem Linux, which has become Microsoft Windows ’ s biggest competitor on serv-
ers and desktops. “ Linux, Inc. ” is anything but a traditional company: “ There ’ s
no headquarters, no CEO, and no annual report. And it ’ s not a single com-
pany. Rather, it ’ s a cooperative venture in which employees at about two dozen
companies, along with thousands of individuals, work together to improve Linux
software . . . . The Linux community, Torvalds says, is like a huge spider web, or
better yet, multiple spider webs representing dozens of related open - source proj-
ects. His offi ce is ‘ near where those webs intersect ’ ” (Hamm, 2005).
The freewheeling web form encounters increasing challenges as an organi-
zation gets bigger. When Meg Whitman become CEO of Internet phenomenon
eBay in 1998, she joined an organization of fewer than fi fty employees confi g-
ured in an informal web surrounding founder Pierre Omidyar. One of her fi rst
steps was to set up appointments with her new staff. She was surprised to learn
that scheduled meetings were a foreign concept in a company where no one kept
a calendar. Omidyar had built a company with a strong culture and powerful
sense of community but no explicit strategy, no regular meetings, no marketing
department, and almost no other identifi able structural elements. Despite the
company ’ s phenomenal growth and profi tability, Whitman concluded that it was
in danger of imploding without more structure and discipline. Omidyar agreed.
He had worked hard to recruit Whitman because he believed she brought the
big - company management experience that eBay needed to keep growing (Hill
and Farkas, 2000).
GENERIC ISSUES IN RESTRUCTURING Sooner or later, internal or external changes force every structure to remodel.
When the time for restructuring comes, managers need to take account of ten-
sions specifi c to each structural confi guration. Consultants and managers often
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Reframing Organizations88
apply general principles and specifi c answers without recognizing key differences
across architectural forms. Reshaping an adhocracy, for example, is radically dif-
ferent from restructuring a machine bureaucracy, and reweaving a web is a far
cry from nudging a professional bureaucracy. Falling victim to the one - best -
system or one - size - fi ts - all mentality is a surefi re route to disaster. But the com-
fort of a well - defi ned prescription lulls too many managers into a temporary
comfort zone. The iceberg looming ahead falls outside their fi eld of vision.
Mintzberg ’ s imagery suggests general principles to guide restructuring across
a range of circumstances. Each major component of his model exerts its own
pressures. Restructuring triggers a multidirectional tug - of - war that eventu-
ally determines the shape of the structure. Unless various pushes and pulls are
acknowledged and managed effectively, the result may be a catastrophe.
The strategic apex — top management — tends to exert centralizing pressures.
Through commands, rules, or less obtrusive means, top managers continually
try to develop a unifi ed mission or strategy. Deep down, they long for a sim-
ple structure they can control. By contrast, middle managers resist control from
the top and tend to pull the organization toward balkanization. Navy captains,
school principals, department heads, and bureau chiefs become committed to
their own domain and seek to protect and enhance their unit ’ s parochial inter-
ests. Tensions between centripetal forces from the top and centrifugal forces
from middle management are especially prominent in divisionalized structures
but are critical issues in any restructuring effort.
The technostructure exerts pressures to standardize; analysts want to measure
and monitor the organization ’ s progress against well - defi ned criteria. Depending
on the circumstances, they counterbalance (or complement) top administra-
tors, who want to centralize, and middle managers, who seek greater autonomy.
Technocrats feel most at home in a machine bureaucracy.
The support staff pulls in the direction of greater collaboration. Its members
usually feel happiest when authority is dispersed to small work units. There they
can infl uence, directly and personally, the shape and fl ow of everyday decisions.
They prefer adhocracy. Meanwhile, the operating core seeks to control its own
destiny and minimize infl uence from the other components. Its members often
look outside — to a union or to their professional colleagues — for support.
Attempts to restructure must acknowledge the natural tensions among various
components. Depending on the confi guration — machine bureaucracy, professional
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Structure and Restructuring 89
bureaucracy, simple structure, divisionalized form, or adhocracy — each component
has more or less infl uence on the fi nal outcome. In a simple structure, the boss has
the edge. In machine bureaucracies, the technostructure and strategic apex possess
the most clout. In professional bureaucracies, chronic confl ict between administra-
tors and professionals is the dominant tension, while members of the technostruc-
ture play an important role in the wings. In the adhocracy, a variety of actors can
play a pivotal role in shaping the emerging structural patterns.
Beyond internal negotiations lurks a more crucial issue. A structure ’ s work-
ability ultimately depends on its fi t with the organization ’ s environment and
technology. Natural selection weeds out the fi eld, determining survivors and vic-
tims. The major players must negotiate a structure that meets the needs of each
component and still works in the organization ’ s environment.
Why Restructure? Restructuring is a challenging process that consumes time and resources with no
guarantee of success. Organizations typically embark on that path when they feel
compelled to respond to major problems or opportunities. Various pressures can
lead to that conclusion:
The environment shifts. At American Telephone & Telegraph, a mandated
shift from regulated monopoly to a market with multiple competitors required
a massive reorganization of the Bell System that played out over decades. When
AT & T split off its local telephone companies into regional “ Baby Bells, ” few
anticipated that eventually one of the children (Southwest Bell) would swallow
up the parent and appropriate its identity.
Technology changes. The aircraft industry ’ s shift from piston to jet engines
profoundly affected the relationship between engine and airframe. Some estab-
lished fi rms faltered because they underestimated the complexities; Boeing rose
to lead the industry because it understood them (Henderson and Clark, 1990).
Organizations grow. Digital Equipment thrived with a very informal and
fl exible structure during the company ’ s early years, but the same structure pro-
duced major problems when it grew into a multibillion - dollar corporation.
Leadership changes. Reorganization is often the fi rst initiative of new lead-
ers. It is a way for them to try to put their stamp on the organization, even if no
one else sees a need to restructure.
•
•
•
•
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Reframing Organizations90
Miller and Friesen (1984) studied a sample of successful as well as troubled
fi rms undergoing structural change and found that those in trouble typically fell
into one of three confi gurations:
The impulsive fi rm: A fast - growing organization, controlled by one individ-
ual or a few top people, in which structures and controls have become too primi-
tive and the fi rm is increasingly out of control. Profi ts may fall precipitously, and
survival may be at stake. Many once - successful entrepreneurial organizations
stumble at this stage; they have failed to evolve beyond their simple structure.
The stagnant bureaucracy: An older, tradition - dominated organization
with an obsolete product line. A predictable and placid environment has lulled
everyone to sleep, and top management is slavishly committed to old ways.
Information systems are too primitive to detect the need for change, and lower -
level managers feel ignored and alienated. Many old - line corporations and pub-
lic bureaucracies fi t this group of faltering machine bureaucracies.
The headless giant: A loosely coupled, divisional organization that has turned
into a collection of feudal baronies. The administrative core is weak, and most of
the initiative and power resides in autonomous divisions. With little strategy or lead-
ership at the top, the fi rm is adrift. Collaboration is minimal because departments
compete for resources. Decision making is reactive and crisis - oriented. WorldCom
is a recent example of how bad things can get in this situation. CEO Bernie Ebbers
built the company rapidly from a tiny start - up in Mississippi to a global telecommu-
nications giant through some sixty - fi ve acquisitions. But “ for all its talent in buying
competitors, the company was not up to the task of merging them. Dozens of con-
fl icting computer systems remained, local network systems were repetitive and failed
to work together properly, and billing systems were not coordinated. ‘ Don ’ t think
of WorldCom the way you would of other corporations, ’ said one person who has
worked with the company at a high level for many years. ‘ It ’ s not a company, it ’ s just
a bunch of disparate pieces. It ’ s simply dysfunctional ’ ” (Eichenwald, 2002c, p. C 4 ).
Miller and Friesen (1984) found that even in troubled organizations, struc-
tural change is episodic: long periods of little change are followed by brief epi-
sodes of major restructuring. Organizations are reluctant to make major changes
because a stable structure reduces confusion and uncertainty, maintains inter-
nal consistency, and protects the existing equilibrium. The price of stability is a
structure that grows increasingly misaligned with the environment. Eventually,
•
•
•
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Structure and Restructuring 91
the gap gets so big that a major overhaul is inevitable. Restructuring, in this view,
is like spring cleaning: we accumulate debris over months or years until we are
fi nally forced to face up to the mess.
Making Restructuring Work: Three Case Examples In this section, we look at three case examples of restructuring. We focus particu-
larly on examples of reengineering, which rose to prominence in the 1990s as an
umbrella concept for emerging trends in structural thinking. Hammer and Champy
promised a revolution in how organizations were structured: “ When a process is
reengineered, jobs evolve from narrow and task oriented to multidimensional.
People who once did as they were instructed now make choices and decisions on
their own instead. Assembly - line work disappears. Functional departments lose
their reason for being. Managers stop acting like supervisors and behave more like
coaches. Workers focus more on customers ’ needs and less on their bosses ’ whims.
Attitudes and values change in response to new incentives. Practically every aspect
of the organization is transformed, often beyond recognition ” (1993, p. 65).
The process of reengineering and the results it produces vary signifi cantly.
As Champy admitted in his follow - up book, Reengineering Management (1995),
“ Reengineering is in trouble. ” He attributed the shortfall to fl aws in senior man-
agement thinking. Essentially, for reengineering to succeed, managers need
to be rewired. Some reengineering initiatives have indeed been catastrophic, a
notorious example being the long - haul bus company, Greyhound Lines. As the
company came out of bankruptcy in the early 1990s, a new management team
announced a major reorganization, with sizable cuts in staffi ng and routes and
development of a new, computerized reservation system. The new initiative
played well on Wall Street, where the company ’ s stock soared, but it fared very
poorly on Main Street as both customer service and the new reservations system
collapsed. Rushed, underfunded, and insensitive to both employees and custom-
ers, it was a textbook example of how not to restructure. Eventually, Greyhound ’ s
stock crashed, and management was forced out. One observer noted wryly,
“ They reengineered that business to hell ” (Tomsho, 1994, p. A1). Across many
organizations, reengineering was a cover for downsizing the workforce.
But while few in number compared to disasters, there have also been exam-
ples of notable restructuring success. Here we discuss three of them, drawn from
different eras and industries. The fi rst, from Citibank, dates back to the 1970s,
well before the term reengineering was applied to structural change.
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Reframing Organizations92
C I T I B A N K ’ S B A C K R O O M
The “ back room ” at Citibank — the department that processed checks
and other fi nancial instruments — was in trouble when John Reed took
charge in 1970 (Seeger, Lorsch, and Gibson, 1975). Productivity was disap-
pointing, errors were frequent, and expenses were rising almost 20 per-
cent every year. Reed soon determined that the area needed dramatic
structural change. Traditionally, it was viewed as a service for the bank ’ s
customer - contact offi ces, though it was structured as a machine bureau-
cracy. Reed decided to think of it not as a support function but as a fac-
tory: an independent, high - volume production facility. To implement this
concept, he imported high - level executives from the automobile indus-
try. One was Robert White, who came from Ford to become the primary
architect of new structure and systems for the back room.
White began by developing a “ phase one action plan ” that called
for cutting costs, putting in new computer systems, and developing a
fi nancial control system capable of both forecasting and measuring
performance. In effect, the strategy retained the machine bureaucracy
but tightened it. After phase one was implemented, White concluded
that “ we hadn ’ t gone back to the basics enough. We found that we
did not really understand the present processes completely ” (Seeger,
Lorsch, and Gibson, 1975, p. 8). What followed was an intensive,
detailed study of how the back room ’ s processes worked, laid out in
a detailed fl owchart that covered the walls of a room. They realized
that the current structure was, in effect, one very large functional pipe-
line. Everything fl owed into “ preprocessing ” at the front end of the
pipe, then to “ encoding, ” and on through a series of functional areas
until it eventually came out at the other end. Reed and White decided
to break the pipe into several smaller lines, each carrying a different
“ product ” and each supervised by a single manager with responsibility
for an end - to - end process. The key insight was to change the structure
from machine bureaucracy to a divisionalized form. Along with the
change, White instituted extensive performance measures and tight
accountability procedures — 69 quality indicators and 129 different
standards for time lines.
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Structure and Restructuring 93
Not surprisingly, White ’ s demanding, top - down approach produced
fear and loathing among many old - timers in the back room and nearly
led to rebellion. As Mintzberg ’ s model predicts, the technical core
strongly resisted this intrusion. Reed and White implemented the new
structure virtually overnight, and the short - term result was chaos and a
major breakdown in the system. It took two weeks to get things work-
ing again, and fi ve months to recover from the problems generated
by the transition. But once past that crisis, the new system led to a
dramatic improvement in operating results: production was up, and
costs and errors were down. The back room had unexpectedly become
a major source of competitive advantage.
The revamp of the Citibank back room demonstrates again the value of mana-
gerial imagination. The basic concepts behind restructuring the back room were
not new. The change from a functional bureaucracy to a divisionalized form fi rst
occurred in the 1920s at General Motors and DuPont. The key imaginative leap was
to apply the concept of a divisionalized organization to the back room of a bank.
The Citibank restructuring was strongly driven from the top down and
focused primarily on internal effi ciencies. This has been true of many, but by no
means all, reengineering efforts.
K O D A K ’ S B L A C K - A N D - W H I T E D I V I S I O N
Eastman Kodak, a classic reengineering example portrayed by Hammer
and Champy (1993), began with a push from the top but put much
greater emphasis on customers and on empowering employees at mul-
tiple levels. Kodak traces its rich historic roots back to the late 1880s,
when George Eastman began to manufacture wooden boxes capable of
capturing one hundred personal images on fi lm.
A century later, Kodak was a giant in trouble. Its name and fi lm
were known around the world, but the company had been rocked by
intense competition, high costs, declining customer satisfaction, threats
of a hostile takeover, and low employee morale. At a top management
meeting in 1989, Kodak ’ s normally gentle, soft - spoken CEO, Colby
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Reframing Organizations94
Chandler, wielded a machete to hack a wooden lectern to pieces. The
message was clear and dramatic: Kodak needed fundamental change,
and its functional, “ stovepipe ” structure had to give way to an orga-
nization based on process — a seamless fl ow from raw materials to fi n-
ished products (Hammer and Champy, 1993).
Kodak chose to reorganize into six fl ows, one of which was black - and -
white fi lm. Implementation was to begin immediately, and any laggard
operations would be shut down. In the black - and - white division, a group
of executives focused on creating three streams: graphics, health sciences,
and solvent coatings. All other areas (fi nancial services, human resources,
and engineering support) would be “ dedicated ” to supporting these fl ows.
One of the fi rst tasks was to create performance measures and stan-
dards for the fl ows (productivity, inventory, waste, quality, conformance
to specifi cations). With the operating fl ow as the center of attention,
managers and supervisors became coaches and cheerleaders. Frequent
informal meetings were an opportunity to air concerns and identify
problems. Employees were encouraged to develop local visions and
determine priorities and improvement plans for everything from reduc-
ing inventory and cutting waste to establishing relationships with sup-
pliers and speeding delivery time (Frangos, 1996).
The overall fl ow focused on satisfying external customers; each step
in the process emphasized satisfying internal customers and build-
ing cooperation among employees. Cross - functional teams began to
achieve breakthroughs in quality and cost reduction. Two years after
the restructuring was launched, performance standards were being sur-
passed. The division was not only one of the company ’ s shining stars in
terms of profi tability but also was widely heralded as one of the compa-
ny ’ s best places to work.
B E T H I S R A E L H O S P I T A L
Boston ’ s Beth Israel Hospital is a restructuring effort in health care that
sought to move toward greater autonomy and teamwork. When Joyce
Clifford became Beth Israel ’ s director of nursing, she found a top - down
structure common in hospitals:
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Structure and Restructuring 95
The nursing aides, who had the least preparation, had the most con-
tact with the patients. But they had no authority of any kind. They
had to go to their supervisor to ask if a patient could have an aspi-
rin. The supervisor would then ask the head nurse, who would then
ask a doctor. The doctor would ask how long the patient had been
in pain. Of course the head nurse had absolutely no idea, so she ’ d
have to track down the aide to ask her, and then relay that infor-
mation back to the doctor. It was ridiculous, a ludicrous and dissatis-
fying situation, and one in which it was impossible for the nurse to
feel any satisfaction at all. The system was hierarchical, fragmented,
impersonal, and [overmanaged] [Helgesen, 1995, p. 134].
Within units, the responsibilities of nurses were highly specialized: some
assigned to handling medications, others to monitoring vital signs, still
others to taking blood pressure readings. Add to the list specialized
housekeeping roles — bedpan, bed making, and food services — and a
patient witnessed interruptions from a multitude of virtual strangers. No
one really knew for sure what was going on with any individual patient.
With the support and cooperation of Mitchell Rabkin, Beth Israel ’ s
progressive CEO, Clifford instituted a major structural change, from a
pyramid with nurses at the bottom to an inclusive web with nurses at
the center. The concept, called primary nursing, has each primary nurse
monitor the care of a specifi c patient. The nurse takes information
when the patient is admitted, develops a comprehensive plan, assem-
bles a team to provide round - the - clock care, and lets the family know
what to expect. A nurse manager sets goals for the unit, deals with
budget and administrative matters, and makes sure that primary nurses
have ample resources to provide quality care.
As the primary nurse assumed more responsibility, connections with
physicians and other hospital workers had to be revised. Instead of simply
carrying out physicians ’ orders, the primary nurse became a professional
partner, attending rounds and participating as an equal in treatment
decisions. Housekeepers reported to primary nurses rather than to house-
keeping supervisors. The same housekeeper was assigned to make a
patient ’ s bed, attend to the patient ’ s hygiene, and deliver trays. Laundry
workers brought in clean items on demand rather than making a once -
a - day delivery. Beth Israel ’ s inclusive web was further strengthened by
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Reframing Organizations96
sophisticated technology that gave all network points easy access to
patient information and administrative data.
Primary nurses learned from performing a variety of heretofore
menial tasks. Bed making, for example, became an opportunity to
evaluate a patient ’ s condition and assess how well a treatment plan
was working. Joyce Clifford ’ s role also was transformed from top - down
supervisor to a web - centered coordinator. Rather than telling people
what to do, she focused on keeping everyone informed:
At the center of all patient care at Beth Israel, Joyce Clifford linked
the various intersecting points of the inclusive web: “ A big part
of my job is to keep nurses informed on a regular basis of what ’ s
going on out there — what the board is doing, what decisions are
confronting the hospital as a whole, what the issues are in health
care in this country. I also let them know that I ’ m trying to repre-
sent what the nurses here are doing — to our vice - presidents, to our
board, and people in the outside world . . . to the nursing profes-
sion and the health care fi eld as a whole ” [Helgesen, 1995, p. 158].
Beth Israel ’ s primary nursing concept, initiated in the mid - 1970s, produced
signifi cant improvement in both patient care and nursing morale. Nursing
turnover declined dramatically (Springarn, 1982) and the model ’ s success
made it highly infl uential and widely copied both in the United States and
abroad. But even successful change won ’ t work forever. Over the years,
changes in the health care system put Beth Israel ’ s model under increas-
ing pressure. More patients with more problems but shorter hospital stays
made nurses ’ jobs much harder at the same time that cost pressures forced
reductions in nursing staff. Beth Israel chose to update its approach by cre-
ating interdisciplinary “ care teams. ” Instead of assembling an ad hoc col-
lection of care providers for each new patient, ongoing teams of nurses,
physicians, and support staff were created to provide interdisciplinary sup-
port to primary nurses (Rundall, Starkweather, and Norrish, 1998).
Principles of Successful Structural Change The proportion of reengineering failures to successes is high. The Citibank,
Kodak, and Beth Israel efforts succeeded by following several basic principles of
successful structural change:
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Structure and Restructuring 97
The change architects developed a new conception of the organization ’ s goals
and strategies.
They carefully studied the existing structure and process so that they fully
understood how things worked. Many efforts at structural change fail because
they start from an inadequate picture of current roles, relationships, and
processes.
They designed the new structure in response to changes in goals, technology,
and environment.
Finally, they experimented as they moved along, retaining things that worked
and discarding those that did not.
SUMMARY At a given moment, an organization ’ s structure represents its best effort to align
internal workings with outside concerns. Simultaneously, managers work to
juggle and resolve enduring organizational dilemmas: Are we too loose, or too
tight? Are employees underworked, or overwhelmed? Are we too rigid, or do we
lack standards? Do people spend too much or too little time harmonizing with
one another? Structure represents a resolution of contending claims from vari-
ous groups.
Mintzberg differentiates fi ve major components in organizational structure:
strategic apex, middle management, operating core, technostructure, and sup-
port staff. These components confi gure in unique designs: machine bureaucracy,
professional bureaucracy, simple structure, divisionalized form, and adhocracy.
Helgesen adds a less hierarchical model, the web of inclusion.
Changes eventually require some form of structural adaptation. Restructuring
or reengineering is a logical but high - risk response. In the short term, it invari-
ably produces confusion, resistance, and even a decline in success. In the long
run, success depends on how well the new model aligns with environment, task,
and technology. It also hinges on the route for putting the new structure in place.
Effective restructuring requires both a fi ne - grained, microscopic assessment of
typical problems and an overall, topographical sense of structural options.
•
•
•
•
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99
Organizing Groups and Teams
In Seattle, a seventeen - year - old girl is mortally injured in an auto-mobile accident. She is pronounced brain - dead, and her parents give permission to harvest her organs. Her kidney tissue type is
entered into a national database. In Nashville, a potential recipient is
identifi ed: a forty - two - year - old mother of three who will die with-
out a new kidney.
Dr. Peter Minnich, the Nashville surgeon who will perform the transplant, con-
tacts his counterpart in Seattle to check the condition of the kidney. Weighing
several factors, he decides to accept the organ. A Seattle surgical team procures
the kidney, checks for a tissue match, and transports the iced kidney to the air-
port for its fl ight to Nashville. Simultaneously, the Nashville transplant team
hospitalizes the recipient. They also notify the hospital and give an estimate of
how long the operation will take. The lab is alerted to perform the fi nal cross -
match once the kidney arrives, a procedure that takes three hours.
On arrival, the kidney is taken to the lab. Ninety minutes before the results
of the cross - match are complete, nurses begin to prepare the operating room.
The lab calls in a positive result, so the transplant can go forward. Members of
the transplant team scrub in and go about their respective duties. The surgeon
cleans up the kidney. The fi rst assistant trims the fat and helps the surgeon pack
the organ in fresh ice slush. A scrub nurse and a circulating nurse prepare the
instrument table. The anesthesiologist and nurse assistant prepare the patient
F I V E
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations100
for surgery. During the transplant procedure, the circulating nurse brings
instruments and sutures. The scrub nurse watches the surgery and anticipates
which instruments the surgeon will need. The surgeon focuses on the procedure.
The fi rst assistant retracts tissue. The anesthesiologist monitors the patient ’ s vital
signs and supervises the nurse assistant.
Success in this life - saving procedure depends as much on the performance
of the team as on the technical skills of the surgeon. Multiple roles are clearly
defi ned, but team members also have the fl exibility to cross role boundaries to do
what needs to be done. The surgeon is in charge, but there is substantial lateral
coordination. A good scrub nurse, for example, anticipates which instruments to
hand off, with the discretion, as Dr. Minnich puts it, to “ give me what I want, not
what I ’ m asking for. ” He adds, “ The more often team members work together the
greater the chance for a successful outcome. Building a cohesive team is critical.
The surgeon has to be a team leader as well as a good technician. ” The resulting
teamwork has allowed Minnich to compile a perfect success record.
The impact of structure on a team ’ s performance is not restricted to the oper-
ating suite. During World War II, a U.S. Army commando team compiled a dis-
tinctive record. It accomplished every mission it was assigned, including extremely
high - risk operations behind the lines. Deaths and injuries were among the low-
est of any U.S. military unit. A research team was charged with fi nding out what
made the unit so successful. Were the enlisted men and offi cers especially tal-
ented? Was their training longer or more intensive than normal? Or was the
group just plain lucky?
Researchers pinpointed the reason for the group ’ s success: the ability to
reconfi gure its structure to fi t the situation. Planning for missions, the group
functioned democratically. Anyone could volunteer ideas and make sugges-
tions. Decisions were reached by consensus, and the engagement strategy was
approved by the group as a whole. The unit ’ s planning structure resembled that
of a research and development team or a creative design group. Amorphous
roles, lateral coordination, and a fl at hierarchy encouraged participation, creativ-
ity, and productive confl ict. Battle plans refl ected the group ’ s best ideas.
Executing the plan was another story. The group ’ s structure transformed
from a loose, creative confederation to a well - defi ned, tightly controlled chain
of command. Each individual had a specifi c assignment. Tasks had to be done
with split - second precision. The commanding offi cer had sole responsibil-
ity for making operational decisions or revising the plan. Everyone else obeyed
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Organizing Groups and Teams 101
orders without question, though they were allowed to offer suggestions if time
permitted. In battle, the group relied on the traditional military structure: clear - cut
responsibilities and decisions made at the top and executed by the rank and fi le.
The group ’ s ability to tailor its structure captured the best of two worlds.
Participation encouraged creativity, ownership, and understanding of the battle
plan. Authority, accountability, and clarity enabled the group to function with
speed and effi ciency during the operation.
Today, we see increasing reliance on self - organizing units or teams. A deadly
example is Al Quaeda. Committed to uniting all Muslims under a new caliphate,
Al Quaeda believes that only force can achieve this mission. Al Quaeda began in
Afghanistan in the 1980s as a more centralized, top - down organization under
the leadership of Osama bin Laden. Expelled from its safe haven and seriously
damaged by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, it adapted to circumstances and
became more decentralized and loosely structured. Communication between
top leadership and local units moves through a clandestine labyrinth of secret
couriers and codes. The logistics of a selected strike are worked out in concert
with intermediaries who link strategy with operations. The strike is then car-
ried out by the mujahideen, or brigade members. Until activated for a specifi ed
mission, members of these sleeper cells blend with the general populace. Cells
within the same region operate autonomously. They can be, without knowing it,
on parallel tracks for the same mission. This hydra - like team structure looms as
a deadly threat that is diffi cult to combat with traditional command - and - control
strategies. Teamwork cuts across organizational and national boundaries and can
work either for or against us.
Much of the work in large organizations of every sort is now done in groups
or teams. When these units work well, they elevate the performance of ordinary
individuals to extraordinary heights. When teams malfunction, as too often hap-
pens, they erode the potential contributions of even the most talented members.
What determines how well groups perform? As illustrated by the surgical team,
the commando team, and Al Quaeda, the performance of a small group depends
heavily on structure. A key ingredient of a top - notch team is an appropriate
blueprint of roles and relationships set in motion to attain common goals.
In this chapter, we explore the structural features of small groups or teams
and show how restructuring can improve group performance. We begin by
describing various design options for teams, accenting the relationship between
design and tasks. Next, using sports as an example, we discuss different patterns
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Reframing Organizations102
of team differentiation, coordination, and interdependence. Then we describe
the characteristics of high - performing teams. Finally, we discuss the pros and
cons of self - managing teams — a hot item in the early twenty - fi rst century.
TASKS AND LINKAGES IN SMALL GROUPS From a range of options, groups must develop a structure that maximizes indi-
viduals ’ contributions while minimizing the problems that often plague small
groups. A key to group structure is the work to be done. Tasks vary in clarity,
predictability, and stability. The task - structure relationship in small groups is
parallel to that in larger organizations.
Contextual Variables As suggested in Chapter Four , complex tasks present challenges different from
simpler ones. Planning a commando mission or transplanting a kidney is not
the same as painting a house or setting up a family outing. Simple tasks align
with basic structures — clearly defi ned roles, elementary forms of interdepen-
dence, and coordination by plan or command. More complicated projects gen-
erally require more complex forms: fl exible roles, reciprocal give - and - take, and
synchronization through lateral dealings and communal feedback. If a situation
becomes exceptionally ambiguous and fast - paced, particularly when time is a
factor, more centralized authority often works best. Otherwise, a group may be
unable to make decisions quickly enough. Without a workable structure, perfor-
mance and morale suffer, and troubles multiply.
Ferreting out the appropriate group structure requires careful consideration
of pertinent contextual variables, some vague or tough to assess:
What is our goal?
What needs to be done?
Who should do what?
How should we make decisions?
Who is in charge?
How do we coordinate efforts?
What do individual members care about most: time, quality, participation?
What are the special skills and talents of each group member?
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•
•
•
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•
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Organizing Groups and Teams 103
What is the relationship between this group and others?
How will we determine success?
Some Fundamental Team Confi gurations A high percentage of employees ’ and managers ’ time is spent in meetings and
working groups of three to twelve people. To illustrate design options, we exam-
ine several fundamental structural confi gurations from studies of fi ve - member
teams. These basic patterns are too simple to apply to larger, more complex sys-
tems, but they help to illustrate the principle of how different structural forms
respond to a variety of challenges.
The fi rst is a one - boss arrangement; one person has authority over others (see
Exhibit 5.1 ). Information and decisions fl ow from the top. Group members offer
information to and communicate primarily with the offi cial leader rather than
with one another. Although this array is effi cient and fast, it works best in a rela-
tively simple and straightforward situation. More complicated circumstances over-
load the boss, producing delays or bad decisions, unless the person in charge has
an unusual level of skill, expertise, and energy. Subordinates quickly become frus-
trated when directives they receive are poorly timed or ill - suited to the situation.
•
•
Exhibit 5.1. One Boss.
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Reframing Organizations104
A second alternative creates a management level below the boss (see Exhibit 5.2 ).
Two individuals are given authority over specifi c areas of the group ’ s work.
Information and decisions fl ow through them. This arrangement works when
a task is divisible; it reduces the boss ’ s span of control, freeing up time to con-
centrate on mission, strategy, or relationships with higher - ups. But adding
a new layer limits access from the lower levels to the boss. Communication
becomes slower and more cumbersome, and may eventually erode morale and
performance.
Another choice is to create, in effect, a simple hierarchy, with a middle man-
ager who reports to the boss and in turn supervises and communicates with oth-
ers (see Exhibit 5.3 ). This arrangement is used extensively at the White House.
It frees the president to focus on mission and external relations while leaving
operational details to the chief of staff. Though this further limits access to the
top, it can be more effi cient than a dual - manager arrangement. At the same time,
Exhibit 5.2. Dual Authority.
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Organizing Groups and Teams 105
friction between operational and top - level managers is commonplace and can
lead to attempts by the number two to usurp the number one ’ s position.
A fourth option is a circle network, where information and decisions fl ow
sequentially from one group member to another (see Exhibit 5.4 ). Each can add
to or modify whatever comes around. This design relies solely on lateral coordi-
nation and simplifi es communication. Each person has to deal directly with only
two others; transactions are therefore easier to manage. But one weak link in the
chain can undermine the entire enterprise. The circle can bog down with com-
plex tasks that require more reciprocity.
A fi nal possibility sets up what small group researchers call the all - channel,
or star, network (see Exhibit 5.5 ). This design is similar to Helgesen ’ s web of
inclusion. It creates multiple connections so that each person can talk to any-
one else. Information fl ows freely; decisions require touching multiple bases.
Morale in an all - channel network is usually very high. The arrangement works
well if a task is amorphous or complicated, but it is slow and ineffi cient for a
Exhibit 5.3. Simple Hierarchy.
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Reframing Organizations106
simpler undertaking. It works best when team members bring well - developed
communication skills, enjoy participation, tolerate ambiguity, embrace diversity,
and are able to manage confl ict.
TEAMWORK AND INTERDEPENDENCE Even in the relatively simple case of fi ve - person groups, the formal network is
critical to team functioning. In the give - and - take of larger organizations, things
get more complicated. We can get a fresh perspective and sharpen our thinking
about structure in groups by looking beyond work organizations. Making the
familiar strange often helps the strange become familiar. Team sports, among
the most popular pastimes around the world, offer a helpful analogy to clarify
how teamwork varies depending on the tasks at hand. Every competition calls for
its own unique patterns of interaction. Because of this, unique team structures
Exhibit 5.4. Circle Network.
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Organizing Groups and Teams 107
are required for different sports. Social architecture is thus remarkably different
for baseball, football, and basketball.
Baseball As baseball player Pete Rose once noted, “ Baseball is a team game, but nine men
who meet their individual goals make a nice team ” (Keidel, 1984, p. 8). In base-
ball, as in cricket and other bat - and - ball games, a team is a loosely integrated
confederacy. Individual efforts are mostly independent, seldom involving more
than two or three players at a time. Particularly on defense, players are sepa-
rated from one another by signifi cant distance. The loose connections mini-
mize the need for synchronization among the various positions. The pitcher and
catcher must each know what the other is going to do, and at times, infi elders
must anticipate how a teammate will act. Managers ’ decisions are mostly tactical,
Exhibit 5.5. All-Channel Network.
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Reframing Organizations108
normally involving individual substitutions or actions. Managers come and go
without seriously disrupting the team ’ s play. Players can transfer from one team
to another with relative ease. A newcomer can do the job without major retun-
ing. John Updike summed it up well: “ Of all the team sports, baseball, with its
graceful intermittence of action, its immense and tranquil fi eld sparsely salted
with poised men in white, its dispassionate mathematics, seemed to be best
suited to accommodate, and be ornamented by, a loner. It is an essentially lonely
game ” (Keidel, 1984, pp. 14 – 15).
Football Baseball is poles apart from American football. Unlike baseball players, football
players perform in close proximity. Linemen and offensive backs hear, see, and
often touch one another. Each play involves every player on the fi eld. Efforts are
sequentially linked in a prearranged plan. The actions of linemen pave the
way for the movement of backs; a defensive team ’ s fi eld position becomes
the starting point for the offense, and vice versa. In the transition from offense
to defense, specialty platoons play a pivotal role. The efforts of individual
players are not independent but instead are tightly coordinated. George Allen,
former coach of the Washington Redskins, put it this way: “ A football team is
a lot like a machine. It ’ s made up of parts. If one part doesn ’ t work, one player
pulling against you and not doing his job, the whole machine fails ” (Keidel,
1984, p. 9).
Because of the tight connections among parts, a football team must be well
integrated, mainly through planning and top - down control. The primary units
are the offensive, defensive, and specialty platoons, each with its own coordina-
tor. Under the direction of the head coach, the team uses scouting reports and
other surveillance to develop a strategy or game plan in advance. During the
game, strategic decisions are typically made by the head coach. Tactical deci-
sions are made by assistants or by designated players on either offense or defense
(Keidel, 1984).
A football team ’ s tight - knit character makes it tougher to swap players from
one team to another. Irv Cross, of the Philadelphia Eagles, once remarked, “ An
Eagles player could never make an easy transition to the Dallas Cowboys; the
system and philosophies are just too different ” (Keidel, 1984, p. 15). Unlike base-
ball, football requires intricate strategy and tightly meshed execution.
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Organizing Groups and Teams 109
Basketball Basketball players perform in even closer proximity to one another than football
players. In quick, rapidly moving transitions, offense becomes defense — with
the same players. The efforts of individuals are highly reciprocal; each player
depends on the performance of others. Each may be involved with any of the
other four. Anyone can handle the ball or attempt to score.
Basketball is much like improvisational jazz. Teams require a high level of
spontaneous, mutual adjustment. Everyone is on the move, often in an emerg-
ing pattern rather than a predetermined course. A successful basketball season
depends heavily on a fl owing relationship among team members who read and
anticipate one another ’ s moves. Players who play together a long time develop
a sense of what their teammates will do. A team of newcomers experiences
diffi culty in adjusting to individual predispositions or quirks. Keidel (1984)
notes that coaches, who sit or roam the sidelines, serve as integrators. Their peri-
odic interventions reinforce team cohesion, helping players coordinate laterally
on the move. Unlike baseball teams, basketball teams cannot function as a collec-
tion of individual stars. Unlike football, basketball has no platoons. It is wholly a
harmonized group effort.
A study of Duke University ’ s successful women ’ s basketball team in 2000
documented the importance of group interdependence and cohesion. The team
won because players could anticipate the actions of others. The individual “ I ”
deferred to the collective “ we. ” Passing to a teammate was valued as highly as
making the shot. Basketball is “ fast, physically close, and crowded, 20 arms and
legs in motion, up, down, across, in the air. The better the team, the more precise
the passing into lanes that appear blocked with bodies ” (Lubans, 2001, p. 1).
DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL TEAMWORK In sports and elsewhere, structural profi les of successful teams at work depend
on the game — on what a team is trying to do. Keidel (1984) suggests several
important questions in designing an appropriate structure:
What is the nature and degree of dealings among individuals?
What is the spatial distribution of unit members?
Given a group ’ s objectives and constraints, where does authority reside?
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•
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Reframing Organizations110
How is coordination achieved?
Which word best describes the required structure: conglomerate, mechanistic,
or organic?
What sports expression metaphorically captures the task of management:
fi lling out the line - up card, preparing the game plan, or infl uencing the
game ’ s fl ow?
Appropriate team structures can vary, even within the same organization.
For example, a senior research manager in a pharmaceutical fi rm observed a
structural progression in discovering and developing a new drug: “ The pro-
cess moves through three distinct stages. It ’ s like going from baseball to foot-
ball to basketball ” (Keidel, 1984, p. 11). In basic research, individual scientists
work independently to develop a body of knowledge. As in baseball, individual
labors are the norm. Once identifi ed, a promising drug passes from develop-
mental chemists to pharmacy researchers to toxicologists. If the drug receives
preliminary federal approval, it moves to clinical researchers for experimen-
tal tests. These sequential relationships are reminiscent of play sequences in
football. In the fi nal stage ( “ new drug application ” ) physicians, statisticians,
pharmacists, pharmacologists, toxicologists, and chemists work closely and
reciprocally to win fi nal approval from the Food and Drug Administration.
Their efforts resemble the closely linked and fl owing patterns of a basketball
team (Keidel, 1984).
Jan Haynes, executive vice president of FzioMed, a California developer of
new biomedical approaches to preventing scar tissue in surgical procedures,
echoes the pharmaceutical executive ’ s observations. But she adds, “ In sports a
game lasts only a short period of time. In our business, each game goes on for
months, even years. It more closely resembles cricket. A single game can go on
for days and still end in a draw. Our product has been in the trial stage for sev-
eral years and now we have to shift the team to a new phase; working with the
FDA to get fi nal approval, which could take a long time. ” Ron Haynes, the fi rm ’ s
chairman, points out how diffi cult it is to change his leadership style as the rules
of the game change: “ I moved from manager to owner of an expansion team
where we have several games being played simultaneously in the same stadium.
If our leadership can ’ t shift quickly from one to another, our operation won ’ t get
the job done right. ” Doing the right job requires a structure or structures well
suited to what an organization is trying to accomplish.
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•
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Organizing Groups and Teams 111
TEAM STRUCTURE AND TOP PERFORMANCE The importance of a clear and appropriate structure to team performance is
well documented. Katzenbach and Smith (1993), for example, interviewed hun-
dreds of people on more than fi fty teams in developing their book The Wisdom
of Teams. Their sample encompassed thirty enterprises in settings as diverse as
Motorola, Hewlett - Packard, Operation Desert Storm, and the Girl Scouts. They
drew a clear distinction between undifferentiated “ groups ” and sharply focused
“ teams ” : “ A team is a small number of people with complementary skills, who
are committed to a common purpose, set of performance goals and approach
for which they hold themselves mutually accountable ” (p. 112).
Katzenbach and Smith ’ s research highlights six distinguishing characteristics
of high - quality teams:
High - performing teams shape purpose in response to a demand or an opportu-
nity placed in their path, usually by higher management. Top managers clarify the
team ’ s charter, rationale, and challenge while giving the team fl exibility to work
out goals and plans of operation. By giving a team clear authority and then stay-
ing out of the way, management releases collective energy and creativity.
High - performing teams translate common purpose into specifi c, measurable
performance goals. Purpose yields an overall mission, but successful teams take
the additional step of recasting purpose into specifi c and measurable perfor-
mance goals: “ If a team fails to establish specifi c performance goals or if those
goals do not relate directly to the team ’ s overall purpose, team members become
confused, pull apart, and revert to mediocre performance. By contrast, when
purpose and goals are built on one another and are combined with team com-
mitment, they become a powerful engine of performance ” (p. 113).
High - performing teams are of manageable size. Katzenbach and Smith fi x the
optimal size for an effective team somewhere between two and twenty - fi ve people:
“ Ten people are far more likely than fi fty to work through their individual, func-
tional, and hierarchical differences toward a common plan and to hold themselves
jointly accountable for the results ” (p. 114). More members mean more structural
complexity, so teams should aim for the smallest size that can get the job done.
High - performing teams develop the right mix of expertise. The structural frame
stresses the critical link between specialization and expertise. Effective teams seek
out the full range of necessary technical fl uency; “ product development teams
that include only marketers or engineers are less likely to succeed than those with
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•
•
•
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Reframing Organizations112
the complementary skills of both ” (p. 115). In addition, exemplary teams fi nd and
reward expertise in problem solving, decision making, and interpersonal skills to
keep the group focused, on task, and free of debilitating personal squabbles.
High - performing teams develop a common commitment to working relation-
ships. “ Team members must agree on who will do particular jobs, how sched-
ules will be set and adhered to, what skills need to be developed, how continuing
membership in the team is to be earned, and how the group will make and modify
decisions ” (p. 115). Effective teams take time to explore who is best suited for a
particular task as well as how individual roles come together. Achieving structural
clarity varies from team to team, but it takes more than an organization chart to
identify roles and pinpoint one ’ s place in the offi cial pecking order and layout of
responsibilities. Most teams require a more detailed understanding of who is going
to do what and how people relate to each other in carrying out diverse tasks.
One possibility is to use responsibility charting (Galbraith, 1977). Respo n-
sibility charting presents a framework and a language for hammering out how
people work together. For a given task, responsibility is assigned to the individ-
ual or group with overall accountability. The next step is to outline how that role
relates to others on the team. Does someone need to approve the actions of the
responsible person? Are there people who need to be consulted? Are there others
who must be kept informed? The acronym CAIRO summarizes the framework:
C for consults; A for approval; I for informed; R for responsibility; and O for out of
the loop, or not informed. Whatever form it takes, an effective team “ establishes a
social contract among members that relates to their purpose and guides and obli-
gates how they will work together ” (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993, p. 116).
Members of high - performing teams hold themselves collectively accountable.
Pinpointing individual responsibility is crucial to a well - coordinated effort, but
effective teams fi nd ways to hold the collective accountable: “ Teams enjoying a
common purpose and approach inevitably hold themselves responsible, both as
individuals and as a team, for the team ’ s performance ” (p. 116).
Teams have become the rage but are often thrown together with little attention
to what ensures success. In an infl uential article, Brian Dumaine (1994) highlights
a common error: “ Teams often get launched in a vacuum, with little or no training
or support, no changes in the design of their work, and no new systems like e - mail
to help communication between teams. Frustrations mount, and people wind up
in endless meetings trying to fi gure out why they are a team and what they are
expected to do. ” A focused, cohesive structure is a fundamental underpinning for
•
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Organizing Groups and Teams 113
high - performing teams. Even highly skilled people zealously pursuing a shared
mission will falter and fail if group structure constantly generates inequity, confu-
sion, and frustration.
SELF - MANAGING TEAMS: STRUCTURE OF THE FUTURE? The sports team analogy discussed earlier assumed some role for a top - down
team manager. But what about teams that manage themselves organically from
the bottom up? Self - managing work teams have been defi ned as groups of
employees with the following characteristics (Wellins and others, 1990):
They manage themselves (plan, organize, control, staff, and monitor).
They assign jobs to members (decide who works on what, where, and when).
They plan and schedule work (control start - up and ending times, the pace of
work, and goal setting).
They make production - or service - related decisions (take responsibility for
inventory, quality control decisions, and work stoppage).
They take action to remedy problems (address quality issues, customer ser-
vice needs, and member discipline and rewards).
Evidence suggests that self - directed teams often produce better results and higher
morale than groups operating under more traditional top - down control (Cohen
and Ledford, 1994; Emery and Fredendall, 2002). But getting such teams started
and giving them the resources they need to be effective is a complex undertaking.
Many well - known fi rms — such as Microsoft, Boeing, Google, W. L. Gore, Southwest
Airlines, Harley - Davidson, Whole Foods, and Goldman Sachs — have stumbled suc-
cessfully toward the benefi ts of self - directed teams without being overwhelmed by
logistical snafus or reverting to the traditional command - and - control structure.
A classic multi decade example is the Saturn division of General Motors.
In 1983, General Motors announced the launch of a revolutionary experi-
ment: the Saturn project, which would produce automobiles in a new way. The
Saturn experiment showed what can happen when you place people in a suitable
structure of roles and relationships. After it was launched by its parent, Saturn
quickly achieved levels of quality, consumer satisfaction, and customer loyalty
that surpassed those of much of the U.S. automotive industry. What was the
secret of the company ’ s success?
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Reframing Organizations114
Credit has been assigned to its sophisticated technology and its enlightened
approach to managing people and its unique culture. On the technology side,
Saturn made extensive use of computers and deployed robots for many repeti-
tive or dangerous jobs. Its human resource practices emphasized training, con-
fl ict management, and extensive employee participation. Its unique way of doing
things and cohesion are legendary. Yet it is easy to overlook Saturn ’ s distinctive
team structure as an important element of its achievements.
Company-wide, Saturn employees were granted authority to make team deci-
sions, within a few fl exible guidelines. Restrictive rules and ironclad, top - down
work procedures were left behind as the company moved away from what
employees call the “ old world ” of General Motors. Early in the company ’ s history,
a new manager imported from General Motors was walking the line and noticed
an assembly worker standing beside a pile of parts. He asked the employee why
the parts were not being used. The worker replied that they did not meet quality
standards. The manager told him to use the parts anyway. The worker refused.
“ Very quickly the UAW [United Automobile Workers] president and a top man-
ager came to the scene. They fl at out told [the new manager] that things aren ’ t
done that way here at Saturn and that he ’ d better learn his job. To which the
manager replied, ‘ What is my job? ’ The union president retorted, ‘ That ’ s for you
to discover ’ ” (Deal and Jenkins, 1994, p. 244).
Saturn ’ s engineers and assembly - line workers worked together to solve prob-
lems and design manufacturing processes. Quality was everyone ’ s business, and
any employee had the authority to stop the assembly line if something ran amiss.
Relationships between UAW and Saturn management were cordial and coopera-
tive, governed by an offi cial agreement just one page in length.
Most of the actual assembly of the Saturn automobile was done by teams.
More than 150 production teams of eight to fi fteen cross - trained, highly inter-
dependent workers assembled the cars on a half - mile - long assembly line. The
traditional system of sequential, repetitive efforts by isolated individuals became
a thing of the past. Saturn created “ a work environment where people pro-
vide leadership for themselves and others. It is cooperation and self and team
management that make Saturn tick. Problems are solved by people working
together — they are not kicked upstairs for others to solve ” (p. 230).
Saturn teams exemplifi ed Katzenbach and Smith ’ s (1993) profi le of success-
ful teams. The design of the car, corporate values, and quality standards came
down from the executive suite, but each team translated broad objectives into
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Organizing Groups and Teams 115
measurable performance goals. Teams were empowered to deal with budget,
safety procedures, ergonomics, vacations, time off, and other matters. In effect,
each team managed its own business within general guidelines. An employee in
body systems described how it worked on her team: “ The working conditions
are like running your own business. We decide when the shifts are, who starts
where, break and eating times, and vacation schedules ” (Deal and Jenkins,
1994, p. 242).
Saturn teams designated their own working relationships. Prior to the begin-
ning of a shift, team members conferred in a team center for fi ve or ten minutes.
They determined the day ’ s rotation. A team of ten would have ten jobs to do
and typically rotated through them, except that rotation was more frequent for
jobs involving heavy lifting or stress. Every week the plant shut down to let teams
review quality standards, budget, safety, and the ergonomics of assembly. The
level of responsibility teams assumed was illustrated by an interior design team
that chose to eliminate sixteen team jobs. In looking for ways to trim costs, the
team identifi ed an ineffi cient practice: walking too far to pick up parts for
the assembly. Moving the parts closer to the line eliminated the extra distance,
but it also made the extra positions unnecessary. The team — including those
who eventually moved to other positions at Saturn — made decisions about
which positions to eliminate.
Group accountability became an accepted way of life for Saturn teams.
Workers watched the numbers every day. At least $10,000 in salary was put at
risk each year. If the company met its performance objectives, everyone gained.
If it did not, the loss was also shared. Everyone at Saturn admitted that things
were not perfect. But there was general agreement that teams were learning from
mistakes and constantly refi ning the structure of teamwork.
Since its beginnings in the 1980s, Saturn has been through ups and downs.
Today, the company is a division of GM and more closely aligned with the parent
company. New presidents chosen in 1998 and 2000 both came from GM. Since
2004, Saturn vehicles have been designed to use parts from other GM divisions.
Saturn ’ s original independence as a company has been reduced by GM ’ s rising
control, and Saturn has struggled to achieve the market success and profi tability
its founders envisioned. But in spite of all the changes, the original team - based
concept continues to produce a high - quality automobile assembled by self -
directed employees. At last word, GM was still convinced that “ Saturn defi nitely
has a future. ”
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Reframing Organizations116
SUMMARY Every group evolves a structure as its members work together, but the design
may help or hinder effectiveness. Conscious attention to structure and roles can
make all the difference in group performance. A team structure emphasizing
hierarchy and top - down control tends to work well for simple, stable tasks. As
work becomes more complex or the environment gets more turbulent, structure
must also develop more multifaceted and lateral forms of communication and
coordination.
Sports analogies can help clarify teamwork options. It helps to understand
whether the game you are playing is more like baseball, football, or basketball.
Many teams never learn the lesson of the commando team: vary the structure
in response to changes in task and circumstance. Leaders must know when the
rules of the game change and redesign the structure accordingly.
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PA RT T H R E E
The Human Resource Frame
Our most important asset is our people.” “ Organizations exploit people — chew them up and spit them out. ” Of these two
contrasting views of the relationship between people and organizations, which is
more accurate? How you answer affects everything you do at work.
The human resource frame centers on what organizations and people do to
and for one another. We begin in Chapter Six by laying out basic assumptions,
focusing on the fi t between human needs and organizational requirements.
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Reframing Organizations118
Organizations generally hope for a cadre of talented, highly motivated employees
who give their best. Often, though, these same organizations rely on outdated
assumptions and counterproductive practices that cause workers to give less and
demand more.
After examining how organizations err in Chapter Six , we turn in Chapter Seven
to a discussion of how smart managers and progressive organizations fi nd better
ways to manage people. We describe “ high - involvement ” or “ high - commitment ”
practices that build and retain a talented and motivated workforce.
In Chapter Eight , we examine issues in interpersonal relations and small
groups. We describe competing strategies for managing relationships and look at
how interpersonal dynamics can make or break a group or team.
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119
People and Organizations
Early afternoon, March 9, 2006. Three electricians who worked for Nucor Corporation got bad news. In Hickman, Arkansas, the company ’ s steel mill was dead in the water because its electric grid
had failed. All three employees dropped what they were doing to head
for Arkansas. One drove from Indiana, arriving at nine that night.
The other two fl ew from North Carolina to Memphis, then drove two
more hours, arriving after midnight. All three camped out at the plant
and worked twenty - hour shifts with local staff to get the grid back up.
The electricians volunteered — they didn ’ t need a boss to tell them that Nucor
had to have that mill back on line. Their Herculean effort brought them no
immediate fi nancial reward, even though it was a big help to the company.
Their initiative helped Hickman post a quarterly record for tons of steel shipped
(Byrnes and Arndt, 2006).
At Nucor, this story is not particularly unusual:
In an industry as Rust Belt as they come, Nucor has nurtured one
of the most dynamic and engaged workforces around. Its nonunion
employees don ’ t see themselves as worker bees waiting for instruc-
tions from above. Nucor ’ s fl attened hierarchy and emphasis on push-
ing power to the front line have given its employees the mindset of
owner - operators. It ’ s a profi table formula: Nucor ’ s 387 % return to
S I X
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations120
shareholders over the past fi ve years soundly bests almost all other
companies in the Standard & Poor ’ s 500 - stock index [Byrnes and
Arndt, 2006, p. 58].
What ’ s in it for the workers? Their base pay is nothing special — it ’ s below the
industry average. But when Nucor has a good year, as it usually does, they get
big bonuses, based on their own output and the company ’ s success. That ’ s one
reason electricians would grab a plane to help jump - start a plant in Arkansas. It ’ s
also why a new plant manager at Nucor can expect supportive calls from veteran
managers who want to help out.
At Nucor, work is more than a job. It ’ s about pride. Employees enjoy seeing
their names listed on the covers of corporate publications. They ’ re proud that their
company, which turns scrap metal into steel, is the world ’ s largest recycler. And
they ’ re exhilarated when they can draw on their intelligence and creativity to dem-
onstrate that American workers can still compete.
Companies like Nucor belong, unfortunately, to a rare breed. Most companies
give lip service to the idea that employees are the fi rm ’ s most important asset.
But few behave accordingly. In practice, employees are treated as pawns to be
moved where needed and sacrifi ced when necessary.
Consider McWane, one of the world ’ s largest manufacturers of cast - iron
pipes, whose management philosophy, at least until recently, could have been
lifted from a Dickens novel. As a former McWane plant manager put it, “ The way
you treat people would be awful. You know, the people, they ’ re nothing ’ , they ’ re
just a number. You move ’ em in and out. If they don ’ t do the job, you fi re ’ em.
If they get hurt, or complain about safety, you put a ‘ bulls - eye ’ on them. They ’ re
not gonna have a job in the near future ” (Frontline, 2003).
Not surprisingly, McWane had “ by far the worst safety record in an indus-
try that has itself the highest injury rate in the nation ” (Barstow and Bergman,
2003c, p. A 1). In 1995, McWane bought Tyler Pipe, a foundry in central Texas.
Over the next two years, McWane cut nearly two - thirds of its employees, elim-
inating quality control and safety inspectors, while maintaining production at
prior levels. Profi ts soared, but so did turnover and injuries (including at least
three deaths). Workers were supposedly expected to work “ as quickly and effi -
ciently as possible without compromising safety rules or safe practices in any
way ” (Barstow and Bergman, 2003a, p. A 14). But federal safety inspectors
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People and Organizations 121
concluded that the safety program was a “ charade ” ; the company routinely
violated safety standards in its push to avoid production downtime. Since rookie
employees often made mistakes, got hurt, and left, injuries and turnover fed one
another. In 2002, McWane admitted in federal court that it had willfully ignored
or violated safety rules (Barstow and Bergman, 2003a). The company has since
promised to clean up its act.
Sacrifi cing people for profi ts reinvigorates age - old images of insensitive,
heartless employers (Amar, 2004). That ’ s still a very popular image of the work-
place. One of America ’ s most popular cartoon strips is Dilbert, whose white -
collar, cubicle - class hero wanders mindlessly through a tortuous offi ce landscape
of bureaucratic inertia, corporate doublespeak, and callous, incompetent bosses.
In this chapter, we focus on the human side of organization. We start by sum-
marizing the assumptions underlying the human resource view. Next, we exam-
ine how people ’ s needs are either satisfi ed or frustrated at work. Then we look
at today ’ s changing employment contract and its impact on both people and
organizations.
HUMAN RESOURCE ASSUMPTIONS McWane and Nucor represent opposite poles in a perennial debate about the
relationship between people and organizations. One side sees individuals as
objects to be exploited by organizations. The opposing camp holds that the
needs of individuals and organizations can be aligned, engaging people ’ s tal-
ent and energy while the enterprise profi ts. This dispute has intensifi ed with
globalization and the growth in size and power of modern institutions. Can
people fi nd freedom and dignity in a world dominated by economic fl uctua-
tions and an emphasis on short - term results? Answers are not easy. They require
a sensitive understanding of people and their symbiotic relationship with
organizations.
The human resource frame evolved from early work of pioneers such as Mary
Parker Follett (1918) and Elton Mayo (1933, 1945), who questioned a century -
old, deeply held assumption — that workers had no rights beyond a paycheck.
Their duty was to work hard and follow orders. Pioneers who laid the human
resource frame ’ s foundation criticized this view on two grounds: it was unfair,
and it was bad psychology. They argued that people ’ s skills, attitudes, energy,
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Reframing Organizations122
and commitment are vital resources that can make or break an enterprise. The
human resource frame is built on core assumptions that highlight this linkage:
Organizations exist to serve human needs rather than the converse.
People and organizations need each other. Organizations need ideas, energy,
and talent; people need careers, salaries, and opportunities.
When the fi t between individual and system is poor, one or both suf-
fer. Individuals are exploited or exploit the organization — or both become
victims.
A good fi t benefi ts both. Individuals fi nd meaningful and satisfying work, and
organizations get the talent and energy they need to succeed.
Organizations ask, “ How do we fi nd and retain people with the skills and atti-
tudes to do the work? ” Workers want to know, “ How well will this place meet
my needs? ” These two questions are closely related, because “ fi t ” is a function of
at least three different things: how well an organization responds to individual
desires for useful work; how well jobs enable employees to express their skills
and sense of self; and how well work fulfi lls individual fi nancial and life - style
needs (Cable and DeRue, 2002).
Human Needs The concept of need is controversial — at least in some academic circles. Some the-
orists argue that the idea is too vague and refers to something diffi cult to observe.
Others say that people have needs that are so variable and strongly infl uenced
by their surroundings that the concept offers little help in explaining behavior
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). Goal - setting theory (Locke and Latham, 2002, 2004)
suggests that managers may do better by emphasizing specifi c performance goals
than by worrying about employees ’ psychic needs. Economists like Jensen and
Meckling (1994) argue that people ’ s willingness to trade off one thing for another
(time for money or sleep for entertainment) disproves the idea of need.
Despite this academic skepticism, needs are a central element in everyday psy-
chology. Parents worry about the needs of their children, politicians promise to
meet the needs of constituents, and managers make an effort to understand the
needs of workers. Wegmans, a grocery chain that perennially fi nishes at or near the
top of Fortune magazine ’ s list of best places to work, states its philosophy in those
terms: “ We set our goal to be the very best at serving the needs of our customers.
•
•
•
•
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People and Organizations 123
Every action we take should be made with this in mind. We also believe that we can
achieve our goal only if we fulfi ll the needs of our own people ” (Wegmans, n.d.).
Common sense tells us that needs are important because we all have them.
But identifying what needs we have at any given time is more elusive. A horti-
cultural analogy may help clarify. A gardener knows that every plant has spe-
cifi c requirements. The right combination of temperature, moisture, soil, and
sunlight allows a plant to grow and fl ourish. Plants do their best to get what
they need. They orient leaves sunward to get more light and sink roots deeper
in search of water. A plant ’ s capabilities generally increase with maturity. Highly
vulnerable seedlings become more self - suffi cient as they grow (better able to
fend off insects and competition from other plants). These capabilities decline as
a plant nears the end of its life cycle.
Human needs are similar. Conditions or elements in the environment allow
people to survive and grow. Basic needs for oxygen, water, and food are clear;
the idea of universal psychic needs is more controversial. A genetic, or “ nature, ”
perspective posits that certain psychological needs are essential to being human
(Maslow, 1954; McClelland, 1985; White, 1960). A “ nurture ” view, in contrast,
suggests that people are so shaped by environment, socialization, and culture
that it is fruitless to talk about common psychic needs.
In extreme forms, both nature and nurture arguments are misleading. An
advanced degree in psychology is not required to recognize that people are capa-
ble of enormous amounts of learning and adaptation. Nor do we need specialized
training in biology to recognize that many physical attributes and psychological
characteristics, such as temperament, are present at birth.
A majority of scholars see human behavior as resulting from the interplay
between heredity and environment. Genes initially determine potential and
predispositions. Research has identifi ed, for example, connections between cer-
tain genetic patterns and behavioral tendencies such as antisocial behavior. But
learning profoundly modifi es innate directives, and research in behavioral genet-
ics regularly concludes that genes and environment interact in complex ways to
determine how people act (Baker, 2004).
The nature - nurture seesaw suggests a more powerful way of thinking about
human needs. A need can be defi ned as a genetic predisposition to prefer some
experiences over others. Needs energize and guide behavior and vary in potency
at different times. We enjoy the company of others, for example, yet sometimes
want to be alone. Since genetic instructions cannot anticipate all situations,
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Reframing Organizations124
both the form and the expression of each person ’ s inborn needs are signifi cantly
tailored by experiences after birth.
What Needs Do People Have? The existential psychologist Abraham Maslow (1954) developed one of the most infl uential theories about human
needs. He started with the notion that people are motivated by a variety of
wants, some more fundamental than others. The desire for food dominates the
lives of the chronically hungry, but other motives drive people who have enough
to eat. Maslow grouped human needs into fi ve basic categories, arrayed in a hier-
archy from lowest to highest (Exhibit 6.1 ).
In Maslow ’ s view, basic needs for physical well - being and safety are “ prepo-
tent ” ; they have to be satisfi ed fi rst. Once lower needs are fulfi lled, individuals
are motivated by social needs (for belongingness, love, and inclusion) and
Exhibit 6.1. Maslow ’ s Hierarchy of Needs.
Source: Conley, 2007.
Self- actualization
Esteem
Social/belonging
Safety
Physiological
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People and Organizations 125
ego needs (for esteem, respect, and recognition). At the top of the hierarchy is
self - actualization — developing to one ’ s fullest and actualizing one ’ s ultimate
potential. The order is not ironclad. Parents may sacrifi ce themselves for their
children, and martyrs sometimes give their lives for a cause. Maslow believed
that such reversals occur when lower needs are so well satisfi ed early in life that
they recede into the background later on.
Attempts to validate Maslow ’ s theory have produced mixed results, partly
because the theory is hard to test (Alderfer, 1972; Latham and Pinder, 2005;
Lawler and Shuttle, 1973; Schneider and Alderfer, 1973; Wahba and Bridwell,
1976). Some research suggests that the theory is valid across cultures (Ajila, 1997;
Rao and Kulkarni, 1998), but there is still little evidence to support the premise
that people have the needs Maslow posited or that the satisfaction of one need
leads to activation of another.
Despite the modest evidence, Maslow ’ s view is still widely accepted and enor-
mously infl uential in managerial practice. Take, for example, the advice that the
Manager ’ s Guide at Federal Express offers employees: “ Modern behavioral scien-
tists such as Abraham Maslow . . . have shown that virtually every person has a
hierarchy of emotional needs, from basic safety, shelter, and sustenance to the
desire for respect, satisfaction, and a sense of accomplishment. Slowly these val-
ues have appeared as the centerpiece of progressive company policies, always
with remarkable results ” (Waterman, 1994, p. 92). Chip Conley, founder of
a California hotel chain, put it simply, “ I came to realize my climb to the top
wasn ’ t going to be on a traditional corporate ladder; instead it was going to be
on Maslow ’ s Hierarchy of Needs pyramid ” (Conley, 2007). Academic skepticism
didn ’ t prevent him, or FedEx, from building a highly successful management
philosophy based on Maslow ’ s theory, because the ideas carry a powerful mes-
sage. If you manage solely by carrot and stick, you ’ ll get only a part of the energy
and talent that people have to offer.
Theory X and Theory Y Douglas McGregor (1960) built on Maslow ’ s theory by adding another important idea: that managers ’ assumptions about people
tend to become self - fulfi lling prophecies. McGregor argued that most manag-
ers harbor “ Theory X ” assumptions, believing that subordinates are passive and
lazy, have little ambition, prefer to be led, and resist change. Most conventional
management practices, in his view, had been built on either “ hard ” or “ soft ”
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Reframing Organizations126
versions of Theory X. The hard version emphasizes coercion, tight controls,
threats, and punishments. Over time, it generates low productivity, antagonism,
militant unions, and subtle sabotage — conditions that were turning up in work-
places across the United States at the time. Soft versions of Theory X try to avoid
confl ict and keep everyone happy. The usual result is superfi cial harmony with
undercurrents of apathy and indifference.
McGregor ’ s key point was that a hard or soft Theory X approach is self - fulfi lling:
if you treat people as if they ’ re lazy and need to be directed, they conform to your
expectations. Managers who say their experience proves that Theory X is the only
way to get anything done are missing a key insight: the fact that people always
respond to you in a certain way may say more about you than about them. McGregor
advocated a different way to think about people that he called Theory Y. Maslow ’ s
hierarchy of needs was the foundation:
We recognize readily enough that a man suffering from a severe dietary
defi ciency is sick. The deprivation of physiological needs has behav-
ioral consequences. The same is true — although less well recognized —
of deprivation of higher - level needs. The man whose needs for safety,
association, independence, or status are thwarted is sick as surely as
the man who has rickets. And his sickness will have behavioral conse-
quences. We will be mistaken if we attribute his resultant passivity, hos-
tility, and refusal to accept responsibility to his inherent human nature.
These forms of behavior are symptoms of illness — of deprivation of
his social and egoistic needs [McGregor, 1960, pp. 35 – 36].
Theory Y ’ s key proposition is that “ the essential task of management is to
arrange conditions so that people can achieve their own goals best by direct-
ing efforts toward organizational rewards ” (McGregor, 1960, p. 61). If individu-
als fi nd no satisfaction in their work, management has little choice but to rely
on Theory X and external control. Conversely, the more managers align orga-
nizational requirements with employee self - interest, the more they can rely on
Theory Y ’ s principle of self - direction.
Personality and Organization Like his contemporary McGregor, Chris Argyris (1957, 1964) saw a basic confl ict
between human personality and prevailing management practice. Argyris argued
that people have basic “ self - actualization trends ” — akin to the efforts of a plant
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People and Organizations 127
to reach its biological potential. From infancy into adulthood, people advance
from dependence to independence, from a narrow to a broader range of skills
and interests. They move from a short time perspective (interests quickly devel-
oped and forgotten, with little ability to anticipate the future) to a much longer -
term horizon. The child ’ s impulsivity and limited self - knowledge are replaced by
a more mature level of self - awareness and self - control.
Like McGregor, Argyris felt organizations often treated workers like children
rather than adults — a view eloquently expressed in Charlie Chaplin ’ s 1936 fi lm
Modern Times. In one scene, Chaplin ’ s character works furiously on an assembly
line, trying to tighten bolts on every piece that slides past. Skill requirements are
minimal, and he has no control over the pace of his work. An effi ciency expert uses
Chaplin as the guinea pig for a new machine designed to feed him lunch while
he continues to tighten bolts. It goes haywire and begins to assault Chaplin with
food — pouring soup on his lap and shoving bolts into his mouth. The fi lm ’ s mes-
sage is clear: industrial organizations abuse workers and treat them like infants.
Argyris and McGregor saw person - structure confl ict built into traditional
principles of organizational design and management. The structural concept of
task specialization defi nes jobs as narrowly as possible to improve effi ciency. But
the rational logic often backfi res. Consider the experience of autoworker Ben
Hamper. His observations mirror a story many other U.S. workers could tell:
I was seven years old the fi rst time I ever set foot inside an automo-
bile factory. The occasion was Family Night at the old Fisher Body
plant in Flint where my father worked the second shift. If nothing
else, this annual peepshow lent a whole world of credence to our
father ’ s daily grumble. The assembly line did indeed stink. The noise
was very close to intolerable. The heat was one complete bastard.
After a hundred wrong turns and dead ends, we found my old
man down on the trim line. His job was to install windshields using
this goofy apparatus with large suction cups that resembled an octo-
pus being crucifi ed. A car would nuzzle up to the old man ’ s work
area and he would be waiting for it, a cigarette dangling from his lip,
his arms wrapped around the windshield contraption as if it might
suddenly rebel and bolt off for the ocean. Car, windshield. Car,
windshield. Car, windshield. No wonder my father preferred playin ’
hopscotch with barmaids [Hamper, 1992, pp. 1 – 2].
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Reframing Organizations128
Following in his father ’ s and grandfather ’ s footsteps, Ben Hamper became an
autoworker — the pay was good, and he didn ’ t know anything else. He soon
discovered a familiar pattern. Though his career began decades after Argyris
and McGregor questioned the fallacies of traditional management, little had
changed. Hamper held down a variety of jobs, each as mindless as the next: “ The
one thing that was impossible to escape was the monotony. Every minute, every
hour, every truck, and every movement was a plodding replica of the one that
had gone before ” (1992, p. 41).
The specialization Ben Hamper experienced in the auto plant calls for a clear
chain of command to coordinate discrete jobs. Bosses direct and control sub-
ordinates, thus encouraging passivity and dependence. The confl ict worsens at
lower levels of the hierarchy — narrower, more mechanized jobs, more directives,
and tighter controls. As people mature, confl ict intensifi es. Leann Bies was forty -
four with a bachelor ’ s degree in business when she started work as a licensed
electrician at a Ford truck plant in 2003, and “ for two years they treated me as
if I were dumber than a box of rocks. You get an attitude if you are treated that
way ” (Uchitelle, 2007, p. 10).
Argyris argued that employees try to stay sane by looking for ways to escape
these frustrations. He identifi ed six options:
They withdraw — through chronic absenteeism or simply by quitting. Ben
Hamper chronicled many examples of absenteeism and quitting, including this
friend, who lasted only a couple of months:
My pal Roy was beginning to unravel in a real rush. His enthusiasm
about all the money we were makin ’ had dissipated and he was hav-
ing major diffi culty coping with the drudgery of factory labor. His
job, like mine, wasn ’ t diffi cult. It was just plain monotonous . . . .
The day before he quit, he approached me with a box - cutter
knife sticking out of his glove and requested that I give him a slice
across the back of the hand. He felt sure this ploy would land him a
few days off. Since slicing Roy didn ’ t seem like a solid career move,
I refused. Roy went down the line to the other workers where he
received a couple of charitable offers to cut his throat, but no dice
on the hand. He wound up sulking back to his job. After that night,
I never saw Roy again [1992, pp. 40, 43].
•
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People and Organizations 129
They stay on the job but withdraw psychologically, becoming indifferent, pas-
sive, and apathetic. Like many other workers, Ben Hamper didn ’ t want to quit, so
he looked for ways to cope with the tedium. His favorite was to “ double up ” by
making a deal with another worker to take turns covering each other ’ s job. This
made it possible to get full pay for half a day ’ s work:
What a setup. Dale and I would both report to work before the 4:30
horn. We ’ d spend a half hour preparing all the stock we ’ d need for
the evening. At 5:00, I would take over the two jobs while Dale went
to sleep in a makeshift cardboard bed behind our bench . . . . I ’ d work
the jobs from 5:00 until 9:24, the offi cial lunch period. When the
line stopped, I ’ d give Dale ’ s cardboard coffi n a good kick. It was time
for the handoff. I would give my ID badge to Dale so that he could
punch me out at quitting time [1992, p. 61].
If doubling up didn ’ t work, workers invented other diversions, like Rivet Hockey
(sailing rivets into a coworker ’ s foot or leg) and Dumpster Ball (kicking card-
board boxes high enough to clear a dumpster). And there was always alcohol:
Drinking right on the line wasn ’ t something everyone cared for. But
plenty did, and the most popular time to go snagging for gusto was
the lunch break. As soon as that lunch horn blew, half of the plant
put it in gear, sprinting out the door in packs of three or four, each
pointed squarely for one of those chilly coolers up at one of the
nearby beer emporiums [1992, p. 56].
They resist by restricting output, deception, featherbedding, or sabotage. 1
Hamper reports what happened when the company removed a popular foreman
because he was “ too close to his work force ” (1992, p. 205):
With a tight grip on the whip, the new bossman started riding the
crew. No music. No Rivet Hockey. No horseplay. No drinking. No
card playing. No working up the line. No leaving the department.
No doubling - up. No this, no that. No questions asked.
No way. After three nights of this imported bullyism, the boys had
had their fi ll. Frames began sliding down the line minus parts. Rivets
became cross - eyed. Guns mysteriously broke down. The repairmen
•
•
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Reframing Organizations130
began shipping the majority of the defects, unable to keep up with
the repair load.
Sabotage was drastic, but it got the point across and brought the new foreman
into line. To survive, the foreman had to fall into step. Otherwise, he would be
replaced, and the cycle would start anew.
They try to climb the hierarchy to better jobs. Moving up works for some, but
there are rarely enough “ better ” jobs to go around. Many workers are reluctant
to take promotions anyway. Hamper reports what happened to a coworker who
tried to crack down after he was promoted to foreman:
For the next eight days, we made Calvin Moza ’ s short - lived career
switch sheer hell. Every time he ’ d walk the aisle, someone would pep-
per his steps with raining rivets. He couldn ’ t make a move without the
hammers banging and loud chants of “ suckass ” and “ brown snout ”
ringin ’ in his ears. He got everything he deserved [1992, p. 208].
Hamper himself found an escape: he started to moonlight as a writer during
one of automaking ’ s periodic layoffs. Styling himself “ The Rivethead, ” he wrote
a column about factory life from the inside. His writing eventually led to a best -
selling book. Most of his buddies weren ’ t as fortunate.
They form alliances (such as labor unions) to redress the power imbal-
ance. Union movements grow out of workers ’ desire for a more equal footing
with management. Argyris cautioned, however, that leaders might run unions
much like factories, because they knew no other way to manage. In the long
run, employees ’ sense of powerlessness would change little. Ben Hamper, like
most autoworkers, was a union member, yet the union is largely invisible in his
accounts of life on the assembly line. He rarely sought union help and even less
often got any. He appreciated wages and benefi ts earned at the bargaining table,
but nothing in the labor agreement protected workers from boredom, frustra-
tion, or the feeling of powerlessness.
They teach their children to believe that work is unrewarding and hopes for
advancement are slim. Hamper ’ s account of life on the line is a vivid illustration of
Argyris ’ s contention that organizations treat adults like children. The company
assigned an employee to wander through the plant dressed in costume as “ Howie
Makem, the Quality Cat. ” (Howie was mostly greeted with groans, insults, and
an occasional fl ying rivet.) Message boards were plastered with inspirational
•
•
•
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People and Organizations 131
phrases such as “ Riveting is fun. ” A plant manager would emerge from his usual
invisibility to give an annual speech promising to talk more with workers. All this
hypocrisy took its toll: “ Working the Rivet Line was like being paid to fl unk high
school the rest of your life. An adolescent time warp in which the duties of the
day were just an underlying annoyance ” (Hamper, 1992, p. 185).
Researchers in the 1960s began to note that children of farmers grew up
believing hard work paid off, while the offspring of urban blue - collar workers
did not. As a result, many U.S. companies began to move facilities away from old
industrial states like Michigan (where Ben Hamper worked) to more rural states
like North Carolina and Tennessee, in search of employees who still embod-
ied the work ethic. Argyris predicted, however, that industry would eventually
demotivate even the most committed workforce unless management practices
changed. In recent decades, manufacturing and service jobs have been mov-
ing offshore to low - wage enclaves around the world, continuing the search for
employees who will work hard without asking for too much in return.
The powerlessness and frustration that Hamper experienced are by no means
unique to factory work. Bosses who treat offi ce workers like children are a pop
culture staple — including the pointy - haired martinet in Dilbert and the patheti-
cally clueless boss in the television series The Offi ce. In public education, many
teachers and parents lament that increasing emphasis on high - stakes standard-
ized tests alienates teachers and turns them into “ deskilled clerks ” (Giroux, 1998).
Batstone sees frustration as pervasive among workers at every level: “ Corporate
workers from the mailroom to the highest executive offi ce express dissatisfaction
with their work. They feel crushed by widespread greed, selfi shness, and quest
for profi t at any cost. Apart from their homes, people spend more time on the
job than anywhere else. With that kind of personal stake, they want to be part of
something that matters and contribute to a greater good. Sadly, those aspirations
often go unmet ” (2003, p. 1).
Argyris and McGregor formed their views on the basis of observations of U.S.
organizations in the 1950s and 1960s. Since then, investigators have documented
similar confl icts between people and organizations around the world. Orgogozo
(1991), for example, contended that typical French management practices
caused workers to feel humiliation, boredom, anger, and exhaustion “ because
they have no hope of being recognized and valued for what they do ” (p. 101).
She depicted relations between superiors and subordinates in France as tense
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Reframing Organizations132
and distant because “ bosses do everything possible to protect themselves from
the resentment that they generate ” (p. 73).
Early on, human resource ideas were often ignored by scholars and manag-
ers. The dominant “ assembly - line ” mentality enjoyed enough economic suc-
cess to persist. The frame ’ s infl uence has grown with the realization that misuse
of human resources depresses profi ts as well as people. Legions of consultants,
managers, and researchers now pursue answers to the vexing human problems
of organizations.
HUMAN CAPACITY AND THE CHANGING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT In recent years, the person - organization relationship has become even more
problematic as global trends have pushed organizations in two confl icting direc-
tions. On one hand, global competition, rapid change, and shorter product life
cycles have produced a turbulent, intensely competitive world, placing an enor-
mous premium on the ability to adapt quickly to shifts in the environment. One
way to do that is to minimize fi xed human assets. Beginning in the late twentieth
century, more and more organizations turned to downsizing, outsourcing, and
using part - time and temporary employees to cope with business fl uctuations.
Universities, for example, have shifted to more part - time adjunct instructors and
fewer full - time faculty. Volkswagen opened a manufacturing plant in Brazil in
which subcontractors employed 80 percent of the workforce. Even in Japan, tra-
ditional notions of lifetime careers have eroded in the face of “ a bloated work
force, particularly in the white collar sector, which proved to be an economic
drag ” (WuDunn, 1996, p. D8). Around the world, employees looking for career
advice have been told to count on themselves rather than employers. Give up on
job security, the advice often went, and focus instead on developing skills and
fl exibility that will make you marketable.
On the other hand, some of the same global forces push in another direction —
toward growing dependence on well - trained, loyal human capital. Organizations
have become more complex as a consequence of globalization and a more
information - intensive economy. More decentralized structures, like the networks
discussed in Chapter Three , have proliferated in response to greater complexity
and turbulence. These new confi gurations depend on a higher level of skill, intel-
ligence, and commitment across a broader spectrum of employees. A network of
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People and Organizations 133
decentralized decision nodes is a blueprint for disaster if the dispersed decision
makers lack the capacity or desire to make sensible choices. Skill requirements
have been changing so fast that individuals are hard - pressed to keep up. The result
is a troubling gap: organizations struggle to fi nd people who bring the skills and
qualities needed, while individuals with yesterday ’ s skills face dismal job prospects.
In 2006, telephone giant AT & T committed to bringing fi ve thousand offshored
jobs back to the U.S. Two years later, CEO Randall Stephenson said only four-
teen hundred had come back, because “ we ’ re having trouble fi nding the numbers
that we need with the skills that are required to do these jobs ” (Forsyth, 2008). He
blamed public schools for turning out a defective product.
The shift from a production - intensive to an information - intensive economy
is not helping to close the gap. There used to be more jobs that involved making
things. In the fi rst three decades after World War II, high - paying jobs in devel-
oped nations were heavily concentrated in blue - collar work (Drucker, 1993).
These jobs generally required little formal training and few specialized skills, but
they afforded pay and benefi ts to sustain a comfortable and stable lifestyle. No
more. Workers in manufacturing jobs accounted for more than a third of the
U.S. workforce in the 1950s. By 2004, they were only a tenth of the workforce
and their share was still declining (Congressional Budget Offi ce, 2004).
Surviving production jobs often require much higher skill levels than in the
past. When U.S. automobile manufacturers began to replace retiring workers in
the mid - 1990s, they emphasized quick minds more than strong bodies and put
applicants “ through a grueling selection process that emphasized mental acuity
and communication skills ” (Meredith, 1996, p. 1).
This skill gap is even greater in many developing nations. China ’ s population of
1.4 billion people consists largely of farmers and workers with old - economy skills.
Beginning in the 1980s, China began a gradual shift to a market economy, reduc-
ing regulations, welcoming foreign investment, and selling off fading state - owned
enterprises. Results were dramatic: China ’ s economy shifted from almost entirely
state - owned in 1980 to 70 percent private by 2005. China became one of the world ’ s
fastest - growing economies, with compound growth at approximately 8 percent a
year in the early twenty - fi rst century, but unemployment mushroomed as state -
owned enterprises succumbed to nimbler — and leaner — domestic and foreign
competitors.
Pressures to increase fl exibility and employee skills simultaneously create
a vexing human resource dilemma. Should an organization seek adaptability
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Reframing Organizations134
(through a downsized, outsourced, part - time workforce) or loyalty (through a
long - term commitment to people)? Should it seek high skills (by hiring the best
and training them well) or low costs (by hiring the cheapest and investing no
more than necessary)?
Lean and Mean: More Benefi ts Than Costs? The advantages of a smaller, more fl exible workforce seem compelling: lower costs,
higher effi ciency, and greater ability to respond to business fl uctuations. Many
analysts have argued that U.S. competitive success in recent decades is directly
related to corporate willingness to shed unnecessary staff (Lynch, 1996). For some
companies, downsizing has worked: “ The formula of cutting staff and investing
heavily in computerized equipment has paid off particularly in manufacturing,
which enjoys a much greater productivity growth rate — more than 3 percent a
year on average in the 1990s — than business as a whole ” (Uchitelle, 1996, p. 1).
Downsizing works best when new technology and smart management com-
bine to enable fewer people to do more. Yet even when downsizing works, it risks
trading short - term gains for long - term decay. As mentioned in Chapter Two ,
“ Chainsaw Al ” Dunlap became a hero of the downsizing movement. As chief
executive of Scott Paper, he more than doubled profi ts and market value. His
strategy? Cut people — half of management, half of research and development,
and a fi fth of blue - collar workers. Financial outcomes were impressive, but
employee morale sank, and Scott lost market share in every major product line.
Dunlap did not stay around long enough to fi nd out if he had sacrifi ced Scott ’ s
future for short - term gains. After less than two years on the job, he sold the com-
pany to its biggest competitor and walked away with almost $100 million for his
efforts (Byrne, 1996).
Companies have eliminated millions of jobs in recent decades, yet many fi rms
have found benefi ts elusive. Markels and Murray (1996) reported that downsizing
has too often turned into “ dumbsizing ” : “ Many fi rms continue to make fl awed
decisions — hasty, across - the - board cuts — that come back to haunt, on the bot-
tom line, in public relationships, in strained relationships with customers and
suppliers, and in demoralized employees. ” In shedding staff, fi rms often found
that they also sacrifi ced knowledge, skill, innovation, and loyalty (Reichheld,
1993, 1996). Recent research confi rms that cutting people hurts more often than
it helps performance (Cascio, Young, and Morris, 1997; Gertz and Baptista, 1995;
Love and Kraatz, 2005; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2006). Nevertheless, more than
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People and Organizations 135
half of the companies in a 2003 survey admitted that they would make cuts that
hurt in the long term if that ’ s what it took to meet short - term earnings targets
(Berenson, 2004).
Downsizing and outsourcing also have a corrosive effect on employee
motivation and commitment. A 1996 poll found that 75 percent of U.S. work-
ers felt that companies had become less loyal to their employees, and 64 percent
felt that employees were less loyal to their companies (Kleinfeld, 1996). Workers
reported that the mood in the workplace was angrier and colleagues were more
competitive. A more recent study (Walker Information, 2005) found a modest
uptick in loyalty — 34 percent of employees said they were truly loyal, up from 30
percent in 2003 — but there is still plenty of room for improvement.
Employee loyalty was a big issue during Robert Nardelli ’ s roller - coaster tenure
as chief executive of Home Depot from 2001 to 2007 (discussed in Chapter One ).
Home Depot ’ s founders had built the company on fun, family, and decentraliza-
tion. Managers ran their stores using experience and intuition, and customers
counted on helpful, knowledgeable staff. But Nardelli was a dyed - in - the - wool
structural - frame manager who put heavy emphasis on measurement and con-
trol. Where the founders had preached “ make love to the customers, ” Nardelli
cut staff, including many veterans who knew their way around paint and power
tools. Customer complaints mushroomed, and by 2005 Home Depot ’ s ratings of
customer satisfaction were dead last among American retailers.
Nardelli ’ s board pushed him out at the beginning of 2007 but cushioned
the blow with a $210 million severance package. His successor, Frank Blake,
reversed course in a hurry. Blake abolished the catered lunch for top executives
that Nardelli had instituted, telling his colleagues to pay their own way in the
employee cafeteria. He brought back the “ inverted pyramid ” organization chart
that the founders liked but Nardelli didn ’ t. It showed customers and employees
on top and the CEO at the bottom. To reinvigorate Home Depot ’ s playful spirit,
he gave every store $3,000 for a “ fun fund ” to be spent at employee discretion
(Barbaro, 2007).
Investing in People Few employers invest the time and resources necessary to develop a cadre of com-
mitted, talented employees. Precisely for that reason, a number of authors (includ-
ing Cascio and Boudreau, 2008; Lawler, 1996; Lawler and Worley, 2006; Pfeffer,
1994, 1998, 2007; and Waterman, 1994) have made the case that a skilled and
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Reframing Organizations136
motivated workforce is a powerful source of strategic advantage. Consistent with
core human resource assumptions, high - performing companies do a better job of
understanding and responding to the needs of both employees and customers. As
a result, they attract better people who are motivated to do a superior job.
The most successful company in the U.S. airline industry in recent decades,
Southwest Airlines, paid employees a competitive wage but had an enormous
cost advantage because its highly committed workforce was so productive.
Competitors tried to imitate Southwest ’ s approach but rarely succeeded because
“ the real difference is in the effort Southwest gets out of its people. That is very,
very hard to duplicate ” (Labich, 1994, p. 52).
Ewing Kauffman started a pharmaceutical business in a Kansas City basement
which he grew into a multibillion - dollar company (Morgan, 1995). His approach
was heavily infl uenced by his personal experiences as a young pharmaceutical
salesman:
I worked on straight commission, receiving no salary, no expenses,
no car, and no benefi ts in any way, shape, or form — just straight
commission. By the end of the second year, my commission
amounted to more than the president ’ s salary. He didn ’ t think that
was right, so he cut my commission. By then I was Midwest sales
manager and had other salesmen working for me under an arrange-
ment whereby my commission was three percent of everything they
sold. In spite of the cut in my commission, that year I still managed
to make more than the president thought a sales manager should
make. So this time he cut the territory, which was the same as taking
away some of my income. I quit and started Marion Laboratories.
I based the company on a vision of what it would be. When we
hired employees, they were referred to as “ associates, ” and they
shared in the success of the company. Once again, the two principles
that have guided my entire career, which were based on my experi-
ence working for that very fi rst pharmaceutical company, are these:
“ Those who produce should share in the profi ts, ” and “ Treat others
as you would be treated ” [Kauffman, 1996, p. 40].
Few managers in 1950 shared Kauffman ’ s faith, and many are still skeptics.
An urgent debate is under way about the future of the relationship between
people and organizations. The battle of lean - and - mean versus invest - in - people
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People and Organizations 137
continues. In pipe manufacturing, two of the dominant players are crosstown
rivals in Birmingham, Alabama. One is McWane, discussed at the beginning of
the chapter for its abysmal record on safety and environmental protection — 9
deaths, 400 safety violations, and 450 environmental violations between 1995
and 2002 (Barstow and Bergman, 2003b). The other is American Cast Iron
Pipe (Acipco), which has appeared on Fortune ’ s list of the best places to work
in America (Levering and Moskowitz, 2003). Barstow and Bergman write that
“ several statistical measures show how different Acipco is from McWane. At
some McWane plants, turnover rates approach 100 percent a year. Acipco — with
a work force of about 3,000, three - fi fths the size of McWane — has annual turn-
over of less than half a percent; 10,000 people recently applied for 100 openings.
McWane has also been cited for 40 times more federal safety violations since
1995, OSHA records show ” (2003c, p. A15).
Which of these two competing visions works better? Financially, it is diffi cult
to judge, since both companies are privately held. Both companies have achieved
business success for roughly a century. But in January 2003, at the same time
that Fortune was lauding Acipco for its progressive human resource practices, the
New York Times and a television documentary pilloried McWane for its callous
disregard of both people and the law. Stay tuned for further updates; this story
continues to evolve.
SUMMARY The human resource frame highlights the relationship between people and
organizations. Organizations need people (for their energy, effort, and talent),
and people need organizations (for the many intrinsic and extrinsic rewards
they offer), but their respective needs are not always well aligned. When the fi t
between people and organizations is poor, one or both suffer: individuals may
feel neglected or oppressed, and organizations sputter because individuals with-
draw their efforts or even work against organizational purposes. Conversely,
a good fi t benefi ts both: individuals fi nd meaningful and satisfying work, and
organizations get the talent and energy they need to succeed.
Global competition, turbulence, and rapid change have heightened an endur-
ing organizational dilemma: Is it better to be lean and mean or to invest in peo-
ple? A variety of strategies to reduce the workforce — downsizing, outsourcing,
use of temporary and part - time workers — have been widely applied to reduce
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Reframing Organizations138
costs and increase fl exibility. But they risk a loss of talent and loyalty that leads
to organizations that are mediocre, even if fl exible. Emerging evidence suggests
that downsizing has often produced disappointing results. Many highly suc-
cessful organizations have gone in another direction: investing in people on the
premise that a highly motivated and skilled workforce is a powerful competitive
advantage.
NOTE 1. Featherbedding is a colloquial term for giving people jobs that involve little
or no work. This can occur for a variety of reasons: union pressures, nepo-
tism (employing family members), or “ kicking someone upstairs ” (moving
an underperformer into a job with no signifi cant responsibilities).
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139
Improving Human Resource Management
With more than fi ve hundred applicants for every job opening in 2007, Google was harder to get into than Harvard. Its king-of-the-Internet image helped, but the search giant knew it took
more to hire and keep the brainy, high-energy geeks who kept the
place going and growing. So it made prospective hires an offer it
hoped they couldn’t refuse. Beyond the basics of generous pay, ben-
efi ts, and time to work on their own projects, Google tried to antici-
pate its employees’ needs to save them from wasting time on personal
distractions. Medical care, gourmet cafeterias, child care, gym, lap
pool, language classes, self-service laundry, shuttle bus service—the
list went on. All were available on site. And all were free.
Few companies go as far as Google, but a growing number of enlightened com-
panies are fi nding their own ways to attract and develop human capital. They see
talent and motivation as business necessities. This thinking has taken a couple of
centuries to gain traction, and a lot of companies still don’t get it. Many adhere
to the old view that anything given to employees siphons money from the bot-
tom line—like having your pocket picked or your bank account cleaned out.
One of the pioneers of a more progressive approach was a Welshman, Robert
Owen, who ran into fi erce opposition. Born in 1771, Owen was in many ways
the Bill Gates of his time. Like Microsoft’s founder, Owen was a wildly successful
S E V E N
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations140
entrepreneur before the age of thirty. He did it by exploiting the day’s hot
technology—in his case, spinning mills. Owen was as controversial as Gates, but
for different reasons. Gates was faulted for his take-no-prisoners approach to
competition. Owens was loathed because he was the only capitalist of his time
who believed it bad for business to work eight-year-olds in thirteen-hour factory
shifts. At his New Lanark, Scotland, knitting mill, bought in 1799, Owen took a
new approach:
Owen provided clean, decent housing for his workers and their
families in a community free of contagious disease, crime, and gin
shops. He took young children out of the factory and enrolled them
in a school he founded. There he provided preschool, day care, and a
brand of progressive education that stresses learning as a pleasurable
experience (along with the fi rst adult night school). The entire busi-
ness world was shocked when he prohibited corporal punishment
in his factory and dumbfounded when he retrained his supervi-
sors in humane disciplinary practices. While offering his workers an
extremely high standard of living compared to other workers of the
era, Owen was making a fortune at New Lanark. This conundrum
drew twenty thousand visitors between 1815 and 1820 [O’Toole,
1995, pp. 201, 206].
Owen tried to convince fellow capitalists that investing in people could produce
a greater return than investments in machinery, but the business world dis-
missed him as a wild radical whose ideas would harm the people he wanted to
help (O’Toole, 1995).
Owen was 150 years ahead of his time. Only in the late twentieth century
did business leaders come to accept that investing in people is a key to success-
ful fi nancial performance. In recent years, periodic waves of restructuring and
downsizing have raised age-old questions about the relationship between the
individual and organization. A number of persuasive reports suggest Owen was
right: one sure route to long-term success is investing in employees and respond-
ing to their needs (Applebaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg, 2000; Collins and
Porras, 1994; Deal and Jenkins, 1994; Farkas and De Backer, 1996; Kotter
and Heskett, 1992; Lawler, 1996; Levering and Moskowitz, 1993; Pfeffer, 1994,
1998; Waterman, 1994). Yet many organizations still don’t believe it, and others
only fl irt with the idea:
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Improving Human Resource Management 141
Something very strange is occurring in organizational management.
Over the past decade or so, numerous rigorous studies conducted
both within specifi c industries and in samples across industries have
demonstrated the enormous economic returns obtained through the
execution of what are variously labeled as high involvement, high
performance, or high commitment management practices. Much
of this research validates earlier writing on participative manage-
ment and employee involvement. But even as positive results pile
up, trends in actual management practice are often moving exactly
opposite to what the evidence advocates [Pfeffer, 1998, p. xv].
Why do managers persist in pursuing less effective strategies when better ones
are at hand? One reason is that Theory X managers fear losing control or indulg-
ing workers. A second is that investing in people requires time and persistence
to yield a payoff. Faced with relentless pressure for immediate results, manag-
ers often conclude that slashing costs, changing strategy, or reorganizing is more
likely to produce a quick hit. Pfeffer (1998) believes another factor is the domi-
nance of a “fi nancial” perspective that sees the organization as simply a portfolio
of fi nancial assets. In this view, human resources are subjective, soft, and suspect
in comparison to hard fi nancial numbers.
GETTING IT RIGHT Despite such barriers, many organizations get it right. Their practices are not
perfect, but they’re good enough. The organization benefi ts from a talented,
motivated, loyal, and free-spirited workforce. Employees in turn are more pro-
ductive, innovative, and willing to go out of their way to get the job done. They
are less likely to make costly blunders or to jump ship when someone offers
them a better deal. That’s a potent edge—in sports, business, or anywhere. Every
organization with productive people management has its unique approach, but
most include variations on strategies summarized in Exhibit 7.1 and examined
in depth in the remainder of the chapter.
Develop and Implement an HR Philosophy Step one is developing a philosophy or credo that makes explicit an organiza-
tion’s core beliefs about managing people. The credo then has to be translated
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Reframing Organizations142
Exhibit 7.1. Basic Human Resource Strategies.
HUMAN RESOURCE PRINCIPLE SPECIFIC PRACTICES
Build and implement an HR strategy.
Hire the right people.
Develop a shared philosophy for managing people.
Build systems and practices to implement the philosophy.
Know what you want.
Be selective.
Keep them. Reward well.
Protect jobs.
Promote from within.
Share the wealth.
Invest in them. Invest in learning.
Create development opportunities.
Empower them. Provide information and support.
Encourage autonomy and participation.
Redesign work.
Foster self-managing teams.
Promote egalitarianism.
Promote diversity. Be explicit and consistent about the organization’s diversity philosophy.
Hold managers accountable.
into specifi c management systems and practices. Most organizations have never
developed a philosophy, or ignore the one they espouse. A philosophy provides
direction; practices make it operational.
In the 1990s, Federal Express explained the company’s philosophy in its
Manager’s Guide: “Take care of our people; they in turn will deliver the impecca-
ble service demanded by our customers, who will reward us with the profi tability
necessary to secure our future. People—Service—Profi t these three words are the
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Improving Human Resource Management 143
very foundation of Federal Express.” FedEx’s philosophy might have been empty
words if the company had not been diligent about reinforcing it. Managers were
rated annually by subordinates on a leadership index with questions about how
well they helped subordinates and listened to their ideas. Managers with subpar
scores had to repeat the process in six months—a distinction no one wanted. If
the collective index fell below the standard, the top three hundred managers lost
their bonuses (Waterman, 1994).
Hire the Right People Strong companies know the kinds of people they want and hire those who fi t the
mold. Southwest Airlines became the airline industry’s most successful fi rm by
hiring people with positive attitudes and well-honed interpersonal skills, includ-
ing a sense of humor (Farkas and De Backer, 1996; Labich, 1994; Levering and
Moskowitz, 1993). When a group of pilots applying for jobs at Southwest were
asked to change into Bermuda shorts for the interviews, two declined. They
weren’t hired (Freiberg and Freiberg, 1998).
A focus on customer service enabled Enterprise Rent-a-Car to overtake Hertz
and become the biggest fi rm in its industry. Enterprise wooed its midmarket cli-
entele by deliberately hiring “from the half of the class that makes the top half
possible”—college graduates more successful in sports and socializing than in
class. Enterprise wanted people skills more than “book smarts” (Pfeffer, 1998,
p. 71). In contrast, Microsoft’s formidably bright CEO, Bill Gates, insisted on
“intelligence or smartness over anything else, even, in many cases, experience”
(Stross, 1996, p. 162). Google wants smarts too, but believes teamwork is equally
important, one reason that hiring is team-based (Schmidt and Varian, 2005).
This same principle—the idea that selecting the right people gets results—was
found in a study of successful midsized companies in Germany (Simon, 1996).
Companies in Simon’s sample had little employee turnover—except among new
hires: “Many new employees leave, or are terminated, shortly after joining the
work force, both sides having learned that a worker does not fi t into the fi rm’s
culture and cannot stand its pace” (p. 199).
Keep Employees To get people they want, companies like Google and Southwest Airlines offer
attractive pay and benefi ts. To keep them, they protect jobs, promote from
within, and give people a piece of the action. They recognize the high cost of
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Reframing Organizations144
turnover—which for some jobs and industries can run well over 100 percent a
year. Beyond the cost of hiring and training replacements, turnover hurts per-
formance because newcomers’ lack of experience and skills increases errors and
reduces effi ciency (Kacmar and others, 2006).
Reward Well In a cavernous, no-frills retail warehouse setting, where bulk sales determine stock-
holder profi ts, knowledgeable, dependable service usually isn’t part of the low-cost
package. Don’t tell that to Costco Wholesale Corp., where employee longevity and
high morale are as commonplace as overloaded shopping carts. “We like to turn
over our inventory faster than our people,” says Jim Sinegal, president and CEO of
Costco, a membership warehouse store headquartered in Washington State with
more than three hundred stores across the country (Montgomery, 2000).
Costco has a unique success formula: pay employees more and charge customers
less than its biggest competitor, Sam’s Club (a subsidiary of retail giant Wal-Mart).
It sounds like a great way to fail, but in recent years Costco has been the industry’s
most profi table fi rm. How? In CEO Sinegal’s view, the answer is easy: “If you pay
the best wages, you get the highest productivity. By our industry standards, we think
we’ve got the best people and the best productivity when we do that.” Compared
with competitors, Costco has achieved higher sales volumes, faster inventory turn-
over, and lower shrinkage (Boyle, 2006). It adds up to industry-leading profi ts and
customer satisfaction (American Customer Satisfaction Index, 2007).
Costco is a specifi c example of a general principle: pay should refl ect value
added. Paying people more than they contribute is a losing proposition. But the
reverse is also true: it makes sense to pay top dollar for exemplary contributions
of skilled, motivated, and involved employees (Lawler, 1996).
To get and keep good people, selective organizations also offer attractive ben-
efi ts. Osterman (1995) found, for example, that fi rms with “high-commitment”
human resource practices were more likely to offer work and family benefi ts,
such as day care and fl exible hours.
Software powerhouse SAS is an example: In the software industry, where
turnover rates hover around 20 percent, SAS maintains a level below 4 percent,
which results in about $50 million a year in HR-related savings, according to a
recent Harvard Business School study. In addition, the company believes that
its stable workforce enables it to produce new versions of its data-mining and
statistical-analysis software more cheaply and effi ciently. “The well-being of
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Improving Human Resource Management 145
our company is linked to the well-being of our employees,” says SAS CEO Jim
Goodnight (Stein, 2000, p. 133).
Protect Jobs Job security seems anachronistic today, a relic of more leisurely, paternalistic
times. In a turbulent, highly competitive world, how is long-term commitment
to employees possible? It’s not easy, and not always possible. Companies (and
even countries) historically offering long-term security have abandoned their
commitment in the face of severe economic pressures.
From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, electronics retailer Circuit City was
so successful that Collins (2001) identifi ed it as one of his “good-to-great” com-
panies. But success can be fi ckle. Circuit City subsequently faded from great to
mediocre. After missing sales estimates and reporting losses for the third and
fourth quarters in 2006, the company announced a layoff of 3,800 of its highest-
paid retail staff. Archrival Best Buy reported big sales and profi t gains in the same
period, and its CEO, Brad Anderson, attributed success to a belief that it’s “all
about the customer—and the employees.” Circuit City ranked last in its industry
in customer satisfaction, and experts predicted the layoffs would make it even
less competitive with the more customer-friendly Best Buy (Kavilanz, 2007).
Sometimes, an entire nation has to change employment practices. The largest
downsizing process in history has been taking place in China. Economic reforms
of the 1990s and early 2000s forced state-owned enterprises to sink or swim in a
competitive market. Many foundered and abandoned the traditional guarantee
of lifetime employment (Smith, 2002). In three years, from 1998 to 2001, a gov-
ernment report counted more than 25 million layoffs from these fi rms, many of
them unskilled older workers (“China Says ‘No’ . . . ,” 2002; Lingle, 2002; Smith,
2002). Many remained unemployed years later. Estimates of unemployment in
China in 2005 ranged as high as a quarter of the workforce (Wolf, 2004).
Still, many fi rms continue to honor job security as a cornerstone of their
human resource philosophy. Publix, an employee-owned, Fortune 500 super-
market chain in the southeastern United States, has never had a layoff since its
1930 founding. Not coincidentally, in 2007, Publix had the highest rating of cus-
tomer satisfaction in its industry for the twelfth consecutive year.
Similarly, Lincoln Electric, the world’s largest manufacturer of arc weld-
ing equipment, has, since 1914, honored a policy that no employee with more
than three years of service would be laid off. This commitment was tested in the
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Reframing Organizations146
1980s, when the company experienced a 40 percent year-to-year drop in demand
for its products. To avoid layoffs, production workers were converted to sales-
people. They canvassed businesses rarely reached by the company’s regular dis-
tribution channels. “Not only did these people sell arc welding equipment in
new places to new users, but since much of the profi t of this equipment comes
from the sale of replacement parts, Lincoln subsequently enjoyed greater market
penetration and greater sales as a consequence” (Pfeffer, 1994, p. 47).
Japan’s Mazda, facing similar circumstances, had a parallel experience: “At the
end of the year, when awards were presented to the best salespeople, the com-
pany discovered that the top ten were all former factory workers. They could
explain the product effectively, and when business picked up, the fact that factory
workers had experience talking to customers yielded useful ideas about product
characteristics” (Pfeffer, 1994, p. 47).
Promote from Within Costco promotes at least 80 percent of its managers from inside the company.
Similarly, 90 percent of managers at FedEx started in a nonmanagerial job.
Promoting from within offers several advantages (Pfeffer, 1998):
It encourages both management and employees to invest time and resources
in upgrading skills.
It is a powerful performance incentive.
It fosters trust and loyalty.
It capitalizes on knowledge and skills of veteran employees.
It avoids errors by newcomers unfamiliar with the company’s history and
proven ways.
It increases the likelihood that employees will think for the longer term and
avoid impetuous, shortsighted decisions. Collins and Porras (1994) found
that highly successful corporations almost never hired a chief executive from
the outside; less effective companies did so regularly.
Share the Wealth Many employees feel little responsibility for an organization’s performance. They
expect gains in effi ciency and profi tability to benefi t only executives and share-
holders. People-oriented organizations have devised a variety of ways to align
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Improving Human Resource Management 147
employee rewards more directly with business success. These include gain-sharing,
profi t-sharing, and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). Scanlon plans, fi rst
introduced in the 1930s, give workers an incentive to reduce costs and improve
effi ciency by offering them a share of gains. Profi t-sharing plans at companies
like Nucor give employees a bonus tied to overall profi tability or to the perfor-
mance of their local unit.
Both gain-sharing and profi t-sharing plans have been shown to have a positive
impact on performance and profi tability. Kanter (1989a) suggests that gain-sharing
plans have spread slowly because they require signifi cant changes: cross-unit teams,
suggestion systems, and more open communication of fi nancial information to
employees. Similar barriers have slowed the progress of ESOPs:
Evidence shows that, to be effective, ownership has to be combined
with ground-fl oor efforts to involve employees in decisions through
schemes such as work teams and quality-improvement groups. Many
companies have been doing this, of course, including plenty without
ESOPs. But employee-owners often begin to expect rights that other
groups of shareholders have: a voice in broad corporate decisions,
board seats, and voting rights. And that’s where the trouble can start,
since few executives are comfortable with this level of power-sharing
[Bernstein, 1996, p. 101].
Nevertheless, there have been many successful ESOPs. Rosen, Case, and Staubus
(2005) estimate that thousands of fi rms participate in ESOPs. Evidence suggests
that most of the plans have been successful (Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein, 2003;
Kruse, 1993; Blair, Kruse, and Blasi, 2000). Employee ownership tends to be a
durable arrangement and to make the company more stable—less likely to go
under, be sold, or lay off employees (Blair, Kruse, and Blasi, 2000). When fi rst
introduced, employee ownership tends to produce a 4 to 5 percent increase in
productivity, and the increase persists over time (Kruse, 1993). Rosen and others
(2005) argue that a plan’s success depends on effective implementation of three
elements of the “equity model” (p. 19):
Employees must have a signifi cant ownership share in the company.
The organization needs to build an “ownership culture” (p. 34) by sharing
fi nancial data, involving employees in decisions, breaking down the hierarchy,
emphasizing teams and cross-training, and protecting jobs.
•
•
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Reframing Organizations148
It is important that “employees both learn and drive the business disciplines
that help their company do well” (p. 38). Depending on the company, the key
discipline might be technical innovation, cost control, or customer service,
but employees understand what it takes to make the company competitive
and focus on making it work.
Bonus and profi t-sharing plans spread rapidly in the boom years of the 1990s.
Top managers were more likely than other employees to benefi t, but many suc-
cessful fi rms shared benefi ts more widely. Skeptics noted a signifi cant down-
side risk to profi t-sharing plans: they work when there are rewards but breed
disappointment and anger if the company experiences a fi nancial downturn.
A famous example is United Airlines, whose employees took a 15 percent pay
cut in return for 55 percent ownership of the company in 1994. Initially, it was a
huge success. Employees were enthusiastic when the stock soared to almost $100
a share. But, like most airlines, United experienced fi nancial diffi culties after
9/11. Employees were crushed when bankruptcy left their shares worthless and
their pensions underfunded.
Invest in Employees As products, markets, and organizations become more complex, the value of
people’s specialized knowledge and skills increases. Undertrained workers harm
organizations in many ways: shoddy quality, poor service, higher costs, and costly
mistakes. Pfeffer (1994), for example, reports that a high proportion of petrochem-
ical industry accidents involve contract employees. In post-invasion Iraq, some of
America’s more damaging mistakes were the work of private security contractors,
who often had less training and discipline than their military counterparts.
Many organizations are reluctant to invest in developing human capital. The
costs of training are immediate and easy to measure; the benefi ts are elusive and
long-term. Training temporary or contract workers carries added disincentives.
Yet many companies report a sizable return on their training investment. An
internal study at Motorola, for instance, found a gain of twenty-nine dollars for
every dollar invested in sales training (Waterman, 1994).
The human resource–oriented organization also recognizes that learning must
occur on the job as well as in the classroom. Carnaud et Metal Box in France,
the world’s third-largest packaging company, puts great emphasis on creating
•
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Improving Human Resource Management 149
a learning organization: “Learning in an organization takes place when three
elements are in place: good mentors who teach others, a management system
that lets people try new things as much as possible, and a very good exchange
with the environment” (Aubrey and Tilliette, 1990, pp. 144–145). Carnaud’s chief
executive, Jean-Marie Descarpentries, has said that the biggest fl aw in managers
is their failure to be aggressive and systematic about learning.
Empower Employees Progressive organizations give power to employees as well as invest in their devel-
opment. Empowerment includes keeping employees informed, but it doesn’t stop
there. It also involves encouraging autonomy and participation, redesigning work,
fostering teams, promoting egalitarianism, and infusing work with meaning.
Provide Information and Support A key factor in Enron’s dizzying collapse was that few people fully understood its fi nancial picture. Eight months before
the crash, Fortune reporter Bethany McLean asked new CEO Jeffrey Skilling,
“How, exactly, does Enron make money?” Her March 2001 article in Fortune
pointed out that the company’s fi nancial reports were almost impenetrable and
the stock price could implode if the company missed its earnings forecasts.
Over the last twenty years, a very different philosophy—called “open-book
management”—has begun to take root in many progressive companies. This
movement is inspired by the near-death experience of an obscure plant in
Missouri, Springfi eld Remanufacturing (now SRC Holdings). SRC was created in
1983 when a group of managers and employees purchased it from International
Harvester for about $100,000 in cash and $9 million in debt. It was one of
history’s most highly leveraged buyouts (Pfeffer, 1998; Stack and Burlingham,
1994). Less debt had strangled many companies, and CEO Jack Stack fi gured the
business could make it only with everyone’s best efforts. He developed the open-
book philosophy as a way to survive. The system is built around three basic prin-
ciples (Case, 1995):
All employees at every level should see and learn to understand fi nancial and
performance measures. Important numbers should be readily available, and all
employees should master Financial Literacy 101 so they know what the num-
bers mean.
•
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Reframing Organizations150
Employees are encouraged to think like owners, doing whatever they can to
improve the numbers.
Everyone gets a piece of the action—a stake in the company’s fi nancial success.
Open-book management works for several reasons. First, it sends a clear signal
that management trusts people. Second, it creates a powerful incentive for employ-
ees to contribute. They can see the big picture—how their work affects the bottom
line and how the bottom line affects them. Finally, it furnishes information they
need to do a better job. If effi ciency is dropping, scrap is increasing, or a certain
product has stopped selling, employees can pinpoint the problem and correct it.
Encourage Autonomy and Participation Information is necessary but not suffi cient to fully engage employees. The work itself needs to offer opportuni-
ties for autonomy, infl uence, and intrinsic rewards. The Theory X approach,
still alive and well, assumes that managers make decisions and employees fol-
low orders. Treated like children, employees behave accordingly. As companies
have faced up to the costs of this downward spiral in motivation and productiv-
ity, they have developed programs under the generic label of participation. This
gives workers more opportunity to infl uence decisions about work and working
conditions. The results have often been remarkable.
A classic illustration comes from a group of manual workers—all women—
who painted dolls in a toy factory (Whyte, 1955). In a reengineered process, each
woman took a toy from a tray, painted it, and put it on a passing hook. The women
received an hourly rate, a group bonus, and a learning bonus. Although manage-
ment expected little diffi culty, production was disappointing and morale worse.
Workers complained that the room was too hot and the hooks moved too fast.
Reluctantly, the foreman followed a consultant’s advice and met face to face
with the employees. After hearing the women’s complaints, the foreman agreed
to bring in fans. Though he and the engineer who designed the manufacturing
process expected no benefi t, morale improved. Discussions continued, and the
employees came up with a radical suggestion: let them control the belt’s speed.
The engineer was vehemently opposed; he had carefully calculated the optimal
speed. The foreman was also skeptical but agreed to give the suggestion a try.
The employees developed a complicated production schedule: start slow at the
beginning of the day, increase the speed once they had warmed up, slow it down
before lunch, and so on.
•
•
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Improving Human Resource Management 151
Results of this inadvertent experiment were stunning. Morale skyrocketed.
Production increased far beyond the most optimistic calculations. The women’s
bonuses escalated to the point that they were earning more than workers with
more skill and experience. For that reason, the experiment ended unhappily.
The women’s production and high pay became a problem as other higher-skilled
workers protested. To restore harmony, management reverted to the earlier rec-
ommendation: a fi xed speed for the belt. Production plunged, morale plum-
meted, and most of the women quit.
Successful examples of participative experiments have multiplied across sec-
tors and around the globe. A Venezuelan example is illustrative. Historically, the
nation’s health care was provided by a two-tier system: small-scale, high-quality
private care for the affl uent and a large public health care system for others. The
public system, operated by the ministry of health, was in a state of perpetual cri-
sis. It suffered from overcentralization, chronic defi cits, poor hygiene, decaying
facilities, and constant theft of everything from cotton balls to X-ray machines
(Palumbo, 1991).
A small group of health care providers founded Ascardio to provide cardiac
care in one rural area (Palumbo, 1991; Malavé, 1995). Participation was a key to
remarkably high standards of patient care:
The Ascardio style requires, beyond mastery of a technical specialty,
the willingness to get involved in an environment of team decision
making instead of working in isolation. This is particularly evident
in the General Assembly, which brings together all key people: doc-
tors, technical personnel, workers, board members, and community
representatives (none of whom are physicians). In its monthly meet-
ings, the Assembly discusses everything from the poor performance
of an individual doctor to the system-wide repercussions of giving
salary increases decreed by the President of Venezuela” [Malavé,
1995, p. 16].
Studies of participation show it to be a powerful tool to increase both morale
and productivity (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg, 2000; Blumberg,
1968; Katzell and Yankelovich, 1975; Levine and Tyson, 1990). A study of three
industries—steel, apparel, and medical instruments—found participation consis-
tently associated with higher performance (Appelbaum and others, 2000). Workers
in high-performance plants had more confi dence in management, liked their jobs
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Reframing Organizations152
better, and received higher pay. The authors suggested that participation improves
productivity through two mechanisms: increasing effectiveness of individual
workers and enhancing organizational learning (Appelbaum and others, 2000).
Even when it works, participation often creates the need for changes resisted
by other parts of an organization, as in the toy-factory example. Another problem
is that participation is often more rhetoric than reality (Argyris, 1998; Argyris
and Schön, 1996), turning into “bogus empowerment” (Ciulla, 1998, p. 63).
Efforts at fostering participation have failed for two main reasons: diffi culty in
designing workable systems, and managers’ ambivalence—they like the idea but
fear subordinates will abuse it. Without realizing it, managers mandate participa-
tion in a controlling, top-down fashion, sending mixed messages, “You make the
decision, but do what I want.” Such contradictions virtually guarantee failure.
Redesign Work In the name of effi ciency, many organizations spent much of the twentieth century trying to oust the human element by designing jobs to
be simple, repetitive, and low skill. The analogue in education is “teacher-proof”
curricula and prescribed teaching techniques. When such approaches dampen
motivation and enthusiasm, managers and reformers habitually blame workers or
teachers for being uncooperative. Only in the late twentieth century did opinion
shift toward the view that problems might have more to do with jobs than with
workers. A key moment occurred when a young English social scientist took a trip
to a coal mine:
In 1949 trade unionist and former coal miner Ken Bamforth made
a trip back to the colliery where he used to work in South Yorkshire.
At the time, he was a postgraduate fellow being trained for industrial
fi eldwork at the Tavistock Institute for Social Research in London and
had been encouraged to return to his former industry to report any
new perceptions of work organization. At a newly opened coal seam,
Bamforth noticed an interesting development. Technical improve-
ments in roof control had made it possible to mine “shortwall,” and
the men in the pits, with the support of their union, proposed to reor-
ganize the work process. Instead of each miner being responsible for
a separate task, as had become synonymous with mechanized “long-
wall” mining, workers organized relatively autonomous groups. Small
groups rotated tasks and shifts among themselves with a minimum of
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Improving Human Resource Management 153
supervision. To take advantage of new technical opportunities, they
reinvigorated a tradition of small group autonomy and responsibility
dominant in the days before mechanization [Sirianni, 1995, p. 1].
Bamforth’s observations helped to spur the “sociotechnical systems” approach
(Rice, 1953; Trist and Bamforth, 1951). Trist and Bamforth noted that the long-
wall method isolated individual workers and disrupted informal groupings that
offered potent social support in the diffi cult and dangerous coal mine envi-
ronment. They argued for the creation of “composite” work groups, in which
individuals would be cross-trained in multiple jobs so each group could work
relatively autonomously. Their approach made only modest headway in England
in the 1950s but got a boost when two Tavistock researchers (Eric Trist and Fred
Emery) were invited to Norway. The invitation came from Einar Thorsrud of the
Norwegian Industrial Democracy Project, a joint labor-management effort to
provide workers more impact.
At about the same time, in a pioneering American study, Frederick Herzberg
(1966) asked employees about their best and worst work experiences. “Good
feelings” stories featured achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement,
and learning; Herzberg called these motivators.“Bad feelings” stories clustered
around company policy and administration, supervision, and working condi-
tions; Herzberg labeled these hygiene factors. Motivators dealt mostly with work
itself; hygiene factors bunched up around the work context. Attempts to motivate
workers with better pay and fringe benefi ts, improved conditions, communica-
tions programs, or human relations training missed the point, said Herzberg. He
saw job enrichment as central to motivation, but distinguished it from simply
adding more dull tasks to a tedious job. Enrichment meant giving workers more
freedom and authority, more feedback, and greater challenges.
Hackman and his colleagues extended Herzberg’s ideas by identifying three
critical factors in job redesign: “Individuals need (1) to see their work as mean-
ingful and worthwhile, more likely when jobs produce a visible and useful ‘whole,’
(2) to use discretion and judgment so they can feel personally accountable for
results, and (3) to receive feedback about their efforts so they can improve”
(Hackman, Oldham, Janson, and Purdy, 1987, p. 320).
Experiments with job redesign have grown signifi cantly in recent decades. Many
efforts have been successful, some resoundingly so (Kopelman, 1985; Lawler, 1986;
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Reframing Organizations154
Yorks and Whitsett, 1989; Pfeffer, 1994; Parker and Wall, 1998; Mohr and Zoghi,
2006). Typically, job enrichment has a stronger impact on quality than on produc-
tivity. There is more satisfaction in doing good work than in simply doing more
(Lawler, 1986). Most workers prefer redesigned jobs, though some still favor old
ways. Hackman emphasized that employees with “high growth needs” would wel-
come job enrichment, while others with “low growth needs” would not.
Recent decades have witnessed a gradual reduction in dreary, unchallenging
jobs. Routine work is either redesigned or turned over to machines and comput-
ers. But signifi cant obstacles block the progress of job enrichment, and monoto-
nous jobs will not soon disappear. One barrier is the lingering belief that technical
imperatives make simple, repetitive work effi cient and cheap. Another barrier is
the belief that workers produce more in a Theory X environment. A third barrier
is economic; many jobs cannot be altered without major investments in rede-
signing physical plant and machinery. A fourth barrier is illustrated in the doll-
manufacturing experiment: when it works, job enrichment leads to pressures for
systemwide change. Workers with enriched jobs often develop higher opinions of
themselves. They may demand more—sometimes increased benefi ts, other times
career opportunities or training for new tasks (Lawler, 1986).
Foster Self-Managing Teams From the beginning, the sociotechnical sys- tems perspective emphasized a close connection between work design and
teamwork. Another infl uential early advocate of teaming was Rensis Likert,
who argued in 1961 that an organization chart should depict not a hierarchy of
individual jobs but a set of interconnected teams.1 Each team would be highly
effective in its own right and linked to other teams via individuals who served
as “linking pins.” It took decades for such ideas to take hold, but an increas-
ing number of fi rms now embrace the idea. One is Whole Foods Markets, a
successful grocery chain based in Texas. Everyone who works at Whole Foods
is a team member. The fi rm cites “featured team members” on its Web site,
and its “Declaration of Interdependence” pledges, “We Support Team Member
Excellence and Happiness.”
Each Whole Foods store is a profi t center, organized into about ten self-
managed teams. Team leaders in each store make up another team, as do store
leaders in each region and the company’s six regional vice presidents. New hires
have to be approved by two-thirds of team members. An elaborate system of peer
review puts strong emphasis on people’s learning from one another (Pfeffer, 1998).
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Improving Human Resource Management 155
The central idea in the autonomous team approach is giving groups respon-
sibility for a meaningful whole—a product, subassembly, or complete service—
with ample autonomy and resources and with collective accountability for results.
Teams meet regularly to determine work assignments, scheduling, and current
production. Supervision typically rests with a team leader, who either is appointed
or emerges from the group itself. Levels of discretion vary. At one extreme, a team
may have authority to hire, fi re, determine pay rates, specify work methods, and
manage inventory. In other cases, the team’s scope of decision making is narrower,
focusing on issues of production, quality, and work methods.
The team concept rarely works without ample training. Workers need group
skills and a broader range of technical skills so that each member understands
and can perform someone else’s job. “Pay for skills” gives team members an
incentive to keep expanding their range of competencies (Manz and Sims, 1995).
Promote Egalitarianism Egalitarianism implies a democratic workplace where employees participate in decision making. This idea goes beyond partici-
pation, often viewed as a matter of style and climate rather than sharing author-
ity. Managers—even in participative systems—still make key decisions. Broader,
more egalitarian sharing of power is resisted worldwide. Managers have particu-
larly opposed organizational democracy, the idea of building worker participa-
tion into the formal structure to protect it from management interference. Most
U.S. fi rms report a form of employee involvement, but many approaches (such
as a suggestion box or quality circle) “do not fundamentally change the level of
decision-making authority extended to the lowest levels of the organization”
(Ledford, 1993, p. 148). Pfeffer (1998) and Ledford (1993) argue that American
organizations make less use of workforce involvement than evidence of effective-
ness warrants.
Formal efforts to democratize the workplace have been attempted in some
parts of Europe. Norway legally mandated worker participation in decision mak-
ing in 1977 (Elden, 1983, 1986). Major corporations pioneered efforts to democ-
ratize and improve the quality of work life. Three decades later, the results of the
“Norwegian model” look impressive—Norway is at or near top of rankings for
“best country to live in,” with a strong economy, broad prosperity, low unem-
ployment, and excellent health care (Barstad, Ellingsen, and Hellevik, 2005).
The Brazilian manufacturer Semco offers a dramatic illustration of orga-
nizational democracy in action (Killian, Perez, and Siehl, 1998; Semler, 1993).
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Reframing Organizations156
Ricardo Semler took over the company from his father in the 1980s and gradu-
ally evolved an unorthodox philosophy of management:
The key to management is to get rid of all the managers.
The key to getting work done on time is to stop wearing a watch.
The best way to invest corporate profi ts is to give them to the
employees.
The purpose of work is not to make money. The purpose of work
is to make the employees, whether working stiffs or top executives,
feel good about life [Ricardo Semler, cited in Killian, Perez, and Siehl,
1998, p. 2].
At Semco, workers hire new employees, evaluate bosses, and vote on major
decisions. In one instance, employees voted to purchase an abandoned factory
Semler didn’t want and then proceeded to turn it into a remarkable success.
Semco’s experiments produced dramatic gains in productivity, and the com-
pany was repeatedly rated the best place to work in Brazil. Even after Semler no
longer saw a need for his company to grow, it grew anyway because innovative
employee groups kept inventing new businesses.
Harrison and Freeman (2004) ask, “Is organizational democracy worth the
effort?” and conclude that the answer is yes. Even if it does not produce eco-
nomic gains, it produces other benefi ts. Despite positive evidence, many manag-
ers and union leaders oppose the idea because they fear losing prerogatives they
believe essential to success. Union leaders sometimes see democracy as a man-
agement ploy to get workers to accept gimmicks in place of gains in wages and
benefi ts or as a wedge that might come between workers and their union.
Organizations that stop short of formal democracy can still become more
egalitarian by reducing both real and symbolic status differences (Pfeffer, 1994,
1998). In most organizations, it is easy to discern an individual’s place in the
pecking order from such cues as offi ce size and access to perks like limousines
and corporate jets. Organizations that invest in people, by contrast, often rein-
force participation and job redesign by replacing symbols of hierarchy with sym-
bols of cooperation and equality. Semco, for example, has no organization chart,
secretaries, or personal assistants. Top executives type letters and make their own
photocopies. At Nucor, the chief executive “fl ies commercial, manages without
an executive parking space, and really does make the coffee in the offi ce when he
takes the last cup” (Byrnes and Arndt, 2006, p. 60).
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Improving Human Resource Management 157
Reducing symbolic differences is helpful, but reducing material disparities is
important as well. A controversial issue is the pay differential between workers
and management. In the 1980s, Peter Drucker suggested that no leader should
earn more than twenty times the pay of the lowest-paid worker. He reasoned
that outsized gaps undermine trust and devalue workers. Corporate America
paid little heed. In 2005, with an average annual compensation of $18.9 million,
CEOs of large American companies earned more than four hundred times as
much as the average factory worker (Strauss and Hansen, 2006). In the year it
went bankrupt, Enron was a pioneer in the golden paycheck movement, handing
out a total of $283 million to its fi ve top executives (Ackman, 2002).
In contrast, a number of progressive companies, such as Costco, Whole Foods,
and Southwest Airlines, have traditionally underpaid their CEOs by comparison
with their competitors. Whole Foods Markets has had a policy limiting execu-
tives’ pay to ten times the average salary of employees. It was newsworthy that
Southwest’s CEO received “less than $1 million in 2006 even as the carrier posted
its 34th straight year of profi ts” (Roberts, 2007). Meanwhile, United Airlines, just
out of bankruptcy, managed to unite all fi ve of its unions in protest against the
estimated take-home pay of $39 million for its CEO.
Promote Diversity A good workplace is serious about treating everyone well—workers as well as
executives; women as well as men; Asians, African Americans, and Hispanics
as well as whites; gay as well as straight employees. Sometimes companies sup-
port diversity because they think it’s the right thing to do. Others do it grudg-
ingly because of bad publicity, a lawsuit, or government pressure.
In 1994, Denny’s Restaurants suffered a public relations disaster and paid
$54 million to settle discrimination lawsuits. The bill was even higher for Shoney’s,
at $134 million. Both restaurant chains got religion as a result (Colvin, 1999). So
did Coca-Cola, which settled a class action suit by African American employees
for $192 million in November 2000 (Kahn, 2001), and Texaco, after the compa-
ny’s stock value dropped by half a billion dollars in the wake of a controversy
over racism (Colvin, 1999). Denny’s transformation was so thorough that the
company has regularly been at or near the top spot on Fortune’s list of the fi fty
best companies for minorities (Esposito, Garman, Hickman, Watson, and Wheat,
2002; Daniels and others, 2004).
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Reframing Organizations158
The biggest discrimination suit in history—a class action on behalf of more
than 1.5 million women hit Wal-Mart in 2003, with allegations of discrimination
in pay and promotion. Wal-Mart tried to block the suit and force women to sue
individually, but as of December 2007, federal courts had consistently ruled that
the suit could go forward (Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 2007). So far, Wal-Mart has vigor-
ously defended its human resource practices, but adverse publicity and liability
risks are likely to pressure the retail giant to seek accommodation with its female
and minority employees.
In the end, it makes good business sense for companies to promote diver-
sity. If a company devalues certain groups, word tends to get out and alienate
customers. In the United States, more than half of consumers and workers are
female, and about a fourth are Asian, African American, or Latino. California,
New Mexico, and Texas have become the fi rst states in which non-Hispanic
whites are no longer a majority. The same will eventually be true of the United
States as a whole. When talent matters, it is tough to build a workforce if your
business practices write off a sizable portion of potential employees. That’s one
reason so many public agencies in the United States have long-standing commit-
ments to diversity. One of the most successful is the U.S. Army, as exemplifi ed in
Colin Powell’s ability to rise through the ranks to head the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and, subsequently, to become the nation’s secretary of state.
Many private employers have also moved aggressively to accommodate gay
employees:
As a high-profi le supporter of gay rights, Raytheon of course pro-
vides health-care benefi ts to the domestic partners of its gay employ-
ees. It does a lot more, too. The company supports a wide array of
gay-rights groups, including the Human Rights Campaign, the
nation’s largest gay-advocacy group. Its employees march under
the Raytheon banner at gay-pride celebrations and AIDS walks. And
it belongs to gay chambers of commerce in communities where it has
big plants. Why? Because the competition to hire and retain engi-
neers and other skilled workers is so brutal that Raytheon doesn’t
want to overlook anyone. To attract openly gay workers, who worry
about discrimination, a company like Raytheon needs to hang out a
big welcome sign. “Over the next ten years we’re going to need any-
where from 30,000 to 40,000 new employees,” explains Heyward Bell,
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Improving Human Resource Management 159
Raytheon’s chief diversity offi cer. “We can’t afford to turn our back
on anyone in the talent pool” [Gunther, 2006, p. 94].
Promoting diversity comes down to focus and persistence. Organizations have
to take it seriously and build it into day-to-day management. They tailor recruit-
ing practices to diversify the candidate pool. They develop a variety of internal
diversity initiatives, such as mentoring programs to help people learn the ropes
and get ahead. They tie executive bonuses to success in diversifying the work-
force. They work hard at eliminating the glass ceiling. They diversify their board
of directors. They buy from minority vendors. It takes more than lip service, and
it doesn’t happen overnight. Many organizations still don’t get it. But many oth-
ers have made impressive strides.
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: TQM AND NUMMI If human resource management strategies are implemented in a halfhearted,
piecemeal fashion, they lead to predictable failure. Success requires a compre-
hensive strategy and long-term commitment that many organizations espouse
but fewer deliver. One example of a comprehensive strategy that combines struc-
tural and human resource elements is total quality management (TQM), which
swept across corporate America in the 1980s. Quality gurus such as W. Edwards
Deming (1986), Joseph Juran (1989), Philip Crosby (1989), and Kaoru Ishikawa
(1985) differed on specifi cs, but they all emphasized workforce involvement, par-
ticipation, and teaming as essential components of a serious quality effort.
Hackman and Wageman (1995) analyzed the theory and practice of the
quality movement and concluded that it represented a coherent and distinctive
philosophy, consistent with existing research on effective human resource man-
agement. They summarized four core assumptions in TQM:
High quality is actually cheaper than low quality.
People want to do good work.
Quality problems are cross-functional.
Top management is ultimately responsible for quality.
In practice, many organizations diluted the philosophy by implementing
only certain parts, usually the easiest and least disruptive. It is no surprise that
a majority of quality programs failed to achieve their objectives (Gertz and
•
•
•
•
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Reframing Organizations160
Baptista, 1995; Port, 1992), although many companies obtained extraordinary
results (Engardio and DeGeorge, 1994; Greising, 1994; Waterman, 1994). One
such company, Motorola, reported a total of $17 billion in savings from its qual-
ity initiatives as of 2006.
The power of an integrated approach to TQM is illustrated in the case of
New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI), a joint venture of General
Motors and Toyota. In 1985, NUMMI reopened an old GM plant in Fremont,
California, and began to build cars. It drew the workforce from fi ve thousand
employees laid off by GM the preceding year. These workers had a reputation at
GM for militancy, poor attendance, alcohol and drug abuse, and even fi stfi ghts on
the assembly line (Holusha, 1989; Lawrence and Weckler, 1990; Lee, 1988). Two years
later, absenteeism had declined from 20 percent at GM to 2 percent at NUMMI, and
the plant was producing cars of higher quality at a lower labor cost than any other
GM plant. NUMMI’s Chevrolets ranked second among cars sold in the United
States in initial owner satisfaction; no other GM car was even in the top fi fteen.
What accounted for this manufacturing miracle? The answer, in a word, was
Toyota, GM’s partner in the joint venture. GM provided the plant, the work-
ers, and an American nameplate, but both car and production processes were
designed in Japan. Toyota managed the plant, and production was split between
Chevrolets and Toyotas. NUMMI’s success was built on a comprehensive human
resource philosophy. There was symbolic egalitarianism: workers and executives
wore the same uniforms, parked in the same lots, and ate in the same cafete-
ria. Grouped in small, self-managing teams, employees designed their jobs and
rotated through different jobs. NUMMI’s motto was “There are no managers, no
supervisors, only team members.”
Both union and management stressed collaboration. If a worker complained
to the union, the union representative was likely to be accompanied by a member
of the company’s human relations staff. The three would try to solve the prob-
lem on the spot. If workers fell behind, they could pull a cord to stop the line,
and help would arrive quickly. NUMMI’s president, Kan Higashi, saw the cord as
a sign of trust between management and labor: “We had heavy arguments about
installing the cord here. We wondered if workers would pull it just to get a rest.
That has not happened.” When car sales slumped in 1988, NUMMI laid off no
one. Workers were sent at full pay to training sessions on problem solving and
interpersonal relations. One worker commented, “With GM, if the line slowed
down, some of us would have been on the street” (Holusha, 1989, p. 1).
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Improving Human Resource Management 161
Even union leaders liked NUMMI. Bruce Lee, a UAW offi cial, said that the
team system liberated workers by giving them more control over their jobs
and was “increasing the plant’s productivity and competitiveness while making
jobs easier” (Holusha, 1989). UAW president Owen Bieber said when he toured
the plant, “I was most struck that there is hardly any management here at all”
(Lee, 1988, pp. 232–233).
NUMMI was not a trouble-free paradise. A dissident union group com-
plained that the brisk pace of work amounted to “management by stress” and
that the plant’s policy on absenteeism was inhumane. But even dissidents con-
ceded things were better than in the past. Most workers were happy simply for
the chance to make automobiles. As one worker said, “We got a second chance
here, and we are trying to take advantage of it. Many people don’t get a second
chance” (Holusha, 1989, p. 1).
GM was suffi ciently impressed to try to transfer NUMMI techniques to other
plants. Sometimes it worked. At one plant, innovations like self-managing teams
doing their own quality audits led to higher quality and lower costs (Hampton
and Norman, 1987). But transplants often failed to root because the NUMMI
philosophy was implemented piecemeal, with predictably marginal results.
“Team decision making” became a fad at GM but often backfi red because man-
agers dictated to the teams (Lee, 1988). Kochan, Lansbury, and MacDuffi e con-
cluded, “The NUMMI story is well known, so it will suffi ce to say that GM did a
terrible job of learning from that experience” (1997, p. 28).
The NUMMI case illustrates that successful human resource applications are
neither as idyllic as idealists might hope nor as soft as old-line managers fear.
The NUMMI experiment combined creative human resource management with
demanding work standards to produce an automobile highly competitive in
terms of both cost and quality. Such combinations have become more and more
common in recent decades.
GETTING THERE: TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT GM’s diffi culty in learning from NUMMI is one of countless examples of orga-
nizations that espouse but fail to apply noble human resource practices. Why?
One problem is managerial ambivalence. Progressive practices cost money and
alter the relationship between superiors and subordinates. Managers are skeptical
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Reframing Organizations162
about a compensatory return on investment and fearful of losing authority.
Moreover, execution requires skill and understanding that are often in short sup-
ply. Beginning as far back as the 1950s, the chronic diffi culties in improving life
at work spurred the rise of the fi eld of Organization Development (OD), an array
of ideas and techniques designed to help managers convert intention to reality.
Group Interventions Working in the 1930s and 1940s, social psychologist Kurt Lewin pioneered the
idea that change efforts should emphasize the group rather than the individual
(Burnes, 2006). His work was instrumental in the development of a provocative
and historically infl uential group intervention: sensitivity training in “T-groups.”
The T-group (T for training) was a serendipitous discovery. At a conference on
race relations in the late 1940s, participants met in groups, and researchers were
stationed in each group to observe and take notes. In the evening, the researchers
reported their observations to program staff. Participants asked to be included
in these evening sessions. They were fascinated to hear things about themselves
and their behavior that they hadn’t known before. Researchers recognized that
they had discovered something important and developed a program of “human
relations laboratories.” Trainers and participants joined in small groups, working
together and learning from their work at the same time.
As word spread, T-groups began to supplant lectures as a way to develop
human relations skills. But research indicated that T-groups were better at
changing individuals than organizations (Gibb, 1975; Campbell and Dunnette,
1968). In light of this evidence, T-group trainers began to experiment with new
approaches. “Confl ict laboratories” were designed for situations involving fric-
tion among groups and organizational units. “Team-building” programs were
created to help groups work more effectively. “Future search” (Weisbord and
Janoff, 1995), “open space” (Owen, 1993, 1995), and other large-group designs
(Bunker and Alban, 1996, 2006) brought together sizable numbers of people
drawn from different constituencies to work on key issues or challenges. Mirvis
(2006) observes that even though the T-group itself has become passé, it gave
birth to an enormous range of workshops and training activities that are now a
standard part of organizational life.
One famous example of a large-group intervention is the “Work-Out” confer-
ences initiated by Jack Welch when he was CEO of General Electric. Frustrated
by the slow pace of change in his organization, Welch convened a series of town
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Improving Human Resource Management 163
hall meetings, typically with one hundred to two hundred employees, to identify
and resolve issues “that participants thought were dumb, a waste of time, or
needed to be changed” (Bunker and Alban, 1996, p. 170). The conferences were
generally viewed as highly successful and spread throughout the company.
Survey Feedback In the late 1940s, researchers at the University of Michigan began to develop sur-
veys to measure patterns in human behavior. They focused on motivation, com-
munication, leadership styles, and organizational climate (Burke, 2006). Rensis
Likert helped found the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan
and produced a 1961 book, New Patterns of Management, that became a clas-
sic in the human resource tradition. Likert’s survey data showed that “employee-
centered” supervisors, who focused more on people and relationships, typically
managed higher-producing units than “job-centered” supervisors, who ignored
human issues, made decisions themselves, and dictated to subordinates.
Survey research paved the way for survey feedback as an approach to orga-
nizational improvement. The process begins with questionnaires aimed at
human resource issues. The results are tabulated and then shown to managers.
The results might show, for example, that information within a unit fl ows well
but that decisions are made in the wrong place using bad information. Members
of the work unit, perhaps with the help of a consultant, discuss the results and
explore how to improve their effectiveness. A variant on the survey feedback
model that has become increasingly standard in organizations is 360-degree
feedback, in which managers get survey feedback about how they are seen by
subordinates, peers, and superiors.
Evolution of OD T-groups and survey research gave birth to the fi eld of OD in the 1950s and
1960s. Since then, OD has continued to evolve as a discipline (Burke, 2006;
Gallos, 2006; Mirvis, 1988, 2006). In 1965, few managers had heard of OD; thirty
years later, few had not. Most major organizations (particularly in the United
States) have experimented with OD: General Motors, the U.S. Postal Service,
IBM, the Internal Revenue Service, Texas Instruments, Exxon, and the U.S. Navy
have all employed their own brands.
Surveying the fi eld in 2006, Mirvis depicts signifi cant innovation and
ferment emanating from both academic visionaries and passionate “disciples”
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Reframing Organizations164
(Mirvis, 2006, p. 87). He also sees “exciting possibilities in the spread of OD to
emerging markets and countries; its broader applications to peace making, social
justice, and community building, and its deeper penetration into the mission of
organizations” (p. 88).
SUMMARY When individuals fi nd satisfaction and meaning in work, the organization prof-
its from effective use of their talent and energy. But when satisfaction and mean-
ing are lacking, individuals withdraw, resist, or rebel. In the end, everyone loses.
Progressive organizations implement a variety of “high-involvement” strategies
for improving human resource management. Some approaches strengthen the
bond between individual and organization by paying well, offering job security,
promoting from within, training the workforce, and sharing the fruits of orga-
nizational success. Others empower workers and give work more signifi cance
through participation, job enrichment, teaming, egalitarianism, and diversity.
No single strategy is likely to be effective by itself. Success typically requires a
comprehensive strategy undergirded by a long-term human resource manage-
ment philosophy. Ideas and practices from organization development often play
a signifi cant role in supporting the evolution of more comprehensive and effec-
tive human resource practices.
NOTE 1. Likert (pronounced Lick-urt) is also widely known for the “Likert Scale,” a
survey method he developed in the 1930s for measuring attitudes. A typi-
cal Likert Scale uses a range of numbers from 1 to 5 or 1 to 7, anchored by
“Strongly agree” at one end, and “Strongly Disagree” at the other.
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165
Interpersonal and Group Dynamics
E I G H T
c h a p t e r
A N N E B A R R E T A
Anne Barreta was excited but scared when she became the fi rst woman
and the fi rst Hispanic American ever promoted to district marketing
manager at the Hillcrest Corporation. She knew she could do the job,
but expected to be under a microscope. Her boss, Steve Carter, was very
supportive. Others were less enthusiastic—like the coworker who smiled
as he patted her on the shoulder and said, “Congratulations! I just wish
I was an affi rmative action candidate.”
Anne was responsible for one of two districts in the same city. Her
counterpart in the other district, Harry Reynolds, was twenty-fi ve years
older and had been with Hillcrest twenty years longer. Some said that
the term good old boy could have been invented to describe Harry.
Usually genial, he had a temper that fl ared quickly when someone got
in his way. Anne tried to maintain a positive and professional relation-
ship but often found Harry to be condescending and arrogant.
Things came to a head one afternoon as Anne, Harry, and their imme-
diate subordinates were discussing marketing plans. Anne and Harry
were disagreeing politely. Mark, one of Anne’s subordinates, tried to sup-
port her views, but Harry kept cutting him off. Anne saw Mark’s frustra-
tion building, but she was still surprised when he angrily told Harry, “If
you’d listen to anyone besides yourself, and think a little before you open
your mouth, we’d make a lot more progress.” With barely controlled fury,
Harry declared that “this meeting is adjourned” and stormed out.
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Reframing Organizations166
Managers spend most of their time relating to other people — in conversations
and meetings, in groups and committees, over coffee or lunch, on the phone, or on
the Internet (Kanter, 1989b; Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973; Watson, 2000). The qual-
ity of their relationships fi gures prominently in how satisfi ed and how effective they
are at work. But people bring patterns of behavior to the workplace that have roots
in early life. These patterns do not change quickly or easily on the job. Thompson
(1967) and others have argued that the socializing effects of family and society shape
people to mesh with the workplace. Schools, for example, teach students to be punc-
tual, complete assignments on time, and follow rules. But schools are not always fully
successful, and future employees are shaped initially by family, a decentralized cot-
tage industry that seldom produces raw materials exactly to corporate specifi cations.
People are imperfect cogs in the bureaucratic machinery. They form relationships
to fi t individual styles and preferences, often ignoring what the organization requires.
They may work, but never only on their offi cial assignments. They also express
personal and social needs that often diverge from formal rules and requirements.
A project falters, for example, because no one likes the manager ’ s style. A committee
A day later, Harry phoned to demand that Anne fi re Mark. Anne tried
to reason with him, but Harry was adamant. Worried about the fallout,
Anne talked to Steve, their mutual boss. He agreed that fi ring Mark
was too drastic but suggested a reprimand. Anne agreed and informed
Harry. He again became angry and shouted, “If you want to get along in
this company, you’d better fi re that guy!” Anne calmly replied that Mark
reported to her. Harry’s fi nal words were, “You’ll regret this!”
Three months later, Steve called Anne to a private meeting. “I just
learned,” he said, “that someone’s been spreading a rumor that I pro-
moted you because you and I are having an affair.” Anne was stunned
by a jumble of feelings—confusion, rage, surprise, shame. She groped
for words, but none came.
“It’s crazy, I know,” Steve continued. “But the company hired a pri-
vate detective to check it out. Of course, they didn’t fi nd anything. So
they’re dropping it. But some of the damage is already done. I can’t
prove it, but I’m pretty sure who’s behind it.”
“Harry?” Anne asked.
“Who else?”
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 167
bogs down because of interpersonal tensions that everyone notices but no one
mentions. A school principal spends most days dealing with a handful of abrasive
and vocal teachers who generate more than their share of discipline problems and
parent complaints. Protracted warfare arises because of personal friction between
two department heads.
This chapter begins by looking at basic sources of effective (or ineffective)
interpersonal relations at work. We examine why individuals are often blind to
self - defeating personal actions. We describe theories of interpersonal compe-
tence and emotional intelligence, explaining how they infl uence offi ce relation-
ships. We explore different ways of understanding individual style preferences.
Finally, we discuss key issues in how groups and teams work (or don ’ t): roles,
norms, confl ict, and leadership.
G R E A T E S T H I T S F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T U D I E S
Hit Number 6: M. S. Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Social Embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology, 1985, 91(3), 481–510
The central question in Granovetter’s infl uential paper is a very broad
one: “how behavior and institutions are affected by social relations.”
Much of his approach is captured in a quip from James Duesenberry:
“Economics is all about how people make choices; sociology is all about
how they don’t have any choices to make” (1960, p. 233) Classical eco-
nomic perspectives, Granovetter argues, are “undersocialized.” They
assume that economic actors are atomized individuals whose decisions
are little affected by their relationships with others. “In classical and
neoclassical economics, therefore, the fact that actors may have social
relations with one another has been treated, if at all, as a frictional
drag that impedes competitive markets” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 484).
Conversely, Granovetter maintains that sociological models are often
“oversocialized,” because they depict “processes in which actors acquire
customs, habits, or norms that are followed mechanically and automati-
cally, irrespective of their bearing on rational choice (p. 485). The truth,
in Granovetter’s view, lies between these two extremes: “Actors do not
behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere
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Reframing Organizations168
slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of
social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at pur-
p osive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of
social relations” (p. 487). Granovetter’s argument may sound familiar,
since it aligns with a central theme in our book: actors make choices,
but their choices are inevitably shaped by social context.
To illustrate his argument, Granovetter critiques another infl uential
perspective—Oliver Williamson’s analysis of why some decisions get
made in organizational hierarchies, and others are made in markets
(Williamson, 1975, number 9 on our list of scholars’ hits). Williamson
proposed that repetitive decisions involving high uncertainty were
more likely to be made in hierarchies because organizations had advan-
tages of information and control—people had more knowledge and
leverage over each another. Granovetter counters that Williamson
underestimates the power of relationships in cross-fi rm transactions,
and overemphasizes the advantages of hierarchy. A central point in
Granovetter’s argument is that relationships often trump structure:
“The empirical evidence that I cite shows . . . that even with complex
transactions, a high level of order can often be found in the market—
that is, across fi rm boundaries—and a correspondingly high level of dis-
order within the fi rm. Whether these occur, instead of what Williamson
expects, depends on the nature of personal relations and networks of
relations between and within fi rms. I claim that both order and disor-
der, honesty and malfeasance have more to do with structures of such
relations than they do with organizational form” (p. 502).
INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS In organizations, as elsewhere in life, many of the greatest highs and lows stem
from our relations with others. Three recurrent questions about relationships
regularly haunt managers:
What is really happening in this relationship?
What motives are behind other peoples ’ behavior?
What can I do about it?
•
•
•
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 169
All were key questions for Anne Barreta. What was happening between her
and Harry Reynolds? Did he really start the rumor? If so, why? How should she
deal with someone who seemed so diffi cult and devious? Should she talk to him?
What options did she have?
To some observers, what ’ s happening might seem obvious: Harry resents a
young minority woman who has become his peer. He becomes even more bit-
ter when she rejects his demand to fi re Mark and seeks revenge through a sneak
attack. The case resembles many others in which men dominate or victimize
women. What should Anne, or any woman in similar circumstances, do? Confront
the larger issues? That might help in the long run, but a woman who initiates con-
frontation risks being branded a troublemaker (Collinson and Collinson, 1989).
Should Anne try to sabotage Harry before he gets her? If she does, will she kindle
a war without winners?
Human resource theorists maintain that constructive personal responses
are possible even in highly politicized situations. Argyris (1962), for example,
emphasizes the importance of “ interpersonal competence ” as a basic managerial
skill. He shows that managers ’ effectiveness is often impaired because they over-
control, ignore feelings, and are blind to their impact on others.
Argyris and Sch ö n ’ s Theories for Action Argyris and Sch ö n (1974, 1996) carry the issue of interpersonal effectiveness a
step further. They argue that individual behavior is controlled by personal theo-
ries for action — assumptions that inform and guide behavior. Argyris and Sch ö n
distinguish two kinds of theory. Espoused theories are accounts individuals pro-
vide whenever they try to describe, explain, or predict their behavior. Theories -
in - use guide what people actually do. A theory - in - use is an implicit program or
set of rules that specifi es how to behave.
Argyris and Sch ö n found signifi cant discrepancies between espoused the-
ories and theories - in - use, which means that individuals ’ self - descriptions
are often disconnected from their actions. Managers typically see themselves
as more rational, open, concerned for others, and democratic than they are
seen by colleagues. Such blindness is persistent because people don ’ t learn very
well from their experience. The biggest block to learning is a self - protective
model of interpersonal behavior that Argyris and Sch ö n refer to as Model I
(see Exhibit 8.1 ).
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Reframing Organizations170
Exhibit 8.1. Model I Theory-in-Use.
CORE VALUES ( GOVERNING VARIABLES)
ACTION STRATEGIES
CONSEQUENCES FOR BEHAVIORAL WORLD
CONSEQUENCES FOR LEARNING
Defi ne and achieve your goals.
Maximize win- ning, minimize losing.
Minimize generating or express- ing negative feelings.
Be rational.
Design and manage the environment unilaterally.
Own and control whatever is relevant to your interests.
Unilaterally protect yourself (from criti- cism, discomfort, vulnerability, and so on).
Unilaterally protect others from being upset or hurt (cen- sor bad news, hold private meetings, and so on).
You will be seen as defensive, inconsistent, fearful, selfi sh.
You create defensiveness in interpersonal relationships.
You reinforce defensive norms (mistrust, risk avoidance, con- formity, rivalry, and so on).
Key issues become undiscussable.
Self-sealing (so you won’t know about negative conse- quences of your actions).
Single-loop learning (you don’t question your core values and assumptions).
You test your assumptions and beliefs privately, not publicly.
Unconscious collusion to protect yourself and others from learning.
Source: Adapted from Argyris and Schön (1996), p.93.
Model I Lurking in Model I is the core assumption that an organization is a dangerous place where you have to look out for yourself or someone else will do
you in. This assumption leads individuals to follow a predictable set of steps in
their attempts to infl uence others. We can see the progression in the exchanges
between Harry and Anne:
1. Assume that the problem is caused by the other side. Harry seems to
think that his problems are caused by Mark and Anne; Mark is insult-
ing, and Anne protects him. Anne, for her part, blames Harry for being
biased, unreasonable, and devious. This is the basic assumption at the core
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 171
of Model I: “ I ’ m OK, you ’ re not. ” So long as problems are someone else ’ s
fault, that person, not you, needs to change.
2. Develop a private, unilateral diagnosis and solution. Harry defi nes the
problem and tells Anne how to solve it: fi re Mark. When she declines, he
apparently develops another, sneakier strategy: covertly undermine Anne.
3. Since the other person is the cause of the problem, get that person to
change. Use one or more of three basic strategies: facts, logic, and rational
persuasion (tell others why you ’ re right); indirect infl uence (ease in, ask
leading questions, manipulate the other person); or direct critique (tell the
other person directly that a specifi c action pattern is wrong). Harry starts
out logically, moves quickly to direct critique, and, if Steve ’ s diagnosis is
correct, fi nally resorts to subterfuge and sabotage.
4. If the other person resists or becomes defensive, it just confi rms that the
other person caused the problem. Anne ’ s refusal to fi re Mark presumably
verifi es Harry ’ s perception of her as an ineffective troublemaker. Harry
confi rms Anne ’ s perception that he ’ s unreasonable by stubbornly insisting
that fi ring is the only suffi cient punishment for Mark.
5. Respond to resistance through some combination of intensifying pressure
and protecting or rejecting the other person. When Anne resists, Harry
intensifi es the pressure. Anne tries to soothe him without fi ring Mark.
Harry apparently concludes that Anne is impossible to deal with and that
the best tactic is sabotage.
6. If your efforts are unsuccessful or less successful than hoped, it is the
other person ’ s fault. You need feel no personal responsibility. Harry does
not succeed in getting rid of Mark or Anne. He stains Anne ’ s reputation
but damages his own in the process. Everyone is hurt. But Harry probably
never realizes the error of his ways. The incident may confi rm to Harry ’ s
colleagues that he is temperamental and devious. Such perceptions will
probably block Harry ’ s promotion to a more senior position. But Harry
may persist in believing that he is right and Anne is wrong, because no
one wants to confront someone as defensive and cranky as Harry.
The result of Model I assumptions is minimal learning, strained relationships,
and deterioration in decision making. Organizations that operate on this model
are rarely happy places.
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Reframing Organizations172
Model II What else can be done about a situation like Anne ’ s? Argyris and Sch ö n (1996) propose Model II as an alternative. Here are Model II ’ s basic
guidelines:
1. Emphasize common goals and mutual infl uence. Even in a situation as dif-
fi cult as Anne ’ s, developing shared goals is possible. Deep down, Anne and
Harry both want to be effective. Neither benefi ts from mutual destruc-
tion. At times, each needs help and might learn and profi t from the other.
To emphasize common goals, Anne might ask Harry, “ Do we really want
an ongoing no - win battle? Wouldn ’ t we both be better off if we worked
together to develop a better outcome? ”
2. Communicate openly; publicly test assumptions and beliefs. Model II
suggests that Anne talk directly to Harry and test her assumptions. She
believes Harry deliberately started the rumor, but she is not certain.
She suspects Harry will lie if she confronts him, another untested assump-
tion. Anne might say, for example, “ Harry, someone started a rumor about
me and Steve. Do you know anything about how that story might have
been started? ” The question might seem dangerous or naive, but Model II
suggests that Anne has little to lose and much to gain. Even if she does not
get the truth, she lets Harry know she is aware of his game and is not afraid
to call him on it.
3. Combine advocacy with inquiry. Advocacy includes statements that com-
municate what an individual actually thinks, knows, wants, or feels.
Inquiry seeks to learn what others think, know, want, or feel. Exhibit 8.2
presents a simple model of the relationship between advocacy and inquiry.
Model II emphasizes integration of advocacy and inquiry. It asks managers
to express openly what they think and feel and to actively seek understanding
of others ’ thoughts and feelings. Harry ’ s demand that Anne fi re Mark combines
high advocacy with low inquiry. He tells her what he wants while showing no
interest in her point of view. Such behavior tends to be perceived as assertive at
best, dominating or arrogant at worst. Anne ’ s response is low in both advocacy
and inquiry. In her discomfort, she tries to get out of the meeting without mak-
ing concessions. Harry might see her as apathetic, unresponsive, or weak.
Model II counsels Anne to combine advocacy and inquiry in an open dia-
logue. She can tell Harry what she thinks and feels while testing her assumptions
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 173
and trying to learn from him. This is diffi cult to learn and practice. Openness
carries risks, and it is hard to be effective when you are ambivalent, uncomfort-
able, or frightened. It gets easier as you become more confi dent that you can
handle others ’ honest responses. Anne ’ s ability to confront Harry depends a lot
on her self - confi dence and interpersonal skills. Beliefs can be self - fulfi lling. If
you tell yourself that it ’ s too dangerous to be open and that you do not know
how to deal with diffi cult people, you will probably be right. But a more opti-
mistic prediction can be equally self - fulfi lling.
The Perils of Self - Protection When managers feel vulnerable, they revert to self - protection. They skirt issues or attack others and escalate games of camou-
fl age and deception (Argyris and Sch ö n, 1978). Feeling inadequate, they try to
camoufl age their inadequacy. To avoid detection, they pile subterfuge on top of
camoufl age. This generates even more uncertainty and ambiguity and makes it
diffi cult or impossible to detect errors. As a result, an organization often per-
sists in following a course everyone privately thinks is a path to disaster. No one
wants to be the one to speak the truth. Who wants to be the messenger bearing
bad news?
Exhibit 8.2. Advocacy and Inquiry.
A d
vo ca
cy
Inquiry
Accommodating Passive
High Low
Low
Integrative Assertive High
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Reframing Organizations174
The result is often catastrophe because critical information never reaches
decision makers. You might think it diffi cult to ignore a major gap between
what we ’ re doing and what we think we ’ re doing, but it ’ s easy because we get so
much help from others. You can see this happening in the following conversa-
tion between Susan, a cubicle - dwelling supervisor in an insurance company, and
one of her subordinates, Dale. Dale has been complaining that he ’ s underpaid
and overqualifi ed for his mail clerk job. As he regularly reminds everyone, he is
a college graduate. Susan has summoned Dale to offer him a new position as an
underwriting trainee.
What Susan is thinking: What Susan and Dale say:
I wonder if his education makes him feel that society owes him a living with- out any relationship to his abilities or productivity.
Susan: We ’ re creating a new trainee position and want to offer it to you. The job will carry a salary increase, but let me tell you something about the job fi rst.
Dale: OK. But the salary increase has to be substantial so I can improve my stan- dard of living. I can ’ t afford a car. I can ’ t even afford to go out on a date.
How can he be so opinionated when he doesn ’ t know anything about under- writing? How ’ s he going to come across to the people he ’ ll have to work with? The job requires judgment and willing- ness to listen.
Susan: You ’ ll start as a trainee working with an experienced underwriter. It ’ s important work, because selecting the right risks is critical to our results. You ’ ll deal directly with our agents. How you handle them affects their willingness to place their business with us.
Dale: I ’ m highly educated. I can do any- thing I set my mind to. I could do the job of a supervisor right now. I don ’ t see how risk selection is that diffi cult.
That ’ s the fi rst positive response I ’ ve heard.
Susan: Dale, we believe you ’ re highly intelligent. You ’ ll fi nd you can learn many new skills working with an expe- rienced underwriter. I ’ m sure many of the things you know today came from talented professors and teachers. Remember, one of the key elements in this job is your willingness to work closely with other people and to listen to their opinions.
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 175
Dale: I ’ m looking for something that will move me ahead. I ’ d like to move into the new job as soon as possible.
We owe him a chance, but I doubt he ’ ll succeed. He ’ s got some basic problems.
Susan: Our thought is to move you into this position immediately. We ’ ll outline a training schedule for you. On - the - job and classroom, with testing at the end of each week.
Dale: Testing is no problem. I think you ’ ll fi nd I score extremely high in anything I do.
Dale is puzzled that no one seems to appreciate his talents. He has no clue that his actions continually backfi re. He tries to impress Susan, but almost every-
thing he says confi rms his weaknesses and makes things worse. His constant
self - promotion reinforces his public persona: opinionated, defensive, and a can-
didate for failure. But Dale doesn ’ t know this because Susan doesn ’ t tell him. At
the moment that Susan is worrying that Dale will offend coworkers by not lis-
tening to them, she tells him, “ We think you ’ re intelligent. ” Susan has good rea-
son to doubt Dale ’ s ability to listen: he doesn ’ t seem to hear her very well. If he
can ’ t listen to his boss, what ’ s the chance he ’ ll hear anyone else? But Susan ends
the meeting still planning to move Dale into a new position in which she expects
that he ’ ll fail. She colludes in the likely disaster by skirting the topic of Dale ’ s
self - defeating behavior. In protecting herself and Dale from a potentially uncom-
fortable encounter, Susan helps to ensure that no one learns anything.
There ’ s nothing unusual about the encounter between Susan and Dale —
similar things happen every day in workplaces around the world. The Dales of
the world dig themselves into deep holes. The Susans help them to remain obliv-
ious as they dig. Argyris calls it “ skilled incompetence ” — using well - practiced
skills to produce the opposite of what you intend. Dale wants Susan to recognize
his talents. Instead, he strengthens her belief that he ’ s arrogant and naive. Susan
would like Dale to recognize his limitations but unintentionally reassures him
that he ’ s fi ne as he is.
Salovey and Mayer ’ s Emotional Intelligence The capacity that Argyris (1962) labeled interpersonal competence harked back
to Thorndike ’ s defi nition of social intelligence as “ the ability to understand and
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Reframing Organizations176
manage men and women, boys and girls — to act wisely in human relations ”
(1920, p. 228). Salovey and Mayer (1990) updated Thorndike by coining the
term emotional intelligence as a label for skills that include awareness of self and
others and the ability to handle emotions and relationships. Salovey and Mayer
found that individuals who scored relatively high in the ability to perceive accu-
rately, understand, and appraise others ’ emotions could respond more fl exibly
to changes in their social environments and were better able to build supportive
social networks (Cherniss, 2000; Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, and Mayer, 1999). In
the early 1990s, Daniel Goleman popularized Salovey and Mayer ’ s work in his
best - selling book Emotional Intelligence.
Interpersonal skills and emotional intelligence are vital because personal rela-
tionships are a central element of daily life. Many change efforts fail not because
managers ’ intentions are incorrect or insincere but because the managers are
unable to handle the social challenges of changing. Not long ago, a manufactur-
ing organization proudly announced its “ Put Quality First ” program. A young
manager was assigned to chair a quality team where she worked. She and her
team began eagerly. But her plant manager dropped in on most team meetings
and regularly dismissed suggestions for change as impractical or unworkable.
The team ’ s enthusiasm quickly faded. The plant manager intended to demon-
strate accessibility and “ management by walking around. ” No one had the cour-
age to tell him he was killing the initiative.
M A N A G E M E N T B E S T - S E L L E R S
Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (New York: Bantam, 1995)
Daniel Goleman didn’t invent the idea of emotional intelligence, but he
made it famous. His best-selling Emotional Intelligence focused more on
children and education than on work, but it still attracted great interest
from the business community. It was followed by articles in the Harvard
Business Review and has led to a small industry producing books, exer-
cises, and training programs aimed at helping people improve their
emotional intelligence (EI). Goleman’s basic argument is that EI, rather
than intellectual abilities (or intelligence quotient, IQ), accounts for
most of the variance in effectiveness among managers, particularly at
the senior level.
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 177
In Primal Leadership, Goleman, McKee, and Boyatzis (2002) defi ne four
dimensions of emotional intelligence. Two are internal (self- awareness
and self-management), and two are external (social awareness and rela-
tionship management). Self-awareness includes awareness of one’s feel-
ings and one’s impact on others. Self-management includes a number of
positive psychological characteristics, among them emotional self-control,
authenticity, adaptability, drive for achievement, initiative, and optimism.
Social awareness includes empathy (attunement to the thoughts and feel-
ings of others), organizational awareness (sensitivity to the importance
of relationships and networks), and commitment to service. The fourth
characteristic, relationship management, includes inspiration, infl uence,
developing others, catalyzing change, managing confl ict, and teamwork.
Critics have two main complaints about Goleman’s work: They say
there’s nothing new, just an updating of old ideas and common sense,
and they maintain that Goleman is better at explaining why EI is impor-
tant than at suggesting practical ideas for enhancing it. Both criticisms
have some validity. Goleman borrowed the EI label from Salovey and
Mayer, and the idea of multiple forms of intelligence was developed
earlier by Howard Gardner (1993) at Harvard and Robert J. Sternberg
(1985) at Yale. The dimensions of EI in Primal Leadership (inspiration,
teamwork, and so forth) look as if they were culled from the leader-
ship literature of the last few decades. But even if Goleman is offering
old wine in new bottles, his work has found a large and receptive audi-
ence because of the way he has packaged and framed the issue. He has
offered a way to think about the relative importance of intellectual and
social skills, arguing that managers with high IQ but low EI are a danger
to themselves and others.
MANAGEMENT STYLES Argyris and Sch ö n ’ s work on theories for action and Salovey and Mayer ’ s work
on emotional intelligence focuses on universal competencies — qualities use-
ful to anyone. Another research stream focuses on how individuals diverge in
personality and style. A classic experiment (Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939)
compared autocratic, democratic, and laissez - faire leadership in a study of boys ’
clubs. Leadership style had a powerful impact on both productivity and morale.
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Reframing Organizations178
Under autocratic leadership, the boys were productive but joyless. Laissez -
faire leadership led to aimlessness and confusion. The boys strongly preferred
democratic leadership, which produced a more productive and positive group
climate.
A number of subsequent studies have examined leadership in the work set-
ting (Stogdill, 1974; Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2005). Fleishman and Harris (1962) exam-
ined two dimensions of interpersonal style: consideration (how much a manager
shows concern for and sensitivity to people) and initiating structure (to what
degree a manager actively structures subordinates ’ activity). Subsequent research
has produced a complex pattern of fi ndings. Higher consideration for employees
is generally associated with lower turnover, fewer grievances, and less absentee-
ism. Overall, more effective supervisors tend to be high on both consideration
and structure.
Countless theories, books, workshops, and tests have been devoted to help-
ing managers identify their own and others ’ personal or interpersonal styles.
Are leaders introverts or extroverts? Are they friendly helpers, tough battlers, or
objective thinkers? Are they higher on dominance, infl uence, stability, or consci-
entiousness? Do they behave more like parents or like children? Are they super-
stars concerned for both people and production, “ country club ” managers who
care only about people, or hard - driving taskmasters who ignore human needs
and feelings (Blake and Mouton, 1969)?
In the 1980s, the Myers - Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1980) became (and has
remained) a popular tool for examining management styles. Built on principles
from Jungian psychology, the inventory assesses four dimensions: introversion
versus extroversion, sensing versus intuition, thinking versus feeling, and per-
ceiving versus judging. On the basis of scores on those dimensions, it categorizes
an individual into one of sixteen types. The Myers - Briggs approach suggests that
each style has its strengths and weaknesses and none is universally better than
the rest. It also makes the case that interpersonal relationships are less confus-
ing and frustrating if individuals understand and appreciate both their own style
and those of coworkers.
One (and maybe both) of the authors of this book, for example, are ENFPs
(extroverted, intuitive, feeling, perceiving). ENFPs tend to be warmly enthusias-
tic, high - spirited, ingenious, and imaginative. But they dislike rules and bureau-
cracy, their desks are usually messy, and they tend to be disorganized, impatient
with details, and uninterested in planning. One of us was once paired with an
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 179
ISTJ (introverted, sensing, thinking, judging), who was true to her type — serious,
quiet, thorough, practical, and dependable. The task was managing an educational
program, but the relationship got off to a rocky start. The ISTJ arrived at meetings
with a detailed agenda and a trusty notepad. Her ENFP counterpart arrived with
enthusiasm and a few vague ideas. As decisions were reached, the ISTJ carefully
wrote down both her assignments and his on a to - do list. Her counterpart made
brief, semilegible notes on random scraps of paper. She followed through on all
her tasks in a timely manner. He often lost the notes and did only the assignments
that he remembered. She became distraught at his lack of organization. He found
her bureaucratic rigidity annoying. The relationship might have collapsed had not
the two discussed their respective Myers - Briggs styles and recognized that they
needed one other; each brought something different but essential to the relation-
ship and the undertaking.
A number of other measures of personality or style, in addition to the
Myers - Briggs, are widely used in management development, but none is pop-
ular with academic psychologists. They prefer the “ Big 5 ” model of personal-
ity on the ground that it has stronger research support (Goldberg, 1992; John,
1990; Judge, Bono, Ilies, and Gerhardt, 2002; Organ and Ryan, 1995). As its
name implies, the model interprets personality in terms of fi ve major dimen-
sions. The labels for these dimensions vary from one author to another, but a
typical list includes extroversion (displaying energy, sociability, and assertive-
ness), agreeableness (getting along with others), conscientiousness (a tendency
to be orderly, planful, and hard - working), neuroticism (diffi culty in control-
ling negative feelings), and openness to experience (preference for creativity
and new experience). For popular use, though, the Big 5 has its disadvantages.
Compared with the Myers - Briggs, it conveys stronger value judgments; it is
hard to argue that being disagreeable and neurotic are desirable leadership
qualities. Moreover, some of the labels (such as neuroticism) make more sense
to psychologists than to laypeople.
Despite the risk of turning managers into amateur psychologists, it helps to
have shared language and concepts to make sense of the elusive, complex world
of individual differences. When managers are blind to their own preferences and
personal style, they usually need help from others to learn about it. Their friends
and colleagues may be more ready to lend a hand if they have some way to talk
about the issues. Tests like the Myers - Briggs provide a shared framework and
language.
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Reframing Organizations180
GROUPS AND TEAMS IN ORGANIZATIONS Anne Barreta ’ s case shows how demanding even a two - person relationship
can become. Managers face even more diffi cult challenges because they spend
much of their time in groups. Groups, as we saw in Chapter Five , can take
many forms: standing committees, boards, task forces, project teams, juries,
advisory groups, and cliques, to name a few. Groups persistently challenge and
frustrate participants. Cynics offer witty but jaundiced perspectives on com-
mittees as “ a cul - de - sac down which ideas are lured and then quietly stran-
gled ” or “ a group of the unwilling, chosen by the unfi t, to do the unnecessary. ”
Painful experience has led many managers to conclude that groups are almost
invariably ineffi cient and frustrating. But even people who hate groups can
often recall at least one peak experience.
Groups, in fact, have both assets and liabilities (Collins and Guetzkow, 1964;
Hackman, 1989; McGrath, 1984; Cohen and Bailey, 1997). Groups have more
knowledge, diversity of perspective, time, and energy than individuals working
alone. Groups often improve communication and increase acceptance of deci-
sions. On the downside, groups may overrespond to social pressure or individual
domination, bog down in ineffi ciency, or let personal agendas smother collective
purposes (Maier, 1967).
Groups can be wonderful or terrible, conformist or creative, productive or
stagnant. Whether paradise or inferno, groups are indispensable in the work-
place. They solve problems, make decisions, coordinate work, promote infor-
mation sharing, build commitment, and negotiate disputes (Handy, 1993).
As modern organizations rely less on hierarchical coordination, groups have
become even more important in forms such as self - managing teams, quality cir-
cles, and virtual groups whose members are linked by technology.
Groups operate on two levels: an overt, conscious level focused on task and
a more implicit level of process, involving group maintenance and interper-
sonal dynamics (Bales, 1970; Bion, 1961; Leavitt, 1978; Maier, 1967; Schein,
1969). Many people see only confusion in groups. The practiced eye sees
much more. Groups, like modern art, are complex and subtle. A few basic
dimensions offer a map for bringing clarity and order out of apparent chaos
and confusion. Our map emphasizes four central issues in group process:
informal roles, informal norms, interpersonal confl ict, and leadership and
decision making.
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 181
Informal Roles In groups, as in organizations, the fi t between the individual and the larger sys-
tem is a central human resource concern. The structural frame emphasizes the
importance of formal roles, traditionally defi ned by a title and a job description.
In groups and teams, individual roles are often much more informal and implicit
on both task and personal dimensions. The right set of task roles helps get work
done and makes optimal use of each member ’ s resources. But without a corre-
sponding set of informal roles, individuals feel frustrated and dissatisfi ed, which
may foster unproductive or disruptive behaviors.
Every work group needs a structure of task roles so members understand who
is going to do what. The roles are often fl uid, evolving over time as the group
moves through phases of its task. Groups do better when task roles align with
individual differences. Group members bring different interests (some love
research but hate writing), skills (some are better at writing, while others are bet-
ter presenters), and varying degrees of enthusiasm (some may be highly comm-
itted to the project, while others drag their feet). It is risky, for example, to assign
the writing of a fi nal report to a poor writer or to put the most insecure member
on stage in front of a demanding group of senior executives.
Anyone who joins a group hopes to fi nd a comfortable and satisfying personal
role. Imagine a three - person task force. One member, Karen, is happiest when she
feels infl uential and visible. Bob prefers to be quiet and inconspicuous. Teresa fi nds
it hard to participate unless she feels liked and valued. In the early going in any
new group, members send implicit signals about roles they prefer, usually without
realizing they are doing it. In their fi rst group meeting, Karen jumps in, takes the
initiative, and pushes for her ideas. Teresa smiles, compliments other people, asks
questions, and says she hopes everyone will get along. Bob mostly just watches.
If the three individuals ’ preferred roles dovetail, things may go well. Karen is
happy to have Bob as a listener, and Bob is pleased that Karen lets him be incon-
spicuous. Teresa is content if she feels that Karen and Bob like her. Now sup-
pose that Tony, who likes to be in charge, joins the group. Karen and Tony may
collide — two alphas who want the same role. The prognosis looks bleak. But
suppose that another member, Susan, signs on. Susan ’ s mission in life is to help
other people get along. If Susan can help Karen feel visible, Teresa feel loved,
and Tony feel powerful while Bob is left alone, everyone will be happy — and the
group should be productive.
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Reframing Organizations182
Some groups are blessed with a rich set of resources and highly compatible
individuals, but many are less fortunate. They have a limited supply of talent,
skill, and motivation. They have areas of both compatibility and potential con-
fl ict. The challenge is to capitalize on their assets while minimizing liabilities.
Unfortunately, many groups either never identify potential hurdles or avoid talk-
ing about them. Avoidance often backfi res. Neglected challenges come back to
haunt team performance, often at the worst possible moment, when a deadline
looms and everyone feels the heat.
It usually works better to deal with issues early on. A major consulting fi rm
produced a dramatic improvement in effectiveness and morale by conducting a
team - building process whenever an “ engagement team ” formed to work on a new
project. Members discussed the roles they preferred, how the group would operate,
and the resources each individual brought. Initially, many skeptics viewed the team
building as a waste of time with doubtful benefi ts. But the investment in group
process at the beginning more than paid for itself in effectiveness down the road.
The absence of team building can be catastrophic. In the friendly - fi re incident
discussed in Chapter Two , where American fi ghter jets accidentally shot down
two U.S. helicopters over Iraq, the post - accident investigation focused on what
the pilots did (misidentifi ed friendly helicopters and then shot them down) and
on what the airborne AWACS controllers didn ’ t do (failed to give pilots infor-
mation or warnings about the presence of friendly helicopters in their vicinity).
Snook (2000) attributes the controllers ’ errors of omission to a weak team,
which, as luck would have it, was undertaking its maiden fl ight. All the individu-
als were technically trained and knew their jobs, but they had not yet jelled as
a working team. Before going operational, the team was supposed to experi-
ence two full - mission simulations to test their functioning under real - time con-
d itions. But because of last - minute assignments, they only got one, and three of
the four key team leaders were not present. Some individuals got half the pre-
scribed “ spin - up ” training. The team as a whole got none.
Informal Group Norms Every group develops informal rules to live by — norms that govern how the
group functions and how members conduct themselves. We once observed two
families in adjacent sites in the same campground. At fi rst glance, both were
alike: two adults, two small children, California license plates. Further observa-
tion made it clear that the families had very different unwritten rules.
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 183
Family A practiced a strong form of “ do your own thing. ” Everyone did what
he or she wanted, and no one paid much attention to anyone else. Their two -
year - old wandered around the campground until he fell down a fi fteen - foot
embankment. He lay there wailing while a professor of leadership pondered the
risks and rewards of intervening in someone else ’ s family. Finally, he rescued
the child and returned him to his parents, who seemed oblivious and behaved as
though they were indifferent to their son ’ s mishap.
Family B, in contrast, was a model of interdependence and effi ciency, oper-
ating like a well - oiled machine. Everything was done collectively; each member
had a role. A drill sergeant would have admired the speed and precision with
which they packed for departure. Even their three - year - old approached her
assigned tasks with purpose and enthusiasm.
Like these two families, groups evolve informal norms for “ how we do things
around here. ” Eventually, such rules are taken for granted as a fi xed social real-
ity. The parents in Family A envied Family B. They were plainly puzzled as they
asked, “ How did they ever get those kids to help out like that? Our kids would
never do that! ”
With norms, as with roles, early intervention helps. Do we want to be task -
oriented, no - nonsense, and get on with the job? Or would we prefer to be more
relaxed and playful? Do we insist on full attendance at every meeting, or should
we be more fl exible? Must people be unerringly punctual, or would that cramp
our style? If individuals fail to complete assignments, do we hang them or gen-
tly encourage them to do better? Do we prize boisterous debate or courtesy and
restraint? Groups develop norms to answer such questions.
Informal Networks in Groups Like informal norms, informal networks — patterns of who relates to whom —
help to shape groups. Remember the Titans, a feel - good Hollywood fi lm, tells a
story of a football teams whose black and white players were suddenly thrust
together as a result of school desegregation. Their coach took them off - site for
a week of team - building camp where black and white players roomed together
and soon developed bonds. Those relationships became a critical feature of the
team ’ s ability to win a state championship.
The Titans, like any team, can be viewed as an informal social network — a
series of connections that link members to one another. When the team was
fi rst formed, it consisted of two different networks separated by suspicion and
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Reframing Organizations184
antagonism across racial boundaries. The coach intuitively understood some-
thing research has confi rmed — informal bonds among members make a big dif-
ference. Balkundi and Harrison (2006) found that teams with more informal ties
were more effective and more likely to stay together than teams in which mem-
bers had fewer connections.
Interpersonal Confl ict in Groups The worst horror stories about group life concern personal confl ict. Interpersonal
strife can block progress and waste time. It can make things unpleasant at best,
painful at worst. Some groups are blessed with little confl ict, but most encounter
predictable differences in goals, perceptions, preferences, and beliefs. The larger
and more diverse the group, the greater the likelihood of confl ict.
How can a group cope with interpersonal confl ict? The Model I manager typi-
cally relies on two strategies: “ pour oil on troubled waters ” and “ might makes
right. ” As a result, things get worse instead of better. The oil - on - troubled - waters
strategy views confl ict as something to avoid at all costs: minimize it, deny its exis-
tence, smooth it over, bury it, or circumvent it. Suppose, for example, that Tony in
our hypothetical group says that the group needs a leader and Karen counters that
a leader would selfi shly dominate the group. Teresa, dreading confl ict, might rush
to say, “ I think we ’ re all basically saying the same thing ” or “ We can talk about
leadership later; right now, why don ’ t we fi nd out a little more about each other? ”
Smoothing tactics may work if the issue is temporary or peripheral. In such
cases, confl ict may disappear on its own, much to everyone ’ s relief. But con-
fl ict suppressed early in a group ’ s life has a remarkable tendency to resurface
again and again. If smoothing tactics fail and confl ict persists, another option is
might - makes - right. If Tony senses confl ict between Karen and himself, he may
employ Model I thinking: since we disagree, and I am right, she is the problem;
I need to get her to shape up. Tony may try any of several strategies to change
Karen. He may try to convince her he ’ s right. He may push others in the group to
side with him and put pressure on Karen. He may subtly, or not so subtly, criti-
cize or attack her. If Karen thinks she is right and Tony is the problem, the two
are headed for collision. The result may be painful for everyone.
If Model I is a costly approach to confl ict, what else might a group do? Here
are some guidelines that often prove helpful.
Develop skills. More and more organizations are recognizing that group effec-
tiveness depends on members ’ ability to understand what is happening and
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 185
contribute effectively. Skills like listening, communicating, managing confl ict,
and building consensus are critical building blocks in a high - performing group.
Agree on the basics. Groups too often plunge ahead without taking the time to
agree on goals and procedures. Down the road, people continue to stumble over
unresolved issues. Shared understanding and commitment around the basics are a
powerful glue to hold things together in the face of the inevitable stress of group life.
Search for common interests. How does a group reach agreement if it starts out
divided? It helps to keep asking, “ What do we have in common? If we disagree
on the issue at hand, how can we put it in a more inclusive framework where we
can all agree? ” If Tony and Karen clash on the need for a leader, where do they
agree? Perhaps both want to do the task well. Recognizing commonalities makes
it easier to confront differences. It also helps to remember that common ground
is often rooted in complementary differences (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Karen ’ s
desire to be visible is compatible with Bob ’ s preference to be in the background.
Conversely, similarity (as when Karen and Tony both want to lead) is often a
source of confl ict.
Experiment. If Tony is sure the group needs a leader (namely, him) and Karen
is equally convinced it does not, the group could bog down in endless debate.
Susan, the group ’ s social specialist, might propose an experiment: since Karen
sees it one way and Tony sees it another, could we try one meeting with a leader
and one without to see what happens? Experiments can be a powerful response
to confl ict. They offer a way to move beyond stalemate without forcing either
party to lose face or admit defeat. Parties may agree on a test even if they can ’ t
agree on anything else. Equally important, they may learn something that moves
the conversation to a more productive plane.
Doubt your infallibility. This was the advice that Benjamin Franklin offered
his fellow delegates to the U.S. constitutional convention in 1787: “ Having lived
long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by better information,
or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects, which
I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I
grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to
the judgment of others ” (Rossiter, 1966).
Groups typically possess diverse resources, ideas, and outlooks. A group that
sees diversity as an asset and a source of learning has a good chance for a pro-
ductive discussion and resolution of differences. Confl ict can be a good thing —
research suggests that confl ict about ideas promotes effectiveness, even though
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Reframing Organizations186
personal confl ict gets in the way (Cohen and Bailey, 1997). In the heat of the
moment, though, a fi ve - person group can easily turn into fi ve teachers in search
of a learner, or a lynch mob in search of a victim. At such times, it helps if at
least one person asks, “ Are we all sure we ’ re infallible? Are we really hearing one
another? ”
Treat differences as a group responsibility. If Tony and Karen are on a collision
course, it is tempting for others to stand aside. But all will suffer if the team fails.
The debate between Karen and Tony refl ects personal feelings and preferences
but also addresses leadership as an issue of shared importance.
Leadership and Decision Making in Groups A fi nal problem that every group must resolve is the question of navigation:
“ How will we set a course and steer the ship, particularly in stormy weather? ”
Groups often get lost. Meetings are punctuated with statements like “ I ’ m not
sure where we ’ re going ” or “ We ’ ve been talking for an hour without getting any-
where ” or “ Does anyone know what we ’ re talking about? ”
Leadership helps groups develop a shared sense of direction and commit-
ment. Otherwise, a group becomes rudderless or moves in directions that no one
supports. Noting that teams are capable of very good and very bad performance,
Hackman emphasizes that a key function of leadership is setting a compelling
direction for the team ’ s work that “ is challenging, energizes team members and
generates strong collective motivation to perform well ” (2002, p. 72). Another
key function of leadership in groups, as in organizations, is managing relation-
ships with external constituents. Druskat and Wheeler found that effective lead-
ers of self - managing teams “ move back and forth across boundaries to build
relationships, scout necessary information, persuade their teams and outside
constituents to support one another, and empower their teams to achieve suc-
cess ” (2003, p. 435).
Though leadership is essential, it need not come from only one person. A
single leader focuses responsibility and clarifi es accountability. But the same
individual may not be equally effective in all situations. Groups sometimes do
better with a shared and fl uid approach, regularly asking, “ Who can best take
charge in this situation? ” Katzenbach and Smith (1993) found that a key char-
acteristic of high - performance teams was mutual accountability, fostered when
leaders were willing to step back and team members were prepared to share the
leadership.
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Interpersonal and Group Dynamics 187
Leadership, whether shared or individual, plays a critical role in group effec-
tiveness and individual satisfaction. Maier (1967) found that leaders who over-
control or understructure tend to produce frustration and ineffectiveness. Good
leaders are sensitive to both task and process. They enlist others actively in
managing both. Effective leaders help group members communicate and work
together, while less effective leaders try to dominate and get their own ideas
accepted.
SUMMARY Employees are hired to do a job but always bring social and personal baggage
with them. At work, they spend much of their time interacting with others, one
to one and in groups. Both individual satisfaction and organizational effective-
ness depend heavily on the quality of interpersonal relationships.
An individual ’ s social skills or competencies are a critical element in the effec-
tiveness of relationships at work. Argyris and Sch ö n argue that interpersonal
dynamics are counterproductive as often as not. People frequently employ theo-
ries - in - use (behavioral programs) that emphasize self - protection and the control
of others. Argyris and Sch ö n developed an alternative model built on values of
mutuality and learning. Salovey and Mayer, as well as Goleman, underscore the
importance of emotional intelligence — social skills that include awareness of self
and others and the ability to handle emotions and relationships.
Small groups are often condemned for wasting time while producing little,
but groups can be both satisfying and effi cient. In any event, organizations can-
not function without them. Managers need to understand that groups always
operate at two levels: task and process. Both levels need to be managed if groups
are to be effective. Among the signifi cant process issues that groups have to man-
age are informal roles, group norms, interpersonal confl ict, and leadership.
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c08.indd 188c08.indd 188 6/30/08 2:28:33 PM6/30/08 2:28:33 PM
PA RT F O U R
The Political Frame
When you ponder the word politics, what images come to mind? Are any of them positive or helpful? The answer is probably no.
Although they came from different persuasions, the last two American presi-
dents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, were repeatedly accused of “ being
political. ” Critics complained that they responded to self - interest and political
pressures rather than championing the common good. Politics and politicians
are almost universally despised and viewed as an unavoidable evil. In organiza-
tions, phrases like “ they ’ re playing politics ” or “ it was all political ” are invariably
terms of disapproval.
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Reframing Organizations190
Similar attitudes surround the idea of power, a concept that is central in
political thinking. In her last interview, only days before she was assassinated
in December 2007, Benazir Bhutto was asked if she liked power. Her response
captured the mixed feelings many of us harbor: “ Power has made me suffer too
much. In reality I ’ m ambivalent about it. It interests me because it makes it pos-
sible to change things. But it ’ s left me with a bitter taste ” (Lagarde, 2008, p. 13).
A jaundiced view of politics constitutes a serious threat to individual and
organizational effectiveness. Viewed from the political frame, politics is the real-
istic process of making decisions and allocating resources in a context of scarcity
and divergent interests. This view puts politics at the heart of decision making.
We introduce the elements of the political frame in Chapter Nine . We begin
by examining dynamics lurking in the background of the tragic loss of the space
shuttles Columbia and Challenger. We also lay out the perspective ’ s key assump-
tions and discuss basic issues of power, confl ict, and ethics.
In Chapter Ten , we look at the constructive side of politics. The chapter is
organized around basic skills of the effective organizational politician: setting
agendas, mapping the political terrain, networking, building coalitions, and
negotiating. We also offer four principles of moral judgment to guide in dealing
with ethically slippery political issues.
Chapter Eleven moves from the individual to the organizational level. In the
chapter, we look at organizations as both arenas for political contests and active
political players or actors. As arenas, organizations have an important duty to
shape the rules of the game. As players or actors, organizations are powerful tools
for achieving the agenda of whoever controls them. We close with a discussion
of the relative power of organizations and society. Will giant corporations take
over the world? Or will other institutions channel and constrain their actions?
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191
Power, Confl ict, and Coalition
Early on the morning of February 1, 2003, the U.S. space shuttle Columbia was returning to earth from a smooth and successful mission when something went terribly wrong. The crew was sud-
denly fl ooded with emergency signals — the noise of alarms and the
glare of indicator lights signaling massive system failure. The craft
tumbled out of control before it was fi nally blown apart. Cabin and
crew were destroyed (Wald and Schwartz, 2003a, 2003b).
After months of investigation, a blue - ribbon commission concluded that
Columbia ’ s loss resulted as much from organizational as from technical fail-
ures. Organizational breakdowns included “ the original compromises that were
required to gain approval for the shuttle, subsequent years of resource - constraints,
fl uctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the shuttle as
operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for
human space fl ight ” (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003, p. 9).
In short, politics brought down the shuttle. It all sounded sadly familiar, and
the investigation board emphasized that there were many “ echoes ” of the loss
of the space shuttle Challenger seventeen years earlier. Then, too, Congressional
committees and a distinguished panel had spent months studying what hap-
pened and developing recommendations to keep it from happening again. But as
the Columbia board said bluntly: “ The causes of the institutional failure respon-
sible for Challenger have not been fi xed ” (Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, 2003, p. 195).
N I N E
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations192
Flash back to 1986. After a series of delays, Challenger was set to launch on
January 28. At sunrise, it was clear but very cold in Cape Canaveral, Florida.
The weather was more like New Hampshire, where Christa McAuliffe was a
high school teacher. Curtains of ice greeted ground crews as they inspected the
shuttle. The temperature had plunged overnight to a record low of 24 degrees
Fahrenheit ( � 4 degrees Celsius). The ice team removed as much as they could.
Temperatures gradually warmed, but it was still brisk at 8:30 am . Challenger ’ s
crew of seven astronauts noted the ice as they climbed into the capsule. As
McAuliffe, the fi rst teacher to venture into space, entered the ship, a technician
offered her an apple. She beamed and asked him to save it until she returned. At
11:38 am , Challenger lifted off. A minute later, there was a massive explosion in
the booster rockets. Millions watched television screens in horror as the shuttle
and its crew were destroyed.
On the eve of the launch, an emergency teleconference had been called
between NASA and the Morton Thiokol Corporation, the contractor for the
shuttle ’ s solid - fuel rocket motor. During the teleconference, Thiokol engineers
pleaded with superiors and NASA to delay the launch. They feared cold tem-
peratures would cause a failure in synthetic rubber O - rings sealing the rocket
motor ’ s joints. If the rings failed, the motor could blow up. The problem was
simple and familiar: rubber loses elasticity at cold temperatures. Freeze a rubber
ball and it won ’ t bounce; freeze an O - ring and it might not seal. Engineers rec-
ommended strongly that NASA wait for warmer weather. They tried to produce
a persuasive engineering rationale, but their report was hastily thrown together,
and the data seemed equivocal (Vaughan, 1995). Meanwhile, Thiokol and NASA
both faced strong pressure to get the shuttle in the air:
Thiokol had gained the lucrative sole source contract for the solid
rocket boosters thirteen years earlier, during a bitterly disputed
award process. It was characterized by some veteran observers as a
low point in squalid political intrigue. At the time of the award,
a relatively small Thiokol Chemical Company in Brigham City, Utah,
had considerable political clout. Both the newly appointed chairman
of the Senate Aeronautics and Space Science Committee, Democratic
Senator Frank Moss, and the new NASA administrator, Dr. James
Fletcher, were insiders in the tightly knit Utah political hierarchy.
By summer 1985, however, Thiokol ’ s monopoly was under attack,
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Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 193
and the corporation ’ s executives were reluctant to risk their billion -
dollar contract by halting shuttle fl ight operations long enough to
correct fl aws in the booster joint design [McConnell, 1987, p. 7].
Meanwhile, NASA managers were experiencing their own political pressures. As
part of the effort to build congressional support for the space program, NASA
had promised that the shuttle would eventually pay for itself in cargo fees, like
a boxcar in space. Projections of profi tability were based on an ambitious plan:
twelve fl ights in 1984, fourteen in 1985, and seventeen in 1986. NASA had fallen
well behind schedule — only fi ve launches in 1984 and eight in 1985. The prom-
ise of “ routine access to space ” and self - supporting fl ights looked more and more
dubious. With every fl ight costing taxpayers about $ 100 million, NASA needed a
lot of cash from Congress, but prospects were not bright. NASA ’ s credibility was
eroding as the U.S. budget defi cit soared.
That was the highly charged context in which Thiokol ’ s engineers recom-
mended canceling the next morning ’ s launch. The response from NASA offi cials
was swift and pointed. One NASA manager said he was “ appalled ” at the pro-
posal, and another said, “ My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch?
Next April? ” (McConnell, 1987, p. 196). Senior managers at Thiokol huddled
and decided, against the advice of engineers, to recommend the launch. NASA
accepted the recommendation and launched Flight 51 - L the next morning. The
O - rings failed almost immediately, and the fl ight was destroyed (Bell and Esch,
1987; Jensen, 1995; McConnell, 1987; Marx, Stubbart, Traub, and Cavanaugh,
1987; Vaughan, 1990, 1995).
It is disturbing to see political agendas corrupting technical decisions, par-
ticularly when lives are at stake. We might be tempted to explain Challenger by
blaming individual selfi shness and questionable motives. But such explana-
tions are little help in understanding what really happened or avoiding a future
catastrophe. As we saw in Chapter Two ’ s friendly - fi re case (where U.S. fi ghter
jets mistakenly shot down two of their own helicopters), individual errors typi-
cally occur downstream from powerful forces channeling decision makers over a
precipice no one sees until too late. With Columbia and Challenger, key decision
makers were experienced, highly trained, and intelligent. If we tried to get better
people, where would we fi nd them? Even if we could, how could we ensure that
they too would not become ensnared by parochial interests and political gaming?
The Columbia investigating board recognized this reality, concluding, “ NASA ’ s
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Reframing Organizations194
problems cannot be solved simply by retirements, resignations, or transferring
personnel ” (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003, p. 195).
Both Columbia and Challenger were extraordinary tragedies, but they illus-
trate political dynamics that are everyday features of organizational life. The
political frame does not blame politics on individual characteristics such as
selfi shness, myopia, or incompetence. Instead, it proposes that interdependence,
divergent interests, scarcity, and power relations inevitably spawn political activ-
ity. It is naive and romantic to hope organizational politics can be eliminated,
regardless of individual players. Managers can, however, learn to acknowledge,
understand, and manage political dynamics, rather than shy away from them.
In government, politics is a way of life rather than dirty pool. Chris Matthews
calls it hardball: “ Hardball is clean, aggressive Machiavellian politics. It is the
discipline of gaining and holding power, useful to any profession or undertak-
ing, but practiced most openly and unashamedly in the world of public affairs ”
(1999, p. 13).
This chapter seeks to explain why political processes are universal, why they
won ’ t go away, and how they can be handled adroitly. We describe the political
frame ’ s basic assumptions and explain how they work. Next, we highlight orga-
nizations as freewheeling coalitions rather than formal hierarchies. Coalitions
are tools for exercising power, and we contrast power with authority and high-
light tensions between authorities (who try to keep things under control) and
partisans (who try to infl uence a system to get what they want). We also delin-
eate multiple sources of power. Since confl ict is normal among members of a
coalition, we underscore the role of confl ict in organizations. Finally, we discuss
an issue at the heart of organizational politics: Do political dynamics inevitably
undermine principles and ethics?
POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS The political frame views organizations as roiling arenas hosting ongoing
contests of individual and group interests. Five propositions summarize the
perspective:
1. Organizations are coalitions of assorted individuals and interest groups.
2. Coalition members have enduring differences in values, beliefs, informa-
tion, interests, and perceptions of reality.
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Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 195
3. Most important decisions involve allocating scarce resources — who
gets what.
4. Scarce resources and enduring differences put confl ict at the center of
day - to - day dynamics and make power the most important asset.
5. Goals and decisions emerge from bargaining and negotiation among
competing stakeholders jockeying for their own interests.
Political Propositions and the Challenger All fi ve propositions of the political frame came into play in the Challenger
incident:
Organizations are coalitions. NASA did not run the space shuttle pro-
gram in isolation. The agency was part of a complex coalition of contractors,
Congress, the White House, the military, the media — even the American pub-
lic. Consider, for example, why Christa McAuliffe was aboard. Her expertise as
a teacher was not technically critical to the mission. But the American public
was bored with seeing white male pilots in space. Human interest was good for
NASA and Congress; it built public support for the space program. McAuliffe ’ s
participation was a media magnet because it made for a great human inter-
est story. Symbolically, Christa McAuliffe represented all Americans. Everyone
fl ew with her.
Coalition members have enduring differences. NASA ’ s hunger for funding com-
peted with the public ’ s interest in lower taxes. Astronauts ’ concerns about safety
were at odds with pressures on NASA and its contractors to maintain an ambi-
tious fl ight schedule.
Important decisions involve allocating scarce resources. Time and money were
both in short supply. Delay carried a high price — not just dollars, but also fur-
ther erosion of support from key constituents. On the eve of the Challenger
launch, key offi cials at NASA and Morton Thiokol struggled to balance these
confl icting pressures. Everyone from President Ronald Reagan to the average cit-
izen was clamoring for the fi rst teacher to fl y in space. No one wanted to tell the
audience the show was off.
Scarce resources and enduring differences make confl ict central and power the
most important asset. The teleconference on the eve of the launch began as
a debate between the contractor and NASA. As sole customer, NASA was in
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Reframing Organizations196
the driver ’ s seat. When managers at Morton Thiokol sensed NASA ’ s level of
disappointment and frustration, the scene shifted to a tense standoff between
engineers and managers. Managers relied on their authority to override the engi-
neers ’ concerns and recommended the launch.
Goals and decisions emerge from bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying for posi-
tion among competing stakeholders. Political bargaining and powerful allies had
propelled Morton Thiokol into the rocket motor business. Thiokol ’ s engineers
had been attempting to focus management ’ s attention on the booster joint prob-
lem for many months. But management feared that acknowledging a problem,
in addition to costing time and money, would erode the company ’ s credibility.
A large and profi table contract was at stake.
Implications of the Political Propositions The assumptions of the political frame also explain why organizations are
inevitably political. A coalition forms because of interconnections among its
members; they need one another, even though their interests may only partly
overlap. The assumption of enduring differences implies that political activity is
more visible and dominant under conditions of diversity than of homogeneity.
Agreement and harmony are easier to achieve when everyone shares similar val-
ues, beliefs, and cultural ways.
The concept of scarce resources suggests that politics will be more salient and
intense in diffi cult times. Schools and colleges, for example, have lived through
alternating feast and famine in response to peaks and valleys in economic and
demographic trends. When money and students are plentiful (as they were in
the 1960s and again in the 1990s), administrators spend time designing new
buildings and initiating innovative programs. Work is fun when you ’ re deliver-
ing good news and constituents applaud. Conversely, when resources dry up,
you may have to shutter buildings, close programs, and lay off staff. Confl ict
mushrooms, and administrators often succumb to political forces they struggle
to understand and control.
Differences and scarce resources make power a key resource. Power in orga-
nizations is basically the capacity to make things happen. Pfeffer defi nes power
as “ the potential ability to infl uence behavior, to change the course of events,
to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things they would not other-
wise do ” (1992, p. 30). Social scientists often emphasize a tight linkage between
power and dependency: if A has something B wants, A has leverage. In much
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Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 197
of organizational life, individuals and groups are interdependent; they need
things from one another, and power relationships are multidirectional. From the
view of the political frame, power is a “ daily mechanism of our social existence ”
(Crozier and Friedberg, 1977, p. 32).
The fi nal proposition of the political frame emphasizes that goals are not set
by edict at the top but evolve through an ongoing process of negotiation and bar-
gaining. Few organizations have a unitary apex. Who, for example, is at the head
of a public company? The CEO? But the CEO reports to the board. The board is
elected by and accountable to the shareholders. And the shareholders are typically
a large and scattered group of absentee owners with little time, interest, or capacity
to infl uence the organization in which each has a sliver of ownership. If a corpo-
rate raider or hedge fund acquires a major ownership stake, the stage is set for a
battle over control of the company.
The dynamic of multiple constituents jockeying for infl uence is especially
apparent in the public sector. Consider a commitment China made in 2001 to
gain membership in the World Trade Organization. The Chinese government
promised to get serious about protecting intellectual property, ensuring that
products carrying brands such as Coca - Cola, Microsoft, Sony, and Rolex were
authentic. The central government passed laws, threw the book at the occa-
sional unlucky offender, blustered in the media, and put pressure on local gov-
ernments. Yet years later, name - brand knockoffs and pirated music continued
to be sold all over China. In late 2007, the Shanghai street price for the lat-
est Hollywood movies on DVD was about sixty cents, and tourists in Beijing
encountered countless vendors offering amazing bargains on Rolex watches
(Powell, 2007). In response to numerous complaints from abroad, the govern-
ment announced still another crackdown, promised stiffer fi nes for violators,
and staged a nationwide burn - in at which 42 million pirated items were con-
signed to bonfi res (Coonan, 2007).
Why have the anti - piracy efforts had so little impact? The Chinese govern-
ment is far from monolithic and is only one of many players in a complex power
game. Newly affl uent Chinese consumers want foreign brands. Lots of large and
small Chinese businesses know, for example, that a homemade carbonated fl uid
can fetch a better price if it carries an American brand name. The problem has
been so widespread that Coca - Cola ’ s Chinese affi liate has found itself not only
raiding factories but also chasing pirates who slap Coke labels on bottles in deliv-
ery trucks en route to retail outlets.
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Reframing Organizations198
Stopping piracy has run into a range of obstacles. Pirates are often local
businesses with plenty of guanxi (connections) who generously share the loot
with local government and police offi cials. As one New York Times reporter
discovered when he was imprisoned for several hours in a toy factory,
“ Factory bosses can overrule the police, and Chinese government offi cials are
not as powerful as you might suspect ” (Barboza, 2007, p. 3). Moreover, the
concept of intellectual property rights is new to many Chinese. They fi nd it
hard to see the merit of punishing a hard - working Chinese entrepreneur to
protect a big foreign corporation. In short, multiple power centers and con-
tinuing divisions have seriously limited senior offi cials ’ ability to translate
intention into action.
ORGANIZATIONS AS COALITIONS Academics and managers alike have assumed that organizations have, or ought
to have, clear and consistent goals set at the apex of authority. In a business, the
owners or top managers set goals such as growth and profi tability. Goals in a
government agency are presumably set by the legislature and elected executives.
The political frame challenges such views. Cyert and March articulate the differ-
ence between structural and political views of goals:
To what extent is it arbitrary, in conventional accounting, that we call
wage payments “ costs ” and dividend payments “ profi t ” rather than
the other way around? Why is it that in our quasi - genetic moments
we are inclined to say that in the beginning there was a manager, and
he recruited workers and capital? . . . The emphasis on the asym-
metry has seriously confused the understanding of organizational
goals. The confusion arises because ultimately it makes only slightly
more sense to say that the goal of a business enterprise is to maxi-
mize profi t than to say that its goal is to maximize the salary of Sam
Smith, assistant to the janitor [1963, p. 30].
Cyert and March are saying something like this: Sam Smith, the assistant jan-
itor; Jim Ford, the foreman; and Celeste Cohen - Peters, the company presi-
dent are all members of a grand coalition, Cohen - Peters Enterprises. All
make demands on resources and bargain to get as much of what they value
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Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 199
as possible. Cohen - Peters has more authority than Jones or Ford and, in case
of disagreement, she will often win — but not always. Her infl uence depends
on how much power she mobilizes in comparison with that of Smith, Ford,
and other members of the coalition. Xerox had a close brush with bankruptcy
in 2001 under a CEO who had come from the outside and never mastered
the politics at the top of the organization. The fi rm was adrift, and the cap-
tain had lost control of his ship. His successor, Anne Mulcahy, was a canny
insider who built the relationships and alliances she needed to get Xerox back
on course.
If political pressures on goals are visible in the private sector, they are
blatant in the public arena. As in the Challenger incident, public agencies
operate amid a welter of constituencies, each making demands and trying
to get its way. The result is a confusing multiplicity of goals, many in con-
flict. Consider Gazprom, Russia ’ s biggest company and the world ’ s largest
producer of natural gas. For a time in 2006, it ranked third in the world in
market capitalization, behind only Exxon and General Electric. Gazprom
supplies most of the natural gas in Eastern Europe and 25 percent or more
in France, Germany, and Italy. It began as a state ministry under Mikhail
Gorbachev, became a public stock company under Boris Yeltsin, and then
turned semi - public under Vladimir Putin, with the Russian government the
majority stockholder.
Many observers felt that Gazprom functioned as an extension of govern-
ment policy. Prices for gas exports seemed to correlate with how friendly a
government was to Moscow. “ If people take us for the state, that doesn ’ t make
us unhappy, ” said Sergey Kouprianov, a company spokesman. “ We iden-
tify with the state ” (Pasquier, 2007, p. 43). Russian President Vladimir Putin
returned the sentiment. Gazprom produced a quarter of Russia ’ s govern-
ment revenues, and Putin saw hydrocarbons substituting for the Red Army
as a lever to project Russian power. At the same time, Russian consumers got
their gas at about 20 percent of market price. When the company tried for
a domestic price increase in 2006, it was blocked by a government that was
thinking ahead to the next presidential election. Was this giant in business to
benefi t customers, management, stockholders, the Kremlin, or Russian citi-
zens? All of the above and more, because all were participants in the grand
and messy Gazprom coalition.
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Reframing Organizations200
G R E A T E S T H I T S F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T U D I E S
Hit Number 2: Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963)
Coming in at number two on the scholars ’ lists of greatest hits is a forty -
year - old book by an economist, Richard Cyert, and a political scientist,
James G. March. Cyert and March defi ned their basic purpose as devel-
oping a predictive theory of organizational decision making rooted
in a realistic understanding of how decisions actually get made. They
rejected as unrealistic the traditional economic view of a fi rm as a uni-
tary entity (a corporate “ person ” ) with a singular goal of maximizing
profi ts. Cyert and March chose instead to view organizations as coali-
tions made up of individuals and subcoalitions. This view implied a
central idea of the political frame: goals emerge out of a bargaining
process among coalition members. Cyert and March also insisted that
“ side payments ” are critical, since preferences are only partly compat-
ible and decisions rarely satisfy everyone. A coalition can survive only
if it offers suffi cient inducements to keep essential members on board.
This is not easy, because resources — money, time, information, and deci-
sion - making capacity — are limited.
In analyzing decision making, Cyert and March developed four
“ relational concepts, ” implicit rules that fi rms use to make decisions
more manageable:
1. Quasi - resolution of confl ict. Instead of resolving confl ict, organiza-
tions break problems into pieces and farm pieces out to different
units. Units make locally rational decisions (for example, market-
ers do what they think is best for marketing). Decisions are never
consistent but need only be good enough to keep the coalition
functioning.
2. Uncertainty avoidance. Organizations employ a range of simplify-
ing mechanisms — such as standard operating procedures, traditions,
and contracts — that enable them to act as if the environment is
clearer than it is.
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Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 201
POWER AND DECISION MAKING At every level in organizations, alliances form because members have interests
in common and believe they can do more together than apart. To accomplish
their aims, they need power. Power can be viewed from multiple perspectives.
Structural theorists typically emphasize authority, the legitimate prerogative to
make binding decisions. In this view, managers make rational decisions (optimal
and consistent with purpose); monitor actions to ensure decisions are imple-
mented; and calculate how well subordinates carry out directives. In contrast,
human resource theorists place less emphasis on power and more on empow-
erment (Bennis and Nanus, 1985; Block, 1987). More than structuralists, they
emphasize limits of authority and tend to focus on infl uence that enhances
mutuality and collaboration. The implicit hope is that participation, openness,
and collaboration substitute for power.
The political frame views authority as only one among many forms of power.
It recognizes the importance of individual (and group) needs but emphasizes
that scarce resources and incompatible preferences cause needs to collide. The
political issue is how competing groups articulate preferences and mobilize
power to get what they want. Power, in this view, is not evil: “ We have to stop
describing power always in negative terms: [as in] it excludes, it represses. In fact,
power produces; it produces reality ” (Foucault, 1975, p. 12).
Authorities and Partisans Gamson (1968) describes the relationship between two antagonists —
partisans and authorities — that are often central to the politics of both orga-
nizations and society. By virtue of their position, authorities are entitled to
make decisions binding on their subordinates. Any member of the coali-
tion who wants to exert bottom - up pressure is a potential partisan. Gamson
3. Problemistic search. Organizations look for solutions in the
neighborhood of the presenting problem and grab the fi rst
acceptable solution.
4. Organizational learning. Over time, organizations evolve their goals
and aspiration levels, altering what they attend to and what they
ignore, and changing search rules.
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Reframing Organizations202
describes the relationship in this way: “ Authorities are the recipients or
targets of influence, and the agents or initiators of social control. Potential
partisans have the opposite roles — as agents or initiators of influence, and
targets or recipients of social control ” (p. 76).
In a family, parents function as authorities and children as partisans. Parents
make binding decisions about bedtime, television viewing, or which child uses
a particular toy. Parents initiate social control, and children are the recipients of
parental decisions. Children in turn try to infl uence the decision makers. They
argue for a later bedtime or point out the injustice of giving one child some-
thing another wants. They try to split authorities by lobbying one parent after
the other has refused. They may form a coalition (with siblings, grandparents,
and so on) in an attempt to strengthen their bargaining position.
Authority is essential to anyone in a formal position because social control
depends on it. Offi ceholders can exert control only so long as partisans respect
or fear them enough that their authority or power remains intact. If partisans
are convinced that existing authorities are too evil or incompetent to continue,
they will risk trying to wrest control — unless they regard the authorities as too
formidable. Conversely, if partisans trust authority, they will accept and support
it in the event of an attack (Gamson, 1968; Baldridge, 1971).
If partisan opposition becomes too powerful, authority systems may col-
lapse. The process can be very swift, as events in Eastern Europe and China in
1989 illustrated. Established regimes had lost legitimacy years earlier but held on
through coercion and control of access to decision making. When massive dem-
onstrations erupted, authorities faced an unnerving choice: activate the police
and army in the hope of preserving power or watch their authority fade away.
Authorities in China and Romania chose the fi rst course. It led to bloodshed in
both cases, but only the Chinese were able to quash their opposition. In Eastern
Europe, authorities ’ attempts to quell dissent with force were futile, and their
legitimacy evaporated as swiftly as water in a desert.
The period of evaporation is typically heady but always hazardous. The
question is whether new authority can reconstitute itself quickly enough to
avoid chaos. Authorities and partisans both have reason to fear a specter such
as Lebanon encountered in the 1980s and again in the early 2000s, Bosnia and
Liberia in the 1990s, Somalia since 1991, and Iraq in the aftermath of U.S. inter-
vention. All are dismal examples of chronic turmoil and misery, with no author-
ity strong enough to bring partisan strife under control.
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Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 203
Sources of Power Authority is far from the only source of power — partisans have other sources
they can draw upon. A number of social scientists (Baldridge, 1971; French and
Raven, 1959; Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981, 1992; Russ, 1994) have tried to identify
the various wellsprings of power. The full list includes
Position power (authority). Positions confer certain levels of legitimate
authority. Professors assign grades, judges settle disputes. Positions also place
incumbents in more or less powerful locations in communications and power
networks. It helps as much to be in the right unit as to hold the right job.
A lofty title in a backwater department may not mean much, but junior mem-
bers of a powerful unit may have substantial clout (Pfeffer, 1992).
Control of rewards. The ability to deliver jobs, money, political support, or
other rewards brings power. There are many differences between Chicago
Mayor Richard Daley and Iraqi cleric Muqtada al - Sadr, who heads the Mahdi
army, but both cement their power base by delivering services and jobs to
loyal supporters (Mihalopoulos and Kimberly, 2006; Rubin, 2007).
Coercive power. Coercive power rests on the ability to constrain, block, inter-
fere, or punish. A union ’ s ability to walk out, students ’ capacity to sit in, and an
army ’ s ability to clamp down exemplify coercive power. A chilling example is
the rise of suicide attacks in the last quarter - century. “ Suicide attacks amount
to just 3 percent of all terrorist incidents from 1980 to 2003, but account for
48 percent of all fatalities, making the average suicide attack twelve times dead-
lier than other forms of terrorism — even if the immense losses of September 11
are not counted ” (Pape, 2006, p. 4).
Information and expertise. Power fl ows to those with the information and
know - how to solve important problems. It fl ows to marketing experts in con-
sumer products industries, to the faculty in elite universities, and to political
consultants who help politicians get elected.
Reputation. Reputation builds on expertise. In almost every area of human
performance, people develop track records based on their prior accomplish-
ments. Opportunities and infl uence fl ow to people with strong reputations,
like the Hollywood superstars whose presence in a new fi lm sells tickets.
Personal power. Individuals who are attractive and socially adept — because
of charisma, energy, stamina, political smarts, gift of gab, vision, or some
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Reframing Organizations204
other characteristic — are imbued with power independent of other sources.
French and Raven (1959) used the term referent power to describe infl u-
ence that comes when people like you or want to be like you. John Kennedy
and Ronald Reagan expanded their infl uence because they brought to the
presidency levels of charm, humor, and ease that Jimmy Carter and George
W. Bush lacked.
Alliances and networks. Getting things done in an organization involves work-
ing through a complex network of individuals and groups. Friends and allies
make things a lot easier. Kotter (1982) found that a key difference between
more and less successful senior managers was attentiveness to building and
cultivating ties with friends and allies. Managers who spent too little time
building networks had much more diffi culty getting things done.
Access and control of agendas. A by - product of networks and alliances is
access to decision arenas. Organizations and political systems typically give
some groups more access than others. When decisions are made, the interests
of those with “ a seat at the table ” are well represented, while the concerns of
absentees are often distorted or ignored (Lukes, 1974; Brown, 1986).
Framing: control of meaning and symbols. “ Establishing the framework within
which issues will be viewed and decided is often tantamount to determining
the result ” (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 203). Elites and opinion leaders often have sub-
stantial ability to shape meaning and articulate myths that express identity,
beliefs, and values. Viewed positively, this fosters meaning and hope. Viewed
cynically, elites can convince others to accept and support things not in their
best interests (Brown, 1986; Frost, 1985; Lakoff, 2004). Lakoff argued that
Republican electoral success in 2000 and 2004 owed much to skill in framing
issues — recasting, for example, the “ estate tax ” (which sounds like a tax on the
rich) into the “ death tax ” (which sounds like adding insult to injury).
Partisans ’ multiple sources of power constrain authorities ’ capacity to make
binding decisions. Offi ceholders who rely solely on position power generate
resistance and get outfl anked, outmaneuvered, or overrun by others more versa-
tile in exercising other forms of power. Kotter (1985) argues that managerial jobs
come with a built - in “ power gap ” because position power is rarely enough to get
the job done. Expertise, rewards, coercion, allies, access, reputation, framing, and
personal power help close the gap.
•
•
•
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Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 205
Power can be very volatile, rising and falling with changes in circumstances.
An organization that sets new profi t records each year is rarely besieged by com-
plaints and demands for change. As many company presidents have learned,
however, the fi rst bad quarter triggers a stream of calls and letters from board
members, stockholders, and fi nancial analysts. In the boom of the late 1990s,
“ everyone ” was getting rich in the stock market, and charismatic CEOs such
as Jack Welch of General Electric and Jean - Marie Messier of France ’ s Vivendi
became popular heroes. But when the economy, the market, and the image of
business crashed in the fi rst years of the new century, so did these heroic images.
In 2002, Welch found himself deeply embarrassed by public revelation of the
generous post retirement payouts his old company was bestowing on him. In
the same year, Messier was booted out by board members dissatisfi ed with the
company ’ s stock price and his arrogant “ American ” leadership style.
Clark Kerr once remarked ruefully that his primary tasks as chancellor of the
University of California at Berkeley seemed to be providing “ sex for the students,
parking for the faculty, and football for the alumni. ” The remark was half face-
tious but refl ects an important grain of truth: a president ’ s power lies particu-
larly in zones of indifference — areas only a few people care much about. The zone
of indifference can expand or contract markedly, depending on how an organi-
zation is performing in the eyes of its major constituents. In the late 1960s, many
college presidents lost their jobs because they were blamed for student unrest.
Among them was Kerr, who remarked that he left the job just as he entered it,
“ fi red with enthusiasm. ” Managers need to track the shifting boundaries of zones
of indifference so they do not blunder into decisions that seem safe but stir up
unanticipated fi restorms of criticism and resistance.
Distribution of Power: Overbounded and Underbounded Systems Organizations and societies differ markedly in how power is distributed. Alderfer
(1979) and Brown (1983) distinguish between overbounded and underbounded
systems. In an overbounded system, power is highly concentrated and everything is
tightly regulated. In an underbounded system, power is diffuse and the system
is very loosely controlled. An overbounded system regulates politics with a fi rm
hand; an underbounded system openly encourages confl ict and power games.
If power is highly regulated, political activity is often forced under wraps.
Before the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev and glasnost ( “ openness ” ) in the
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Reframing Organizations206
1980s, it was common for Westerners to view Soviets as a vast, amorphous mass
of like - minded people, brainwashed by decades of government propaganda.
It was not true, but even so - called experts on Soviet affairs missed the underly-
ing reality (Alterman, 1989). Ethnic, political, philosophical, and religious dif-
ferences simmered quietly underground so long as the Kremlin maintained a
tightly regulated society. Glasnost took the lid off, leading to an outpouring of
debate and dissent that rapidly caused the collapse of the old order in the Soviet
Union and throughout Eastern Europe. Almost overnight, much of Eastern
Europe went from overbounded to underbounded.
The war in Iraq, beginning in 2003, produced a similar result. The collapse of
the overbounded Saddam Hussein regime created a power vacuum that attracted
a host of contenders vying for supremacy. By 2006, Iraq had the formal elements
of a new government, including a constitution and an elected parliament, but it
was still uncertain two years later when, or if, the state would have the capacity
to bring confl ict and chaos under control.
CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONS The political frame stresses that the combination of scarce resources and diver-
gent interests produces confl ict as surely as night follows day. Confl ict is not
viewed as something that can or should be tamped down or stamped out. Other
frames view confl ict differently. The structural frame, in particular, views confl ict
as an impediment to effectiveness. Hierarchical confl ict raises the possibility that
lower levels will ignore or subvert management directives. Confl ict among major
partisan groups can undermine leadership ’ s ability to function. Such dangers are
precisely why the structural perspective fi nds virtue in a well - defi ned, authorita-
tive chain of command.
From a political perspective, confl ict is not necessarily a problem or a sign
that something is amiss. Organizational resources are in short supply; there is
rarely enough to give everyone everything they want. Individuals compete for
jobs, titles, and prestige. Departments compete for resources and power. Interest
groups vie for policy concessions. If one group controls the policy process, others
may be frozen out. Confl ict is normal and inevitable. It ’ s a natural by - product of
collective life.
The political prism puts more emphasis on strategy and tactics than on reso-
lution of confl ict. Confl ict has benefi ts as well as costs: “ a tranquil, harmonious
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Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 207
organization may very well be an apathetic, uncreative, stagnant, infl exible, and
unresponsive organization. Confl ict challenges the status quo [and] stimulates
interest and curiosity. It is the root of personal and social change, creativity, and
innovation. Confl ict encourages new ideas and approaches to problems, stimu-
lating innovation ” (Heffron, 1989, p. 185).
An organization can experience too much or too little confl ict (Brown, 1983;
Heffron, 1989; Jehn, 1995). Intervention may be needed to tamp down or stoke
up the intensity, depending on the situation (Heifetz and Linsky, 2002). Even
more important than the amount of confl ict is how it is managed. Badly man-
aged confl ict leads to the infi ghting and destructive power struggle revealed in
the Challenger and Columbia cases. But well - handled confl ict can stimulate cre-
ativity and innovation that make an organization a livelier, more adaptive, and
more effective place (Kotter, 1985).
Confl ict is particularly likely to occur at boundaries, or interfaces, between
groups and units. Horizontal confl ict occurs in the boundary between depart-
ments or divisions; vertical confl ict occurs at the border between levels.
Cultural confl ict crops up between groups with differing values, traditions,
beliefs, and lifestyles. Cultural quarrels in the larger society often seep into the
workplace, generating tension around gender, ethnic, racial, and other differ-
ences. But organizations also house their own value disputes. The culture of
management is different from that of frontline employees. Workers who move
up the ladder sometimes struggle with elusive adjustments required by their
new role.
The management challenge is to recognize and manage interface confl ict. Like
other forms, it can be productive or debilitating. One of the most important
tasks of unit managers or union representatives is to be a persuasive advocate
for their group on a political fi eld with many players representing competing
interests. They need negotiation skills to develop alliances and cement deals that
enable their group to move forward with “ without physical or psychological
bloodshed and with wisdom as well as grace ” (Peck, 1998, p. 71).
MORAL MAZES: THE POLITICS OF GETTING AHEAD Does a world of power, self - interest, confl ict, and political games inevitably
develop into a dog - eat - dog jungle in which the strong devour the weak? Is an
unregulated organization invariably a nasty, brutish place where values and
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Reframing Organizations208
ethics are irrelevant? The corporate ethics scandals of recent years reinforced
a recurrent suspicion that the morals of the marketplace amount to no mor-
als at all.
Jackall (1988) views the corporation as a world of cabals and alliances, domi-
nance and submission, confl ict and self - interest, and “ moral mazes. ” He sug-
gests that “ wise and ambitious managers resist the lulling platitudes of unity,
though they invoke them with fervor, and look for the inevitable clash of inter-
ests beneath the bouncy, cheerful surface of corporate life ” (p. 37). Moving up
the ladder inevitably involves competition for the scarce resource of status. The
favored myth is that free and fair competition ensures that better performers will
win, at least in the long run.
But assessing performance in a managerial job is fraught with ambiguity.
There are multiple criteria, some of which can be assessed only through sub-
jective judgment (particularly by the boss and other superiors). It is often hard
to separate individual performance from group performance or from a host of
exogenous factors. It may also make a big difference who is doing the judging.
When bright, creative energy traders at Enron developed clever techniques with
names like “ Get Shorty ” and “ Fat Boy ” to exploit a crisis in California ’ s elec-
tricity market in 2001, did they deserve commendation for boosting the bot-
tom line? Or jail time? Did Thiokol engineers who fought to stop the launch
of Challenger deserve a high grade for persistence and integrity, or a low grade
because they failed to persuade their bosses? When some of those same engineers
went public with their criticism, were they demonstrating courage or disloyalty?
Whistleblowers are regularly lauded by the press, yet pilloried or banished by
employers (Alford, 2001). This is exemplifi ed by Time magazine ’ s 2002 Person
of the Year award, given to three women who blew the whistle on their employ-
ers: Enron, WorldCom, and the FBI. By the time they received the award, all had
moved on from workplaces that viewed them more as traitors than as exemplars
of courage and integrity.
Managers frequently learn that getting ahead is a matter of personal “ credibil-
ity, ” which comes from doing what is socially and politically correct. Defi nitions
of political correctness refl ect tacit forms of power deeply embedded in organiza-
tional patterns and structure (Frost, 1986). Because getting ahead and making it
to the top dominate the attention of many managers (Dalton, 1959; Jackall, 1988;
Ritti and Funkhouser, 1982), both organizations and individuals need to develop
constructive and positive ways to engage in the political game. The question is
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Power, Confl ict, and Coalition 209
not whether organizations will have politics but rather what kind of politics they
will have. Jackall ’ s view is bleak:
Bureaucracy breaks apart the ownership of property from its control,
social independence from occupation, substance from appearances,
action from responsibility, obligation from guilt, language from
meaning, and notions of truth from reality. Most important, and at
the bottom of all these fractures, it breaks apart the traditional con-
nection between the meaning of work and salvation. In the bureau-
cratic world, one ’ s success, one ’ s sign of election, no longer depends
on an inscrutable God, but on the capriciousness of one ’ s superiors
and the market; and one achieves economic salvation to the extent
that one pleases and submits to new gods, that is, one ’ s bosses and
the exigencies of an impersonal market [1988, pp. 191 – 192].
This is not a pretty picture, but it is often accurate. Productive politics is a pos-
sible alternative although hard to achieve. In the next chapter, we explore ways
that a manager can become a constructive politician.
SUMMARY The traditional view sees organizations as created and controlled by legitimate
authorities who set goals, design structure, hire and manage employees, and
ensure pursuit of the right objectives. The political view frames a different world:
Organizations are coalitions composed of individuals and groups with enduring
differences who live in a world of scarce resources. That puts power and confl ict
at the center of organizational decision making.
Authorities have position power, but they must vie with many other contend-
ers for other forms of leverage. Contenders bring their own beliefs, values, and
interests. They seek access to various forms of power and compete for their share
of scarce resources in a fi nite organizational pie.
From a political perspective, goals, structure, and policies emerge from an
ongoing process of bargaining and negotiation among major interest groups.
Sometimes legitimate authorities are the dominant members of the coali-
tion, as is often true in small, owner - managed organizations. But large corpo-
rations are often controlled by senior management rather than by stockholders
or the board of directors. Government agencies may be controlled more by the
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Reframing Organizations210
permanent civil servants than by the political leaders at the top. The dominant
group in a school district may be the teachers ’ union instead of the school board
or the superintendent. In such cases, rationalists see the wrong people setting
the agenda. But the political view suggests that exercising power is a natural part
of ongoing contests. Those who get and use power to their advantage will be
winners.
There is no guarantee that those who gain power will use it wisely or
justly. But power and politics are not inevitably demeaning and destructive.
Constructive politics is a possibility — indeed, a necessary option if we are to cre-
ate institutions and societies that are both just and effi cient.
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211
The Manager as Politician
Bill Gates was standing in the right place in the early 1980s when IBM ’ s fl edgling personal computer business came looking for an operating system. Gates didn ’ t have one, but his partner, Paul
Allen, knew someone who did. Gates paid $ 75,000 for QDOS (Quick
and Dirty Operating System) in the deal — or steal — of the twentieth
century. Gates changed the name to DOS and resold it to IBM, but
shrewdly retained the right to license it to anyone else. DOS quickly
became the primary operating system for most of the world ’ s per-
sonal computers. Gates himself was on the road to becoming one of
the world ’ s richest men (Manes and Andrews, 1994; Zachary, 1994).
Windows, a graphic interface riding atop DOS, fueled another great leap for-
ward for the Microsoft empire. But by the late 1980s, Gates had a problem. He
and everyone else knew that DOS was obsolete and woefully defi cient. The solu-
tion was supposed to be OS/2, a new operating system developed jointly by
Microsoft and IBM, but it was a tense partnership. IBMers saw “ Microsofties ” as
undisciplined adolescents. Microsoft folks moaned that “ Big Blue ” was a hope-
lessly bureaucratic producer of “ poor code, poor design, and poor process ”
(Manes and Andrews, 1994, p. 425). Increasingly pessimistic about the viability
of OS/2, Gates decided to hedge his bets by developing a new operating system
to be called Windows NT. Gates recruited the brilliant but crotchety Dave Cutler
T E N
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations212
from Digital Equipment to head the effort. Cutler had led the development of
the operating system that helped DEC dominate the minicomputer industry.
Gates recognized that Cutler was known “ more for his code than his charm ”
(Zachary, 1993, p. A1). Things started well, but Cutler insisted on keeping his team
small and wanted no responsibility beyond the “ kernel ” of the operating system. He
fi gured someone else could worry about details like the user interface. Gates began
to see a potential disaster looming, but issuing orders to the temperamental Cutler
was as promising as telling Picasso how to paint. So Gates put the calm, under-
stated Paul Maritz on the case. Born in South Africa, Maritz had studied mathe-
matics and economics in Cape Town before deciding that software was his destiny.
He joined Microsoft in 1986 and became the leader of its OS/2 effort. When he was
assigned informal oversight of Windows NT, he got a frosty welcome:
As he began meeting regularly with Cutler on NT matters, Maritz
often found himself the victim of slights. Once Maritz inno-
cently suggested to Cutler that “ We should — ” Cutler interrupted,
“ We! Who ’ s we? You mean you and the mouse in your pocket? ”
Maritz brushed off such retorts, even fi nding humor in Cutler ’ s
apparently inexhaustible supply of epithets. He refused to allow
Cutler to draw him into a brawl. Instead, he hoped Cutler would
“ volunteer ” for greater responsibility as the shortcomings of the sta-
tus quo became more apparent [Zachary, 1994, p. 76].
Maritz enticed Cutler with tempting challenges. In early 1990, he asked Cutler if
he could put together a demonstration of NT for COMDEX, the industry ’ s big-
gest trade show. Cutler took the bait. Maritz knew that the effort would expose
NT ’ s weaknesses (Zachary, 1994). When Gates subsequently seethed that NT was
too late, too big, and too slow, Maritz scrambled to “ fi lter that stuff from Dave ”
(p. 208). Maritz ’ s patience eventually paid off when he was promoted to head all
operating systems development:
The promotion gave Maritz formal and actual authority over Cutler
and the entire NT project. Still, he avoided confrontations, prefer-
ring to wait until Cutler came to see the benefi ts of Maritz ’ s views.
Increasingly Cutler and his inner circle viewed Maritz as a power-
house, not an empty suit. “ He ’ s critical to the project, ” said [one of
Cutler ’ s most loyal lieutenants]. “ He got into it a little bit at a time.
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The Manager as Politician 213
Slowly he blended his way in until it was obvious who was running
the show. Him ” [p. 204].
Chapter Nine ’ s account of the Columbia and Challenger cases drives home a
chilling lesson about political pressures sidetracking momentous decisions. The
implosion of fi rms such as Enron and WorldCom shows how the unfettered pur-
suit of self - interest by powerful executives can bring even a huge corporation to
its knees. Many believe that the antidote is to get politics out of management.
But this is unrealistic so long as politics is inseparable from social life. Enduring
differences lead to multiple interpretations of what ’ s true and what ’ s important.
Scarce resources trigger contests about who gets what. Interdependence means
that people cannot ignore one another; they need each other ’ s assistance, sup-
port, and resources. Under such conditions, efforts to eliminate politics are futile
and counterproductive. In our search for more positive images of the manager as
constructive politician, Paul Maritz ’ s deft combination of patience, persistence,
and diplomacy offers an instructive example.
Kotter (1985) contends that too many managers are either naive or cynical
about organizational politics. Pollyannas view the world through rose - colored
glasses, insisting that most people are good, kind, and trustworthy. Cynics believe
the opposite: everyone is selfi sh, things are always cutthroat, and “ get them
before they get you ” is the best survival tactic. Brown and Hesketh (2004) docu-
mented similar contrasting stances among college job seekers. The naive “ pur-
ists ” believe that hiring is fair and that, if they present themselves honestly, they ’ ll
be rewarded on their merits. The more cynical “ players ” game the system and try
to present the self they think employers want. In Kotter ’ s view, neither extreme is
realistic or effective: “ Organizational excellence . . . demands a sophisticated type
of social skill: a leadership skill that can mobilize people and accomplish impor-
tant objectives despite dozens of obstacles; a skill that can pull people together
for meaningful purposes despite the thousands of forces that push us apart; a
skill that can keep our corporations and public institutions from descending
into a mediocrity characterized by bureaucratic infi ghting, parochial politics,
and vicious power struggles ” (p. 11).
Organizations now more than ever need “ benevolent politicians ” who can
fi nd a middle course: “ Beyond the yellow brick road of na ï vet é and the mugger ’ s
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Reframing Organizations214
lane of cynicism, there is a narrow path, poorly lighted, hard to fi nd, and even
harder to stay on once found. People who have the skill and the perseverance to
take that path serve us in countless ways. We need more of these people. Many
more ” (Kotter, 1985, p. xi).
In a world of chronic scarcity, diversity, and confl ict, the nimble manager
has to walk a tightrope: developing a direction, building a base of support, and
cobbling together working relations with both allies and opponents. In this
chapter, we discuss why this is vital and then lay out the basic skills of the man-
ager as politician. Finally, we tackle ethical issues, the soft underbelly of orga-
nizational politics. Is it possible to be political and still do the right thing? We
discuss four instrumental values to guide ethical choice.
POLITICAL SKILLS The manager as politician exercises four key skills: agenda - setting (Kanter, 1983;
Kotter, 1988; Pfeffer, 1992; Smith, 1988), mapping the political terrain (Pfeffer,
1992; Pichault, 1993), networking and forming coalitions (Kanter, 1983; Kotter,
1982, 1985, 1988; Pfeffer, 1992; Smith, 1988), and bargaining and negotiating
(Bellow and Moulton, 1978; Fisher and Ury, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986).
Agenda Setting Structurally, an agenda outlines a goal and a schedule of activities. Politically,
an agenda is a statement of interests and a scenario for getting the goods. In
refl ecting on his experience as a university president, Warren Bennis arrived at
a deceptively simple observation: “ It struck me that I was most effective when
I knew what I wanted ” (1989, p. 20). Kanter ’ s study of internal entrepreneurs
in American corporations (1983), Kotter ’ s analysis of effective corporate leaders
(1988), and Smith ’ s examination of effective U.S. presidents (1988) all reached a
similar conclusion: whether you ’ re a middle manager or the CEO, the fi rst step
in effective political leadership is setting an agenda.
The effective leader creates an “ agenda for change ” with two major ele-
ments: a vision balancing the long - term interests of key parties, and a strat-
egy for achieving the vision while recognizing competing internal and external
forces (Kotter, 1988). The agenda must convey direction while addressing con-
cerns of major stakeholders. Kanter (1983) and Pfeffer (1992) underscore the
intimate tie between gathering information and developing a vision. Pfeffer ’ s
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The Manager as Politician 215
list of key political attributes includes “ sensitivity ” — knowing how others
think and what they care about so that your agenda responds to their con-
cerns: “ Many people think of politicians as arm - twisters, and that is, in part,
true. But in order to be a successful arm - twister, one needs to know which arm
to twist, and how ” (p. 172).
Kanter adds: “ While gathering information, entrepreneurs can also be ‘ plant-
ing seeds ’ — leaving the kernel of an idea behind and letting it germinate and
blossom so that it begins to fl oat around the system from many sources other
than the innovator ” (1983, p. 218). Paul Maritz did just that. Ignoring Dave
Cutler ’ s barbs and insults, he focused on getting information, building relation-
ships, and formulating an agenda. He quickly concluded that the NT project was
in disarray and that Cutler had to take on more responsibility. Maritz ’ s strat-
egy was attuned to his quarry: “ He protected Cutler from undue criticism and
resisted the urge to reform him. [He] kept the peace by exacting from Cutler no
ritual expressions of obedience ” (Zachary, 1994, pp. 281 – 282).
A vision without a strategy remains an illusion. A strategy has to recognize
major forces working for and against the agenda. Smith ’ s point about U.S. presi-
dents is relevant to managers at every level:
The paramount task and power of the president is to articulate the
national purpose: to fi x the nation ’ s agenda. Of all the big games at
the summit of American politics, the agenda game must be won fi rst.
The effectiveness of the presidency and the capacity of any president
to lead depend on focusing the nation ’ s political attention and its
energies on two or three top priorities. From the standpoint of his-
tory, the fl ow of events seems to have immutable logic, but political
reality is inherently chaotic: it contains no automatic agenda. Order
must be imposed [1988, p. 333].
Agendas never come neatly packaged. The bigger the job, the harder it is to
wade through the clutter and fi nd order amid chaos. Contrary to Woody Allen ’ s
dictum, success requires more than just showing up. High offi ce, even if the
incumbent enjoys great personal popularity, is no guarantee. In his fi rst year as
president, Ronald Reagan was remarkably successful following a classic strategy
for winning the agenda game: “ First impressions are critical. In the agenda game,
a swift beginning is crucial for a new president to establish himself as leader — to
show the nation that he will make a difference in people ’ s lives. The fi rst one
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Reframing Organizations216
hundred days are the vital test; in those weeks, the political community and the
public measure a new president — to see whether he is active, dominant, sure,
purposeful ” (Smith, 1988, p. 334).
Reagan began with a vision but without a strategy. He was not gifted as a
manager or a strategist, despite extraordinary ability to portray complex issues
in broad, symbolic brushstrokes. Reagan ’ s staff painstakingly studied the fi rst
hundred days of four predecessors. They concluded that it was essential to
move with speed and focus. Pushing competing issues aside, they focused on
two: cutting taxes and reducing the federal budget. They also discovered a secret
weapon in David Stockman, the only person in the Reagan White House who
understood the federal budget process. “ Stockman got a jump on everyone else
for two reasons: he had an agenda and a legislative blueprint already prepared,
and he understood the real levers of power. Two terms as a Michigan congress-
man plus a network of key Republican and Democratic connections had taught
Stockman how to play the power game ” (Smith, 1988, p. 351). Reagan and his
advisers had the vision; Stockman provided strategic direction.
Mapping the Political Terrain It is foolhardy to plunge into a minefi eld without knowing where explosives are
buried, yet managers unwittingly do it all the time. They launch a new initiative
with little or no effort to scout and master the political turf. Pichault (1993) sug-
gests four steps for developing a political map:
1. Determine channels of informal communication.
2. Identify principal agents of political infl uence.
3. Analyze possibilities for mobilizing internal and external players.
4. Anticipate counterstrategies that others are likely to employ.
Pichault offers an example of planned change in a large government agency
in Belgium. The agency wanted to replace antiquated manual records with a fully
automated paperless computer network. But proponents of the new system had
virtually no understanding of how work got done. Nor did they anticipate the
interests and power of key middle managers and frontline bureaucrats. It seemed
obvious to the techies that better data meant higher effi ciency. In reality, front-
line bureaucrats made little use of the data. They applied standard procedures
in 90 percent of cases and asked their bosses what to do about the rest. Their
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The Manager as Politician 217
queries were partly to get the “ right ” answer, but even more to get political cover.
Since they saw no need for the new technology, frontline bureaucrats were likely
to ignore or work around it. After a consultant clarifi ed the political map, a new
battle erupted between unrepentant techies, who insisted their solution was cor-
rect, and senior managers who argued for a less ambitious approach. The two
sides ultimately compromised.
A simple way to develop a political map for any situation is to create a two -
dimensional diagram mapping players (who is in the game), power (how much
clout each player is likely to exercise), and interests (what each player wants).
Exhibits 10.1 and 10.2 present two hypothetical versions of the Belgian bureau-
cracy ’ s political map. Exhibit 10.1 shows the map as the techies saw it. They
expected little opposition and assumed they held all the high cards; that implied
a quick and easy win. Exhibit 10.2 , a more objective map, paints a very differ-
ent picture. Resistance is more intense and opponents more powerful. This view
forecasts a stormy process with protracted confl ict. Though less comforting, the
second map has an important message: success requires substantial effort to
Exhibit 10.1. The Political Map as Seen by the Techies:
Strong Support and Weak Opposition for Change.
P o
w er
Interests
High
Low
Top management
Techies
Opposed to Change Pro Change
Middle managers
Frontline officials
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Reframing Organizations218
realign the political force fi eld. The third and fourth key skills of the manager as
politician, discussed in the next two sections, include strategies for doing that.
Networking and Building Coalitions Managers often fail to get things done because they rely too much on reason
and too little on relationships. In both the Challenger and Columbia space
shuttle catastrophes (discussed in Chapter Nine ), engineers pitched careful,
data - based arguments to their superiors about potentially lethal safety risks —
and failed to dent their bosses ’ resistance (Glanz and Schwartz, 2003; Vaughn,
1995). Six months before the Challenger accident, for example, an engineer
at Morton Thiokol wrote to management: “ The result [of an O - ring failure]
would be a catastrophe of the highest order — loss of human life ” (Bell and
Esch, 1987, p. 45). A memo, if it is clear and powerful, may work, but is often a
sign of political innocence. Kotter (1985) suggests four basic steps for exercis-
ing political infl uence:
Exhibit 10.2. The Real Political Map:
A Battleground with Strong Players on Both Sides.
Techies
P o
w er
Interests
High
Low Opposed to Change Pro Change
Frontline officials
Top management
Middle managers
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The Manager as Politician 219
1. Identify relevant relationships. (Figure out which players you need to
infl uence.)
2. Assess who might resist, why, and how strongly. (Determine where the
leadership challenges will be.)
3. Develop, wherever possible, links with potential opponents to facilitate
communication, education, or negotiation. (Hold your enemies close.)
4. If step three fails, carefully select and implement either more subtle or
more forceful methods. (Save your big guns until you really need them,
but have a Plan B in case Plan A falls short.)
These steps underscore the importance of developing a power base. Moving
up the managerial ladder confers authority but also creates more dependence,
because success requires the cooperation of many others (Kotter, 1985, 1988;
Butcher and Clarke, 2001). People rarely give their best efforts and fullest coop-
eration simply because they have been ordered to do so. They accept direction
better when they perceive the people in authority as credible, competent, and
sensible.
The fi rst task in building networks and coalitions is to fi gure out whose help
you need. The second is to develop relationships so people will be there when you
need them. Successful middle - management change agents typically begin by get-
ting their boss on board (Kanter, 1983). They then move to “ preselling, ” or “ mak-
ing cheerleaders ” : “ Peers, managers of related functions, stakeholders in the issue,
potential collaborators, and sometimes even customers would be approached
individually, in one - on - one meetings that gave people a chance to infl uence the
project and [gave] the innovator the maximum opportunity to sell it. Seeing
them alone and on their territory was important: the rule was to act as if each
person were the most important one for the project ’ s success ” (p. 223).
Once you cultivate cheerleaders, you can move to “ horse trading ” : promis-
ing rewards in exchange for resources and support. This builds a resource base
that helps in “ securing blessings, ” or getting the necessary approvals and man-
dates from higher management (Kanter, 1983). Kanter found that the usual
route to success in securing blessings is to identify critical senior managers
and to develop a polished, formal presentation to nail down their support. The
best presentations respond to both substantive and political concerns. Senior
managers typically care about two questions: Is it a good idea? How will my
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Reframing Organizations220
constituents react? Once innovators get a nod from higher management, they
can formalize the coalition with their boss and make specifi c plans for pursu-
ing the project.
The basic point is simple: as a manager, you need friends and allies to get
things done. To sew up their support, you need to build coalitions. Rationalists
and romantics sometimes react with horror to this scenario. Why should you
have to play political games to get something accepted if it ’ s the right thing to
do? One of the great works in French drama, Moli è re ’ s The Misanthrope, tells the
story of a protagonist whose rigid rejection of all things political is destructive
for him and everyone close by. The point that Moli è re made four centuries ago
still holds: it is hard to dislike politics without also disliking people. Like it or
not, political dynamics are inevitable under three conditions most managers face
every day: ambiguity, diversity, and scarcity.
Informal networks perform a number of functions that formal structure may
do poorly or not at all — moving projects forward, imparting culture, mentor-
ing, and creating “ communities of practice. ” Some organizations use measures
of social networking to identify and manage who ’ s connected to whom. When
Procter & Gamble studied linkages among its twenty - fi ve research and develop-
ment units around the world, it discovered its unit in China was relatively iso-
lated from all the rest — a clear signal that linkages needed to be improved to
corner a big and growing market (Reingold and Yang, 2007).
Ignoring or misreading people ’ s roles in networks is costly. Consider the
mistake that undermined John LeBoutillier ’ s political career. Shortly after he
was elected to Congress from a wealthy district in Long Island, LeBoutillier
fi red up his audience at the New York Republican convention with the colorful
quip that Speaker of the House Thomas P. O ’ Neill, was “ fat, bloated and out
of control, just like the Federal budget. ” Asked to comment, Tip O ’ Neill was
atypically terse: “ I wouldn ’ t know the man from a cord of wood ” (Matthews,
1999, p. 113). Two years later, LeBoutillier unexpectedly lost his bid for reelec-
tion to an unknown opponent who didn ’ t have the money to mount a real
campaign — until a mysterious fl ood of contributions poured in from all over
America. When LeBoutillier later ran into O ’ Neill, he admitted sheepishly,
“ I guess you were more popular than I thought you were ” (Matthews, 1999,
p. 114). LeBoutillier learned the hard way that it is dangerous to underesti-
mate or provoke people when you don ’ t know how much power they have or
who their friends are.
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The Manager as Politician 221
Bargaining and Negotiation We often associate bargaining with commercial, legal, and labor relations trans-
actions. From a political perspective, though, bargaining is central to decision
making. The horse trading Kanter describes as part of coalition building is just
one of many examples. Negotiation is needed whenever two or more parties with
some interests in common and others in confl ict need to reach agreement. Labor
and management may agree that a fi rm should make money and offer good jobs
to employees but part ways on how to balance pay and profi tability. Engineers
and managers in the NASA space program had a common interest in the suc-
cess of the shuttle fl ights, but at key moments differed sharply on how to balance
technical and political trade - offs.
A fundamental dilemma in negotiations is choosing between “ creating value ”
and “ claiming value ” (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Value creators believe that suc-
cessful negotiators must be inventive and cooperative in searching for a win - win
solution. Value claimers see “ win - win ” as naively optimistic. For them, bargain-
ing is a hard, tough process in which you have to do what it takes to win as much
as you can.
One of the best - known win - win approaches to negotiation was developed
by Fisher and Ury (1981) in their classic Getting to Yes. They argue that people
too often engage in “ positional bargaining ” : they stake out positions and then
reluctantly make concessions to reach agreement. Fisher and Ury contend that
positional bargaining is ineffi cient and misses opportunities to create something
that ’ s better for everyone. They propose an alternative: “ principled bargaining, ”
built around four strategies.
The fi rst strategy is to separate people from the problem. The stress and ten-
sion of negotiations can easily escalate into anger and personal attack. The result
is that a negotiator sometimes wants to defeat or hurt the other party at almost
any cost. Because every negotiation involves both substance and relationship, the
wise negotiator will “ deal with the people as human beings and with the prob-
lem on its merits. ” Paul Maritz demonstrated this principle in dealing with the
prickly Dave Cutler. Even though Cutler continually baited and insulted him,
Maritz refused to be distracted and persistently focused on getting the job done.
The second strategy is to focus on interests, not positions. If you get locked
into a particular position, you might overlook better ways to achieve your goal.
An example is the 1978 Camp David treaty between Israel and Egypt. The sides
were at an impasse over where to draw the boundary between the two countries.
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Reframing Organizations222
Israel wanted to keep part of the Sinai, while Egypt wanted all of it back.
Resolution became possible only when they looked at underlying interests. Israel
was concerned about security: no Egyptian tanks on the border. Egypt was con-
cerned about sovereignty: the Sinai had been part of Egypt from the time of the
Pharaohs. The parties agreed on a plan that gave all of the Sinai back to Egypt
while demilitarizing large parts of it (Fisher and Ury, 1981). That solution led to
a durable peace agreement.
Fisher and Ury ’ s third strategy is to invent options for mutual gain instead of
locking on to the fi rst alternative that comes to mind. More options increase the
chance of a better outcome. Maritz recognized this in his dealings with Cutler.
Instead of bullying, he asked innocently, “ Could you do a demo at COMDEX? ”
It was a new option that created gains for both parties.
Fisher and Ury ’ s fourth strategy is to insist on objective criteria — standards
of fairness for both substance and procedure. Agreeing on criteria at the begin-
ning of negotiations can produce optimism and momentum, while reducing the
use of devious or provocative tactics that get in the way of a mutually benefi cial
solution. When a school board and a teachers ’ union are at loggerheads over the
size of a pay increase, they can look for independent standards, such as the rate
of infl ation or the terms of settlement in other districts. A classic example of fair
procedure fi nds two sisters deadlocked over how to divide the last wedge of pie
between them. They agree that one will cut the pie into two pieces and the other
will choose the piece that she wants.
Fisher and Ury devote most of their attention to creating value — fi nding bet-
ter solutions for both parties. They downplay the question of claiming value. Yet
there are many examples in which shrewd value claimers have come out ahead.
In 1980, Bill Gates offered to license an operating system to IBM about forty -
eight hours before he had one to sell. Then he neglected to mention to QDOS ’ s
owner, Tim Paterson of Seattle Computer, that Microsoft was buying his operat-
ing system to resell it to IBM. Gates gave IBM a great price: only $ 30,000 more
than the $ 50,000 he ’ d paid for it. But he retained the rights to license it to anyone
else. At the time, Microsoft was a fl ea atop IBM ’ s elephant. Almost no one except
Gates saw the possibility that consumers would want an IBM computer made
by anyone but IBM. IBM negotiators might well have thought they were stealing
candy from babies in buying DOS royalty - free for a measly $ 80,000. Meanwhile,
Gates was already dreaming about millions of computers running his code. As
it turned out, the new PC was an instant hit, and IBM couldn ’ t make enough of
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The Manager as Politician 223
them. Within a year, Microsoft had licensed MS - DOS to fi fty companies, and the
number kept growing (Mendelson and Korin, n.d.). Twenty years later, onlook-
ers who wondered why Microsoft was so aggressive and unyielding in battling
government antitrust suits might not have known that Gates had always been a
dogged value claimer.
A classic treatment of value claiming is Schelling ’ s 1960 essay The Strategy of
Confl ict, which focuses on how to make a credible threat. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that I want to buy your house and am willing to pay $ 250,000. How can
I convince you that I ’ m willing to pay only $ 200,000? Contrary to a common
assumption, I ’ m not always better off if I ’ m stronger and have more resources.
If you believe that I ’ m very wealthy, you might take my threat less seriously than
if I can get you to believe that $ 200,000 is the furthest I can go. Common sense
also suggests that I should be better off if I have considerable freedom of action.
Yet I may get a better price if I can convince you my hands are tied — for exam-
ple, I ’ m negotiating for a very stubborn buyer who won ’ t go above $ 200,000,
even if the house is worth more. Such examples suggest that the ideal situation
for a bargainer is to have substantial resources and freedom while convincing the
other side of the opposite. Value claiming provides its own slant on the bargain-
ing process:
Bargaining is a mixed - motive game. Both parties want an agreement but have
differing interests and preferences, so that what seems valuable to one is insig-
nifi cant to the other.
Bargaining is a process of interdependent decisions. What each party does
affects the other. Each player wants to be able to predict what the other will
do while limiting the other ’ s ability to reciprocate.
The more player A can control player B ’ s level of uncertainty, the more powerful
A is. The more A can keep private — as Bill Gates did with Seattle Computer
and IBM — the better.
Bargaining involves judicious use of threats rather than sanctions. Players may
threaten to use force, go on strike, or break off negotiations. In most cases,
they prefer not to bear the costs of carrying out the threat.
Making a threat credible is crucial. A threat works only if your opponent
believes it. Noncredible threats weaken your bargaining position and confuse
the process.
•
•
•
•
•
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Reframing Organizations224
Calculation of the appropriate level of threat is also critical. If I underthreaten,
you may think I ’ m weak. If I overthreaten, you may not believe me, may break
off the negotiations, or may escalate your own threats.
Creating value and claiming value are both intrinsic to the bargaining pro-
cess. How does a manager decide how to balance the two? At least two questions
are important: How much opportunity is there for a win - win solution? And will
I have to work with these people again? If an agreement can make everyone bet-
ter off, it makes sense to emphasize creating value. If you expect to work with the
same people in the future, it is risky to use scorched - earth tactics that leave anger
and mistrust in their wake. Managers who get a reputation for being manipu-
lative, self - interested, or untrustworthy have a hard time building the networks
and coalitions they need for future success.
Axelrod (1980) found that a strategy of conditional openness works best
when negotiators need to work together over time. This strategy starts with open
and collaborative behavior and maintains the approach if the other responds in
kind. If the other party becomes adversarial, however, the negotiator responds
accordingly and remains adversarial until the opponent makes a collaborative
move. It is, in effect, a friendly and forgiving version of tit for tat — do unto oth-
ers as they do unto you. Axelrod ’ s research discovered that this conditional open-
ness approach worked better than even the most fi endishly diabolical adversarial
strategy.
A fi nal consideration in balancing collaborative and adversarial tactics
is ethics. Bargainers often deliberately misrepresent their positions — even
though lying is almost universally condemned as unethical (Bok, 1978). This
leads to a tricky question for the manager as politician: What actions are ethi-
cal and just?
MORALITY AND POLITICS Block (1987), Burns (1978), Lax and Sebenius (1986), and Messick and Ohme
(1998) explore ethical issues in bargaining and organizational politics. Block ’ s
view asserts that individuals empower themselves through understanding:
“ The process of organizational politics as we know it works against people tak-
ing responsibility. We empower ourselves by discovering a positive way of being
political. The line between positive and negative politics is a tightrope we have to
walk ” (1987, p. xiii).
•
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The Manager as Politician 225
Block argues that bureaucratic cycles often leave individuals feeling vulnerable,
powerless, and helpless. If we confer too much power on the organization or
others, we fear that the power will be used against us. Consequently, we develop
manipulative strategies to protect ourselves. To escape the dilemma, managers
need to support organizational structures, policies, and procedures that promote
empowerment. They must also empower themselves.
Block urges managers to begin by building an “ image of greatness ” — a vision
of what their department can contribute that is meaningful and worthwhile.
Then they need to build support for their vision by negotiating a binding pact of
agreement and trust. Block suggests treating friends and opponents differently.
Adversaries, he says, are simultaneously the most diffi cult and most interesting
people to deal with. It is usually ineffective to pressure them; a better strategy is
to “ let go of them. ” He offers four steps for letting go: (1) tell them your vision,
(2) state your best understanding of their position, (3) identify your contri-
bution to the problem, and (4) tell them what you plan to do without making
demands. It ’ s a variation on Axelrod ’ s strategy of conditional openness.
Although this strategy may work in favorable conditions, it can backfi re with
a formidable, hard - headed opponent in a situation of scarce resources and dura-
ble differences. Bringing politics into the open may make confl ict more obvi-
ous and overt but offer little hope of resolution. Block argues that “ war games
in organizations lose their power when brought into the light of day ” (1987,
p. 148), but wise managers will test that assumption against their circumstances.
Burns ’ s conception of positive politics (1978) draws on examples as diverse
and complex as Franklin Roosevelt and Adolph Hitler, Gandhi and Mao,
Woodrow Wilson and Joan of Arc. He sees confl ict and power as central to
leadership. Searching for fi rm moral footing in a world of cultural and ethical
diversity, Burns turned to Maslow ’ s (1954) theory of motivation and Kohlberg ’ s
(1973) treatment of ethics.
From Maslow, he borrowed the hierarchy of motives (see Chapter Six ). Moral
leaders, he argued, appeal to higher - order human needs. Kohlberg supplied the
idea of stages of moral reasoning. At the lowest, “ preconventional ” level, moral
judgment is based primarily on perceived consequences: an action is right if you
are rewarded and wrong if you are punished. In the intermediate or “ conven-
tional ” level, the emphasis is on conforming to authority and established rules.
At the highest, “ postconventional ” level, ethical judgment rests on general prin-
ciples: the greatest good for the greatest number, or universal moral principles.
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Reframing Organizations226
Maslow and Kohlberg intertwined gave Burns a foundation for constructing
a positive view of politics: “ If leaders are to be effective in helping to mobilize
and elevate their constituencies, leaders must be whole persons, persons with full
functioning capacities for thinking and feeling. The problem for them as educa-
tors, as leaders, is not to promote narrow, egocentric self - actualization, but to
extend awareness of human needs and the means of gratifying them, to improve
the larger social situation for which educators or leaders have responsibility and
over which they have power ” (1978, pp. 448 – 449).
Burns ’ s view provides two expansive criteria: Does your leadership rest on
general moral principles? And does it appeal to the “ better angels ” in your con-
stituents ’ psyches? Lax and Sebenius (1986) see ethical issues as inescapable
quandaries but provide a concrete set of questions for assessing leaders ’ actions:
Are you following rules that are mutually understood and accepted? In poker,
for example, everyone understands that bluffi ng is part of the game but pull-
ing cards from your sleeve is not.
Are you comfortable discussing and defending your choices? Would you want
your colleagues and friends to know what you ’ re doing? Your spouse, chil-
dren, or parents? Would you be comfortable if your deeds appeared in your
local newspaper?
Would you want to be on the receiving end of your own actions? Would you
want this done to a member of your family?
What if everyone acted as you did? Would the impact on society be desirable? If
you were designing an organization, would you want people to follow your
example? Would you teach your children the ethics you have embraced?
Are there alternatives you could consider that rest on fi rmer ethical ground?
Could you test your strategy with a trusted adviser and explore other options?
Although these questions may not tally up to a comprehensive ethical frame-
work, they embody four important principles of moral judgment. They are
instrumental values — guidelines about right actions rather than right outcomes.
Four solidly anchored principles do not guarantee success, but they reduce ethi-
cal risks of taking a particular course of action.
Mutuality. Are all parties to a relationship operating under the same under-
standing about the rules of the game? Enron ’ s Ken Lay was talking up the
company ’ s stock to analysts and employees even as he and others were selling
•
•
•
•
•
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The Manager as Politician 227
their shares. In the period when WorldCom improved its profi ts by cooking
the books, it made its competitors look bad. Top executives at competing fi rms
such as AT & T and Sprint felt the heat from analysts and shareholders and won-
dered, “ Why can ’ t we get the results they ’ re getting? ” Only later did they learn the
answer: “ They ’ re cheating, and we ’ re not. ”
Generality. Does a specifi c action follow a principle of moral conduct appli-
cable to comparable situations? When Enron and WorldCom violated account-
ing principles to infl ate their results, they were secretly breaking the rules, not
adhering to a broadly applicable rule of conduct.
Openness. Are we willing to make our thinking and decisions public and con-
frontable? As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed many years ago, “ Sunlight
is the best disinfectant. ” Keeping others in the dark was a consistent theme in
the corporate ethics scandals of 2001 – 2002. Enron ’ s books were almost impen-
etrable, and the company attacked analysts who questioned the numbers.
Enron ’ s techniques for manipulating the California energy crisis had to be clan-
destine to work. One device involved creating the appearance of congestion in
the California power grid and subsequently getting paid for “ moving energy to
relieve congestion without actually moving any energy or relieving any conges-
tion ” (Oppel, 2002, p. A1).
Caring. Does this action show concern for the legitimate interests and feelings
of others? Enron ’ s effort to protect its share price by locking in employees so they
couldn ’ t sell the Enron shares in their retirement accounts, even as the value of
the shares plunged, put the interests of senior executives ahead of everyone else ’ s.
The scandals of the early 2000s were not unprecedented; such a wave is a pre-
dictable feature of the trough following every business boom. The 1980s, for
example, gave us Ivan Boesky and the savings and loan crisis. There was another
wave of corporate scandals in the 1970s. In the 1930s, the president of the
New York Stock Exchange went to jail in his three - piece suit (Labaton, 2002).
There will always be temptation whenever gargantuan egos and large sums of
money are at stake. Top managers too rarely think or talk about the moral dimen-
sion of management and leadership. Porter notes the dearth of such conversation:
In a seminar with seventeen executives from nine corporations, we
learned how the privatization of moral discourse in our society has
created a deep sense of moral loneliness and moral illiteracy; how the
absence of a common language prevents people from talking about
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Reframing Organizations228
and reading the moral issues they face. We learned how the isolation
of individuals — the taboo against talking about spiritual matters in
the public sphere — robs people of courage, of the strength of heart
to do what deep down they believe to be right [1989, p. 2].
If we choose to banish moral discourse and leave managers to face ethical issues
alone, we invite dreary and brutish political dynamics. An organization can and
should take a moral stance. It can make its values clear, hold employees account-
able, and validate the need for dialogue about ethical choices. Positive politics
without an ethical framework and moral dialogue is as unlikely as bountiful har-
vests without sunlight or water.
SUMMARY The question is not whether organizations are political but what kind of politics
they will encompass. Political dynamics can be sordid and destructive. But poli-
tics can also be a vehicle for achieving noble purposes. Organizational change
and effectiveness depend on managers ’ political skills. Constructive politicians
know how to fashion an agenda, map the political terrain, create a network of
support, and negotiate with both allies and adversaries. In the process, they
will encounter a predictable and inescapable ethical dilemma: when to adopt
an open, collaborative strategy or when to choose a tougher, more adversarial
approach. In making the decision, they have to consider the potential for collab-
oration, the importance of long - term relationships, and, most important, their
own values and ethical principles.
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229
Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents
Sam Walton started his merchant career in 1945 as proprietor of the second - best variety store in a small rural Arkansas town. From that humble beginning, he built the world ’ s largest retail chain.
With close to 2 million “ associates, ” Wal - Mart is by far the largest
employer and, for both better and worse, one of the most powerful
companies on the globe. More than 90 percent of American house-
holds shop at Wal - Mart every year, expecting the company to keep
its promise of “ always low prices ” (Fishman, 2006).
Wal - Mart ’ s impact is both subtle and pervasive, as is illustrated in a story about
deodorant packaging. Deodorant containers used to come packed in cardboard
boxes until Wal - Mart decision makers concluded in the early 1990s that the boxes
were wasteful and costly — about a nickel apiece for something consumers would
just throw away. When Wal - Mart told suppliers to kill the cardboard, the boxes
disappeared from retail shelves across America. Good enough for Wal - Mart was
okay for everyone else. The story is but one of countless examples of the “ Wal -
Mart effect ” — an umbrella term for multiple ways Wal - Mart infl uences consum-
ers, vendors, employees, communities, and the environment (Fishman, 2006).
Yet, for all its power and infl uence, Wal - Mart has struggled in recent years
with a budding assortment of critics and image problems. The company has
been accused of abusing workers, discriminating against women, busting unions,
destroying small businesses, and damaging the environment. Circled by enemies,
E L E V E N
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations230
it has mounted major public relations campaigns in defense of its image, with
limited success (Bianco, 2007).
Like all organizations, Wal - Mart is both an arena for internal confl ict and a
political agent or player operating on a fi eld crammed with competitors pursu-
ing parochial interests. As arenas, organizations house an ongoing interplay of
players and agendas. As agents, organizations are powerful tools for achieving
the purposes of those calling the shots. Wal - Mart ’ s enormous size and power
have made its political maneuvers widely visible; almost everyone has strong
feelings about Wal - Mart, one way or another. To be sure, the company ’ s historic
penchant for secrecy and its secluded location in Bentonville, Arkansas, have
sometimes shielded its internal politics from the spotlight, but tales of political
skullduggery still emerge. Vintage 2007 scandals included a titillating story of a
recently recruited superstar marketing executive who was fi red amid rumors of
confl ict with her conservative bosses and an offi ce romance. The same year also
spawned the strange tale of a Wal - Mart techie who claimed he ’ d been secretly
recording the deliberations of the board of directors.
This chapter explores organizations like Wal - Mart as both arenas and political
agents. Viewing organizations as political arenas is a way to reframe many orga-
nizational processes. Organizational design, for example, can be viewed not as a
rational expression of an organization ’ s goals but as a political embodiment of
contending claims. In our discussion of organizations as arenas, we examine the
political dimensions of organizational change, contrasting directives from the top
with pressures from below. As political agents, organizations operate in complex
ecosystems — interdependent networks of autonomous organizations engaged
in related activities and occupying particular niches. We illustrate several forms
ecosystems can take — business itself, public policy, the interface between busi-
ness and government, and society. Finally, we look at the dark side of organiza-
tional power. We explore the concern that large global organizations represent a
growing risk to the world because they are too powerful for anyone to control.
ORGANIZATIONS AS ARENAS From a political view, “ happily ever after ” exists only in fairy tales. In reality,
today ’ s winners may quickly become tomorrow ’ s losers or vice versa. Change
and stability are paradoxical: organizations constantly change and yet never
change. As in any competitive sport, players come and go, but the game goes on.
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Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents 231
Jockeying for position is constant, and yesterday ’ s elite may be tomorrow ’ s also -
ran. In the annals of organizational politics, few have illustrated these precepts as
well as Ross Johnson, who once made the cover of Time magazine as the emblem
of corporate greed and insensitivity. In Barbarians at the Gate, Bryan Burrough
and John Helyar (1990) explain how.
B A R B A R I A N S A T T H E G A T E
Ross Johnson began his career in the 1960s. His charm, humor, and cha-
risma moved him ahead, and by the mid-1970s he was second in com-
mand to Henry Weigl at the consumer products fi rm Standard Brands.
Johnson’s lavish spending (on limousines and sumptuous entertainment,
for example) soon put him on a collision course with his tightfi sted
boss, who tried to get him fi red. But Johnson had wooed members of
Standard’s board of directors so successfully that he had more friends
on the board than Weigl. Johnson argued that Weigl’s conservative style
was strangling the company, and the board bought his pitch. Weigl was
kicked upstairs, and Johnson took over. He fi red many of Weigl’s people
and enjoyed a spectacular period of lavish spending on executive perks.
After four years of mediocre business results, an unexpected call came
from the chairman of the food giant Nabisco, who proposed a merger
of the two companies. Within two weeks, the transaction was done: a
$1.9 billion stock swap—a big deal in 1981.
Everyone knew Nabisco would be in charge after the deal, since it
was by far the stronger player. But they underestimated Ross Johnson.
He was so successful at ingratiating himself with Nabisco’s chairman
while quietly forcing out the old Nabisco executives that after a few
years, he was able to take over the company. Once in charge, Johnson
showed more interest in hobnobbing with celebrities than in running
the company. And then, in 1985, he received another call: Tylee Wilson,
chief executive of R. J. Reynolds, the huge tobacco company, called to
talk merger. Wilson needed a corporate partner to help Reynolds reduce
its heavy dependence on the controversial cigarette business. Johnson
held out for more than Wilson wanted to pay, but the deal was soon
done: Reynolds coughed up $4.9 billion for Nabisco.
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Reframing Organizations232
Political Dimensions of Organizational Processes As arenas, organizations house contests and set parameters for the players, as
well as the stakes and the rules of the game. In this light, every organizational
process has a political dimension. Consider the task of shaping and structuring
an organization. Most theories built on structural premises (as discussed in pre-
ceding chapters) assume that the best design is the one that contributes most
to effi cient strategy and successful attainment of goals. Pfeffer offers an explic-
itly political conception as an alternative: “ Since organizations are coalitions,
and the different participants have varying interests and preferences, the criti-
cal question becomes not how organizations should be designed to maximize
effectiveness, but rather, whose preferences and interests are to be served by the
organization. . . . What is effective for students may be ineffective for administra-
tors . . . . Effectiveness as defi ned by consumers may be ineffectiveness as defi ned
by stockholders. The assessment of organizations is dependent upon one ’ s pref-
erences and one ’ s perspective ” (1978, p. 223).
Even though groups have confl icting preferences, they have a shared interest in
avoiding incessant confl ict. So they agree on ways to distribute power and resources,
producing settlements refl ected in organizational design. Structures are “ the resolu-
tion, at a given time, of the contending claims for control, subject to the constraint
that the structures permit the organization to survive ” (Pfeffer, 1978, p. 224).
An example is a controversial decision made by Ross Johnson when he
headed RJR Nabisco. Johnson moved RJR ’ s headquarters from Winston - Salem,
where it had been for a century, to Atlanta. Reynolds was the commercial heart
of Winston - Salem. It engendered fi erce pride and loyalty among the citizenry,
many of whom were substantial stockholders. Structural logic suggests putting
Though more than one of his friends warned him about Johnson,
Wilson fi gured it was his deal, and he would be in charge. But Wilson,
who lacked Johnson’s awesome skills at ingratiation, had alienated
some members of his board. After cultivating alliances with board mem-
bers, Johnson used the same gambit that had worked at Standard
Brands. He told friends on the board that he would be leaving because
there was only room for one CEO. A few weeks later, Wilson was star-
tled when his board pushed him out.
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Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents 233
your headquarters in a location that best serves the business, but Johnson and
his key lieutenants saw the small city in the heart of tobacco country as boring
and provincial. The move to Atlanta had scant business justifi cation, was unpop-
ular with the RJR board, and made Johnson the most hated man in Winston -
Salem. But he headed the dominant coalition. He got what he wanted.
Sources of Political Initiative Gamson ’ s distinction (1968) between authorities and partisans (see Chapter
Nine ) implies two major sources of political initiative: bottom - up, relying
on mobilization of groups to assert their interests; and top - down, relying on
authorities ’ capacity to infl uence subordinates. We discuss examples of both to
illustrate some of the basic premises of political action.
Bottom - Up Political Action The rise of trade unions, the emergence of the American civil rights movement, the antiwar movement of the 1970s, and
environmental activism in recent decades all exemplify the process of bottom -
up change. In every case, the impetus for change was a signifi cant disruption in
old patterns. Trade unions developed in the context of the industrial revolution,
rapid urbanization, and the decline of family farms. The civil rights movement
arose after massive occupational and geographic shifts for black citizens. The
antiwar movement emerged from the juxtaposition of an unpopular war with a
draft lottery that affected every eighteen - year - old male in the United States.
“ Green ” activism developed as the costs of growing prosperity — including pol-
lution, destruction of habitats and species, and global warming — became
increasingly visible and hard to discount. In each case, changing conditions
intensifi ed dissatisfaction for disenfranchised groups. Each refl ected a classic
script for revolutions: a period of rising expectations followed by widespread
disappointment.
The initial impetus for change came from grassroots mobilizing and
organizing — the formation of trade unions, civil rights groups, student move-
ments, or environmental groups. Elites bitterly contested the legitimacy of
grassroots action and launched coercive blocking tactics. At various points,
employers used everything from lawsuits to violence to resist unions. The civil
rights movement, particularly in its early stages, experienced violent repres-
sion by whites. Efforts to suppress the antiwar movement reached their apo-
gee at Kent State University, when members of the Ohio National Guard fi red
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Reframing Organizations234
on student demonstrators. Greens have been engaged in a long battle against
business and political leaders who dispute the signifi cance of environmental
threats and resist what they see as the excessive costs of proposed remedies.
Despite intense opposition, grassroots groups fought to have their rights
embodied in law or policy. Each movement might have failed had it been
weaker or its opposition stronger. Each suffered profound setbacks but mobi-
lized enough power to survive and grow.
Compared with many grassroots change efforts, the ones just mentioned were
relatively successful. Most such initiatives fail. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
2003, for example, another antiwar movement arose. But political conditions
were different: The 9/11 terrorist attacks had intensifi ed Americans ’ fears of dan-
gers from abroad. Equally important, fewer American troops were involved, and
no one was being drafted. Particularly on college campuses, the movement never
gained the momentum of opposition to the Vietnam War.
Barriers to Control from the Top The diffi culties of grassroots political action lead many people to believe that you have to begin at the top to get any-
thing done. Yet research on mandated efforts also catalogues many failures.
Deal and Nutt (1980), for example, conducted a revealing analysis of local
school districts that received generous, long - term federal funding to develop
experimental programs for comprehensive changes in rural education. A typical
scenario for these projects included these phases:
1. The central administration learned of the opportunity to obtain a sizable
chunk of government funding.
2. A small group of administrators met to develop a proposal for improving
some aspect of the educational program. (Tight deadlines meant that the
process was usually rushed with only a few people involved.)
3. When funding was approved, the administration announced with pride
and enthusiasm that in a national competition, the district had won an
award that would bring substantial funds to support an exciting new proj-
ect to improve instruction.
4. Teachers were dismayed to learn that the administration had committed to
new teaching approaches without faculty input. Administrators were star-
tled and perplexed when teachers greeted the news with resistance, criti-
cism, and anger.
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Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents 235
5. Caught in the middle between teachers and the funding agency, adminis-
trators interpreted teacher resistance as a sign of defensiveness and unwill-
ingness to change.
6. The new program became a political football, producing more dishar-
mony, mistrust, and confl ict than tangible improvement in education.
The programs studied by Deal and Nutt represented examples of top - down
change efforts under comparatively favorable circumstances. The districts were
not in crisis. The change efforts were well funded and blessed by the federal gov-
ernment. Yet across the board, the new initiatives set off heated political battles.
In many cases, administrators found themselves outgunned. Only one superin-
tendent survived over the program ’ s fi ve - year funding cycle.
In most instances, administrators never anticipated a major political battle.
They were confi dent their proposed programs were progressive, effective, and
good for everyone. They overlooked the risks in proposing change that someone
else was expected to carry out. As a result, they were showered with antagonism
instead of the expected huzzahs.
A similar pattern appears repeatedly in other attempts at change from above.
Innumerable efforts mounted by chief executives, frustrated managers, hopeful
study teams, and high - status management consultants end in failure. The usual
mistake is assuming that the right idea (as perceived by the idea ’ s champions)
and legitimate authority ensure success. This assumption neglects the agendas and
power of the “ lowerarchy ” — partisans and groups in midlevel and lower - level
positions, who devise creative and maddening ways to resist, divert, undermine,
ignore, or overthrow innovative plans.
ORGANIZATIONS AS POLITICAL AGENTS Organizations are lively arenas for internal politics. They are also active politi-
cal agents in larger arenas, or “ ecosystems ” (Moore, 1993). Since organizations
depend on their environment for resources they need to survive, they are inevita-
bly enmeshed with external constituents whose expectations or demands must be
heeded. These constituents often speak with loud but confl icting voices, adding
to the challenge of managerial work (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Grossman,
2002). As political actors, organizations need to master many of the basic skills
of individual managers as politicians: develop an agenda, map the environment,
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Reframing Organizations236
manage relationships with both allies and enemies, and negotiate compacts,
accords, and alliances.
Many of an organization ’ s key constituents are other enterprises. Just as frogs,
fl ies, and lily pads co - evolve in a swamp, organizations develop in tandem in a
common environment. Moore (1993) illustrates with two ecosystems in the
personal computer business, one pioneered by Apple Computer and the other
by IBM. Apple ’ s ecosystem dominated the PC industry before IBM ’ s entry. But
IBM ’ s ecosystem rapidly surpassed Apple ’ s. IBM had a very powerful brand,
and the open architecture of its PC induced new players to fl ock to it. Some of
these players competed head - on (for example, Compaq and Dell in hardware,
Microsoft and Lotus in software). Others were related much like bees and fl ow-
ers, each performing an indispensable service to the other. One symbiotic pairing
was particularly fateful. As Microsoft gained control of the operating system and
Intel of the microprocessor in the IBM ecosystem, the two increasingly became
mutually indispensable. More sophisticated software needed faster microproces-
sors, and vice versa, so the two had every reason to cheer each other on. “ Intel
giveth, and Microsoft taketh away, ” as some cynics put it. Two companies that
began as servants to IBM eventually took over what became the “ Wintel ” eco-
system. Industry terminology changed to refl ect the shift in power — what were
once called “ IBM clones ” and proudly advertised as “ 100 - percent IBM compat-
ible! ” became simply “ Windows PCs. ”
POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS The same factors that spawn politics inside organizations also create political
dynamics within and between ecosystems. Organizations have parochial inter-
ests and compete for scarce resources. Ross Johnson again provides an example.
After he became CEO of RJR Nabisco, Johnson made a fateful decision to engage
in a management craze of the time — a leveraged buyout (LBO). The basic idea
of an LBO is to fi nd an undervalued company, buy up shares with someone else ’ s
money, fi x it up or break it up, and sell it at a profi t. It ’ s a high - risk venture.
Johnson ’ s idea was to use a leveraged buyout to take RJR Nabisco private. But
once he had announced the LBO, the company was in play; it was open season for
anyone to enter the bidding. Anyone in this case meant Henry Kravis and his secre-
tive fi rm, KKR, with some $45 billion in buying power. Johnson thought Kravis
would stay out because the deal was so big, but he underestimated a dangerous
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Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents 237
adversary. What followed was one of business history ’ s biggest six - week poker
games. Huge coalitions formed around both players. Millions of dollars in fees
gushed into the laps of bankers, lawyers, and brokers. When the dust cleared, Henry
Kravis and KKR had won by a nose. RJR Nabisco was theirs for a cool $25 billion.
The bidding war created a fl uid, temporary ecosystem illustrating many of
the complexities of such arrangements. Dozens of individuals, groups, and orga-
nizations were involved, but the big prize in the contest, RJR Nabisco, was largely
a bystander; its board was on the sidelines for most of the game. Johnson and
his allies pursued their private interests more than the corporation ’ s. Financial
stakes were enormous, yet the game was often driven by issues of power, reputa-
tion, and personal animosity. Everyone wanted the prize, but you could win by
losing and lose by winning. In the competitive frenzy, both sides bid too much,
and the winner was stuck with an overpriced albatross.
The RJR Nabisco LBO ecosystem lasted only until the brutal bidding war was
over. But many ecosystems, like Wintel ’ s and Wal - Mart ’ s, are durable, lasting for
decades. In such cases, an organization ’ s role in the ecosystem is an important
determinant of how it can best balance pursuit of its own interests with the over-
all well - being of the ecosystem. This may not be a major concern for small play-
ers with only marginal infl uence, but Iansiti and Levien argue that this issue is
vital for “ keystone ” fi rms like Wal - Mart that sit at the hub of an ecosystem:
Wal - Mart is successful because it fi gured out how to create, manage
and evolve an incredibly powerful business ecosystem. Over the years
Wal - Mart took advantage of its ability to gather consumer informa-
tion to coordinate the distributed assets of its vast network of sup-
pliers. Wal - Mart made a point of tracking demand information in
real time. The key was that it decided to share this information with
its supplier network. It introduced Retail Link, the system that still
delivers the most accurate, real - time sales information in the indus-
try to Wal - Mart partners. Wal - Mart was unique in the retail space in
offering this kind of service, turning Retail Link into a critical supply
chain hub [2004, pp. 1 – 2].
Fishman agrees but sees less rosy results:
The ecosystem isn ’ t a metaphor; it is a real place in the global econ-
omy where the very metabolism of business is set by Wal - Mart.
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Reframing Organizations238
The fear of Wal - Mart isn ’ t just the fear of losing a big account. It ’ s
the fear that the more business you do with Wal - Mart, the deeper
you end up inside the Wal - Mart ecosystem, and the less you are
actually running your own business. Wal - Mart ’ s leadership virtually
never acknowledges this control, but the company clearly under-
stands it, and even takes a sly pride in it [2006, p. 16].
But Wal - Mart ’ s ecosystem is not a gated preserve. Much as it might like to, Wal -
Mart has limited ability to exclude other players — including the fi rm ’ s many
competitors and critics — who choose to spend time in its neighborhood, even
if uninvited. Wal - Mart initiatives to build new stores are routinely countered by
opponents who decry the economic and environmental costs they claim the new
outlet would create.
Organizational ecosystems come in many forms and sizes. Some, like Wal -
Mart ’ s, are huge and global. Others are small and local (like the ecosystem of
laundries in Oslo or policing in Omaha). Next, we examine several signifi cant
types of ecosystems to illustrate the dynamics involved.
Public Policy Ecosystems In the public sector, policy arenas form around virtually every government activ-
ity. One example is the air carriers, airplane manufacturers, travelers, legislators,
and regulators who are all active participants in the commercial aviation ecosys-
tem. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration has been a trou-
bled key player for decades. Charged with divergent goals of defending safety,
promoting the economic health of the industry, and keeping its own costs down,
the FAA has perennially come under heavy fi re from virtually every direction.
Feeble oversight permitted marginal carriers to shortcut safety but continue
fl ying. An air traffi c modernization plan rang up billions of dollars in bills, but
twenty years later had yielded few results:
When Marion C. Blakey took over at the Federal Aviation
Administration in 2002, she was determined to fi x an air travel
system battered by terrorism, antiquated technology, and the ever -
turbulent fi nances of the airline industry. Five years later, as she
prepares to step down on Sept. 13, 2007, it ’ s clear she failed. Almost
everything about fl ying is worse than when she arrived. Greater are
the risks, the passenger headaches, and the costs in lost productivity.
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Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents 239
Almost everyone has a horror story about missed connections, lost
baggage, and wasted hours on the tarmac [Palmeri and Epstein,
2007, p. 1].
Some of the FAA ’ s troubles were internal. An earlier report from what was
then called the General Accounting Offi ce had faulted the agency ’ s lack of a
“ performance - oriented culture essential to establishing a culture of account-
ability and coordination ” (Dillingham, 2001). But almost every move it made to
solve one constituency ’ s problem created trouble for others. Much of the fault
lay in its ecosystem: “ Nobody is in charge. The various players in the system,
including big airlines, small aircraft owners, labor unions, politicians, airplane
manufacturers, and executives with their corporate jets, are locked in permanent
warfare as they fi ght to protect their own interests. And the FAA, a weak agency
that needs congressional approval for how it raises and spends money, seems
incapable of breaking the gridlock ” (Palmeri and Epstein, 2007).
Education is another illustration of a complex policy ecosystem. Everyone
thinks good schools are important. Families want their children to acquire
the ingredients for success. Businesses need well - trained, literate graduates.
Economists and policy analysts stress the importance of human capital. Teachers
want better pay and working conditions. Taxpayers want to cut frills and keep
costs down. Almost no one believes that American schools are as good as they
should be, but there is little agreement about how to make them better. One
popular remedy, enshrined in federal law in the “ No Child Left Behind ” Act,
emphasizes tests and incentives. Measure how well schools are doing, reward the
winners, and penalize the losers. But many teachers and parents argue that over-
emphasis on metrics and sanctions is crippling teachers and driving out essential
learning opportunities.
Another cure for educational ills is granting parents more choice about which
schools their children attend. One version of school choice is vouchers, grants
that families can use to send their children to private schools. Another is charter
schools, publicly funded, quasi - independent educational enterprises. Proponents
of choice argue that parents would obviously choose the best school for their
children and that the ensuing competition would have an invigorating effect on
public schools. But school administrators maintain that vouchers and charter
schools drain away resources and exacerbate the challenges of the neediest stu-
dents. Coalitions have formed on both sides of the choice issue and have lobbied
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Reframing Organizations240
vigorously at the state and national levels. Available research suggests that, on
the whole, choice programs enhance student achievement and parent satisfac-
tion (Robinson, 2005), but opponents question the evidence, and the battle goes
on. No Child Left Behind has been even more controversial; research evidence
is equivocal, and strenuous opposition in many states has forced the federal
Department of Education into state - by - state negotiations to modify the require-
ments, making valid assessments of success even more diffi cult (Sunderman,
2006). The debates continue.
Business - Government Ecosystems Government and business inevitably intersect in a multitude of ecosystems.
Perrow (1986) discusses one example: pharmaceutical companies, physicians, and
government. A major threat to drug companies ’ profi t margins is generic drugs,
which sell at a much lower price than brand - name equivalents. In the United
States, the industry trade association, an interorganization coalition, success-
fully lobbied many state legislatures to prohibit the sale of generic drugs, osten-
sibly to protect consumers. The industry also persuaded the American Medical
Association (AMA) to permit drugs to be advertised by brand name in its jour-
nals. Consumers normally buy whatever the doctor prescribes, and drug compa-
nies wanted doctors to think brands rather than chemical names. As a result of
the policy shift, the AMA ’ s advertising income tripled in seven years, and the man-
ufacturers strengthened the position of their respective brands (Perrow, 1986).
The ecosystem shifted with the rapid rise of a newly powerful group of players:
insurers and managed care providers. The growing market dominance of a few
large insurers dramatically reduced the bargaining power of physicians and drug
companies. Insurers used their growing political leverage to push physicians to
prescribe less expensive generic drugs. In an effort to save consumers ’ money, state
legislatures began to require pharmacists to offer the generic equivalent when a
brand name is prescribed. Pharmaceutical companies fought back with television
advertising encouraging patients to ask their doctors for brand name drugs.
Drug companies are not alone in their attention to politics. Firms search
feverishly for sources of competitive advantage. One such source is “ govern-
ment policy, which determines the rules of commerce; the structure of markets
(through barriers to entry and changes in cost structures due to regulations,
subsidies, and taxation); the offerings of goods and services that are permis-
sible; and the sizes of markets based on government subsidies and purchases.
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Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents 241
Consequently, gaining and maintaining access to those who make public pol-
icy may well be a fi rm ’ s most important political goal ” (Schuler, Rehbein, and
Cramer, 2002, p. 659).
Schuler ’ s group found that politically active fi rms use a range of strategies for
infl uencing government agencies. FedEx illustrates the possibilities. In Chapter
Seven , we noted the company ’ s sophisticated approach to managing people.
FedEx has been equally agile in managing its political environment. The New
York Times described it as “ one of the most formidable and successful corporate
lobbies in the capital ” (Lewis, 1996, p. A17). Its CEO, Fred Smith, “ spends consid-
erable time in Washington, where he is regarded as Federal Express ’ s chief advo-
cate. It was Mr. Smith who hit a lobbying home run in 1977 when he persuaded
Congress to allow the fl edgling company to use full - sized jetliners to carry its
cargo, rather than the small planes to which it had been restricted. That was the
watershed event that allowed the company to grow to its present dominating
position with almost $10.3 billion in business ” (p. A30).
FedEx ’ s political action committee ranked among the nation ’ s top ten, mak-
ing generous donations to hundreds of congressional candidates. Its board was
adorned with former legislative leaders from both major political parties. Its cor-
porate jets regularly ferried offi ceholders to events around the country. All this
generosity paid off. In October 1996, when FedEx wanted two words inserted
into a 1923 law regulating railway express companies, the Senate stayed in ses-
sion a few extra days to get it done, even with elections only a month away. A
fi rst - term senator commented, “ I was stunned by the breadth and depth of their
clout up here ” (Lewis, 1996, p. A17).
A similar co - evolution of business and politics occurs around the world:
No one would dispute that business and politics are closely inter-
twined in Japan. As one leading fi nancial journalist puts it, “ If you
don ’ t use politicians, you can ’ t expand business these days in Japan —
that ’ s basic. ” Businessmen provide politicians with funds, politicians
provide businessmen with information. If you wish to develop a
department store, a hotel or a ski resort, you need licenses and per-
missions and the cooperation of leading local political fi gures. And it
is always useful to hear that a certain area is slated for development,
preferably several years before development starts, when land prices
are still low [Downer, 1994, p. 299].
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Reframing Organizations242
Society as Ecosystem On a still grander scale, we fi nd society: the massive, swirling ecosystem in
which business, government, and the public are embedded. A critical question
in this arena is the power relationship between organizations and everyone else.
All organizations have power. Large organizations have a lot: “ Of the 100 larg-
est economies in the world, 51 are corporations, and only 49 are countries. Wal -
Mart is bigger than Israel, Poland or Greece. Mitsubishi is bigger than Indonesia.
General Motors is bigger than Denmark. If governments can ’ t set the rules, who
will? The corporations? But they ’ re the players. Who ’ s the referee? ” (Longworth,
1996, p. 4).
This question is becoming more urgent as big companies get bigger. In 1954,
it took more than sixty companies to equal 20 percent of the American econ-
omy; in 2005, it took only twenty. “ We don ’ t often talk about the concentration
of corporate power, but it is almost unfathomable that the men and women who
run just 20 companies make decisions every day that steer one - fi fth of the U.S.
economy ” (Fishman, 2006, p. 22). A number of organizational scholars (includ-
ing Korten, 1995; Perrow, 1986; and Stern and Barley, 1996) emphasize that who-
ever controls a multibillion - dollar tool wields enormous power. Korten ’ s view is
particularly gloomy:
An active propaganda machinery controlled by the world ’ s largest
corporations constantly reassures us that consumerism is the path
to happiness, government restraint of market excess is the cause of
our distress, and economic globalization is both a historical inevi-
tability and a boon to the human species. In fact, these are all myths
propagated to justify profl igate greed and mask the extent to which
the global transformation of human institutions is a consequence
of the sophisticated, well - funded, and intentional interventions of a
small elite whose money enables them to live in a world of illusion
apart from the rest of humanity. These forces have transformed once
benefi cial corporations and fi nancial institutions into instruments
of a market tyranny that is extending its reach across the planet like
a cancer, colonizing ever more of the planet ’ s living spaces, destroy-
ing livelihoods, displacing people, rendering democratic institu-
tions impotent, and feeding on life in an insatiable quest for money
[Korten, 1995, p. 12] .
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Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents 243
G R E A T E S T H I T S F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T U D I E S
Hit Number 3: Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik, The External Control of Organizations (New York: HarperCollins, 1978)
Pfeffer and Salancik ’ s book fell out of print for several years and is
little known outside academic circles, but scholars love it; it occupies
the third rung in our ranking of most - cited works. As its title sug-
gests, the book ’ s principal theme is that organizations are much more
creat ures than creators of their environment. In the authors ’ words:
“ The perspective [in this book] denies the validity of the conceptualiza-
tion of organizations as self - directed, autonomous actors pursuing their
own ends and instead argues that organizations are other - directed,
involved in a constant struggle for autonomy and discretion, confronted
with constraint and external control ” (p. 257). The authors follow Cyert
and March (1963) in viewing organizations as coalitions that are both
“ markets in which infl uence and control are transacted ” (p. 259) and
players that need to negotiate their relationships with a range of exter-
nal constituents.
Pfeffer and Salancik emphasize that organizations depend on their
environment for inputs that they need to survive. Much of the job of
management is to understand and respond to demands of key external
constituents whose support is vital to organizational survival. This job is
made more diffi cult by two challenges:
• Organizations ’ understanding of their environment is often distorted
or imperfect (because organizations only act on the information
they ’ re geared to collect and know how to interpret).
• Organizations confront multiple constituents whose demands are
often inconsistent.
Organizations comply where they have to, but they also look for
ways to increase their autonomy by making their environment more
predictable and favorable. They may merge to gain greater market
supremacy, form coalitions (alliances, joint ventures) to gain greater
infl uence, or enlist government help (by seeking subsidies, tax breaks,
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Reframing Organizations244
Do sophisticated consumer marketing fi rms create and control consumer
tastes, or do they simply react to needs created by larger social forces? Critics like
Korten are convinced that the advantage lies with the corporations, but Pfeffer
and Salancik (1978) see it the other way around, as do many proponents of “ the
marketing concept ” :
The marketing concept of management is based on the premise
that over the longer term all businesses are born and survive or die
because people (the market) either want them or don ’ t want them.
In short, the market creates, shapes, and defi nes the demand for all
classes of products and services. Almost needless to say, many man-
agers tend to think that they can design goods and services and then
create demand. The marketing concept denies this proposition.
Instead, the marketing concept emphasizes that the creative aspect of
marketing is discovering, defi ning, and fulfi lling what people want or
need or what solves their life - style problems [Marshall, 1984, p. 1].
Proponents of this view note that even the most successful marketers have had
their share of Edsels — products released with great fanfare and a huge marketing
budget that fl uttered briefl y and then sank like stones.
Are large multinational corporations so powerful that they have become a
law unto themselves, or are they strongly shaped by the need to respond to the
or protective tariffs, for example). But there is a dilemma: every entan-
glement, even as it garners greater infl uence over a part of the environ-
ment, also produces erosion of the organization ’ s autonomy. There ’ s no
free lunch.
Pfeffer and Salancik describe three roles for managers, two political
and one symbolic. There is a responsive role in which managers adjust
the organization ’ s activities to comply with pressures from the environ-
ment. There is a discretionary role in which they seek to alter the orga-
nization ’ s relationship with its environment. And there is a symbolic role
arising from the widely accepted myth that managers make a difference.
If a team is losing but you can ’ t change the players, you fi re the coach,
creating the appearance of change without actually changing anything
(an important idea that we address in the next three chapters).
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Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents 245
customers, culture, and governments in the countries where they operate? An
ecological view suggests that the answer is some of both. Ecosystems and com-
petitors within them rise and fall. Power relations are never static, and even the
most powerful have no guarantee of immortality. Of the top twenty - fi ve U.S.
companies at the beginning of the twentieth century, all but one had dropped
off the list or vanished altogether when the century came to a close. The lone
survivor? General Electric.
Fishman frames both sides of this issue in the case of Wal - Mart:
The easiest response to the Wal - Mart critics comes from people who
shrug and say, the United States economy is capitalistic and market -
based. Wal - Mart is large and ubiquitous — and powerful — because it
does what it does so well. Wal - Mart is winning for no other reason
than personal choice: Customers vote for Wal - Mart with their wal-
lets; suppliers vote for Wal - Mart with their products. Any consumer,
any businessperson who doesn ’ t care for the way Wal - Mart does
business is free to buy and sell products somewhere else.
The problem is that this free choice has become an illusion. In
many categories of products it sells, Wal - Mart is now 30 percent or
more of the entire market. It sells 31 percent of the pet food used
in the United States, 37 percent of the fresh meat, 45 percent of
the offi ce and school supplies bought by consumers, and 24 per-
cent of the bottled water. That kind of dominance at both ends of
the spectrum — dominance across a huge range of merchandise and
dominance of geographic consumer markets — means that market
capitalism is being strangled with the kind of slow inexorability of a
boa constrictor. It ’ s not free - market capitalism; Wal - Mart is running
the market. The newly merged Procter & Gamble and Gillette has
sales in excess of $64 billion a year — not only bigger by far than any
other consumer products company, but bigger than all but 20 public
companies of any kind in the United States. But remember: Wal - Mart
isn ’ t just P & G ’ s number - one customer; it ’ s P & G ’ s business. Wal -
Mart is bigger than P & G ’ s next nine customers combined. That ’ s
why businesspeople are scared of Wal - Mart. They should be. And if
a corporation with the scale, vigor, and independence of P & G must
bend to Wal - Mart ’ s will, it ’ s easy to imagine the kind of infl uence
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Reframing Organizations246
Wal - Mart wields over the operators of small factories in develop-
ing nations, factories that just want work and have no leverage with
Wal - Mart or Wal - Mart ’ s vendors [2006, p. 20].
Wal - Mart ’ s clout remains formidable, but it is hard to predict where it will go
from here. It has been caught in an embattled, slow - growth mode in recent years.
Will it catch a second wind and accelerate its growth? Or will it follow compa-
nies like Sears and General Motors into a long downhill slide from the pinnacle
it once commanded? Whatever happens to Wal - Mart, the battle over corporate
power will continue on a global scale. Large multinational companies have enor-
mous power but must also cope with the demands of other powerful players:
governments, labor unions, investors, and consumers. In a cacophonous global
village, this is the biggest political contest of all.
SUMMARY Organizations are both arenas for internal politics and political agents with their
own agendas, resources, and strategies. As arenas, they house competition and
offer a setting for the ongoing interplay of divergent interests and agendas. An
arena ’ s rules and parameters shape the game to be played, the players on the
fi eld, and the interests to be pursued. From this perspective, every signifi cant
organizational process is inherently political.
As agents, organizations are tools, often very powerful tools, for achieving the
purposes of whoever controls them. But they are also inevitably dependent on
their environment for needed support and resources. They exist, compete, and
co - evolve in business or political ecosystems with clusters of organizations, each
pursuing its own interests and seeking a viable niche. As in nature, relationships
within and between ecosystems are sometimes fi ercely competitive, sometimes
collaborative and interdependent.
A particularly urgent and controversial question is the relative power of
organizations and society. Giant multinational corporations have achieved
scale and resources unprecedented in human history. Critics worry that they
are dominating and distorting politics, society, and the environment. Others
argue that organizations are inherently dependent on a changing and turbulent
environment — they retain their clout only by adapting to larger social forces and
responding to the needs and demands of customers and constituents.
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The Symbolic Frame
What images or associations come to mind when you think about each of these terms? American fl ag
Nazi
General Motors
Princess Diana
Abu Ghraib
Declaration of Independence
•
•
•
•
•
•
PA RT F I V E
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Reframing Organizations248
Al Quaeda
McDonald ’ s
Pearl Harbor
Paris
It is likely that you had emotional, even visceral, reactions to many of these
familiar words. Each refers to a specifi c person, group, place, or event, but each
has also acquired symbolic resonance. Symbols carry powerful intellectual and
emotional messages; they speak to both the mind and the heart.
The symbolic frame focuses on how humans make sense of the chaotic,
ambiguous world in which they live. Meaning, belief, and faith are its central
concerns. Meaning is not given to us; we have to create it. There are, for exam-
ple, many who revere the American fl ag and many others who burn it. The fl ag
is symbolically powerful for both groups, but for different reasons. It represents
patriotism for one group, oppression or imperialism for the other. Symbols are
the basic building blocks of the meaning systems, or cultures we inhabit. We
experience our way of life in the same way that fi sh live in water. Our own cul-
tural ways are often invisible to us because we see them simply as the ways things
are — and ought to be. But we can react with revulsion and horror to cultures
that are alien or hostile to our own. Consider the following words from an Al
Quaeda instruction manual captured in Europe:
Committed to uniting all Muslims under a new caliphate, Al Qaeda
believes that only force can achieve this mission: The confrontation
that we are calling for . . . does not know Socratic debates, Platonic
ideals, nor Aristotelian dialogues. But it knows the dialogue of bul-
lets, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the
diplomacy of the cannon and the machine gun. Islamic governments
have never been and will never be established through peaceful solu-
tions and cooperative councils. They are established as they have
always been by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth
[Al Quaeda, n.d.].
The message is appalling to most Westerners, yet inspiring to those who share its
particular vision of a restored caliphate. As symbols often do, the words carry an
emotional wallop that may be very positive or very negative, depending on your
perspective.
•
•
•
•
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The Symbolic Frame 249
In Chapter Twelve , we explore the many forms symbols take in social life,
including myth, vision, story, heroes and heroines, ritual, and ceremony. We
then use a variety of examples to demonstrate what culture is and why it is so
important.
In Chapter Thirteen , we apply symbolic concepts to team dynamics. We use a
detailed account of a highly successful computer development team to show that
the essence of its success was cultural and spiritual. The team relied on initiation
rituals, humor, play, specialized language, ceremony, and other symbolic forms to
weld a diverse and fractious group of individuals into a spirited, successful team.
Chapter Fourteen highlights dramaturgical and institutional perspectives, view-
ing organizations as akin to theater companies that seek recognition and support
by staging dramas that both please and infl uence their audiences. We show that
many activities and processes in organizations, such as evaluation and strategic
planning, rarely achieve supposed goals. Yet they persist because they project vital
messages that internal and external audiences want to hear.
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251
Organizational Symbols and Culture
For eight hundred years neighborhoods in Siena, Italy, have competed twice each summer in a horse race known as the palio. Each side has its club, hymn, costumes, museum, and elected
head. A crowd of more than a hundred thousand gathers to witness
a seventy - fi ve - second event that people live for all year. Riding under
banners of the goose, seashell, or turtle, jockeys attack one another
with whips and hang on desperately around ninety - degree turns.
The fi rst horse to fi nish, with or without rider, wins. “ The winners
are worshipped. The losers embarrass their clan ” (Saubaber, 2007,
p. 42). In July 2007, twenty - two - year - old Giovanni Atzeni won in a
photo fi nish. His followers were ecstatic. A young woman shouted,
“ We ’ ve waited eight years, ” as she showered him with kisses. An old
man almost fainted with joy at the chance to see a victory before he
died. The legendary Aceto, a fourteen - time winner, once said, “ Palio
is a drug that makes you a God . . . and then crucifi es you. ” The rest
of Italy considers the event barbaric, but locals are proudly unfazed.
Unless you were born in Siena, they insist, you will never understand
the palio. Rooted in a time when Siena was a proud and powerful
republic, the occasion embodies the town ’ s unique identity.
T W E LV E
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations252
Building community around a brand name updates ancient traditions based
on tribe and homeland, like those surrounding the palio. In 2002, for example,
Harley - Davidson celebrated its hundredth birthday with festivities that lasted
for fourteen months. In a culminating extravaganza, a million bikers roared into
the company ’ s headquarters in Milwaukee to showcase their bikes and revel in
Harley - Davidson ’ s unique culture. To the HOGs (Harley Owner ’ s Groups), own-
ing a Harley is a way of life, and many riders have the company logo tattooed on
their skins.
Despite their diversity, Harley riders have something in common: a
fanatical dedication to their Harleys. It ’ s a feeling that many cannot
articulate, and for them there ’ s a Harley T - shirt inscribed: “ Harley -
Davidson — If I Have To Explain You Wouldn ’ t Understand ” . . .
One thing is certain: This incredible brand loyalty is emotional. It
is based on a pattern of associations that includes the American fl ag
and another American symbol, the eagle (which is also a Harley
symbol), as well as camaraderie, individualism, the feeling of riding
free, and the pride of owning a product that has become a legend.
On the road, one Harley rider always helps another in distress — even
though one may be a tattooed biker and the other a buttoned - down
bank president [Reid, 1989, p. 5].
Harley - Davidson and Siena ’ s palio are two examples of how symbols perme-
ate every fi ber of society and organizations. “ A symbol is something that stands
for or suggests something else; it conveys socially constructed means beyond its
intrinsic or obvious functional use ” (Zott and Huy, 2007, p. 72). Distilled to the
essence, people seek meaning in life. Since life is mysterious, we create symbols to
sustain hope and faith. These intangibles then shape our thoughts, emotions, and
actions. Symbols cut deeply into the human psyche (Freud, [1899] 1980) and tap
the collective unconscious (Jung, [1912] 1965).
Symbols and symbolic actions are part of everyday life and are particularly
perceptible at weekly, monthly, or seasonal high points. Symbols stimulate energy
in moments of triumph and offer solace in times of tribulation. After 9/11
Americans turned to symbols to cope with the aftermath of a devastating ter-
rorist attack. Flags fl ew. Makeshift monuments honored victims and the heroic
acts of police and fi refi ghters who gave their lives. Members of Congress sang
“ God Bless America ” on the Capitol steps. Across the country, people gathered in
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 253
both formal and informal healing ceremonies. Especially in times of calamity or
victory, we embrace the spiritual magic symbols represent.
The symbolic frame interprets and illuminates the basic issues of meaning
and belief that make symbols so powerful. It depicts a world far different from
canons of rationality, certainty, and linearity. This chapter journeys into the
symbolic inner sanctum. We fi rst discuss symbolic assumptions and then high-
light various forms that symbols take in organizations. These are basic building
blocks of culture that people shape to fi t unique circumstances. We then move
on to discuss organizations as unique cultures or tribes. Finally, we describe
how three distinctive companies — BMW, Continental Airlines, and Nordstrom
Department Stores — have successfully applied symbolic ideas.
SYMBOLIC ASSUMPTIONS The symbolic frame forms an umbrella for ideas from several disciplines, includ-
ing organization theory and sociology (Selznick, 1957; Blumer, 1969; Schutz, 1970;
Clark, 1975; Corwin, 1976; March and Olsen, 1976; Meyer and Rowan, 1978;
Weick, 1976; Davis and others, 1976; Hofstede, 1984); political science (Dittmer,
1977; Edelman, 1971); magic (O ’ Keefe, 1983); and neurolinguistic programming
(Bandler and Grinder, 1975, 1977). Freud and Jung relied heavily on symbolic
concepts to probe the human psyche and unconscious archetypes. Anthropologists
have traditionally focused on symbols and their place in the lives of humans
(Mead, 1989; Benedict, 1989; Goffman, 1974; Ortner, 1973; Bateson, 1972).
The symbolic frame distills ideas from diverse sources into fi ve suppositions:
What is most important is not what happens but what it means.
Activity and meaning are loosely coupled; events and actions have multiple
interpretations as people experience life differently.
Facing uncertainty and ambiguity, people create symbols to resolve confu-
sion, fi nd direction, and anchor hope and faith.
Events and processes are often more important for what is expressed than for
what is produced. Their emblematic form weaves a tapestry of secular myths,
heroes and heroines, rituals, ceremonies, and stories to help people fi nd pur-
pose and passion.
Culture forms the superglue that bonds an organization, unites people, and
helps an enterprise accomplish desired ends.
•
•
•
•
•
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Reframing Organizations254
The symbolic frame sees life as fi gurative, more serendipitous than linear.
Organizations are like constantly changing, organic pinball machines. Issues,
actors, decisions, and policies carom through an elastic labyrinth of cushions,
barriers, and traps. Managers turning to Peter Drucker ’ s Effective Executive
might do better seeking advice from Lewis Carroll ’ s Through the Looking Glass.
But apparent chaos has a pattern and an emblematic order increasingly appreci-
ated in corporate life.
ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOLS An organization ’ s culture is revealed and communicated through its symbols:
Geico ’ s gecko, Target ’ s bull ’ s - eye, or Budweiser ’ s Clydesdales. McDonald ’ s fran-
chises are unifi ed as much by golden arches, core values, and the legend of Ray
Kroc as by sophisticated control systems. Harvard professors are bound less by
structural constraints than by rituals of teaching, values of scholarship, and the
myths and mystique of Harvard.
Symbols take many forms in organizations. Myth, vision, and values imbue
an organization with purpose and resolve. Heroes and heroines, through words
and deeds, serve as living logos. Fairy tales and stories tender explanations, rec-
oncile contradictions, and resolve dilemmas (Cohen, 1969). Rituals and ceremo-
nies offer direction, faith, and hope (Ortner, 1973). Metaphor, humor, and play
loosen things up. We look at each of these symbolic forms in this section.
Myths, Vision, and Values Myths, operating at a mystical level, are the story behind the story (Campbell,
1988). They explain, express, legitimize, and maintain solidarity and cohesion.
They communicate unconscious wishes and confl icts, mediate contradicti-
ons, and offer a narrative anchoring the present in the past (Cohen, 1969). All
organizations rely on myths or sagas of varying strength and intensity (Clark,
1975). Myths transform a place of work into a revered institution and an all -
encompassing way of life.
Myths often originate in the launching of an enterprise. The original plan
for Southwest Airlines, for example, was sketched on a cocktail napkin in a San
Antonio bar. It envisioned connecting three Texas cities: Dallas, Houston, and
San Antonio. As legend has it, Rollin King, one of the original founders, said to
his counterpart Herb Kelleher, “ Herb, let ’ s start an airline. ” Kelleher, who later
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 255
became Southwest ’ s CEO, replied, “ Rollin, you ’ re crazy. Let ’ s do it! ” (Freiberg and
Freiberg, 1998, p. 15).
As the new airline moved ahead, it met fi erce resistance from established car-
riers. Four years of legal wrangling kept the upstart grounded. In 1971, the Texas
Supreme Court ruled in Southwest ’ s favor, and its planes were ready to fl y. A local
sheriff ’ s threat to halt fl ights under a court injunction prompted a terse directive
from Kelleher: “ You roll right over the son of a bitch and leave our tire tracks on
his uniform if you have to ” (Freiberg and Freiberg, 1998, p. 21). (The order, of
course, signaled resolve, not an actual intention to cause harm.) The persistence
and zaniness of Southwest ’ s mythologized beginnings shape its unique culture:
“ The spirit and steadfastness that enabled the airline to survive in its early years
is what makes Southwest such a remarkable company today ” (p. 14).
Myths undergird an organization ’ s values. Values characterize what an orga-
nization stands for, qualities worthy of esteem or commitment. Unlike goals, val-
ues are intangible and defi ne a unique distinguishing character. Values convey a
sense of identity, from boardroom to factory fl oor, and help people feel special
about what they do.
The values that count are those an organization lives, regardless of what it
articulates in mission statements or formal documents. Southwest Airlines has
never codifi ed its values formally. But its Symbol of Freedom billboards and
banners express the company ’ s defi ning purpose: extending freedom to fl y to
everyone, not just the elite, and doing it with an abiding sense of fun. Other
organizations make values more explicit. The Edina (Minnesota) School District,
following the suicide of a superintendent, involved staff, parents, and students in
formally articulating values in a document: “ We care. We share. We dare. ” The
values of the U.S. Marine Corps are condensed into a simple phrase: “ Semper
Fi ” (short for semper fi delis — always faithful). It is more than a motto; it stands
for the traditions, sentiments, and solidarity that are instilled into recruits and
perpetuated by veteran Marines: “ The values and assumptions that shape its
members . . . are all the Marines have. They are the smallest of the U.S. military
services, and in many ways the most interesting. Theirs is the richest culture: for-
malistic, insular, elitist, with a deep anchor in their own history and mythology ”
(Ricks, 1998, p. 19).
Vision turns an organization ’ s core ideology, or sense of purpose, into an
image of the future. It is a shared fantasy, illuminating new possibilities within
the realm of myths and values. Martin Luther King ’ s “ I Have a Dream ” speech, for
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Reframing Organizations256
example, articulated poetically a new future for race relations rooted in the ideals
of America ’ s founding fathers.
Vision is seen as vital in contemporary organizations. In Built to Last, Collins
and Porras profi le a number of extraordinary companies and conclude, “ The
essence of a visionary company comes in the translation of its core ideology
and its own unique drive for progress into the very fabric of the organization ”
(1994, p. 201). Johnson & Johnson ’ s commitment to the elimination of “ pain
and disease ” and to “ the doctors, nurses, hospitals, mothers, and all others who
use our products ” motivated the company to make the costly decision to pull
Tylenol from store shelves when several tainted bottles were discovered. 3M ’ s
principle of “ thou shalt not kill a new product idea ” came to life when someone
refused to stop working on an idea that became Scotch Tape. The same princi-
ple paved the way for Post - it notes, a product resurrected from a failed adhesive.
A vision offers mental pictures linking historical legend and core precepts to
future events. Shared, it imbues an organization with spirit, resolve, and é lan.
Subtle distinctions among intangible myths, values, and visions are diffi cult
to draw — these ideas often conjoin. Take eBay, which emerged as a highly vis-
ible success amid a sea of 1990s dot - com disasters. Its interplay of myth, values,
and vision contributes to top performance, even in a tough economic environ-
ment. Much of eBay ’ s success can be traced to its founder, Pierre Omidyar. He
envisioned a marketplace where buyers would have equal access to products and
prices, and sellers would have an open outlet for goods. Prices would be set by
laws of supply and demand. But Omidyar ’ s vision incorporated another element:
community. Historically, people have used market stalls and caf é s to swap gossip,
trade advice, and pass the time of day. Omidyar wanted to combine virtual busi-
ness site and caring community. That vision led to eBay ’ s core values of com-
merce and community. Embedded in these are corollary principles: “ Treat other
people online as you would like to be treated, and when disputes arise, give other
people the benefi t of the doubt. ”
eBay is awash in myths and legends. Omidyar ’ s vision is said to have taken
root over dinner with his fi anc é e. She complained that their move from Boston
to Silicon Valley severed her ties with fellow collectors of Pez dispensers. He
obliquely came to her rescue by writing code laying the foundation for a new
company. Did it happen this way? Not quite. This story was hatched by Mary
Lou Song, an eBay publicist, in an effort to get media exposure. Her rationale:
“ Nobody wants to hear about a thirty - year - old genius who wanted to create
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 257
a perfect market. They want to hear that he did it for his fi anc é e. ” Her version
persists because myths are truer than truth.
Heroes and Heroines In the wake of scandals at Enron and elsewhere, Business Week (Byrnes, Byrne,
Edwards, and Lee, 2002) profi led six “ good ” CEOs. They were not media celebri-
ties like Lee Iacocca and Jack Welch nor symbols of corporate greed like Ken Lay,
Bernie Ebbers, and Dennis Kozlowski. They were solid leaders who built time -
tested companies and delivered results.
Just as important, these six leaders modeled corporate values they hoped
to instill. Colgate Palmolive ’ s Ruben Mark, one of the six, refused to comment
on the story. He felt that an interview would add little value to his company.
Another, Costco ’ s James Sinegal, took pride in his disdain for corporate perks. He
answered his own phone and personally escorted guests to his spartan offi ce — no
bathroom, no walls, twenty - year - old furniture. He commented: “ We ’ re low - cost
operators, and it would be a little phony if we tried to pretend that we ’ re not and
had all the trappings ” (Byrnes, Byrne, Edwards, and Lee, 2002, p. 82).
All six executives seemed to embrace their symbolic role as cultural heroes.
They were living logos, human icons, whose words and deeds exemplifi ed and
reinforced important core values. The impact of well - placed cultural heroes
and heroines is underscored by Bernie Marcus, cofounder of Home Depot:
“ People watch the titular heads of companies, how they live their lives, and they
know [if] they are being sold a bill of goods. If you are a selfi sh son - of - a - bitch,
well that usually comes across fairly well. And it comes across no matter how
many memos you send out [stating otherwise] ” (Roush, 1999, p. 139).
Not all icons are at the top. Doing their jobs, ordinary people often perform
exemplary deeds. The late Joe Vallejo, custodian at a California junior high
school, kept the place immaculate. But he was also a liaison between the school
and its community. His infl uence knew few limits. When emotions ran high,
he attended parent conferences and often negotiated a compromise acceptable
to all parties. He knew the students and checked report cards. He was not bash-
ful about telling seasoned teachers how to tailor lessons. When he retired, a patio
was named in his honor. It remains today, commemorating a hero who made a
difference well beyond his formal assignment.
Some heroic exploits go unrecognized because they happen out of view.
Southwest Airlines annually recognizes its behind - the - scenes employees in a
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Reframing Organizations258
“ Heroes of the Heart ” award ceremony. The honor goes to the backstage group
that contributes most to Southwest ’ s unique culture and successful performance.
The year following the award, a Southwest aircraft fl ies with the group ’ s name on
its fuselage. A song written for the occasion expresses the value Southwest places
on its heroes and heroines whose important work is often hidden:
Heroes come in every shape and size; Adding something very special to others in their lives
No one gives you medals and the world won ’ t know your name
But in Southwest ’ s eyes you ’ re heroes just the same.
The Twin Towers tragedy reminded Americans of the vital role heroism plays
in the human spirit. New York City police offi cers and fi refi ghters touched peo-
ple ’ s hearts by risking their lives to save others. Many perished as a result. Their
sacrifi ces reaffi rmed Americans ’ spirit and resolve in enduring one of the nation ’ s
most costly tragedies. But every day, less dramatic acts of courage come to light
as people go out of their way to help customers or serve communities. Newsweek
runs an “ everyday heroes ” feature showcasing the uncommon exploits of com-
mon people. NBC ’ s Nightly News airs a Friday segment recognizing people who
“ have made a difference. ” In 2007, Colin Powell proposed an “ Above the Call ”
citizen award, a recognition on par with the Congressional Medal of Honor.
Exploits of heroes and heroines are lodged in our psyches. We call on
their examples in times of uncertainty and stress. American POWs in North
Vietnamese prisons drew upon stories of the courage of Captain Lance Sijan,
Admiral James Stockdale, and Colonel Bud Day, who refused to capitulate to
Viet Cong captors. “ [Their examples] when passed along the clandestine prison
communications network . . . helped support the resolve that eventually defeated
the enemy ’ s efforts ” (McConnell, 2004, p. 249). During the Bosnian confl ict, the
ordeal of Scott O ’ Grady, a U.S. Air Force fi ghter pilot, made headlines. To survive
after being shot down, O ’ Grady drew on the example of Sijan: “ His strong will to
survive and be free was an inspiration to every pilot I knew ” (O ’ Grady, 1998,
p. 83). Although drawn from nightmares of warfare, these examples demonstrate
how human models infl uence our decisions and actions. We carry lessons of
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 259
teachers, parents, and others with us. Their exploits, animated through stories,
serve as guides to choices we make in our personal lives and at work.
Stories and Fairy Tales Stories, like folk or fairy tales, offer more than entertainment or moral instruc-
tion for small children. They grant comfort, reassurance, direction, and hope
to people of all ages. They externalize inner confl icts and tensions (Bettelheim,
1977). Stories are sometimes dismissed as the last resort of people lacking
substance — like a professor accused of telling “ war stories. ” Yet stories convey
information, morals, and myths vividly and convincingly (Mitroff and Kilmann,
1975; Denning, 2005). They perpetuate values and keep feats of heroes and hero-
ines alive. This helps account for the recent proliferation of business books link-
ing stories and leadership (Clark, 2004; Denning, 2005; Simmons, 2006, 2007;
Seely Brown, Denning, Groh, and Prusak, 2004). Barry Lopez captures poetically
why stories are signifi cant:
Remember only this one thing,
The stories people tell have a way of taking care of them.
If stories come to you, care for them.
And learn to give them away where they are needed.
Sometimes a person needs a story more than food to stay alive.
That is why we put these stories in each other ’ s memories.
This is how people care for themselves [Lopez, 1998, p. 13].
An example from higher education shows the sentiments a story can transmit.
Joe B. Wyatt (then chancellor of Vanderbilt University) took the podium at the
university ’ s annual convocation. Several hundred professors and staff members
were assembled to kick off a new school year. Wyatt wended his way through
facts and fi gures about the university ’ s status, recognized professors with long -
term service, and awarded chairs to professors who had retired. He closed his
presentation with a story: 1
I ’ d like to share with you a story about a young second - grade teacher
in Austin, Texas. Her name is Roberta Wright. Among her young stu-
dents was a little girl who was stealing materials from the classroom.
Ms. Wright noticed the recurring pilfering, called the mother and
scheduled a parent conference. She told the mother about the daily
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Reframing Organizations260
thefts and let her know that the stealing could not continue. The
mother sat silent for a few seconds and then said, “ Oh, Ms. Wright,
you don ’ t understand, do you? She comes home each afternoon and
plays that she ’ s still in school. She pretends she ’ s you. ”
Chancellor Wyatt paused, his eyes moving from person to person. He concluded:
“ And ladies and gentleman, that does not stop in second grade. ” His story gave
emphasis to the sacred side of teaching, one of the university ’ s core values, in an
unusually dramatic way.
Stories are deeply rooted in the human experience. They are told and retold
around campfi res and during family reunions (Clark, 2004). David Armstrong,
CEO of Armstrong International, notes that storytelling has played a command-
ing role in history through the teachings of Jesus, the Buddha, and Mohammed,
among many others. It can play an equally potent role in contemporary organi-
zations: “ Rules, either in policy manuals or on signs, can be intimidating. But the
morals in stories are invariably inviting, fun and inspiring. Through story - telling
our people can know very clearly what the company believes in and what needs
to be done ” (Armstrong, 1992, p. 6). To Armstrong, storytelling is a simple, time-
less, and memorable way to have fun, train new people, recognize accomplish-
ments, and spread the word. Denning (2005) puts the functions of stories into
eight categories:
Sparking action
Communicating who you are
Communicating who the company is — branding
Transmitting values
Fostering collaboration
Taming the grapevine
Sharing knowledge
Leading people into the future
Effective organizations are full of good stories. They often focus on the legendary
exploits of corporate heroes. Marriott Hotels founder J. W. Marriott Sr. died years
ago, but his presence is still felt. Stories of his unwavering commitment to customer
service are told and retold. His aphorism “ Take good care of your employees and
they ’ ll take good care of your customers ” is still part of Marriott ’ s philosophy.
•
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 261
According to fable, Marriott visited new general managers and took them for a
walk around the property. He pointed out broken branches, sidewalk pebbles, and
obscure cobwebs. By tour ’ s end, the new manager ended up with a long to - do list —
and, more important, an indelible lesson in what mattered at Marriott.
Not all stories center on the founder or chief executive. Ritz - Carlton is famous for
the upscale treatment it offers guests. “ My pleasure ” is employees ’ traditional response
to requests, no matter how demanding or how trivial. One hurried guest jumped into
a taxi to the airport but left his briefcase on the sidewalk. The doorman retrieved the
briefcase, abandoned his post, sped to the airport, and delivered it to the panicked
guest. Instead of being fi red, the doorman became part of the legends and lore — a
living example of the company ’ s commitment to service (Deal and Jenkins, 1994).
Stories are a key medium for communicating corporate myths. They estab-
lish and perpetuate tradition. Recalled and embellished in formal meetings and
informal coffee breaks, they convey an organization ’ s values and identity to insid-
ers, building confi dence and support. Stories also transmit the appeal of products
and services. A good story trumps data and abstractions in wooing consumers.
In the late 1990s, Subway launched an advertising campaign to establish itself
as a healthful alternative to high - fat rivals: “ 7 under 6 ” summed up the message
that seven of Subway ’ s sandwiches had less than six grams of fat. But the next
promotion, based on the story of Jared Fogel, worked even better. Fogel initially
tipped the scales at 425 pounds. A health scare motivated him to slim down, and
Subway ’ s “ 7 under 6 ” campaign caught his attention. He created his Subway diet
plan: a foot - long veggie sub for lunch, a six - inch turkey sub for dinner. His dra-
matic weight loss caught the attention of a franchisee as well as the national media.
An advertising blitz took it from there. Subway had a 189 - pound hero whose story
cut a competitive edge that dramatically improved sales (Heath and Heath, 2007).
Ritual As a symbolic act, ritual is routine that “ usually has a statable purpose, but one
that invariably alludes to more than it says, and has many meanings at once ”
(Moore and Meyerhoff, 1977, p. 5). Enacted, ritual connects an individual or
group to something mystical, more than words can capture. At home and at
work, ritual gives structure and meaning to each day: “ We fi nd these magical
moments every day — drinking our morning coffee, reading the daily paper, eat-
ing lunch with a friend, drinking a glass of wine while admiring the sunset, or
saying, ‘ Good night, sleep tight . . . ’ at bedtime. The holy in the daily; the sacred
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Reframing Organizations262
in the single act of living . . . . A time to do the dishes. And a time to walk the
dog ” (Fulghum, 1995, pp. 3, 254).
Humans create both personal and communal rituals. The ones that carry mean-
ing become the dance of life. “ Rituals anchor us to a center, ” Fulghum writes, “ while
freeing us to move on and confront the everlasting unpredictability of life. The par-
adox of ritual patterns and sacred habits is that they simultaneously serve as a solid
footing and springboard, providing a stable dynamic in our lives ” (1995, p. 261).
The power of ritual becomes palpable if one experiences the emptiness of los-
ing it. Campbell (1988) underscores this loss: “ When you lose rituals, you lose a
sense of civilization; and that ’ s why society is so out of kilter. ” When the Roman
Catholic Church changed its liturgy from Latin to vernacular, many Catholics
felt a profound loss of conviction and faith. Conversely, in 2001 and 2002, when
the Catholic Church suffered a series of scandals involving sexual misbehavior
by priests, shaken laypersons turned to rituals of the mass for comfort and reas-
surance. The Church in 2007 reversed its earlier position and gave local priests
permission to conduct the mass in Latin.
Rituals of initiation induct newcomers into communal membership. “ Green-
horns ” encounter powerful symbolic pressures as they join a group or organi-
zation. A new member must gain entry to the inner sanctum. Transition from
stranger to full - fl edged member grants access to cherished organizational secrets.
The key episode is the rite of passage affi rming acceptance. In tribes, simply
attaining puberty is insuffi cient for young males: “ There must be an accompa-
nying trial and appropriate ritual to mark the event. The so - called primitives
had the good sense to make these trials meaningful and direct. Upon attain-
ing puberty you killed a lion and were circumcised. After a little dancing and
whatnot, you were admitted as a junior member and learned some secrets. The
[men ’ s] hut is a symbol of, and a medium for maintaining, the status quo and
the good of the order ” (Ritti and Funkhouser, 1982, p. 3).
We are not beyond the primitive drives, sexism, and superstition that gave rise
to age - old institutions such as the men ’ s hut. Consider the experience of a newly
elected member of the U.S. House of Representatives:
One of the early female novices was a representative who was a
serious feminist. Soon after arriving in Congress, she broke propriety
by audaciously proposing an amendment to a military bill of Edward
Hebert, Chief of the Defense Clan. When the amendment received
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 263
only a single vote, she supposedly snapped at the aged committee
chairman: “ I know the only reason my amendment failed is that I ’ ve
got a vagina. ” To which Herbert retorted, “ If you ’ d been using your
vagina instead of your mouth, maybe you ’ d have gotten a few more
votes ” [Weatherford, 1985, p. 35].
That last exchange seems particularly harsh and offensive, but its multiple inter-
pretations take us to the heart of symbolic customs. A kinder and gentler anec-
dote would conceal what transpires in a multilayered transaction with multiple
meanings. Let ’ s look at some possible interpretations.
One version highlights the age - old battle between the sexes. The female rep-
resentative raises the specter of sexual discrimination; Hebert uses a sexist jibe
to put her in her place. Another view sees the exchange as a classic give - and -
take. Newcomers bring new ideas as agents of evolution and reform. Old - timers
are supposed to pass along time - tested values and traditions. If newcomers suc-
cumb, an organization risks stultifi cation and decay; if old - timers fail to induct
new arrivals properly, chaos and disarray lie ahead.
As an initiation ritual, the exchange is a predictable clash between a new arrival
and an established veteran. The old - timer is reminding the rookie who ’ s in charge.
Newcomers don ’ t get free admission. The price is higher for those who, because of
race, gender, or ethnicity, question or threaten existing values, norms, or patterns.
Yet only a weak culture accepts newcomers without some form of hazing.
The rite of passage reinforces the existing culture while testing the new-
comer ’ s ability to become a member. As a freshman, Hillary Rodham Clinton
survived her initiation and achieved full membership in the U.S. Senate when
she and Senator Don Nickles, a Republican from Oklahoma, partnered on
an unemployment bill in early 2003. This was impressive, since Nickles had led
the effort to impeach Clinton ’ s husband when he was president.
Initiation is one important role of ritual. But rituals also bond a group
together and imbue the enterprise with traditions and values. They prepare com-
bat pilots to slip into a fi ghter cockpit knowing they may not return:
For me, there can be no fi ghter pilots without fi ghter pilot rituals.
The end result of these rituals is a culture that allows individuals to
risk their lives and revel in it. If the normal American fi nds it dif-
fi cult to understand the circumstances that compel individuals to
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Reframing Organizations264
willingly hurtle their bodies through space encased in several tons
of steel while determined people are actively trying to kill them, it
is because the normal American has not been indoctrinated into the
fi ghter pilot culture [Broughton, 1988, p. 131].
Some rituals become ceremonial occasions to recognize momentous accomplish-
ments. When Captain Sijan, mentioned earlier, received his posthumous Medal
of Honor, the president of the United States attended:
In the large room, men in impressive uniforms and costly vested
suits and women [in uniforms] and cheerful spring pastels stood
motionless and silent in their contemplation of the words. The
stark text of the citation contained a wealth of evocative imagery,
some of it savage, some tender to the point of heartbreak. President
Ford left the rostrum: a group of senior offi cers drew up beside
him to hand forward the glass - covered walnut case containing
the medal. There was a certain liturgical quality to this passing of
a sanctifi ed object among a circle of anointed leaders [McConnell,
2004, pp. 217].
Other rituals soften grief. Major Kevin Reed, a former F - 16 pilot, has outlined
the Air Force ’ s comprehensive liturgy (2001). The most solemn of Air Force
rituals is the death notifi cation. Once a fatality has been confi rmed, a team of
three offi cers is dispatched to the home of the nearest relative. An offi cer
of superior rank passes the news: “ The Chief of Staff of the Air Force conveys
his deep sympathies. ” A fl ight surgeon is there for physical support. A chaplain
offers spiritual sustenance. The notifi cation ritual is the fi rst step in the consola-
tion ceremony (p. 10).
At the other end of the scale are the numerous fun rituals, but even they have
a serious side:
On a Friday night at a base offi cers club, four Marine A - 6 Intruder
pilots joined a packed crowd of Air Force offi cers. One of the
Marine aviators put his cap on the bar while fi shing for some
money to pay for his drink. The bartender rang a foot - tall bell and
yelled “ Hat on the bar! ” This infraction automatically means the
guilty party buys a round of drinks. Surveying the size of the crowd,
the Marine . . . refused to pay. An Air Force colonel approached him
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 265
and asked him if he really intended to fl out the tradition. When the
Marine responded in the affi rmative, the colonel called the base
security and ordered the A - 6 [aircraft] on the ramp impounded.
The Marine left and called his superior to report the colonel ’ s
action. Shortly thereafter, he returned and asked sheepishly, “ What ’ s
everyone having? ”
Rituals also govern key relationships. In a fi ghter squadron, one
of the most important relationships is that between a pilot and a
crew chief. A prefl ight ritual transfers ownership between someone
who cares for an aircraft on the ground and the one who will take it
aloft. The ground ritual has several phases. “A fi rst salute reinforces
rank and signifi es respect between mechanic and pilot. A handshake
takes the formal greeting to a new level, cementing the personal
bond between the two. A second salute after the pilot has checked
the aircraft indicates the aircraft ’ s airworthiness. It is now offi cially
under the pilot ’ s command. Finally, a thumbs - up is a personal ges-
ture wishing the pilot a good fl ight. Interwoven, the many rituals of
combat fl ying bond the participants and bind them to the service ’ s
traditions and values. The same is true for cohesive cultures in other
sectors” [R. Mola, cited in Reed, 2001, p. 5].
Ceremony Historically, cultures have relied on ritual and ceremony to create order, clar-
ity, and predictability — particularly around mysterious and random issues or
dilemmas. The distinction between ritual and ceremony is elusive. As a rule of
thumb, ritual is more everyday. Ceremonies are more episodic — grander and
more elaborate — convened at times of transition or special occasions. Rain
dances, harvest celebrations, and annual meetings invoke supernatural assistance
in critical, unpredictable tasks of raising crops or building market share. Annual
conventions renew old ties and revive deep collective commitments. “ Convention
centers are the basilicas of secular religion ” (Fulghum, 1995, p. 96).
Both ritual and ceremony are illustrated in an account from Japan:
It has been the same every night since the death in 1964 of Yasujiro Tsutsumi,
the legendary patriarch of the huge Seibu real - estate and transportation group.
Two employees stand an overnight vigil at his tomb. On New Year ’ s, the weather
is often bitter, but at dawn the vigil expands to include fi ve or six hundred top
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Reframing Organizations266
executives — directors, vice presidents, presidents — arrayed by company and
rank, the most senior in front. A limousine delivers Yasujiro ’ s third son, Yoshiaki
Tsutsumi, the head of the family business and Japan ’ s richest man. A great brass
bell booms out six times as Yoshiaki approaches his father ’ s tomb. He claps his
hands twice, bows deeply, and says, “ Happy New Year, Father, Happy New Year. ”
Then he turns to deliver a brief - but - stern sermon to the assembled congrega-
tion. The basic themes change little from year to year: last year was tough, this
year will be even tougher, and you ’ ll be washing dishes in one of the hotels if
your performance is bad. Finally, he toasts his father with warm sake and departs
(Downer, 1994).
Ceremonies serve four major roles: they socialize, stabilize, reassure, and convey
messages to external constituencies. Consider the example of Mary Kay Cosmetics.
Several thousand people gather at the company ’ s annual seminars to hear (now
posthumous) personal messages from Mary Kay, to applaud the achievements of
star salespeople, to hear success stories, and to celebrate. The ceremony brings new
members into the fold and helps maintain faith, hope, and optimism in the Mary
Kay family. It is a distinctive pageant and makes the Mary Kay culture accessible to
outsiders, particularly consumers. Failure recedes and obstacles disappear in the
“ you can do it ” spirit of the company symbol of the bumblebee — a creature that,
according to mythical aerodynamics experts, should not be able to fl y. Unaware of
its limitations, it fl ies anyway.
Some events, like retirement dinners and welcoming events for new employ-
ees, are clearly ceremonial. Other ceremonies happen at moments of triumph
or transition. When Phil Condit took over the reins of Boeing, he invited
senior managers to his home for dinner. Afterward, the group gathered around
a giant fi re pit to tell stories about Boeing. Condit asked them to toss negative
stories into the fl ames. It was an emblematic way to banish the dark side of the
company ’ s past (Deal and Key, 1998).
Condit resigned under pressure as Boeing ’ s chairman in 2003 but returned
as part of the crowd to witness the ceremonial roll - out of an aircraft his team
had begun work on a decade earlier — the 787 Dreamliner. As the Seattle Times
reported (July 8, 2007), “ With some 15,000 people gathered Sunday inside the
world ’ s largest building — Boeing ’ s Everett factory — and tens of thousand more
watching the event live around the world — Boeing opened the hanger doors to
reveal the 787 Dreamliner, the fi rst commercial passenger plane that will have a
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 267
mostly composite airframe rather than aluminum . . . . Those 15,000 employees,
past and current executives, airline customers and others crowded around the
new jet for an up - close look. ”
Condit mingled with employees to give and receive congratulations. Tom
Brokaw served as master of ceremonies. Rock music roused the crowd. The event
gave VIPs and politicians an opportunity to bask in the glory of a momentous
accomplishment. As those who had launched every plane from the 707 through
the 747 rubbed elbows and swapped tales, the roots of the past were fused with
the joy of the present and the promise of tomorrow ’ s next leap forward.
Ceremonies do not have to be as lavish as Boeing ’ s introduction of the
Dreamliner, of course. Every organization has its moments of achievement and
atonement. Expressive events provide order and meaning and bind an organiza-
tion or a society together.
Ceremony is equally evident in other social arenas. In the United States, polit-
ical conventions select candidates, even though there is rarely much suspense
about the outcome. Then follow several months in which competing candidates
trade clich é s. The same pageantry unfolds each election year. Rhetoric and spon-
taneous demonstrations are staged in advance. Campaigning is repetitious and
superfi cial, reporters play up the skirmish of the day, and voting often seems dis-
connected from the main drama.
Even so, the process of electing a president is a momentous ceremony. It
entails a sense of social involvement. It is an outlet for expression of discontent
and enthusiasm. It stages live drama for citizens to witness and debate and gives
millions of people a sense of participating in an exciting adventure. It lets can-
didates reassure the public that there are answers to our important questions
and solutions to our vexing problems. It draws attention to common social
ties and to the importance of accepting whichever candidate eventually wins
(Edelman, 1977).
When properly conducted and attuned to valued myths, both ritual and cere-
mony fi re the imagination and deepen faith; otherwise, they become cold, empty
forms that people resent and avoid. They can release creativity and transform
meanings, but they can also cement the status quo and block adaptation and
learning. In some organizations, whining and complaining can evolve as rituals
of choice. Negative symbols perpetuate evil, just as positive symbols reinforce
goodness. Symbols cut both ways.
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Reframing Organizations268
Metaphor, Humor, and Play Metaphor, humor, and play illustrate the important “ as if ” quality of symbols.
Metaphors make the strange familiar and the familiar strange. They capture sub-
tle themes normal language can obscure. Consider these metaphors from man-
agers asked to depict their agency as it is and as they hope it might become:
As It Is As It Might Become
A maze A well - oiled wheel
Wet noodle Oak tree
Aggregation of tribes with competing
agendas
Symphony orchestra
Three - ring circus Championship team
A puzzle no one can put together A smooth - running machine
Twilight zone Utopia
Herd of cattle on the rampage Fleet of ships heading for the
same port
Metaphors compress complicated issues into understandable images, infl u-
encing our attitudes and actions. A university head who views the institution as
a factory leads differently from one who conceives of it as a craft guild, shopping
center, or beloved alma mater.
Humor also serves important functions. Indeed, Hansot (1979) argues that
rather than asking why people use humor in organizations, we should ask why
they are so serious. Humor plays a number of important roles: it integrates,
expresses skepticism, contributes to fl exibility and adaptiveness, and signals sta-
tus. Though a classic device for distancing, humor also draws people together.
It establishes solidarity and facilitates face saving. Above all, it is a way to illu-
minate and break frames, indicating that any single defi nition of a situation is
arbitrary.
In most work settings, play and humor are sharply distinguished from work.
Play is what people do away from work. Images of play among managers typi-
cally connote aggression, competition, and struggle ( “ We ’ ve got to beat them
at their own game ” ; “ We dropped the ball on that one ” ; “ We knocked that one
out of the park ” ) rather than relaxation and fun. But if play is viewed as a state
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 269
of mind (Bateson, 1972; Goffman, 1974), any activity can become playful. Play
relaxes rules to explore alternatives, encouraging experimentation, fl exibility,
and creativity. Many remarkable innovations have been crafted by playful people
at work. March (1976) suggests some guidelines for play in organizations: treat
goals as hypotheses, intuition as real, hypocrisy as transition, memory as an
enemy, and experience as a theory.
ORGANIZATIONS AS CULTURES Culture: What is it? What is its role in an organization? Both questions are con-
tested. Some argue that organizations have cultures; others insist that organiza-
tions are cultures. Schein (1992, p. 12) offers a formal defi nition: “ a pattern of
shared basic assumptions that a group learned as it solved its problems of exter-
nal adaptation and integration, that has worked well enough to be considered
valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive,
think, and feel in relation to those problems. ” Deal and Kennedy (1982, p. 4)
portray culture more succinctly as “ the way we do things around here. ” Culture
is both a product and a process. As a product, it embodies wisdom accumulated
from experience. As a process, it is renewed and re - created as newcomers learn
the old ways and eventually become teachers themselves.
There is a long - standing controversy about the relationship between culture
and leadership. Do leaders shape culture, or are they shaped by it? Is symbolic
leadership empowering or manipulative? Another debate swirls around the link
between culture and results. Do organizations with robust cultures outperform
those relying on structure and strategy? Does success breed a cohesive culture,
or is it the other way around? Books like Kotter and Heskett ’ s Corporate Culture
and Performance (1992), Collins and Porras ’ s Built to Last (1994), and Collins ’ s
Good to Great (2001) offer impressive longitudinal evidence linking culture to
the fi nancial bottom line.
Over time, an organization develops distinctive beliefs, values, and customs.
Managers who understand the signifi cance of symbols and know how to evoke
spirit and soul can shape more cohesive and effective organizations — so long as
the cultural patterns are aligned with the challenges of the marketplace. To be
sure, culture can become a negative force, as it did at Enron. But the three exam-
ples that follow demonstrate how a positive, cohesive culture can be fashioned
and perpetuated.
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Reframing Organizations270
BMW ’ s Dream Factory In 1959, BMW was in a fi nancial hole as deep as the one General Motors and
Ford have occupied in recent years (Edmunson, 2006). During the 1950s, the
company misjudged the consumer market, and customers shunned two new
models — one too big and pricey even for the luxury market, the other a two -
seater too small and impractical for the sporty crowd. BMW almost went
bankrupt and came close to being acquired by Mercedes. A wealthy share-
holder stepped in and, with concessions from the unions, bailed the company
out. The memory of this close call is part of BMW ’ s lore: “ Near death expe-
riences are healthy for companies. BMW has been running scared for years ”
(p. 4). The near - death story is continually retold and is one of the fi rst things
newcomers learn.
Old ways are particularly vulnerable in times of crisis. BMW shucked off its
top - down mentality in 1959 and took on a new mind - set to guard against mak-
ing the same mistake twice. A visit to BMW ’ s Leipzig plant shows how far the
company has come. The plant ’ s modern, artsy, open - air feeling refl ects the com-
pany ’ s cultural values and demonstrates its commitment to breaking down bar-
riers among workers, designers, engineers, and managers. Openness encourages
chance encounters and a freewheeling exchange of ideas. People “ meet simply
because their paths cross naturally. And they say ‘ Ah, glad I ran into you, I have
an idea ’ ” (Edmunson, 2006, p. 1).
At BMW, the bedrock value is innovation:
Just about everyone working for the Bavarian automaker — from the
factory fl oor to the design studios to the marketing department — is
encouraged to speak out. Ideas bubble up freely, and there is never
a penalty for proposing a new way of doing things, no matter how
outlandish. Much of BMW ’ s success stems from an entrepreneur-
ial culture that ’ s rare in corporate Germany, where management is
usually top - down and the gulf between workers and management
is vast. BMW ’ s 100,000 employees have become a nimble network
of true believers with few barriers to hinder innovation [Edmunson,
2006, pp. 1 – 2].
Commitment to its workers is another core value of BMW. Getting a job is
not easy at a company that fi elds two hundred thousand applications annually.
Those who pass initial screening have to survive intense interviews and a day of
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 271
working in teams. The goal: to screen out those who don ’ t fi t. The lucky few who
are hired are thrown in the deep end of the pool, forced to rely on colleagues to
learn the ropes. But once part of the BMW workforce, workers have unparal-
leled job security. Layoffs, a common occurrence at places like Ford and GM,
don ’ t happen at BMW. The company is loyal to its employees, and they respond
in kind.
From the start, workers are indoctrinated into the BMW Way. They are
steeped “ with a sense of place, history and mission. Individuals from all strata
of the corporation work elbow - to - elbow, creating informal networks where
they can hatch even the most unorthodox ideas for making better Bimmers or
boosting profi ts. The average BMW buyer may not know it, but he is driving a
machine born of thousands of important brain - storming sessions. BMW, in fact,
may be the chattiest company ever ” (Edmunson, 2006, p. 2).
Rituals are a way of life at BMW — building bonds among diverse groups,
connecting employees ’ hearts with the company ’ s soul, and pooling far - fl ung
ideas for better products. After BMW acquired Rolls - Royce, an assemblage of
designers, engineers, marketers, and line workers was thrown together to rede-
sign Rolls ’ s signature Phantom. The result was a super - luxurious best - seller.
When management decided to drop the Z3, a designer persuaded some other
designers and engineers to join him in an “ off the books, skunk - works ” effort.
The outcome of their collective endeavor: the successful Z4 sports car.
The fl exibility of BMW ’ s manufacturing process allows buyers to select
engine types, interior confi guration, and trim, customizing almost every key fea-
ture. They can change their minds up to fi ve hours before the vehicle is assem-
bled — and do. The assembly line logs 170,000 alterations a month. This level of
personal attention lets assemblers visualize who the driver might be. Making
an identical car only every nine months creates a sense of personal touch and
creativity. That ’ s a prime reason why work at BMW has meaning beyond a pay-
check. Everyone ’ s efforts are aimed at building a distinctive automobile that an
owner will be proud to drive.
The vitality and cohesiveness of the idea - driven BMW culture is refl ected in
the company ’ s bottom line. From its nadir in the 1950s, BMW has grown past
Mercedes to become the world ’ s largest premium carmaker (Vella, 2006). But
that growth may also be its biggest vulnerability. “ Losing its culture to sheer size
is a major risk ” (Edmunson, 2006, p. 3). The challenge is to keep nurturing rec-
ollections of 1959 as a defense against complacency.
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Reframing Organizations272
Continental ’ s Cultural Transformation Across the Atlantic, the power of symbols and drama prevailed in Gordon
Bethune ’ s turnaround of Continental Airlines, once panned as the worst air
carrier in the United States. In 1994, the airline ranked dead last in on - time
performance, worst in mishandling luggage, highest in customer complaints,
and near the bottom in overbooking. It was losing money so fast that each of
Bethune ’ s early meetings to develop plans for reform was labeled “ the last
supper ” (Bethune and Huler, 1999).
G R E A T E S T H I T S F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T U D I E S
Hit Number 18: Geert Hofstede, Culture ’ s Consequences: International Differences in Work - Related Values (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1984)
Geert Hofstede pioneered research on the impact of national culture on
the workplace. Although other studies, such as GLOBE (House, Hanges,
Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta, 2004), are more current, his remains the
most frequently cited work.
Defi ning culture as “ the collective programming of the mind that
distinguishes the members of one human group from another ” (p. 21),
he focused particularly on work - related values. The heart of Hofstede ’ s
book is a survey of a large U.S. multinational company ’ s employ-
ees. Some 117,000 surveys were collected from workers and manag-
ers in forty countries and twenty languages. Data were collected in
two waves, one in 1968 and another in 1972. Hofstede then identifi ed
variables that reliably differentiated managers of various nations. He
ultimately settled on four dimensions of national culture:
1. Power distance — A measure of power inequality between bosses
and subordinates. High power - distance countries (such as the
Philippines, Mexico, and Venezuela) display more autocratic rela-
tionships between bosses and subordinates than low power - distance
countries (including Denmark, Israel, and Austria) that show more
democratic and decentralized patterns.
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 273
2. Uncertainty avoidance — level of comfort with uncertainty and
ambiguity. Countries high on uncertainty avoidance (Greece,
Portugal, Belgium, and Japan) tend to make heavy use of structure,
rules, and specialists to maintain control. Those low on the index
(Hong Kong, Denmark, Sweden, and Singapore) put less emphasis
on structure and are more tolerant of risk taking.
3. Individualism — the importance of the individual versus the collec-
tive (group, organization, or society). Countries highest on indi-
vidualism (the United States, Australia, Great Britain, and Canada)
put emphasis on autonomous, self - reliant individuals who care
for themselves. Countries lowest on individuality (Peru, Pakistan,
Colombia, and Venezuela) emphasized mutual loyalty.
4. Masculinity - femininity — the degree to which a culture emphasizes
ambition and achievement versus caring and nurture. In countries
highest in masculinity (Japan, Austria, Venezuela, Italy), men tend
to feel strong pressures for success, relatively few women hold
high - level positions, and job stress is high. The opposite is true
in countries low in masculinity (such as Denmark, Norway, the
Netherlands, and Sweden).
Hofstede argues that management practices and theories are inevita-
bly culture - bound. Most management theory has been developed in the
United States, which is culturally similar to nations where people speak
English and other northern European languages, but distinct from most
countries in Asia (as well as those speaking Romance languages). To
Hofstede, managers and scholars have too often assumed that what
works in their culture will work anywhere, an assumption that can have
disastrous results.
Hofstede also explores the relationship between national and orga-
nizational culture, noting that a common culture is a powerful form of
organizational glue. This is most likely to occur in multinationals in which
a home country culture reigns companywide, which in turn requires
that managers from outside the home country become bicultural. Many
American managers who work abroad, in Hofstede ’ s view, tend to live
in American enclaves and remain both monolingual and monocultural.
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Reframing Organizations274
Hofstede ’ s research was limited in many ways. His sample came from
only one American company (IBM), and many nations were absent
(China, Russia, most of Africa and Eastern Europe). His data are now
some four decades old. But no other work has been as infl uential (in
terms of citations) in demonstrating the pervasive impact of national
culture on organizations.
Bethune quickly launched a series of symbolic actions to get the company
headed in a new direction:
He removed the security cameras and opened the doors to the executive suite,
previously locked and accessible only with an ID.
He convened open houses in the executive offi ces with food and drink for
employees. He personally led tours of his offi ce, opening a closet door to
prove that his unloved predecessor, Frank Lorenzo, was really gone.
He sat in a different chair at each management meeting.
He gathered up old employee manuals full of rules and regulations and led a
group of employees to the parking lot for a bonfi re.
He ordered a new paint scheme for Continental ’ s fl eet. When the operations
managers complained the time frame was too short, Bethune told them, “ I
have a Beretta at home with a fi fteen - round magazine, and if you don ’ t get
those airplanes painted by July 1 I ’ m going to come in here and empty the
clip. You ’ re wonderful people and I love you, but you ’ re going to get those air-
planes painted or I ’ m going to shoot every last one of you. ” (As with Herb
Kelleher ’ s threat to drive an airplane over a local sheriff, recipients understood
that the real message was about passion and urgency, not physical violence.)
He invited a hundred of the airline ’ s best customers and their spouses to his
home for dinner and apologized for what they had put up with prior to 1994.
He used metaphors to illustrate principles of cultural cohesion. An example
was the watch, which, Bethune noted with a fl ourish, requires every part to
function.
He backed up intangible values with tangible rewards. Reliability, for exam-
ple, became a core value. This meant being on time all the time. When
Continental ’ s fl ights hit 71 percent, each employee received a check for $65;
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 275
when the company topped all other U.S. airlines in on - time performance,
each employee received $100. But the true value of the money was illustrated
in stories of how it was spent, often by employees buying something for
themselves or giving their kids a treat.
As a result of these and other actions, Continental began to haul in presti-
gious awards. The company received the J. D. Power Award for customer sat-
isfaction in 1996 and 1997 and was named 1996 Airline of the Year. The same
distinction was bestowed by OAG (Offi cial Airline Guide) in 2004, along with
Best Airline Based in North America and Best Executive Business Class. In
2002, the company earned spots on several of Fortune magazine ’ s A lists: num-
ber two on “ most admired global airlines, ” number thirty on “ most admired
global corporations, ” and number forty - two on “ 100 best companies to work
for in America. ” The magazine designated Continental the most admired global
company in 2006. Equally important, the company became profi table in 1995
and has remained so despite a highly competitive airline market and the indus-
try ’ s chronic economic woes.
Nordstrom ’ s Rooted Culture Nordstrom department stores are renowned for customer service and employee
satisfaction. Customers rave about its no - hassle, no - questions - asked commit-
ment to high - quality service: “ not service the way it used to be, but service that
never was ” (Spector and McCarthy, 1995, p. 1). Year after year, Nordstrom has
been ranked at or near the top in retail service ratings ( Business Week, 2007).
Founder John Nordstrom was a Swedish immigrant who settled in Seattle
after an odyssey across America and a brief stint looking for gold in Alaska. He
and Carl Wallin, a shoemaker, opened a shoe store. Nordstrom ’ s sons Elmer,
Everett, and Lloyd joined the business. Collectively, they anchored the fi rm in
an enduring philosophical principle: the customer is always right. The follow-
ing generations of Nordstroms expanded the business while maintaining a close
connection with historical roots.
The company relies on acculturated “ Nordies ” to induct new employees
into customer service the Nordstrom way. Newcomers begin in sales, learning
traditions from the ground up: “ When we are at our best, our frontline people are
lieutenants because they control the business. Our competition has foot soldiers on
the front line and lieutenants in the back ” (Spector and McCarthy, 1995, p. 106).
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Reframing Organizations276
Nordstrom ’ s unique commitment to customer service is heralded in its
“ heroics ” — tales of heroes and heroines going out of their way:
A customer fell in love with a particular pair of pleated burgundy slacks on
sale at Nordstrom ’ s downtown Seattle store. Unfortunately, the store was
out of her size. The sales associate got cash from the department manager,
marched across the street, bought the slacks at full price from a competitor,
brought them back, and sold them to the customer at Nordstrom ’ s reduced
price (Spector and McCarthy, 1995, p. 26).
When a customer inadvertently left her airline ticket on a Nordstrom counter,
the sales associate called the airline. When that didn ’ t work, she hopped a cab,
headed for the airport, and handed the ticket to a thankful customer (Spector
and McCarthy, 1995, p. 125).
According to legend, a Nordie once refunded a customer ’ s payment for a set
of automobile tires, even though the company had never stocked tires. In
1975, Nordstrom had acquired three stores from Northern Commercial in
Alaska. The customer had purchased the tires from Northern Commercial,
so Nordstrom took them back — as the story goes (Spector and McCarthy,
1995, p. 27).
Nordstrom ’ s commitment to customer service is reinforced in storewide rituals.
Newcomers encounter the company ’ s values in the initial employee orientation.
For many years, they were given a 5" � 8 " card labeled the “ Nordstrom Employee
Handbook, ” which listed only one rule: Use your sound judgment in all situations.
Although the no - rule rule is no longer part of the company ’ s orientation, the
emphasis on pleasing the customer is still dominant. At staff meetings, sales asso-
ciates compare and discuss sales techniques and role - play customer encounters.
Periodic ceremonies reinforce the company ’ s cherished values. From the
company ’ s early years, the Nordstrom family sponsored summer picnics and
Christmas dance parties, and the company continues to create occasions to cel-
ebrate customer service: “ We do crazy stuff. Monthly store pow - wows serve as
a kind of revival meeting, where customer letters of appreciation are read and
positive achievements are recognized, while co - workers whoop and cheer for one
another. Letters of complaint about Nordstrom customer service are also read
over the intercom (omitting the names of offending salespeople) ” (Spector and
McCarthy, 1995, pp. 120, 129).
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•
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Organizational Symbols and Culture 277
At one spirited sales meeting, a regional manager asked all present to call out
their sales targets for the year, which he posted on a large chart. Then the regional
manager uncovered his own target for each person. Anyone whose target was below
the regional manager ’ s was roundly booed. Those whose individual goals were
higher were acclaimed with enthusiastic cheers (Spector and McCarthy, 1995).
The delicate balance of competition, cooperation, and customer service has
served Nordstrom well. Its stellar identity has created a sterling image. In a sermon
titled “ The Gospel According to Nordstrom, ” one California minister “ praised the
retailer for carrying out the call of the gospel in ways more consistent and caring
than we sometimes do in the church ” (Spector and McCarthy, 1995, p. 21).
But symbolic luster must be persistently buffed to prevent the accumulat-
ing tarnish of time and change. Even though the fi rm continues to do well in
surveys, there have been sporadic complaints in recent years about rude clerks
and poor service, suggesting that Nordstrom might be slipping. It can happen
quickly. Starbucks, purveyor of coffee to the world, is also known for its heart-
felt, high - spirited culture. A 2007 memo from founder and chairman Howard
Schultz sounded a warning about the risk of cultural slippage resulting from
growth and technological change.
Starbucks had been growing at a phenomenal rate (from one hundred to
thirteen thousand stores in ten years) and had recently automated its espresso
makers and begun storing its coffee beans in airtight containers. These decisions
made rational sense but “ sacrifi ced the ‘ romance and theater ’ of the coffee shop
experience for effi ciency and profi t ” (Neil, 2007, p. 46). Schultz wrote: “ Some
people even call our stores sterile, cookie cutter, no longer refl ecting the passion
our partners feel about our coffee . . . . Stores no longer have the soul of the past
and refl ect a chain of stores vs. the warm feeling of a neighborhood store ” (Neil,
2007, p. 46). His memo called for stopping the cultural drift: “ It ’ s time to get back
to the core and make the changes that are necessary to evoke the heritage, the
tradition, and passion we all have for the Starbucks ’ experience ” (Wayne, 2007).
SUMMARY In contrast to traditional views emphasizing rationality, the symbolic frame high-
lights the tribal aspect of contemporary organizations. It centers on complexity and
ambiguity and emphasizes the idea that symbols mediate the meaning of work and
anchor culture. An organization’s culture is built over time as members develop
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Reframing Organizations278
beliefs, values, practices, and artifacts that seem to work and are transmitted to new
recruits. Defi ned as “the way we do things around here,” culture anchors an orga-
nization’s identity and sense of itself.
Myths, values, and vision bring cohesiveness, clarity, and direction in the
presence of confusion and mystery. Heroes and heroines are role models for
people to admire and emulate. Stories carry values and serve as powerful modes
of communication and instruction. Rituals and ceremonies provide scripts for
celebrating success and facing calamity. Metaphors, humor, and play offer escape
from the tyranny of facts and logic; they stimulate creative alternatives to time-
worn choices. Symbolic forms and activities are the basic building blocks of
culture, accumulated over time to shape an organization ’ s unique identity and
character. In The Feast of Fools, Cox (1969, p. 13) summarizes: “ Our links to yes-
terday and tomorrow depend also on the aesthetic, emotional, and symbolic
aspects of human life — on saga, play, and celebration. Without festival and fan-
tasy, man would not really be a historical being at all.”
NOTE 1. Personal observation by author. Chancellor Joe B. Wyatt ’ s opening convo-
cation, Vanderbilt University, 1989.
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279
Culture in Action
Prescriptions and theories for better teamwork often miss the deeper secret of how groups and teams reach the state of grace and peak performance. Former Visa CEO Dee Hock captured
the heart of the issue: “ In the fi eld of group endeavor, you will see
incredible events in which the group performs far beyond the sum
of its individual talents. It happens in the symphony, in the ballet,
in the theater, in sports, and equally in business. It is easy to recog-
nize and impossible to defi ne. It is a mystique. It cannot be achieved
without immense effort, training, and cooperation, but effort, train-
ing, and cooperation alone rarely create it ” (quoted in Schlesinger,
Eccles, and Gabarro, 1983, p. 173).
With a population of only slightly more than two million people in the 1770s,
how was the United States able to produce an extraordinary leadership team
that included John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and George
Washington? In World War II, did anyone believe that Britain ’ s Royal Air Force
could defend the island nation against Hitler ’ s Luftwaffe? As Winston Churchill
later commented, “ Never have so many owed so much to so few. ” Did anyone
expect the Iraqi soccer team to take home the Asian Cup in 2007? With all the
turmoil and strife in Iraq, it is hard to picture the country even fi elding a team.
And how could two graduate students who came from opposite ends of the earth
T H I R T E E N
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations280
(Michigan and Moscow), and who initially didn ’ t like one another, create a com-
pany whose name — Google — would become a household word?
Are such peak performances simply a great mystery — beautiful when they
happen but no more predictable or controllable than California ’ s next earth-
quake? In this chapter, we analyze a well - documented team that achieved a state
of transcendence. The story takes us directly to the symbolic roots of fl ow, spirit,
and magic.
THE EAGLE GROUP ’ S SOURCES OF SUCCESS Tracy Kidder, in The Soul of a New Machine (1981), wrote a dazzling account of a
small group of engineers at Data General who created a new computer in record
time in the 1970s. Despite scant resources and limited support, the Eagle Group
outperformed all other Data General divisions to produce a new state - of - the - art
machine. The technology is now antiquated, but lessons from how they pulled it
off are as current as ever. 1
Why did the Eagle Group succeed? So many groups of engineers — or educa-
tors, physicians, executives, or graduate students — start out with high hopes but
falter and fail. Were the project members extraordinarily talented? Not really. Each
was highly skilled, but there were equally talented engineers working on other Data
General projects. Were team members always treated with dignity and respect?
Quite the contrary. As one engineer noted, “ No one ever pats anyone on the back ”
(p. 179). Instead, the group experienced what they called mushroom management:
“ Put ’ em in the dark, feed ’ em shit, and watch ’ em grow ” (p. 109). For over a year,
group members jeopardized their health, their families, and their careers: “ I ’ m fl at
out by defi nition. I ’ m a mess. It ’ s terrible. It ’ s a lot of fun ” (p. 119).
Were fi nancial rewards a motivating factor? Group members said explicitly
that they did not work for money. Nor were they motivated by fame. Heroic
efforts were rewarded neither by formal appreciation nor by offi cial applause.
The group quietly dissolved shortly after completing the new computer, and
most members moved unrecognized to other parts of Data General, or to other
companies. Their experience fi ts later successes at Cisco Systems, where Paulson
concludes, “ All personnel are driven by the desire to be a part of a winning orga-
nization ” (2001, p. 187).
Perhaps the group ’ s structure accounted for its success. Were its members pur-
suing well - defi ned and laudable goals? The group leader, Tom West, offered the
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Culture in Action 281
precept that “ not everything worth doing is worth doing well. ” Pushed to translate
his maxim, he elaborated, “ If you can do a quick - and - dirty job and it works, do it ”
(p. 119). Did the group have clear and well - coordinated roles and relationships?
According to Kidder, it kept no meaningful charts, graphs, or organization tables.
One of the group ’ s engineers put it bluntly: “ The whole management structure —
anyone in Harvard Business School would have barfed ” (p. 116).
Can the political frame unravel the secret of the group ’ s phenomenal perfor-
mance? Perhaps group members were motivated more by power than by money:
“ There ’ s a big high in here somewhere for me that I don ’ t fully understand.
Some of it ’ s a raw power trip. The reason I work is because I win ” (p. 179). They
were encouraged to circumvent formal channels to advance group interests: “ If
you can ’ t get what you need from some manager at your level in another depart-
ment, go to his boss — that ’ s the way to get things done ” (p. 191). Group mem-
bers were also unusually direct and confrontational: “ Feeling sorely provoked,
[David] Peck one day said to this engineer, ‘ You ’ re an asshole. ’ Ordered by his
boss to apologize, Peck went to the man he had insulted, looking sheepish, and
said, ‘ I ’ m sorry you ’ re an asshole ’ ” (p. 224).
The group was highly competitive with others in the company: “ There ’ s a
thing you learn at Data General, if you work here for any period of time . . .
that nothing ever happens unless you push it ” (p. 111). They also competed with
one another. Their “ tube wars ” are a typical example. Carl Alsing, head of a sub-
group known as the Microkids, returned from lunch one day to fi nd that all his
fi les had become empty shells: the names were there, but the contents had van-
ished. It took him an hour to fi nd where the real fi les were hidden. Alsing coun-
terattacked by creating an encrypted fi le and tantalizing the team, “ There ’ s erotic
writing in there and if you can fi nd it, you can read it ” (p. 107).
Here we begin to encounter the secrets of the group ’ s success. The tube wars —
and other exchanges among group members — were more than power struggles.
They were a form of play that released tensions, created bonds, and contributed
to an unusual group spirit. A shared and cohesive culture, rather than a clear,
well - defi ned structure, was the invisible force that gave the team its drive.
From the Eagle Group ’ s experience we can distill several important tenets of
the symbolic frame that are broadly applicable to groups and teams:
How someone becomes a group member is important.
Diversity supports a team ’ s competitive advantage.
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Reframing Organizations282
Example, not command, holds a team together.
A specialized language fosters cohesion and commitment.
Stories carry history and values and reinforce group identity.
Humor and play reduce tension and encourage creativity.
Ritual and ceremony lift spirits and reinforce values.
Informal cultural players make contributions disproportionate to their for-
mal role.
Soul is the secret of success.
Becoming a Member Joining a team involves more than a rational decision. It is a mutual choice
marked by some form of ritual. In the Eagle Group, the process of becoming
a member was called “ signing up. ” When interviewing recruits, Alsing conveyed
the message that they were volunteering to climb Mount Everest without a rope
despite lacking the “ right stuff ” to keep up with other climbers. When the new
recruits protested they wanted to climb Mount Everest anyway, Alsing told them
they would fi rst have to fi nd out if they were good enough. After the selections
had been made, Alsing summed it up this way: “ It was kind of like recruiting for
a suicide mission. You ’ re gonna die, but you ’ re gonna die in glory ” (p. 66).
Through the signing - up ritual, an engineer became part of a special effort
and agreed to forsake family, friends, and health to accomplish the impossible.
It was a sacred declaration: “ I want to do this job and I ’ ll give it my heart and
soul ” (p. 63).
Diversity Is a Competitive Advantage Though nearly all the group ’ s members were engineers, each had unique skills
and style. Tom West, the group ’ s leader, was by reputation a highly talented tech-
nical debugger. He was also aloof and unapproachable, the “ Prince of Darkness. ”
Steve Wallach, the group ’ s computer architect, was a highly creative maverick.
According to Kidder (p. 75), before accepting West ’ s invitation to join the group,
he went to Edson de Castro, the president of Data General, to fi nd out precisely
what he ’ d be working on:
“ Okay, ” Wallach said, “ what the fuck do you want? ”
“ I want a thirty - two - bit Eclipse, ” de Castro told him.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
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Culture in Action 283
“ If we can do this, you won ’ t cancel it on us? ” Wallach asked. “ You ’ ll leave us
alone? ”
“ That ’ s what I want, a thirty - two, ” de Castro assured him, “ a thirty - two - bit
Eclipse and no mode bit. ”
Wallach signed up. His love of literature, stories, and verse provided a lit-
erary substructure for the technical architecture of the new machine. Alsing,
the group ’ s microcode expert, was as warm and approachable as West was
cold and remote. He headed the Microkids, the group of young engineers
who programmed the new machine. Ed Rasala, Alsing ’ s counterpart, headed
the Hardy Boys, the group ’ s hardware design team. Rasala was a solid, hyper-
active, risk - taking, detail - oriented mechanic: “ I may not be the smartest
designer in the world, a CPU giant, but I ’ m dumb enough to stick with it to
the end ” (p. 142).
Diversity among the group ’ s top engineers was institutionalized in specialized
functions. One engineer, for example, was viewed as a creative genius who liked
inventing an esoteric idea and then trying to make it work. Another was a crafts-
man who enjoyed fi xing things, working tirelessly until the last bug had been
tracked down and eliminated. West buffered the team from upper management
interference and served as a group “ devil. ” Wallach created the original design.
Alsing and the Microkids created “ a synaptic language that would fuse the physi-
cal machine with the programs that would tell it what to do ” (p. 60). Rasala and
the Hardy Boys built the physical circuitry. Understandably, there was tension
among these diverse individuals and groups. Harnessing the resulting energy
galvanized the parts into a working team.
Example, Not Command Wallach ’ s design generated modest coordination for Eagle ’ s autonomous indi-
viduals and groups. The group had some rules but paid little attention to them.
De Castro, the CEO, was viewed as a distant god. He was never there physically,
but his presence was always felt. West, the group ’ s offi cial leader, rarely inter-
fered with the actual work, nor was he particularly visible in the laboratory. One
Sunday morning in January, however, when the team was supposed to be resting,
a Hardy Boy happened to come by the lab and found West sitting in front of one
of the prototypes. The next Sunday, West wasn ’ t in the lab, and after that they
rarely saw him. For a long time he did not hint that he might again put his hands
inside the machine.
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Reframing Organizations284
West contributed primarily by causing problems for the engineers to solve and
making mundane events and issues appear special. He created an almost end-
less series of “ brushfi res ” so he could inspire his staff to put them out. He had a
genius for fi nding drama and romance in everyday routine. Other members of the
group ’ s formal leadership followed de Castro and West in creating ambiguity, encour-
aging inventiveness, and leading by example. Heroes of the moment gave inspiration
and direction. Subtle and implicit signals rather than concrete and explicit guidelines
or decisions held the group together and directed it toward a common goal.
Specialized Language Every group develops words, phrases, and metaphors unique to its circum-
stances. A specialized language both refl ects and shapes a group ’ s culture. Shared
language allows team members to communicate easily, with minimal misun-
derstanding. To the members of the Eagle Group, for example, a kludge was a
poor, inelegant solution — such as a machine with loose wires held together with
duct tape. A canard was anything false. Fundamentals were the source of enlight-
ened thinking. The word realistically typically prefaced fl ights of fantasy. “ Give
me a core dump ” meant tell me your thoughts. A stack overfl ow meant that an
engineer ’ s memory compartments were too full, and a one - stack - deep mind indi-
cated shallow thinking. “ Eagle ” was a label for the project, while “ Hardy Boys ”
and “ Microkids ” gave identity to the subgroups. Two prototype computers were
named Woodstock and Trixie.
A shared language binds a group together and is a visible sign of membership.
It also sets a group apart and reinforces unique values and beliefs. Asked about
the Eagle Group ’ s headquarters, West observed, “ It ’ s basically a cattle yard.
What goes on here is not part of the real world. ” Asked for an explanation, West
remarked, “ Mm - hmm. The language is different ” (p. 50).
Stories Carry History, Values, and Group Identity In high - performing organizations and groups, stories keep traditions alive and
provide examples to guide everyday behavior. Group lore extended and rein-
forced the subtle yet powerful infl uence of Eagle ’ s leaders — some of them distant
and remote. West ’ s reputation as a “ troublemaker ” and an “ excitement junkie ”
was conveyed through stories about computer wars of the mid - 1970s. Alsing said
of West that he was always prepared and never raised his voice, but conveyed
intensity and the conviction that he knew the way out of whatever storm was
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Culture in Action 285
currently battering the group. West also had the skills of a good politician. He
knew how to develop agendas, build alliances, and negotiate with potential sup-
porters or opponents. When he had a particular objective in mind, he would fi rst
go upstairs to sign up senior executives. Then he went to people one at a time,
telling them the bosses liked the idea and asking them to come on board: “ They
say, ‘ Ah, it sounds like you ’ re just gonna put a bag on the side of the Eclipse, ’
and Tom ’ ll give ’ em his little grin and say, ‘ It ’ s more than that, we ’ re really gonna
build this fucker and it ’ s gonna be fast as greased lightning. ’ He tells them, ‘ We ’ re
gonna do it by April ’ ” (p. 44).
Stories of persistence, irreverence, and creativity encouraged others to go
beyond themselves, adding new exploits and tales to Eagle ’ s lore. For example,
as the group neared completion, a debugging problem threatened the entire
project. Jim Veres, one of the engineers, worked day and night to fi nd the error.
Ken Holberger, one of the Hardy Boys, drove to work early one morning, ponder-
ing the state of the project and wondering if it would ever get done. He was awak-
ened from his reverie by an unexpected scene as he entered the lab. “ A great heap
of paper lies on the fl oor, a continuous sheet of computer paper streaming out of
the carriage at [the] system console. Stretched out, the sheet would run across the
room and back again several times. You could fi t a fairly detailed description of
American history . . . on it. Veres sits in the midst of this chaos, the picture of the
scholar. He ’ s examined it all. He turns to Holberger. ‘ I found it, ’ he says ” (p. 207).
Humor and Play Groups often focus single - mindedly on the task at hand, shunning anything not
directly work - related. Seriousness replaces godliness as a cardinal virtue. Effective
teams balance seriousness with play and humor. Surgical teams, cockpit crews,
and many other groups have learned that joking and playful banter are essential
sources of invention and team spirit. Humor releases tension and helps resolve
issues arising from day - to - day routines as well as from sudden emergencies.
Play among the members of the Eagle project was an innate part of the group
process. When Alsing wanted the Microkids to learn how to manipulate the
computer known as Trixie, he made up a game. As the Microkids came on board,
he told each of them to fi gure out how to write a program in Trixie ’ s assembly
language. The program had to fetch and print contents of a fi le stored inside the
computer. The Microkids went to work, learned their way around the machine,
and felt great satisfaction — until Alsing ’ s perverse sense of humor tripped them
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Reframing Organizations286
up. When they fi nally found the elusive fi le, they were greeted with the message
“ Access Denied. ” Through such play, the Microkids learned to use the computer,
coalesced into a team, and practiced negotiating their new technical environ-
ment. They also learned that their playful leader valued creativity.
Humor was a continuous thread as the team struggled with its formidable
task. Humor often stretched the boundaries of good taste, but that too was part
of the group ’ s identity:
[Alsing] drew his chair up to his terminal and typed a few letters — a
short code that put him in touch with Trixie, the machine reserved
for the use of his microcoding team. “ We ’ ve anthropomorphized
Trixie to a ridiculous extent, ” he said.
He typed, WHO.
On the dark - blue screen of the cathode - ray tube, with alacrity, an
answer appeared: CARL.
WHERE, typed Alsing.
IN THE ROAD, WHERE ELSE! Trixie replied.
HOW.
ERROR, read the message on the screen.
“ Oh, yeah, I forgot, ” said Alsing, and he typed, PLEASE HOW.
THAT ’ S FOR US TO KNOW AND YOU TO FIND OUT.
Alsing seemed satisfi ed with that, and he typed, WHEN.
RIGHT FUCKING NOW, wrote the machine.
WHY, wrote Alsing.
BECAUSE WE LIKE TO CARL [pp. 90 – 91].
Throughout the year and a half it took to build their new machine, engineers of
the Eagle project relied on play and humor as a source of relaxation, stimulation,
enlightenment, and spiritual renewal.
Ritual and Ceremony Rituals and ceremonies are expressive occasions. As parentheses in an ordinary
workday, they enclose and defi ne special forms of behavior. What occurs on the sur-
face is not nearly as important as the deeper meaning communicated beneath visible
behavior. Despite the stereotype of narrowly task - focused engineers with little time
for anything nonrational, the Eagle Group understood the importance of symbolic
activity. From the beginning, leadership encouraged ritual and ceremony.
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Culture in Action 287
As one example, Rasala, head of the Hardy Boys, established a rule requir-
ing that changes in the boards of the prototype be updated each morning. This
activity allowed efforts to be coordinated formally. More important, the daily
update was an occasion for informal communication, bantering, and gaining a
sense of the whole. The engineers disliked the daily procedure, so Rasala changed
it to once a week — on Saturday. He made it a point always to be there himself.
Eagle ’ s leaders met regularly, but their meetings focused more on symbolic
issues than on substance. “ ‘ We could be in a lot of trouble here, ’ West might say,
referring to some current problem. And Wallach or Rasala or Alsing would reply,
‘ You mean you could be in a lot of trouble, right, Tom? ’ It was Friday, they were
going home soon, and relaxing, they could half forget that they would be com-
ing back to work tomorrow ” (p. 132). Friday afternoon is a customary time to
wind down and relax. Honoring such a tradition was all the more important for
a group whose members often worked all week and then all weekend. West made
himself available to anyone who wanted to chat. Near the end of the day, before
hurrying home, he would lean back in his chair with his offi ce door open and
entertain any visitor.
In addition to recurring rituals, the Eagle Group convened intermittent cere-
monies to raise their spirits and reinforce their sense of shared mission. Toward
the end of the project, Alsing instigated a ceremony to trigger a burst of renewed
energy for the fi nal push. The festivities called attention to the values of creativ-
ity, hard work, and teamwork. A favorite pretext for parties was presentation of
the Honorary Microcoder Awards that Alsing and the Microcoder Team insti-
tuted. Not to be outdone, the Hardy Boys cooked up the PAL Awards (named
for the programmable array logic chips used in the machines). The fi rst was pre-
sented after work at a local establishment called the Cain Ridge Saloon. The cita-
tion read as follows (p. 250):
H O N O R A R Y P A L A W A R D
In recognition of unsolicited contributions to the advancement of
Eclipse hardware above and beyond the normal call of duty, we
hereby convey unto you our thanks and congratulations on achiev-
ing this “ high ” honor.
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Reframing Organizations288
The same values and spirit were reinforced again and again in a continued
cycle of celebratory events:
Chuck Holland [Alsing ’ s main submanager] handed out his own spe-
cial awards to each member of the Microteam, the Under Extraordinary
Pressure Awards. They looked like diplomas. There was one for Neal
Firth, “ who gave us a computer before the hardware guys did, ” and one
to Betty Shanahan, “ for putting up with a bunch of creepy guys. ” After
dispensing the Honorary Microcoder Awards to almost every possible
candidate, the Microteam instituted the All - Nighter Award. The fi rst
of these went to Jim Guyer, the citation ingeniously inserted under the
clear plastic coating of an insulated coffee cup [p. 250].
The Contribution of Informal Cultural Players Alsing was the main organizer and instigator of parties. He was also the Eagle
Group ’ s conscience and nearly everyone ’ s confi dant. For a time when he was still
in college, Alsing had wanted to become a psychologist. He adopted that sort of
role now. He kept track of his team ’ s technical progress, but was more visible
as the social director of the Microteam, and often of the entire Eclipse Group.
Fairly early in the project, Chuck Holland had complained, “ Alsing ’ s hard to be a
manager for, because he goes around you a lot and tells your people to do some-
thing else. ” But Holland also conceded, “ The good thing about him is that you
can go and talk to him. He ’ s more of a regular guy than most managers ” (p. 105).
Every group or organization has a “ priest ” or “ priestess ” who ministers to spiri-
tual needs. Informally, these people hear confessions, give blessings, maintain tra-
ditions, encourage ceremonies, and intercede in matters of gravest importance.
Alsing did all these things and, like the tribal priest, acted as a counterpart to and
interpreter of the intentions of the chief:
West warned him several times, “ If you get too close to the people
who work for you, Alsing, you ’ re gonna get burned. ” But West didn ’ t
interfere, and he soon stopped issuing warnings.
One evening, while alone with West in West ’ s offi ce, Alsing said:
“ Tom, the kids think you ’ re an ogre. You don ’ t even say hello to
them. ”
West smiled and replied. “ You ’ re doing fi ne, Alsing ” [pp. 109 – 110].
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Culture in Action 289
The duties of Rosemarie Seale, the group ’ s secretary, also went well beyond
formal boundaries. If Alsing was the priest, she was the mother superior. She did
all the usual secretarial chores — answering the phones, preparing documents,
and constructing budgets. But she found particular joy in serving as a kind of
den mother who solved minor crises that arose almost daily. When new mem-
bers came on, it was Rosemarie Seale who worried about fi nding them a desk
and some pencils. When paychecks went astray, she would track them down and
get them to their intended recipients. She liked the job, she said, because she felt
that she was doing something important.
In any group, a network of informal players deals with human issues outside
formal channels. On the Eagle project, their efforts were encouraged, appreci-
ated, and rewarded outside the formal chain of command; they helped keep the
project on track.
Soul Is the Secret of Success The symbolic side of the Eagle Group was the real secret of its success. Its soul,
or culture, created a new machine: “ Ninety - eight percent of the thrill comes
from knowing that the thing you designed works, and works almost the way you
expected it would. If that happens, part of you is in that machine ” (p. 273). All the
members of the Eagle Group put something of themselves into the new computer.
Individual efforts went well beyond the job and were supported by a way of life
that encouraged each person to commit to doing something of signifi cance. This
commitment was elicited through the ritual of signing up and then maintained
and accentuated by shared diversity, exceptional leaders, common language, sto-
ries, rituals, ceremonies, play, and humor. In the best sense of the word, the Eagle
Group was a team, and the efforts of the individual members were knitted together
by a cohesive culture. Symbolic elements were at the heart of the group ’ s success.
The experience of the Eagle Group is not unusual. After extensive research
on high - performing groups, Vaill (1982) concluded that spirit was at the core
of every such group he studied. Members of such groups consistently “ felt the
spirit, ” a feeling essential to the meaning and value of their work. Bennis could
have been writing about the Eagle Group when he concluded, “ All Great Groups
believe that they are on a mission from God, that they could change the world,
make a dent in the universe. They are obsessed with their work. It becomes not
a job but a fervent quest. That belief is what brings the necessary cohesion and
energy to their work ” (1997, p. 1).
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Reframing Organizations290
More and more teams and organizations, like the Eagle project, now realize
that culture, soul, and spirit are the wellspring of high performance. The U.S.
Air Force, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, embarked on a vigorous effort
to reaffi rm traditions and rebuild its culture. “ Cohesion is a principle of war ”
was added to the list of core values. Project Warrior brought heroes — living and
dead — forward as visible examples of the right stuff. Rituals were revitalized
and reinforced. For example, the Air Force instituted a “ reblue - ing ” ceremony to
encourage recommitment to its traditions and values.
Countless other organizations have taken similar steps. Mitsubishi, with
more than twenty - fi ve thousand products ranging from “ noodles to space satel-
lites ” (Lifson and Takagi, 1981, p. 11), uses an elaborate entrance ceremony for
newly hired employees as part of its effort to reinforce a corporate culture that
stresses professionalism, cooperation, and entrepreneurship. Jan Carlzon revital-
ized the culture of the Scandinavian Air System around the precepts that every
encounter between a customer and an SAS employee was a “ moment of truth ”
and that SAS “ fl ies people, not planes ” (Carlzon, 1987, p. 27). The commitment
at Outback Steakhouse to “ No rules, just right ” has distinguished the company in
the intensely competitive restaurant industry. Instilling in employees the theme
of creating a cheerful, comfortable, enjoyable, and fun atmosphere has made
the restaurant chain a huge success in an industry littered with failures (Taylor,
Ramaya, and Puia, 2003).
SUMMARY Symbolic perspectives question traditional views that building a team mainly
means fi nding the right people and designing an appropriate structure. The
essence of high performance is spirit. If we were to banish play, ritual, ceremony,
and myth, we would destroy teamwork, not enhance it. There are many signs
that contemporary organizations are at a critical juncture because of a crisis of
meaning and faith. Managers wonder how to build team spirit when turnover
is high, resources are tight, and people worry about losing their jobs. Such ques-
tions are important, but by themselves they limit managerial imagination and
divert attention from deeper issues of faith and purpose. Managers are inescap-
ably accountable for budget and bottom line; they have to respond to individual
needs, legal requirements, and economic pressures. But they can serve a deeper
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Culture in Action 291
and more durable function if they recognize that team building at its heart is a
spiritual undertaking. It is both a search for the spirit within and creation of a
community of believers united by shared faith and shared culture. Peak perfor-
mance emerges as a team discovers its soul.
NOTE 1. Unless otherwise attributed, page number citations in this chapter are to
Kidder ’ s book.
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293
Organization as Theater
Theater as an activity, as a staging of reality, depends on the ability of the audience to frame what they experience. It depends precisely on the audience recognizing, being aware, that they are an audience; they are
witnesses to, not participants in, a performance. It depends further on a distinction between actors and the parts they play — characters may die on stage, but actors will live to take a bow. Finally, theater depends on a recognition that performances play with reality in such a way as to turn
the taken - for - granted into a plausible appearance.
— Mangham and Overington, 1987, p. 49
All the world ’ s a stage, And all the men and women merely players.” So wrote Shakespeare some four hundred years ago, capturing an enduring truth we sometimes neglect in our modern
love affair with facts and logic. Much of human behavior is aimed
at getting things done, and the assumption of linear causality works
when the connection between means and ends is clear and measur-
able. But the logic falters when results are hard to produce and pin
down. A factory rises or falls on what it produces. But what about
a church or temple? Budget and congregation size are measurable,
but souls saved and lives enriched are elusive. Instead, shared faith
F O U R T E E N
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations294
and liturgy tie believers together and bestow legitimacy. As in theater,
performance and appearance matter more than data and logic.
Even in technical environments, a dramaturgical view offers enlightenment. The
story of the U.S. Navy ’ s Polaris missile system is a fascinating example of show
business at work. In its time, the project was heralded as an exemplar of effec-
tive, effi cient government work. One of its attributes was reliance on modern
management techniques such as PERT (Program Evaluation Review Techniques)
charts and PPBS (Program Planning and Budgeting Systems) — both better
known by their acronyms than by their names. The methods were embodied
in specialist roles, technical divisions, management meetings, and the Special
Projects Offi ce. In the wake of the project ’ s success — on time and under bud-
get — analysts gave credit to the project ’ s innovative management approach. The
admiral in charge was recognized for bringing modern management techniques
to the U.S. Navy. A team of visiting British experts recommended PERT to their
Admiralty.
But a later study by Sapolsky (1972) revealed a symbolic explanation for
the project ’ s accomplishments. Management innovations were highly visible
but only marginally connected to the actual work. Specialists ’ activities were
loosely linked to other elements of the project. The plans and charts produced
by the technical division were mostly ignored. Management meetings served
as public arenas to chide poor performers and to stoke the project ’ s religious
fervor. The Special Projects Offi ce served as an offi cial briefi ng area. Visiting
dignitaries were regaled with impressive diagrams and charts mostly unrelated
to the project ’ s progress. Upon its visit, the team from the British Navy appar-
ently surmised all this — and still recommended a similar approach back home
(Sapolsky, 1972).
Instead of serving intended rational purposes, modern management tech-
niques contributed to a saga that built external legitimacy and support and kept
critics at bay. This myth afforded breathing space for work to go forward and ele-
vated participants ’ spirits and self - confi dence. The Polaris story demonstrates the
virtues of drama in engaging the attention and appreciation of both internal and
external audiences: “ An alchemist ’ s combination of whirling computers, bright -
colored charts, and fast - talking public relations offi cers gave the Special Projects
Offi ce a truly effective management system. It mattered not whether the parts of
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Organization as Theater 295
the system functioned, or even existed. It mattered only that certain people, for a
certain period of time, believed that they did ” (Sapolsky, 1972, p. 129).
Of course, not all theater has a happy ending. The dramatic stage features trag-
edies as well as triumphs. U2 ’ s music video “ The Saints Are Coming ” demonstrates
the power of drama in driving home the meaning of an experience. The video,
which focuses on the effects of Hurricane Katrina, opens with scenes of the storm ’ s
traumatic aftermath: New Orleans under water, survivors trapped on roofs plead-
ing for help, the horror of conditions at the Superdome, widespread devastation.
The music ’ s lyrics plaintively call for the next act: When will aid arrive?
CNN news fl ashes appear periodically on the screen below images of the rav-
aged city, showing troops redeployed to the city from Iraq and U.S. Air Force aid
missions. With the melancholic lyrics as musical background, the video shows
swarms of Black Hawk helicopters arriving to pluck victims from roofs, and
larger helicopters and Harrier fi ghters dropping food and medical supplies. The
video fades and a large sign appears: “ Not as seen on TV. ”
The U2 video packs a wallop for several reasons: Bono himself is a heroic
symbol on the world stage. The opening acts reveal the pathos all Americans
observed initially. The “ troops to the rescue ” imagery conveys what everyone
wanted to see; the fi nal scene transports us back to what viewers actually saw on
their television sets.
During previous hurricanes, FEMA had been cast as a heroic rescuer. The
script was clear. Hurricane hits, bringing devastation and suffering. FEMA
arrives with symbolic fanfare to dispense aid and hope to victims. A world audi-
ence applauds the performance. In New Orleans, the drama went off - track. The
hero missed the show. The audience waited for an appearance that never came —
or came too late. The once - heroic agency was transformed into an inept per-
former in a bad play.
The juxtaposed theatrical masks of comedy and tragedy capture the different
dramas played out by Polaris and FEMA. Polaris capitalized on a theatrical presenta-
tion to produce a smash hit. FEMA blew its performance and dismayed its audience.
The symbolic frame recasts organizational structures and processes as secu-
lar drama that expresses our fears, joys, and expectations. Theater arouses emo-
tions and kindles our spirit or reveals our fears. It reduces bewilderment and
soothes open wounds. It provides a shared basis for understanding the present
and imagining a more promising tomorrow. Dramaturgical and institutional
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Reframing Organizations296
theorists have explored the role of theater in organizations, and we begin this
chapter by discussing their views. We then look at structure as theater and do the
same with a number of organizational processes.
DRAMATURGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY Institutional theory is a recent addition to the management literature that draws
on ideas from earlier dramaturgical theories. We can identify two dramaturgical
traditions (Boje, Luhman, and Cunliffe, 2003), one represented by the work of
Erving Goffman (1959, 1974), who pioneered in use of theater as a metaphor for
understanding organizations, and the other by the work of Kenneth Burke (1937,
1945, 1972), who drew his inspiration from philosophy and literary criticism.
Goffman approached organizations as if they were theatrical; Burke saw them
as theater. Despite their differences, both theorists opened a window for seeing
organizations in a new way: “ Most of our organizational life is carefully scripted,
we play out our scenes in organizationally approved dress codes and play the
game by acceptable roles of conduct ” (Boje, Luhman, and Cunliffe, 2003, p. 4).
Whereas dramaturgical theorists focus on social interaction among individu-
als and on internal situations, institutional scholars extend theatrical examples
like Polaris and FEMA to the interface between organizations and their publics:
“ In technical organizations, the development of a rational plan is a prelude to the
reconstruction and reintegration of a pattern of production activities. In institu-
tionalized organizations, the creation of a rational plan constitutes a dramatur-
gical alternative to actual changes. Plans are regarded as ends in themselves — as
evidence that we are a humane and scientifi c people who have brought yet
another problem under rational control ” (Meyer and Rowan, 1983a, p. 126).
DiMaggio and Powell, for example, conclude that in some contexts orga-
nizations worry more about how innovations appear than what they add to
effectiveness: “ New practices become infused with value beyond the techni-
cal requirements of the task at hand. . . . As an innovation spreads, a threshold
is reached beyond which adoption provides legitimacy rather than improves
performance ” (1983, p. 142). Staw and Epstein (2000) present evidence that
adoption of modern management techniques accentuates a company ’ s legiti-
macy and heightens CEO compensation, even if the methods are not fully
implemented. Economic performance does not improve, but perceptions of
innovativeness and confi dence in management rise.
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Organization as Theater 297
Institutional theory is not without its critics (see Scott and Davis, 2007). But
the ideas provide a counterweight to traditional views of organizations as closed,
rational systems. In such views, functional demands shape social architecture.
The environment serves as a source of raw materials and a market for fi nished
products. Effi ciency, internal control of the means of production, and economic
performance are key concerns. External fl uctuations and production uncertain-
ties are buffered by rational devices such as forecasting, stockpiling, leveling
peaks and valleys of supply and demand, and growth (so as to get more leverage
over the environment).
Institutional theorists present a dramaturgical retake on rational imagery.
Organizations, particularly those with vague goals and weak technologies, cannot
seal themselves off from external events and pressures. They are constantly buf-
feted by larger social, political, and economic trends. The challenge is sustaining
isomorphism — that is, schools need to look like schools and churches like
churches in order to project legitimacy and engender support, faith, and hope
among constituents. Structure and processes must refl ect widely held myths and
expectations. When production and results are hard to measure, correct appear-
ance and presentation become the prevailing gauge of effectiveness.
G R E A T E S T H I T S F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T U D I E S
Hit Number 1: Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “ The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, ” American Sociological Review, Apr. 1983, 48, 147 – 160
At the top of our list of greatest hits (up from third place in the last
edition) is an article by Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell that par-
allels our view of organization as theater. Isomorphism, as DiMaggio
and Powell use the word, refers to processes that cause organizations
to become more like other organizations, particularly members of the
same “ organizational fi eld. ” The authors defi ne an organizational fi eld
as a set of organizations that “ constitute a recognized area of institu-
tional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory
agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or
products ” (p. 148). This is similar to the concept of an organizational
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Reframing Organizations298
ecosystem, discussed in Chapter Eleven . As an example, think about
public schools. They are like each other but unlike most other kinds of
organization. They have similar buildings, classrooms, curricula, staffi ng
patterns, gyms, and parent - teacher organizations. The structural frame
explains these similarities as resulting from the need to align structure
with goals, task, and technology. DiMaggio and Powell counter that
isomorphism occurs for reasons unrelated to effi ciency or effectiveness.
They describe three kinds of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and
normative. Coercive isomorphism occurs when organizations become
more similar in response to outside pressures or requirements. For
example, MBA programs tend to have similar admission requirements,
curricula, and faculty credentials because so many of them are accred-
ited by the same body using the same standards. Mimetic isomorphism
occurs when one organization simply copies another, as when a univer-
sity of modest reputation adopts a set of freshman requirements bor-
rowed from those at Harvard or Yale. To DiMaggio and Powell imitation
is particularly likely in the presence of fuzzy goals and uncertain tech-
nology. When uncertainty makes it hard to prove one approach better
than another, imitation saves time and may buy legitimacy.
Normative isomorphism, the third type, occurs because professionals
(such as lawyers, doctors, engineers, and teachers) bring shared ideas,
values, and norms from their training to the workplace. DiMaggio and
Powell argue that professionally trained individuals are becoming more
numerous and predominant. Managers with MBAs from accredited busi-
ness schools carry shared values, beliefs, and practices wherever they
go. Latest ideas from business schools may or may not produce better
results, but they spread rapidly because the newly minted professionals
believe in them.
The primary benefi t of isomorphism is to improve an organization ’ s
image rather than its products and services: “ Each of the institutional
isomorphic processes can be expected to proceed in the absence of
evidence that they increase internal organizational effi ciency. To the
extent that organizational effectiveness is enhanced, the reason will
often be that organizations are rewarded for being similar to other
organizations in their fi elds. This similarity can make it easier for orga-
nizations to transact with other organizations, to attract career - minded
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Organization as Theater 299
staff, to be acknowledged as legitimate and reputable, and to fi t into
administrative categories that defi ne eligibility for public and private
grants and contracts ” (p. 153).
The idea that presentation can be more important than tangible results may
seem heretical. Such heresy can easily lead to cynicism, undercutting confi dence
in organizations and undermining faith and morale for those struggling to make
a difference. Skepticism is spawned mainly by rationalists who champion a tidy
cause - and - effect world where concrete outcomes matter most. The symbolic
frame offers a more hopeful interpretation. Institutionalized structures, activi-
ties, and events become expressive components of organizational theater. They
create ongoing drama that entertains, creates meaning, and portrays the orga-
nization to itself and outsiders. They undergird life ’ s meaning. Geertz observed
this phenomenon in Balinese pageants, where “ the carefully crafted and scripted,
assiduously enacted ritualism of court culture was . . . ‘ not merely the drapery of
political order but its substance ’ ” (Mangham and Overington, 1987, p. 39).
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AS THEATER Recall that the structural frame depicts a workplace as a formalized network of
interdependent roles and units coordinated through a variety of horizontal and
vertical linkages. Structural patterns align with purpose and are determined by
goals, technologies, and environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1979;
Woodward, 1970). In contrast, a symbolic view approaches structure as stage
design: an arrangement of space, lighting, props, and costumes that make the
drama vivid and credible to its audience.
One dramaturgical role of structure is refl ecting and conveying prevailing social
values and myths. Settings and costumes should be appropriate: a church should
have a suitable building, religious artifacts, and a properly attired member of the
clergy. A clinic should have examination rooms, uniformed nurses, and licensed
physicians with diplomas prominently featured on the wall. Meyer and Rowan
(1978, 1983b) depict the structure of public schools as largely symbolic. A school
has diffi culty sustaining public support unless it offers fashionable answers to three
questions: Does it offer appropriate topics (for example, third - grade mathematics
or world history)? Are topics taught to age - graded students by certifi ed teachers?
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Reframing Organizations300
Does it look like a school (with classrooms, a gymnasium, a library, and a fl ag near
the front door)?
An institution of higher education is judged by the age, size, and beauty of the
campus, the amount of its endowment, its faculty - student ratio, and the num-
ber of professors who received doctorates from prestigious institutions. Kamens
(1977) suggests that the major function of a college or university is to redefi ne
novice students as graduates who possess special qualities or skills. The value
of the status transformation must be negotiated with important constituencies.
This is done through constant references to the quality and rigor of educational
programs and is validated by the structural characteristics or appearance of the
institution.
A valid structural confi guration, in Kamens ’ s view, depends on whether an
institution is elite or not and whether it allocates graduates to a specifi c social
or corporate group. Each type of institution espouses its own myth and drama-
tizes its own aspects of structure. Ivy League schools such as Harvard, Yale, and
Princeton are known for producing graduates who occupy elite roles in society.
Elite schools dramatize selectivity, maintain an attractive residential campus,
advertise a favorable ratio of faculty to students, and develop a core curriculum
that restrains specialization in favor of a unifi ed core of knowledge.
If an institution or its environment changes, theatrical refurbishing is needed.
New audiences require revisions in actors, scripts, or settings. Since legitimacy
and worth are anchored primarily in the match between structural characteris-
tics and prevailing myths, organizations alter appearances to mirror changes in
social expectations. For example, if total quality management, reengineering, or
Six Sigma becomes the fashionable badge of honor for progressive companies,
corresponding programs and consultants spread like fi re in a parched forest.
New structures refl ect legal and social expectations and represent a bid for
legitimacy and support from the attending audience. An organization without
an affi rmative action program, for example, is suspiciously out of step with pre-
vailing concerns for diversity and equity. Nonconformity invites questions, crit-
icism, and inspection. It is easier to appoint a diversity offi cer than to change
hiring practices deeply embedded in both individual and institutional beliefs and
practices. Since the presence of a diversity offi cer is more visible than revisions in
hiring priorities, the addition of a new role may signal to external constituencies
that there has been improvement, even if, in reality, the appointment is a formal-
ity and no real change has occurred.
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Organization as Theater 301
In this light, government agencies serve mostly political and symbolic
functions: “ Congress passes on to these agencies a type of symbolic control; they
represent our belief in the virtues of planning and the value of an integrated
program of action. But the agencies are given no formal authority over the orga-
nizations whose services they are to control and few funds to use as incentives to
stimulate the cooperation of these existing organizations ” (Scott, 1983, p. 126).
In practice, agencies reduce tension and uncertainty and increase the public ’ s
sense of confi dence and security. Only in a crisis — as when people or pets die
from eating contaminated food — do people ask why regulators didn ’ t do their
job. The ensuing drama of reform calls for perpetrators to be identifi ed and pun-
ished and the situation remedied so the problems never recur.
ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS AS THEATER Rationally, procedures produce results. Administrative protocols coordinate work.
Technology improves effi ciency. Professors lecture to impart knowledge and wis-
dom. Physicians treat patients to cure illness. Social workers manage cases and
write reports to identify and remedy social ills.
People spend much of their time engaged in such endeavors. To justify their
labor, they want to believe their efforts produce the intended outcomes. Of course,
even the best intentions or the most sophisticated technologies do not always yield
expected results. Regardless, these activities play a very important theatrical role.
They serve as scripts and stage markings for self - expressive opportunities, forums
for airing grievances, and get - togethers for negotiating new understandings. We
illustrate these purposes in the context of meetings, planning, performance apprais-
als, collective bargaining, the exercise of power, and symbolic management.
Meetings March and Olsen (1976) were ahead of their time in depicting meetings as
improvisational “ garbage cans. ” In this imagery, meetings are magnets attract-
ing managers looking for something to do, problems seeking answers, and peo-
ple with solutions in search of problems. The results of a meeting depend on a
serendipitous interplay among items that show up: Who came to the meeting?
What problems, concerns, or needs were on their minds? What solutions or sug-
gestions did they bring?
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Reframing Organizations302
Garbage - can scripts are likely to play out in meetings dealing with emotionally
charged, symbolically signifi cant, or technically fuzzy issues. The topic of mis-
sion, for example, attracts a more sizable collection of people, problems, and
solutions than the topic of cost accounting. Meetings may not always produce
rational discourse, sound plans, or radical improvements. But they serve as
expressive occasions to clear the air and promote collective bonding. Some play-
ers come upon their role in the drama and are able to practice and polish their
lines. Others revel in the chance to add excitement to work. Audiences feel reas-
sured that issues are getting attention and better times may lie ahead.
Planning An organization without a plan can be labeled as reactive, shortsighted, and
rudderless. Planning, then, is an essential ceremony organizations conduct peri-
odically to maintain legitimacy. A plan is a badge of honor displayed conspicu-
ously and with pride. A strategic plan carries even higher status. Mintzberg ’ s
insightful book The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (1994) presents an array
of survey and anecdotal evidence questioning the link between strategic plan-
ning and its stated objectives. He shows that the presumed linear progression
from analysis to objectives to action to results is more fanciful than factual.
Many executives recognize the shortcomings of strategic planning, yet continue
to champion it: “ Recently I asked three corporate executives what decisions they
had made in the last year that they would not have made were it not for their
corporate plans. All had diffi culty identifying one such decision. Since each
of their plans [was] marked ‘ secret ’ or ‘ confi dential, ’ I asked them how their
competitors might benefi t from the possession of their plans. Each answered
with embarrassment that their competitors would not benefi t. Yet these execu-
tives were strong advocates of corporate planning ” (Russell Ackoff, quoted in
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 98).
Planning persists because it plays an eminent role in an organization ’ s endur-
ing drama. Quinn notes: “ A good deal of the corporate planning I have observed
is like a ritual rain dance; it has no effect on the weather that follows, but those
who engage in it think it does. Moreover, it seems to me that much of the advice
and instruction related to corporate planning is directed at improving the danc-
ing, not the weather ” (quoted in Mintzberg, 1994, p. 139).
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Organization as Theater 303
Discussing universities, Cohen and March (1974) list four symbolic roles that
plans play:
Plans are symbols. Academic organizations have few real pieces of objective
evidence to evaluate performance. They have nothing comparable to profi t or sales
fi gures. How are we doing? No one really knows. Planning is a signal that all is well
or improvement is just around the corner. A school or university undergoing an
accreditation review engages in a “ self - study ” and lays out an ambitious strategic
plan, which can then gather a decade of dust until it is time to repeat the process.
Plans become games. Especially where goals and technology are unclear, plan-
ning becomes a test of will. A department that wants a new program badly must
justify the expenditure by substantial planning efforts. An administrator who
wishes to avoid saying yes but has no real basis for saying no can test commitment
by asking for a plan. Benefi ts lie more in the process than the result.
Plans become excuses for interaction. Developing a plan forces discussion
and may increase interest in and commitment to new priorities. Occasionally,
interaction yields positive results. But rarely does it yield an accurate forecast.
Conclusions about what will happen next year are notoriously susceptible to
alteration as people, politics, policies, or preferences change, but discussions of
the future often modify views of what should be done differently today.
Plans become advertisements. What is frequently called a plan is more like
an investment brochure. It is an attempt to persuade private and public donors
of an institution ’ s attractiveness. Plans are typically adorned with glossy photo-
graphs of beautiful people in pristine settings, offi cial pronouncements of excel-
lence, and a noticeable dearth of specifi cs.
Cohen and March (1974) asked college presidents their views of the linkage
between plans and decisions. Responses fell into four main categories:
“ Yes, we have a plan. It is used in capital project and physical loca-
tion decisions. ”
“ Yes, we have a plan. Here it is. It was made during the adminis-
tration of our last president. We are working on a new one. ”
“ No, we do not have a plan. We should. We ’ re working on one. ”
“ I think there ’ s a plan around here someplace. Miss Jones, do we
have a copy of our comprehensive, ten - year plan? ” [p. 113].
•
•
•
•
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Reframing Organizations304
Evaluation Assessing the performance of individuals, departments, or programs is a major
undertaking. Organizations devote considerable time, energy, and resources to
appraising individuals, even though few believe that the procedures are closely
connected to improvements. Organization - wide reviews yield lengthy reports
presented with fi tting pomp and ceremony. Universities convene visiting com-
mittees or accrediting teams to evaluate schools or departments. Government
requires routine assessment of program effi cacy. Social service agencies com-
mission studies or audits whenever an important problem or issue arises. Once
in a while, insights or recommendations are carried out. Sometimes they yield
tangible improvements. Just as often, however, results disappear into recesses of
people ’ s minds or the far reaches of administrators ’ fi le cabinets. But, taking into
account an organization ’ s need to foster faith and confi dence among constitu-
ents, evaluation plays a decisive role.
Evaluation assures spectators that an organization is responsible, serious, and
well managed. It shows that goals are taken seriously, performance receives atten-
tion, and improvement is a high priority. The evaluation process gives participants
an opportunity to share opinions and have them recognized publicly. It helps
people relabel old practices, escape normal routine, and build new beliefs (Rallis,
1980). Although impact on decisions or behavior may be marginal, methodical
evaluation with its magic numbers serves as a potent weapon in political battles or
as a compelling justifi cation for a decision already made (Weiss, 1980).
In public organizations, Floden and Weiner argue, “ Evaluation is a ritual
whose function is to calm the anxieties of the citizenry and to perpetuate an
image of government rationality, effi ciency, and accountability. The very act
of requiring and commissioning evaluations may create the impression that
government is seriously committed to the pursuit of publicly espoused goals,
such as increasing student achievement or reducing malnutrition. Evaluations
lend credence to this image even when programs are created to appease interest
groups ” (1978, p. 17).
Collective Bargaining In collective bargaining, labor and management meet and confer to forge divi-
sive standoffs into workable agreements. The process typically pits two sets of
interests against each other: unions want better wages, benefi ts, and working
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Organization as Theater 305
conditions for members; management aims to keep costs down and maximize
profi ts for shareholders. Negotiating teams follow a familiar script: “ Negotiators
have to act like opponents, representatives and experts, showing that they are
aligned with teammates and constituents, willing to push hard to achieve con-
stituent goals, and constantly in control. On the public stage, anger and oppo-
sition dominate; rituals of opposition, representation and control produce a
drama of confl ict. At the same time, there are mechanisms for private under-
standing between opposing lead bargainers, such as signaling and sidebar dis-
cussions ” (Friedman, 1994, pp. 86 – 87).
On the surface, the negotiation process appears as a strife - ridden political
brawl where persistence and power determine the distribution of scarce
resources. On a deeper plane, negotiation is a carefully crafted ritual that
delivers the performance various audiences demand. Going off script carries
high risk: “ A young executive took the helm of a fi rm with the intention of
eliminating bickering and confl ict between management and labor. He com-
missioned a study of the company ’ s wage structure and went to the bargaining
table to present his offer. He informed the union representatives what he had
done, and offered them more than they had expected to get. The astonished
union leaders berated the executive for undermining the process of collective
bargaining and asked for another fi ve cents an hour beyond his offer ” (Blum,
1961, pp. 63 – 64).
Similar problems have been documented by Friedman in his studies of
mutual gains bargaining (which emphasizes cooperation and a win - win out-
come rather than confl ict). A disillusioned participant in an abortive mutual
gains process lamented: “ It hurt us. We got real chummy. Everyone talked. Then
in the fi nal hours, it was the same old shit. Maybe we should have been pound-
ing on the table ” (Friedman, 1994, p. 216).
In theater, actors who deviate from the script disrupt everyone else ’ s ability to
deliver their lines. The bargaining drama is designed to convince each side that
the outcomes were the result of a heroic battle — often underscored by desper-
ate, all - night, after - the - deadline rituals of combat that produce a deal just when
hope seems lost. If well performed, the drama conveys the message that two
determined opponents fought hard and persistently for what they believed was
right (Blum, 1961; Friedman, 1994). It obscures the reality that actors typically
know in advance how the play will end.
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Reframing Organizations306
Power Power is usually viewed as a real commodity that individuals or systems possess —
something that can be seized, exercised, or redistributed. But power is inherently
ambiguous and slippery. It is rarely easy to determine what power is, who has
it, or how to get it. Sometimes it is even harder to know when power is wielded.
You are powerful if others think you are.
Power is often attributed to certain performances. People who talk a lot,
belong to committees, and seem close to the action are typically perceived as
powerful. Yet there may be little relationship between activity and impact. The
relationship may even be negative; the frustrated may talk a lot, and the disgrun-
tled may resort to futile political intrigue or posturing (Enderud, 1976).
Power is also often attributed to particular individuals or groups to account
for observed outcomes. If the unemployment or crime rates drop, political
incumbents take credit. If a fi rm ’ s profi ts jump, we credit the chief executive. If a
program is started as things are getting better, it inherits success. Myths of lead-
ership attribute causality to individuals in high places. Whether things are going
well or badly, we like to hold someone responsible. Cohen and March have this
to say about college presidents:
Presidents negotiate with their audiences on the interpretations of
their power. As a result, during . . . years of campus troubles, many
college presidents sought to emphasize the limitations of presiden-
tial control. During the more glorious days of conspicuous success,
they solicited a recognition of their responsibility for events. This
is likely to lead to popular impressions of strong presidents during
good times and weak presidents during bad times. Persons who are
primarily exposed to the symbolic presidency (for example, out-
siders) will tend to exaggerate the power of the presidency. Those
people who have tried to accomplish something in the institution
with presidential support (for example, educational reforms) will
tend to underestimate presidential power or presidential will [1974,
pp. 198 – 199].
As Edelman puts it: “ Leaders lead, followers follow, and organizations prosper.
While this logic is pervasive, it can be misleading. Marching one step ahead of
a crowd moving in a specifi c direction may realistically defi ne the connection
between leadership and followership. Successful leadership is having followers
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Organization as Theater 307
who believe in the power of the leader. By believing, people are encouraged to
link positive events with leadership behaviors ” (1977, p. 73).
Though reassuring, the assumption that powerful leaders make a difference
is often misleading. Cohen and March compare the command and control of
college presidents to the driver of a skidding automobile: “ The marginal judg-
ments he makes, his skill, and his luck will probably make some difference to the
life prospects of his riders. As a result, his responsibilities are heavy. But whether
he is convicted of manslaughter or receives a medal for heroism is largely outside
his control ” (1974, p. 203).
As with other processes, a leader ’ s power is less a matter of action than of
appearance. When a leader does make a difference, it is by enriching and updat-
ing the drama — constructing new myths that alter beliefs and generate faith.
Managing Impressions Peter Vaill (1989) characterized management as a performing art. This rings
especially true for those trying to launch a business. One of the chief challenges
confronting entrepreneurs is acquiring the resources needed to get embryonic
ideas to the marketplace. This requires convincing investors of the future worth
of an idea or product. Entrepreneurs typically concentrate on developing
a persuasive business plan that projects a rosy fi nancial future, coupled with a
PowerPoint presentation full of information about the new idea ’ s potential.
Zott and Huy ’ s two - year fi eld study suggests that symbols may be more
powerful than numbers in determining who gets funded (2007). They com-
pared entrepreneurs who garnered a lion ’ s share of resources with others who
did not fare as well. Their results depict “ the entrepreneur as an active shaper
of perceptions and a potentially skilled user of cultural tool kits . . . . By enact-
ing symbols effectively entrepreneurs can shape a compelling symbolic universe
that complements the initially weak and uncertain quality of their ventures ”
(pp. 100 – 101).
Resources fl owed to entrepreneurs who presented themselves, their com-
panies, and their products with dramatic fl air rather than relying solely on
technical promise and fi nancial analyses. The winners knew their audience, capi-
talized on credentials and business associations, wore appropriate costumes to
blend with clients and investors, shone the spotlight on the symbolic value of
their products, stressed the cultural vigor of their enterprises, called attention
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Reframing Organizations308
to unique processes, highlighted personal commitment, pointed to short - term
achievements, and told good stories.
It has been said that giving is a matter of heart more than head. By invoking
meaningful symbols, successful entrepreneurs were able to loosen the purse
strings of investors. They skillfully managed impressions through carefully
crafted theatrical performances.
SUMMARY From a symbolic perspective, organizations are judged as much on appearance
as outcomes. The right drama gives audiences the performance they expect. The
production reassures, fosters belief in the organization ’ s purposes, and cultivates
hope and faith. Structures that do little to coordinate activity, and protocols that
rarely achieve their intended outcomes still play a signifi cant symbolic role. They
provide internal glue. They help participants cope, fi nd meaning, and play their
roles without reading the wrong lines, upstaging the lead actors, or confusing
tragedy with comedy. To outside audiences, they provide a basis for confi dence
and support.
Dramaturgical concepts sharply redefi ne organizational dynamics. Historically,
theories of management and organization have focused on instrumental issues. We
see problems, try to solve them, and then ask, “ What did we accomplish? ” Often,
the answer is “ nothing ” or “ not much. ” We fi nd ourselves repeating the old saw
that the more things change, the more they remain the same. Such a message can
be disheartening and disillusioning. It often produces a sense of helplessness and
a belief that things will never get much better. In Hope Dies Last, Studs Terkel says
it well: “ In all epochs, there were fi rst doubts and the fear of stepping forth and
speaking out, but the attribute that spurred the warriors on was hope. And the act.
Seldom was there a despair or a sense of hopelessness. Some of those on the side-
lines, the spectators, feeling hopeless and impotent, had by the very nature of the
passionate act of others become imbued with hope themselves ” (2004, p. xviii).
Theatrical imagery offers a hopeful note. For a variety of reasons, we may be
restless, frustrated, lost, or searching to renew our faith. We commission a new play
called Change. At the end of the pageant, we can ask: What was expressed? What
was recast? And what was legitimized? A good play assures us that each day is
potentially more exciting and full of meaning than the last. If things go badly, buff
up the symbols, revise the drama, develop new myths — or dance to another tune.
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PA RT S I X
Improving Leadership Practice
Up to now, we have emphasized the unique features of four dis-tinctive ways to think about organizations. But making sense of a complex situation is not a single - frame activity. A messy, turbu-
lent world rarely presents bounded, well - defi ned problems. In this
part of the book, we focus on combining lenses to achieve multi -
frame approaches to managing and leading.
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Reframing Organizations310
In Chapter Fifteen , we contrast a stereotype of crisp, orderly rationality with
a more frantic, reactive reality of managerial life. We show how routine activities
and processes such as strategic planning, decision making, and confl ict take on
different meanings depending on how they are viewed. We provide an example
to illustrate the cacophony that arises when parties are seeing different reali-
ties. Finally, we look at studies of effective organizations and senior managers to
examine how research aligns with our framework.
In Chapter Sixteen , we examine a case of a middle manager who encounters
an unexpected crisis on the fi rst day in a new job. We show how, in a situation
where the stakes and risks are high, each lens spawns both helpful and unpro-
ductive scenarios for her response.
We turn in Chapter Seventeen to a discussion of leadership. We begin with
an example of a prominent leader in crisis to examine the interaction between
leader and circumstances. We explore the concept of leadership and review
research on the characteristics of effective leaders. After dissecting some popular
leadership models, we illustrate each frame ’ s image of leaders and leadership.
Chapter Eighteen takes us to a perennial challenge: creating change. We exam-
ine predictable barriers each frame suggests and point out different remedies. We
then integrate the frames with a stage model of change. The two in combination
provide a powerful map.
Ethics and spirit are the focus of Chapter Nineteen . We begin with a look at
what went wrong at Enron. While Enron had plenty of smart, aggressive people,
it lacked wisdom and soul. We end by discussing four criteria for ethical behav-
ior: authorship, love, justice, and signifi cance.
Chapter Twenty presents an integrative case in which we zoom in on a new
principal in his perilous early weeks at a troubled urban high school. We illus-
trate how the frames in tandem generate a more comprehensive diagnosis of the
issues and offer more promising options for moving ahead.
Finally, in the Epilogue, we summarize the basic messages of the book and lay
out implications for the development of future leaders.
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311
Integrating Frames for Effective Practice
No one could have forecast what New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani would face on September 11, 2001. During a break- fast meeting, he learned that a plane had hit one of the World Trade
Center ’ s twin towers. He went directly to the scene, arriving in time
to see the devastating strike on the second tower. It was now clear
that this was planned terrorism, an unprecedented human tragedy
and a deep symbolic wound for the city.
In the aftermath, the American public observed what many assumed was a
transformed Giuliani — a sensitive, emotional, and deeply caring leader whose
ubiquitous presence was a source of inspiration to New Yorkers, as well as to
all Americans. But His Honor disputes his supposed personal makeover: “ The
events of September 11 affected me more deeply than anything I have ever expe-
rienced; but the idea that I somehow became a different person on that day —
that there was a pre – September 11 Rudy and a wholly other post - September
Rudy — is not true. I was prepared to handle September 11 precisely because
I was the same person who had been doing his best to take on challenges my
whole career . . . . You can ’ t be paralyzed by any situation. It ’ s about balance ”
(Giuliani and Kurson, 2002, pp. x, xiii).
In an unprecedented crisis, Giuliani found himself drawing upon differ-
ent aspects of his cognitive and behavioral repertoire — lessons learned from
prior experience. Both the mayor and his constituents faced dramatically
F I F T E E N
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations312
altered circumstances, which required new thinking and realignment of their
perceptive lenses. Symbolism, for example, had always seemed prominent
in Giuliani ’ s leadership but became even more so after 9/11. Meanwhile, the
political dynamics on which Giuliani had historically thrived receded in rela-
tive signifi cance.
Harmonizing the frames, and crafting inventive responses to new circum-
stances, is essential to both management and leadership. This chapter considers
the frames in combination. How do you choose a way to frame an event? How
do you integrate multiple lenses in the same situation? We begin by revisiting the
turbulent world of managers. We then explore what happens when people rely
on different views of the same challenge. We offer questions and guidelines to
stimulate thinking about which prisms are likely to apply in specifi c situations.
Finally, we examine literature on effective managers and organizations to see
which modes of thought dominate current theory.
LIFE AS MANAGERS KNOW IT Prevailing mythology depicts managers as rational men and women who plan,
organize, coordinate, and control activities of subordinates. Periodicals, books,
and business schools paint a pristine image of modern managers: unruffl ed and
well organized, with clean desks, power suits, and sophisticated information sys-
tems. Such “ super managers ” develop and implement farsighted strategies, pro-
ducing predictable and robust results. It is a reassuring picture of clarity and
order. Unfortunately, it ’ s wrong.
An entirely different picture appears if you watch managers at work (Carlson,
1951; Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973; Luthans, 1988). It ’ s a hectic life, shifting
rapidly from one situation to another. Decisions emerge from a fl uid, swirling
vortex of conversations, meetings, and memos. Information systems ensure an
overload of detail about what happened last month or last year. Yet they fail to
answer a far more important question: What to do next? In Afghanistan, sophis-
ticated systems make information from battle zones readily available all the way
up the command structure. But a faster fl ow of information has slowed rather
than sped up tactical decision making because top offi cers can now ponder
decisions better made on the spot. After identifying a high - value target, Special
Forces may wait days before receiving permission to fi re. By then the target is
long gone.
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Integrating Frames for Effective Practice 313
In deciding what to do next, managers operate largely on the basis of intu-
ition, drawing on fi rsthand observations, hunches, and judgment derived
from experience. Too swamped to spend much time thinking, analyzing, or
reading, they get most of their information in meetings, through e - mail,
or over the phone. They are hassled priests, modern muddlers, and corporate
wheeler - dealers.
How does one reconcile the actual work of managers with the heroic imagery?
“ Whenever I report this frenetic pattern to groups of executives, ” says Harold
Leavitt, “ regardless of hierarchical level or nationality, they always respond with
a mix of discomfi ture and recognition. Reluctantly, and somewhat sheepishly,
they will admit that the description fi ts, but they don ’ t like to be told about it.
If they were really good managers, they seem to feel, they would be in control,
their desks would be clean, and their shops would run as smoothly as a Mercedes
engine ” (1996, p. 294). Led to believe that they should be rational and on top
of things, managers may instead become bewildered and demoralized. They are
supposed to plan and organize, yet they fi nd themselves muddling around and
playing catch - up. They want to solve problems and make decisions. But when
problems are ill defi ned and options murky, control is an illusion and rationality
an afterthought.
ACROSS FRAMES: ORGANIZATIONS AS MULTIPLE REALITIES Life in organizations is packed with happenings that can be interpreted in a
number of ways. Exhibit 15.1 examines familiar processes through four lenses.
As the chart shows, any event can be framed in several ways and serve multiple
purposes. Planning, for example, produces specifi c objectives. But it also creates
arenas for airing confl ict and becomes a sacred occasion to renegotiate symbolic
meanings.
Multiple realities produce confusion and confl ict as individuals look at the
same event through different lenses. A hospital administrator once called a meet-
ing to make an important decision. The chief technician viewed it as a chance to
express feelings and build relationships. The director of nursing hoped to gain
power vis - à - vis physicians. The medical director saw it as an occasion for reaf-
fi rming the hospital ’ s distinctive approach to medical care. The meeting became
a cacophonous jumble, like a group of musicians each playing from a different
score.
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Exhibit 15.1. Four Interpretations of Organizational Processes.
PROCESS STRUCTURAL FRAME
HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME
POLITICAL FRAME
SYMBOLIC FRAME
Strategic planning
Strategies to set objec- tives and coordinate resources
Gatherings to promote participation
Arenas to air confl icts and realign power
Ritual to sig- nal responsi- bility, produce symbols, negotiate meanings
Decision making Rational sequence to produce right decision
Open process to produce commitment
Opportunity to gain or exercise power
Ritual to con- fi rm values and provide opportunities for bonding
Reorganizing Realign roles and respon- sibilities to fi t tasks and environment
Maintain a balance between human needs and formal roles
Redistribute power and form new coalitions
Maintain an image of account- ability and responsive- ness; negoti- ate new social order
Evaluating Way to distribute rewards or penalties and control performance
Feedback for helping indi- viduals grow and improve
Opportunity to exercise power
Occasion to play roles in shared ritual
Approaching confl ict
Maintain organiza- tional goals by having authori- ties resolve confl ict
Develop relationships by having individuals confront confl ict
Develop power by bargaining, forcing, or manipulat- ing others to win
Develop shared values and use confl ict to negotiate meaning
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Integrating Frames for Effective Practice 315
The confusion that can result when people view the world through different
lenses is illustrated in this classic case:
Goal setting Keep orga- nization headed in the right direction
Keep people involved and communica- tion open
Provide opportunity for indi- viduals and groups to make inter- ests known
Develop symbols and shared values
Communication Transmit facts and information
Exchange information, needs, and feelings
Infl uence or manipulate others
Tell stories
Meetings Formal occasions for making decisions
Informal occasions for involvement, sharing feelings
Competitive occasions to win points
Sacred occa- sions to cel- ebrate and transform the culture
Motivation Economic incentives
Growth and self- actualization
Coercion, manipula- tion, and seduction
Symbols and celebrations
D O C T O R F I G H T S O R D E R T O Q U I T M A I N E I S L A N D
Dr. Gregory O’Keefe found himself the focus of a fi erce battle between
1,200 year-round residents of Vinalhaven, Maine (an island fi shing com-
munity), and the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), which pays his
salary and is insisting he take a promotion to an administrator’s desk in
Rockville, Maryland.
O’Keefe doesn’t want to go, and his patients don’t want him to
either. The islanders are so upset that, much to the surprise of
NHSC offi cials, they have enlisted the aid of Senator William Cohen
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Reframing Organizations316
(R-Maine) and U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Margaret
Heckler to keep him here.
It’s certainly not the prestige or glamour of the job that is hold-
ing O’Keefe, who drives the town’s only ambulance and, as often
as twice a week, takes critically ill patients to mainland hospitals
via an emergency ferry run or a Coast Guard cutter, private plane,
or even a lobster boat.
Apparently unyielding in their insistence that O’Keefe accept
the promotion or resign, NHSC offi cials seemed startled last week
by the spate of protests from angry islanders, which prompted
nationwide media attention and inquiries from the Maine
Congressional delegation. NHSC says it probably would not replace
O’Keefe on the island, which, in the agency’s view, is now able to
support a private medical practice.
Cohen described himself as “frustrated by the lack of respon-
siveness of lower-level bureaucrats.” But to the NHSC, O’Keefe is
a foot soldier in a military organization of more than 1,600 physi-
cians assigned to isolated, medically needy communities. And he’s
had the audacity to question the orders of a superior offi cer.
“It’s like a soldier who wanted to stay at Ft. Myers and jumped
on TV and called the Defense Secretary a rat for wanting him
to move,” Shirley Barth, press offi cer for the federal Public Health
Service, said in a telephone interview Thursday [Goodman,
1983, p. 1].
The NHSC offi cials had trouble seeing beyond the structural frame;
they had a task to do and a strategy for achieving it. O’Keefe’s resistance
was illegitimate. O’Keefe saw the situation in human resource terms.
He felt the work he was doing was meaningful and satisfying, and the
islanders needed him. For Senator Cohen, it was a political issue; could
minor bureaucrats be allowed to harm his constituents through mind-
less abuse of power? For the hardy residents of Vinalhaven, O’Keefe
was a heroic fi gure of mythic proportions: “If he gets one night’s sleep
out of twenty, he’s lucky, but he’s always up there smiling and work-
ing.” The islanders were full of stories about O’Keefe’s humility, skill,
humaneness, dedication, wit, confi dence, and caring.
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Integrating Frames for Effective Practice 317
With so many people peering through different fi lters, confusion and
confl ict were predictable. The inability of NHSC offi cials to understand
and acknowledge the existence of other perspectives illustrates the costs
of clinging to a single view of a situation. Whenever someone’s actions
seem to make no sense, it is worth asking if you and they are seeing
contrasting realities. You know better what you’re up against when you
understand their perspective, even if you’re sure they’re wrong. Their
mind-set—not yours—determines how they act.
MATCHING FRAMES TO SITUATIONS In a given situation, one cognitive map may be more helpful than others. At a
strategic crossroads, a rational process focused on gathering and analyzing
information may be exactly what is needed. At other times, developing com-
mitment or building a power base may be more critical. In times of great stress,
decision processes may become a form of ritual that brings comfort and sup-
port. Choosing a frame to size things up, or understanding others ’ perspectives,
involves a combination of analysis, intuition, and artistry. Exhibit 15.2 poses
questions to facilitate analysis and stimulate intuition. It also suggests conditions
under which each way of thinking is most likely to be effective.
Exhibit 15.2. Choosing a Frame.
QUESTION IF YES: IF NO:
Are individual commitment and motivation essential to success?
Human resource Symbolic
Structural Political
Is the technical quality of the decision important?
Structural Human resource Political Symbolic
Are there high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty?
Political Symbolic
Structural Human resource
Are confl ict and scarce resources signifi cant?
Political Symbolic
Structural Human resource
Are you working from the bottom up?
Political Structural Human resource Symbolic
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Reframing Organizations318
Are commitment and motivation essential to success? The human resource and
symbolic approaches need to be considered whenever issues of individual dedica-
tion, energy, and skill are vital to success. A new curriculum launched by a school
district will fail without teacher support. Support might be strengthened by human
resource approaches, such as participation and self - managing teams, or through
symbolic approaches linking the innovation to values and symbols teachers cherish.
Is the technical quality important? When a good decision needs to be
technically sound, the structural frame ’ s emphasis on data and logic is essential.
But if a decision must be acceptable to major constituents, then human resource,
political, or symbolic issues loom larger. Could the technical quality of a deci-
sion ever be unimportant? A college found itself embroiled in a three - month
battle over the choice of a commencement speaker. The faculty pushed for a
great scholar, the students for a movie star. The president was more than willing
to invite anyone acceptable to both groups; she saw no technical criterion prov-
ing that one choice was better than the other.
Are ambiguity and uncertainty high? If goals are clear, technology is well under-
stood, and behavior is reasonably predictable, the structural and human resource
approaches are likely to apply. As ambiguity increases, the political and symbolic
perspectives become more relevant. The political frame expects that the pursuit of
self - interest will often produce confused and chaotic contests that require politi-
cal intervention. The symbolic lens sees symbols as a way of fi nding order, mean-
ing, and “ truth ” in situations too complex, uncertain, or mysterious for rational
or political analysis. In the R. J. Reynolds leveraged buyout (discussed in Chapter
Eleven ), the most critical unknown was what opposing bidders were doing and
what it meant. Everyone scouted the competition intensely and tried to interpret
and read meaning into even the weakest signals. At a key point in the endgame,
Henry Kravis hinted that he might drop out. To make the hint credible, he went
off for a long weekend in Colorado just before fi nal bids were due. The opposition
picked up the signals and concluded, “ Henry ’ s not bidding. ” It was, according to
one member of the other team, “ our fatal error. ”
Are confl ict and scarce resources signifi cant? Human resource logic fi ts best in
situations favoring collaboration — as in profi table, growing fi rms or highly unifi ed
schools. But when confl ict is high and resources are scarce, dynamics of confl ict,
power, and self - interest regularly come to the fore. In situations like the Reynolds
bidding war, sophisticated political strategies are vital to success. In other cases,
skilled leaders may fi nd that an overarching symbol helps potential adversaries
•
•
•
•
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Integrating Frames for Effective Practice 319
transcend their differences and work together. In the early 1980s, Yale University
was paralyzed by a clerical and technical workers ’ strike. No one, including Yale ’ s
president, A. Bartlett Giamatti, knew how to settle the dispute. Then Phil Donahue
invited the Yale community to appear on his television show. Union members ener-
getically presented their side, and Giamatti represented the administration. The
audience was active and vocal but polarized. Near the end of the program, Giamatti
told a story about his father, an Italian immigrant, who was admitted to the neigh-
borhood university, which happened to be Yale. His father couldn ’ t pay the tuition,
but Yale had a core value of “ admission by ability, support by need. ” The story and
the invocation of a shared value helped bridge the chasm dividing the parties.
Are you working from the bottom up? Restructuring is an option primarily for
those in a position of authority. Human resource approaches to improvement —
such as training, job enrichment, and participation — usually need support from the
top to be successful. The political frame, in contrast, fi ts well for changes initiated
from below. Because partisans — change agents lower in the pecking order — rarely
can rely on formal clout, they must fi nd other bases of power, such as symbolic acts
to draw attention to their cause and embarrass opponents. The 9/11 terrorists could
have picked from an almost unlimited array of targets, but the World Trade Towers
and the Pentagon were deliberately selected for their symbolic value.
The questions in Exhibit 15.2 are no substitute for judgment and intuition
in deciding how to size up or respond to a situation. But they can guide and
augment the process of choosing the most promising course of action. Consider
once again the Helen Demarco case (Chapter Two ). Her boss, Paul Osborne,
had a plan for major change. Demarco thought the plan was a mistake but did
not feel she could directly oppose it. What should she do? The issue of commit-
ment and motivation was important, both in terms of her lack of support for
Osborne ’ s plan and her concern about fi nding a solution he could accept. The
table suggests that the human resource frame was worth considering, though
Demarco never did. The quality of the plan was critical in her judgment, but she
was convinced that Osborne was immune to technical arguments.
Ambiguity played a signifi cant role in the case. Even if technical issues were
reasonably clear, the key issue of how to infl uence Osborne was shrouded in
haziness. Implicitly, Demarco acknowledged the importance of the symbolism
in using a form of theater (research that wasn ’ t really research, a technical
report that was window dressing) as her key strategy. Above all, Exhibit 15.2
•
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Reframing Organizations320
suggests that Demarco ’ s plight aligns best with the political frame: resources were
scarce, confl ict was high, and she was trying to infl uence from the bottom up.
The choice point pressed toward politics and symbols. She went with the fl ow.
The guidelines in Exhibit 15.2 cannot be followed mechanically. Arriving at
an adequate response for every situation is a matter of playing probabilities. In
some cases, your line of thinking might lead you to a familiar frame. If the tried -
and - true approach shows signs of producing a shortfall, though, reframe again.
You may discover an exciting and creative new lens for deciphering the situa-
tion. Then you face another problem: how to communicate your breakthrough
to others who still champion the old reality.
EFFECTIVE MANAGERS AND ORGANIZATIONS Does the ability to use multiple frames actually help managers decipher events
and determine alternative ways to respond? If so, how are the frames embed-
ded and integrated in everyday situations? We examine several strands of research
to answer these questions. First, we look at three infl uential guides to organiza-
tional excellence: In Search of Excellence (Peters and Waterman, 1982), Built to
Last (Collins and Porras, 1994), and From Good to Great (Collins, 2001). We then
review three studies of managerial work, The General Managers (Kotter, 1982),
Managing Public Policy (Lynn, 1987), and Real Managers (Luthans, Yodgetts, and
Rosenkrantz, 1988). Finally, we look at recent studies of managers ’ frame orien-
tations to see if current thinking is equal to present - day challenges.
Organizational Excellence Peters and Waterman ’ s spectacular best - seller In Search of Excellence (1982)
explored the question, “ What do high - performing corporations have in com-
mon? ” Peters and Waterman studied more than sixty large companies in six major
industries: high technology (Digital Equipment and IBM, for example), con-
sumer products (Kodak, Procter & Gamble), manufacturing (3M, Caterpillar),
service (McDonald ’ s, Delta Airlines), project management (Boeing, Bechtel), and
natural resources (Exxon, DuPont). The companies were chosen on the basis of
both objective performance indicators (such as long - term growth and profi tabil-
ity) and the judgment of knowledgeable observers.
Collins and Porras (1994) attempted a similar study of what they termed “ vision-
ary ” companies but tried to address two methodological limitations in the Peters
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Integrating Frames for Effective Practice 321
and Waterman study. Collins and Porras included a comparison group (missing in
Peters and Waterman) by matching each of their top performers with another fi rm
in the same industry with a comparable history. Their pairings included Citibank
with Chase Manhattan, General Electric with Westinghouse, Sony with Kenwood,
Hewlett - Packard with Texas Instruments, and Merck with Pfi zer. Collins and Porras
emphasized long - term results by restricting their study to companies at least fi fty
years old with evidence of consistent success over many decades.
Collins (2001) used a comparative approach similar to that of Collins and
Porras but focused on another criterion for success: instead of organizations that
had excelled for many years, he identifi ed a group of companies that had made
a dramatic breakthrough from middling to superlative and compared them with
similar companies that had remained ordinary.
Each of the three studies identifi ed seven or eight critical characteristics of excel-
lent companies, similar in some respects and distinct in others, as Exhibit 15.3
shows. All three suggest that excellent companies manage to embrace paradox. They
are loose yet tight, highly disciplined yet entrepreneurial. Peters and Waterman ’ s
“ bias for action ” and Collins and Porras ’ s “ try a lot, keep what works ” both point to
risk taking and experimenting as ways to learn and avoid bogging down in analysis
paralysis. All three studies emphasize a clear core identity that helps fi rms stay on
track and be clear about what they will not do.
Two of the studies emphasized something they did not fi nd: charismatic,
larger - than - life leadership. Collins and Porras (1994) and Collins (2001) both
highlighted leaders who were usually homegrown and focused on building their
organization rather than their personal reputation. Collins ’ s “ level 5 ” leaders
were driven but self - effacing, extremely disciplined and hardworking but consis-
tent in attributing success to their colleagues rather than themselves.
As Exhibit 15.3 shows, all three studies produced three - frame models. Notice
that none of the characteristics of excellence are political. Does an effective
organization eliminate politics? Or did the authors miss something? By defi ni-
tion, their samples focused on companies with a strong record of growth and
profi tability. Infi ghting and backbiting tend to be less visible on a winning team
than on a loser. When resources are relatively abundant, political dynamics are
less prominent because slack assets can be used to buy off confl icting interests.
Recall, too, that a strong culture tends to increase homogeneity — people think
more alike. A unifying culture reduces confl ict and political strife — or at least
makes them easier to manage.
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Reframing Organizations322
Even in successful companies, it is likely that power and confl ict are more
important than these studies suggest. Ask a few managers, “ What makes your
organization successful? ” They rarely talk about coalitions, confl ict, or jockey-
ing for position. Even if it is a prominent issue, politics is typically kept in the
closet — known to insiders but not on public display. But if we change our focus
from effective organizations to effective managers, we fi nd a different picture.
The Effective Senior Manager Kotter (1982) conducted an intensive study of fi fteen corporate general managers
(GMs). His sample included “ individuals who hold positions with some multi-
functional responsibility for a business ” (p. 2); each managed an organization with
at least several hundred employees. Lynn (1987) analyzed fi ve sub - cabinet - level
Exhibit 15.3. Characteristics of Excellent or Visionary Companies.
FRAME PETERS AND WATERMAN, 1982
COLLINS AND PORRAS, 1994 COLLINS, 2001
Structural Autonomy and entrepreneurship; bias for action; simple form, lean staff
Clock building, not time telling; try a lot, keep what works
Confront the brutal facts; “hedgehog concept” (best in the world, economic engine); technol- ogy accelerators; “ fl ywheel,” not “doom loop”
Human resource
Close to the cus- tomer; productiv- ity through people
Home-grown management
“Level 5 leader- ship”; fi rst who, then what
Political
Symbolic Hands-on, value- driven; simultane- ously loose and tight; stick to the knitting
Big hairy audacious goals; cultlike cul- tures; good enough never is; preserve the core, stimulate progress; more than profi ts
Never lose faith; hedgehog concept (deeply passionate); culture of discipline
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Integrating Frames for Effective Practice 323
executives in the U.S. government, political appointees with responsibility for a
major federal agency. Luthans, Yodgetts, and Rosenkrantz (1988) studied a larger
but less elite sample of managers than Kotter and Lynn. With a sample of about 450
managers at a variety of levels, they examined managers ’ day - to - day activities and
reported how those activities related to success and effectiveness. Exhibit 15.4 shows
the characteristics that these studies emphasize as being the keys to effectiveness.
Exhibit 15.4. Challenges in Managers’ Jobs.
FRAME KOTTER (1982) LYNN (1987)
LUTHANS, YODGETTS, AND ROSENKRANTZ (1988)
Structural Keep on top of large, complex set of activities
Set goals and policies under conditions of uncertainty
Attain intel- lectual grasp of policy issues
Communication* (paperwork, exchange routine information)
Traditional manage- ment (planning, goal setting, controlling)
Human resource
Motivate, coordinate, and control large, diverse group of subordinates
Use own personal- ity to best advantage
Human resource management* (motivat- ing, managing confl ict, staffi ng, and so on)
Political Achieve “delicate bal- ance” in allocating scarce resources
Get support from bosses
Get support from corporate staff and other constituents
Exploit all opportunities to achieve strategic gains
Networking† (poli- tics, interacting with outsiders)
Symbolic Develop credible strategic premises
Identify and focus on core activities that give meaning to employees
* Most relevant to managers who were judged “effective” by their subordinates. † Most relevant to managers who were considered “successful” (achieved rapid promotions to higher positions faster than peers).
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Reframing Organizations324
Kotter and Lynn described jobs of enormous complexity and uncertainty,
coupled with substantial dependence on networks of people whose support and
energy were essential for the executives to do their job. Both focused on three
basic challenges: setting an agenda, building a network, and using the network to
get things done. Lynn ’ s work is consistent with Kotter ’ s observation: “ As a result
of these demands, the typical GM faced signifi cant obstacles in both fi guring out
what to do and in getting things done ” (Kotter, 1982, p. 122).
Kotter and Lynn both emphasized the political dimension in senior managers ’
jobs. Lynn described the need for a signifi cant dose of political skill and sophis-
tication: “ building legislative support, negotiating, and identifying changing
positions and interests ” (1987, p. 248). Kotter ’ s model includes elements of all
four frames; Lynn ’ s includes all but the symbolic.
A somewhat different picture emerges from the study by Luthans, Yodgetts,
and Rosenkrantz. In their sample, middle - and lower - level managers spent about
three - fi fths of their time on structural activities (routine communications and
traditional management functions like planning and controlling), about one -
fi fth on “ human resource management ” (people - related activities like moti-
vating, disciplining, training, staffi ng), and about one - fi fth on “ networking ”
(political activities like socializing, politicking, and relating to external constitu-
ents). The results suggest that, compared with the senior executives Kotter and
Lynn studied, middle managers spend less time grappling with complexity and
more time on routine.
Luthans, Yodgetts, and Rosenkrantz distinguished between “ effectiveness ” and
“ success. ” The criteria for effectiveness were the quantity and quality of the unit ’ s
performance and the level of subordinates ’ satisfaction with their boss. Success
was defi ned in terms of promotions per year — how fast people got ahead.
Effective managers and successful managers used time differently. The most
“ effective ” managers spent much of their time on communications and human
resource management and relatively little time on networking. But networking
was the only activity that was strongly related to getting ahead. “ Successful ”
managers spent almost half their time on networking and only about 10 percent
on human resource management.
At fi rst glance, this might seem to confi rm the cynical suspicion that getting
ahead in a career is more about politics than performance. More likely, though, the
results confi rm that performance is in the eye of the beholder. Subordinates rate
their boss primarily on criteria internal to the unit — effective communications
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Integrating Frames for Effective Practice 325
and treating people well. Bosses, on the other hand, focus on how well a manager
handles relations to external constituents, including, of course, the bosses them-
selves. The researchers found that the 10 percent or so of their sample high on
both success and effectiveness had a balanced approach emphasizing both internal
and external issues. They were, in effect, multiframe managers.
Comparing all six studies — those focusing on organizations and those focus-
ing on managers — reveals both similarities and differences. All give roughly
equal emphasis to structural and human resource considerations. But politi-
cal issues are invisible in the organizational excellence studies, whereas they are
prominent in all the studies of individual managers. Politics was as important
for Kotter ’ s corporate executives as for Lynn ’ s political appointees and was the
key to getting ahead for middle managers. Conversely, symbols and culture were
more prominent in the studies of organizational excellence. For various reasons,
each study tended to neglect one frame or another. In assessing any prescription
for improving organizations, ask if any frame is omitted. The overlooked per-
spective could be the one that derails the effort.
MANAGERS ’ FRAME PREFERENCES Yet another line of research has yielded additional data on how frame preference
infl uences leadership effectiveness. Bolman and Deal (1991, 1992a, 1992b) and
Bolman and Granell (1999) studied populations of managers and administra-
tors in both business and education. They found that the ability to use multiple
frames was a consistent correlate of effectiveness. Effectiveness as a manager was
particularly associated with the structural frame, whereas the symbolic and polit-
ical frames tended to be the primary determinants of effectiveness as a leader.
Bensimon (1989, 1990) studied college presidents and found that multi-
frame presidents were viewed as more effective than presidents wedded to a sin-
gle frame. In her sample, more than a third of the presidents used only one frame,
and only a quarter relied on more than two. Single - frame presidents tended to be
less experienced, relying mainly on structural or human resource perspectives.
Presidents who relied solely on the structural frame were particularly likely to be
seen as ineffective leaders. Heimovics, Herman, and Jurkiewicz Coughlin (1993)
found the same thing for chief executives in the nonprofi t sector, and Wimpelberg
(1987) found comparable results in a study of eighteen school principals. His
study paired nine more effective and less effective schools. Principals of ineffective
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Reframing Organizations326
schools relied almost entirely on the structural frame, whereas principals in effec-
tive schools used multiple frames. When asked about hiring teachers, principals in
less effective schools talked about standard procedures (how vacancies are posted,
how the central offi ce sends a candidate for an interview), while more effective
principals emphasized “ playing the system ” to get the teachers they needed.
Bensimon found that presidents thought they used more frames than their
colleagues observed. They were particularly likely to overrate themselves on the
human resource and symbolic frames, a fi nding also reported by Bolman and
Deal (1991). Only half of the presidents who saw themselves as symbolic leaders
were perceived that way by others.
Despite the low image of organizational politics in the minds of many man-
agers, political savvy appears to be a primary determinant of success in certain
jobs. Heimovics, Herman, and Jurkiewicz Coughlin (1993, 1995) found this for
chief executives of nonprofi t organizations, and Doktor (1993) found the same
thing for directors of family service organizations in Kentucky.
SUMMARY The image of fi rm control and crisp precision often attributed to managers has little
relevance to the messy world of complexity, confl ict, and uncertainty they inhabit.
They need multiple frames to survive. They need to understand that any event or
process can serve several purposes and that participants are often operating from
different views of reality. Managers need a diagnostic map that helps them assess
which lenses are likely to be salient and helpful in a given situation. Among the key
variables are motivation, technical constraints, uncertainty, scarcity, confl ict, and
whether an individual is operating from the top down or from the bottom up.
Several lines of research have found that effective leaders and effective organi-
zations rely on multiple frames. Studies of effective corporations, of individuals in
senior management roles, and of public and nonprofi t administrators all point to the
need for multiple perspectives in developing a holistic picture of complex systems.
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327
Reframing in Action Opportunities and Perils
Another case in point: R E A C H A N D G R A S P
Put yourself in the shoes of Cindy Marshall, headed to the offi ce for
your fi rst day in a new job. Your company has transferred you to Kansas
City to manage a customer service unit. It ’ s a big promotion, with a sub-
stantial increase in pay and responsibility. You know you face a major
challenge. You are inheriting a department with a reputation for slow,
substandard service. Senior management credits much of the blame to
your predecessor, Bill Howard, who is seen as too authoritarian and rigid.
Howard is moving to another job, but the company asked him to stay on
for a week to help you get oriented. One potential sticking point is that
he hired most of your new staff. Many may still feel loyal to him.
When you arrive, you get a frosty hello from Susan Bond, the depart-
ment secretary. As you walk into your new offi ce, you see Howard
behind the desk in a conversation with three other staff members. You
say hello, and he responds by saying, “ Didn ’ t the secretary tell you that
we ’ re in a meeting right now? If you ’ ll wait outside, I ’ ll be able to see
you in about an hour. ”
S I X T E E N
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations328
As Cindy Marshall, what would you do? You ’ re in the glare of the
spotlight, and the audience eagerly awaits your response. If you feel
threatened or attacked — as most of us would — those feelings will push
you toward either fi ght or fl ight. Fighting back and escalating the con-
fl ict is risky and could damage everyone. Backing away or fl eeing could
suggest that you are too emotional or not tough enough.
This is a classic example of a manager ’ s nightmare: a totally unexpected
situation that is headed for disaster. Howard ’ s greeting is well designed to
throw you off stride and put you in a bind. It carries echoes of historic pat-
t erns of male arrogance and condescension in relating to women (similar to
those that surfaced in the Anne Barreta case in Chapter Eight ). Whether or
not he intended it that way, Howard ’ s response appears ideal for disconcert-
ing a younger female colleague. He makes it likely that, as Cindy, you will feel
trapped and powerless, or you will do something rash and regrettable. Either
way, he wins and you lose.
The frames suggest another set of possibilities. They offer the advantage
of multiple angles to size up the situation. What ’ s really going on here? What
options do you have? What script does the situation demand? How might you
reinterpret the scene to create a more effective scenario? Reframing is a powerful
tool in a tough situation for generating possibilities other than fi ght or fl ight.
An immediate question facing you, as Cindy Marshall, is whether to respond
to Howard on the spot or to buy time. If you ’ re at a loss for what to say or if
you fear you will make things worse instead of better, take time to “ go to the
balcony ” — try to get above the confusion of the moment long enough to get a
better perspective and develop a workable strategy. Even better, though, fi nd an
effective response on the spot.
Each of the frames generates its own possibilities that can be translated into
alternative scenarios. They can also be misapplied or misused. Success depends
on the skill and artistry of the person following a given script. In this chapter, we
describe setups Marshall could compose showing that each the four lenses can
produce both effective and ineffective reactions. We conclude with a summary of
the power and risks of reframing and highlight its importance for outsiders and
newcomers.
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Reframing in Action 329
Structural Frame A S T R U C T U R A L S C E N A R I O
A structural scenario casts managers and leaders in the fundamental
roles of clarifying goals, attending to the relationship between struc-
ture and environment, and developing a clearly defi ned array of roles
and relationships appropriate to what needs to be done. Without a
workable structure, people become unsure about what they are sup-
posed to be doing. The result is confusion, frustration, and confl ict.
In an effective organization, individuals understand their responsibili-
ties and their contribution. Policies, linkages, and lines of authority are
straightforward and accepted. With the right structure, the organiza-
tion can achieve its goals, and individuals can see their role in the big
picture.
The main job of a leader is to focus on task, facts, and logic, rather
than personality and emotions. Most people problems stem from struc-
tural fl aws, not personal limitation or liability. The structural leader is
not rigidly authoritarian and does not attempt to solve every problem
by issuing orders (though that is sometimes appropriate). Instead, the
leader tries to design and implement a process or architecture appropri-
ate to the circumstances.
You may wonder what structure has to do with a direct, personal confronta-
tion, but the structural scenario in the box can be scripted to generate a variety
of responses.
Here ’ s one example:
Howard: Didn ’ t the secretary tell you that we ’ re in a meeting right
now? If you ’ ll wait outside, I ’ ll be able to see you in about an hour.
Marshall: My appointment as manager of this offi ce began at nine
this morning. This is now my offi ce, and you ’ re sitting behind my desk.
Either you relinquish the desk immediately, or I will call headquarters
and report you for insubordination.
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Reframing Organizations330
Howard: I was asked to stay on the job for one more week to try to
help you learn the ropes. Frankly, I doubt that you ’ re ready for this job,
but you don ’ t seem to want any help.
Marshall: I repeat, I am now in charge of this offi ce. Let me also
remind you that headquarters assigned you to stay this week to assist me.
I expect you to carry out that order. If you don ’ t, I will submit a letter for
your fi le detailing your lack of cooperation. Now, [fi rmly] I want my desk.
Howard: Well, we were working on important offi ce business, but since
the princess here is more interested in giving orders than in getting work
done, let ’ s move our meeting down to your offi ce, Joe. Enjoy the desk!
In this exchange, Cindy places heavy emphasis on her formal authority and
the chain of command. By invoking her superiors and her legitimate authority,
she takes charge and gets Howard to back down, but at a price. She risks long -
term tension with her new subordinates, who surely feel awkward during this
combative encounter. They may see their new boss as autocratic and rigid.
There are other options. Here ’ s another example of how Marshall might
exercise her authority:
Howard: Didn ’ t the secretary tell you that we ’ re in a meeting right now? If you ’ ll wait outside, I ’ ll be able to see you in about an hour.
Marshall: She didn ’ t mention it, and I don ’ t want to interrupt impor-
tant work, but we also need to set some priorities and work out an
agenda for the day anyway. Bill, have you developed a plan for how
you and I can get to work on the transition?
Howard: We can meet later on, after I get through some pressing
business.
Marshall: The pressing business is just the kind of thing I need to
learn about as the new manager here. What issues are you discussing?
Howard: How to keep the offi ce functioning when the new manager
is not ready for the job.
Marshall: Well, I have a lot to learn, but I feel up to it. With your help,
I think we can have a smooth and productive transition. How about if
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Reframing in Action 331
you continue your meeting and I just sit in as an observer? Then, Bill, you
and I could meet to work out a plan for how we ’ ll handle the transition.
After that, I ’ d like to schedule a meeting with each manager to get an
individual progress report. I ’ d like to hear from each of you about your
major customer service objectives and how you would assess your prog-
ress. Now, what were you talking about before I got here?
This time, Marshall is still clear and fi rm in establishing her authority, but she
does it without appearing harsh or dictatorial. She underscores the importance
of setting priorities. She asks if Howard has a plan for making the transition
productive. She emphasizes shared goals and defi nes a temporary role for herself
as an observer. She focuses steadfastly on the task and not on Howard ’ s provoca-
tions. In keeping the exchange on a rational level and outlining a transition plan,
she avoids escalating or submerging the confl ict. She also communicates to her
new staff that she has done her homework, is organized, and knows what she
wants. When she says she would like to hear their personal objectives and prog-
ress, she communicates an expectation that they should follow her example.
Human Resource Frame A H U M A N R E S O U R C E S C E N A R I O
The human resource leader believes that people are the center of any
organization. If people feel the organization is responsive to their
needs and supportive of their personal goals, you can count on com-
mitment and loyalty. Administrators who are authoritarian or insensi-
tive, who don ’ t communicate effectively, or who don ’ t care can never
be effective leaders. The human resource leader works on behalf of
both the organization and its people, seeking to serve the best inter-
ests of both.
The job of the leader is support and empowerment. Support takes a
variety of forms: showing concern, listening to people ’ s aspirations and
goals, and communicating personal warmth and openness. The leader
empowers through participation and inclusion ensuring that people
have the autonomy and support needed to do their job.
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Reframing Organizations332
As indicated in the human resource box, this frame favors listening and
responsiveness. Some people, though, go a little too far in trying to be responsive:
Howard: Didn ’ t the secretary tell you that we ’ re in a meeting right
now? If you ’ ll wait outside, I ’ ll be able to see you in about an hour.
Marshall: Oh, gosh, no, she didn ’ t. I just feel terrible about inter-
rupting your meeting. I hope I didn ’ t offend anyone because to me, it ’ s
really important to establish good working relationships right from the
outset. While I ’ m waiting, is there anything I can do to help? Would
anyone like a cup of coffee?
Howard: No. We ’ ll let you know when we ’ re fi nished.
Marshall: Oh. Well, have a good meeting, and I ’ ll see you in an hour.
In the effort to be friendly and accommodating, Marshall is acting more like
a waitress than a manager. She defuses the confl ict, but her staff are likely to see
their new boss as weak. She could instead capitalize on an interest in people:
Howard: Didn ’ t the secretary tell you that we ’ re in a meeting right
now? If you ’ ll wait outside, I ’ ll be able to see you in about an hour.
Marshall: I ’ m sorry if I ’ m interrupting, but I ’ m eager to get started,
and I ’ ll need all your help. [She walks around, introduces herself, and
shakes hands with each member of her new staff. Howard scowls
silently.] Bill, could we take a few minutes to talk about how we can
work together on the transition, now that I ’ m coming in to manage the
department?
Howard: You ’ re not the manager yet. I was asked to stay on for a
week to get you started — though, frankly, I doubt that you ’ re ready for
this job.
Marshall: I understand your concern, Bill. I know how committed you
are to the success of the department. If I were you, I might be worried
about whether I was turning my baby over to someone who wouldn ’ t
be able to take care of it. But I wouldn ’ t be here if I didn ’ t feel ready.
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Reframing in Action 333
I want to benefi t as much as I can from your experience. Is it urgent to
get on with what you were talking about, or could we take some time
fi rst to talk about how we can start working together?
Howard: We have some things we need to fi nish.
Marshall: Well, as a manager, I always prefer to trust the judgment
of the people who are closest to the action. I ’ ll just sit in while you fi n-
ish up, and then we can talk about how we move forward from there.
Here, Marshall is unfazed and relentlessly cheerful; she avoids a battle and
acknowledges Howard ’ s perspective. When he says she is not ready for the job,
she resists the temptation to debate or return his salvo. Instead, she recognizes
his concern but calmly communicates her confi dence and focus on moving
ahead. She demonstrates an important skill of a human resource leader: the
ability to combine advocacy with inquiry. She listens carefully to Howard but
gently stands her ground. She asks for his help while expressing confi dence that
she can do the job. When he says they have things to fi nish, she responds with
the agility of a martial artist, using Howard ’ s energy to her own advantage. She
expresses part of her philosophy — she prefers to trust her staff ’ s judgment — and
positions herself as an observer, thus gaining an opportunity to learn more about
her staff and the issues they are addressing. By reframing the situation, she has
gotten off to a better start with Howard and is able to signal to others the kind of
people - oriented leader she intends to be.
Political Frame A P O L I T I C A L S C E N A R I O
The political leader believes that managers have to recognize politi-
cal reality and know how to deal with confl ict. Inside and outside any
organization, a variety of interest groups, each with its own agenda,
compete for scarce resources. There is never enough to give all parties
what they want, so there will always be struggles.
The job of the leader is to recognize major constituencies, develop
ties to their leadership, and manage confl ict as productively as possible.
Above all, leaders need to build a power base and use power carefully.
They can ’ t give every group everything it wants, but they can create
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Reframing Organizations334
arenas where groups can negotiate differences and come up with a
reasonable compromise. They also need to work at articulating what
everyone has in common. It is wasteful for people to expend energy
fi ghting each other when there are plenty of enemies outside to battle.
Any group that doesn ’ t get its act together internally tends to get
trounced by outsiders.
Some managers translate the political approach described in this box to mean
management by intimidation and manipulation. It sometimes works, but the
risks are high. Here ’ s an example:
Howard: Didn ’ t the secretary tell you that we ’ re in a meeting right now? If you ’ ll wait outside, I ’ ll be able to see you in about an hour.
Marshall: In your next job, maybe you should train your secretary bet-
ter. Anyway, I can ’ t waste time sitting around in hallways. Everyone in
this room knows why I ’ m here. You ’ ve got a choice, Bill. You can cooper-
ate with me, or you can lose any credibility you still have in this company.
Howard: If I didn ’ t have any more experience than you do, I wouldn ’ t
be so quick to throw my weight around. But if you think you know it all
already, I guess you won ’ t need any help from me.
Marshall: What I know is that this department has gone downhill
under your leadership, and it ’ s my job to turn it around. You can go home
right now, if you want — you know where the door is. But if you ’ re smart,
you ’ ll stay and help. The vice president wants my report on the transi-
tion. You ’ ll be a lot better off if I can tell him you ’ ve been cooperative.
Moviegoers cheer when bullies get their comeuppance. It can be satisfying to
give the verbal equivalent of a kick in the groin to someone who deserves it. In this
exchange, Marshall establishes that she is tough, even dangerous. But such coercive
tactics can be expensive in the long run. She is likely to win this battle because her
hand is stronger. But she may lose the war. She increases Howard ’ s antagonism,
and her attack may offend him and frighten her new staff. Even if they dislike
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Reframing in Action 335
Howard, they might see Marshall as arrogant and callous. She lays the ground for a
counterattack, and may have done political damage that will be diffi cult to reverse.
Sophisticated political leaders prefer to avoid naked demonstrations of power,
looking instead for ways to appeal to the self - interests of potential adversaries:
Howard: Didn ’ t the secretary tell you that we ’ re in a meeting right
now? If you ’ ll wait outside, I ’ ll be able to see you in about an hour.
Marshall: [pleasantly] Bill, if it ’ s OK with you, I ’ d prefer to skip the
games and go to work. I expect this department to be a winner, and
I hope that ’ s what we all want. I also would like to manage the transition
in a way that ’ s good for your career, Bill, and for the careers of others in
the room.
Howard: If I need advice from you on my career, I ’ ll ask.
Marshall: OK, but the vice president has asked me to let him know
about the cooperation I get here. I ’ d like to be able to say that everyone
has been helping me as much as possible. Is that what you ’ d like, too?
Howard: I ’ ve known the vice president a lot longer than you have. I
can talk to him myself.
Marshall: I know, Bill, he ’ s told me that. In fact, I just came from his
offi ce. If you ’ d like, we could both go see him right now.
Howard: Uh, no, not right now.
Marshall: Well, then, let ’ s get on with it. Do you want to fi nish what
you were discussing, or is this a good time for us to develop some
agreement on how we ’ re going to work together?
In this politically based response, Marshall is both direct and diplomatic. She
uses a light touch in dismissing Howard ’ s opening salvo. ( “ I ’ d prefer to skip the
games. ” ) She speaks directly to Howard ’ s interest in his career and her subordi-
nates ’ interest in theirs. She deftly defl ates his posturing by asking if he wants to
go with her to talk to the vice president. Clearly, she is confi dent of her political
position and knows that his bluster has little to back it up.
Note that in both political scenarios, Marshall draws on her power resources.
In the fi rst, she uses those resources to humiliate Howard, but in the second, her
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Reframing Organizations336
approach is subtler. She conserves her political capital and takes charge while
leaving Howard with as much pride as possible, achieving something closer to a
win - win than a win - lose outcome.
Symbolic Frame A S Y M B O L I C S C E N A R I O
The symbolic leader believes that the most important part of a leader ’ s
job is inspiration — giving people something they can believe in. People
become excited about and committed to a place with a unique identity,
a special place where they feel that what they do is really important.
Effective symbolic leaders are passionate about making the organiza-
tion unique in its niche and communicating that passion to others. They
use dramatic symbols to get people excited and to give them a sense of
the organization ’ s mission. They are visible and energetic. They create
slogans, tell stories, hold rallies, give awards, appear where they are
least expected, and manage by wandering around.
Symbolic leaders are sensitive to an organization ’ s history and cul-
ture. They seek to use the best in an organization ’ s traditions and val-
ues as a base for building a culture that has cohesiveness and meaning.
They articulate a vision that communicates the organization ’ s unique
capabilities and mission.
At fi rst glance, Cindy Marshall ’ s encounter with Bill Howard might seem a
poor candidate for the symbolic approach outlined in this box. An ineffective
effort could produce embarrassing results, making the would - be symbolic leader
look foolish:
Howard: Didn ’ t the secretary tell you that we ’ re in a meeting right
now? If you ’ ll wait outside, I ’ ll be able to see you in about an hour.
Marshall: It ’ s great to see that you ’ re all hard at work. It ’ s proof that
we all share a commitment to excellence in customer service. In fact,
I ’ ve already made up buttons for all the staff. Here — I have one for each
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Reframing in Action 337
of you. They read, “ The customer is always fi rst. ” They look great, and
they communicate the spirit that we all want in the department. Go on
with your meeting. I can use the hour to talk to some of the staff about
their visions for the department. [She walks out of the offi ce.]
Howard: [to remaining staff] Did you believe that? I told you they
hired a real space cadet to replace me. Maybe you didn ’ t believe me,
but you just saw it with your own eyes.
Marshall ’ s symbolic direction might be on the right track, but symbols work
only when they are attuned to the context — both people and place. As a new-
comer to the department culture, she needs to pay close attention to her audi-
ence. Meaningless symbols antagonize, and empty symbolic events backfi re.
Conversely, a skillful symbolic leader understands that a situation of chal-
lenge and stress can serve as a powerful opportunity to articulate values and
build a sense of mission. Marshall demonstrates how, in a well - formed symbolic
approach to Howard ’ s gruffness:
Howard: Didn ’ t the secretary tell you that we ’ re in a meeting right
now? If you ’ ll wait outside, I ’ ll be able to see you in about an hour.
Marshall: [smiling] Maybe this is just the traditional initiation ritual in
this department, Bill, but let me ask a question. If one of our customers
came through the door right now, would you ask her to wait outside
for an hour?
Howard: If she just came barging in like you did, sure.
Marshall: Are you working on something that ’ s more important than
responding to our customers?
Howard: They ’ re not your customers. You ’ ve only been here fi ve
minutes.
Marshall: True, but I ’ ve been with this company long enough to
know the importance of putting customers fi rst.
Howard: Look, you don ’ t know the fi rst thing about how this depart-
ment functions. Before you go off on some customer crusade, you
ought to learn a little about how we do things.
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Reframing Organizations338
Marshall: There ’ s a lot I can learn from all of you, and I ’ m eager to
get started. For example, I ’ m very interested in your ideas on how we
can make this a department where as soon as people walk in, they get
the sense that this is a place where people care, are responsive, and
genuinely want to be helpful. I ’ d like that to be true for anyone who
comes in — a staff member, a customer, or just someone who got lost
and came into the wrong offi ce. That ’ s not the message I got from my
initiation a couple of minutes ago, but I ’ m sure we can think of lots of
ways to change that. How does that fi t with your image of what the
department should be like?
Notice how Marshall recasts the conversation. Instead of engaging in a per-
sonal confrontation with Howard, she focuses on the department ’ s core values.
She brings her “ customer fi rst ” commitment with her, but she avoids position-
ing that value as something imposed from outside. Instead, she grounds it in an
experience everyone in the room has just shared: the way she was greeted when
she entered. Like many successful symbolic leaders, she is attuned to the cues
about values and culture that are expressed in everyday life. She communicates
her philosophy, but she also asks questions to draw out Howard and her new
staff members. If she can use the organization ’ s history to an advantage in rekin-
dling a commitment to customer service, she is off to a good start.
BENEFITS AND RISKS OF REFRAMING The multiple replays of the Howard - Marshall incident illustrate both the power
and the risks of reframing. The frames are powerful because of their ability to
spur imagination and generate new insights and options. But each frame has
limits as well as strengths, and each can be applied well or poorly.
Frames can be used as scripts, or scenarios, to guide action in high - stakes
circumstances. By changing your script, you can change how you appear, what
you do, and how your audience sees you. You can create the possibility of trans-
formation in everyday life. Few of us have the dramatic skill and versatility of
a professional actor, but you can alter what you do by choosing an alternative
script or scenario. You have been learning how to do this since birth. Both men
and women, for example, typically employ different scenarios for same - sex and
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Reframing in Action 339
opposite - sex encounters. Students who are guarded and formal when talking to
a professor become energized and intimate when talking to friends. Managers
who are polite and deferential with the boss may be gruff and autocratic with
subordinates and then come home at night to romp playfully with their kids.
The tenderhearted neighbor becomes a ruthless competitor when his company ’ s
market share is threatened. The tough - minded drill instructor bows to authority
when faced by a colonel. Consciously or not, we all read situations to fi gure out
what scene we ’ re in and what role we ’ ve been assigned so that we can respond in
character. But it ’ s important to ask ourselves whether the drama is the one we
want and to recognize that we have latitude as to which character to play and
how to interpret the script.
The essence of reframing is examining the same situation from multiple van-
tage points. The effective leader changes lenses when things don ’ t make sense
or aren ’ t working. Reframing offers the promise of powerful new options, but it
cannot guarantee that every new strategy will be successful. Each lens offers dis-
tinctive advantages, but each has its blind spots and shortcomings.
The structural frame risks ignoring everything that falls outside the rational
scope of tasks, procedures, policies, and organization charts. Structural think-
ing can overestimate the power of authority and underestimate the authority
of power. Paradoxically, overreliance on structural assumptions and a narrow
emphasis on rationality can lead to an irrational neglect of human, political, and
cultural variables crucial to effective action.
Adherents of the human resource frame sometimes cling to a romanticized
view of human nature in which everyone hungers for growth and collaboration.
Human resource enthusiasts can be overly optimistic about integrating individ-
ual and organizational needs while neglecting structure and the stubborn reali-
ties of confl ict and scarcity.
The political frame captures dynamics that other frames miss but has its
own limits. A fi xation on politics easily becomes a cynical self - fulfi lling proph-
ecy, reinforcing confl ict and mistrust while sacrifi cing opportunities for ratio-
nal discourse, collaboration, and hope. Political action is too often interpreted as
amoral, scheming, and oblivious to the common good.
The symbolic frame offers powerful insight into fundamental issues of mean-
ing and belief, as well as possibilities for bonding people into a cohesive group
with a shared mission. But its concepts are also elusive; effectiveness depends
on the artistry of the user. Symbols are sometimes mere fl uff or camoufl age, the
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Reframing Organizations340
tools of a scoundrel who seeks to manipulate the unsuspecting or an awkward
attempt that embarrasses more than energizes people at work.
REFRAMING FOR NEWCOMERS AND OUTSIDERS Marshall ’ s initial encounter with Howard exemplifi es many of the challenges and
tests that managers confront as they move forward in their careers. The different
scenarios offer a glimmer of what they might run into, depending on how they
size up a situation. Managers feel powerless and trapped when they rely on only
one or two frames. This is particularly true for newcomers, as well as for women
and members of other groups who experience “ the dogged frustration of people
living daily in a system not made for them and with no plans soon to adjust for
them or their differences ” (Gallos, Ramsey, and Associates, 1997, p. 216). These
outsiders are less likely to get a second or third chance when they fail.
Though progressive organizations have made heroic strides in building more
just opportunity structures (Levering and Moskowitz, 1993; Morrison, 1992),
the path to success is still fraught with obstacles blocking women and minorities.
Judicious reframing can enable them to transform an imprisoning managerial
trap into a promising leadership opportunity. And the more often individuals
break through the glass ceiling or out of the corporate ghetto, the more quickly
those barriers will disappear altogether. Career barriers can feel as foreboding
and impenetrable as the Berlin Wall did — until it suddenly fell. The 2008 U.S.
presidential race signaled that more walls were imploding when the Democratic
nomination came down to an unprecedented contest between a woman and an
African American — Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.
SUMMARY Managers can use frames as scenarios, or scripts, to generate alternative
approaches to challenging circumstances. In planning for a high - stakes meeting
or a tense encounter, they can imagine and try out novel ways to play their roles.
Until reframing becomes instinctive, it takes more than the few seconds that
Cindy Marshall had to generate an effective response in every frame. In practic-
ing any new skill — playing tennis, fl ying an airplane, or handling a tough lead-
ership challenge — the process is often slow and painstaking at fi rst. But as skill
improves, it gets easier, faster, and more fl uid.
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341
Reframing Leadership
Rudy Giuliani could have shrunk from the awesome burdens created by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. He woke up that morning a virtual has - been, a wounded, end - of - term mayor whose ratings in
New York and elsewhere had been in steady decline. New Yorkers were
tired of his arrogance and bullying. A messy, very public divorce was
beginning to turn him into an object of ridicule (his estranged wife
and their children were living at Gracie Mansion, the mayor ’ s offi -
cial residence, while His Honor bunked in a friend ’ s spare bedroom).
Yet, as discussed in Chapter Fifteen , Giuliani seemed transformed
on New York ’ s bloodiest day. He sped to the scene, arriving in time
to see smoke, chaos, and bodies falling from the sky. He brought his
hand to his mouth as he battled back tears, and then he went to work.
He closed bridges and tunnels, ordered the evacuation of the disas-
ter area, and postponed the primary elections. “ By mid - day, he had all
of the city ’ s commissioners sitting at a makeshift conference table at
a temporary command center reporting on how their agencies were
responding. Not just the police and fi re and emergency management
agencies: Every agency was present. That process created an immedi-
ate sense of discipline for a government that otherwise might have
spun in confusion ” (Coles, 2002).
S E V E N T E E N
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations342
Giuliani appeared repeatedly on television to offer calm, reassuring accounts of
complex and horrible news. He resisted pressure to speculate beyond what he
knew about the death toll, saying simply that it would be “ much more than any of
us can bear. ” Wearing spattered boots and a New York Fire Department baseball
cap, he gave tours to visiting dignitaries. Determined to prove New York ’ s resil-
ience, the mayor pushed relentlessly to get Broadway theaters and the New York
Stock Exchange reopened as soon as possible, overriding naysayers who said it
couldn ’ t or shouldn ’ t be done. “ He attended funerals, comforted survivors, urged
residents to dine out and tourists to come in, all the while exuding compassion
and resolve. The man who had seemed so fi nished just a few weeks earlier was
now greeted with cheers wherever he went: Rudy! Rudy! ” (Barry, 2001, p. A 1).
In times of crisis we expect leadership from people in high places, and we are
grievously disappointed if they fail to provide it. But it is misleading to imagine
that leadership comes only from people in high positions. Such a view causes us
to ask too much of too few. Rudy Giuliani insisted that the real heroes of 9/11
were fi refi ghters, police offi cers, and rescue workers who risked, and in many
cases lost, their lives trying to help others. Under conditions of enormous dan-
ger and confusion, often cut off from communication with their commanding
offi cers, they improvised and exercised on - the - spot leadership that signifi cantly
reduced the death toll. They demonstrated clearly that we need more leaders as
well as better leadership.
We begin this chapter by exploring what leadership is, what it is not, and what
it can and cannot accomplish. We look at the differences between leadership and
power and between leadership and management, and we emphasize that lead-
ership is always situated in both relationships and contexts. We then review
research on effective leadership and explore two leadership models popular with
practitioners. We also examine the issue of gender and leadership. Finally, we
explore how each of the four frames generates its own image of leadership.
THE IDEA OF LEADERSHIP Leadership is seen as a panacea for almost any social problem. Middle managers
and workers often say their enterprise would thrive if senior management showed
“ real leadership. ” Conventional wisdom sees leadership as a good thing that we
need more of, at least the right kind. “ For many — perhaps for most — Americans,
leadership is a word that has risen above normal workaday usage as a conveyer of
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Reframing Leadership 343
meaning and has become a kind of incantation. We feel that if we repeat it often
enough with suffi cient ardor, we shall ease our sense of having lost our way, our
sense of things unaccomplished, of duties unfulfi lled ” (Gardner, 1986, p. 1). Yet
there is confusion and disagreement about what leadership means and how much
difference it can make.
Sennett (1980, p. 197) writes, “ Authority is not a thing; it is a search for solid-
ity and security in the strength of others which will seem to be like a thing. ” The
same is true of leadership. It is not tangible. It exists only in relationships and in
the perception of the engaged parties. Most images suggest that leaders are pow-
erful. Yet many examples of the use of power fall outside our image of leadership:
armed robbers, extortionists, bullies, traffi c cops. Implicitly, we expect leaders
to persuade or inspire rather than to coerce. We also expect leaders to produce
cooperative effort and to pursue goals that transcend narrow self - interest.
Leadership is distinct from authority and position, though authorities may
be leaders. Weber (1947) linked authority to legitimacy. People choose to obey
authority so long as they believe it is legitimate. Authority and leadership are both
built on voluntary compliance. Leaders cannot lead without legitimacy. But many
examples of authority fall outside the domain of leadership. As Gardner put it,
“ The meter maid has authority, but not necessarily leadership ” (1989, p. 7).
Heifetz argues that authority often impedes leadership: “ Authority constrains
leadership because in times of distress, people expect too much. They form inap-
propriate dependencies that isolate their authorities behind a mask of know-
ing. [The leadership role] is played badly if authorities reinforce dependency
and delude themselves into thinking that they have the answers when they do
not. Feeling pressured to know, they will surely come up with an answer, even if
poorly tested, misleading, and wrong ” (1994, p. 180).
Leadership is often confused with management. But a person can be a leader
without being a manager, and many managers could not “ lead a squad of seven -
year - olds to the ice - cream counter ” (Gardner, 1989, p. 2). Bennis and Nanus
(1985) suggest that “ managers do things right, and leaders do the right thing ”
(p. 21) — managers focus on execution, leaders on purpose. A managerially ori-
ented navy offi cer gave a ringing endorsement of his more leaderlike successor:
“ I go by the book; he writes the book. ”
Kotter (1988) sees management as being primarily about structural nuts and
bolts: planning, organizing, and controlling. He views leadership as a change -
oriented process of visioning, networking, and building relationships. But Gardner
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Reframing Organizations344
argues against contrasting leadership and management too sharply because leaders
may “ end up looking like a cross between Napoleon and the Pied Piper, and man-
agers like unimaginative clods ” (1989, p. 3). He suggests several dimensions for
distinguishing leadership from management. Leaders think in the long term, look
outside as well as inside, and infl uence constituents beyond their immediate for-
mal jurisdiction. They emphasize vision and renewal and have the political skills
to cope with the demands of multiple constituencies.
THE CONTEXT OF LEADERSHIP In story and myth, leaders are often lonely heroes and itinerant warriors, wed
only to honor and a noble cause. Think of Jason Bourne, Joan of Arc, the Lone
Ranger, or Rambo. But images of solitary, heroic leaders mislead by suggesting
that leaders go it alone and by focusing the spotlight too much on individuals
and too little on the stage where they play their parts. Leaders make things hap-
pen, but things also make leaders happen. The transformation in Rudy Giuliani ’ s
image after 9/11 from has - been to hero in twenty - four hours is a perfect illus-
tration. Giuliani found himself center stage in an unplanned theater of horror
and delivered the performance of his life. Another scenario would have required
a different leadership role. No single formula is possible for the great range of
situations leaders encounter.
Heroic images of leadership convey the notion of a one - way transaction: lead-
ers show the way and followers tag along. This view masks the mutual interplay
between the two. Leaders are not independent actors; they both shape and are
shaped by their constituents (Gardner, 1989; Simmel, 1950; Heifetz and Linsky,
2002). Leaders often promote a new initiative only after a large number of con-
stituents favor it (Cleveland, 1985). Leaders ’ actions generate responses that in
turn affect the leaders ’ capacity for taking further initiatives (Murphy, 1985). As
Briand puts it, “ A ‘ leader ’ who makes a decision and then attempts to ‘ sell ’ it is
not wise and will likely not prove effective. The point is not that leaders should
do less, but that others can and should do more. Everyone must accept responsi-
bility for the people ’ s well - being, and everyone has a role to play in sustaining it ”
(1993, p. 39).
Although it is tempting to equate leadership with position, this relegates oth-
ers to a passive role. It also reinforces a tendency for senior executives to take on
more responsibility than they can discharge (Oshry, 1995). Leadership does not
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Reframing Leadership 345
come automatically with high position; conversely, it is possible to be a leader
without a position of formal authority. In fact, good organizations encourage
leadership from many quarters (Barnes and Kriger, 1986; Kanter, 1983).
Leadership is thus a subtle process of mutual infl uence fusing thought, feeling,
and action. It produces cooperative effort in the service of purposes embraced
by both leader and led. Single - frame managers are unlikely to understand and
attend to the intricacies of this lively process.
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT GOOD LEADERSHIP? Two of the most widely accepted leadership propositions offer divergent per-
spectives. One asserts that all good leaders must have the right stuff — qualities
like vision, strength, and commitment. The other holds that good leadership is
situational; what works in one setting will not work in another. A proposition
from the “ effective schools ” literature illustrates the right - stuff perspective: a
good school is headed by a strong and visionary instructional leader. An example
of the situational view is the belief that it takes a different kind of person to lead
when you ’ re growing and adding staff than when you ’ re cutting budgets and lay-
ing people off.
Despite the tension between these one - best - way and contingency views, both
capture part of the truth. Studies have found shared characteristics among effec-
tive leaders across sectors and situations. Another body of research has identifi ed
situational variables that determine the kind of leadership that works best.
One Best Way Recent decades have produced a steady stream of studies of effective leadership
(Bennis and Nanus, 1985, 2007; Clifford and Cavanagh, 1985; Collins, 2001;
Collins and Porras, 1994; Conger, 1989; Farkas and De Backer, 1996; Kotter,
1982, 1988; Kotter and Cohen, 2002; Kouzes and Posner, 2007; Levinson and
Rosenthal, 1984; Maccoby, 1981, 2003; Peters and Austin, 1985; Vaill, 1982).
Many have been qualitative studies of leaders, primarily corporate executives.
Methodology has varied from casual impressions to systematic interviews and
observation.
No characteristic is universal in these studies, but vision and focus show
up most often. Effective leaders help articulate a vision, set standards for per-
formance, and create focus and direction. A related characteristic explicit in
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Reframing Organizations346
some reports (Clifford and Cavanagh, 1985; Kouzes and Posner, 2007; Peters
and Austin, 1985) and implicit in others is the ability to communicate a vision
effectively, often through the use of symbols. Another quality often mentioned
is commitment or passion (Clifford and Cavanagh, 1985; Collins, 2001; Peters
and Austin, 1985; Vaill, 1982). Good leaders care deeply about their work and
the people who do it. Yet another characteristic is the ability to inspire trust
and build relationships (Bennis and Nanus, 2007; Kotter, 1988; Maccoby, 1981).
Beyond vision, passion, and trust, consensus breaks down. The studies cited
so far, along with extensive reviews of the literature (Bass, 1990; Gardner, 1987;
Hollander, 1978; Yukl, 2005), generate a long list of attributes associated with
effective leadership: risk taking, fl exibility, self - confi dence, interpersonal skills,
managing by walking around, task competence, intelligence, decisiveness, under-
standing of followers, and courage, to name a few. Kouzes and Posner (2007)
found that honesty came fi rst on a list of traits that people most admired in a
leader. Workers said of Pat Carrigan, a school psychologist who shifted to the
auto industry and turned around two different General Motors parts plants:
“ She ain ’ t got a phony bone in her body. ” Her truthfulness played a key role in
gaining the cooperation of formerly disaffected employees. Collins, in his best -
seller Good to Great (2001), insists that humility is a key quality of great leaders,
while Maccoby (2003) argues for narcissism instead. The oldest reliable fi nding
about effective leaders — they are smarter and work harder than other people —
continues to fi nd research support (O ’ Reilly and Chatman, 1994). But effort and
IQ are found in people who are better at almost anything, and there are many
brilliant hard workers who are hopeless leaders.
Blake and Mouton ’ s “ managerial grid ” (1969, 1985) is a classic and still popu-
lar example of a one - best - way approach. Diffused through scores of books, arti-
cles, and training programs, the grid postulates two fundamental dimensions of
leader effectiveness: concern for task and concern for people. The model arrays
approaches to leadership on a two - dimensional grid shown in Exhibit 17.1 .
Theoretically, the grid contains eighty - one cells, though Blake and Mouton
emphasize only fi ve:
1, 1: The manager with little concern for task or people who simply goes
through the motions.
1, 9: The friendly manager who likes people but has less concern for task.
9, 1: The hard - driving taskmaster.
•
•
•
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Reframing Leadership 347
Exhibit 17.1. Managerial Grid Model.
C o
n ce
rn f
o r
P eo
p le
1, 9 Indulgent
management
5, 5 Compromise management
9, 9 Integrative
management
1, 1 Minimal
management
9, 1 Authoritarian management
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
Concern for Task
Source: Adapted from Blake and Mouton (1985).
5, 5: The compromising manager who tries to split the difference between
task and people.
9, 9: The ideal manager who integrates task and people and produces out-
standing performance.
Blake and Mouton have vigorously defended their conviction that a 9, 9 style
is a leadership approach for all situations and all seasons (Blake and Mouton,
1982), but this claim has been heavily criticized. The grid approach focuses
almost exclusively on task and people. It gives little attention to constituents
other than direct subordinates and assumes that a leader who integrates concern
for task with concern for people is effective in almost all circumstances. But if
structure is unwieldy, political confl ict is rampant, or culture is threadbare, the
grid model has little to say.
•
•
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Reframing Organizations348
Contingency Theories Do leaders make the times, or do the times make leaders? In considering this
age - old question, think about some examples. The Battle of Britain secured
Winston Churchill ’ s place in history, though the British public rejected him
before the war and again right after. Much the same happened for Rudy Giuliani,
who went from has - been before 9/11 to hero after it and then back to has - been
when he ran for president in 2008. Jimmy Carter ’ s intellect propelled him to suc-
cess as a navy offi cer and governor, but could not save his presidency. Joan of
Arc would not have rated a historical footnote without a war, a beleaguered king,
and the dramatic circumstances of her death. Such examples argue for situation
as the prime catalyst in leadership.
Several writers have offered situational theories of leadership (including
Fiedler, 1967; Fiedler and Chemers, 1974; Hersey, 1984; Hersey and Blanchard,
1977; Reddin, 1970; and Vroom and Yetton, 1973), but most take a limited view
of leadership and few have much empirical support. Many confl ate leadership
and management, typically treating leadership as synonymous with manag-
ing subordinates. In contrast, Burns (1978), Gardner (1986), Kotter and Cohen
(2002), and Heifetz and Linsky (2002) argue persuasively that leaders need skill
in managing relationships with all signifi cant stakeholders, including superi-
ors, peers, and external constituents. Contingency theories are a major area for
further research. Almost everyone believes that widely varying circumstances
require different forms of leadership, but evidence is still sparse.
These limitations have not kept approaches such as the Hersey and Blanchard
notion of situational leadership (1977, 2007) from becoming widely popular in
management development programs. Hersey and Blanchard use two dimen-
sions of leadership similar to those in the managerial grid: task and people.
Hersey defi nes task behavior as “ the extent to which the leader engages in spell-
ing out the duties and responsibilities of an individual or group ” (1984, p. 31).
Relationship behavior is “ the extent to which the leader engages in two - way
or multi - way communication. ” It includes “ listening, encouraging, facilitat-
ing, providing clarifi cation, and giving socioemotional support ” (p. 32). Hersey
combines task and people into a two - by - two chart that shows four possible
“ leadership styles. ” (See Exhibit 17.2 .) The labels for three of those styles have
evolved over the decades (from telling, selling, and participating to directing,
coaching, and supporting), but the basic message has changed little.
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Reframing Leadership 349
Exhibit 17.2. Situational Leadership Model.
High Relationship, Low Task:
Leadership Through Supporting
Use when followers are “able” but “unwilling” or “insecure”
Low Relationship, Low Task:
Leadership Through Delegation
Use when followers are “able” and “willing” or “motivated”
High Relationship, High Task:
Leadership Through Coaching
Use when followers are “unable” but “willing” or “motivated”
Low Relationship, High Task:
Leadership Through Directing
Use when followers are “unable” and “unwilling” or “insecure”
Source: Adapted from Hersey (1984, p. 63).
When is each style appropriate? It depends on subordinates ’ “ maturity ”
(Hersey and Blanchard, 1977) or “ readiness level ” (Hersey, 1984). Hersey defi nes
readiness in terms of subordinates ’ commitment (how willing they are to do a
good job) and competence (how able they are to do the job well). Four levels of
subordinate readiness determine the appropriate style.
For subordinates at the lowest level (low competence and low commitment),
the model counsels managers to “ direct ” : such people need their boss to tell them
what to do. At the next level up (high commitment but low competence), subor-
dinates want to do the job but lack skills — they need “ coaching ” from the boss.
When subordinates are able but unwilling, the leader should “ support ” through
a participative process of sharing ideas and discussing what to do. At the highest
level, with subordinates who are both able and willing, the leader should simply
“ delegate ” : the subordinates will do fi ne on their own.
The model is very popular because it is intuitively plausible, but research has
not provided strong support (Hambleton and Gumpert, 1982; Graeff, 1983; Blank,
Weitzel, and Green, 1990). If, for example, managers give unwilling and unable
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Reframing Organizations350
subordinates high direction and low support, what would cause their motivation
to improve? The manager of a computer design team told us ruefully, “ I treated
my group with a ‘ telling ’ [directing] management style and found that in fact
they became both less able and less willing. ” Furthermore, like Blake and Mouton,
Hersey and Blanchard focus mostly on the relationship between managers and
immediate subordinates and say little about structure, politics, or symbols.
Leadership Models as Secular Myths Dealing with people is a perennially perplexing aspect of managing. Managers
are always looking for ideas to make the job easier. Too often, the search for sim-
plicity overlooks important realities. Even so, a manager may conclude that any
model or theory is better than nothing in the face of confusion and mystery. True
believers may defend their faith with fervor, as the following case study illustrates.
W H E N F A I T H S C O L L I D E
A corporation was developing a new management training program for
a group of two thousand technical managers. A task force with repre-
sentatives from two divisions came together to decide what to teach.
The representatives from Division A had participated in managerial grid
seminars. They knew in their hearts that the grid was the one best way
and that it should be the foundation of the seminar. The managers in
Division B had attended situational leadership seminars, and their faith
in the situational model was equally fervent.
Initially, the two sides engaged in polite talk and rational argument.
When that failed, the conversation gradually became more heated.
Eventually, the group found itself hopelessly deadlocked. An outside con-
sultant came in to mediate the dispute. He listened while the representa-
tives from each division reviewed the conversation. The consultant then
said to the group, “ I ’ m impressed by the passion on both sides. I ’ m curi-
ous about one thing. If you all believe so deeply in these models and if it
makes a difference which model someone learns, why can ’ t I see any dif-
ference in the behavior of your two groups? ” Stunned silence fell over the
room. Finally one member said, “ You know, I think he ’ s right. We don ’ t
use the damn models, we just preach them. ” That ended the impasse.
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Reframing Leadership 351
From the beginning, humans have sought explanations for occurrences that
defi ed their capacity to make sense. Things happen and we can ’ t explain why. To
maintain our sanity we create myths to bolster our faith. Thereafter our beliefs
sustain us in the face of doubt and confusion, shielding us from the reality of
how little we know. That is true of our approaches to leadership — unless we are
able to entertain more than one theology.
GENDER AND LEADERSHIP Historically, research and writing on leadership focused mostly on men. The
implicit, taken - for - granted assumption was that leadership is a male activity.
More recent years, however, have seen a dramatic shift in women ’ s roles and
accomplishments. In breaking from masculine traditions and embracing more
feminine conceptions of leadership, women have blazed new paths.
One example is Karren Brady, who became managing director of the
Birmingham (England) City Football Club in 1993. At twenty - three, she was
the youngest person, and the only woman, heading a professional English soccer
team. As you might expect, she ran into a few challenges. There was the strapping
forward who told her on the team bus that he liked her blouse because he could
see her breasts through it. She looked him in the eye and replied, “ Where I ’ m
going to send you, you won ’ t be able to see them from there. ” A week later, he was
downgraded to a club a hundred miles away. There was the time the directors of
another team told her how fortunate she was that they were willing to let her into
their owners ’ box. She fi red back, “ The day I have to feel grateful for half a lager
and a pork pie in a dump of a little box with a psychedelic carpet is the day I give
up ” (Hoge, 2002, p. A14).
Brady got plenty of media attention, but it often focused on her looks and
wardrobe. One newspaper ran a full - page photo of her in a short skirt under the
headline, “ Sex Shooter. ” Another described her entry into a meeting: “ Every inch
the modern woman, she totters into the room on high - heeled strappy sandals
and a short and sexy black suit. ” Brady was continually perplexed: “ I came here
to run a business, to put right a dilapidated, rundown operation with a series
of business solutions. But the media, with the combination of my age, the way I
look, and obviously the fact that I was a female — the fi rst in a male - dominated
world — went into a frenzy. It was unbelievable. I ’ d be in press conferences, and
journalists would actually ask me my vital statistics ” (Hoge, 2002, p. A14).
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Reframing Organizations352
Still, Brady understood that publicity, even tinged with notoriety, was good for
business. She took a team that had never shown a profi t from the edge of bank-
ruptcy to become one of the England ’ s strongest teams, both on the fi eld and at
the cash register, with an estimated value in 2007 of more than $ 100 million. She
even overcame the complications that might have arisen after she married one
of her players. She bought and sold her husband twice, making over a million
pounds in the process. She won businesswoman - of - the - year awards, and eventu-
ally even her fellow football executives recognized her talent, naming her to rep-
resent them in negotiations for the national television contract that yielded a big
chunk of their revenue.
Women like Karren Brady have proven that they can lead in a man ’ s world. But
do men and women lead differently? Are they seen differently in leadership roles?
Why do men still have such a disproportionate hold on positions of institutional
and organizational power? Research on gender and leadership has asked these and
other questions, and we turn next to some of the answers that have emerged.
Do Men and Women Lead Differently? Helgesen (1990), Rosener (1990), and others have argued that women bring a
“ female advantage ” to leadership. They believe that modern organizations need
the leadership style that women are more likely to bring, including concern for
people, nurturance, and willingness to share information. But the evidence is
equivocal. We might expect, for example, that women would be higher on people
attributes (warmth, support, participation) and lower on political characteristics
(power, shrewdness, aggression). But examples like Karren Brady, Carly Fiorina
as Hewlett - Packard CEO, and Margaret Thatcher as British Prime Minister tell
us that things are not so simple. In fact, research gives such stereotypes limited
support. Bolman and Deal (1991, 1992a) found no differences in frame orienta-
tion among men and women. Eagly and Johnson (1990) found no gender differ-
ences in emphasis on people versus task, though women tended to be somewhat
more participative and less directive than men.
For the most part, the available evidence suggests that men and women in
comparable positions are more alike than different, at least in the eyes of their
subordinates (Carless, 1998; Komives, 1991; Morrison, White, and Van Velsor,
1987; Bolman and Deal, 1991, 1992a). When differences are detected, they gener-
ally show women scoring somewhat higher than men on a variety of measures of
leadership and managerial behavior (Bass, Avolio, and Atwater, 1996; Eagly and
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Reframing Leadership 353
Carli, 2003; Edwards, 1991; Hallinger, Bickman, and Davis, 1990; Weddle, 1991;
and Wilson and Wilson, 1991). But the differences are not large, and it is not
clear whether they have practical signifi cance.
Why the Glass Ceiling? If women lead at least as well as men, why does the so - called glass ceiling cap their
rise to top positions? Growing numbers are now in the pipeline leading to the
executive suite. In the United States, they are a substantial majority of college stu-
dents and an expanding presence in professional schools — more than half of edu-
cation and law students and close to half in business and medical schools. This is
a dramatic shift (except in education, where they have long been a majority).
Nevertheless, at the end of the twentieth century, women still represented
less than 10 percent of senior executives in business (Ragins, Townsend, and
Mattis, 1998). And in 2007, women made up less than 7 percent of senior execu-
tives and 2 percent of CEOs in Fortune ’ s Global 100 companies. More than half
the companies did not have a single female offi cer. “ In the race for talent, women
are barely on the playing fi eld in the most senior levels of the largest compa-
nies in the world, ” says Irene Natividad, co - chair of Corporate Women Directors
International (Business Wire, 2007). “ This is ironic, since the percentage of
female workers, consumers, small business owners and investors continues to
accelerate. ”
The story is similar in education. In American schools, women constitute the
great majority of teachers and a growing percentage of middle managers, yet in
2007 they accounted for only 15 percent of school superintendents. That was about
the same as in 1930, though it was up from only 2 percent in 1981 (Keller, 1999).
There is no consensus about what sustains the glass ceiling, but evidence
points to several contributing factors:
Stereotypes associate leadership with maleness. Schein (1975, 1990) found
that both men and women tend to link leadership characteristics to men more
than women.
Women walk a tightrope of confl icting expectations. Simply put, high - level
jobs are “ powerful, but women, in the minds of many people, should not be.
According to this set of beliefs, a powerful woman is distasteful, unfeminine, and
even ludicrous. A strong woman can make both men and women uncomfort-
able by challenging the conventional understanding — unless, that is, she fi nds
•
•
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Reframing Organizations354
a way to exercise power that is recognizably different from the norm ” (Keller,
1999; Belkin, 2007). For example, Brescoll and Uhlmann (2008) found that
expressing anger was viewed as a positive for male executives, but a negative for
women. Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2006) found that women
were attracted to intelligent men, but men tended not to like women who were
smarter than they were.
The challenge for women is to be powerful and “ feminine ” at the same time,
which is “ an incredibly diffi cult role negotiation ” (Brunner, cited in Keller, 1999).
According to Eagly and Carli, women face pressures to “ behave extremely com-
petently while reassuring others that they conform to expectations concerning
appropriate female behavior ” (Eagly and Carli, 2003, p. 825). That was a distinc-
tive challenge for Hillary Clinton as the one woman running for president in
2008. How could she demonstrate that she was tough enough to be commander -
in - chief without seeming too aggressive or angry? How could she show feminine
warmth and caring without seeming weak?
Women encounter discrimination. In ancient fairy tales as well as modern
fi lms, powerful women often turn out to be witches (or worse). Shakespeare ’ s
The Taming of the Shrew is typical of many stories with the message that a strong
woman is dangerous until tamed by a stronger man. The historical association of
powerful men with leadership and of powerful women with evil produces unspo-
ken and often unconscious bias. Valian (1999) argues that prevailing gender sche-
mata tacitly shape our ways of thinking and associate competence with maleness.
Even though these differences are subtle and unconscious, they accumulate over
the course of individual careers to give men a competitive advantage. Eagly and
Carli report that bias against women leaders varies by situation and that “ women
face discriminatory barriers mainly in male - dominated and masculine environ-
ments and with male evaluators. Because higher levels of authority and higher
wages are concentrated in such environments and are controlled primarily by men,
this prejudice is highly consequential for women ’ s advancement ” (2003, p. 822).
Women pay a higher price. Shakeshaft (cited in Keller, 1999) argues that the
rewards of senior positions may be lower for women for a reason. Compared
with men, they have higher needs for success in their family and personal lives
but lower needs for esteem and status. Almost 70 percent of women in one
study named personal and family responsibilities as by far the biggest barrier to
their career success (Morris, 2002). Executive jobs impose a crushing workload
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Reframing Leadership 355
on incumbents. The burden is even more overwhelming for women, who still
do the majority of the housework and child rearing in most dual - career fami-
lies. That helps to explain why fast - track women are less likely to marry and, if
they do marry, are more likely to divorce (Heffernan, 2002; Keller, 1999). It also
clarifi es why many women who do make it to the top are blessed with “ trophy
husbands ” — those hard - to - fi nd stay - at - home dads (Morris, 2002).
Women have made progress. Attitudes are changing, support mechanisms
(such as day care) have increased, and cultural views have shifted. Perhaps the
single strongest force for continued advancement is the tremendous talent pool
that women represent — they make up more than half the population and have a
growing educational edge over their male counterparts. In 1988, Benazir Bhutto
became the fi rst female prime minister in a Muslim country, and she might have
returned to the job if not for her tragic assassination in 2007. In 2007, Nancy
Pelosi became the fi rst woman to occupy the powerful role of Speaker of the
U.S. House of Representatives. Her home - state support network included both
of California ’ s senators, Democrats Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein. In the
same year, Hillary Clinton became the fi rst woman who was viewed as having
a strong chance of becoming president of the United States. Between 1986 and
2006, the proportion of female presidents of American universities more than
doubled — to almost one in four — and Harvard put a woman in the job for the
fi rst time in 2007. Princeton accepted no women until 1969, and thirty years
later, some of its mostly male alumni worried that their beloved alma mater
might be on the skids when the fi rst woman president appointed the fi rst female
provost. But grumbling at alumni gatherings could not change the fact that
women were making gains even in America ’ s most elite academic institutions.
REFRAMING LEADERSHIP Reframing offers a chance to get beyond constricted, oversimplifi ed views of
leadership. Each frame offers a distinctive image of the leadership process.
Depending on leader and circumstance, each turn of the kaleidoscope can
reveal compelling and constructive leadership opportunities, even though no
one image is right for all times and seasons. In this section, we discuss the four
images of leadership summarized in Exhibit 17.3 . For each, we examine skills
and processes and propose rules of thumb for successful leadership practice.
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Exhibit 17.3. Reframing Leadership.
FRAME
LEADERSHIP IS EFFECTIVE WHEN
LEADERSHIP IS INEFFECTIVE WHEN
LEADER IS: LEADERSHIP PROCESS IS: LEADER IS:
LEADERSHIP PROCESS IS:
Structural Analyst, architect
Analysis, design
Petty bureaucrat or tyrant
Management by detail and fi at
Human resource
Catalyst, servant
Support, empowerment
Weakling, pushover
Abdication
Political Advocate, negotiator
Advocacy, coalition building
Con artist, thug
Manipulation, fraud
Symbolic Prophet, poet
Inspiration, meaning-making
Fanatic, charlatan
Mirage, smoke and mirrors
Architect or Tyrant? Structural Leadership Structural leadership often evokes images of petty tyrants and rigid bureaucrats
who never met a command or rule they didn ’ t like. Compared with other frames,
literature on structural leadership is sparse, and some structural theorists have
contended that leadership is neither important nor basic (Hall, 1987). But the
effects of structural leadership can be powerful and enduring, even if the style is
subtler and more analytic than other forms. Collins and Porras (1994) reported
that the founders of many highly successful companies, such as Hewlett - Packard
and Sony, had neither a clear vision for their organization nor even a particular
product in mind. They were “ clock builders ” : social architects who focused on
designing and building an effective organization.
One of the great architects in business history was Alfred P. Sloan Jr., who
became president of General Motors in 1923 and remained a dominant force until
his retirement in 1956. The structure and strategy he established made GM the
world ’ s largest corporation. He has been described as “ the George Washington of
the GM culture ” (Lee, 1988, p. 42), even though his “ genius was not in inspira-
tional leadership, but in organizational structures ” (p. 43).
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Reframing Leadership 357
At the turn of the twentieth century, some thirty manufacturers produced
automobiles in the United States. In 1899, they produced a grand total of about
six hundred cars. Most of these small carmakers stumbled out of the start-
ing gate, leaving two late entries, the Ford Motor Company (founded by Henry
Ford in 1903) and GM (founded by William Durant in 1908) as front - runners
in the race to dominate the American automobile industry. Henry Ford ’ s single -
minded determination to build an affordable car pushed Ford into a command-
ing lead — until Sloan took over at GM.
Under Billy Durant, GM ’ s founder, the company ’ s divisions operated as inde-
pendent fi efdoms. Durant had built GM by buying everything he could, forming
a loose combination of previously independent fi rms. “ GM did not have ade-
quate knowledge or control of the individual operating divisions. It was man-
agement by crony, with the divisions operating on a horse - trading basis. The
main thing to note here is that no one had the needed information or the needed
control over the divisions. The divisions continued to spend lavishly, and their
requests for additional funds were met ” (Sloan, 1965, pp. 27 – 28).
Uncontrolled costs and a business slump in 1920 created a fi nancial crisis.
Chevrolet lost $ 5 million in 1921, and GM almost sank (Sloan, 1965). In 1923,
Sloan ’ s fi rst year, matters got worse. GM ’ s market share dropped from 20 percent to
17 percent, while Ford ’ s increased to 55 percent. But change was afoot. Henry Ford
had a disdain for organization and clung to his vision of a single low - priced, mass -
market car. His cheap, reliable Model T — the “ Tin Lizzie ” — was a marketing mir-
acle at a time when customers would buy anything with four wheels and a motor.
But Ford stayed with the same design for almost twenty years. Ford dismissed the
need for creature comforts in the Model T, but Sloan surmised that consumers
would pay more for amenities like windows to keep out rain and snow. His strat-
egy worked, and Chevrolet soon began to gnaw off large chunks of Ford ’ s market
share. By 1928, Model T sales had dropped so precipitously that Henry Ford was
forced to close his massive River Rouge plant for a year to retool. General Motors
took the lead in the great auto race for the fi rst time in twenty years. For the rest of
the twentieth century, no company ever sold more cars than General Motors.
The dominant structural model of the time was a centralized, functional
organization, but Sloan felt that GM needed something better. He conceived one
of the world ’ s fi rst decentralized organizations. The basic principle was simple:
centralize planning and resource allocation; decentralize operating decisions.
Under Sloan ’ s model, divisions focused on making and selling cars, while top
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Reframing Organizations358
management did long - range strategy and made major funding decisions. Central
staff provided the information and control systems senior management needed
to make sound strategic decisions.
The structure worked. By the late 1920s, GM had a more versatile organiza-
tion with a broader product line than Ford. With the founder still dominating
his highly centralized company, Ford was poorly positioned to compete with
GM ’ s multiple divisions, each producing its own cars and chasing distinct mar-
ket niches at different price points. GM ’ s pioneering structural form eventu-
ally set the standard for others: “ Although they developed many variations and
although in very recent years they have been occasionally mixed into a matrix
form, only two basic organizational structures have been used for the manage-
ment of large industrial enterprises. One is the centralized, functional depart-
mentalized type perfected by General Electric and Du Pont before World War I.
The other is the multidivisional, decentralized structure initially developed at
General Motors and also at Du Pont in the 1920s ” (Chandler, 1977, p. 463).
In the 1980s, GM found itself with another structural leader, Roger Smith,
at the helm. The results were less satisfying. Like Sloan, Smith ascended to the
top job at a diffi cult time. In 1980, his fi rst year as GM ’ s chief executive, every
American carmaker lost money. It was GM ’ s fi rst loss since 1921. Recognizing
that the company had serious competitive problems, Smith banked on structure
and technology to make it “ the world ’ s fi rst 21st century corporation ” (Lee, 1988,
p. 16). He restructured vehicle operations and spent billions of dollars in a quest
for paperless offi ces and robotized assembly plants. The changes were dramatic,
but the results were dismal:
[Smith ’ s] tenure has been a tragic era in General Motors history. No
GM chairman has disrupted as many lives without commensurate
rewards, has spent as much money without returns, or has alien-
ated so many along the way. An endless string of public relations and
internal relations insensitivities has confused his organization
and complicated the attainment of its goals. Few employees believe
that [Smith] is in the least concerned with their well - being, and
even fewer below executive row anticipate any measure of respect, or
reward, for their contributions [Lee, 1988, pp. 286 – 287].
Why did Smith stumble where Sloan had succeeded? They were equally
uncharismatic. Sloan was a somber, quiet engineer who habitually looked as if
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Reframing Leadership 359
he were sucking a lemon. Smith ’ s leadership aura was not helped by his blotchy
complexion and squeaky voice. Neither had great sensitivity to human resource
or symbolic issues. Why, then, was Sloan ’ s structural contribution so durable
and Smith ’ s so problematic? The answer comes down to how well each imple-
mented the right structural form. Structural leaders succeed not because of
inspiration but because they have the right design for the times and are able to
get their structural changes implemented. Effective structural leaders share sev-
eral characteristics:
Structural leaders do their homework. Sloan was a brilliant engineer who
had grown up in the auto industry. Before coming to GM, he ran an auto acces-
sories company where he implemented a divisional structure. When GM bought
his fi rm in 1916, Sloan became a vice president and board member. Working
under Durant, he devoted much of his energy to studying GM ’ s structural prob-
lems. He pioneered the development of better information systems and mar-
ket research. He was an early convert to group decision making and created a
committee structure to make major decisions. Roger Smith had spent his entire
career with General Motors, but most of his jobs were in fi nance. The numbers
told him machines were cheaper than people, so much of his vision for General
Motors involved changes in production technology, an area where he had little
experience or expertise.
Structural leaders rethink the relationship of structure, strategy, and environ-
ment. Sloan ’ s new structure was intimately tied to a strategy for reaching the
automotive market. He foresaw growing demand, better cars, and more dis-
criminating consumers. In the face of Henry Ford ’ s stubborn attachment to the
Model T, Sloan initiated the “ price pyramid ” (cars for every pocketbook) and
the annual introduction of new models. Automotive technology in the 1920s was
evolving almost as fast as electronics and the Internet in recent years. New mod-
els every year soon became the industry norm.
For a variety of reasons, GM in the 1960s began to move away from Sloan ’ s
concepts. Fearing a government effort to break up the corporation, GM reduced
the independence of the car divisions and centralized design and engineering.
Increasingly, the divisions became marketing groups required to build and sell
the cars that corporate gave them. “ Look - alike cars ” became the standard, and
consumers became confused and angry when they found it hard to see the dif-
ferences between a Chevrolet and a Cadillac.
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Reframing Organizations360
Instead of addressing this central issue, Smith focused more on reducing costs
than on selling cars. As he saw it, GM ’ s primary competitive problem was high
costs driven by high wages. He showed little interest in efforts already under way
at GM to improve working conditions on the shop fl oor. Ironically, his two best
investments — NUMMI and Saturn — succeeded precisely because of innovative
approaches to managing people: “ With only a fraction of the money invested in
GM ’ s heavily robotized plants, [the NUMMI plant at] Fremont is more effi cient
and produces better - quality cars than any plant in the GM system ” (Hampton
and Norman, 1987, p. 102).
Structural leaders focus on implementation. Structural leaders often miscal-
culate the diffi culties of putting their designs in place. They underestimate resis-
tance, skimp on training, fail to build a political base, and misread cultural cues.
Sloan was no human resource specialist, but he intuitively saw the need to culti-
vate understanding and acceptance of major decisions. He did that by continu-
ally asking for advice and by establishing committees and task forces to address
major issues.
Effective structural leaders experiment. Sloan tinkered constantly with
GM ’ s structure and strategy and encouraged others to do likewise. The Great
Depression produced a drop of 72 percent in sales at GM between 1929 and 1932,
but the company adapted adroitly to hard times. Sales fell, but GM increased its
market share and made money every year. Sloan briefl y centralized operations to
survive the Depression but decentralized again once business began to recover.
In the 1980s, Smith spent billions on his campaign to modernize the corporation
and cut costs, yet GM lost market share every year and remained the industry ’ s
highest - cost producer: “ Much of the advanced technology that GM acquired
at such high cost hindered rather than improved productivity. Runaway robots
started welding doors shut at the new Detroit - Hamtramck Cadillac plant. Luckily
for Ford and Chrysler, poverty prevented them from indulging in the same orgy
of spending on robots ” ( “ On a Clear Day . . . , ” 1989, p. 77).
Catalyst or Wimp? Human Resource Leadership The tiny trickle of writing about structural leadership is swamped by a torrent
of human resource literature (among the best: Argyris, 1962; Bennis and Nanus,
1985, 2007; Blanchard and Johnson, 1982; Bradford and Cohen, 1984; Boyatzis
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Reframing Leadership 361
and McKee, 2005; Fiedler, 1967; Fiedler and Chemers, 1974; Goleman, Boyatzis, and
McKee, 2004; Hersey, 1984; Hollander, 1978; House, 1971; Levinson, 1968; Likert,
1961, 1967; Vroom and Yetton, 1973; and Waterman, 1994). Human resource the-
orists typically advocate openness, caring, mutuality, listening, coaching, partici-
pation, and empowerment. They view the leader as a facilitator and catalyst who
uses emotional intelligence to motivate and empower subordinates. The leader ’ s
power comes from talent, caring, sensitivity, and service rather than position or
force. Greenleaf concludes that followers “ will freely respond only to individu-
als who are chosen as leaders because they are proven and trusted as servants ”
(1973, p. 4). He adds, “ The servant - leader makes sure that other people ’ s highest
priority needs are being served. The best test [of leadership] is: do those served
grow as persons; do they, while being served, become healthier, wiser, freer, more
autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants? ” (p. 7).
Will managers who embrace such humanistic images be respected leaders
who make a difference? Or will they be seen as naive and weak, carried along on
the current of other people ’ s ideas and energy? The Cindy Marshall case illus-
t rates both sides. In one human resource encounter, Marshall seems more fl unky
than leader. In the other, she combines some of the virtues of both servant and
catalyst. The leadership tightrope is challenging, and some managers hide behind
participation and sensitivity as an excuse not to venture ahead.
There are also many human resource leaders whose skill and artistry pro-
duce extraordinary results. An example is Mart í n Varsavsky, an Argentine
native who wound up in New York as a teenager after violence forced his family
to fl ee the military dictatorship in his homeland. Over two decades, Varsavsky
founded seven companies and picked up entrepreneur - of - the - year awards
in both America and Europe. He made his fi rst millions in New York City real
estate before moving to Europe. There he founded two high - tech companies
that he later sold for more than a billion dollars each. In 2005, he partnered with
venture capitalists and Google to found FON, which soon became the world ’ s
largest WiFi network. His approach to managing people was pivotal to his suc-
cess: “ Mart í n developed management practices that would be keys throughout
his career: create horizontal organizations without any hierarchy, communicate
clearly what you intend before doing it, delegate as much as possible, trust your
colleagues, and leave operating decisions in the hands of others ” (Ganitsky and
Sancho, 2002, p. 101).
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Reframing Organizations362
Gifted human resource leaders such as Varsavsky typically apply a consistent
set of people - friendly leadership principles.
Human resource leaders communicate their strong belief in people. Human
resource leaders are passionate about “ productivity through people ” (Peters and
Waterman, 1982). They express this faith in both words and actions, often for-
malized in a core philosophy or credo. Fred Smith, founder and CEO of Federal
Express, sees “ putting people fi rst ” as the cornerstone of his company ’ s success:
“ We discovered a long time ago that customer satisfaction really begins with
employee satisfaction. That belief is incorporated in our corporate philosophy
statement: “ People — Service — Profi t . . . In that order ” (Waterman, 1994, p. 89).
William Hewlett, cofounder of electronics giant Hewlett - Packard, put it
this way:
The dignity and worth of the individual is a very important part
of the HP Way. With this in mind, many years ago we did away with
time clocks, and more recently we introduced the fl exible work hours
program. This is meant to be an expression of trust and confi dence in
people, as well as providing them with an opportunity to adjust their
work schedules to their personal lives. Many new HP people as well as
visitors often note and comment to us about another HP way — that is,
our informality and our being on a fi rst - name basis. I could cite other
examples, but the problem is that none by [itself] really catches the
essence of what the HP Way is all about. You can ’ t describe it in num-
bers and statistics. In the last analysis, it is a spirit, a point of view. There
is a feeling that everyone is part of a team, and that team is HP. It is an
idea that is based on the individual [Peters and Waterman, 1982, p. 244].
Human resource leaders are visible and accessible. Peters and Waterman
(1982) popularized the notion of “ management by wandering around ” — the
idea that managers need to get out of their offi ces and spend time with workers
and customers. Patricia Carrigan — who, as noted earlier, was the fi rst woman to
be a plant manager at General Motors — modeled this technique in the course of
turning around two manufacturing plants, each with a long history of union -
management confl ict (Kouzes and Posner, 1987). In both situations, she began
by going to the plant fl oor to introduce herself to workers and ask how they
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Reframing Leadership 363
thought the operation could be improved. One worker commented that before
Carrigan, “ I didn ’ t know who the plant manager was. I wouldn ’ t have recog-
nized him if I saw him. ” When she left her fi rst assignment after three years, the
local union gave her a plaque. It concluded, “ Be it resolved that Pat M. Carrigan,
through the exhibiting of these qualities as a people person, has played a vital
role in the creation of a new way of life at the Lakewood plant. Therefore, be
it resolved that the members of Local 34 will always warmly remember Pat M.
Carrigan as one of us ” (Kouzes and Posner, 1987, p. 36).
Effective human resource leaders empower others. People - oriented leaders often
refer to their employees as “ partners, ” “ owners, ” or “ associates. ” They make it clear
that workers have a stake in the organization ’ s success and a right to be involved
in making decisions. In the 1980s, Jan Carlzon, CEO of Scandinavian Air Systems
(SAS), turned around a sluggish business with the intent of making it “ the best
airline in the world for business travelers ” (Carlzon, 1987, p. 46). To fi nd out what
the business traveler wanted, he turned to SAS ’ s frontline service employees for
their ideas and suggestions. Focus groups generated hundreds of ideas and empha-
sized the importance of frontline autonomy to decide on the spot what passengers
needed. Carlzon concluded that SAS ’ s image was built on countless “ moments of
truth ” : fi fteen - second encounters between employees and customers.
If we are truly dedicated toward orienting our company to each cus-
tomer ’ s individual needs, we cannot rely on rule books and instruc-
tion from distant corporate offi ces. We have to place responsibility
for ideas, decisions, and actions with the people who are SAS dur-
ing those 15 seconds. If they have to go up the organizational chain
of command for a decision on an individual problem, then those
15 golden seconds will elapse without a response and we will have
lost an opportunity to earn a loyal customer ” [Carlzon, 1987, p. 66].
Advocate or Hustler? Political Leadership Even in the results - driven private sector, leaders fi nd that they have to plunge
into the political arena to move their company where it needs to go. Consider
two chief executives from quite dissimilar eras: Lee Iacocca, who became chief
executive of Chrysler in the late 1970s when the company was near death, and
Carleton “ Carly ” Fiorina, who became CEO of Silicon Valley giant Hewlett -
Packard in July 1999.
•
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Reframing Organizations364
Iacocca ’ s career had taken him to the presidency of Ford Motor Company. But
then, on July 1, 1978, his boss, Henry Ford II, fi red him, reportedly with the sim-
ple explanation, “ Let ’ s just say I don ’ t like you ” (O ’ Toole, 1984, p. 231). Iacocca ’ s
unemployment was brief. Chrysler Corporation, desperate for new leadership,
saw Iacocca as the answer to the company ’ s business woes.
Even though Iacocca had done his homework before accepting Chrysler ’ s
offer, he found things were worse than he expected. Chrysler was losing money
so fast that bankruptcy seemed almost inevitable. He concluded that the only
way out was to persuade the U.S. government to guarantee massive loans. It was
a tough sell; much of Congress, the media, and the American public were against
the idea. Iacocca had to convince them all that government intervention was in
their best interest as well as Chrysler ’ s.
Like Iacocca, Fiorina came in to head a troubled giant. HP ’ s problems were
not as bad as Chrysler ’ s; it was a profi table company with more than $ 40 billion
in annual revenue. But Business Week included HP as part of “ the clueless estab-
lishment ” (Burrows and Elstrom, 1999, p. 76) — customer service was deteriorat-
ing, bureaucracy was stifl ing innovation, and HP seemed to be falling behind the
technology curve. Fiorina ’ s arrival was big news for more than one reason. She
was only the fi fth CEO in HP ’ s sixty - year history and was the fi rst to come from
outside since Bill (Hewlett) and Dave (Packard) founded the company in a Palo
Alto garage in 1938. She was also the fi rst woman to head a company of HP ’ s size
in any industry. She brought many strengths, including “ a silver tongue and an
iron will ” (Burrows and Elstrom, 1999, p. 76). But she faced daunting challenges,
especially after she set her sights on a merger with Compaq, another fl ounder-
ing $ 40 billion company. Her board supported her initiative, but Bill and Dave ’ s
heirs, who controlled more than 15 percent of HP ’ s stock, didn ’ t. Fiorina had to
win a massive gunfi ght at HP corral or lose her job.
Ultimately, Iacocca got his guarantees and Fiorina got her merger. Both won
their battles by artfully employing a set of principles for political leaders.
Political leaders clarify what they want and what they can get. Political lead-
ers are realists. They avoid letting what they want cloud their judgment about
possibilities. Iacocca translated Chrysler ’ s survival into the realistic goal of get-
ting enough help to eke through a couple of diffi cult years. He was always care-
ful to ask not for money but for loan guarantees. He insisted that it would cost
taxpayers nothing because Chrysler would pay back its loans. Fiorina, too, was
•
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Reframing Leadership 365
realistic. Once she knew she faced a nasty public squabble, she zeroed in on one
goal: getting enough votes to put the merger through.
Political leaders assess the distribution of power and interests. Political lead-
ers map the political terrain by thinking carefully about the key players, their
interests, and their power, asking: Whose support do I need? How do I go about
getting it? Who are my opponents? How much power do they have? What can
I do to reduce or overcome their opposition? Is this battle winnable? Iacocca
needed the support of Chrysler ’ s employees and unions, but they had little
choice. The key players were Congress and the public. Congress would vote for
the guarantees only if Iacocca ’ s proposal had suffi cient popular support.
Fiorina needed the support of HP ’ s board, analysts, and, in the end, a major-
ity of voting shares. She fi rst went after her board ’ s support but ran into a stroke
of bad luck. Walter Hewlett, board member and son of HP cofounder Bill
Hewlett, missed the July 2001 board meeting at which McKinsey consultants
made the case for merger. A month later, Hewlett voted reluctantly to approve
the merger, but he had serious misgivings. Substantial layoffs were touted as one
of the merger ’ s “ synergies, ” but in Hewlett ’ s mind this amounted to abandoning
the HP Way. HP ’ s stock dropped some 40 percent after the merger announce-
ment, buttressing his doubts. A few weeks later, he announced that he would
vote against the merger (Burrows, 2001). Fiorina now faced an uphill battle. Her
job and her vision for HP both hung on the outcome. The key was making a case
persuasive enough to woo analysts and shareholders who were still on the fence.
Political leaders build linkages to key stakeholders. Political leaders focus their
attention on building relationships and networks. They recognize the value of
personal contact and face - to - face conversations. Iacocca worked hard to build
linkages with Congress, the media, and the public. He spent hours meeting with
members of Congress and testifying before congressional committees. After he
met with thirty - one Italian American members of Congress, all but one voted
for the loan guarantees. Said Iacocca, “ Some were Republicans, some were
Democrats, but in this case they voted the straight Italian ticket. We were desper-
ate, and we had to play every angle ” (Iacocca and Novak, 1984, p. 221).
Fiorina ’ s primary target was institutional shareholders, who held more than
half the company ’ s stock, and a few highly infl uential analysts. Armed with a
fi fty - page document that laid out the strategic and fi nancial rationale for the
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Reframing Organizations366
merger, Fiorina and Compaq CEO Michael Capellas hit the road, speaking to
every analyst they could fi nd. Fiorina focused on the big picture while Capellas
backed her up on the nitty - gritty details of integrating the two fi rms. A particu-
larly vital target was Institutional Shareholders Services, an advisory fi rm whose
clients held more than a fi fth of HP ’ s stock. ISS ’ s recommendation could make
or break the deal. Though initially skeptical, ISS ’ s lead analyst for the merger,
Ram Kumar, said that the Fiorina - Capellas team ’ s persuasiveness and command
of detail won him over. “ They had a strong grasp of the technical aspects of the
merger, ” Kumar said. “ It was an exhaustive, detailed plan ” ( “ Hewlett - Packard
Merger Pitch . . . , ” 2002).
Political leaders persuade fi rst, negotiate second, and coerce only if necessary.
Wise political leaders recognize that power is essential to their effectiveness; they
also know to use it judiciously. William P. Kelly, an experienced public adminis-
trator, put it well: “ Power is like the old Esso [gasoline] ad — a tiger in your tank.
But you can ’ t let the tiger out, you just let people hear him roar. You use power
terribly sparingly because it has a short half - life. You let people know you have it
and hope that you don ’ t have to use it ” (Ridout and Fenn, 1974, p. 10).
Sophisticated political leaders know that infl uence begins with understanding
others ’ concerns and interests. What is important to them? How can I help them
get what they want? Iacocca knew that he had to address a widespread belief that
federal guarantees would throw millions of taxpayer dollars down a rat hole. He
used advertising to respond directly to public concerns. Does Chrysler have a
future? Yes, he said, we ’ ve been here fi fty - four years, and we ’ ll be here another
fi fty - four years. Would the loan guarantees be a dangerous precedent? No, the
government already carried $ 400 billion in other loan guarantees, and in any
event, Chrysler was going to pay its loans back. Iacocca also spoke directly to
Congressional concerns. Chrysler prepared computer printouts painting a grim
picture of jobs lost in every district if Chrysler went under.
Fiorina knew her biggest hurdle was the spotty track record for big mergers,
particularly in the computer industry. Hewlett, her most potent opponent, used
Compaq ’ s acquisition of fading giant Digital Equipment in 1998 as evidence that
the deal would be a disaster, noting the 80 percent decline in Compaq ’ s share
value after the deal. Fiorina developed a threefold argument based on competi-
tive scale, cost savings, and management strength. She took this story on the road
in countless meetings with analysts and institutional shareholders. Her audiences
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Reframing Leadership 367
generally found her very persuasive. HP buttressed the case with a blizzard of
press releases, advertising, and direct mail.
As the battle intensifi ed, Fiorina even resorted to the business equivalent of an
attack ad. HP put out a press release designed to gently but fi rmly discredit Walter
Hewlett as a semiclueless dilettante: “ Walter Hewlett, an heir of HP co - founder
Bill Hewlett, is a musician and academic who oversees the Hewlett family trust
and foundation. While he serves on HP ’ s board of directors, Walter has never
worked at the company or been involved in its management ” (Fried, 2002).
Iacocca and Fiorina, as mentioned, both won their battles. Chrysler pulled out of
its tailspin, repaid its loans, ignited the minivan craze, and had many profi table
years before the return of bad times in the 1990s led to a sale fi rst to German
automaker Daimler Benz in 1998 and then to a private equity fi rm in 2007. HP ’ s
merger fell short of expectations, and the company drifted for three years until
HP ’ s board forced Fiorina out early in 2005.
Prophet or Zealot? Symbolic Leadership The symbolic frame represents a fourth turn of the leadership kaleidoscope, por-
traying organization as both theater and temple. As theater, an organization cre-
ates a stage on which actors play their roles and hope to communicate the right
impression to their audience. As temple, an organization is a community of faith,
bonded by shared beliefs, traditions, myths, rituals, and ceremonies.
Symbolically, leaders lead through both actions and words as they interpret and
reinterpret experience. What are the real lessons of history? What is really happen-
ing in the world? What will the future bring? What mission is worthy of our loyalty
and investment? Data and analysis offer few compelling answers to such questions.
Symbolic leaders interpret experience so as to impart meaning and purpose through
phrases of beauty and passion. Franklin D. Roosevelt reassured a nation in the midst
of its deepest economic depression that “ the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. ”
At almost the same time, Adolph Hitler assured Germans that their severe economic
and social problems were the result of betrayal by Jews and communists. Germans,
he said, were a superior people who could still fulfi ll their nation ’ s destiny of world
mastery. Though many saw the destructive paranoia in Hitler ’ s message, millions of
fearful citizens were swept up in Hitler ’ s bold vision of German preeminence.
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Reframing Organizations368
Burns (1978) was mindful of leaders such as Franklin Roosevelt, Mohandas
Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr., when he drew a distinction between “ trans-
forming ” and “ transactional ” leaders. According to Burns, transactional leaders
“ approach their followers with an eye to trading one thing for another: jobs for
votes, subsidies for campaign contributions ” (p. 4). Transforming leaders are
rarer. As Burns describes them, they evoke their constituents ’ “ better angels ” and
move them toward higher and more universal needs and purposes. They are
visionary leaders whose leadership is inherently symbolic.
Symbolic leaders follow a consistent set of practices and scripts.
Symbolic leaders lead by example. They demonstrate their commitment and
courage by plunging into the fray. In taking risks and holding nothing back, they
reassure and inspire others. New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani ’ s leadership in the
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is again a dramatic case in point. Risking
his own life, he moved immediately to the scene. When the fi rst tower collapsed,
he was trapped for fi fteen minutes in the rubble alongside other New Yorkers.
They use symbols to capture attention. When Diana Lam became principal
of the Mackey Middle School in Boston in 1985, she faced a substantial chal-
lenge. Mackey had the usual problems of an urban school: decaying physi-
cal plant, poor discipline, racial tension, disgruntled teachers, and limited
resources (Kaufer and Leader, 1987a). In such a situation, a symbolic leader
looks for something visible and dramatic to signal that change is on the way.
During the summer before assuming her duties, Lam wrote a personal letter to
every teacher requesting an individual meeting. She met teachers wherever they
wanted (in one case driving two hours). She asked them how they felt about the
school and what changes they wanted. Then she recruited her family to repaint
the school ’ s front door and some of the most decrepit classrooms. “ When school
opened, students and staff members immediately saw that things were going to
be different, if only symbolically. Perhaps even more important, staff members
received a subtle challenge to make a contribution themselves ” (Kaufer and
Leader, 1987b, p. 3).
When Iacocca became president of Chrysler, one of his fi rst steps was to
announce that he was reducing his salary from $ 360,000 to $ 1 a year. “ I did it for
good, cold pragmatic reasons. I wanted our employees and our suppliers to be
thinking: ‘ I can follow a guy who sets that kind of example, ’ ” Iacocca explained
in his autobiography (Iacocca and Novak, 1984, pp. 229 – 230).
•
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Reframing Leadership 369
Symbolic leaders frame experience. In a world of uncertainty and ambiguity,
a key function of symbolic leadership is to offer plausible and hopeful interpre-
tations of experience. President John F. Kennedy channeled youthful exuberance
into the Peace Corps and other initiatives with his stirring Inaugural challenge:
“ Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your coun-
try. ” When Martin Luther King Jr. spoke at the March on Washington in 1963
and gave his extraordinary “ I Have a Dream ” speech, his opening line was, “ I am
happy to join with you today in what will go down in history as the greatest
demonstration for freedom in the history of our nation. ” He could have inter-
preted the event in a number of other ways: “ We are here because progress has
been slow, but we are not ready to quit yet ” ; “ We are here because nothing else
has worked ” ; “ We are here because it ’ s summer and it ’ s a good day to be outside. ”
Each version is about as accurate as the next, but accuracy is not the real issue.
King ’ s assertion was bold and inspiring; it told members of the audience that
they were making history by their presence at a momentous event.
Symbolic leaders communicate a vision. One powerful way in which a leader
can interpret experience is by distilling and disseminating a vision — a persuasive
and hopeful image of the future. A vision needs to address both the challenges of
the present and the hopes and values of followers. Vision is particularly impor-
tant in times of crisis and uncertainty. When people are in pain, when they are
confused and uncertain, or when they feel despair and hopelessness, they des-
perately seek meaning and hope.
Where does such vision come from? One view is that leaders create a vision
and then persuade others to accept it (Bass, 1985; Bennis and Nanus, 1985). An
alternative view is that leaders discover and articulate a vision that is already
there, even if in an inchoate and unexpressed form (Cleveland, 1985). Kouzes
and Posner put it well: “ Corporate leaders know very well that what seeds the
vision are those imperfectly formed images in the marketing department about
what the customers really wanted and those inarticulate mumblings from the
manufacturing folks about the poor product quality, not crystal ball gazing in
upper levels of the corporate stratosphere. The best leaders are the best followers.
They pay attention to those weak signals and quickly respond to changes in the
corporate course ” (1987, p. 114).
Lou Gerstner let it be known on his arrival as the new CEO of a troubled IBM
in 1993, “ The last thing IBM needs is a vision. ” People expected him to tighten
•
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Reframing Organizations370
and shake things up as he had done earlier at RJR Nabisco. But instead of mak-
ing wholesale changes, he looked through a rear - view mirror to trace IBM ’ s his-
tory. He found what he was looking for: old values and practices, now forgotten,
that were just what IBM needed to revive its spirit and performance. His new
vision artfully restored the gloss on tarnished symbolic commitments that had
once made IBM the world ’ s most admired corporation.
Leadership is a two - way street. No amount of charisma or rhetorical skill
can sell a vision that refl ects only the leader ’ s values and needs. Effective sym-
bolic leadership is possible only for those who understand the deepest values
and most pressing concerns of their constituents. But leaders still play a criti-
cal role in articulating a vision by bringing a unique, personal blend of history,
poetry, passion, conviction, and courage in distilling and shaping direction. Most
important, they can choose which stories to tell as a means of communicating a
shared quest.
Symbolic leaders tell stories. Symbolic leaders often embed their vision in
a mythical story — a story about “ us ” and about “ our ” past, present, and future.
“ Us ” could be a school ’ s faculty, a plant ’ s employees, the people of Thailand, or
any other audience a leader hopes to reach. The past is usually golden, a time of
noble purposes, of great deeds, of legendary heroes and heroines. The present is
troubled, a critical moment when we have to make fateful choices. The future is
a dreamlike vision of hope and greatness, often tied to past glories.
A version of this story line helped Ronald Reagan, a master storyteller,
become America ’ s thirty - ninth president. Reagan ’ s golden past was rooted in the
frontier, a place of rugged, sturdy, self - reliant men and women who built a great
nation. They took care of themselves and their neighbors without interference
from a monstrous national government. It was an America of small towns and
volunteer fi re departments. America had fallen into crisis, said Reagan, because
“ the liberals ” had created a federal government that levied oppressive taxes and
eroded freedom through bureaucratic regulation and meddling. Reagan offered
a promising new vision: a return to American greatness by “ getting government
off the backs of the American people ” and restoring traditional values of free-
dom and self - reliance. The story line worked for Reagan and resurfaced twenty
years later for a Reagan acolyte, George W. Bush.
Such stories succeed because we want to believe them rather than to scrutinize
their historical validity or empirical support. Even a fl awed story will work if it
•
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Reframing Leadership 371
taps persuasively into the experience, values, and hopes of listeners. Mohammed
Said Sahaf, Saddam Hussein ’ s information minister at the time of the 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq, was dismissed by most Westerners as an unreliable source of
lies and misinformation. He repeatedly predicted Iraqi victories that never mate-
rialized. Two days before Baghdad fell, he brazenly told reporters that there were
no American forces in the city, despite the conspicuous presence of an American
armored battalion at a presidential palace less than half a mile away.
But Sahaf became a media star in much of the Arab world, where many view-
ers saw him as more interesting and credible than the colorless U.S. military
sources. His military uniform, pistol on hip, and rakish cocked beret expressed
spirit and é lan. Arabs admired his creative and pungent insults for the Americans
( “ bloodsucking worms, ” “ sick dogs, ” “ donkeys ” ). They particularly relished the
story Sahaf told with such fl air and conviction: the infi del invaders were aim-
lessly plunging deeper into a trap and would soon be destroyed by heroic Iraqi
fi ghters. Sahaf ’ s star fi zzled abruptly with the collapse of Saddam ’ s government.
But for a time, millions of Arabs who felt enraged and humiliated by the inva-
sion of Iraq took great delight in a man who told the story they wanted to believe
(Alderson, 2003).
Good stories are truer than true: this refl ects both the power and the dan-
ger of symbolic leadership. In the hands of a Gandhi or a King, the constructive
power of stories is immense. Told by a Hitler, their destructive power is almost
incalculable.
Symbolic leaders respect and use history. When leaders assume that history
started with their arrival, they typically misread their circumstances and alienate
their constituents. Wise leaders attend to history and link their initiatives to the
values, stories, and heroes of the past. Even as she unleashed massive changes at
HP, Carly Fiorina told Bill and Dave stories and insisted on her fi delity to the HP
Way. It might have worked had she not displayed a tin ear for the deeper values
and folkways of HP ’ s culture.
Sometimes the use of history is deliberately selective. When Hu Jintao
became chief of the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 2002, many won-
dered whether he would ever escape the long shadow of his predecessor, Jiang
Zemin, who had bequeathed a party leadership stacked with his loyalists. Hu was
unstinting in his praise of Jiang ’ s legacy but began to differentiate himself sym-
bolically (Eckholm, 2003). Hu enlisted a symbolic ally, Mao Zedong, the supreme
•
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Reframing Organizations372
hero of the Chinese Communist revolution. In December 2002, only a month
after coming to power, Hu traveled to a small rural town that had been Mao ’ s
headquarters just before he took over China. In contrast to Jiang, who consis-
tently touted the economic successes of his reign, Hu emphasized the need to
help the poor and dispossessed deal with the changes sweeping over China. He
referred often to Mao and rarely to Jiang, repeating Mao ’ s call to the faithful to
practice “ plain living and arduous struggle ” more than sixty times. As the editor
of a party paper commented, “ He showed that his legitimacy comes ultimately
from Mao, not Jiang ” (Eckholm, 2003, p. A6).
SUMMARY Though leadership is universally accepted as a cure for all organizational ills,
it is also widely misunderstood. Many views of leadership fail to recognize its
relational and contextual nature and its distinction from power and position.
Shallow ideas about leadership mislead managers. A multiframe view provides a
more comprehensive map of a complex and varied terrain.
Each frame highlights signifi cant possibilities for leadership, but each by itself
is incomplete. A century ago, models of managerial leadership were narrowly
rational. In the 1960s and 1970s, human resource leadership became fashionable.
In recent years, symbolic and political leadership have become more prominent,
and the literature abounds with advice on how to become a powerful or visio n-
ary leader. Ideally, managers combine multiple frames into a comprehensive
approach to leadership. Wise leaders understand their own strengths, work to
expand them, and build diverse teams that can offer an organization leadership
in all four modes: structural, political, human resource, and symbolic.
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373
Reframing Change in Organizations Training, Realigning, Negotiating, and Grieving
For years, the United States has been urged to align its weights and measures with the rest of the world, but in 2007, it was one of only three nations that had not yet offi cially converted to the
metric system. This seems odd, given that the United States has little
in common with the other two holdouts — Liberia and Myanmar. It
also seems strange because, as far back as 1958, the Federal Register
contained provisions that “ all calibrations in the U.S. customary
system of weights and measurements carried out by the National
Bureau of Standards will continue to be based on metric mea-
surement and standards. ” And seems even more peculiar because
in 1996 all federal agencies were ordered to adopt the metric sys-
tem. Adhering to a thousand - year - old English system that even
the English have been abandoning imposes many disadvantages. It
handicaps international commerce, for example, and it led to mea-
surement confusion in the design of the Hubble space telescope that
cost taxpayers millions of dollars. Yet little progress has been made
in converting to a different system.
E I G H T E E N
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations374
America ’ s metric inertia illustrates pervasive and predictable realities of change
that repeatedly scuttle promising innovations. Organizations spend millions
of dollars on change strategies that produce little improvement or make things
worse. Mergers fail. Technology falls short of its potential. Strategies that are
vital to success never wend their way into practice. In U.S. presidential elections,
nearly all candidates promise change, but the winners struggle to deliver on even
a fraction of their pledges.
To shrink the gap between change agents ’ intentions and outcomes, a volu-
minous body of literature has fl ourished. The sheer volume of change models,
case studies, and prescriptive remedies is overwhelming. Some contain produc-
tive insights. Beer and Nohria (2001), for example, compare two distinct change
models — a hard, top - down approach that emphasizes shareholder value (Theory E)
and a softer, more participative strategy (Theory O) that targets organizational
culture. Kanter, Stein, and Jick ’ s “ Big Three ” model (1992) helps managers sort
through the interplay of change strategies, change implementers, and change
recipients. But despite growing knowledge, the same mistakes repeat themselves.
It ’ s like reading the latest books on dieting but never losing weight. The desired
target is never easy to reach, and almost everyone wants change as long as they
don ’ t have to do anything differently. An old adage summarizes the predicament:
Plus ç a change, plus c ’ est la m ê me chose (The more things change, the more they
stay the same; Karr, 1849).
This chapter opens by examining the innovation process at two different
companies. It then moves to a multiframe analysis to show how participation,
training, structural realignment, political bargaining, and symbolic rituals of
letting go can help achieve more positive outcomes. It concludes with a discus-
sion integrating the frames with John Kotter ’ s infl uential analysis of the stages of
change.
THE INNOVATION PROCESS What makes organizational change so diffi cult? Comparing a typically fl awed
change effort with an atypical success story offers some answers.
Six Sigma at 3M: A Typical Scenario Beginning at Motorola in 1986 and later enhanced at General Electric, Six
Sigma evolved from a statistical concept to a range of metrics, methods, and
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Reframing Change in Organizations 375
management approaches intended to reduce defects and increase quality in
products and services (Pande, Neuman, and Cavanagh, 2000). It became the
new corporate shibboleth in the 1990s after its successful, widespread use at GE.
Essentially the approach has two components, one emphasizing metrics and
control and the other emphasizing systems design. It has spawned acronyms like
DMAIC (defi ne, measure, analyze, improve, and control) and DFSS (design for
Six Sigma — by building quality in the from the start). GE executives groomed
in the Six Sigma way brought the techniques with them when they moved to
other corporations. One was James McNerney, who missed the chance to suc-
ceed Jack Welch as GE ’ s CEO but was snapped up by 3M in 2001 to bring some
discipline to a legendary enterprise that seemed to be losing its edge. Profi t and
sales growth were erratic, and the stock price had languished.
McNerney got people ’ s attention by slashing eight thousand jobs (11 percent
of the workforce), putting teeth in the performance review process, and tighten-
ing the free - fl owing spending spigot. Thousands of 3M workers were trained to
earn the Six Sigma title of “ Black Belt. ” These converts pioneered company - wide
Six Sigma initiatives such as boosting the tempo of production by reducing vari-
ation and eliminating pointless steps in manufacturing. The Black Belts trained
rank - and - fi le employees as “ green belts, ” in charge of local Six Sigma initiatives.
The Black Belt elite maintained metrics that tracked both overall and “ neigh-
borhood ” efforts to systematize and streamline all aspects of work — including
research and development.
In the short run, McNerney ’ s strategy paid off. Indicators of productivity
improved, costs were trimmed, and the stock price soared. But Six Sigma ’ s stan-
dardization began to intrude on 3M ’ s historical emphasis on innovation. Prior to
McNerney ’ s arrival, new ideas were accorded almost unlimited time and funding
to get started. Fifteen percent of employees ’ on - the - clock time was devoted to
developing groundbreaking products — with little accountability. This approach
had given birth to legendary products like Scotch Tape and Post - it notes.
Six Sigma systematized the research and development process. Sketchy, blue -
sky projects gave way to scheduled, incremental development. Funds carried
an expiration date, and progress through a planned pipeline was measured and
charted. Development of new products began to wane. “ The more you hard-
wire a company on total quality management, [the more] it is going to hurt
breakthrough innovation, ” says Vijay Govindarajan, a management professor
at Dartmouth. “ The mindset that is needed, the capabilities that are needed,
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Reframing Organizations376
the metrics that are needed, the whole culture that is needed for discontinuous
innovation, are fundamentally different. ” Art Fry, the inventor of the Post - it,
agreed. “ We all came to the conclusion that there was no way in the world that
anything like a Post - it note would ever emerge from this new system ” (Hindo,
2007, p. 9).
The lethargy ended, but the damage done, McNerney left 3M in 2005 to
become the new CEO of Boeing. Fry added, “ What ’ s remarkable is how fast a
culture can be torn apart. [McNerney] didn ’ t kill it because he wasn ’ t here long
enough. But if he had been here much longer, I think he would have. ” George
Buckley, McNerney ’ s successor, observed in retrospect, “ Perhaps one of the mis-
takes that we made as a company — it ’ s one of the dangers of Six Sigma — is that
when you value sameness more than you value creativity, I think you potentially
undermine the heart and soul of a company like 3M ” (Hindo, 2007, p. 9).
The progression of change at 3M reveals a familiar scenario: New CEO intro-
duces modern management techniques and scores a short - term victory; politi-
cal pressures and cultural resistance start to mount; CEO leaves to try again;
organization licks its wounds and moves both backward and onward. In short,
optimistic beginning, tumultuous middle, and controversial conclusion. Robert
Nardelli, one of McNerney ’ s contemporaries at GE, followed a similar script in
his six years as Home Depot ’ s CEO.
Microsoft: An Atypical Case Changes launched from the top often aim for standardization, measurement,
tightening things up, and enhancing profi tability. Less often do efforts burble up
from below with an aim to loosen things up and emphasize more spiritual con-
cerns. In 2007, Microsoft took the less traveled path.
Steve Ballmer, Microsoft ’ s CEO, was perplexed. The company ’ s stock was slip-
ping sideways, products were delayed, and many insiders perceived the com-
pany as “ fl abby, middle - aged and un - hip ” — especially in contrast to Google
(Conlin and Greene, 2007). The standard fi x - it response would be to hire a new
human resource chief to come up with a company - driven antidote to the mal-
aise. Instead, Ballmer reached down into the ranks and promoted a maverick
to rekindle the company ’ s spirit. He picked Lisa Brummel, a product manager
beloved for her unconventional ways and dress.
One of Brummel ’ s fi rst initiatives might seem strange to structural thinkers —
she brought back the towels that had been a feature of employee locker rooms
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Reframing Change in Organizations 377
until removed to cut costs. The lost towels had become a heated subject in
internal blogs, primarily as symbols of how little the company cared. Beyond
helping with Seattle ’ s chronic drizzle, the towels were a small but treasured perk
of working at Microsoft. Brummel also replaced the self - service “ industrial
sludge ” coffeemakers with Starbucks machines that fi t Seattle ’ s barista ethos.
The next target for Brummel ’ s magic wand was Microsoft ’ s dreaded perfor-
mance review procedure. Devised by Ballmer himself, the ranking system was a
zero - sum game in which employees competed for their individual shares of a lim-
ited purse. Managers could give only so many A ’ s, even if several employees had per-
formed exceptionally well. It was a touchy issue pitting Brummel against Ballmer,
but she won and implemented a system that gave managers more discretion and
tied raises and bonuses to a combination of pay grade and annual performance.
Brummel opened up communications by moving the internal “ underground ”
blog into the public spotlight. She changed the company ’ s offi ce d é cor from
institutional drab to modern chic and created a mobile medicine service to dis-
patch company physicians to employees ’ homes for emergencies. Brummel ’ s ini-
tiatives raised morale, cut attrition, and, in many instances, one - upped Google.
Brummel combined human resource, political, and symbolic ideas as a catalyst
for change rather than as a barrier. Instead of taking things away or imposing
something unwanted, she gave people things they welcomed.
How Frames Can Help Comparing the stories of change at 3M and Microsoft illustrates an iron law:
changes rationally conceived at the top often fail. More versatile approaches
have a better chance. Organizations today face a persistent dilemma. Changes
in their environment or leadership pressure them to adapt, yet the more they
try to change, the more likely their performance is to deteriorate (Nickerson
and Silverman, 2003; Barnett and Freeman, 2001). Ormerod (2007) argues that
“ things usually fail ” because decision makers don ’ t understand their environ-
ment well enough to anticipate the consequences of their actions. So they march
blindly down their preferred path despite warning signs that they are headed in
the wrong direction. And in studying scores of innovations, we continue to see
managers whose strategies are limited because their thinking is limited to one or
two cognitive lenses.
As Machiavelli observed many years ago in The Prince, “ It must be realized
that there is nothing more diffi cult to plan, more uncertain of success, or more
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Reframing Organizations378
dangerous to manage than the establishment of a new order of [things]; for he
who introduces [change] makes enemies of all those who derived advantage
from the old order and fi nds but lukewarm defenders among those who stand to
gain from the new one ” ([1514] 1961, p. 27).
Machiavelli ’ s trenchant observations are as timely as ever. Think about the
challenges of rebuilding Iraq. The architects of the U.S. invasion foresaw a rela-
tively quick and painless transition to democratic stability. Instead, removing the
Saddam Hussein regime opened a Pandora ’ s box of political and symbolic issues
that had been seething beneath the surface. It is much better to see quicksand
before rather than after you ’ re mired in it. The frames can help change agents see
pitfalls and roadblocks ahead, thereby increasing their odds of success.
Organizational change is a complex systemic undertaking. It rarely works
to retrain people without revising roles or to revamp roles without retraining.
Planning without broad - based participation that gives voice to the opposition
almost guarantees stiff resistance later on. Change alters power relationships and
undermines existing agreements and pacts. Even more profoundly, it intrudes on
deeply rooted symbolic forms, traditional ways, and customary behavior. Below
the surface, the organization ’ s social tapestry begins to unravel, threatening both
time - honored traditions and prevailing cultural values and ways.
In the remainder of the chapter, we look at the human resource, structural,
political, and symbolic aspects of organizational change and integrate them
with Kotter ’ s model of the change process. Exhibit 18.1 summarizes the views
of major issues in change that each frame offers. The human resource view
focuses on needs, skills, and participation, the structural approach on alignment
and clarity, the political lens on confl ict and arenas, and the symbolic frame on
loss of meaning and the importance of creating new symbols and ways. Each
mode of thought highlights a distinctive set of barriers and offers possibilities
for making change stick.
CHANGE, TRAINING, AND PARTICIPATION It sounds simplistic to point out that investment in change calls for collateral
outlays in training and developing active channels for employee input. Yet count-
less innovations falter and fl op because managers neglect to spend time and
money to develop needed knowledge and skills and to involve people throughout
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Reframing Change in Organizations 379
Exhibit 18.1. Reframing Organizational Change.
FRAME BARRIERS TO CHANGE ESSENTIAL STRATEGIES
Structural Loss of direction, clarity, and stability; confusion, chaos
Communicating, realigning, and renegotiating formal patterns and policies
Human resource Anxiety, uncertainty; people feel incompetent and needy
Training to develop new skills; participation and involve- ment; psychological support
Political Disempowerment; confl ict between winners and losers
Create arenas where issues can be renegotiated and new coalitions formed
Symbolic Loss of meaning and pur- pose; clinging to the past
Create transition rituals; mourn the past, celebrate the future
the process. The human resource department is too often an afterthought no one
takes seriously.
In one large fi rm, for example, top management decided to purchase state -
of - the - art technology. They expected a decisive competitive advantage from
a 50 percent cut in cycle time from customer order to delivery. Hours of care-
ful analysis went into crafting the strategy. The new technology was launched
with great fanfare. The CEO assured a delighted sales force it would now have
a high - tech competitive edge. After the initial euphoria faded, though, the sales
force realized that its old methods and skills were obsolete; years of experience
were useless. Veterans felt like neophytes. When the CEO heard that the sales
force was shaky about the new technology, he said, “ Then get someone in human
resources to throw something together. You know, what ’ s - her - name, the new vice
president. That ’ s why we hired her. ” A year later, the new technology had failed to
deliver. The training never materialized. Input from the front lines never reached
the right ears. The company ’ s investment ultimately yielded a costly, ineffi cient
process and a demoralized sales force. The window of opportunity was lost to
the competition.
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Reframing Organizations380
M A N A G E M E N T B E S T - S E L L E R S
Spencer Johnson, Who Moved My Cheese? An A-Mazing Way to Deal with Change in Your Work and Your Life (New York: Putnam, 1998)
Spencer Johnson’s brief (ninety-four-page) parable about mice, men,
and change topped Business Week’s best-seller list for three consecutive
years (1999, 2000, and 2001), making it one of the most successful man-
agement books ever.
The essence of the book is a story about a maze and its four inhabit-
ants: two mice named Sniff and Scurry and two “little people” named
Hem and Haw. Life is good because they have found a place in the maze
where they reliably discover a plentiful supply of high-quality cheese.
But then the quality and quantity of cheese decline, and eventually the
cheese disappears altogether.
The mice, being relatively simple creatures, fi gure “No cheese here?
Let’s go look somewhere else.” Sniff is very good at sniffi ng out new
supplies, and Scurry excels in scurrying after them once they’re found.
Before long, they’re both back in cheese heaven.
But Hem and Haw, being human, are reluctant to abandon old ways.
They fi gure someone has made a mistake because they’re entitled to
get cheese where they have always gotten it. They’re confi dent that, if
they wait, the cheese will return. It doesn’t. As they get hungrier, Hem
and Haw gripe and complain about the unfairness of it all. Eventually,
Haw decides it’s time to explore and look for something better. Hem,
however, insists on staying where he is until the cheese comes back.
As he searches, Haw develops a new outlook. He posts signs on the
walls to express his new thinking, with messages such as “Old beliefs
do not lead you to new cheese.” Haw’s explorations eventually reunite
him with Sniff, Scurry, and the new cache of cheese. Hem continues to
starve.
Cheese, as the book points out, is a metaphor for whatever you
might want in life. The maze represents the context in which you work
and live; it could be your family, your workplace, or your life. The
basic message is simple and clear: clinging to old beliefs and habits
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Reframing Change in Organizations 381
when the world around you has changed is self-defeating. Flexibility,
experimentation, and the willingness to try on new beliefs are critical
to success in a fast-changing world.
The book certainly has critics, particularly from those who worry that
the story downplays the possibility that some change is wrongheaded
and deserves to be resisted. But Cheese has far more fans, for whom its
simplicity is a virtue. The parable often enables its ardent readers to see
aspects of themselves and their own experience—times when, like Hem,
they have hurt themselves by refusing to adapt to new circumstances.
A happier example occurred in a large hospital that invested millions of dol-
lars in a new integrated information system. The goal was to improve patient
care by making updates quickly available to everyone involved in a treatment
plan. Widespread involvement ensured that relevant ideas and concerns were
folded into the innovative system. Terminals linked patients ’ bedsides to nurs-
ing stations, attending physicians, pharmacy, and other services. To ensure that
the new system would work, hospital administrators created a simulation lab.
Individual representatives from all groups were brought into a room and seated
at terminals. Hypothetical scenarios gave them a chance to practice and work
out the kinks. Many staff members, particularly physicians, needed to improve
their computer skills. Coaches were there to help. Each group became its own
self - help support system. Skills and confi dence improved in the training session.
Relationships that formed as a result of extensive involvement and participation
were invaluable as the new technology went into operation.
From a human resource perspective, people have good reason to resist change.
Sometimes resistance is sensible because the new methods are a management
mistake that would take the organization in the wrong direction. But in any
event, no one likes feeling anxious, voiceless, and incompetent. Changes in rou-
tine practice and protocol undermine existing knowledge and skills and undercut
people ’ s ability to perform with confi dence and success. When asked to do some-
thing they don ’ t understand, haven ’ t had a voice in developing, don ’ t know how
to do, or don ’ t believe in, people feel puzzled, anxious, and insecure. Lacking skills
and confi dence to implement the new ways, they resist or even engage in sabo-
tage, awaiting the return of the good old days. Or they may comply superfi cially
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Reframing Organizations382
while covertly dragging their feet. Even if they try to do what they are told, the
results are predictably dismal. Training, psychological support, and participation
all increase the likelihood that people will understand and feel comfortable with
the new methods.
Often overlooked in the training loop are the change agents responsible for
promoting and guiding the change. Kotter presents a vivid example of how
training can prepare people to communicate the rationale for a new order of
things. A company moving to a team - based structure developed at the top was
concerned about how workers and trade unions would react. To make sure peo-
ple would understand and accept the changes, the managers went through an
intensive training regimen: “ Our twenty ‘ communicators ’ practiced and prac-
ticed. They learned the responses, tried them out, and did more role plays until
they felt comfortable with nearly anything that might come at them. Handling
200 issues well may sound like too much, but we did it. . . . I can ’ t believe that
what we did is not applicable nearly everywhere. I think too many people wing
it ” (Kotter and Cohen, 2002, p. 86). Taking the time to hear people ’ s ideas and
concerns and to make sure that all involved have the talent, confi dence,
and expertise necessary to carry out their new responsibilities is a requisite of
successful innovation.
CHANGE AND STRUCTURAL REALIGNMENT Involvement and training will not ensure success unless existing roles and rela-
tionships are realigned to fi t the new initiative. As an example, a school system
created a policy requiring principals to assume a more active role in supervis-
ing classroom instruction. Principals were trained in how to observe and counsel
teachers. When they set out to apply their new skills, morale problems and com-
plaints soon began to surface. No one had anticipated how changes in principals ’
duties might affect teachers and impinge on existing agreements about authority.
Did teachers believe it was legitimate for principals to spend time in classrooms
observing and suggesting ways to improve teaching? Most important, no one had
asked who would handle administrative duties for which principals no longer
had time. As a result, supplies were delayed, parents felt neglected, and discipline
deteriorated. By midyear, most principals had gone back to their administrative
duties and were leaving teachers alone.
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Reframing Change in Organizations 383
Change undermines existing structural arrangements, creating ambiguity,
confusion, and distrust. People no longer know what is expected of them or what
they can expect from others. Everyone may think someone else is in charge when,
in fact, no one is. As a result of changes in health care, for example, a hospital was
experiencing substantial employee turnover and absenteeism, a shortage of nurses,
poor communication, and low staff morale. There were rumors of an impend-
ing effort to organize a union. A consultant ’ s report identifi ed several structural
problems:
One set related to top management. Members of the executive com-
mittee seemed to be confused about their roles and authority. Many
believed all important decisions were made (prior to the meetings)
by Rettew, the hospital administrator. Many shared the percep-
tion that major decisions were made behind closed doors, and that
Rettew often made “ side deals ” with different individuals, promis-
ing them special favors or rewards in return for support at the com-
mittee meetings. People at this level felt manipulated, confused, and
dissatisfi ed.
Major problems also existed in the nursing service. The director
of nursing seemed to be patterning her managerial style after that of
Rettew . . . . Nursing supervisors and head nurses felt that they had
no authority, while staff nurses complained about a lack of direction
and openness by the nursing administration. The structure of the
organization was unclear. Nurses were unaware of what their jobs
were, whom they should report to, and how decisions were made
[McLennan, 1989, p. 231].
As the school and hospital examples both illustrate, when things start to shift,
people become unsure of what their duties are, how to relate to others, and who
has authority to decide what. Clarity, predictability, and rationality give way to
confusion, loss of control, and a sense that politics trumps policy. To minimize
such diffi culty, innovators must anticipate structural issues and work to redesign
the existing architecture of roles and relationships. In some situations, this can
be done informally. In others, structural arrangements need to be renegotiated
more formally (through some version of responsibility charting, discussed in
Chapter Five ).
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Reframing Organizations384
G R E A T E S T H I T S F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T U D I E S
Hit Number 8: Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982)
How do economists think about change in organizations? Nelson and
Winter’s book represents one side of a debate within economics that
pits the dominant neoclassical view against a range of heretical per-
spectives. In essence, the neoclassical view sees both humans and orga-
nizations as rational decision makers who maximize their own interests
(utility) in the face of available options and incentives. The problem
of change is simple: rational maximizers will change if their prefer-
ences change, or if the environment changes the options and incen-
tives they face.
An example of the neoclassical approach is Jensen and Meckling’s paper
on agency theory, discussed in Chapter Four as Greatest Hit Number 5.
Nelson and Winter are dissenters. (So are the authors of two other works
on our hit list: Number 2, Cyert and March, discussed in Chapter Nine, and
Number 10, March and Simon, discussed in Chapter Two.)
Nelson and Winter criticize maximization on the ground that “fi rms
have but limited bases for judging what will work best; they may
even have diffi culty establishing the plausible range of alternatives to
be considered” (p. 399). In other words, decision makers fi nd it hard
to know their options and hard to evaluate the alternatives they see.
Borrowing from Darwinian concepts of evolution, Nelson and Winter
develop a theory of change that is intended to conform more closely to
how change works in practice. Three concepts are central:
• Routine: A regular and predictable pattern of behavior, a way of
doing something that a fi rm uses repeatedly. This is akin to what
March and Simon (1958) refer to as “programmed activity.”
• Search: The process of assessing current options, acquiring new
information, and altering routines. “Routines play the role of genes
in our evolutionary theory. Search routines stochastically generate
mutations” (p. 400).
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Reframing Change in Organizations 385
• Selection environment: The set of considerations determining
whether an organization adopts an innovation and how an
organization learns about an innovation from others.
Nelson and Winter see an organization as combining ongoing behav-
ior patterns, which produce stability and continuity, with activities for
scouting new options. When an organization fi nds promising new
alternatives, it tries them out. As with natural selection, mutations that
work are kept; others are discarded. Nelson and Winter’s view is dis-
tinct from the “population ecology” perspective in organization theory,
even though both borrow from Darwin. Nelson and Winter see selection
affecting the routines that live or die within organizations; population
ecologists see selection determining which organizations survive or fail.
CHANGE AND CONFLICT Change invariably creates confl ict. It typically turns into a tug - of - war between
innovators and traditionalists to determine winners and losers. Change almost
always benefi ts some people while neglecting or harming others. That ensures that
some individuals and groups support the change while others oppose it, sit on the
fence, or become isolated. Often, clashes go underground and smolder beneath
the surface. Occasionally, they burst open as eruptions of unregulated warfare.
A classic case in point comes from a U.S. government initiative to improve
America ’ s rural schools.
T H E E X P E R I M E N T A L S C H O O L S P R O J E C T
The Experimental Schools Project provided funds for comprehensive
changes. It also carefully documented experiences of ten participating
districts over a fi ve-year period. The fi rst year—the planning period—
was free of confl ict. But as plans became actions, hidden issues boiled
to the surface. A Northwest school district illustrates a common pattern:
In the high school, a teacher evaluator explained the evaluation
process while emphasizing the elaborate precautions to insure
the raters would be unable to connect specifi c evaluations with
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Reframing Organizations386
specifi c teachers. He also passed out copies of the check-list used
to evaluate the [evaluation forms]. Because of the tension the sub-
ject aroused, he joked that teachers could use the list to “grade”
their own [forms]. He got a few laughs; he got more laughs when
he encouraged teachers to read the evaluation plan by suggest-
ing, “If you have fi fteen minutes to spare and are really bored,
you should read this section.” When another teacher pointed out
that her anonymity could not be maintained because she was the
only teacher in her subject, the whole room broke into laughter,
followed by nervous and derisive questions and more laughter.
When the superintendent got up to speak shortly afterwards,
he was furious. He cautioned teachers for making light of the
teacher evaluators who, he said, were trying to protect the staff.
Several times he repeated that because teachers did not support
the [project] they did not care for students. “Your attitude,” he
concluded, “is damn the children and full speed ahead!” He then
rushed out of the room. . . . As word of the event spread through
the system, it caused reverberations in other buildings as well
[Firestone, 1977, pp. 174–175].
After the heated exchange, confl ict between the administration and
teachers intensifi ed. The issue was broader than evaluation or anonym-
ity. Teachers were angry about the entire project. The school board got
involved and reduced the superintendent’s authority. Rumors he might
be fi red undermined his clout even more.
Such a scenario is predictable. As changes emerge, camps form: support-
ers, opponents, and fence - sitters. Confl ict is avoided or smoothed over until it
explodes in divisive battles. Coercive power, rather than legitimate authority, often
determines the victor. Typically, the status quo prevails and change agents lose.
From a political perspective, confl ict is natural. It is best managed through
processes of negotiation and bargaining, where settlements and agreements can
be hammered out. If ignored, disputes explode into street fi ghts — no rules, any-
thing goes. People get hurt, and scars linger for years. The alternative to street
fi ghts is arenas with rules, referees, and spectators. Arenas create opportunities to
forge divisive issues into shared agreements. Through bargaining, compromises
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Reframing Change in Organizations 387
can be worked out between the status quo and innovative ideals. Welding new
ideas onto existing practices is essential to successful change. One hospital
administrator said, “ The board and I had to learn how to wrestle in a public
forum. ”
Mitroff (1983) describes a drug company facing competitive pressure on its
branded prescription drug from generic substitutes. Management was split into
three factions: one group wanted to raise the price of the drug, another wanted
to lower it, and still another wanted to keep it the same but cut costs. Each group
collected information, constructed models, and developed reports showing
that its solution was correct. The process degenerated into a frustrating spiral.
Mitroff intervened to get each group to identify major stakeholders and articu-
late assumptions about them. All agreed that the most critical stakeholders were
physicians prescribing the drug. Each group had its own suppositions about
how physicians would respond to a price change. But no one really knew. The
three groups fi nally agreed to test their assumptions by implementing a price
increase in selected markets.
The intervention worked through convening an arena with a more produc-
tive set of rules. Similarly, experimental school districts that created arenas for
resolving confl ict were more successful than others in bringing about compre-
hensive change. In the school district cited earlier, teachers reacted to adminis-
trative coercion with a power strategy of their own:
Community members initiated a group called Concerned Citizens
for Education in response to a phone call from a teacher who noted
that parents should be worried about what the [administrators] were
doing to their children. The superintendent became increasingly
occupied with responding to demands and concerns of the commu-
nity group. Over time, the group joined in a coalition with teachers
to defeat several of the superintendent ’ s supporters on the school
board and to elect members who were more supportive of their
interests. The turnover in board membership reduced the admin-
istrator ’ s power and authority, making it necessary to rely more
and more on bargaining and negotiation strategies to promote the
intended change [Deal and Nutt, 1980, p. 20].
Successful change requires an ability to frame issues politically, build coali-
tions, and establish arenas in which disagreements can be hammered into
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Reframing Organizations388
workable pacts. One insightful executive remarked: “ We need to confront, not
duck, and face up to disagreements and differences of opinions and confl icting
objectives . . . . All of us must make sure — day in and day out — that confl icts are
aired and resolved before they lead to internecine war. ”
CHANGE AND LOSS In the early 1980s, America ’ s Cola wars — a battle between Coke and Pepsi —
reached a fever pitch. A head - to - head taste test called the Pepsi Challenge was mak-
ing inroads in Coca - Cola ’ s market share. In blind tests, even avowed Coke drinkers
preferred Pepsi. Pepsi won narrowly in a Coke counterchallenge held at its corpo-
rate headquarters in Atlanta. Coca - Cola executives became more nervous when
Pepsi stunned the industry by signing Michael Jackson to a $ 5 million celebrity
advertising campaign. Coke struck back with one of the most startling announce-
ments in the company ’ s ninety - nine - year history: Old Coke would be replaced
with New Coke:
Shortly before 11:00 am [on Tuesday, April 23, 1985], the doors of
the Vivian Beaumont Theater at Lincoln Center opened to two hun-
dred newspaper, magazine, and TV reporters. The stage was aglow
with red. Three huge screens, each solid red and inscribed with the
company logo, rose behind the podium and a table draped in red.
The lights were low; the music began: “ We are. We will always be.
Coca - Cola. All - American history. ” As the patriotic song fi lled the
theater, slides of Americana fl ashed on the center screen — families
and kids, Eisenhower and JFK, the Grand Canyon and wheat fi elds,
the Beatles and Bruce Springsteen, cowboys, athletes, and the Statue
of Liberty — and interspersed throughout, old commercials for Coke.
Robert Goizueta [CEO of Coca - Cola] came to the podium. He
fi rst congratulated the reporters for their ingenuity in already hav-
ing reported what he was about to say. And then he boasted, “ The
best has been made even better. ” Sidestepping the years of labora-
tory research that had gone into the program, Goizueta claimed that
in the process of concocting Diet Coke, the company fl avor chem-
ists had “ discovered ” a new formula. And research had shown that
consumers preferred this new one to old Coke. Management could
then do one of two things: nothing, or buy the world a new Coke.
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Reframing Change in Organizations 389
Goizueta announced that the taste - test results made management ’ s
decisions “ one of the easiest ever made ” [Oliver, 1986, p. 132].
The rest is history. Coke drinkers overwhelmingly rejected the new product.
They felt betrayed; many were outraged:
Duane Larson took down his collection of Coke bottles and outside
of his restaurant hung a sign, “ They don ’ t make Coke anymore. ” . . .
Dennis Overstreet of Beverly Hills hoarded 500 cases of old Coke and
advertised them for $ 30 a case. He is almost sold out . . . . San Francisco
Examiner columnist Bill Mandel called it “ Coke for wimps. ” . . . Finally,
Guy Mullins exclaimed, “ When they took old Coke off the market,
they violated my freedom of choice — baseball, hamburgers, Coke —
they ’ re all the fabric of America ” [Morganthau, 1985, pp. 32 – 33].
Even bottlers and Coca - Cola employees were aghast: “ By June the anger and resent-
ment of the public was disrupting the personal lives of Coke employees, from the
top executives to the company secretaries. Friends and acquaintances were quick
to attack, and once - proud employees now shrank from displaying to the world any
association with the Coca - Cola company ” (Oliver, 1986, pp. 166 – 167).
Coca - Cola rebounded quickly with Classic Coke. Indeed, the company ’ s mas-
sive miscalculation led to one of the strangest serendipitous triumphs in market-
ing history. All the controversy, passion, and free publicity stirred up by the New
Coke fi asco ultimately helped Coca - Cola regain its dominance in the soft drink
industry. A brilliant stratagem, if anyone had planned it.
What led Coke ’ s executives into such a quagmire? Several factors were at
work. Pepsi was gaining market share. As the newly appointed CEO of Coca -
Cola, Goizueta was determined to modernize the company. A previous innova-
tion, Diet Coke, had been a huge success. Most important, Coca - Cola ’ s revered
long - time “ Boss, ” Robert Woodruff, had just passed away. On his deathbed, he
reportedly gave Goizueta his blessing for the new recipe.
In their zeal to compete with Pepsi, Coke ’ s executives overlooked a central
tenet of the symbolic frame. The meaning of an object or event can be far more
powerful than the reality. Strangely, Coke ’ s leadership had lost touch with their
product ’ s signifi cance to consumers. To many people, old Coke was a piece of
Americana. It was linked to cherished memories. Coke represented something
far deeper than just a soft drink.
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Reframing Organizations390
In introducing New Coke, company executives unintentionally announced
the passing of an American symbol. Symbols create meaning, and when one is
destroyed or vanishes people experience emotions akin to those at the passing
of a spouse, child, old friend, or pet. When a relative or close friend dies, we feel
a deep sense of loss. We harbor similar feelings when a computer replaces old
procedures, a logo changes after a merger, or an old leader is replaced by a new
one. When these transitions take place in the workplace rather than in a family,
feelings of loss are often denied or attributed to other causes.
Rituals of Loss Any signifi cant change in an organization may trigger two confl icting symbolic
responses. The fi rst is to keep things as they were, to replay the past. The second
is to ignore the loss and plunge into the future. Individuals or groups can get
stuck in either form of denial or bog down vacillating between the two.
Four years after AT & T was forced to divest its local phone operations, an
executive remarked: “ Some mornings I feel like I can set the world on fi re. Other
mornings I can hardly get out of bed to face another day. ” Nurses in one hospi-
tal ’ s intensive care unit were caught in a loss cycle for ten years following their
move from an old facility. Loss is an unavoidable by - product of improvement. As
change accelerates, executives and employees get caught in endless cycles of unre-
solved grief.
In our personal lives, the pathway from loss to healing is culturally prescribed.
Every culture outlines a sequence for transition rituals following signifi cant loss:
always a collective experience in which pain is expressed, felt, and juxtaposed
against humor and hope. (Think of Irish actor Malachy McCourt who, as his
mother lay dying, said to her distressed physician, “ Don ’ t worry, Doctor, we
come from a long line of dead people. ” )
In many societies, the sequence of ritual steps involves a wake, a funeral, a
period of mourning, and some form of commemoration. From a symbolic per-
spective, ritual is an essential companion to signifi cant change. A Naval change -
of - command ceremony, for example, is informally scripted by tradition. A wake
is held for the outgoing commander. The mantle of command is passed to the
new commander in a full - dress ceremony attended by friends, relatives, and
assembled offi cers and sailors. The climactic moment of transition occurs with
the incoming and outgoing skippers at attention facing each other. The new
commander salutes and says, “ I relieve you, sir. ” The retiring commander salutes
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Reframing Change in Organizations 391
and responds, “ I stand relieved. ” During the ceremony, the new commander ’ s
name is posted on the unit ’ s entrance. After a time, the old commander ’ s face
or name is displayed in a picture or plaque.
Transition rituals initiate a sequence of steps that help people let go of the past,
deal with a painful present, and move into a meaningful future. The form of these
rites varies widely, but they are essential to the ability to face and transcend loss.
Otherwise, people vacillate between clinging to the old and rushing to the future.
An effective ritual helps them let go of old ways and embrace a new beginning.
The Rebirth of Delta Corporation Owen (1987) vividly documents these issues in his description of change at
“ Delta Corporation. ” An entrepreneur named Harry invented a product that
sold well enough to support a company of thirty - fi ve hundred people. After a
successful public stock offering, the company experienced soaring costs, fl at-
tened sales, and a dearth of new products. Facing stockholder dissatisfaction and
charges of mismanagement, Harry passed the torch to a new leader.
Harry ’ s replacement was very clear about her vision: she wanted “ engineers
who could fl y. ” But her vision was juxtaposed against a history of “ going down-
hill. ” A further complication was that various parts of the company were gov-
erned by distinct stories representing different Delta themes. Finance division
stories exemplifi ed the new breed of executives brought in following Harry ’ s
departure. Research and development stories varied by organizational level. At
the executive level, “ Old Harry ” stories extolled the creative accomplishments
of the former CEO. Middle management stories focused on the Golden Fleece
award given monthly behind the scenes to the researcher who developed the idea
with the least bottom - line potential. On the production benches, workers told of
Serendipity Sam, winner of more Golden Fleece awards than anyone else, exem-
plar of the excitement and innovation of Harry ’ s regime.
Across the levels and divisions, the tales clustered into two competing themes:
the newcomers ’ focus on management versus the company ’ s tradition of innova-
tion. The new CEO recognized the importance of blending old and new to build
a company where “ engineers could fl y. ” She brought thirty - fi ve people from
across the company to a management retreat where she surprised everyone:
She opened with some stories of the early days, describing the inten-
sity of Old Harry and the Garage Gang (now known as the Leper
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Reframing Organizations392
Colony). She even had one of the early models of Harry ’ s machine
out on a table. Most people had never seen one. It looked primi-
tive, but during the coffee break, members of the Leper Colony
surrounded the ancient artifact, and began swapping tales of the
blind alleys, the late nights, and the breakthroughs. That dusty old
machine became a magnet. Young shop fl oor folks went up and
touched it, sort of snickering as they compared this prototype with
the sleek creations they were manufacturing now. But even as they
snickered, they stopped to listen as the Leper Colony recounted tales
of accomplishment. It may have been just a “ prototype, ” but that ’ s
where it all began [Owen, 1987, p. 172].
After the break, the CEO divided the group into subgroups to share their hopes
for the company. When the participants returned, their chairs had been re-
arranged into a circle with Old Harry ’ s prototype in the center. With everyone
facing one another, the CEO led a discussion, linking the stories from the vari-
ous subgroups. Serendipity Sam ’ s account of a new product possibility came out
in a torrent of technical jargon:
The noise level was fi erce, but the rest of the group was being left
out. Taking Sam by the hand, the CEO led him to the center of
the circle right next to the old prototype. There it was the old
and the new — the past, present, and potential. She whispered in
Sam ’ s ear that he ought to take a deep breath and start over in words
of one syllable. He did so, and in ways less than elegant, the concept
emerged. He guessed about applications, competitors, market shares,
and before long the old VP for fi nance was drawn in. No longer was
he thinking about selling [tax] losses, but rather thinking out loud
about how he was going to develop the capital to support the new
project. The group from the shop fl oor . . . began to spin a likely tale
as to how they might transform the assembly lines in order to make
Sam ’ s new machine. Even the Golden Fleece crowd became excited,
telling each other how they always knew that Serendipity Sam could
pull it off. They conveniently forgot that Sam had been the recipient
of a record number of their awards, to say nothing of the fact that
this new idea had emerged in spite of all their rules [Owen, 1987,
pp. 173 – 174].
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Reframing Change in Organizations 393
In one intense event, part of the past was buried, yet its spirit was resurrected
and revised to fi t the new circumstances. Disparaging themes and stories were
merged into a company where “ engineers could fl y ” profi tably.
Releasing a Negative Past Many fi nd it hard to understand how villains can hold a culture together. But
negative symbols are attractive when people lack more positive glue. In such cul-
tural voids, griping can become the predominant ritual. The new owners of a
newspaper realized that their acquisition was mired in a negative past. Letting go
of old tyrants and wounds was essential to a new, more positive start.
Needing something dramatic, the new owners invited all employees to an
event. They arrived to a room fi lled with black balloons. Pictures of the reviled
managers were affi xed to the lid of an open coffi n positioned prominently in
the front. Startled employees silently took their places. The new CEO opened the
ceremony: “ We are assembled today to say farewell to the former owners of this
newspaper. But it only seems fi tting that we should say a few words about them
before they leave us forever. ”
On cue, without prompting or rehearsal, individuals rose from their seats,
came forward, and, one by one, grabbed a picture. Each then described briefl y
life under the sway of “ the bastards, ” tore up the person ’ s photograph, and threw
it into the coffi n. When all the likenesses had been removed, a New Orleans style
group of jazz musicians fi led in playing a mournful dirge. Coffi n bearers marched
the coffi n outside. Employees followed and released the black balloons into the
sky. A buffet lunch followed, festooned by balloons with the colors of the new
company logo.
The CEO admitted later, “ What a risk. I was scared to death. But it came off
without a hitch and the atmosphere is now completely different. People are talk-
ing and laughing together. Circulation has improved. So has morale. Who would
have ‘ thunk ’ it? ”
CHANGE STRATEGY The frames offer a checklist of issues that change agents must recognize and
respond to. But how can they be combined into an integrated model? How does
the change process move through time? John Kotter, an infl uential student of
leadership and change, has studied both successful and unsuccessful change
c18.indd 393c18.indd 393 7/1/08 3:45:31 PM7/1/08 3:45:31 PM
Reframing Organizations394
efforts in organizations around the world. In his book The Heart of Change
(2002, written with Dan S. Cohen), he summarizes what he has learned. His
basic message is very much like ours. Too many change initiatives fail because
they rely too much on “ data gathering, analysis, report writing, and presenta-
tions ” instead of a more creative approach aimed at grabbing the “ feelings that
motivate useful action ” (p. 8). In other words, change agents fail when they rely
mostly on reason and structure while neglecting human, political, and symbolic
elements.
Kotter describes eight stages that he repeatedly found in successful change
initiatives:
1. Creating a sense of urgency
2. Pulling together a guiding team with the needed skills, credibility, connec-
tions, and authority to move things along
3. Creating an uplifting vision and strategy
4. Communicating the vision and strategy through a combination of words,
deeds, and symbols
5. Removing obstacles, or empowering people to move ahead
6. Producing visible symbols of progress through short - term victories
7. Sticking with the process and refusing to quit when things get tough
8. Nurturing and shaping a new culture to support the emerging innovative
ways
Kotter ’ s stages depict a dynamic process moving through time, though not
necessarily in a linear sequence. In the real world, stages overlap, and change
agents sometimes need to cycle back to earlier phases.
Combining Kotter ’ s stages with the four frames generates the model presented
in Exhibit 18.2 . The table lists each of Kotter ’ s stages and illustrates actions that
change agents might take. Not every frame is essential to each stage, but all are
critical to overall success. Consider, for example, Kotter ’ s fi rst stage, developing
a sense of urgency. Strategies from the human resource, political, and symbolic
strategies all contribute. Symbolically, leaders can construct a persuasive story
by painting a picture of the current challenge or crisis and emphasizing why
failure to act would be catastrophic. Human resource techniques of skill build-
ing, participation, and open meetings can help to get the story out and gauge
c18.indd 394c18.indd 394 7/1/08 3:45:31 PM7/1/08 3:45:31 PM
Ex h
ib it
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c18.indd 395c18.indd 395 7/1/08 3:45:31 PM7/1/08 3:45:31 PM
Reframing Organizations396
audience reaction. Behind the scenes, leaders can meet with key players, assess
their interests, and negotiate or use power as necessary to get people on board.
As another example, Kotter ’ s fi fth step calls for removing obstacles and
empowering people to move forward. Structurally, this is a matter of identifying
rules, roles, procedures, and patterns that block progress and then working to
realign them. Meanwhile, the human resource frame counsels training, support,
and resources to enable people to master new behaviors. Symbolically, a few
“ public hangings ” (for example, fi ring, demoting, or exiling prominent oppo-
nents) could reinforce the message. Public celebrations could honor successes
and herald a new beginning.
Exhibit 18.2 is intended as an illustration, not an exhaustive plan. Every situ-
ation and change effort is unique. Creative change agents can use the ideas to
stimulate thinking and spur imagination as they develop an approach that fi ts
local circumstances.
SUMMARY Innovation inevitably generates four issues. First, it affects individuals ’ ability
to feel effective, valued, and in control. Without support, training, and a chance to
participate in the process, people become powerful anchors, embedded in the
past, that block forward motion. Second, change disrupts existing patterns of
roles and relationships, producing confusion and uncertainty. Structural patterns
need to be revised and realigned to support the new direction. Third, change
creates confl ict between winners and losers — those who benefi t from the new
direction and those who do not. This confl ict requires creation of arenas where
the issues can be renegotiated and the political map redrawn. Finally, change cre-
ates loss of meaning for recipients of the change. Transition rituals, mourning
the past, and celebrating the future help people let go of old attachments and
embrace new ways of doing things. Kotter ’ s model of successive change includes
eight stages. Integrated with the frames, it offers a well - orchestrated, integrated
design for responding to needs for participative learning, realignment, negotia-
tion, and grieving.
c18.indd 396c18.indd 396 7/1/08 3:45:32 PM7/1/08 3:45:32 PM
397
Reframing Ethics and Spirit
What shall an organization profi t if it should gain the world but lose its soul? 1 For Starbucks chairman Howard Schultz, the answer is “ not a lot, ” which is why he raised exactly that question in a
memo to everyone in his company in 2007, as described in Chapter
Twelve . In the case of Enron, the answer was evidently “ nothing at
all ” ; the company eventually lost both its soul and the world it hoped
to gain. Enron was America ’ s largest gas pipeline company when
Kenneth Lay took over as chief executive in 1985. At the time, it was a
solid but pedestrian business. It was a strong competitor in its indus-
try, but demand was fl at, and profi ts cycled with fl uctuations in the
price of gas (Bodily and Bruner, 2002). Deregulation loomed, creat-
ing both threats and opportunities. Lay, as smart as he was genial,
did what CEOs are expected to do: look for ways to grow the busi-
ness and boost the share price. For more than fi fteen years, he was
remarkably successful. A once - sleepy company morphed into world ’ s
largest energy - trading business, and Enron ’ s market value grew from
$ 2 billion in 1985 to $ 70 billion in mid - 2001.
Most of the excitement at Enron was generated by a new and unique business
model. Instead of just pumping gas through pipes, the company redefi ned itself
N I N E T E E N
c h a p t e r
c19.indd 397c19.indd 397 7/1/08 3:53:16 PM7/1/08 3:53:16 PM
Reframing Organizations398
as a trader, a deal maker in a variety of commodities. Initially, the focus was
energy, but Enron gradually expanded into areas as diverse as broadband and
an esoteric form of weather insurance. By 2000, the old pipelines represented
only about a fi fth of Enron ’ s revenues and profi ts. Much of the rest came from
the new “ merchant ” businesses, which attracted a new breed of Enron employee:
bright young fast - trackers with advanced degrees in business and fi nance.
The stable pipeline business was run by managers with years of industry
experience. Reliability and operating effi ciency were the keys to success. Pay
was linked to seniority. The new trading operations carried much higher risks,
which brought Enron into the business equivalent of the Wild West. Big rewards
awaited aggressive gunslingers with the guts and smarts to grab whatever loot
they could fi nd. Enron ’ s old pay system gave way to huge bonuses and gener-
ous stock options for high - performers. This was topped off with corporate jets
and lavish parties adorned by $ 500 bottles of champagne and strippers who cost
even more (Roberts and Thomas, 2002). As James O ’ Toole put it, “ At Enron, you
had a bunch of kids running loose without adult supervision ” (Byrne, France,
and Zellner, 2002, p. 1).
It ’ s easy to catch gold fever in a mining town during a boom, and many of
Enron ’ s aggressive young pioneers were stricken. One was Timothy Belden,
thirty - four - year - old head of Enron ’ s energy trading offi ce in Portland, Oregon.
Belden earned bonuses totaling close to $ 5 million in 2001. A year later, he
agreed to give some of it to the state of California, pleading guilty to illegal
manipulation of California ’ s energy crisis: “ In the plea Belden admitted to work-
ing with others on trading tactics that effectively transformed California ’ s com-
plex system for buying and transmitting energy into a fi ctional world, complete
with bogus transmission schedules, imaginary congestion on power lines and
fraudulent sales of ‘ out of state ’ energy that in fact came from California itself ”
(Eichenwald and Richtel, 2002, p. C1).
When some of Enron ’ s new mines produced only fool ’ s gold, the company ’ s
fi nancial wizards tried to keep the game going. Fancy fi nancial maneuvers infl ated
revenue and hid debt, mostly by selling assets to supposedly independent part-
nerships that were controlled by Enron ’ s chief fi nancial offi cer, Andrew Fastow.
Partnerships borrowed the money from banks or brokerages, and Enron guaran-
teed the loans (Eichenwald, 2002b). Moving money from one pocket to another
bumped up Enron ’ s fi nancial statements in the short run, but eventually the off -
balance - sheet shenanigans came home to roost, and the company imploded.
c19.indd 398c19.indd 398 7/1/08 3:53:16 PM7/1/08 3:53:16 PM
Reframing Ethics and Spirit 399
At the heart of this tragedy, the company lost track of what it was or stood
for. As Arie De Geus puts it, companies “ need profi ts in the same way as any liv-
ing being needs oxygen. It is a necessity to stay alive, but it is not the purpose
of life ” (De Geus, 1995, p. 29). Enron ’ s story is far from unique. Over the years,
corporate fl ame - outs have recurred around the world. What can managers and
organizations do about this abysmal state of moral lapse? We argue in this chap-
ter that ethics must reside in soul, a sense of bedrock character that harbors core
beliefs and values. We discuss why soul is important and how it sustains spiritual
conviction and ethical behavior. We then present a variegated picture of leader-
ship ethics.
SOUL AND SPIRIT IN ORGANIZATIONS What Enron lacked becomes obvious if we compare it to the pharmaceutical
giant Merck, one of America ’ s most successful fi rms. Merck states its core pur-
pose as preserving and improving human life, above making a profi t. A noble
sentiment, but is it refl ected in key decisions and everyday behavior? Mostly,
though Merck has sustained legitimate criticism in recent years for being slow to
acknowledge health risks with some of its best - selling drugs like Vioxx (Fielder,
2005). But Merck can also point to a number of instances of selling a drug at
a loss or giving it away to fulfi ll the company ’ s core value of putting patients
fi rst. In one well - known instance, Merck had to decide whether to develop
and distribute a drug for river blindness, an affl iction of poor people in many
Third World countries. From a cost - benefi t viewpoint, the choice was clear: the
drug had little chance of making money. For bottom - line - driven companies,
such a decision would be a no - brainer. Merck, true to its emphasis on health,
developed the drug and then gave it away. The company ’ s commitment to its val-
ues made the decision easy, the CEO said afterward.
In contrast, “ the woods were fi lled with smart people at Enron, but there were
really no wise people, or people who could say ‘ this is enough ’ ” (John Olson,
cited in Eichenwald, 2002a, p. A26). Some of us have such strong ethical convic-
tions that it matters little where we work, but many of us are more inclined to
shilly - shally, attuned to cues and expectations from our colleagues at work about
what to do and not to do. Enron lost track of its redeeming moral purpose and
failed to provide ethical guardrails for its employees. Some went to jail, and many
others suffered damage to careers and self - worth.
c19.indd 399c19.indd 399 7/1/08 3:53:17 PM7/1/08 3:53:17 PM
Reframing Organizations400
Many dispute the notion that organizations possess soul, but there is grow-
ing evidence that spirituality is a critical element in long - run success. A diction-
ary defi nition of soul uses terms such as “ animating force, ” “ immaterial essence, ”
and “ spiritual nature. ” For an organization, group, or family, soul can also be
viewed as a resolute sense of character, a deep confi dence about who we are,
what we care about, and what we deeply believe in. Merck had it. Enron did not.
Starbucks is concerned about losing it.
Why should an organization — a company, a school, or a public agency — be
concerned about soul? Many organizations and most management writers
either scoff at or ignore the matter. As an example, two best - sellers on strat-
egy, Treacy and Wiersema ’ s The Discipline of Market Leaders (1995) and Hamel
and Prahalad ’ s Competing for the Future (1994), link the enormous success of
Southwest Airlines to its strategic prowess. But founder Herb Kelleher offered
a very different explanation for what makes Southwest work, one that features
people, humor, love, and soul. “ Simply put, Kelleher ‘ cherishes and respects ’ his
employees, and his ‘ love ’ is returned in what he calls ‘ a spontaneous, voluntary
overfl owing of emotion ’ ” (Farkas and De Backer, 1996, p. 87). Kelleher ’ s style was
certainly unique: “ On Easter, he walked a plane ’ s aisle clad in an Easter bunny
outfi t, and for St. Patrick ’ s Day he dressed as a leprechaun. When Southwest
started a new route to Sacramento, Kelleher sang a rap song at a press conference
with two people in Teenage Mutant Ninja costumes and two others dressed as
tomatoes ” (Levering and Moskowitz, 1993, p. 413).
But Kelleher ’ s hijinks are only part of the Southwest success story. Soul, the
heart of the “ Southwest spirit, ” is shared throughout the company. Kelleher
claimed that the most important group in the company was the “ Culture
Committee, ” a seventy - person cross - section of employees established to per-
petuate the company ’ s values and spirit. His charge to the committee was to
“ carry the spiritual message of Southwest Airlines ” (Farkas and De Backer, 1996,
p. 93). There were plenty of skeptics, and a competing airline executive grum-
bled, “ Southwest runs on Herb ’ s bullshit ” (Petzinger, 1995, p. 284). But year after
year, Southwest ’ s growth and profi tability topped its industry.
A growing number of successful leaders embrace a philosophy much like
Kelleher ’ s. Ben Cohen, cofounder of the ice cream company Ben and Jerry ’ s
Homemade, observes: “ When you give love, you receive love. I maintain that
there is a spiritual dimension to business just as there is to the lives of individuals ”
c19.indd 400c19.indd 400 7/1/08 3:53:17 PM7/1/08 3:53:17 PM
Reframing Ethics and Spirit 401
(Levering and Moskowitz, 1993, p. 47). Lou Gerstner of IBM and Howard Schultz
of Starbuck ’ s echo his sentiments in their emphasis on culture and heart.
Evidence suggests that tapping a deeper level of human energy pays off.
Collins and Porras (1994) and De Geus (1995) both found that a central char-
acteristic of corporations succeeding over the long haul was a core ideology
emphasizing “ more than profi ts ” and offering “ guidance and inspiration to peo-
ple inside the company ” (Collins and Porras, 1994, pp. 48, 88). When authen-
tic and part of everyday life, such core ideologies — love at Southwest, preserving
human life at Merck — give a company soul.
Soul and ethics are inextricably intertwined. Recent decades have regularly
produced highly public scandals of major corporations engaging in unethical, if
not illegal, conduct. It happened in the 1980s, a decade of remarkable greed and
corruption in business. It happened again with the spate of scandals in 2001
and 2002, as well as in the sub - prime mortgage mess of 2007 – 2008. Efforts to
do something about the ethical void in management have ebbed and fl owed as
dishonor comes and goes. One proposed remedy is more emphasis on ethics in
professional training programs. A second has sparked a fl urry of corporate eth-
ics statements. A third has pushed for stronger legal and regulatory muscle, such
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, forbidding U.S. corporations from bribing
foreign offi cials to get or retain business, and “ SOX ” — the Sarbanes - Oxley Act
of 2002 2 — which mandated a variety of measures to combat fraud and increase
corporate transparency.
These are important initiatives, but they only skim the surface. Solomon calls
for a deeper “ Aristotelian ethic ” :
There is too little sense of business as itself enjoyable (the main virtue
of the “ game ” metaphor), that business is not a matter of vulgar self -
interest but of vital community interest, that the virtues on which one
prides oneself in personal life are essentially the same as those essential
to good business — honesty, dependability, courage, loyalty, integrity.
Aristotle ’ s central ethical concept, accordingly, is a unifi ed, all - embracing
notion of “ happiness ” (or, more accurately, eudaimonia, perhaps better
translated as “ fl ourishing ” or “ doing well ” ). The point is to view one ’ s
life as a whole and not separate the personal and the public or profes-
sional, or duty and pleasure [1993, p. 105].
c19.indd 401c19.indd 401 7/1/08 3:53:18 PM7/1/08 3:53:18 PM
Reframing Organizations402
Solomon settled on the term Aristotelian because it makes no pretensions of
imparting the latest cutting - edge theory or technique of management. Rather,
he reminds us of a perspective and debate reaching back to ancient times. The
central motive is not to commission a new wave of experts and seminars or to
kick off one more downsizing bloodbath. “ It is to emphasize the importance of
continuity and stability, clearness of vision and constancy of purpose, corporate
loyalty and individual integrity ” (1993, p. 104). Solomon reminds us that ethics
and soul are essential for living a good life as well as managing a fulfi lling orga-
nization. Since the beginning, the world ’ s philosophical and spiritual traditions
have proffered wisdom to guide our search for better ways to accomplish both.
We have emphasized the four frames as cognitive lenses for understanding
and tools for infl uencing collective endeavors. Our focus has been the heads and
hands of leaders. Both are vitally important. But so are hearts and souls. The
frames also carry implications for creating ethical communities and for reviving
the moral responsibilities of leadership. Exhibit 19.1 summarizes our view.
Exhibit 19.1. Reframing Ethics.
FRAME METAPHOR ORGANIZATIONAL ETHIC
LEADERSHIP CONTRIBUTION
Structural Factory Excellence Authorship
Human resource Extended family Caring Love
Political Jungle Justice Power
Symbolic Temple Faith Signifi cance
The Factory: Excellence and Authorship One of our oldest images of organizations is that of factories engaged in a pro-
duction process. Raw materials (steel, peanuts, or fi ve - year - olds) come in the
door and leave as fi nished products (refrigerators, peanut butter, or educated
graduates). The ethical imperative of the factory is excellence: ensuring that
work is done as effectively and effi ciently as possible to produce high - quality
yields. Since the 1982 publication of Peters and Waterman ’ s famous book,
almost everyone has been searching for excellence, though fl awed products and
c19.indd 402c19.indd 402 7/1/08 3:53:18 PM7/1/08 3:53:18 PM
Reframing Ethics and Spirit 403
mediocre services keep reminding us that the hunt does not always bring home
the quarry.
One source of disappointment is that excellence requires more than pious ser-
mons from top management; it demands commitment and autonomy at all lev-
els of an enterprise. How do leaders foster such dedication? As we ’ ve said before,
“ Leading is giving. Leadership is an ethic, a gift of oneself ” (Bolman and Deal, 2001,
p. 106). Critical for creating and maintaining excellence is the gift of authorship:
Giving authorship provides space within boundaries. In an orchestra,
musicians develop individual parts within the parameters of a musi-
cal score and the interpretative challenges posed by the conductor.
Authorship turns the pyramid on its side. Leaders increase their
infl uence and build more productive organizations. Workers expe-
rience the satisfactions of creativity, craftsmanship and a job well
done. Gone is the traditional adversarial relationship in which supe-
riors try to increase control while subordinates resist them at every
turn. Trusting people to solve problems generates higher levels of
motivation and better solutions. The leader ’ s responsibility is to cre-
ate conditions that promote authorship. Individuals need to see their
work as meaningful and worthwhile, to feel personally accountable
for the consequences of their efforts, and to get feedback that lets
them know the results [Bolman and Deal, 2001, pp. 111 – 112].
Southwest Airlines offers a compelling example of authorship. Its associates are
encouraged to be themselves, have fun, and above all use their sense of humor. Only
on Southwest are you likely to hear required FAA safety briefi ngs sung to the music
of a popular song or delivered as a stand - up comedy routine. ( “ Those of you who
wish to smoke will please fi le out to our lounge on the wing, where you can enjoy
our feature fi lm, Gone with the Wind. ” ) Too frivolous for something as serious as a
safety announcement? Just the opposite: it ’ s a way to get passengers to pay attention
to a message they usually ignore. Surely, it ’ s also a way for fl ight attendants to have
fun and feel creative rather than being mechanically scripted by routine.
The Family: Caring and Love Caring — one person ’ s compassion and concern for another — is both the pri-
mary purpose and the ethical glue that holds a family together. Parents care for
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Reframing Organizations404
children and, eventually, children care for their parents. A compassionate family
or community requires servant - leaders concerned with the needs and wishes of
members and stakeholders. This creates a challenging obligation for leaders to
understand and to provide stewardship of the collective well - being. The gift of
the servant - leader is love.
Love is largely absent from most modern corporations. Most managers would
never use the word in any context more profound than their feelings about food,
family, fi lms, or games. They shy away from love ’ s deeper meanings, fearing both
its power and its risks. Caring begins with knowing; it requires listening, under-
standing, and accepting. It progresses through a deepening sense of appreciation,
respect, and ultimately love. Love is a willingness to reach out and open one ’ s
heart. An open heart is vulnerable. Confronting vulnerability allows us to drop
our mask, meet heart to heart, and be present for one another. We experience a
sense of unity and delight in those voluntary, human exchanges that mold “ the
soul of community ” (Whitmyer, 1993, p. 81).
They talk openly about love at Southwest Airlines. As president Colleen
Barrett reminisced, “ Love is a word that isn ’ t used often in Corporate America,
but we used it at Southwest from the beginning. ” The word love is woven into the
culture. They fl y out of Love Field in Dallas; their symbol on the New York Stock
Exchange is LUV; the employee newsletter is called Luv Lines; and their twentieth
anniversary slogan was “ Twenty Years of Loving You ” (Levering and Moskowitz,
1993). They hold an annual “ Heroes of the Heart ” ceremony to honor members
of the Southwest family who have gone above and beyond even Southwest ’ s high
call of duty. There are, of course, ups and downs in any family, and the airline
industry certainly experiences both. Through life ’ s peaks and valleys, love holds
people — both employees and passengers — together in a caring community.
For Levi Strauss, the issue of caring came to a head in trying to apply the
company ’ s ethical principles (honesty, fairness, respect for others, compassion,
promise keeping, and integrity) to the thorny dilemmas of working with for-
eign subcontractors. How should the company balance concern for domestic
employees with concern for overseas workers? Even if pay and working condi-
tions at foreign subcontractors are below those in the United States, are inferior
jobs better than no jobs? A task force set to work to collect data and formulate
guidelines for ethical practice. Ultimately, the company wound up making some
tough decisions. It became the fi rst American clothing company to develop a set
of standards for working conditions in overseas plants. It pulled out of China for
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Reframing Ethics and Spirit 405
fi ve years beginning in 1993 because of human rights abuses, despite the huge
market potential there. In a factory in Bangladesh employing underage children,
Levi ’ s arranged for the children to go back to school while the contractor contin-
ued to pay their salaries (Waterman, 1994).
The Jungle: Justice and Power We turn now to a third image: the organization as jungle. Woody Allen captured
the competitive, predator - prey imagery succinctly: “ The lion and the calf shall lie
down together, but the calf won ’ t get much sleep ” (1986, p. 28). As the metaphor
suggests, the jungle is a politically charged environment of confl ict and pursuit
of self - interest. Politics and politicians are routinely viewed as objects of scorn —
often for good reason. Their behavior tends to prompt the question: Is there any
ethical consideration associated with political action? We believe there is: the
commitment to justice. In a world of competing interests and scarce resources,
people are continually compelled to make trade - offs. No one can give everyone
everything they want, but it is possible to honor a value of fairness in making
decisions about who gets what. Solomon (1993, p. 231) sees justice as the ulti-
mate virtue in corporations, because fairness — the perception that employees,
customers, and investors are all getting their due — is the glue that holds things
together.
Justice is never easy to defi ne, and disagreement about its application is inevi-
table. The key gift that leaders can offer in pursuit of justice is sharing power.
People with a voice in key decisions are far more likely to feel a sense of fair-
ness than those with none. Leaders who hoard power produce powerless orga-
nizations. People stripped of power look for ways to fi ght back: sabotage, passive
resistance, withdrawal, or angry militancy. Giving power liberates energy for
more productive use. If people have a sense of effi cacy and an ability to infl uence
their world, they are more likely to direct their energy and intelligence toward
making a contribution rather than making trouble. The gift of power enrolls
people in working toward a common cause. It also creates diffi cult choice points.
If leaders clutch power too tightly, they activate old patterns of antagonism. But
if they cave in and say yes to anything, they put an organization ’ s mission at risk.
During the Reagan administration, House Speaker “ Tip ” O ’ Neil was a con-
stant thorn in the side of the president, but they carved out a mutually just
agreement: they would fi ght ferociously for their independent interests but stay
civil and fi nd fairness wherever possible. Their rule: “ After six o ’ clock, we ’ re
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Reframing Organizations406
friends, whatever divisiveness the political battle has produced during working
hours. ” Both men gave each other the gift of power. During one acrimonious
public debate between the two, Regan reportedly whispered, “ Tip, can we pre-
tend it ’ s six o ’ clock? ” (Neuman, 2004, p. 1).
Power and authorship are related; autonomy, space, and freedom are important
in both. Still, there is an important distinction between the two. Artists, authors,
and craftspeople can experience authorship even working alone. Power, in con-
trast, is meaningful only in relation to others. It is the capacity to wield infl u-
ence and get things to happen on a broader scale. Authorship without power is
isolating and splintering; power without authorship can be dysfunctional and
oppressive.
The gift of power is important at multiple levels. As individuals, people want
power to control their immediate work environment and the factors that impinge
on them directly. Many traditional workplaces still suffocate their employees with
time clocks, rigid rules, and authoritarian bosses. A global challenge at the group
level is responding to ethnic, racial, and gender diversity. Gallos, Ramsey, and
their colleagues get to the heart of the complexity of this issue:
Institutional, structural and systemic issues are very diffi cult for
members of dominant groups to understand. Systems are most often
designed by dominant group members to meet their own needs. It is
then diffi cult to see the ways in which our institutions and structures
systematically exclude others who are not “ like us. ” It is hard to see
and question what we have always taken for granted and painful to
confront personal complicity in maintaining the status quo. Privilege
enables us to remain unaware of institutional and social forces and
their impact [1997, p. 215].
Justice requires that leaders systematically enhance the power of subdominant
groups — ensuring access to decision making, creating internal advocacy groups,
building diversity into information and incentive systems, and strengthening
career opportunities (Cox, 1994; Gallos, Ramsey, and Associates, 1997; Morrison,
1992). All this happens only with a rock - solid commitment from top manage-
ment, the one condition that Morrison (1992) found to be universal in organiza-
tions that led in responding to diversity.
Justice also has important implications for the increasingly urgent question
of “ sustainability ” : How long can a production or business process last before it
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Reframing Ethics and Spirit 407
collapses as a result of the resource depletion or environmental damage it pro-
duces? Decisions about sustainability inevitably involve trade - offs among the
interests of constituencies that differ in role, place, and time. How do we bal-
ance our company ’ s profi tability against damage to the environment, or current
interests against those of future generations? Organizations with a commitment
to justice will take these questions seriously and look for ways to engage and
empower diverse stakeholders in making choices.
The Temple: Faith and Signifi cance An organization, like a temple, can be seen as a hallowed place, an expression
of human aspirations, a monument to faith in human possibility. A temple is
a gathering place for a community of people with shared traditions, values,
and beliefs. Members of a community may be diverse in many ways (age, back-
ground, economic status, personal interests), but they are tied together by shared
faith and bonded by a sanctifi ed spiritual covenant. In work organizations, faith
is strengthened if individuals feel the organization is characterized by excellence,
caring, and justice. Above all, people must believe that the organization is doing
something worth doing — a calling that adds something of value to the world.
Signifi cance is partly about the work itself, but even more about how the work is
embraced. This point is made by an old story about three stonemasons giving an
account of their work. The fi rst said he was “ cutting stone. ” The second said that
he was “ building a cathedral. ” The third said simply that he was “ serving God. ”
Temples need spiritual leaders. This does not mean promoting religion or a
particular theology; rather, it means bringing a genuine concern for the human
spirit. The dictionary defi nes spirit as “ the intelligent or immaterial part of
man, ” “ the animating or vital principal in living things, ” and “ the moral nature
of humanity. ” Spiritual leaders help people fi nd meaning and faith in work and
help them answer fundamental questions that have confronted humans of every
time and place: Who am I as an individual? Who are we as a people? What is the
purpose of my life, of our collective existence? What ethical principles should we
follow? What legacy will we leave?
Spiritual leaders offer the gift of signifi cance, rooted in confi dence that the
work is precious, that devotion and loyalty to a beloved institution can offer
hard - to - emulate intangible rewards. Work is exhilarating and joyful at its best;
arduous, frustrating, and exhausting in less happy moments. Many adults
embark on their careers with enthusiasm, confi dence, and a desire to make a
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Reframing Organizations408
contribution. Some never lose that spark, but many do. They become frustrated
with sterile or toxic working conditions and discouraged by how hard it is to
make a difference, or even to know if they have made one. Tracy Kidder puts it
well in writing about teachers: “ Good teachers put snags in the river of children
passing by, and over time, they redirect hundreds of lives. There is an innocence
that conspires to hold humanity together, and it is made up of people who can
never fully know the good they have done ” (Kidder, 1989, p. 313). The gift of sig-
nifi cance helps people sustain their faith rather than burn out and retire from a
meaningless job.
Signifi cance is built through the use of many expressive and symbolic forms:
rituals, ceremonies, stories, and music. An organization without a rich symbolic
life grows empty and barren. The magic of special occasions is vital in build-
ing signifi cance into collective life. Moments of ecstasy are parentheses that
mark life ’ s major passages. Without ritual and ceremony, transition remains
incomplete, a clutter of comings and goings; “ life becomes an endless set of
Wednesdays ” (Campbell, 1983, p. 5).
When ritual and ceremony are authentic and attuned, they fi re the imagina-
tion, evoke insight, and touch the heart. Ceremony weaves past, present, and
future into life ’ s ongoing tapestry. Ritual helps us face and comprehend life ’ s
everyday shocks, triumphs, and mysteries. Both help us experience the unseen
web of signifi cance that ties a community together. When inauthentic, such
occasions become meaningless, repetitious, and alienating — wasting our time,
disconnecting us from work, and splintering us from one another. “ Community
must become more than just gathering the troops, telling the stories, and
remembering things past. Community must also be rooted in values that do not
fail, values that go beyond the self - aggrandizement of human leaders ” (Griffi n,
1993, p. 178).
Stories give fl esh to shared values and sacred beliefs. Everyday life in orga-
nizations brings many heartwarming moments and dramatic encounters.
Transformed into stories, these events fi ll an organization ’ s treasure chest with
lore and legend. Told and retold, they draw people together and connect them
with the signifi cance of their work.
Music captures and expresses life ’ s deeper meaning. When people sing or
dance together, they bond to one another and experience emotional connections
otherwise hard to express. The late Harry Quadracci, chief executive offi cer of
the printing company Quadgraphics, convened employees once a year for an
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Reframing Ethics and Spirit 409
annual gathering. A management chorus sang the year ’ s themes. Quadracci him-
self voiced the company philosophy in a solo serenade.
Max DePree, famed both as both a business leader and an author of elegant
books on leadership, is clear about the role of faith in business: “ Being faithful
is more important than being successful. Corporations can and should have a
redemptive purpose. We need to weigh the pragmatic in the clarifying light of
the moral. We must understand that reaching our potential is more important
than reaching our goals ” (1989, p. 69). Spiritual leaders have the responsibility
of sustaining and encouraging faith in themselves and in recalling others to the
faith when they have wandered from it or lost it.
SUMMARY Ethics ultimately must be rooted in soul: an organization ’ s commitment to its
deeply rooted identity, beliefs, and values. Each frame offers a perspective on the
ethical responsibilities of organizations and the moral authority of leaders. Every
organization needs to evolve for itself a profound sense of its own ethical and
spiritual core. The frames offer spiritual guidelines for the quest.
Signs are everywhere that institutions in many developed nations suffer
from a crisis of meaning and moral authority. Rapid change, high mobility, glo-
balization, and racial and ethnic confl ict tear at the fabric of community. The
most important responsibility of managers is not to answer every question or
get every decision right. Though they cannot escape their responsibility to track
budgets, motivate people, respond to political pressures, and attend to culture,
they serve a deeper, more powerful, and more enduring role if they are models
and catalysts for such values as excellence, caring, justice, and faith.
NOTES 1. The question paraphrases Matthew 16:26: “ For what is a man profi ted,
if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? ” (King James
version).
2. Offi cially, the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Act of 2002.
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411
Bringing It All Together Change and Leadership in Action
Life ’ s daily challenges rarely arrive clearly labeled or neatly pack-aged. Instead, they immerse us in a murky, turbulent, and unre- lenting fl ood. The art of reframing uses knowledge and intuition to
make sense of the current and to fi nd sensible and effective ways
to channel the fl ow.
In this chapter, we illustrate the process by following a new principal through his
fi rst week in a deeply troubled urban high school. 1 Had this been a corporation
in crisis, a struggling hospital, or an embattled public agency, the basic leader-
ship issues would be much the same. We assume that our protagonist is familiar
with the frames and with reframing and is committed to the view of leadership
and ethics described in Chapter Nineteen . How might he use what he knows to
fi gure out what ’ s going on? What strategies can he mull over? What will he do?
Read the case thoughtfully. Ask yourself what you think is going on and what
options you would consider. Then compare your refl ections with his.
R O B E R T F . K E N N E D Y H I G H S C H O O L
On July 15, David King became principal of Robert F. Kennedy High
School, the newest of six high schools in Great Ridge, Illinois. The school
had opened two years earlier amid national acclaim as one of the
fi rst schools in the country designed and built on the “ house system ”
concept. Kennedy High was organized into four “ houses, ” each with
T W E N T Y
c h a p t e r
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Reframing Organizations412
three hundred students, eighteen faculty, and a housemaster. Each
house was in a separate building connected to the “ core facilities ” —
cafeteria, nurse ’ s room, guidance offi ces, boys ’ and girls ’ gyms, offi ces,
shops, and auditorium — and other houses by an enclosed outside pas-
sageway. Each had its own entrance, classrooms, toilets, conference
rooms, and housemaster ’ s offi ce.
Hailed as a major innovation in inner - city education, Kennedy High
was featured during its fi rst year in a documentary on a Chicago televi-
sion station. The school opened with a carefully selected staff of teach-
ers, many chosen from other Great Ridge schools. At least a dozen
were specially recruited from out of state. King knew that his faculty
included graduates from several elite East Coast and West Coast schools,
such as Yale, Princeton, and Stanford, as well as several of the very best
Midwestern schools. Even the racial mix of students had been carefully
balanced so that blacks, whites, and Latinos each comprised a third of
the student body (although King also knew — perhaps better than its
planners — that Kennedy ’ s students were drawn from the toughest and
poorest areas of the city). The building itself was also widely admired
for its beauty and functionality and had won several national architec-
tural awards.
Despite careful and elaborate preparations, Kennedy High School
was in serious trouble by the time King arrived. It had been racked
by violence the preceding year — closed twice by student disturbances
and once by a teacher walkout. It was also widely reported (although
King did not know for sure) that achievement scores of its ninth - and
tenth - grade students had declined during the last two years, and no
signifi cant improvement could be seen in the scores of the eleventh and
twelfth graders ’ tests. So far, Kennedy High School had fallen far short
of its planners ’ hopes and expectations.
David King
David King was born and raised in Great Ridge, Illinois. His father was
one of the city ’ s fi rst black principals. King knew the city and its school
system well. After two years of military service, King followed in his
father ’ s footsteps by going to Great Ridge State Teachers College, where
he received B.Ed. and M.Ed. degrees. King taught English and coached in
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Bringing It All Together 413
a predominantly black middle school for several years until he was asked
to become the school ’ s assistant principal. He remained in that post for
fi ve years, when he was asked to take over a large middle school of nine
hundred pupils — believed at the time to be the most “ diffi cult ” middle
school in the city. While there, King gained a citywide reputation as a
gifted and popular administrator. He was credited with changing the
worst middle school in the system into one of the best. He had been very
effective in building community support, recruiting new faculty, and rais-
ing academic standards. He was also credited with turning out basketball
and baseball teams that had won state and county championships.
The superintendent made it clear that King had been selected for
the Kennedy job over several more senior candidates because of his
ability to handle tough situations. The superintendent had also told
him that he would need every bit of skill and luck he could muster.
King knew of the formidable credentials of Jack Weis, his predecessor
at Kennedy High. Weis, a white man, had been the superintendent of
a small local township school system before becoming Kennedy ’ s fi rst
principal. He had written one book on the house system concept and
another on inner - city education. Weis held a Ph.D. from the University
of Chicago and a divinity degree from Harvard. Yet despite his impres-
sive background and ability, Weis had resigned in disillusionment. He
was described by many as a “ broken man. ” King remembered seeing
the physical change in Weis over that two - year period. Weis ’ s appear-
ance had become progressively more fatigued and strained until
he developed what appeared to be permanent dark rings under his
eyes and a perpetual stoop. King remembered how he had pitied the
man and wondered how Weis could fi nd the job worth the obvious per-
sonal toll it was taking on him.
History of the School
The First Year
The school ’ s troubles began to manifest themselves in its fi rst year.
Rumors of confl icts between the housemasters and the six subject -
area department heads spread throughout the system by the middle of
the year. The confl icts stemmed from differences in interpretations of
curriculum policy on required learning and course content. In response,
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Reframing Organizations414
Weis had instituted a “ free market ” policy: subject - area department
heads were supposed to convince housemasters why they should offer
certain courses, and housemasters were supposed to convince depart-
ment heads which teachers they wanted assigned to their houses. Many
felt that this policy exacerbated the confl icts.
To add to the tension, a teacher was assaulted in her classroom in
February. The beating frightened many of the staff, particularly older
teachers. A week later, eight teachers asked Weis to hire security guards.
This request precipitated a debate in the faculty about the desirability of
guards in the school. One group felt that the guards would instill a sense
of safety and promote a better learning climate. The other faction felt
that the presence of guards in the school would be repressive and would
destroy the sense of community and trust that was developing. Weis
refused the request for security guards because he believed they would
symbolize everything the school was trying to change. In April, a sec-
ond teacher was robbed and beaten in her classroom after school hours,
and the debate was rekindled. This time, a group of Latino parents
threatened to boycott the school unless better security measures were
implemented. Again, Weis refused the request for security guards.
The Second Year
The school ’ s second year was even more troubled than the fi rst.
Financial cutbacks ordered during the summer prevented Weis from
replacing eight teachers who resigned. Since it was no longer possible
for each house to staff all of its courses with its own faculty, Weis insti-
tuted a “ fl exible staffi ng ” policy. Some teachers were asked to teach a
course outside their assigned house, and students in the eleventh and
twelfth grades were able to take elective and required courses in other
houses. Chauncey Carver, one of the housemasters, publicly attacked
the new policy as a step toward destroying the house system. In a letter
to the Great Ridge Times, he accused the board of education of try-
ing to subvert the house concept by cutting back funds.
The debate over the fl exible staffi ng policy was heightened
when two of the other housemasters joined a group of faculty and
department heads in opposing Carver ’ s criticisms. This group argued
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Bringing It All Together 415
that interhouse cross - registration should be encouraged because the
fi fteen to eighteen teachers in each house could never offer the variety
of courses that the schoolwide faculty of sixty - fi ve to seventy could.
Further expansion of the fl exible staffi ng policy was halted, however,
because of diffi culties in scheduling fall classes. Errors cropped up in the
master schedule developed during the preceding summer. Scheduling
problems persisted until November, when the vice principal responsi-
ble for developing the schedule resigned. Burtram Perkins, a Kennedy
housemaster who had formerly planned the schedule at Central High,
assumed the function on top of his duties as housemaster. Scheduling
took most of Perkins ’ s time until February.
Security again became an issue when three sophomores were
assaulted because they refused to give up their lunch money during a
shakedown. The assailants were believed to be outsiders. Several teach-
ers approached Weis and asked him to request the board of education
to provide security guards. Again, Weis declined, but he asked Bill Smith,
a vice principal at the school, to secure all doors except for the entrances
to each of the four houses, the main entrance to the school, and the
cafeteria. This move seemed to reduce the number of outsiders roaming
through the school.
In May of the second year, a fi ght in the cafeteria spread and resulted
in considerable damage, including broken classroom windows and desks.
The disturbance was severe enough for Weis to close the school. A num-
ber of teachers and students reported that outsiders were involved in
the fi ght and in damaging the classrooms. Several students were taken
to the hospital for minor injuries, but all were released. A similar distur-
bance occurred two weeks later, and again the school was closed. The
board of education ordered a temporary detail of municipal police to
the school against Weis ’ s advice. In protest to the assignment of police,
thirty of Kennedy ’ s sixty - eight teachers staged a walkout, joined by over
half the student body. The police detail was removed, and an agreement
was worked out by an ad hoc subcommittee composed of board mem-
bers and informal representatives of teachers who were for and against
a police detail. The compromise called for the temporary stationing of a
police cruiser near the school.
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Reframing Organizations416
King ’ s First Week at Kennedy High
King arrived at Kennedy High on Monday, July 15, and spent most of his
fi rst week individually interviewing key administrators (see box):
A D M I N I S T R A T I V E O R G A N I Z A T I O N O F
R O B E R T F . K E N N E D Y H I G H S C H O O L
Principal: David King, 42 (black)
B.Ed., M.Ed., Great Ridge State Teachers College
Vice principal: William Smith, 44 (black)
B.Ed., Breakwater State College;
M.Ed., Great Ridge State Teachers College
Vice principal: Vacant
Housemaster, A House: Burtram Perkins, 47 (black)
B.S., M.Ed., University of Illinois
Housemaster, B House: Frank Czepak, 36 (white)
B.S., University of Illinois;
M.Ed., Great Ridge State Teachers College
Housemaster, C House: Chauncey Carver, 32 (black)
A.B., Wesleyan University;
B.F.A., Pratt Institute; M.A.T., Yale University
Housemaster, D House: John Bonavota, 26 (white)
B.Ed., Great Ridge State Teachers College;
M.Ed., Ohio State University
Assistant to the principal: Vacant
Assistant to the principal for community affairs: Vacant
On Friday, he held a meeting with all administrators and depart-
ment heads. King ’ s purpose in these meetings was to familiarize him-
self with the school, its problems, and its key people. His fi rst interview was with Bill Smith, a vice principal. Smith was black and had worked as
a counselor and then vice principal of a middle school before coming to
Kennedy. King knew Smith ’ s reputation as a tough disciplinarian who
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Bringing It All Together 417
was very much disliked by many of the younger faculty and students.
King had also heard from several teachers whose judgment he
respected that Smith had been instrumental in keeping the school from
“ blowing apart ” the preceding year. It became clear early in the inter-
view that Smith felt that more stringent steps were needed to keep
outsiders from wandering into the buildings. Smith urged King to con-
sider locking all the school ’ s thirty doors except for the front entrance
so that everyone would enter and leave through one set of doors.
Smith also told him that many of the teachers and pupils were scared
and that “ no learning will ever begin to take place until we make it
so people don ’ t have to be afraid anymore. ” At the end of the inter-
view, Smith said he had been approached by a nearby school system to
become its director of counseling but that he had not yet made up his
mind. He said he was committed enough to Kennedy High that he did
not want to leave, but his decision depended on how hopeful he felt
about the school ’ s future.
As King talked with others, he discovered that the “ door question ”
was highly controversial within the faculty and that feelings ran high on
both sides of the issue. Two housemasters in particular, Chauncey Carver,
who was black, and Frank Czepak, who was white, were strongly against
closing the house entrances. The two men felt such an action would sym-
bolically reduce house “ autonomy ” and the feeling of distinctness that
was a central aspect of the house concept.
Carver, master of House C, was particularly vehement on this issue
and on his opposition to allowing students in one house to take classes
in another house. Carver contended that the fl exible staffi ng program
had nearly destroyed the house concept. He threatened to resign if King
intended to expand cross - house enrollment. Carver also complained
about what he described as “ interference ” from department heads that
undermined his teachers ’ autonomy.
Carver appeared to be an outstanding housemaster from everything
King had heard about him — even from his many enemies. Carver had
an abrasive personality but seemed to have the best - operating house
in the school and was well liked by most of his teachers and pupils. His
program appeared to be the most innovative, but it was also the one
most frequently attacked by department heads for lacking substance
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Reframing Organizations418
and ignoring requirements in the system ’ s curriculum guide. Even with
these criticisms, King imagined how much easier it would be if he had
four housemasters like Chauncey Carver.
During his interviews with the other three housemasters, King dis-
covered that they all felt infringed upon by the department heads, but
only Carver and Czepak were strongly against locking the doors. The
other two housemasters actively favored cross - house course enroll-
ments. King ’ s fourth interview was with Burtram Perkins, also a house-
master. Perkins, mentioned earlier, was a black man in his late forties
who had served as assistant to the principal of Central High before
coming to Kennedy. Perkins spent most of the interview discussing how
schedule pressures could be relieved. Perkins was currently developing
the schedule for the coming school year until a vice principal could be
appointed to perform that job (Kennedy High had allocations for two
vice principals and two assistants in addition to the housemasters).
Two bits of information concerning Perkins came to King during his
fi rst week at the school. The fi rst was that several teachers were cir-
culating a letter requesting Perkins ’ s removal as a housemaster. They
felt that he could not control the house or direct the faculty. This sur-
prised King because he had heard that Perkins was widely respected
within the faculty and had earned a reputation for supporting high
academic standards and for working tirelessly with new teachers. As
King inquired further, he discovered that Perkins was genuinely liked
but was also widely acknowledged as a poor housemaster. The second
piece of information concerned how Perkins ’ s house compared with the
others. Although students had been randomly assigned to each house,
Perkins ’ s house had the highest absence rate and the greatest number
of disciplinary problems. Smith had told him that Perkins ’ s dropout rate
the preceding year was three times that of the next highest house.
While King was in the process of interviewing his staff, he was called
on by David Crimmins, chairman of the history department. Crimmins
was a native of Great Ridge, white, and in his late forties. Though
scheduled for an appointment the following week, he had asked King
if he could see him immediately. Crimmins had heard about the letter
asking for Perkins ’ s removal and wanted to present the other side. He
became very emotional, saying that Perkins was viewed by many of the
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Bringing It All Together 419
teachers and department chairmen as the only housemaster trying to
maintain high academic standards; his transfer would be seen as a blow
to those concerned with quality education. Crimmins also described in
detail Perkins ’ s devotion and commitment to the school. He emphasized
that Perkins was the only administrator with the ability to straighten
out the schedule, which he had done in addition to all his other duties.
As Crimmins departed, he threatened that if Perkins was transferred, he
would write a letter to the regional accreditation council decrying the
level to which standards had sunk at Kennedy. King assured Crimmins
that such a drastic measure was unnecessary and offered assurance that
a cooperative resolution would be found. King knew that Kennedy
High faced an accreditation review the following April and did not wish
to complicate the process unnecessarily.
Within twenty minutes of Crimmins ’ s departure, King was visited by
Tim Shea, a young white teacher. He said he had heard that Crimmins
had come in to see King. Shea identifi ed himself as one of the teachers
who had organized the movement to get rid of Perkins. He said that he
liked and admired Perkins because of the man ’ s devotion to the school
but that Perkins ’ s house was so disorganized and that discipline there
was so bad that it was nearly impossible to do any good teaching. Shea
added, “ It ’ s a shame to lock the school up when stronger leadership is
all that ’ s needed. ”
King ’ s impressions of his administrators generally matched what he
had heard before arriving at the school. Carver seemed to be a very
bright, innovative, and charismatic leader whose mere presence gen-
erated excitement. Czepak came across as a highly competent though
not very imaginative administrator who had earned the respect of his
faculty and students. Bonavota, at twenty - six, seemed smart and ear-
nest but unseasoned and unsure of himself. King felt that with a little
guidance and training, Bonavota might have the greatest promise of
all; at the moment, however, the young housemaster seemed confused
and somewhat overwhelmed. Perkins impressed King as a sincere and
devoted person with a good mind for administrative details but an inca-
pacity for leadership.
King knew that he had the opportunity to make several administra-
tive appointments because of the three vacancies that existed. Indeed,
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Reframing Organizations420
should Smith resign as vice principal, King could fi ll both vice principal
positions. He also knew that his recommendations for these positions
would carry a great deal of weight with the central offi ce. The only
constraint King felt was the need to achieve some kind of racial balance
among the Kennedy administrative group. With his own appointment as
principal, black administrators outnumbered white administrators two
to one, and Kennedy did not have a single Latino administrator, even
though a third of its pupils were Hispanic.
The Friday Afternoon Meeting
In contrast to the individual interviews, King was surprised to fi nd how
quiet and confl ict - free these same people seemed in the staff meeting
he called on Friday. He was amazed at how slow, polite, and friendly the
conversation was among people who had so vehemently expressed neg-
ative opinions of each other in private. After about forty - fi ve minutes of
discussion about the upcoming accreditation review, King broached the
subject of housemaster – department head relations. There was silence
until Czepak made a joke about the uselessness of discussing the topic.
King probed further by asking if everyone was happy with the current
practices. Crimmins suggested that the topic might be better discussed
in a smaller group. Everyone seemed to agree — except for Betsy Dula, a
white woman in her late twenties who chaired the English department.
She said that one of the problems with the school was that no one was
willing to tackle tough issues until they exploded. She added that rela-
tions between housemasters and department heads were terrible, and
that made her job very diffi cult. She then attacked Chauncey Carver for
impeding her evaluation of a nontenured teacher in Carver ’ s house. The
two argued for several minutes about the teacher and the quality of
an experimental sophomore English course the teacher was offering.
Finally, Carver, by now quite angry, coldly warned Dula that he would
“ break her neck ” if she stepped into his house again. King intervened in
an attempt to cool both their tempers, and the meeting ended shortly
thereafter.
The following morning, Dula called King at home and told him that
unless Carver publicly apologized for his threat, she would fi le a griev-
ance with the teachers ’ union and take it to court if necessary. King
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Bringing It All Together 421
assured Dula that he would talk with Carver on Monday. King then
called Eleanor Debbs, a Kennedy High math teacher he had known well
for many years, whose judgment he respected. Debbs was a close friend
of both Carver and Dula and was also vice president of the city ’ s teach-
ers ’ union. Debbs said that the two were longtime adversaries but both
were excellent professionals.
She also reported that Dula would be a formidable opponent and
could muster considerable support among the faculty. Debbs, who was
black, feared that a confrontation between Dula and Carver might
stoke racial tensions in the school, even though both Dula and Carver
were generally popular with students of all races. Debbs strongly urged
King not to let the matter drop. She also told him that she had over-
heard Bill Smith, the vice principal, say at a party the night before that
he felt King didn ’ t have the stomach or the forcefulness to survive at
Kennedy. Smith said that the only reason he was staying was that he
did not expect King to last the year, in which case Smith would be in a
good position to be appointed principal.
David King inherited a job that had broken his predecessor and could
easily destroy him as well. His new staff greeted him with a jumble of prob-
lems, demands, maneuvers, and threats. His fi rst staff meeting began with an
undercurrent of tension and ended in outright hostility. Sooner or later, almost
every manager will encounter situations this bad — or worse. The results are
often devastating, leaving the manager feeling confused, overwhelmed, and help-
less. Nothing makes any sense, and nothing seems to work. No good options are
apparent. Can King escape such a dismal fate?
There is one potential bright spot. As the case ends, King is talking to Eleanor
Debbs on a Saturday morning. She is a supportive colleague. He also has some
slack — the rest of the weekend — to regroup. Where should he begin? We suggest
that he might start by actively refl ecting and reframing. A straightforward way to
do that is to examine the situation one frame at a time asking two simple ques-
tions: From this perspective, what ’ s going on? And what options does this angle
suggest? This refl ective process deserves ample time and careful thought. It requires
“ going to the balcony ” (see Heifetz, 1994) to get a panoramic view of the scene
below. Ideally, King would include one or more other people — a valued mentor,
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Reframing Organizations422
principals in other schools, close friends, his spouse — for alternative perceptions in
pinpointing the problem and developing a course of action. We present a stream-
lined version of the kind of thinking that David King might entertain.
STRUCTURAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS King sits down at his kitchen table with a cup of coffee, a pen, and a fresh
yellow pad. He starts to review structural issues at Kennedy High. He recalls the
“ people - blaming ” approach (Chapter Two ), in which individuals are blamed for
everything that goes wrong. He smiles and nods his head. That ’ s it! Everyone at
Kennedy High School is blaming everyone else. He recalls the lesson of the struc-
tural frame: we blame individuals when the real problems are systemic.
So what structural problems does Kennedy High have? King thinks about
the two cornerstones of structure, differentiation and integration. In a fl ash of
insight, he sees that Kennedy High School has an ample division of labor but
weak overall coordination. He scribbles on his pad, trying to sketch the school ’ s
organization chart. He gradually realizes that the school has a matrix structure —
teachers have an ill - defi ned dual reporting relationship to both department
chairs and housemasters. He remembers the downside of the matrix structure:
it ’ s built for confl ict (teachers wonder which authority they ’ re supposed to
answer to, and administrators bicker about who ’ s in charge). The school has no
integrating devices to link the approaches of housemasters like Chauncey Carver
(who wants a coherent, effective program for his house) with those of depart-
ment chairs like Betsy Dula (who is concerned about the schoolwide English
curriculum and adherence to district guidelines). It ’ s not just personalities; the
structure is pushing Carver and Dula toward each other ’ s throats. Goals, roles,
and responsibilities are all vaguely defi ned. Nor is there a workable structural
protocol (say, a task force or a standing committee) to diagnose and resolve such
problems. If King had been in the job longer, he might have been able to rely
more heavily on the authority of the principal ’ s offi ce. It helps that he ’ s been
authorized by the superintendent to fi x the school. But so far, he ’ s seen little evi-
dence that the Kennedy High staff is endorsing his say - so with much enthusiasm.
King ’ s musings are making sense, but it isn ’ t clear what to do about the struc-
tural gaps. Is there any way to get the school back under control based on reason
when it is teetering on the edge of irrational chaos? It doesn ’ t help that his
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Bringing It All Together 423
authority is shaky. He is having trouble controlling the staff, and they are having
the same problem with the students. The school is an underbounded system
screaming for structure and boundaries.
King notes, ruefully, that he made things worse in the Friday meeting. “ I knew
how these people felt about one another, ” he thinks. “ Why did I push them to
talk about something they were trying to avoid? We hadn ’ t done any homework.
I didn ’ t give them a clear purpose for the conversation. I didn ’ t set any ground
rules for how to talk about the issue. When it started to heat up, I just watched.
Why didn ’ t I step in before it exploded? ” He stops and shakes his head. “ Live
and learn, I guess. But I learned these lessons a long time ago — they served me
well in turning the middle school around. In all the confusion, I forgot that even
good people can ’ t function very well without some structure. What did I do the
last time around? ”
King begins to brainstorm options. One possibility is responsibility charting
(Chapter Five ): bring people together to defi ne tasks and responsibilities. It
has worked before. Would it work here? He reviews the language of responsi-
bility charting. The acronym CAIRO helps him remember. Who ’ s responsible?
Who has to approve? Who needs to be consulted? Who should be informed? Who
doesn ’ t need to be in the loop? As he applies these questions to Kennedy High,
the overlap between the housemasters and the department chairs is an obvious
problem. Without a clear defi nition of roles and relationships, confl ict and con-
fusion are inevitable. He wonders about a total overhaul of the structure: “ Is the
house system viable in its current form? If not, is it fi xable? Maybe we need a
process to look at the structure: What if I chaired a small task force to examine
it and develop recommendations? I could put Dula and Carver on it — let them
see fi rsthand what ’ s causing their confl ict. Get them involved in working out a
new design. Give each authority over specifi c areas. Develop some policies and
procedures. ”
It is clear even from a few minutes ’ refl ection that Kennedy High School has
major structural problems that have to be addressed. But what to do about the
immediate crisis between Dula and Carver? The structure helped create the prob-
lem in the fi rst place, and fi xing it might prevent stuff like this in the future. But
Dula ’ s demand for an immediate apology didn ’ t sound like something a rational
approach would easily fi x. King is ready to try another angle. He turns to the
human resource frame for counsel.
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Reframing Organizations424
HUMAN RESOURCE ISSUES AND OPTIONS “ How ironic, ” King muses. “ The original idea behind the school was to respond
better to students. Break down the big, bureaucratic high school. Make the house
a community, a family even, where people know and care about each other. But
it ’ s drifted off course. Everyone ’ s marooned on the bottom of Maslow ’ s needs
hierarchy: no one even feels safe. Until they do, they ’ ll never focus on caring. The
problem isn ’ t personalities. Everyone ’ s frustrated because no one is getting needs
met. Not me, not Carver, not Dula. We ’ re all so needy, we don ’ t realize everyone
else is in the same boat. ”
King shifts his thoughts from individual needs to interpersonal relation-
ships. It ’ s hard not to turn that way, with the Dula - Carver mess staring him in
the face. Tense relationships everywhere. People talking only to people who agree
with them. Why? How to get a handle on it? He remembers reading, “ Lurking
in Model I is the core assumption that an organization is a dangerous place
where you have to look out for yourself or someone else will do you in ” (Chapter
Eight ). “ That ’ s it! ” he says. “ That ’ s us. Too bad they don ’ t give a prize for the
most Model I school in America. We ’ d win hands down. Everything here is win -
lose. Nothing is discussed openly, and if it is, people just attack each other. If
anything goes wrong, we blame others and try to straighten them out. They get
defensive, which proves we were right. But we never test our assumptions. We
don ’ t ask questions. We just harbor suspicions and wait for people to prove us
right. Then we hit them over the head. We ’ ve got to fi nd better ways to deal with
one another.
“ How do you get better people management? ” King wonders. “ Successful
organizations start with a clear human resource philosophy. We don ’ t have one,
but it might help. Invest in people? We ’ ve got good people. They ’ re paid pretty
well. They ’ ve got job security. We ’ re probably OK there. Job enrichment? Jobs
here are plenty challenging. Empowerment? That ’ s a big problem. Everyone
claims to be powerless, yet somehow everyone expects me to fi x everything. Is
there something we could do to get people ’ s participation? Get them to own
more of the problem? Convince them we ’ ve got to work together to make things
better? The trouble is, if we go that way, people probably don ’ t have the group
skills they ’ d need. Staff development? With all the confl ict, mediation skills
might be a place to start. ” Confl ict. Politics. Politics is normal in an organiza-
tion. He ’ s read it, and he knows it ’ s true. “ But we don ’ t seem to have a midpoint
between getting along and getting even. ”
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Bringing It All Together 425
POLITICAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS King reluctantly shifts to a political lens. It isn ’ t easy for him. He knows it ’ s
relevant; but he doesn ’ t like to play the political game. Still, he ’ s never seen a
school with more intense political strife. His old school is beginning to seem
tame by comparison; he tackled some things head - on there. Kennedy is a lot
more volatile, with a history of explosions. Coercive force seems to be the power
tactic of choice. But that ’ s not an option he ’ s comfortable with.
Things might get even more vicious if he tackles the confl ict openly. He
mulls over the basic elements of the political frame: enduring differences, scarce
resources, confl ict, and power. “ Bingo! We ’ ve got ’ em all — in spades. We ’ ve got
factions for and against the house concept. Housemasters want to run their
houses and guard their turf. Department chairs want to run the faculty and
expand their territory. One group wants to close the doors and bring in guards
to keep outsiders away. Another wants to keep out the guards and throw open
the doors. We ’ ve got race issues simmering under the surface. No Latino admin-
istrators. This Carver - Dula thing could blow up the school. Black male says he ’ ll
break white female ’ s neck. A recipe for disaster. We need some damage control.
“ Then we ’ ve got all those outside folks looking over our shoulder. Parents
worry about safety. The school board doesn ’ t trust us. All they care about is test
scores. The media are looking for a story. Accreditation is coming in the spring.
Maybe there ’ s some way to get people thinking about the enemies outside instead
of inside. A common devil might pull people together — for a little while anyway.
“ Scarce resources? They ’ re getting scarcer. We lost 10 percent of our teachers —
that got us into the fl exible staffi ng mess. Housemasters and department chairs
are fi ghting over turf. Bill Smith wants my job. It ’ s a war zone. We need some
kind of peace settlement. But who ’ s going to take the diplomatic lead? We don ’ t
seem to have any neutral parties. Eleanor Debbs would respond to the call.
People respect her. But she ’ s not an administrator. ”
King ’ s attention turns to the two faces of power. “ Power can be used to do
people in. That ’ s what we ’ re doing right now. But you can also use power to get
things done. That ’ s the constructive side of politics. Too bad no one here seems
to have a clue about it. If I ’ m going to be a constructive politician, what can I do?
First, I need an agenda. Without that, I ’ m dead in the water. Basically, I want
everyone working in tandem to make the school better for kids. Most people
could rally behind that. I also need a strategy. Networking — I need good rela-
tionships with key folks like Smith, Carver, and Dula. The interviews were a good
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Reframing Organizations426
place to start. I learned a lot about who wants what. The Friday meeting was a
mistake, a collision of special interests with no common ground. It ’ s going to
take some horse trading. We need a deal the housemasters and the department
chairs can both buy into. And I need some allies — badly. ”
He smiles as he remembers all the times he ’ s railed against analysis paraly-
sis. But he feels he ’ s getting somewhere. He turns to a clean sheet on his pad.
“ Let ’ s lay this thing out, ” he says to the quiet, empty kitchen. Across the top he
labels three columns: allies, fence - sitters, and opponents. At the top left, he writes
“ High power. ” At the bottom left, “ Low power. ” Over the next half - hour, he cre-
ates a political map of Kennedy High School, arranging individuals and groups
in terms of their interests and their power. When he fi nishes, he winces. Too
many powerful opponents. Too few supportive allies. A bunch of people waiting
to choose sides. He begins to think about how to build a coalition and reshape
the school ’ s political map.
“ No doubt about it, ” King says, “ I have to get on top of the political mess.
Otherwise they ’ ll carry me out the same way they did Weis. But it ’ s a little
depressing. Where ’ s the ray of hope? ” He smiles. He ’ s ready to think about sym-
bols and culture. “ Where ’ s Dr. King when I need him? ” He recalls the famous
words from 1963: “ For even though we face the diffi culties of today and tomor-
row, I still have a dream. ” What happened to Kennedy High ’ s dream?
He decides to take a break, get some fresh air. He takes stock of his surround-
ings. Moonlit night. Crowded sidewalks. Young and old, poor and affl uent, black,
white, and Latino. Merchandise pours out of stores into sidewalk bins: clothes,
toys, electronic gear, fruit, vegetables — you name it. It makes him feel better.
King runs into some students from his old school. They ’ re at Kennedy now.
“ We ’ re tellin ’ our friends we got a good principal now, ” they say. He thanks them,
hoping they ’ re right.
SYMBOLIC ISSUES AND OPTIONS Back to the kitchen and the yellow pad. Buoyed by the walk and another cup
of coffee, he reviews the school ’ s history. “ Interesting, ” he observes. “ That ’ s
one of the problems: the school ’ s too new to have many roots or traditions. What
we have is mostly bad. We ’ ve got a hodgepodge of individual histories people
brought from someplace else. Deep down, everyone is telling a different story.
Maybe that ’ s why Carver is so attached to his house and Dula to her English
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Bringing It All Together 427
department. There ’ s nothing schoolwide for people to bond to. Just little pockets
of meaning. ”
He starts to think about symbols that might create common ground. Robert
Kennedy, the school ’ s namesake. He has only vague recollection of Bobby Kennedy ’ s
speeches. Anything there? He remembers the man. What was he like? What did
he stand for? What were the founders thinking when they chose his name for
the school? What signals were they trying to send? Any unifying theme? Then
it comes to him — words from Bobby Kennedy ’ s eulogy for his brother: “ Some
people see things as they are, and say why? I dream things that never were, and
say why not? ”
“ That ’ s the kind of thinking we need here, ” King realizes. “ We need to
get above all the factions and divisions. We need a banner or icon that we all
can rally around. Celebrate Kennedy ’ s legacy now? Can we have a ceremony
in the midst of warring chaos? It could backfi re, make things worse. But it seems
the school never had any special occasions — even at the start. No rituals, no tra-
ditions. The only stories are downbeat ones. The high road might work. We ’ ve
got to get back to the values that launched the school in the fi rst place. Rekindle
the spark. What if I pull some people together? Start from scratch — this time
paying more attention to symbols and ceremony? We need some glue to weld
this thing together. ”
Meaning. Faith. He rolls the words around in his mind. Haunting images.
Ideas start to tumble out. “ We ’ re supposed to be pioneers, but somehow we got
lost. A lighthouse where the bulb burned out. Not a beacon anymore. We ’ re
on the rocks ourselves. A dream became a nightmare. People ’ s faith is pretty
shaky. There ’ s a schism — folks splitting into two different faiths. Like a holy war
between the church of the one true house system and the temple of academic
excellence. We need something to pull both sides together. Why did people join
up in the fi rst place? How can we get them to sign up again — renew their vows? ”
He smiles at the religious overtones in his thoughts. His mother and father
would be proud.
He catches himself. “ We ’ re not a church; we ’ re a school, in a country that
separates religion and state. But maybe the symbolic concept bridges the gap.
Organization as temple. A lot of it is about meaning. What ’ s Kennedy High
School really about? Who are we? What happened to our spirit? What ’ s our
soul, our values? That ’ s what folks are fi ghting over! Deep down, we ’ re split over
two versions of what we stand for. Department chairs promoting excellence.
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Reframing Organizations428
Housemasters pushing for caring. We need both. That was the original dream.
Bring excellence and caring together. We ’ ll never get either if we ’ re always at war
with one another. ”
He thinks about why he got into public education in the fi rst place. It was
his calling. Why? Growing up in a racist society was tough, but his father had it
a lot tougher — he was a principal when it was something black men didn ’ t do.
King had always admired his dad ’ s courage and discipline. More than anything,
he remembered his father ’ s passion about education. The man was a real cham-
pion for kids — high standards, deep compassion. Growing up with this man as
a role model, there was never much question in King ’ s mind. As far back as he
could remember, he ’ d wanted to be a principal too. It was a way to give to the
community and to help young people who really needed it. To give everyone a
chance. In the midst of a fi refi ght, it was easy to forget his mission. It felt good to
remember.
A FOUR - FRAME APPROACH Before going further, King senses that it is a good time for a review. Over yet
another cup of coffee, he goes back over his notes. They strike him as stream of
consciousness, with some good stuff and a little whining and self - pity. He smiles
as he remembers himself in graduate school, fi ghting against all that theory.
“ Don ’ t think; do! Be a leader! ” Now, here he is, thinking, refl ecting, struggling to
pull things together. In a strange way, it feels natural.
He organizes his ideas into a chart (see Exhibit 20.1 ). He ’ s starting to feel bet-
ter now. The picture is coming into focus. He feels he has a better sense of what
he ’ s up against. It ’ s reassuring to see he has options. There are plenty of pitfalls,
but some real possibilities. He knows he can ’ t do everything at once; he needs
to set priorities. He needs a plan of action, an agenda anchored in basic values.
Where to begin? Soul? Values? He has to fi nd a rallying point somewhere.
He has already embraced two values: excellence and caring. He turns his
attention to leadership as gift giving. “ I ’ ve mostly been waiting for others to ini-
tiate. What about me? What are my gifts? If I want excellence, the gift I have to
offer is authorship. That ’ s what people want. They don ’ t want to be told what
to do. They want to put their signature on this place. Make a contribution.
They ’ re fi ghting so hard because they care so much. That ’ s what brought them to
Kennedy in the fi rst place. They wanted to be a part of something better. Create
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Exhibit 20.1. Reframing Robert F. Kennedy High School.
FRAME WHAT’S GOING ON? WHAT OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE?
Structural Weak integration—goals, roles, responsibilities, linkages unclear
Responsibility charting
Ill-defi ned matrix structure
Underbounded
Task force on structure
Human resource Basic needs not met (safety, and so on)
Improve safety, security
Poor confl ict management Training in communication, confl ict management
People feel disempowered Participation
Teaming
Political House-department confl ict Create arenas for negotiation
Doors and guards issue Damage control
Carver-Dula and racial tension
Unite against outside threats
Outside constituents— parents, board, media, and so on
Build coalitions, negotiate
Symbolic No shared symbols (history, ceremony, ritual)
Hoist a banner (common symbol: RFK?)
Loss of faith, religious schism
Develop symbols (meld excellence and caring?)
Lack of identity (What is RKF’s soul?)
Ceremony, stories
Leadership gifts
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Reframing Organizations430
something special. They all want to do a good job. How can I help them do it
without tripping over or maiming each other?
“ What about caring? The leadership gift is love. No one ’ s getting much of that
around here. ” (He smiles as a song fragment comes to mind: “ Looking for love
in all the wrong places. ” ) “ I ’ ve been waiting for someone else to show caring and
compassion, ” he realizes. “ I ’ ve been holding back. ”
The thought leads him to pick up the phone. He calls Betsy Dula. She is out,
but he leaves a message on the machine: “ Betsy, Dave King. I ’ ve been thinking a
lot about our conversation. One thing I want you to know is that I ’ m glad you ’ re
part of the Kennedy High team. You bring a lot, and I sure hope I can count on
your help. We can ’ t do it without you. We need to fi nish what we started out to
do. I care. I know you do, too. I ’ ll see you Monday. ”
He senses he ’ s on a roll. But it ’ s one thing to leave a message on someone ’ s
machine and another to deliver it in person — particularly if you don ’ t know how
receptive the other person will be. She may think I ’ m just shining on, faking it.
On his next call, to Chauncey Carver, King takes a deep breath. He gets
through immediately. “ Chauncey? Dave King. Sorry to bother you at home, but
Betsy Dula called me this morning. She ’ s upset about what you said yesterday.
Particularly the part about breaking her neck. ”
King listens patiently as Carver makes it clear that he was only defending
himself against Dula ’ s unprovoked and inappropriate public attack. “ Chauncey,
I hear you . . . . Yeah, I know you ’ re mad. So is she. ” King listens patiently through
another one - sided tirade. “ Yes, Chauncey, I understand. But look, you ’ re a key to
making this school work. I know how much you care about your house and the
school. The word on the street is clear — you ’ re a terrifi c housemaster. You know
it, too. I need your help, man. If this thing with Betsy blows up and goes public,
what ’ s it going to do to the school? . . . You ’ re right, we don ’ t need it. Think about
it. Betsy ’ s pushing hard for an apology. ”
He feared that the word apology might set Carver off again, and it does. This
is getting tough. He reminds himself why he made the call. He shifts back into
listening mode. After several minutes of venting, Chauncey pauses. Softly, King
tries to make his point. “ Chauncey, I ’ m not telling you what to do. I ’ m just asking
you to think about it. I don ’ t know the answer. Two heads might be better than
one. Let me know what you come up with. Can we meet fi rst thing Monday? . . .
Thanks for your time. Have a good weekend. ”
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Bringing It All Together 431
King puts down the phone. Things are still tense, but he hopes he ’ s made
a start. Carver is a loose cannon with a short fuse. But he ’ s also smart, and he
cares about the school. Get him thinking, King fi gures, and he ’ ll see the risks in
his comment to Dula. Push him too hard, and he ’ ll fi ght like a cornered badger.
With some space; he might just fi gure out something on his own. The gift of
authorship. Would Chauncey bite? Or would the problem wind up back on the
principal ’ s doorstep — with prejudice?
After the conversation with Chauncey, King needs another breather. He goes
back to his yellow pad, which has become something of a security blanket. More
than that, it ’ s helping him fi nd his way to the balcony. It has given him a better
view of the situation. He ’ s made notes about excellence and caring. Is he making
progress or just musing? It doesn ’ t matter. He feels better; the situation seems to
be getting clearer and his options more promising.
King ’ s thoughts move on to justice. “ Do people feel the school is fair? ” he asks.
“ I ’ m not hearing a lot of complaints about injustice. But it wouldn ’ t take much
to set off another war. The Chauncey - Betsy thing is scary. A man physically
threatening a woman could send a terrible message. There ’ s too much male vio-
lence in the community already. Make it a black man and a white woman, and it
gets worse. The fact that Chauncey and I are black men is good and bad: it makes
for a better chance of getting Chauncey ’ s help — brothers united and all that. But
it could be devastating if people think I ’ m siding with Chauncey against Betsy —
sisters in defi ance. It ’ s like being on a tightrope: one false step and I ’ m history.
And the school too. All the more reason to encourage Chauncey and Betsy to
work this out. If I could get the two together, what a symbol of unity that would
be! Maybe just what we need. A positive step at least. ”
Finally, King thinks about the ethic of faith and the gift of signifi cance.
Symbols again, revisited in a deeper way. “ How did Kennedy High go from high
hopes to no hope in two years? How do we rekindle the original faith? How do
we recapture the dream that launched the school? Well, ” he sighs, “ I ’ ve been
around this track before. My last school was a snake pit when I got there. Not as
bad as Kennedy, but still pretty awful. We turned that one around, and I learned
some things in the process — including being patient, while hanging tough. It ’ s
gonna be hard. But maybe fun, too. And it will happen. That ’ s why I took this job
in the fi rst place. So what am I moaning about? I knew what I was getting into.
It ’ s just that knowing it in my head is one thing. Feeling it in my gut is another. ”
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Reframing Organizations432
By Sunday night, King has twenty - fi ve pages of notes. They help — but not as
much as his conversation with himself in an empty kitchen. Going to the gallery,
getting a fresh look, refl ecting instead of just fretting. The inner dialogue has led
to new conversations with others, on a deeper level. He ’ s made a lot of phone
calls, talked to almost every administrator in the building. A lot of them have
been surprised — a principal who calls on the weekend is unusual.
He is making headway. He needs to hear from Betsy but has some volunteers
for a task force on structural issues. He ’ s done some relationship building.
A second call to Chauncey to commend him for devotion to the mission. A
deeper connection. Crediting Frank Czepak for excellent counsel, even if the
principal isn ’ t smart enough to pay attention — a frank admission.
Some has been pure politics. Negotiating a deal with Bill Smith: “ I could help
you, Bill, next time the district needs a principal, but only if you help me. You
scratch my back, I ’ ll scratch yours. ” Gently persuading Burt Perkins that his call-
ing was scheduling, not running a house, and that moving to assistant principal
would be a step up. A call to Dave Crimmins to tell him Perkins has decided
to make a change. An encouraging conversation with Luz Hernandez, a stalwart
in his previous school. She is at least willing to think about coming to Kennedy
High as a housemaster. Planting seeds with everyone about ways to resolve the
door problem.
Above all, King has worked on creating symbolic glue, renewing the hopes
and dreams people felt at the time the school was founded. A cohesive group
pulling together for a common purpose, a school everyone can feel proud of. His
to - do list is ambitious. But at least he has one. A month and a half until the fi rst
day of school and a lot to accomplish. He isn ’ t sure what the future will bring,
but he feels a little more hope in the air. The knot in his stomach is mostly gone.
So are the images of being carried off like his predecessor, a broken man with a
shattered career.
The phone rings. It ’ s Betsy Dula. She ’ s been away for the weekend but wants
to thank King for his message. It was important to know he cared, she told him.
“ By the way, ” she says, “ Chauncey Carver called me. Said he felt bad about Friday.
Told me he ’ d lost his temper and said some things he didn ’ t really mean. He
invited me to breakfast tomorrow. ”
“ Are you going? ” King asks, as nonchalantly as possible. He holds his breath,
thinking, If she declines, we could be back to square one.
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Bringing It All Together 433
“ Yes, ” she says. “ Even a phone call is a big step for Chauncey. He ’ s a proud and
stubborn man. But we ’ re both professionals. It ’ s worth a try. ”
A sigh of relief. “ One more question, ” King says. “ When you came to the school,
you knew it wouldn ’ t be easy. Why did you sign up for this in the fi rst place? ”
She is silent for a long time. He can almost hear her thinking. “ I love English
and I love kids, ” she says. “ And I want kids to love English. ”
“ And now? ” he asks.
“ Can ’ t we get past all the bickering and fi ghting? That ’ s not why we launched
this noble experiment. Let ’ s get back to why we ’ re here. Work together to make
this a good school for our kids. They really need us. ”
“ How about a great school we can all be proud of? ” he asks.
“ Sounds even better, ” she says. Maybe she doesn ’ t grasp what he means. But
they are beginning to read from the same page. It will take time, but they can
work it out.
At the end of a very busy weekend, David King is still a long way from solv-
ing all the problems of Kennedy High. “ But, ” he tells himself, “ I made it through
the valley of confusion and I ’ m feeling more like my old self. The picture of what
I ’ m up against is a lot clearer. I ’ m seeing a lot more possibilities than I was see-
ing on Friday. In fact, I ’ ve got some exciting things to try. Some may work; some
may not. But deep down, I think I know what ’ s going on. And I know which way
is west. We ’ re now moving roughly in that direction. ”
He can ’ t wait for Monday morning.
CONCLUSION: THE REFRAMING PROCESS A different David King would probably raise other questions and see other
options. Reframing, like management and leadership, is more art than sci-
ence. Every artist brings a distinctive vision and produces unique works. King ’ s
reframing process necessarily builds on a lifetime of skill, knowledge, intuition,
and wisdom. Reframing guides him in accessing what he already knows. It helps
him feel less confused and overwhelmed by the doubt and disorder around him.
A cluttered jumble of impressions and experiences gradually evolves into a man-
ageable image. His refl ections help him see that he is far from helpless — he has
a rich array of actions to choose from. He has also rediscovered a very old truth:
refl ection is a spiritual discipline, much like meditation or prayer. A path to
c20.indd 433c20.indd 433 7/1/08 3:48:12 PM7/1/08 3:48:12 PM
Reframing Organizations434
faith and heart. He knows the road ahead is still long and diffi cult. There is no
guarantee of success. But he feels more confi dent and more energized than when
he started. He is starting to dream things that never were and say, “ Why not? ”
NOTE 1. The case in this chapter was adapted from case no. 9 - 474 - 183, Robert
F. Kennedy High School, © 1974 by the President and Fellows of Harvard
College. Used by permission of the Harvard Business School. The case was
prepared by John J. Gabarro as a basis for class discussion rather than to
illustrate the effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.
c20.indd 434c20.indd 434 7/1/08 3:48:12 PM7/1/08 3:48:12 PM
435
Epilogue Artistry, Choice, and Leadership
We hope Reframing Organizations continues to inspire inve n-tive management and wise leadership. Both managers and leaders require high levels of personal artistry if they are to respond
to today ’ s challenges, ambiguities, and paradoxes. They need a sense
of choice and personal freedom to fi nd new patterns and possibili-
ties in everyday life at work. They need versatility in thinking that
fosters fl exibility in action. They need capacity to act inconsistently
when uniformity fails, diplomatically when emotions are raw, non-
rationally when reason fl ags, politically in the face of vocal paro-
chial self - interests, and playfully when fi xating on task and purpose
backfi res.
Managers face a leadership paradox: maintaining integrity and mission with-
out making organizations rigid and intractable. Leading requires walking a
fi ne line between rigidity and spinelessness. Rigidity saps energy, stifl es initia-
tive, misdirects resources, and leads ultimately to catastrophe. This pattern can
be seen graphically in the decline of great corporations and in the escalation of
chronic ethnic violence and terrorism. In a world of “ permanent white water ”
(Vaill, 1989), nothing is fi xed and everything is in fl ux. It is tempting to track
familiar paths in a shifting terrain and to summon time - worn solutions, even
when problems have changed. Doing what ’ s familiar is comforting. It helps us
T W E N T Y- O N E
c h a p t e r
c21.indd 435c21.indd 435 6/30/08 2:14:57 PM6/30/08 2:14:57 PM
Reframing Organizations436
believe that our world is orderly and that we are in command. But when old ways
fail, managers often fl ip - fl op: they cave in and try to appease everyone. The result
is aimlessness and anarchy, which kill or maim concerted, purposeful action.
Collins and Porras (1994) made it extremely clear. “ Visionary ” companies have
the paradoxical capacity to stimulate change and pursue high - risk new ventures
while simultaneously maintaining their commitment to core ideology and values.
Good managers and leaders sustain a tension - fi lled poise between extremes.
They combine core values with elastic strategies. They get things done without
being done in. They know what they stand for and what they want and commu-
nicate their vision with clarity and power. But they also understand and respond
to the vortex of forces that propel organizations in confl icting trajectories. They
think creatively about how to make things happen. They develop strategies with
enough elasticity to respond to the twists and turns of the path to a better future.
There is a misguided notion that a leader ventures into uncharted terrain with
omniscient foresight and unlimited courage. Keller comes closer to the reality:
“ The greatest leaders are often, in reality, skillful followers. They do not control
the fl ow of history, but by having the good sense not to stand in its way, they
seem to. So it is with Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Mr. Gorbachev ’ s achievement was
having the vision to see the inevitable, and adopting it as his program rather than
applying the repressive apparatus at his command to suppress it ” (1990, p. 1).
Gorbachev ’ s extraordinary rise and rapid fall illustrate many of the daunting
challenges that all leaders confront. Leaders need confi dence to confront gnarly
problems and deep divisions. They must expect confl ict, knowing their actions
may unleash forces beyond their control. They need courage to follow uncharted
routes, expecting surprise and pushing ahead when the ultimate destination is
dimly foreseeable. Most important, they need to be in touch with their hearts as
well as their heads. It has been said that the heart has a mind of its own. Good
leaders listen.
COMMITMENT TO CORE BELIEFS Poetry and philosophy are rare topics in managerial training, and business
schools seldom ask if spiritual development is central to their mission. It is
no wonder that managers are often viewed as chameleons who can adapt to
anything, guided only by expediency. Analysis and agility are necessary, but not
enough. Organizations need leaders who can provide a durable sense of purpose
c21.indd 436c21.indd 436 6/30/08 2:14:58 PM6/30/08 2:14:58 PM
Epilogue 437
and direction, rooted deeply in values and the human spirit. “ We have a revo-
lution to make, and this revolution is not political, but spiritual ” (Gu é henno,
1993, p. 167).
Leaders need to be deeply refl ective and dramatically explicit about core val-
ues and beliefs. Many of the world ’ s legendary corporate heroes articulated their
philosophies and values so strikingly that they are still visible in today ’ s behavior
and operations. In government, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Charles de Gaulle,
Margaret Thatcher, and Lee Kuan Yew were controversial, but each espoused
enduring values and beliefs. These served as a guiding beacon for their respective
nations.
MULTIFRAME THINKING Commitment to both resilient values and elastic strategies involves a paradox.
Franklin Roosevelt ’ s image as lion and fox, Mao ’ s reputation as tiger and mon-
key, and Mary Kay Ash ’ s depiction as both fairy godmother and pink panther
were not so much inconsistencies as signs that they could embrace contradic-
tion. They intuitively recognized the multiple dimensions of society and moved
fl exibly to implement their visions. The use of multiple frames permits leaders
to see and understand more — if they are able to employ the different logics that
accompany diverse ways of thinking.
Leaders fail when they take too narrow a view. Unless they can think fl exibly
and see organizations from multiple angles, they will be unable to deal with the
full range of issues they inevitably encounter. Jimmy Carter ’ s preoccupation with
details and rationality made it hard for him to marshal support for his programs
or to capture the hearts of most Americans. Even FDR ’ s multifaceted approach
to the presidency — he was a superb observer of human needs, a charming per-
suader, a solid administrator, a political manipulator, and a master of ritual and
ceremony — miscarried when he underestimated the public reaction to his plan
to enlarge the Supreme Court.
Multiframe thinking is challenging and often counterintuitive. To see the
same organization as machine, family, jungle, and theater requires the capacity
to think in different ways at the same time about the same thing. Like surfers,
leaders must ride the waves of change. Too far ahead, they will be crushed. If
they fall behind, they will become irrelevant. Success requires artistry, skill, and
the ability to see organizations as organic forms in which needs, roles, power,
c21.indd 437c21.indd 437 6/30/08 2:14:58 PM6/30/08 2:14:58 PM
Reframing Organizations438
and symbols must be integrated to provide direction and shape behavior. The
power to reframe is vital for modern leaders. The ability to see new possibilities
and to create new opportunities enables leaders to discover alternatives when
options seem severely constrained. It helps them fi nd hope and faith amid fear
and despair. Choice is at the heart of freedom, and freedom is essential to achiev-
ing the twin goals of commitment and fl exibility.
Organizations everywhere are struggling to cope with a shrinking planet and
a global economy. The accelerating pace of change continues to produce grave
political, economic, and social discontinuities. A world ever more dependent
on organizations now fi nds them evolving too slowly to meet pressing social
demands. Without wise leaders and artistic managers to help close the gap, we
will continue to see misdirected resources, massive ineffectiveness, and unneces-
sary human pain and suffering. All these affl ictions are already here, and there is
no guarantee that they will not get worse — unless we can enlarge our palette of
options.
We see prodigious challenges ahead for organizations and those who guide
them, yet we remain optimistic. We want this revised volume to lay the ground-
work for a new generation of managers and leaders who recognize the impor-
tance of poetry and philosophy as well as analysis and technique. We need
pioneers who embrace the fundamental values of human life and the human
spirit. Such leaders and managers will be playful theorists who can see organiza-
tions through a complex prism. They will be negotiators able to design resilient
strategies that simultaneously shape events and adapt to changing circumstances.
They will understand the importance of knowing and caring for themselves and
the people with whom they work. They will be architects, catalysts, advocates,
and prophets who lead with soul.
c21.indd 438c21.indd 438 6/30/08 2:14:58 PM6/30/08 2:14:58 PM
439
The Best of Organizational Studies Scholars ’ Hits and Popular Best - Sellers
One of our goals is to cover the most important and infl uen-tial works in the fi eld and cite or summarize them where appropriate. There is no perfect way to determine the best or most
important books and articles, but we can assess which ones seem to
be most often read by scholars and by the general public. We devel-
oped two different lists: the greatest hits as rated by scholars, and
the popular favorites as represented in Business Week ’ s annual list of
business best - sellers.
SCHOLARS ’ HITS Our list of scholars ’ “ greatest hits ” relies on citation analysis — how often a work
is cited in the scholarly literature. This method is often used to measure schol-
arly impact. We began by conducting a citation analysis of the two journals that
Trieschmann, Dennis, and Northcraft (2000) cited as the most visible and infl u-
ential in the fi eld of management: Academy of Management Journal (AMJ; for
the years 1996 to 2004) and the Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ; for the
years 1993 to 2004). We combined the analyses from those two journals to get a
list of the top articles and books based on citation frequency. (In identifying our
A P P E N D I X
bapp.indd 439bapp.indd 439 6/30/08 12:39:37 PM6/30/08 12:39:37 PM
Reframing Organizations440
top works, we excluded purely methodological works that dealt with statistical
analysis or research methods.)
We then conducted an additional analysis using Google Scholar (GS), which
provides a broadly inclusive analysis of citation data for scholarly work. This
gave us three separate rankings: AMJ, ASQ, and GS. The fi rst two are specifi c to
the fi eld of organization studies. The GS data provide a broader indication of
infl uence both within and beyond the management fi eld. For the items in our
top twenty - fi ve, the correlations among AMJ, ASQ, and GS are positive but low
(ranging between .09 for AMJ/ASQ to .16 for ASQ/GS). We believe this refl ects
reality. Scholars who publish in different journals or come from different disci-
plines have different tastes and prefer different sources. It also suggests that our
results are partly arbitrary, since a different set of journals might have produced
different results. The results for the top twenty are shown in Exhibit A.1 .
The results are not defi nitive, but they provide a broad estimate of the works
that have had the greatest infl uence on scholars. To reduce our list to a single
rank order, we averaged the rankings across the three separate data bases. For
example, our highest ranking went to an article by DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
that ranked fi rst in AMJ and ASQ and tenth in GS.
Though the citation analysis is based on articles published in the 1990s and
early 2000s, many of the works that appear at the high end of the list were pub-
lished much earlier, in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The oldest item in the top
twenty was published in 1958; the newest, in 1989. The results suggest that there
is typically a lag of a decade or more before a new work can become a widely
cited “ classic. ”
POPULAR BEST - SELLERS What scholars like and what the public reads are two very different things. For
each of the years 1996 to 2006, we have identifi ed a book at or near the top of the
Business Week best - seller list (see Exhibit A.2 ). Normally, we chose a book that
occupied the number one position on the hardcover or paperback list. But we
chose books at a lower rank under two conditions: the top rank focused on top-
ics outside the fi eld of management and organizations (for example, works on
personal fi nance), or the same book had held the top position for more than one
year (which was particularly the case with Who Moved My Cheese? by Spencer
Johnson).
bapp.indd 440bapp.indd 440 6/30/08 12:39:38 PM6/30/08 12:39:38 PM
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Appendix 443
Exhibit A.2. Business Week Best-Sellers.
YEAR BUSINESS BEST-SELLER RANK ON BUSINESS WEEK LIST
2006 Friedman, T. L., The World Is Flat #1 on hardcover list
2005 Gladwell, M., Blink #1 on hardcover list
2004 Trump, D., How to Get Rich #2 on hardcover list behind The Automatic Millionaire
2003 Bossidy, L., and Charan, R., Execution
#2 on hardcover list behind Good to Great
2002 Collins, J., Good to Great #1 on hardcover list
2001 Welch, J., Jack: Straight from the Gut
#2 on hardcover list (behind Who Moved My Cheese?)
2000 Gladwell, M., The Tipping Point #3 on hardcover list behind Who Moved My Cheese? and The Millionaire Mind
1999 Johnson, S., Who Moved My Cheese?
#1 on hardcover list (for 1999, 2000, and 2001)
1998 Chernow, R., Titan #3 on hardcover list (behind two personal fi nance titles)
1997 Covey, S., The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People
#1 on paperback list for many years
1996 Adams, S., The Dilbert Principle #1 on hardcover list
Not surprisingly, the popular best - sellers are often shorter and simpler than
the scholars ’ picks. They are pragmatic and often emphasize people issues that
fall in the human resource or symbolic frames, whereas the scholars ’ top choices
emphasized symbolic, political, and structural issues. Typically, the popular best -
sellers are upbeat. The message is, “ You can make a difference. ” The scholars
often prefer works with the opposite message: “ You probably won ’ t make much
difference because you and your organization are controlled by much larger
social and economic forces. ”
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T H E A U T H O R S
Lee G. Bolman holds the Marion Bloch Missouri Chair in Leadership at the Bloch
School of Business and Public Administration, University of Missouri – Kansas
City. He received a B.A. (1962) in history and a Ph.D. (1968) in administra-
tive sciences, both from Yale University. Bolman ’ s interests lie in the intersec-
tion of leadership and organizations, and he has published numerous articles,
chapters, and cases. He is coauthor of Escape from Cluenessness: A Guide for the
Organizationally Challenged. Bolman has been a consultant to corporations, pub-
lic agencies, universities, and public schools in the United States, Asia, Europe,
and Latin America. For twenty years, he taught at the Harvard Graduate School
of Education, where he also chaired the Institute for Educational Administration
and the School Leadership Academy. He has been director and board chair of the
Organizational Behavioral Teaching Society and Director of the National Training
Laboratories.
Bolman lives in Kansas City, Missouri, with his wife, Joan Gallos, the youngest
of his six children, Brad, and a spirited Theory Y Cockapoo, Douglas McGregor.
Terrence E. Deal retired as the Irving R. Melbo Professor at the University of
Southern California ’ s Rossier School of Education. Before joining USC, he served
on the faculties of the Stanford University Graduate School of Education, the
Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Vanderbilt University ’ s Peabody
College of Education. He received his B.A. (1961) from LaVerne College in history,
his M.A. (1966) from California State University at Los Angeles in educational
administration, and his Ph.D. (1972) from Stanford University in education and
sociology. Deal has been a policeman, public school teacher, high school princi-
pal, district offi cer administrator, and university professor. His primary research
interests are in organization symbolism and change. He is the author of thirty
babout.indd 481babout.indd 481 7/1/08 3:38:34 PM7/1/08 3:38:34 PM
The Authors 482
books, including the best - seller Corporate Cultures (with A. A. Kennedy, 1982)
and Shaping School Culture (with K. Peterson, 1999). He has published numer-
ous articles on organizations, change, and leadership. He is a consultant to busi-
ness, health care, military, educational, and religious organizations domestically
and in Europe, Scandinavia, the Middle East, Canada, South America, Japan, and
Southeast Asia.
Deal lives in San Luis Obispo ’ s Edna Valley, California, with his wife, Sandy,
and their cat, Max. Along with writing, his current avocation is wine - making as
a member of the Edna Ranch Vintner ’ s Guild.
Bolman and Deal fi rst met in 1976 when they were assigned to co - teach a course
on organization at Harvard University. Trained in different disciplines on oppo-
site coasts, they disagreed on almost everything. It was the beginning of a chal-
lenging but very productive partnership. They have written a number of other
books together, including Leading with Soul: An Uncommon Journey of Spirit.
Their books have been translated into multiple languages for readers in Asia,
Europe, and Latin America.
For fi ve years, Bolman and Deal also co - directed the National Center for
Educational Leadership, a research consortium of Harvard, Vanderbilt, and the
University of Chicago.
The authors appreciate hearing from readers and welcome comments, ques-
tions, suggestions, or accounts of experiences that bear on the ideas in the book.
Stories of success, failure, or puzzlement are all welcome. Readers can contact
the authors at the following addresses:
Lee Bolman
Bloch School - UMKC
5100 Rockhill Road
Kansas City MO 64113
Terry Deal
6625 Via Piedra
San Luis Obispo CA 93401
babout.indd 482babout.indd 482 7/1/08 3:38:34 PM7/1/08 3:38:34 PM
483
A Aceto, 251 Ackman, D., 157 Ackoff, R., 302 Adams, A. S., 40 Adams, J., 279 Adams, S., 8, 443 Adler, B., 4 Adler, P. S., 51 Ajila, C. O., 125 Al-Sadr, M., 203 Alban, B. T., 162, 163 Alderfer, C. P., 125, 205 Alderson, A., 371 Alford, C. F., 208 Allen, G., 108 Allen, P., 211 Allen, W., 215, 405 Allison, G., 22n.3 Alsing, C., 281, 282, 283,
284–286, 287, 288 Alterman, E., 206 Amar, V., 121 Anderson, B., 145 Andrews, P., 211 Applebaum, E., 140,
151, 152 Argyris, C., 34, 36, 52,
126–131, 152, 169–170, 172, 173, 175, 177, 187
Aristotle, 401, 402 Armstrong, D., 260 Arndt, M., 61, 65,
119–120, 156 Ash, M. K., 266, 437 Atwater, L., 352 Atzeni, G., 251 Aubrey, B., 149 Austin, N., 345, 346 Avolio, B., 352 Axelrod, R., 224, 225
B Bailey, D. E., 180, 186 Bailey, T., 140, 151 Baker, C., 123 Baldridge, J. V., 202, 203 Bales, F., 180 Balkundi, P., 184 Ballmer, S., 376, 377 Bamforth, K., 152, 153 Bandler, R., 253 Baptista, J.P.A., 134,
159–160 Barbaro, M., 4, 135 Barboza, D., 198 Bardach, E., 9 Barley, S. R., 64, 242 Barnes, L. B., 345 Barnett, W. P., 377
Barreta, A., 165–166, 169, 170–171, 172–173, 180, 328
Barrett, C., 404 Barry, D., 342 Barstad, A., 155 Barstow, D., 120, 137 Bartlett, C. A., 59, 68 Bass, B., 352 Bass, B. M., 178, 346, 369 Bateson, G., 253, 269 Batstone, D., 131 Bedell, B., 176 Beer, M., 374 Belden, T., 398 Belkin, L., 354 Bell, H., 158–159 Bell, T. E., 193, 218 Bellow, G., 214 Benedict, R., 253 Bennis, W. G., 201, 214,
343, 345, 346, 369 Bensimon, E. M., 19,
325, 326 Berenson, A., 135 Berg, P., 140, 151 Bergman, L., 120, 137 Bergquist, W. H., 22n.3 Bernstein, A., 147 Bethune, G., 272, 274–275
N A M E I N D E X
bindauth.indd 483bindauth.indd 483 6/30/08 12:53:45 PM6/30/08 12:53:45 PM
Name Index484
Bettelheim, B., 259 Bhutto, B., 190, 355 Bianco, A., 229–230 Bickman, L., 353 Bieber, O., 161 Bies, L., 128 Bin Laden, O., 101 Bion, W. R., 180 Birnbaum, R., 19, 22n.3 Blair, M. M., 147 Blake, F., 135 Blake, R., 178, 246–247, 350 Blakey, M. C., 238–239 Blanchard, K., 348–350, 360 Blank, W., 349 Blasi, J. R., 147 Blau, P. M., 48 Block, P., 201, 224–225 Block, R., 54, 72 Blum, A., 305 Blumberg, P., 151 Blumer, H., 253 Bodily, S., 397 Boesky, I., 227 Boje, D. M., 296 Bok, S., 224 Bolman, L. G., 14, 19, 325,
326, 352, 403 Bonavota, J., 416, 419 Bono, 295 Bono, J. E., 179 Borrus, A., 75 Borys, B., 51 Bossidy, L., 443 Boudreau, J., 135 Bougon, M. G., 22n.2 Bourne, J., 344 Bower, J. L., 84 Boxer, B., 355 Boyatzis, R. E., 177,
360–361
Boyle, M., 144 Bradford, D. L., 360 Brady, K., 351–352 Brescoll, V. L., 354 Briand, M., 344 Bridwell, L. G., 125 Brief, A. P., 22n.2 Broder, J. M., 66 Brokaw, T., 267 Broughton, I., 263–264 Brown, L. D., 204, 205, 207 Brown, M., 73 Brown, P., 213 Brummel, L., 376–377 Bruner, S., 397 Brunner, 354 Bryan, L. L., 51–52 Buckley, G., 376 Buddha, 260 Bunker, B. B., 162, 163 Burke, K., 296 Burke, W., 163 Burlingham, B., 149 Burnes, B., 162 Burns, J. M., 224, 225–226,
348, 368 Burns, N., 8 Burrough, B., 231–232 Burrows, P., 364, 365 Burt, R. S., 442 Bush, G. W., 19, 53, 189,
204, 370 Butcher, D., 219 Byrne, J. A., 9, 34, 134,
257, 398 Byrnes, N., 119–120,
156, 257
C Cable, J. P., 122 Cameron, K., 63
Campbell, D., 408 Campbell, J., 254, 262 Campbell, J. P., 162 Capellas, M., 366 Capra, F., 87 Carless, S. A., 352 Carli, L. L., 352–353, 354 Carlson, S., 312 Carlzon, J., 290, 363 Carrigan, P., 346, 362–363 Carroll, L., 254 Carstedt, G., 10 Carter, J., 72, 204, 348, 437 Carter, S., 165 Carver, C., 414, 416,
417–418, 419, 420–421, 422, 423–424, 425, 426–427, 430–431, 432–433
Cascio, W., 134, 135 Case, J., 147, 149 Cavanagh, R. E., 345, 346 Cavanagh, R. R., 375 Cavanaugh, M., 193 Cézanne, P., 13 Champy, J., 91, 93, 94 Chandler, A. D., Jr., 6,
65, 358 Chandler, C., 93–94 Chaplin, C., 127 Charan, R., 3, 8, 443 Chase, W. G., 11 Chatman, J. A., 346 Chemers, M., 348, 361 Cherniss, C., 176 Chernow, R., 443 Christensen, C. M., 64 Churchill, W., 279, 348 Ciulla, J. B., 151 Clark, B. R., 253, 254 Clark, E., 259, 260
bindauth.indd 484bindauth.indd 484 6/30/08 12:53:45 PM6/30/08 12:53:45 PM
Name Index 485
Clark, K. B., 64, 89 Clarke, M., 219 Clarke, R., 29 Cleveland, H., 344, 369 Clifford, D. K., 345, 346 Clifford, J., 94–96 Clinton, B., 6, 189 Clinton, H. R., 263,
340, 354 Cochran, S., 58 Cohen, A. R., 360 Cohen, B., 400–401 Cohen, D. S., 345, 348,
382, 394 Cohen, M., 303, 306, 307 Cohen, P. S., 254 Cohen, S. G., 113, 180, 186 Cohen, W., 315–316 Coles, T., 341 Collins, B. E., 180 Collins, J. C., 140, 145,
146, 256, 269, 320–322, 345, 346, 356, 401, 436, 443
Collinson, D. L., 169 Collinson, M., 169 Colvin, G., 157 Condit, P., 266–267 Conger, J. A., 345 Conley, C., 125 Conlin, M., 376 Coonan, C., 197 Cooper, C., 54, 72 Corwin, R., 253 Covey, S.M.R., 15, 443 Cox, H., 278 Cox, T., Jr., 406 Cramer, R. D., 241 Crawford, G., 14 Crimmons, D., 418–419,
420, 432
Cronshaw, S. F., 22n.2 Crosby, P., 159 Cross, I., 108 Crozier, M., 197 Cunliffe, A. L., 296 Curphy, G. J., 8 Cutler, D., 211–213, 215,
221, 222 Cyert, R. M., 34, 49,
198–199, 200–201, 243, 384, 441
Czepak, F., 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 432
D Daley, R., 203 Dalton, M., 208 Dane, E., 11, 37 Daniels, C., 157 Darwin, C., 384, 385 David, G., 61 Davis, G. F., 297 Davis, K., 353 Davis, M., 253 Day, B., 258 De Backer, P., 33, 140, 143,
345, 400 De Castro, E., 282–283, 284 De Gaulle, C., 437 De Gues, A., 399, 401 Deal, G., 45, 140 Deal, T. E., 14, 19, 67–68,
114, 115, 234–235, 261, 266, 269, 325, 326, 352, 387, 403
Debbs, E., 421, 425 DeBecker, G., 38 DeGeorge, G., 160 Dell, M., 33 Demarco, H., 29–31,
32–33, 36, 319–320
Deming, W. E., 159 Denning, S., 259, 260 Dennis, A. R., 439 DePree, M., 409 DeRue, D. S., 122 Descarpentries, J.-M., 149 Detweiler, J. B., 176 Dewey, 10 Dillingham, D. L., 239 DiMaggio, P. J., 296,
297–299, 440, 441 Dittmer, L., 253 Doktor, J., 326 Donahue, P., 319 Donovan, “W. B.”, 17 Dorfman, P. W., 272 Dornbusch, S., 54, 64, 66 Downer, L., 241, 266 Downey, H. K., 22n.2 Drucker, P. F., 67, 68, 133,
157, 254 Druskat, V. U., 186 Duesenberry, J., 167 Dula, B., 420–421, 422,
423–424, 425, 426–427, 430–431, 432–433
Dumaine, B., 112 Dunford, R. W., 19 Dunlap, “C. A.”, 34, 134 Dunnette, M. D., 162 Dunning, D., 8 Durant, W., 357, 359 Dwyer, J., 46 Dyer, L. M., 22n.2
E Eagly, A. H., 352–353, 354 Eastman, G., 93 Ebbers, B., 90, 257 Eccles, R., 279 Eckholm, E., 372
bindauth.indd 485bindauth.indd 485 6/30/08 12:53:46 PM6/30/08 12:53:46 PM
Name Index486
Edelman, M. J., 253, 267, 306–307
Edison, T., 80 Edmondson, G., 51 Edmunson, 270, 271 Edwards, C., 257 Edwards, M. R., 353 Eichenwald, K., 90,
398, 399 Einstein, A., 25 Elden, M., 155 Ellingsen, D., 155 Elmore, R. F., 9, 22n.3 Elstrom, P., 364 Emery, C. R., 113 Emery, F., 153 Enderud, H. G., 306 Engardio, P., 160 Engle, R. A., 22n.2 Epstein, K., 238–239 Epstein, L. D., 296 Esch, K., 193, 218 Esposito, F., 157
F Faerman, S. R., 22n.3 Farkas, C. M., 33, 140, 143,
345, 400 Farkas, M. T., 180 Fastow, A., 398 Fayol, H., 48 Feinberg, M., 4, 7 Feinstein, D., 355 Fenn, D. H., 366 Fessenden, F., 46 Fiedler, F. E., 348, 361 Fiedler, K., 22n.2 Fielder, J. H., 399 Fiorina, C., 352,
363–367, 371 Firestone, D., 74
Firestone, W. A., 385–386
Firth, N., 288 Fisher, R., 214, 221–222 Fishman, C., 229, 237–238,
242, 245–246 Fiske, S. T., 22n.2 Fisman, R., 354 Fleishman, E. A., 178 Fletcher, J., 192 Floden, R. E., 304 Flynn, K., 46 Fogel, J., 261 Follett, M. P., 121 Ford, H., 357, 359 Ford, H., II, 364 Forsyth, J., 133 Foti, R. J., 22n.2 Foucault, M., 201 France, M., 398 Frangos, S., 94 Franklin, B., 185, 279 Fredendall, L. D., 113 Freeman, J., 377, 442 Freeman, R. E., 156 Freiberg, J., 143, 255 Freiberg, K., 143, 255 French, J.R.P., 203, 204 Frensch, P. A., 22n.2 Freud, S., 252, 253 Freudenberg, W. R., 9 Fried, I., 367 Friedberg, E., 197 Friedman, R. A., 305 Friedman, T. L., 443 Friesen, P. H., 90–91 Frost, P. J., 204, 208 Fry, A., 376 Fulghum, R.,
261–262, 265 Funkhouser, G. R., 262
G Gabarro, J., 279, 434n.1 Galbraith, J. R., 53, 67, 112 Galileo, 18 Gallos, J. V., 163, 340, 406 Gamson, W. A.,
201–202, 233 Gandhi, M., 225, 368, 371 Ganitsky, J., 361 Gardner, H., 177 Gardner, J. W., 343–344,
346, 348 Garland, H., 40 Garman, S., 157 Gates, B., 139, 143,
211–213, 222–223 Geertz, C., 299 Gegerenzer, G., 40 Gerhardt, M. W., 179 Gerstein, M. S., 51 Gerstner, L., 369–370, 401 Gertz, D., 134, 159–160 Ghoshal, S., 59 Giamatti, A. B., 319 Gibb, J. R., 162 Gibson, C. F., 92 Giroux, H., 131 Giuliani, R., 311–312,
341–342, 344, 348, 368
Gladwell, M., 11, 39, 443 Glanz, J., 218 Goffman, E., 10, 253,
269, 296 Goizueta, R., 388–389 Goldberg, L. R., 179 Goleman, D., 176–177,
187, 361 Gonzalez, R., 40 Goodman, D., 315–316 Goodnight, J., 145
bindauth.indd 486bindauth.indd 486 6/30/08 12:53:46 PM6/30/08 12:53:46 PM
Name Index 487
Gorbachev, M. S., 199, 205–206, 436
Govindarajan, V., 375–376 Graeff, C. L., 349 Gramling, R., 9 Granell, E., 325 Granovetter, M. S.,
167–168, 441 Green, S. G., 349 Greenberg, J., 81–82 Greene, J., 376 Greenleaf, R. K., 361 Gregory, K. L., 22n.2 Greiner, L. E., 63 Greising, D., 160 Griffi n, E., 408 Grinder, J., 253 Groh, K., 259 Groopman, J., 12 Grossman, W., 235 Grow, B., 4 Guéhenno, J.-M., 437 Guetzkow, H., 180 Gulick, L., 48 Gumpert, R., 349 Gunther, M., 158–159 Gupta, R., 9 Gupta, V., 272 Guyer, J., 288
H Hackman, J. R., 153, 154,
159, 180, 186 Hall, R. H., 48, 356 Hallinger, P., 353 Hambleton, R. K., 349 Hambrick, D. C., 442 Hamel, G., 400 Hamm, S., 87 Hammer, M., 91, 93, 94 Hampden-Turner, C., 10
Hamper, B., 127–131 Hampton, W. J., 161, 360 Handy, C., 180 Hanges, P. J., 272 Hannan, M. T., 442 Hannaway, J., 60 Hansen, B., 157 Hansot, E., 268 Harris, E. F., 178 Harrison, D. A., 184 Harrison, J., 156 Haynes, J., 110 Haynes, R., 110 Heath, C., 40, 261 Heath, D., 261 Hebert, E., 262–263 Hedberg, B.L.T., 85 Heffernan, M., 355 Heffron, F., 207 Hegelsen, S., 73, 86–87,
95, 105 Heifetz, R. A., 207, 343,
344, 348, 421 Heimovics, R. D., 19,
325, 326 Helgesen, S., 352 Hellevik, O., 155 Helyar, J., 231–232 Henderson, R. M., 64, 89 Herman, R. D., 19,
325, 326 Hernandez, L., 432 Hersey, P., 348–350, 361 Herzberg, F., 153 Hesketh, A., 213 Heskett, J. L., 140, 269 Hewlett, W. (Walter), 365,
366, 367 Hewlett, W. (William), 79,
362, 364, 371 Hickman, J., 157
Higashi, K., 160 Hill, L. A., 87 Hindo, B., 55, 376 Hitler, A., 6, 225, 279,
367, 371 Hitt, M. A., 235 Hoang, H., 40 Hock, D., 279 Hoffrage, U., 40 Hofstede, G., 212–214,
253, 442 Hogan, J., 8 Hogan, R., 8 Hoge, W., 351 Holberger, K., 285 Holland, C., 288 Hollander, E. P., 346, 361 Holmes, O. W., 227 Holusha, J., 160, 161 Hoover, J. E., 17 Hoskisson, R. E., 235 Houghton, J., 4 House, R. J., 272, 361 Howard, B., 327–338 Hu Jintao, 371–372 Huler, S., 272 Hussein, S., 206, 371, 378 Huy, Q. N., 252, 307
I Iacocca, L., 257,
363–367, 368 Iansiti, M., 237 Ilies, R., 179 Ishikawa, K., 159 Iyengar, S. S., 354
J Jackall, R., 208, 209 Jackson, M., 388 Jacobson, R., 40
bindauth.indd 487bindauth.indd 487 6/30/08 12:53:47 PM6/30/08 12:53:47 PM
Name Index488
Janoff, S., 162 Janson, R., 153 Javidan, M., 272 Jefferson, T., 279 Jehn, K. A., 207 Jenkins, W. A., 114, 115,
140, 261 Jensen, C., 193 Jensen, M. C., 76–77, 122,
384, 441 Jesus, 260 Jiang Zemin, 371–372 Jick, T. D., 374 Joan of Arc, 225, 344, 348 Jobs, S., 79–80 John, O. P., 179 Johnson, B. T., 352 Johnson, K., 86 Johnson, R., 231–233,
236–237 Johnson, R. A., 235 Johnson, S., 360, 380–381,
440, 443 Joyce, C. I., 51–52 Judge, T. A., 179 Jung, C., 252, 253 Juran, J. M., 159 Jurkiewicz Coughlin, C. L.,
19, 325, 326
K Kacmar, K. M., 144 Kahn, J., 34, 157 Kahneman, D., 40 Kalleberg, A. L., 140, 151 Kamenica, E., 354 Kamens, D. H., 300 Kanter, R. M., 147, 166,
203, 214, 215, 219, 221, 345, 374, 442
Karr, J-B. A., 374
Katzell, R. A., 151 Katzenbach, J. R., 111–112,
114, 186 Kaufer, N., 368 Kauffman, E., 136 Kavilanz, P. B., 145 Kegan., R., 6 Keidel, R. W., 107, 108,
109–110 Kelleher, H., 254–255,
274, 400 Keller, B., 353, 354,
355, 436 Kelly, W. P., 366 Kennedy, A. A.,
67–68, 269 Kennedy, J. F., 17,
204, 369 Kennedy, R., 427 Kerr, C., 205 Key, M. K., 266 Kidder, T., 280–289, 408 Kiley, D., 8 Killian, K., 155 Kilmann, 259 Kimberly, J., 203 King, D., 411–434 King, M. L., Jr., 255–256,
368, 369, 371, 426 King, R., 254–255 Kleinbölting, H., 40 Kleinfeld, N. R., 135 Kochan, T. A., 161 Kohlberg, L., 225–226 Komives, S. R., 352 Kopelman, R. E., 153 Koput, K. W., 59 Korin, A., 223 Korten, D. C., 242, 244 Kotter, J. P., 140, 166, 204,
207, 213–214, 218–219,
269, 320, 322, 323, 324, 343, 345, 346, 348, 374, 379, 382, 393–396
Kouprianov, S., 199 Kouzes, J. M., 345, 346,
362–363, 369 Kozlowski, D., 77, 257 Kraatz, M., 134 Kravis, H., 236–237, 318 Kriger, M. P., 345 Kroc, R., 63–64, 254 Kruger, J., 8 Kruse, D. L., 147 Kühberger, A., 40 Kuhn, T. S., 22n.2 Kulkarni, A., 125 Kumar, R., 366 Kurosawa, A., 19 Kurson, K., 311
L Labaton, S., 227 Labich, K., 136, 143 Lagarde, D., 190 Lajoie, S., 22n.2 Lakoff, G., 204 Lam, D., 368 Langer, E., 19 Lansbury, R. D., 161 Larson, D., 389 Latham, G. P., 56, 122, 125 Lawler, E. E., III, 125, 135,
140, 144, 153, 154 Lawrence, A. T., 160 Lawrence, J., 48 Lawrence, J. T., 22n.2 Lax, D. A., 185, 214, 221,
224, 226 Lay, K. W., 4, 5, 6, 40,
226–227, 257, 397 Leader, G. C., 368
bindauth.indd 488bindauth.indd 488 6/30/08 12:53:47 PM6/30/08 12:53:47 PM
Name Index 489
Leavitt, H. J., 50, 180, 313 LeBoutillier, J., 220 Ledford, G. E., 113, 155 Lee, A., 356, 358 Lee, B., 161 Lee, L., 257 Lee Kuan Yew, 437 Lesgold, A., 22n.2 Levering. R., 137, 140, 143,
340, 400–401, 404 Levien, R., 237 Levine, D. I., 151 Levinson, H., 345, 361 Levinthal, D. A., 442 Levitt, B., 442 Lewin, K., 162, 177–178 Lewis, N. A., 241 Lifson, T., 290 Likert, R., 154, 163,
164n.1, 361 Lingle, C., 145 Linsky, M., 207, 344, 348 Lippitt, R., 177–178 Lipsky, M., 76 Locke, E. A., 56, 122 Lombardo, M. M., 12 Longworth, R. C., 242 Lopez, B., 259 Lord, R. G., 22n.2 Lorenzo, F., 274 Lorsch, J., 48, 92 Love, E. G., 134 Love, J. F., 63 Lubans, J., 109 Luhman, J. T., 296 Lukes, S., 204 Luthans, F., 312, 320,
323, 324 Lynch, P., 134 Lynn, L. E., Jr., 320,
322–323, 324
M Maccoby, M., 345, 346 MacDuffi e, J. P., 161 Machan, D., 86 Machiavelli, N., 16,
377–378 Maier, N., 180, 187 Malavé, J., 151 Mandel, B., 389 Manes, S., 211 Mangham, I. L., 293, 299 Manz, C. C., 155 Mao Zedong, 225,
371–372, 437 March, J. G., 26–27, 29, 34,
49, 198–199, 200–201, 243, 253, 269, 301, 303, 306, 307, 384, 441, 442
Marcus, B., 257 Maritz, P., 212–213, 215,
221, 222 Mark, R., 257 Markels, A., 134 Marriott, J. W., Sr.,
260–261 Marshall, C., 327–338,
340, 361 Marshall, M. V., 244 Marx, R., 193 Maslow, A. H., 123,
124–125, 126, 225–226, 424
Mason, P. A., 442 Matthews, C., 194, 220 Mattis, 353 Mayer, J. D., 176, 177, 187 Mayo, E., 121 McAuliffe, C., 192, 195 McCall, M. W., 12 McCarthy, D.,
275–276, 277
McClelland, D. C., 123 McConnell, M., 192–193,
258, 264 McGrath, M. R.,
22n.3, 180 McGregor, D., 125–126,
127, 128, 131 McIntyre, M. G., 15 McKee, A., 177, 360–361 McLean, B., 4, 149 McLennan, R., 383 McNamee, M., 75 McNerney, J., 375–376 Mead, M., 253 Meckling, W. H., 76–77,
122, 384, 441 Mellahi, K., 134 Mendelson, H., 223 Meredith, R., 133 Merrill, R. R., 15 Messick, D. M., 224 Messier, J.-M., 205 Meyer, J. W., 253, 296,
299–300, 441 Meyerhoff, B., 261 Michelli, J., 15 Mihalopoulos, D., 203 Miller, D., 90–91 Minnich, P., 99–100 Mintzberg, H., 52–53, 56,
65, 73, 78–86, 88, 97, 166, 302, 312
Mirvis, P. H., 162, 163–164 Mitroff, I. I., 259, 387 Moeller, J., 50 Mohammed, 260 Mohr, R. D., 154 Mola, R., 264–265 Molière, 220 Montgomery, L., 144 Moore, B., 261
bindauth.indd 489bindauth.indd 489 6/30/08 12:53:48 PM6/30/08 12:53:48 PM
Name Index490
Moore, J. F., 235, 236 Morgan, A., 136 Morgan, G., 22n.3 Morganthau, T., 389 Morris, B., 354, 355 Morris, J. R., 134 Morrison, A. M., 12, 340,
352, 406 Moskowitz, M., 137, 140,
143, 340, 400–401, 404 Moss, F., 192 Moulton, B., 214 Mouton, J. S., 178,
246–247, 350 Mulcahy, A., 199 Murphy, J. T., 344 Murray, M., 134 Myers, I., 178
N Nadler, D. A., 51 Nanus, B., 201, 343, 345,
346, 369 Nardelli, R., 3–4, 6, 8,
135, 376 Natividad, I., 353 Neil, D., 277 Nelson, R. R., 384–385, 441 Neuman, J., 406 Neuman, R. P., 375 Nickerson, J. A., 377 Nickles, D., 263 Niemann, G., 50 Nixon, R., 6 Nohria, N., 374 Nordstrom, E.
(Elmer), 275 Nordstrom, E.
(Everett), 275 Nordstrom, J., 275 Nordstrom, L., 275
Norman, J. R., 161, 360 Norrish, B., 96 Northcraft, G. B., 439 Novak, 365, 368 Nutt, S. C., 234–235, 387 Nystrom, P. C., 85
O Obama, B., 340 O’Grady, S., 258 Ohmae, K., 68 Ohme, D. K., 224 O’Keefe, D. L., 253 O’Keefe, G., 315–317 Oldham, G. R., 153 Oliver, T., 388–389 Olsen, J., 253, 301 Olson, J., 399 Omidyar, P., 87, 256–257 O’Neill, T. P., 220, 405–406 Oppel, R. A., 227 O’Reilly, C. A., III, 346 Organ, D. W., 179 Orgogozo, I., 131–132 Ormerod, P., 377 Ortner, S., 253, 254 Osborne, P., 29–31, 32–33,
319–320 Oshry, B., 34, 35, 344 Osterman, P., 144 O’Toole, J., 140, 398 O’Toole, P., 364 Overington, M. A.,
293, 299 Overstreet, D., 389 Owen, H., 162, 391–392 Owen, R., 139–140
P Packard, D., 79, 364, 371 Palmer, I. C., 19
Palmeri, C., 238–239 Palumbo, G., 151 Pande, P. S., 375 Pape, R., 203 Parker, S., 154 Pasquier, S., 199 Paterson, T., 222 Paulson, E., 280 Peck, D., 281 Peck, S., 207 Pelosi, N., 355 Perez, F., 155 Perkins, B., 415, 416,
418–419, 432 Perrow, C., 22n.3, 48, 54,
240, 242, 299 Peters, B. G., 9 Peters, T. J., 320–322, 345,
346, 362, 402 Petzinger, T., 400 Pfeffer, J., 122, 135, 140,
141, 143, 146, 148, 149, 154, 155, 156, 196, 203, 204, 214–215, 232, 243–244, 441
Pichault, F., 214, 216 Pinder, C. C., 125 Porras, J. I., 140, 146, 256,
269, 320–322, 345, 356, 401, 436
Port, O., 160 Porter, E., 227–228 Posner, B. Z., 345, 346,
362–363, 369 Powell, B., 197 Powell, C., 158, 258 Powell, W. W., 59, 296,
297–299, 440, 441 Prahalad, C. K., 400 Pratt, M. G., 11, 37 Pressman, J. L., 9
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Name Index 491
Prusak, L., 259 Puia, G., 290 Purdy, K., 153 Putin, V., 199 Pyzdek, T., 55
Q Quadracci, 408–409 Quinn, R. E., 22n.3,
63, 302
R Rabkin, M., 95 Ragins, 353 Rallis, S., 304 Ramaya, K., 290 Ramsey, V. J., 340, 406 Rao, P., 125 Rappaport, C., 58 Rasala, E., 283, 287 Raven, B. H., 203, 204 Reagan, R., 195, 204,
215–216, 370, 405–406 Reddin, W. J., 348 Reed, J., 92–93 Reed, K., 264–265 Reed, S., 58 Rehbein, K., 241 Reichheld, F. F., 134 Reid, 252 Reingold, J., 25, 220 Reynolds, H., 165–166,
169, 170–171, 172–173 Rice, A. K., 153 Richtel, M., 398 Ricks, D., 4 Ricks, T., 255 Ridge, T., 53, 72 Ridout, C. F., 366 Riebling, M., 16–17 Ritti, R. R., 262
Roberts, J. L., 398 Roberts, M., 157 Robinson, G., 240 Roosevelt, F. D., 17, 225,
367, 368, 437 Rose, P., 107 Rosen, C., 147 Rosener, J. B., 352 Rosenkrantz, 320, 323, 324 Rosenthal, R., 40 Rosenthal, S., 345 Rossiter, C., 185 Roush, C., 257 Rowan, B., 253, 296,
299–300, 441 Rowan, C., “C. C.”, 13 Rubin, A. J., 203 Rundall, T., 96 Russ, J., 203 Ryan, K. A., 179
S Sahaf, M. S., 371 Sains, A., 58 Salancik, G., 122,
243–244, 441 Salovey, P., 176, 177, 187 Sancho, A., 361 Sapolsky, H., 294–295 Saubaber, D., 251 Schein, E. H., 180, 269 Schein, V. E., 353 Schelling, T., 223 Schlender, B., 57 Schlesinger, L., 279 Schmitt, E., 66, 143 Schneider, B., 125 Schön, D. A., 34, 36, 152,
169–170, 172, 173, 177, 187
Schuler, D. A., 241
Schultz, H., 277, 397, 401 Schutz, A., 253 Schwartz, H. S., 29 Schwartz, J., 5, 191, 218 Scott, W. R., 22n.3, 48, 54,
64, 66, 297, 301, 442 Seale, R., 289 Sebenius, J. K., 185, 214,
221, 224, 226 Seeger, J. A., 92 Seely Brown, J., 259 Sellers, P., 3 Selznick, P., 253 Semler, R., 155, 156 Senge, P. M., 22n.2, 34,
35–36 Sennett, R., 343 Seper, J., 17 Sérieyx, H., 6 Shakeshaft, 354 Shakespeare, W., 293, 354 Shanahan, B., 288 Shaw, R. B., 51 Shea, T., 419 Shu Li, 40 Shuttle, J. L., 125 Siehl, C., 155 Sijan, L., 258, 264 Silverman, B. S., 377 Simmel, G., 344 Simmons, A., 259 Simon, H., 143 Simon, H. A., 11, 26–27,
29, 49, 384, 442 Simonson, I., 354 Sims, H. P., Jr., 155 Sinegal, J., 144, 257 Sirianni, C., 153 Sjostrand, S., 66 Skilling, J. K., 5, 6, 149 Sloan, A. P., Jr., 356–360
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Name Index492
Smith, B., 415, 416–417, 418, 420, 421, 432
Smith, C. S., 145 Smith, D. K., 111–112,
114, 186 Smith, F., 241, 362 Smith, H., 214,
215–216 Smith, R., 358–360 Smith-Doerr, L., 59 Snook, S., 36–37, 182 Sobel, R., 4 Solomon, R. C.,
401–402, 405 Song, M. L., 255–256 Sorkin, A. R., 77 Spector, R.,
275–276, 277 Springarn, N. D., 96 Sproull, L., 60 Stack, J., 149 Starbuck, W. H., 85 Starkweather, D., 96 Staubus, M., 147 Staw, B. M., 40, 296 Stein, B. A., 374 Stein, N., 145 Stephenson, R., 133 Stern, R. N., 242 Sternberg, R. J.,
22n.2, 177 Steward, T. A., 59 Stires, D., 65, 82 Stockdale, J., 258 Stockman, D., 216 Stogdill, R., 178 Strauss, G., 157 Stross, R. E., 143 Stubbart, C., 193 Summers, L., 71, 73, 83 Sunderman, G. L., 240
T Tagliabue, J., 65 Takagi, H., 290 Taleb, N., 20, 55 Tarrant, J. J., 4, 7 Taylor, F. W., 48, 49 Taylor, M., 290 Terkel, S., 308 Tetlock, P. E., 40 Thatcher, M., 352, 437 Thomas, E., 398 Thompson, J. D., 48,
49–50, 166, 441 Thompson, M. P., 22n.3 Thorndike, E. L.,
175–176 Thorsrud, E., 153 Tilliette, B., 149 Toffl er, B. L., 25 Tomsho, R., 91 Topoff, H. R., 52 Torvalds, L., 87 Townsend, 353 Traub, V., 193 Treacy, M., 400 Trieschmann,
J. S., 439 Trist, E., 153 Trost, C., 38 Trump, D., 443 Tsutsumi, Y., 265–266 Tversky, A., 40 Tyson, L. D., 151
U Uchitelle, L., 128, 134 Uhlmann, E. L., 354 Updike, J., 108 Urwick, L., 48 Ury, W., 214, 221–222 Useem, J., 8
V Vaill, P. B., 289, 307, 345,
346, 435 Valian, D., 354 Vallejo, J., 257 Van Velsor, E., 352 Varian, H., 143 Varsavsky, M., 361 Vaughan, D., 8, 192,
193, 218 Vella, M., 271 Veres, J., 285 Voss, J. F., 22n.2 Vroom, V. H., 348, 361
W Wageman, R., 159 Wahba, M. A., 125 Wald, M. L., 191 Waldrop, M. M., 67 Wall, T. D., 154 Wallach, S., 282–283, 287 Wallin, C., 275 Walton, S., 229 Washington, G., 279 Waterman, R. H., 125,
135, 140, 143, 148, 160, 320–322, 361, 362, 402, 405
Watson, N., 157 Watson, t., 166 Wayne, l., 277 Weatherford, J. M.,
262–263 Weber, M., 48, 49, 343 Weckler, D. A., 160 Weddle, C. J., 353 Weick, K. E., 22n.2, 253 Weigl, H., 231 Weiner, S. S., 304 Weis, J., 413–415
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Name Index 493
Weisbord, M. R., 162 Weiss, C. H., 304 Weitzel, J. R., 349 Welch, J., 3, 4, 162–163,
205, 257, 375, 443 Wellins, R. S., 113 West, C., 83 West, T., 280–281,
282–283, 284–285, 288 Westerlund, G., 66 Wheat, A., 157 Wheeler, J. V., 186 White, R., 177–178 White, R. P., 352 White, R. (Robert), 92–93 White, R. W., 123 Whitman, M., 87 Whitmyer, C., 404 Whitsett, D. A., 154 Whyte, W. F., 150
Wiersema, F., 400 Wildavsky, A. B., 9 Wilkinson, A., 134 Williamson, O., 168, 442 Wilson, C., 353 Wilson, J., 353 Wilson, T., 231–232 Wilson, W., 225 Wimpelberg, R. K., 19,
325–326 Winter, S. G., 384–385, 441 Witt, J. L., 72 Wolf, C., 145 Wolfe, C. R., 22n.2 Woodruff, R., 389 Woodward, J., 299 Worley, C., 135 Wozniak, S., 80 Wright, R., 259–260 WuDunn, S., 132
Wyatt, J. B., 259–260, 278n.1
Y Yang, J. L., 220 Yankelovich, D., 151 Yeltsin, B., 199 Yetton, P. W., 348, 361 Yodgetts, R. M., 320,
323, 324 Yorks, L., 154 Young, C. E., 134 Yukl, G., 178, 346
Z Zachary, G. P., 211,
212–213, 215 Zellner, W., 398 Zoghi, C., 154 Zott, C., 252, 307
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494
A “Above the Call” citizen award, 258 Absenteeism, 128 Academy of Management Journal (AMJ),
439–440 Accessibility, of human resource leaders,
362–363 Accountability: need for personal, 153;
team, 112, 115, 186 Accreditation review, as symbol, 303 Action planning, 56 Action theories, 169–175, 187 Activism, 233–235 Adaptability: human resource dilemmas
and, 132–138; and values, 435–443 Adhocracy, 85–86, 88, 89 Administrative component, 78 Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ),
439–440 Adversarial tactics, 222–224 Adversaries: appealing to self-interests of,
335–336; coercive tactics with, 333–334, 386, 425; letting go of, 225
Advertisements, plans as, 303 Advocacy and inquiry, 172–173 Advocates, 363–367 Afghanistan, 46, 101, 312 Age, organizational, 63–64 Agency problem, 76–77, 384 Agenda setting, 204, 214–216, 425
Agreeableness, 179 Aircraft carrier organization, 45–46, 54 Aircraft industry, 89 Airline industry: aviation ecosystem and,
238–239; cultural turnaround in, 272, 274–275; human resource practices in, 136, 143
Al Quaeda, 24, 29, 101, 248 Alcohol, 129 Alignment: of frames with situations, 12,
317–320; of rewards with business suc- cess, 146–148; structural, 382–383
All-channel network, 105–106, 107 Alliances, 204, 218–220 Alternative scenarios, for reframing in
action, 328–339. See also Scenarios Ambiguity: in adhocracy, 85; coping with,
36–41; cultural differences in toler- ance for, 273; framing and, 36–41; level of, and choice of frame, 318, 319; in organizational change, 383; as orga- nizational characteristic, 32–33; of performance assessment, 208; self-protection and, 33, 173; symbols and, 253. See also Uncertainty
American Cast Iron Pipe (Acipco), 137 American Customer Satisfaction Index,
144 American fl ag, 248 American football teams, 108, 110
S U B J E C T I N D E X
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Subject Index 495
American Journal of Sociology, 167 American Medical Association
(AMA), 240 American Sociological Review, 297 American Telephone & Telegraph
(AT&T), 89, 133, 390 “Amtran” case study, 29–31, 32–33, 36 Anchoring, 12 Andersen Worldwide, 5, 75 Anger, gender expectations and, 354 “Anne Barreta” case study, 165–166, 169,
170–171, 172–173, 180, 328 Annual conventions, 265 Anthropology, 14, 16, 253 Antiwar movement, 233–234 Apathy, 129 Appearance and image: causality and,
293–294; focus on, 296, 297, 298–299, 308; power and, 306–307. See also Theater
Apple Computer: ecosystem of, 236; structure of, 79–80
Architects, 356–360 Armstrong International, 260 Artistry and artistic approach: charac-
teristics of, 20; to leadership, 20–21, 433–434, 435–443, 437–438; versus rational-technical approach, 20–21; to reframing, 433–434, 437–438; in using symbols, 339–340
Ascardio, 151 Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), 58 Aspirations, 26–27 Assembly-line mentality, 127–132 Assessment: ambiguity of, 208; symbolic
view of, 304 Associated Press, 13 Assumptions and beliefs, testing,
171–172, 424 Atomized organization, 67–68 Attack ad, 367
Authority: collapse of, 202; exercising, 330–331; leadership and, 343; and partisans, 201–202, 204, 209, 233, 235; perspectives on power and, 201, 209–210; position power and, 202, 203, 204, 209, 219, 235, 343; realign- ment of, in organizational change, 383; in teams, 103, 104; in vertical coordi- nation, 54, 60. See also Power
Authorship, 402–403, 406 Autocratic leadership style, 178 Automobile factory work, 127–131, 133 Automotive industry, 113, 133, 270–271,
356–360, 363–367 Autonomy: in divisionalized organization,
83–85, 90; encouraging employee, 150–152; versus interdependence, 75; of nurses, 94–96; of organizations versus society, 242–246; of profession- als, 82–83; work design and, 152–153, 155. See also Interdependence; Self- managing teams
Aviation ecosystem, 238–239 Avoidance: of confl ict, 126, 182, 184, 386,
420; as obstacle to learning, 36; in Theory X, 126; uncertainty, 200, 273
Awards, 275, 287, 288
B Balcony, going to the, 421 Balinese pageants, 299 Bankruptcies, corporate, 8 Barbarians at the Gate (Burrough and
Helyar), 231–232 Bargaining: collective, 304–305; ethical
issues of, 224–228; mutual gains, 305; in organizational change, 386–388; in political frame, 196, 197, 209; positional, 221; principled, 221–222; relational concepts and, 200–201; skill of, 214, 221–224; value claiming
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Subject Index496
Bargaining: (Continued) in, 222–224; value creating in, 221–222, 224
Baseball teams, 107–108, 110 Basketball teams, 109, 110 Battle of Britain, 348 Behavior, interpersonal. See Interpersonal
relationships Behavioral Theory of the Firm, A (Cyert,
March, Pfeffer, Salancik), 441 Belgium, 216–218 Bell System, 89 Ben and Jerry’s Homemade, 400–401 Benefi ts, 144 Berwind Corporation, 84 Best Buy, 145 Beth Israel Hospital, restructuring of, 94–96 “Big 5” model of personality, 179 Big Mac, 61, 64 “Big Three” model, 374 Biotechnology fi rms, 59 Birmingham (England) City Football
Club, 351–352 Black swans, 20, 55. See also Unexpected
events Blaming: bureaucracy, 27–29; in dra-
maturgical approach, 301; due to misreading system dynamics, 35–36; others, 171, 424; persons, 25–27, 28, 32, 73, 193, 194, 422; politics and, 193, 194; thirst for power, 28, 29
Blessings, securing, 219–220 Blink (Gladstone), 11, 443 Blink process. See Rapid cognition BMW, 51, 270–271 Boards, 57, 197 Body counts, 56 Boeing, 89, 113, 266–267 Bonding: through organizational culture,
253, 269, 278, 427–428, 432; through rituals, 263–264
Bonus plans, 148 Bosnia, 202, 258 Bottom-up change, and choice of frame,
319, 320 Boundary confl ict, 207 Boundary-spanners, 57–58, 60, 186 Brazil, 155–156 British Airways, 34 Budweiser, 254 Built to Last (Collins and Porras), 256,
269, 320–321 Bureaucracy: blaming the, 27–29; critique
of, 209; features of, 48; machine, 80–82, 88, 89, 90, 92; professional, 82–83, 88, 89; rigidity of, 76; self- protection in, 225; stagnant, 90; structure versus, 51; Weber’s theory of, 48, 49
Business schools, isomorphism among, 298
Business Week, 257, 275, 364, 380; business best-seller list, 441–443
Business Wire, 353
C Cadillac, 359, 360 California: Enron and, 208, 227; female
politicians in, 355 Camp David treaty, 221–222 Capitalism, 245–246 Caring, 227, 403–405, 428, 430–431 Carnaud et Metal Box, 148–149 Carnivals, organizations as, 16 Catalysts, 360–363 Cause-and-effect relationships: appearance
and, 293–294, 299; power attribution and, 306; understanding complex, 34–36
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Department of Homeland Security and, 74; relationship of FBI and, 16–18, 29
Centralization. See Vertical coordination
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Subject Index 497
Ceremonies, 264, 265–267, 276–277, 286–288, 393, 396, 408–409. See also Rituals
Challenger space shuttle, 8, 191–194, 195–196, 207, 208, 213, 218
Change: agenda setting for, 214–216, 425; confl ict and, 385–388; culture and, 388–393; diffi culties of, 374–379, 393–394; economics’ view of, 384–385; emotional intelligence and, 176; getting others to, 171, 184; human resource frame for, 378, 379–382, 394–396; and loss, 388–393; model of, 393–396; political activism and, 233–235; political frame for, 378, 385–388, 395–396; political map- ping for, 216–218; power volatility and, 205, 230–232, 245; reframing, 373–396; research and models of, 374; restructuring and, 87–91, 300; stages of, 394–396; structural frame for, 378, 382–383, 395–396; and structural pro- gression in teams, 110, 116; symbolic frame for, 378, 388–393, 394–396; symbols and, 254; systemic approach to, 378–379; systemwide, job enrich- ment and, 151, 152, 154
Change, rapid. See Turbulence and rapid change
Change agents, 219–220, 374, 382, 393 Change strategy, 393–396 Chaos, 254 Charisma, 203–204, 205, 321 Charter, team, 111 Charter schools, 239–240 Chase Manhattan, 321 Cheerleaders, cultivating, 219 Chess masters, 11 Chevrolet, 357, 359 Chief executive offi cers (CEOs): compen-
sation of, 157; as heroes and heroines,
257, 260–261, 344; politics and, 197. See also Senior executives
Children: as partisans, 202; treating work- ers like, 127, 130–131, 150
China: anti-piracy efforts of, 197–198; Communist Party leaders in, 371–372; contradictory directions in, 34; eco- nomic reform in, 133, 145; human rights abuses in, 404–405; isolation of, 220; job security loss in, 145; political opposition in, 202; social networks in, 58; unemployment in, 145
Choice, 435–443 Chrysler Corporation, 360; political lead-
ership in, 363–367 “Cindy Marshall” case study, 327–338,
340, 361 Circle network, 105, 106 Circuit City, 145 Circular causality, 34–35 Cisco Systems, 280 Citibank, 91–93, 321 Civil rights movement, 233 Classic Coke, 388–390 Cluelessness, 3–10, 21 CNN, 6, 73, 295 Coaching, leadership through, 349–350 Coal miners, 152–153 Coalitions: building, 214, 218–220,
387; organizations as, 194, 195, 197, 198–201, 209; power and decision making in, 201–206
Coca-Cola, 157, 197, 388–390 Coercion, 126, 203, 334–335, 366, 386, 425 Coercive isomorphism, 298 Cognitive maps, 22n.2 Cola wars, 388–390 Colgate Palmolive, 257 Collaboration, political, 201, 224 Collective bargaining, 304–305. See also
Labor unions
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Subject Index498
Collective unconscious, 252, 253 Collectivism, 273 Colleges and universities: downsizing in,
132; isomorphism among, 298; poli- tics of, 196; storytelling in, 259–260; symbolic planning of, 303; symbolic structure of, 300
Colleges and universities, presidents: atti- tudes of, toward planning, 303; female, 355; power of, 205, 214, 306, 307; presidents of, multiframe thinking of, 325, 326
Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 191, 193–194
Columbia space shuttle, 191–194, 207, 213, 218
COMDEX, 212, 222 Comedy, 295 Commando team, 100–101, 102, 116 Commitment: authorship and, 403;
downsizing and, 135, 145; of lead- ers, 346; requirements, and choice of frame, 318, 319; in teams, 186. See also Loyalty
Committees, 180 Common ground: symbols to unite,
318–319, 427; in teamwork, 185 Communication: of belief in people, 362;
determining channels of, 216; mul- tiframe approach to, 315; open, 172; in organizational change, 382, 395; through rituals and ceremonies, 266, 286–288; self-protective, 173–175; through stories, 259–261, 270, 370–371; through symbols, 254, 346; of vision, 346, 369–370
Communities of practice, 220 Community, 256 Compaq, 86, 236, 363–367 Compensation, executive, 157 Competing for the Future (Hamel and
Prahalad), 400
Competition: human resource frame and, 132–137; myth of fair, 208; playful, 281, 285–286; political frame and, 16, 208, 245. See also Confl ict
Competitive advantage: diversity as, 282–283; government policy as, 240–241
Complexity: coordination and, 73; cop- ing with, 36–41; environmental, 27; framing and, 36–41; human resource choices and, 132–137; manage- rial thinking and, 23–42; organi- zational change and, 378–379; as organizational characteristic, 31; organizational decision making and, 26–27; organizational learning and, 33–36; of organizations, 23–42; and peculiarities of organizations, 29–33; proliferation of, 6–7; rapid cognition and, 12, 37, 38, 39–40; team struc- ture and, 102
Computer engineering team, 280–290 Conditional openness, 224, 225 Confl ict: as asset, 185–186, 206–207;
avoidance of, 126, 182, 184, 386, 420; centrality of, 195–196, 206, 225; cultural, 207; employee- management, 128–132; eruption of suppressed, 385–386, 420–421; ethics and, 405–407; in groups and teams, 184–186; horizontal, 207; inner, 259; interface, 207; interpersonal, 165–179, 184–186; level of, and choice of frame, 318–319, 320; management of, 207, 333–336; multiframe approach to, 314; multiple lenses and, 313; organi- zational change and, 385–388; politics and, 195–196, 225, 385–388; in public school case study, 413–434; quasi- resolution of, 200; scenario for han- dling, 333–336; structural view of, 206, 422–423; vertical, 207. See also Politics
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Subject Index 499
Confl ict laboratories, 162 Conformity, 74–75. See also Standards
and standardization Conscientiousness, 179 Conseco, 8 Consideration (for employees), 178 Constituents. See Stakeholders Consultants, failure of, to improve
organizations, 9 Consumer versus corporate power,
242–246 Continental Airlines, 272, 274–275 Contingency theories, 345,
348–350 Contract employees, 148 Control(s): blaming, for failure, 27–29;
employee resistance to, 128–131; fear of losing, 141; innovation and, 375–376; loose versus tight, 75–76; of power distribution, 205–206; in professional bureaucracy, 83; restruc- turing and, 88; in Six Sigma, 375–376; Theory X and, 126, 141; top-down, 234–235; in vertical coordination, 56
Conventions, 265, 267 Conversations: about ethics, 227–228;
plans as excuses for, 303 Coordinating roles or units, 57–58, 60 Coordination: in adhocracy, 85–86; lateral,
54, 56–59, 60, 73, 85, 100; in machine bureaucracy, 80–82; methods of, 54–60; in professional bureaucracy, 82–83; in simple structure, 79; structural design and, 52–68, 69, 422–423; structural dilemmas of, 73; vertical, 54–56, 59, 60; in webs of inclusion, 86–87. See also Interorganizational coordination
Core process or technology: employee involvement in, 148; structure and, 63, 64–65
Corporate Culture and Performance (Kotter and Heskett), 269
Corporate Women Directors International, 353
Costco Wholesale Corp., 144, 146, 157, 257
Courage, 19, 436 Creativity: confl ict and, 207; play and,
269, 285–286; symbols and, 267. See also Innovation
Credibility, personal, 208 Cricket teams, 110 Crisis, reframing in, 311–312 Criteria, objective, in negotiations, 222 Cross-functional teams, 94 Cross-training, 153 Cultural differences: confl ict and, 207;
framework of, 272–274; in human needs, 125; in management, 273–274; reactions to, 248
Culture, 249, 272–274, 390 Culture, organizational: bonding and,
253, 263–264, 269, 278, 427–428, 432; change and, 388–393, 395; confl ict of, 207; examples of, 252, 270–272, 274–277, 280–290; and FBI-CIA rela- tionship, 17–18; of high-performing teams, 279–290; in high-school prin- cipal case study, 426–428, 429; history and, 336, 370, 371–372, 426–427; of innovation, 270–271, 376–377; and leadership, 269; negative, 269, 393, 426–427; overview of, 269; of owner- ship, 147; shaping of, 269; slippage in, 277; spirit and soul in, 399–409, 428–433; success and, 269; symbolic forms and, 254–269; symbolic frame and, 16, 17–18, 249, 251–253. See also Symbolic frame; Symbols
Culture’s Consequences (Hofstede), 272–274, 442
Customer attraction: ceremonies and, 266; diversity policies and, 158; story- telling and, 261
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Subject Index500
Customer-based groupings, 53 Customer satisfaction: employee satisfac-
tion and, 275–277; hiring for, 143; reengineering for, 93–94
Customer service: organizational cul- ture for, 275–277; storytelling about, 261, 276
Cynicism: about dramaturgical/institu- tional approach, 299; about politics, 189–190, 213, 214, 220, 339
D Daimler Benz, 367 Dallas Cowboys, 108 Data General, Eagle Group, 280–290 “David King” case study, 411–434 Death notifi cation ritual, 264 Decentralization: coordination and, 73;
globalization and, 68; goals and, 65; human resource requirements and, 132–133; in lateral coordination, 60, 62, 73; of operations, 357–358; in self-organized teams, 101. See also Lateral coordination
Deception: by frustrated employees, 129–130; in organizations, 29–31, 32, 33, 36; about rules of the game, 226–227; self-protection and, 173
Decision making: access to, as source of power, 204, 406; bargaining and, 221–224, 225; complexity of, 27, 312–313; ethical, 225–227; framing effect and, 40; in groups and teams, 186–187; with Model I theory-in-use, 170, 171, 174–175; multiframe view of, 314; negotiation and, 221–224, 225; participation in, 155–157, 363; planning and, 303; political dynam- ics in, 195, 196, 200–206; power and, 201–206; reactive and crisis-oriented, 90; relational concepts of, 200–201;
relationships and, 168; role models and, 258–259; “satisfi cing” view of, 26–27; structure and, 168
Defensiveness, 169–171, 173–175, 424 Delegation, leadership through, 349–350 Dell Computer Corporation, 33, 86, 236 “Delta Corporation,” 391–393 Democratic leadership style, 178 Democratic presidential candidates,
340, 354 Democratic workplace, 155–157 “Den mother,” 289 Denny’s Restaurants, 157 Dependency: and leadership, 343;
and power, 196–197, 219. See also Interdependence
Deregulation, 89 Developing countries: corporate power in,
246; ethical outsourcing in, 404–405; skill gap in, 133
Diagnosis, making an accurate, 36–41 Differentiation: integration versus, 73; in
structural design, 52, 69, 422 Digital Equipment (DEC), 86, 89, 212, 366 Dilbert, 121, 131 “Dilbert principle,” 8 Dilbert Principle, The (Adams), 443 Directing, leadership through, 349–350 Direction setting: as political skill,
214–216; spiritual leadership and, 436–437; in teams, 186
Discipline of Market Leaders, The (Treacy and Wiersema), 400
Discrimination lawsuits, 157–158 Disk drive industry, 64 Distribution of power, 205–206, 365 Divergent interests. See Interests Diversity: appearance of, 300; as group
asset, 185–186, 282–283; politics and, 194; power and, 406; promotion and management of, 157–159, 406
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Subject Index 501
Diversity offi cer, 300 Division of labor, 47, 52, 59 Divisionalized form, 83–85, 88, 90, 92–93 “Doctor Fights Order to Quit Maine
Island,” 315–317 Double bind, 36 Doubling up, 129 Doubt, 185 Downsizing: alternatives to, 145–146;
benefi ts and costs of, 134–135; and dumbsizing, 134; reengineering and, 91; trends in, 132, 134, 145
Drama, organizational, 293–308 Dramaturgical theory, 16, 249, 294,
296–299. See also Theater Dreamliner, 266–267 Duke University, women’s basketball
team, 109 Dukes vs. Wal-Mart, 158 Dumpster Ball, 129 DuPont, 93
E Eagle Group, 280–290 Early wins, 395 Eastern cultures, 40–41 Eastern Europe, 202, 206 Eastman Kodak, 93–94 EBay, 87, 256–257 “Economic Action and Social Structure”
(Granovetter), 167–168, 441 Economic Institutions of Capitalism, The
(Williamson), 442 Economic theory, 15, 122, 167, 384–385 Ecosystems: business-government,
240–241; organizational fi elds and, 298; organizations as political agents in, 230, 235–246; political dynamics of, 236–246; public sector, 238–240; soci- ety, 242–246
Effective Executive, The (Drucker), 254
Effectiveness: criteria for success versus, 324–325; dramaturgical/institutional view of, 297; in human resource lead- ership, 362–363; leadership, 345–351; managerial, 322–326; of multiframe approaches, 320–325; organizational, 320–322; in political leadership, 364–367; political view of, 232; in structural leadership, 359–360
Effort, 346 Egalitarianism, 155–157, 160 Egg McMuffi n, 61 Egypt, 221–222 E-mail, 66 Elite schools, 300 Elites, 204 Emotional intelligence (EI), 175–177,
187, 361 Emotional Intelligence (Goleman),
176–177 Emotions: symbols and, 247–248; theater
and, 295 Employee-management confl ict, 127–132,
304–305, 319. See also Labor unions Employee orientation rituals, 262, 271,
275, 282 Employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs), 147 Employees: empowering, 93–94, 114, 115,
149–157; frustrated, 127–131; hiring the right, 143; keeping, 143–159. See also Human resource management; People
Employment contract, changes in, 132–137
Empowerment: bogus, 152; in high-school principal case study, 424; human resource leadership and, 361, 363; in organizational change, 395, 396; organizational culture for, 270–271; power and, 201; practices
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Empowerment: (Continued) for, 149–157, 331; reengineering for, 93–94, 150–151; in self-managing teams, 114, 115, 154–155, 160, 161; self-protection versus, 225
Enron: culture of, 269; deception in, 32, 36, 75, 226–227; ethical laxity of, 397–399; executive compensa- tion at, 157; explanations for demise of, 25, 26, 28; fi nancial secrecy of, 149–150; loss of soul of, 397–399, 400; McKinsey and, 9; and politics of getting ahead, 208; preexisting beliefs and, 40; surprise at demise of, 31–32
Enterprise Rent-a-Car, 143 Entrepreneurial culture, 270–271 Entrepreneurs: funding of, symbolic view
of, 307–308; internal, 214; myths and stories about, 254–255, 260–261. See also Start-up companies
Environment: complexity of, 27; dramaturgical and institutional views of, 297; human needs and, 123–124; organizational ecosystems and, 235–246; organizational power and, 242–246; restructuring due to shifts in, 89, 300, 359–360; as source of uncer- tainty, 49–50; structure and, 49–50, 51–52, 63, 65, 89, 359–360
Environmental activism, 233, 234 Environmental sustainability, 406–407 Equity model, 147–148 Errors of omission, 182 Ethics: Aristotelian, 401–402; conver-
sations about, 227–228; human resource frame for, 402, 403–405; and moral reasoning, 225–227; political frame for, 402, 405–407; and politics, 207–209, 224–228; principles for, 225–227; reframing, 397–409; soul and, 399–409; structural frame for,
402–403; symbolic frame for, 402, 407–409
Evaluation: multiframe view of, 314; symbolic view of, 304
Evolution, 384–385 Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change, An (Nelson and Winter), 384–385, 441
Excellence: ethic of, 402–403, 427–428, 430; research on organizational, 320–322
Execution (Bossidy and Charan), 443 Executive committees, 57 Executive compensation, linking, to stock
price, 77 Existing goals, 66 Expectations: perception and, 36–37, 38,
39–40; performance and, 126; power of, 40; for women versus men, 353–354
Experience: openness to, 179; refl ection on, 12; as source of power, 203; struc- tural leadership effectiveness and, 359; symbolic leaders’ interpretation of, 367, 369
“Experimental Schools Project,” 385–386, 387
Experimentation, 185, 360 Expertise: fl uid, 12; in high-performing
teams, 111–112; structural leadership effectiveness and, 359
External Control of Organizations, The (Pfeffer and Salancik), 243–244, 441
External pressures, 65 Extroversion, 178–179 Exxon, 163, 199
F Factories: employee autonomy in,
150–151; employee frustration in, 127–131; organizations as, 15–16, 402–403
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Failure: of change efforts, 374–379, 393–394; due to cluelessness, 3–10, 18; covering up, 32; fallacious explanations of, 25–29; due to lack of imagination, 19–20; due to political pressures, 191–194, 195–196, 197–198, 207, 213; to prevent catastrophe, 19–20, 23–25; systemic causes of, 25, 28, 378–379; of top-down control, 234–235
Fairy tales, 258 Faith, 407–409, 427, 431 Families: informal norms of, 182–183;
as organizations, 7; organizations as, 16, 403–405; power in, 202; socializa- tion in, 166; women executives and, 354–355
Favoritism, 76 Feast of Fools, The (Cox), 278 Featherbedding, 129–130, 138n.1 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
24–25, 238–239 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):
Department of Homeland Security and, 74; relationship of CIA and, 16–18, 29; whistleblower of, 208
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 53–54, 72–73, 295
Federal Express (FedEx): human resource management of, 125, 142–143, 146, 362; political strategy of, 241
Federal Register, 373 Feedback, 153, 163 Feeling, as personality dimension, 178–179 Feminine cultures, 273 Fields, organizational, 297–299 Fighter pilots, 258, 263–265 Filters, 11. See also Frames Financial reports, sharing, with
employees, 149–150 First impressions, 215–216
Fit: people-organization, 122, 137, 143; structure, 47, 89
Flatter structures, 67 Followers: and power of leaders, 306–307;
readiness and maturity of, 349–350; and servant-leadership, 361, 369, 436
FON, 361 Football teams, American, 108, 110 Ford Motor Company, 51, 128, 270, 271,
357, 359, 360, 364 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 401 Fortune, 149; America’s most admired
companies, 4; best companies for minorities, 157; best companies to work for in America, 122, 137, 275; global 100 companies, 353; most admired global airlines, 275; most admired global company, 275
Founders: myths and stories about, 254–255, 260–261, 371, 391–392; as social architects, 356
Four-frame model: applied, in high-school principal case study, 428–433; devel- opment of, 14; government agency illustration of, 16–18; in management books, 14–15; multiframe thinking with, 18–20, 22, 41; overview of, 18, 21; plu- ralistic approach to, 41. See also Frames; Human resource frame; Multiframe thinking; Political frame; Structural frame; Symbolic frame
Frames and framing: breaking, 12–14; changing versus conserving, 39–41; concept of, 10–12; for coping with ambiguity and complexity, 36–41; error and, 12, 37; for ethics, 402–409; infl uence of, on reality, 40, 42n.2; inte- grating, 311–326, 393–396, 411–434; leadership according to, 355–372; managers’ preferences in, 325–326; matching, to situations, 12, 317–320,
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Frames and framing: (Continued) 338–340; model of four organiza- tional, 14–21; multiframe thinking and, 18–20, 22, 41; for organizational change, 377–396; pluralistic approach to, 40–41; rapid cognition and, 11–12, 37, 38, 39–40; as source of power, 204; terms and metaphors for, 10–11, 22n.2. See also Four-frame model; Human resource frame; Multiframe thinking; Political frame; Reframing; Structural frame; Symbolic frame
Framing effect, 40 France, 131–132 Free-market capitalism, 245–246 Friendly-fi re incident, 36–37, 38, 39,
182, 193 Friends, 204, 218–220, 225, 421–422 Frontline, 120 Frustration, employee, 127–131 Funders, managing impressions with,
307–308 Future: leadership and, 435–443; and let-
ting go of past, 390–391; vision and, 255–256, 369–370
Future search, 162 FzioMed, 110
G Gain-sharing plans, 147 Games, plans as, 303 Garbage-can scripts, 301–302 Gay employees, 158–159 Gazprom, 199 Geico, 254 Gender: culture and, 273; discrimination
and, 158, 328, 340, 354; interpersonal dynamics and, 169, 263, 328; and leadership, 351–355; organizational structure and, 86; power and, 353–354; and reframing, 338–339; stereotypes, 352, 353
General Electric (GE), 3, 80, 199, 205, 321; Six Sigma at, 374, 375; survival of, 245; Work-Out conferences of, 162–163
General managers, 322, 323 General Managers, The (Kotter), 320, 322,
323, 324 General Motors (GM), 93, 163, 246, 270,
271, 346; management by wander- ing around in, 362–363; NUMMI joint venture of, 160–161, 360; Saturn division of, 113–115, 360; structural leaders of, 356–360
Generality, 227 Genetic predispositions, 123–124 Geographically-based groupings, 53 Geographically-dispersed groupings,
67–68 Germany, 143, 367 Gillette, 245 Glasnost, 205–206 Glass ceiling, 340, 353–355 Global corporations: cultural differences
and, 272–274; power of, 229–230, 237–238, 242–246; structural design of, 58, 59, 65, 68
Globalization: organizational complexity and, 6, 438; and person-organization relationship, 132–138, 145; and society-organization relationship, 242–246
GLOBE, 272 GM, 51 Goal-setting theory, 122 Goals and goal-setting: defi ning specifi c
and measurable performance, in teams, 111, 114–115; multiframe approach to, 315; performance control and, 56; politics and, 196, 197, 198–199, 200–201; shared, 172; structure and, 63, 65–66, 76, 198–199; in teams, 111, 185; unstated types of, 66; vague or fuzzy, 297, 298, 318; values versus, 255
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Goldman Sachs, 113 Good to Great (Collins), 269, 320, 321,
346, 443 Google: creation of, 279–280; and FON,
361; human resource management at, 139, 143, 377; structure of, 10, 113
Google Scholar (GS), 440 Gore, W. L., 113 Government: ecosystems of, 238–241;
failure of, to improve organizations, 9–10; politics and, 197–198, 199, 234–235, 238–241; women leaders in, 355. See also Public sector
Government agencies: bumbling of, 4–5; bureaucratic rigidity in, 76; decep- tion in, 29–31, 32–33, 36; ecosystems of, 238–241; fl aws of restructured, 72–73; goal setting in, 198, 199; politi- cal mapping of, 216–218; politics and, 192–193, 195–196, 198, 199, 238–241; strategies for infl uencing, 241; subop- timization of, 53–54; as theaters, 301. See also Public sector
Grassroots action, 233–235 Great Depression, 360, 367 Greatest hits, from organization studies:
Behavioral Theory of the Firm, A (Cyert and March), 200–201; cita- tion analysis of, 42n.1, 439–440; “Economic Action and Social Structure” (Granovetter), 167–168; “Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, An” (Nelson and Winter), 384–385; External Control of Organizations, The (Pfeffer and Salancik), 243–244; “Iron Cage Revisited, The” (DiMaggio and Powell), 297–299; Organization (March and Simon), 26–27; Organizations in Action (Thompson), 49–50; “Theory of the Firm” (Jensen and Meckling), 76–77
Green activism, 233, 234 Grieving, 252–253, 264. See also Loss Griping, 393 Group interventions, 162–163 Groupings, in structural design, 52–54 Groups: assets and liabilities of, 180;
culture of, 279–291; decision mak- ing in, 186–187; forms of, 103–106, 180; in high-school principal case study, 416–434; informal networks in, 183–184; informal norms in, 182–183; informal roles in, 181–182, 288–289; interpersonal confl ict in, 184–186, 424; leadership of, 186–197; process and dynamics of, 180–187; task and process levels of, 180. See also Team headings
Guiding team, 395 Gulf War, early 1990s, 46
H Hardball, 194 Hardy Boys, 283, 284, 285, 286 Harley-Davidson, 113, 252 Harvard Business Review, 176 Harvard Business School, 144 Harvard University: attempted
restructuring of, 71, 83; female president of, 355; structure of, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 82–83; symbolic elements of, 254, 300
Headless giants, 90 Headquarters: divisional managers’ rela-
tionship with, 84–85; local managers’ relationship with, 81–82
Healing, 252–253, 390–391 Health care insurers, 240 Heart: ethics and, 402; giving as a mat-
ter of, 308; symbols and, 248. See also Soul; Spirit and spirituality
Heart of Change, The (Kotter and Cohen), 394
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“Helen Demarco” case study, 29–31, 32–33, 36, 319–320
Heroes and heroines: leaders and, 342, 344, 437; as symbolic elements, 257–259, 260–261, 264, 276; values and, 437
Hertz, 143 Hewlett-Packard (HP), 321; Compaq
merger negotiations in, 363–367; founders of, 356, 364, 371; human resource management in, 362; political leadership in, 363–367; structure of, 75, 79, 83
Hierarchy: decision making and, 168; of motives, 225–226; of needs, 124–125, 126, 424; promotion in, 130; system blindness in, 35; in teams, 104–105; web of inclusion versus, 86–87
High-performing teams: characteristics of, 111–112, 114–115; culture and, 279–291; political frame for, 281; secrets of success of, 281–282, 289–290; structure and, 111–113, 280–281; symbolic frame for, 279–291. See also Teams
High-school principal case study, 411–434 High-technology fi rms: adhocracy in,
86; lateral coordination forms in, 57, 59, 65
Higher education institutions. See Colleges and universities
Hillcrest Corporation, 165–166 Hippocratic Oath, 11 Hiring, 143, 270–271 History: lack of, in culture, 426–427;
releasing negative, 393; symbolic use of, 336, 370, 371–372, 391–393
Home Depot, 3–4, 135, 257 Homeland Security, Department of:
Hurricane Katrina and, 5, 53–54, 72–73; structural fl aws of, 72–73,
74. See also U.S. homeland defense organizations
Homework, structural leadership effec- tiveness and, 359
Honesty, 346 Honorifi c goals, 66 Hope, 252, 308, 369 Hope Dies Last (Terkel), 308 Horse trading, 219–220, 221, 426 Hospitals: client-based groupings in, 53;
divisionalized form in, 83; redundancy in, 74; restructuring of, 94–96
House-system school, 411–434 How to Get Rich (Trump), 443 Human capacity: and employment con-
tract, 132–137; and work redesign, 152–154
Human needs: hierarchy of, 124–125, 126, 424; for self-actualization, 127–131, 226; theories of, 122–126
Human psyche, 252, 253 Human resource frame, 117–187; assump-
tions of, 121–132, 136; for ethics, 402, 403–405; for FBI-CIA relationship, 17; global forces and dilemmas in, 132–138, 145; for high-school principal case, 424, 429, 432; interpersonal dynamics in, 165–179, 187; leadership in, 356, 360–363; management book based on, 15, 16; for managerial effectiveness, 323, 324–325, 326; for organizational change, 378, 379–382, 394–396; for organizational effectiveness, 321, 322; organizational metaphor for, 16, 18, 402; to organizational processes, 314–315; overview of, 18, 21, 117–118; pioneers of, 121–122, 139–140; for power, 201; scenario for, 331–333; situations appropriate for, 318–320; strengths and weaknesses of, 339, 356, 360–363. See also Employees; People
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Human resource management: barriers to progressive, 141, 161–162; basic strate- gies for, 142; comprehensive approach to, 159–161; credo or philosophy for, 141–143, 424; global forces and, 132–138, 145; high-involvement practices for, 141–164; improving, 139–164; invest-in-people approach to, 135–138, 139–164; lean-and-mean approach to, 134–135, 136–138; for loyalty versus adaptability, 132–138; organization development and, 162, 163–164; traditional, assembly- line practice of, 127–132. See also Employees; People
Human resource requirements: changes in, 67–68, 132–134; gap in availability and, 133
Humility, 346 Humor, 268–269, 285–286, 400, 403 Hurricane Katrina: bumbled response to,
5–6, 72–73, 295; Homeland Security organization and, 53–54, 72–73; U2 video about, 295
Hustlers, 356, 363 Hygiene factors, 153
I “I Have a Dream” speech (King), 255–256,
369, 426 IBM, 274; ecosystem of, 236; Microsoft
and, 211, 222–223; organization devel- opment and, 163; structure of, 75; val- ues of, 369–370, 401
Image. See Appearance and image Imagination: failure of, 19–20; for
restructuring, 93 Imitation, 297–299 Implementation, structural leadership
and, 360 Implicit theories, 22n.2
Impressions, managing, 307–308. See also Theater
Improvisational jazz, 109 Impulsive organizations, 90 In Search of Excellence (Peters and
Waterman), 320–321 Inclusion, web of, 86–87, 95–96, 105 Incompetence, 8 Indifference, zones of, 205 Individualism, 273 Industrial analysts, 48 Infallibility, doubting one’s, 185, 186 Infl uence: of authorities and partisans,
201–202, 204, 209, 233, 235; building, through networking and coalitions, 218–220, 425–426; inquiry and, 366; with Model I theory-in-use, 170, 171; of organizations versus environ- ment, 242–246; sources of power and, 203–205, 233–235. See also Power
Informal cultural players, 288–289 Informal exchanges, 57, 286–288 Informal group norms, 182–183 Informal networks, 183–184, 220. See also
Networks Informal roles, 181–182, 288–289 Information: agenda setting and,
214–215; ambiguity and, 33, 173–175; ignoring or misinterpreting, 3–10, 174–175; political infl uence and, 218; providing, for employees, 149–150; as source of power, 203
Information revolution: job changes and, 133; lateral networks and, 58–59; orga- nizational complexity and, 6
Information technology: decision making and, 312; structure and, 63, 64, 66–67
Initiating-structure style, 178 Initiation rituals, 262–263, 271, 275, 282 Innovation: confl ict and, 207; control
and, 375–376; culture for, 270–271,
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Innovation: (Continued) 376–377; process of, 374–379; sym- bolic frame for, 391–393. See also Creativity
Inquiry, advocacy and, 172–173 Inspiration, leadership for, 346 Institutional Shareholders Services
(ISS), 366 Institutional theory, 249, 296–297 “Institutionalized Organizations” (Meyer
and Brown), 441 Institutions and Organizations (Scott), 442 Integration: differentiation versus, 73; of
frames, 311–326, 393–396, 411–434; structural, 52, 69, 422–423. See also Coordination
Intel, 236 Intellectual property protection, 197–198 Intelligence, 346 Interdependence: versus autonomy, 75;
and politics, 194, 196–197, 213; team- work and, 106–109. See also Autonomy
Interdisciplinary care teams, 96 Interests: and centrality of confl ict, 194,
195–196, 206, 225; and coalitions, 198–199, 209–210; focus on, versus positions, 221–222; mapping, 217–218
Interface confl ict, 207 Internal schemata, 38–39 International Harvester, 149 Interorganizational coordination: com-
plexity of, 31; networks for, 58–59; suboptimization and, 53–54
Interpersonal competence, 169, 175, 187 Interpersonal relationships, 165–179;
building political, 214, 218–220, 365–366; dynamics of, 168–177, 187, 424; emotional intelligence and, 175–177, 187; in groups and teams, 180–187; key questions of, 168–169; Model I, 169–171, 173–175, 184, 424;
Model II, 172–175; negotiation and bargaining in, 221–224; personal con- tact in, 416–420; social embeddedness and, 167–168
Intimidation, 334–335 Introversion, 178–179 Intruder story, 12–13 Intuition: personality dimension,
178–179; in reading or responding to situations, 38, 313, 317, 319, 411
Invest-in-people strategy: barriers to, 141, 161–162; benefi ts of, 135–136, 140, 141; human resource manage- ment for, 139–164; versus lean- and-mean strategy, 136–138; pioneer of, 139–140
Iran-Contra scandal, 17 Iraq: antiwar movement and, 234; com-
plexity of change in, 378; contractors in, 148; friendly-fi re incident over, 36–37, 38, 39, 182, 193; lack of author- ity in, 202, 206; soccer team of, 279; stories in, 371; technology and resis- tance in, 66–67
Iron Cage Revisited, The (DiMaggio and Powell), 297–299, 441
Islam, 248 Isomorphism, 297–299 Israel, 221–222 Issue framing, 204 Ivy League schools, 300
J J. D. Power Award, 275 Japan: business-politics intersection in,
241; manufacturing processes of, 160; manufacturing standards in, 55; reli- gious pluralism in, 40–41; Seibu cer- emony in, 265–266
Jazz, improvisational, 109
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Job descriptions, overdefi ned, 74–75, 127–131. See also Role defi nition
Job redesign and enrichment, 152–154, 156, 424
Job security, 424; changes in employ- ment contract and, 132–137, 145; organizational culture and, 270–271; providing, 145–146
Johnson & Johnson, 256 Judging, as personality dimension,
178–179 Jungles, organizations as, 16, 207–208,
405–407 Justice, 405–407, 431
K Kent State University, 233–234 Kenwood, 321 Kidney transplant, 99–100, 102 KKR, 236–237 Knowledge-based groupings, 53 Kodak. See Eastman Kodak
L Labor unions: bargaining with, 221, 222,
304–305, 319; bottom-up political action and, 233; dramaturgical view of bargaining with, 304–305; organizational democracy and, 156; participation and, 160–161; to redress employee-management power imbalance, 130
Laissez-faire leadership style, 178 Language, specialized, 284 Large-group interventions, 162–163 Large organizations: complexity of, 31;
as interorganizational networks, 59; mortality of, 245; power of, 229–230, 237–238, 242–246; structure and, 87, 89. See also Global corporations; Organizations
Last Link, The (Crawford), 14, 15 Lateral coordination, 54, 56–59, 60; in
adhocracy, 85; complexity and, 73; information technology and, 66–67; in teams, 100; vertical coordination ver- sus, 60–68, 73
Leaders: characteristics of good, 345–347; cluelessness problem of, 3–10, 18; frame preferences of, 325–326; heroes and, 342, 344, 437; human resource, 331–333, 356, 360–363; managers ver- sus, 343–344; multiframe thinking of, 311–326, 411–434; political, 211–228, 333–336, 356, 363–367; power attri- bution and, 306–307, 343; reframing case studies of, 311–326, 411–434; restructuring by new, 89; scenarios for reframing by, 327–340; situational, 348–350; spiritual, 407–409, 428–434, 436–437; structural, 329–331, 356–360; symbolic, 336–338, 356, 367–372; transforming versus transac- tional, 368; women as, 351–355. See also Managers; Senior executives
Leadership, 309–438; artistic approach to, 20–21, 433–434, 435–443, 437–438; concept of, 342–344; context of, 344–345; contingency/situational theories of, 345, 348–350; effective, research on, 322, 326, 345–351; ethi- cal, 224–228, 402–409; by example, 283–284, 368; in four-frame model, 18; gender and, 351–355; as gift-giving, 428; in groups and teams, 186–187, 283–284; human resource, 331–333, 356, 360–363; management versus, 343–344; models of, 345–351; multiframe approaches to, 309–310, 311–326, 411–434; one-best-way view of, 345–347; organizational cul- ture and, 269, 279–280; political,
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Leadership (Continued) 211–228, 333–336, 356, 363–367; rational- technical approach to, 20–21; reframing, 341–372, 435–443; shared, 186–187; structural, 329–331, 356–360; symbolic, 336–338, 356, 367–372. See also Management
Leadership styles: in human resource frame, 356, 360–363; models of, 177–179, 348–350; in political frame, 356, 363–367; in structural frame, 356–360; in symbolic frame, 356, 367–372; of women versus men, 352–353
Lean-and-mean strategy, 134–135, 136–138
Learning: in complex organizations, 33–36; individual versus organiza- tional, 34; with Model I theory-in-use, 170; in organizations, 148–149. See also Organizational learning
Lebanon, 202 Legitimacy: appearance and, 296;
authority and, 330, 343; isomorphism and, 299
Lenses: frames and, 11. See also Frames Leveraged buyout (LBO), 236–237, 318 Levi Strauss, 404–405 Liberia, 202 Likert Scale, 164n.1 Lincoln Electric, 145–146 Linux, 10, 87 Listening, 332, 366, 382, 404, 416–420 Literary criticism, 296 Lobbying, 241 Longwall method, 152, 153 Loss, 388–393. See also Grieving Lotus, 236 Love, 400, 401, 403–405 Loyalty: downsizing and, 135, 138; human
resource dilemmas and, 132–138;
organizational culture and, 270–271. See also Commitment
M Machine bureaucracy, 80–82, 88, 89, 90;
restructuring, to divisionalized form, 92–93. See also Bureaucracy
Mackey Middle School, 368 Magic, 253 Mahdi army, 203 Managed health care, 75–76, 240 Management: artistic approach to, 20–21,
433–434, 435–443, 437–438; cultural differences and, 273–274; failed efforts to upgrade, 9; leadership versus, 343–344; multiframe thinking and, 19–20; rational-technical approach to, 20–21; shortcomings of, in com- plexity, 23–42; theatrical approach to, 293–308; traditional, and self- actualization needs, 127–131. See also Leadership
Management books: best-sellers, 380–381, 400, 441–443; four frames represented in, 14–15; on stories and leadership, 259
Management by wandering around, 362–363
Management science, 15 Management styles, 177–179 Managerial grid, 346–347, 350 Managers: ambivalence of, toward pro-
gressive human resource practices, 161–162; assumptions of, about people, 125–126; cluelessness prob- lem of, 3–10, 18; compensation of, 157; ethical principles for, 224–228; frame preferences of, 325–326; group dynamics and, 180–187; interpersonal relationships and, 165–179; leaders versus, 343–344; multiframe thinking
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of, 311–326, 411–434; myth of “super,” 312–313; personal styles of, 177–179; as politicians, 211–228, 244; power gap of, 204; realities of life for, 312–313, 411; reengineering failures and, 91; reframing in action for, 327–340, 411–434; research on effectiveness of, 322–326; sense-making by, 36–41; symbolic role of, 244. See also Leaders; Senior executives
Managing Public Policy (Lynn), 320, 322–323, 324
Manipulative strategies, 225, 226–227, 334–335, 340
Manufacturing jobs, decline in, 133 Maps and mapping: for coping with
ambiguity and complexity, 36–41; frames and, 11, 22n.2; political, 214, 216–218, 365, 426; rapid cogni- tion and, 12, 37; system, 34. See also Frames
March of Dimes, 76 Marion Laboratories, 136 Marketing concept, 244, 245–246 Markets and Hierarchies (Williamson),
442 Marriott Hotels, 260–261 Mary Kay Cosmetics, 266 Masculine cultures, 273 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 124–125,
126, 424 Matrix structures, 58, 60, 358, 422 Matsushita, 68 Matthew 16:26, 409n.1 Mazda, 146 McDonald’s: action planning at, 56; struc-
tural dilemma of, 81–82; structure of, 60–61, 63–64, 65, 68, 74, 80; symbols of, 254
McKinsey & Co., 9 McWane, 120–121, 137
Meaning: rituals and, 261–262, 286–287; spirit and, 290–291, 409; symbols and, 248, 252, 253, 277, 389–390, 427. See also Sense-making; Spirit; Symbolic frame; Symbols
Meaningful work, 153–154, 407–409 Medal of Honor, 256 Medical diagnosis, 11–12 Meetings: confl ict in, 420–421; formal
and informal, 57; ground rules for, 423; for lateral coordination, 57, 60; multiframe approach to, 315; symbolic focus of, 287, 301–302
Memos, 218 Men: culture and, 273; interpersonal
dynamics and, 169, 263, 328; leader- ship styles and, 352
Men and Women of the Corporation (Kanter), 442
Mental maps. See Frames; Maps Mental models: for ambiguous and com-
plex situations, 36–41; concept of frames and, 10–11, 22n.2; tenacity of, 8. See also Frames
Mercedes, 270, 271 Merck, 321, 399, 400 Mergers: political leadership for, 363–367;
politics in, 231–232 Messes, 41. See also Ambiguity;
Complexity Metaphors: for frames, 10–11, 22n.2, 402;
for organizations, 15–16, 18, 296, 402; root, 22n.2; as symbolic elements, 268–269, 274
Metric system adoption, 9–10, 373–374 Microkids, 281, 284 Microsoft, 197; ecosystem of, 236;
human resource management at, 143, 376–377; IBM and, 211, 222–223; political management at, 211–213, 221, 222–223; structure of, 34, 113
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Microsoft Windows, 87; NT, 211–213, 221, 222
Middle East negotiations, 221–222 Middle managers, restructuring and, 88 Might-makes-right approach, 184 Mimetic isomorphism, 298 Mindlessness, 19 Minorities, 340, 406 Mintzberg’s model, 78–87, 88, 93, 97 Misanthrope, The (Molière), 220 Mission, team, 111, 115 Mission statements, 255, 302 Model I theory-in-use, 169–171, 173–175,
184, 424 Model II theory-in-use, 172–175 Model T, 357, 359 Modern management techniques,
dramaturgical view of, 293–294, 296, 297
Modern Times, 127 Moments of truth, 363 Monocratic bureaucracy, 48 Moral mazes, 208 Moral reasoning: conversation about,
227–228; questions and tests of, 226–227; stages of, 225–226
Morale: downsizing and, 134, 135; job redesign and, 153–154, 156; organiza- tional change for, 376–377; participa- tion and, 150–152; structure and, 48, 50–51, 96, 104, 105, 113
Morality: politics and, 207–209, 224–228; taught in stories, 260. See also Ethics
Morton Thiokol Corporation, 192–193, 195–196, 208, 218
Motivation: in invest-in-people approach, 136; job enrichment and, 153–154; leadership style and, 350; in lean-and- mean approach, 135; multiframe view of, 315; requirements, and choice of frame, 318; team performance and,
280, 281; in traditional assembly-line management, 130–131
Motivators, 153 Motorola, 148, 160, 374 MS-DOS, 211, 222–223 Multicentric organization, 59 Multiframe thinking: concepts of, 18–20,
21, 22, 41; for leaders and manag- ers, 309, 311–326, 411–434, 437–438; and matching frames to situations, 317–320; for organizational processes, 313–317; research on effectiveness and, 320–326. See also Four-frame model; Frames; Reframing
Multinational corporations. See Global corporations
Music, 408–409 Mutual gains bargaining, 305 Mutuality, 226–227 Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, 178–179 “Myopia of Learning, The” (Levinthal and
March), 442 Myths and legends: leadership models
as, 350–351; as symbolic elements, 254–257, 370–371
N Nabisco, 231–233, 236–237 Naïveté, 213, 221 Narcissism, 346 National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), 192–193, 195–196, 221
National Bureau of Standards, 373 National Health Service Corps (NHSC),
315–317 Natural selection, 384–385 Nature-nurture interplay, 123–124 NBC, Nightly News, 258 Near-death experiences, 270 Need, human, 122–126
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Subject Index 513
Negotiation: dramaturgical view of, 305; ethical issues of, 224–228; in political frame, 196, 197, 209, 366; skill of, 214, 221–224
Nepotism, 32 Networks: all-channel or star, 105–106,
107; building, 214, 218–220, 425–426; circle, 105, 106; geographically dis- persed, 67–68; human resource require- ments and, 132–133; informal, 183–184, 220; information technology and, 67; as lateral coordination form, 58–59, 60; political, 204, 214, 218–220, 425–426; as source of power, 204, 425–426
Neurolinguistic programming, 253 Neuroticism, 179 New Coke, 388–390 New Lanark, Scotland, knitting mill, 140 New Patterns of Management (Likert), 163 New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc.
(NUMMI), 160–161, 360 New York City: fi re and police depart-
ments, 46, 53, 342; Mayor Giuliani and, 311–312, 341–342, 348, 368. See also World Trade Center
New York Stock Exchange, 227 New York Times, 83, 137, 198, 241 Newcomers: in reframing case studies,
327–338, 411–434; reframing for, 340; rituals for, 262, 271, 275, 282; symbols and, 337, 391–393
Newsweek, 258 9/11 terrorist attacks: agency restructur-
ing after, 72–73; antiwar movement and, 234; failure to prevent, 19–20, 23–25, 27–28, 29; FBI-CIA relation- ship and, 17, 29; heroes of, 258, 342, 344; Mayor Giuliani and, 311–312, 341–342, 348, 368; organizational complexity and, 31, 33; organizational deception and, 32; police and fi re
department coordination in, 46, 53; standard operating procedures and, 55; symbols and, 252–253, 319. See also World Trade Center
No Child Left Behind Act, 239, 240 Nordstrom, 275–277 Normative isomorphism, 298 Norms, informal group, 182–183 North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD), 24–25 Northern Commercial, 276 Norway: Industrial Democracy Project
of, 153; participative decision making in, 155
Novo-Nordisk, 10 Nucor Corporation, 119–120, 121,
147, 156 NUMMI, 160–161, 360 Nursing, restructuring of, 94–96
O OAG (Offi cial Airline Guide), 275 Offi ce, The, 131 Offshoring, 133, 404–405 One-the-job training, 148–149 Open-book management, 149–150 Open space, 162 Open systems, organizations as, 31 Openness: conditional, 224, 225; in ethi-
cal decision making, 227; to experi- ence, 179; of human resource leaders, 362–363
Operating core: defi ned, 78; of machine bureaucracy, 81–82; of professional bureaucracy, 82–83; and restructuring, 88; of simple structure, 79
Opinion leaders, 204 Opportunity structures, 340 Organization chart: egalitarianism and,
156; of interconnected teams, 154; traditional, 44, 78, 86
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Subject Index514
Organization development (OD), 162, 163–164
Organizational change. See Change Organizational design: political dimen-
sion of, 232–233; restructuring and, 71–97; as stage design, 299–301; struc- tural assumptions and, 47; structural confi gurations for, 78–89. See also Structure
Organizational Ecology (Hannan and Freeman), 442
Organizational fi elds, 297–299 Organizational learning: complexity and,
33–36; evolution to, 201; need for, 33; perspectives on, 34–35
“Organizational Learning” (Levitt and March), 442
Organizational processes: multiframe per- spective on, 313–317; political dimen- sions of, 232–233; as theater, 301–308
Organizational theory: consolidation of, into four-frame model, 14, 41; plural- istic approach to, 41; symbolic frame and, 253
Organizations: ambiguity of, 32–33, 173; autonomy versus infl uence of, 242–246; as coalitions, 194, 195, 197, 198–201, 209; complexity of, 6–10, 12, 23–42; dark side of, 7, 242–246; decep- tion in, 29–31, 32, 33, 36; democracy in, 155–157; ecosystems of, 230, 235–246; failure of improvement strat- egies for, 8–10; fi t between people and, 122, 137, 143; goal-setting in, 198–201; metaphors for, 15–16, 18, 296, 402; as multiple realities, 313–317; new models of, 10; people and, 119–138; as political agents, 230, 235–246; as polit- ical arenas, 230–235, 246, 386–387; power distributions in, 205–206; power of, 229–230, 237–238, 242–246;
reframing change in, 373–396; rela- tionships in, 166–167; research on effective and successful, 320–322; soul and spirit in, 399–409, 428–433; sym- bolic elements in, 251–269; as temples, 16, 367–372, 407–409; as theaters, 293–308, 367; universal peculiarities of, 29–33; virtues and drawbacks of, 6–10. See also Large organizations
Organizations (March and Simon), 26–27, 442
Organizations in Action (Thompson), 49–50, 441
Orientations, 11. See also Frames OS/2, 211, 212 OSHA, 137 Outsiders: power sharing with, 406;
reframing for, 340 Outsourcing, trends in, 132, 135, 137 Overbounded systems, 205–206 Oversight: in divisionalized form, 84–85;
by stock analysts, 77 Oversimplifi cation: and complexity, 27,
200; in explaining organizational problems, 25–29
Ownership: agency problem and, 77; bar- riers to, 147, 161–162; downside of, 148; open-book management and, 147, 150; reward practices of, 146–148
P Palio, 251–252 Paradigms, 22n.2 Part-time employees, 132, 137 Participation: in decision making,
155–157, 363; encouraging, 150–152; failure of, 152; in high-school princi- pal case study, 424; in organizational change, 379–382; ownership and, 147; in self-managing teams, 114, 154–155, 160, 161
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Subject Index 515
Particularism, 54–55 Parties, 287 Partisans: authorities and, 201–202, 204,
209, 233, 235; sources of power of, 203–205, 233–235
Passion, 346, 428 Passivity, 129 Patriarchal organizations, 48 Patterns, changing versus conserving,
39–41 Pay differentials, 157 Pay for skills, 155 Pay practices, 144–145 Peace Corps, 369 Peak performance, 279–280. See also
High-performing teams People: blaming, 25–27, 28, 32, 73, 193,
194, 422; dimension of, in leadership styles, 348–350, 352; dimension of, in managerial grid, 346–347; exploitation of, 120–121, 122; fi t between organi- zations and, 122, 137; good practices for, 141–159; hiring the right, 143; investing in, 135–138, 139–164; needs of, 122–131, 424; and organizations, 119–138; self-actualization needs of, 127–131, 226; as source of uncer- tainty, 50. See also Employees; Human resource frame; Human resource management
Pepsi, 388 Perceiving, as personality dimension,
178–179 Perception, expectations and, 36–37, 38,
39–40 Performance: assessment of, ambiguity
of, 208; dramaturgical view of, 296; expectations and, 126; overestimating, 8; peak, 279–280; profi t-sharing plans and, 147; review, 377; team culture and, 269, 279–291; team structure
and, 111–113, 280–281. See also High- performing teams
Personal computer industry, 236, 366–367 Personal power, 203–204 Personal roles, 181 Personality: blaming failure on fl awed, 7,
25–26, 28, 32; informal group roles and, 181–182; and organization, 126–132; styles, 177–179; tests, 178–179
Perspectives: frames and, 11. See also Frames
Persuasion, 171, 366–367 Petrochemical industry accidents, 148 Pfi zer, 321 Pharmaceutical industry:
business- government ecosystems of, 240; confl ict management in, 387; human resource practices in, 136; research and development process in, 110
Philadelphia Eagles, 108 Philips, 68 Philosophy, 296 Physicians, rapid cognition of, 11–12 Pilots, 39, 55. See also Fighter pilots Pipe manufacturing, human resource
approaches in, 137 Piracy, 197–198 Pixar, 57 Placebo effect, 40 Plans and planning: multiframe view of,
313, 314; symbolic/dramaturgical view of, 296, 302–303; in vertical coordina- tion, 56
Play, 268–269, 281, 285–286 Pluralism, in worldview, 40–41 Point-of-sale terminals, 56 Polaris missile project, 293–294 Policies, in vertical coordination, 54–55 Policymaking: corporate infl uence on,
240–241; and organizational improve- ment, 8, 9–10
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Political action: bottom-up, 233–234; top-down, 234–235
Political action committees, 241 Political agents, organizations as, 230,
235–246 Political appointees, research on effective-
ness of, 322–323, 324, 325 Political arenas, 230–235, 246, 386–387 Political conventions, 267 Political correctness, 208 Political frame, 189–246; assumptions
of, 194–198, 201; centrality of confl ict in, 195–196, 205, 206; for ethics, 402, 405–407; for FBI-CIA relationship, 17, 29; goals and, 63, 65–66, 76, 198–201; for high-school principal case study, 425–426, 429, 432; leadership in, 356, 363–367; management book based on, 15, 16; for managerial effective- ness, 323, 324, 325, 326; for manag- ers, 211–228; morality in, 207–209, 224–228; for organizational change, 378, 385–388, 395–396; for organiza- tional effectiveness, 321–322; organi- zational metaphor for, 16, 18, 402; for organizational processes, 314–315; for organizations as arenas, 230–235, 246, 386–387; for organizations as political agents, 230, 235–246; overview of, 18, 21, 189–190; scenario for, 333–336; situations appropriate for, 318–320; strengths and weaknesses of, 339, 356; for team performance, 281
Political maps, 214, 216–218, 365, 426 Political science, 14, 16, 253 Politicians: female, 355; managers as,
211–228, 244, 333–336; principles for effective, 364–367; skills of, 211–224, 235–236; team leader as, 285
Politics: authorities and, 201–202, 209, 233, 235; blaming, for organizational
problems, 28; constructive, 169, 208–209, 210, 211–228, 425–426; ethics and, 207–209, 224–228; of get- ting ahead, 207–209; managers and, 211–228; negative attitudes toward, 189–190, 213, 220, 405; organizational failures and, 191–194, 195–196; par- tisans and, 201–205, 233; positive, 225–226, 228; as realistic and inevi- table process, 190, 194, 201, 213, 220, 225; relational concepts and, 200–201; suppression of, 205–206. See also Power
Population ecology, 385 Position: jockeying for, 196, 197–198, 231;
leadership and, 343, 344–345, 361; power, 202, 203, 204, 209, 361
Positional bargaining, 221 Post-it notes, 256, 376 Postconventional moral reasoning, 225 Power: as asset, 195–197; authority and,
201–202, 209, 233, 235, 343; build- ing coalitions of, 218–220; corporate, 229–230, 237–238, 242–246; and deci- sion making, 201–206; defi ned, 196; dependency and, 196–197, 219; distri- bution of, 205–206, 365; dramaturgical view of, 306–307; ethics and, 405–407; gender and, 353–354; in high-school principal case study, 425–426; human resource perspective on, 201; leader- ship and, 343, 366; mapping and assessing, 217–218, 220, 365; negative attitudes toward, 190; in overbounded and underbounded systems, 205–206; partisan, 201–205, 233; political frame and, 16, 195–197, 201–206; reality of, 201; scenarios for using, 333–336; self-protection and, 225; sharing, 405–407; sources and types of, 203–205, 233–235; structural
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Subject Index 517
perspective on, 201; team performance and, 281; thirst for, as source of orga- nizational problems, 28, 29; volatil- ity of, 205, 230–232, 245. See also Authority; Infl uence; Political frame; Politics
Power distance, 272 Power-sharing, ownership and, 147 Preconceptions, 39–41. See also Frames;
Mental models Preconventional moral reasoning, 225 Presentation. See Appearance and image Presentations, 219–220, 307–308 Presidents. See Colleges and universities,
presidents; U.S. presidents Pret à Manger, 10 “Price pyramid” cars, 359 Pride, 120 “Priest” or “priestess” role, 288 Primal Leadership (Goleman, McKee,
Boyatzis), 177 Prince, The (Machiavelli), 16,
377–378 Princeton University, 300, 355 Prisms, 11. See also Frames Prisoners of war (POWs), 258 Private sector, public sector intersection
with, 240–241 Problem solving: bargaining and, 221–224,
225; with Model I theory-in-use, 170, 171, 184; negotiation and, 221–224, 225; relational concepts of, 200–201
Problemistic search, 201 Problems, solutions as future, 32 Process-based groupings, 53 Procter & Gamble (P&G), 220, 245 Product-based groupings, 53 Product cycle time, rapid, 31, 132 Productivity: job enrichment and, 154;
participation and, 151–152; under
traditional management practices, 127–131
Professional bureaucracy, 82–83, 88, 89 Profi t-sharing plans, 147–148 Program Evaluation Review Techniques
(PERT), 293 Program Planning and Budgeting Systems
(PPBS), 293 Program reviews, symbolic, 304 Programs, to deal with complexity, 27 Promotion: from within, 146; in
factory, 130 Prophets, 367–372 Psychological withdrawal, 129 Psychology, 14, 16, 26; of human needs
and motivation, 122–132, 424; and personality/management styles, 177–179; of self-actualization needs, 126–131; and symbolic frame, 253
Public schools: ecosystems of, 239–240; employee skill defi cits and, 133; external pressures on, 65; goals of, 66; heroes in, 257; house-system approach to, 411–434; isomorphism among, 298; power in, 210; reform efforts for, 9, 82, 234–235, 239–240, 385–386, 387; reframing case study in, 411–434; symbolic structure of, 299–300; wom- en’s positions in, 353. See also School principals
Public sector: ecosystems of, 238–241; goal-setting in, 199; politics in, 197–198, 199, 238–240; private sec- tor intersection with, 240–241; symbolic evaluation in, 304. See also Government; Government agencies
Publix, 145
Q QDOS, 211, 222 Quadgraphics, 408–409
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Subject Index518
Quality, job enrichment and, 154 Quality movement and programs, 55,
159–161, 374–376 Quitting, 128
R R. J. Reynolds, 231–233, 318 Racial discrimination, 157, 158 Racial tensions, 420–421, 425, 431 Ranking system, 377 Rapid change. See Turbulence and rapid
change Rapid cognition (blink process): accuracy
in, 37, 38; characteristics of, 11–12; personal theories and, 39–40
Rashomon, 19 Rational approach: artistic approach
versus, 20–21, 437; characteristics of, 20; dramaturgical approach versus, 296, 297; to explaining organiza- tional problems, 28–29; illusion of, 312–313; political approach versus, 220; of structural frame, 15–16, 47, 48, 49, 339
“Rational man” view, 26–27 Raytheon, 158–159 “Reach and Grasp” case study, 327–338 Readiness, of subordinates, 349–350 Real Managers (Luthans, Yodgetts,
Rosenkrantz), 320, 323, 324 Realists, 364–365 Recognition, of heroes and heroines,
257–258, 276–277 Red tape, 27–28, 68, 76 Redundancy, 74 Reengineering: concept and practice of,
91; principles of successful, 96–97; successful cases of, 91–96, 150–151
Reengineering Management (Champy), 91 Referent power, 204 Refl ection, 12, 421, 432, 433–434, 437
Reframing: in action, 327–340, 411–434; artistry and, 21, 433–434, 437–438; benefi ts and risks of, 338–340; case studies of, 327–340, 411–434; change, 373–396; cluelessness problem and, 3–10, 18; concept of frame break- ing and, 12–14; of ethics and spirit, 397–409, 428–434; four-frame model and, 18–20, 41; gender dif- ferences and, 338–339; integrative case study of, 411–434; leadership, 341–372, 435–443; for new and tough situations, 12, 311–326, 327–340, 411–434; for newcomers, 340; orga- nizations as political arenas, 230–235, 246, 386–387; for outsiders, 340; power of, 3–22, 41; refl ecting and, 421–434; scenarios for, 328–338. See also Frames and framing; Multiframe thinking
Regime fall, 202 Relational concepts, 200–201 Relationship management, 177 Relationships. See Interpersonal
relationships Remember the Titans, 183–184 Reorganizing, multiframe view of, 314 Representations, 22n.2 Republicans, 204 Reputation, as source of power, 203 Resistance: assessing potential, 217,
219, 365; by frustrated employees, 129–130, 164; to organizational change, 378–379, 381–382
Resource allocation, 195, 196 Resource scarcity: confl ict and, 206, 425;
level of, and choice of frame, 318–319, 320; politics and, 16, 194, 195, 196, 213; power and, 201; simplifi cation and, 27
Responsibility charting, 112, 383, 423
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Subject Index 519
Responsibility taking: for interpersonal confl ict in groups, 186; with Model I theory-in-use, 171
Restructuring, 71–97; generic issues in, 87–91; perils of, 71–73, 90–91, 97, 358–360; principles of, 96–97; reasons for, 89–91, 319; reengineering and, 91–96; structural confi gurations and, 87–89; structural defi ciencies and, 47; structural dilemmas and, 73–76, 97; successful cases of, 91–96; tensions in, 87–89; theatrical, 300; troubled orga- nizations and, 90. See also Structure
Review committees, 57 Rewards: for cultural turnaround,
274–275; in human resource frame, 144–145, 146–148; as power base, 203, 219–220
Rigidity, 76, 435–436 Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, The
(Mintzberg), 302 Rites of passage, 262–263 Rituals, 261–265; for building signifi -
cance, 408–409; in case examples, 271, 275, 276, 282, 286–288; of initia- tion, 262–263, 271, 275, 282; of loss, 390–391; of transition, 266–267, 390–391. See also Ceremonies
Ritz-Carlton, 261 Rivet Hockey, 129 RJR Nabisco, 231–233, 236–237 “Robert F. Kennedy High School” case
study, 411–434 Role defi nition: in aircraft carrier, 46;
autonomy versus interdependence dilemma in, 75, 82; clarity versus creativ- ity dilemma in, 74–75, 81, 127–131; gap versus overlap dilemma in, 74; in high- performing teams, 112, 115; in struc- tural frame, 47, 52, 69, 74, 181; underuse versus overload dilemma in, 74
Role models: heroes and heroines as, 257–259; leading by example and, 283–284, 368, 428
Roles: change and realignment of, 382–383; formal, 181; informal, 181–182, 288–289
Rolex, 197 Rolls-Royce, 271 Roman Catholic Church, 262 Romania, 202 Routine: to deal with complexity, 27;
machine bureaucracy and, 81; work, 154
Rules: blaming, for failure, 27–28; ground, 423; mutual understanding of, 226–227; taught in stories, 260; in vertical coordination, 54–55
Russia, natural gas company in, 199
S Sabotage, 126, 129–130, 381 Safety needs, 424 Safety problems, workplace, 120–121,
137, 148 “Saints Are Coming, The,” 295 Sam’s Club, 144 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 401 Satisfi cing, 26–27 Saturn, 113–115, 360 Savings and loan crisis, 227 Scandals: in Catholic Church, 262; ethics
and, 208, 226–228, 387–398, 401; heroes and heroines and, 257; loss of soul and, 397–399, 401; reactions and remedies for, 401
Scandinavian Air Systems (SAS), 144–145, 363
Scanlon plans, 147 Scenarios: gender differences and, 338–
339; human resource, 331–333; politi- cal, 333–336; for reframing in
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Scenarios: (Continued) action, 328–340; structural, 329–331;
symbolic, 336–338 Schemata or schema theory, 22n.2 Scholarly literature, citation analysis of,
439–440. See also Greatest hits, from organization studies
School choice, 239–240 School principals: case study of, 411–434;
frame preferences of, 325–326; role change for, 382
Scientifi c management, 48, 49, 82 Scott Paper, 34, 134 Scripts: for alternative scenarios, 328–339;
deviation from, 305; for symbolic leaders, 368–372. See also Scenarios
Sears, 246 Seasonal ceremonies, 265 Seattle Computer, 222–223 Seattle Times, 266–267 Secrets to Winning at Offi ce Politics
(McIntyre), 15, 16 Seibu, 265–266 Selection, 143, 270–271, 282 Self-actualization needs, 125, 126–131, 226 Self-awareness, 177 Self-destructive intelligence syndrome, 7 Self-direction, Theory Y and, 126 Self-fulfi lling prophecies: managers’
assumptions about people as, 125–126; in political frame, 339; testing assump- tions and, 173
Self-interest, 207–209, 213, 224; appealing to adversaries’, 335–336
Self-management, 177 Self-managing teams/workgroups: char-
acteristics of, 113; human resource management and, 154–155, 160, 161; leadership of, 186–187; structure and, 100–101, 113–115
Self-protection: in interpersonal and group dynamics, 169–171,
173–175, 187, 424; political dynamics and, 225; system dynamics and, 35–36
Semco, 155–156 Senior executives: compensation of, 157;
as heroes and heroines, 257, 260–261, 344; and high-performing teams, 111, 114; position and, 344–345; rate of failure of, 8; research on effective- ness of, 322–326, 345–351; strategic planning drama and, 302; women as, 86, 351–355. See also Strategic apex
Sense-making: in complex and ambigu- ous situations, 36–41; failure of, 7–8; frames and, 10–12, 36–41; symbols and, 248
Sense of urgency, 394–396 Sensing, 178–179 Sensitivity, 215 Sensitivity training, 162 September 11, 2001. See 9/11 terrorist
attacks Servant-leader, 361, 369, 436 Service delivery, standardized versus
divergent, 62 Service jobs, action planning in, 56 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, The
(Covey), 443 Shareholders: agency relationship and, 77;
politics and, 197 Shoney’s, 157 Short-term results, sacrifi cing people for,
120–121, 141 Side payments, 200 Siena, Italy, 251–252 Signifi cance, 407–409, 431 Signing-up ritual, 282 Simple structure, 79–80, 89 Simplifi cation: and adherence to leader-
ship models, 350–351; approaches to, 36; and uncertainty avoidance, 200. See also Oversimplifi cation
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Single-loop learning, 170 Situational analysis, 38 Situational leadership, 345, 348–350 Situations: context of leadership and,
344–345; defi nitions of, 22n.2; match- ing frames to, 317–320, 338–340; misreading, 3–10; reading ambiguous and complex, 36–41, 313; reframing in new or tough, 12, 311–326, 327–340, 411–434
Six Sigma, 55, 374–376 Size, organizational: restructuring and,
89; structure and, 63–64, 80, 87 Size, team, 103, 111 Skilled incompetence, 175 Skills: gap between needs and, 132–133;
for interpersonal confl ict in groups, 184–185; invest-in-people strategy for, 135–138, 139–164; investing in training of, 148–149; lean-and-mean strategy for, 134–135, 136–138; pay for, 155; political, 190, 213–224, 235–236
Slack resources, 67 Sleeper cells, 101 Smoothing tactics, 184 Soccer coach, 351–352 Social architecture: importance of, 51–52;
structural frame and, 44, 297; struc- tural leadership and, 356–360
Social awareness, 177 Social categorizations, 22n.2 Social constructivist perspective, 42n.2 Social control, 202 Social embeddedness, 167–168 Social intelligence, 175–176 Social networking, 220. See also Networks Social psychology, 162 Social sciences: four-frame model and,
14, 15–16; power and, 203; structure and, 49
Socialization, 166
Society: corporate power and, 242–246; as ecosystem, 242–246; symbols in, 251–252
Sociology, 14, 15, 167–168, 253 Sociotechnical systems approach,
153, 154 Software industry: good human resource
practices in, 144–145; turnover rates in, 144
Solutions, win-win, 221–222, 224, 336 Somalia, 202 Sony, 197, 321, 356 Soul, 289–290, 397–399. See also Culture,
organizational; Spirit; Values Soul of a New Machine, The (Kidder),
280–289 Southwest Airlines: authorship at, 403;
executive compensation at, 157; human resource management at, 136, 143, 400; launching of, 254–255; self- directed teams at, 113; soul and spirit at, 400, 403, 404; symbolic elements at, 254–255, 257–258, 400
Southwest Bell, 89 Soviet Union, 205–206 Space shuttle disasters, 8, 191–194,
195–196, 207, 208, 213, 218, 221 Specialization: in high-performing teams,
111–112; self-actualization needs versus, 127–131; structure and, 47, 52, 53; team diversity and, 283
SPEED of Trust, the (Covey and Merrill), 15, 16
Spinelessness, 435–436 Spinning mills, 140 Spirit and spirituality: discipline of,
433–434, 436–437; innovation and, 376–377; organizational culture and, 269, 288, 290–291; in organizations, 399–409; reframing, 397–409, 428–434; symbolic frame and, 16; theater and, 295
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Subject Index522
Sports teams, 106–109, 110, 116, 279 Springfi eld Remanufacturing (SRC
Holdings), 149 SRC Holdings, 149 Stagnant bureaucracy, 90 Stakeholders: agenda setting and,
214–216; bargaining and negotiation with, 221–224, 225; building relation- ships with, 214, 218–220, 365–366; organizations as political agents and, 235–246; political frame and, 196, 199
Standard Brands, 231–232 Standard operating procedures (SOPs),
55, 80–81 Standards and standardization: in
machine bureaucracy, 80–81; in public education, 131; in Six Sigma, 375–376; technostructure and, 88; in vertical coordination, 55, 61, 62
Star network, 105–106 Starbucks, 277, 397, 400, 401 Starbucks Experience, The (Michelli), 15,
16 Start-up companies: myths about,
254–255; simple structure of, 79–80, 90. See also Entrepreneurs
Status differences, reducing, 156 Status quo, 435–436 Stereotypical goals, 66 Stock analysts’ role, 77 Stories and storytelling: negative,
426–427; role of, in organizational change, 391–392, 394; as symbolic ele- ments, 259–261, 270, 276, 284–285, 408; symbolic leadership and, 370–371
Straight from the Gut (Welch), 443 Strategic apex: defi ned, 78; in machine
bureaucracy, 80; in professional bureaucracy, 82, 83; and restructuring, 88, 89; in simple structure, 79. See also Senior executives
Strategic planning: dramaturgical view of, 302–303; multiframe view of, 314
Strategy: fl exible, and core values, 435–443; for organizational change, 393–396; structure and, 63, 65–66, 359–360; vision and, 214, 215–216
Strategy of Confl ict, The (Schelling), 223 Street fi ghts, 386 Structural confi gurations, 78–89 Structural frame, 43–118; assumptions
of, 47; basic concepts of, 45–69; on confl ict, 206, 422–423; for ethics, 402–403; for FBI-CIA relationship, 17; goals and, 63, 65–66, 76, 198–199; for groups and teams, 99–116; for high- school principal case, 422–433, 429, 432; intellectual origins of, 48–50; key questions of, 47, 52–54; leadership in, 356–360; management book based on, 14, 15–16; for managerial effectiveness, 323, 324, 325, 326; for organizational change, 378, 382–383, 395–396; for organizational effectiveness, 321, 322; organizational metaphors for, 15–16, 18, 402; for organizational processes, 314–315; overview of, 18, 21, 44; on power, 201; rational approach of, 15–16, 47, 48, 49; scenario for, 329–331; situations appropriate for, 318–320; strengths and weaknesses of, 339, 356–360
Structural Holes (Burt), 442 “Structural Inertia and Organizational
Change” (Hannan and Freeman), 442 Structural realignment, 382–383 Structure: confi gurations for, 78–89;
coordination methods and, 54–59, 73; decision making and, 168; design issues and options for, 47, 52–68, 69, 73–76; different, for unique c ircumstances, 62–68, 69; dilemmas
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Subject Index 523
of, 73–76, 97; fi t of, 47, 89; forms and functions of, 50–52; group and team, 99–116, 280–281; for high-performing teams, 111–113; imperatives of, 62–68; lateral, 56–59, 60, 73, 85; Mintzberg’s model of, 78–87, 88, 93, 97; param- eters in determining, 62–68; patholo- gies and pitfalls in, 73–76; political dimension of, 232–233; restructuring and, 71–97; strategy and, 63, 65–66, 359–360; as theater, 299–301; tight versus loose, 50–51, 68, 75–76; verti- cal, 54–56, 59; vertical versus lateral, 60–68, 73. See also Restructuring
Suboptimization, 53 Subway, 261 Success: celebrating early, 395; ceremonies
of, 266–267; criteria for effectiveness versus, 324–325; culture and, 269, 280–290; research on multiframe approaches and, 320–325; spirit and, 400–401, 436–437; symbolic explana- tions of, 269, 280–290, 294–295
Suicide attacks, 203 Supervisors, employee-centered versus
job-centered, 163 Support: attracting, through presenta-
tion, 297, 299–300, 307–308; friends and, 204, 218–220, 225, 421–422; leadership style of, 349–350; during organizational change, 382; providing, 331–333, 349
Support staff, 78, 88 Surgical team, 99–100 Surprises. See Unexpected events Survey research approach, 163 Survey Research Center, 163 Sustainability, 406–407 Symbolic frame, 247–308; assumptions
of, 253–254; dramaturgical theory and, 293–308; for ethics, 402, 407–409; for
FBI-CIA relationship, 17–18; for high-school principal case study, 426–428, 429, 430–433; leadership in, 356, 367–372; management book based on, 15, 16; for managerial effec- tiveness, 323, 324, 325, 326; for mana- gerial role, 244; for organizational change, 378, 388–393, 394–396; for organizational effectiveness, 321, 322; organizational metaphors for, 16, 18, 296, 402; for organizational processes, 314–315; overview of, 18, 21, 247–249, 251–253; scenario for, 336–338; situations appropriate for, 318–320; strengths and weaknesses of, 339–340, 356. See also Culture; Culture, organizational; Symbols
Symbols: for building signifi cance, 408–409, 431; defi ned, 252; emotions and, 247–248; forms of organizational, 249, 251–269, 408–409; funding and, 307–308; ineffective use of, 336–337, 339–340; negative, 267, 393, 426–427; organizational culture and, 266–277, 279–291; pervasiveness of, 251–253; plans as, 303; status, 156, 160; sym- bolic frame and, 16, 249; uses of, 252–253, 346, 372
System maps, 34 Systems: complex, 34–36, 378–379; gam-
ing the, 213; overbounded and under- bounded, 205–206, 423
Systems model with delay, 34–35
T T-groups, 162, 163 Taboo goals, 66 Taming of the Shrew, The
(Shakespeare), 354 Target, 254 Task forces, 57, 60
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Subject Index524
Task roles, 181 Tasks: dimension of, in leadership styles,
348–350, 352; dimension of, in mana- gerial grid, 346–347; specialization of, 127–131; and team dynamics, 180; and team structure, 102–110, 116
Tavistock Institute for Social Research, 152–153
Teachers: autonomy of, 75, 82–83; effects of structure on morale of, 50, 152; expectations of, and student behavior, 40; standardization and, 131
Team building: informal networks and, 183–184; process of, 182; programs, 162; spirit and, 291
Teams: accountability in, 112, 115, 186; all-channel or star network, 105–106, 107; characteristics of effective, 187; circle-network, 105, 106; confi gurations for, 103–106; contextual variables in designing, 102–103; culture- performance link- ages of, 279–291; diversity in, 185–186, 282–283; dual-authority, 104; dynam- ics of, 180–187; expertise in, 111–112; external relationships of, 186; goal- setting in, 111; guiding, 395; interper- sonal confl ict in, 184–186; leadership of, 186–187, 283–284; one-boss arrangement for, 103; organizational culture of, 279–291; organizing and structuring, 99–116; responsibility allocation in, 112, 115, 181; self- managing/self- organizing, 100–101, 113–115, 154–155, 160, 161; simple hierarchy, 104–105; size of, 103, 111; sports’, 106–109, 110, 116; structural progression in, 110, 116; structural questions for, 109–110; structure- performance linkages in, 111–113, 280–281; symbolic frame for, 249, 279–291; task-structure relationship
in, 102–110, 116; versus unstructured groups, 111. See also Groups; High- performing teams
Teamwork: and confl ict, 184–186; culture and, 279–291; determinants of suc- cessful, 109–110; hiring for, 143; in hospitals, 94–96, 99–100; and interde- pendence, 106–109
Technical quality, and choice of frame, 318
Technology: as source of uncertainty, 48; structure and, 48, 51–52, 89; upgrad- ing, 89, 379, 381
Technostructure, 78, 81, 82, 88, 89, 93 Telephone companies, 89 Temples, organizations as, 16, 367–372,
407–409 Temporary employees, 132, 137, 148 Terrorism, 203, 435. See also 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks; U.S. homeland defense organizations
Texaco, 157 Texas Instruments, 163, 321 Theater: as metaphor for organizations,
18, 296; organization as, 16, 293–308, 367; organization process as, 301–308; structure as, 299–301
Theories: for action, 169–175, 187; in-use and espoused, 169–175, 187; personal, 39–41, 169–175
Theory E and Theory O, 374 “Theory of the Firm” (Jensen and
Meckling), 76–77, 384, 441 Theory X, 125–126, 141, 150, 154 Theory Y, 125, 126 Thinking, as personality dimension,
178–179 Thiokol Chemical Company, 192–193,
195–196, 208, 218 Threats, making credible, 223–224 3M, 55, 256, 374–376 360-degree feedback, 163
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Subject Index 525
Through the Looking Glass (Carroll), 254 Tiger 01. See Friendly-fi re incident Time, 208, 231 Time-based units, 53 Tipping Point, The (Gladwell), 443 Titan (Chernow), 443 Tools: frames and, 11; wise use of, 13–14.
See also Frames Top-down change, 319, 377 Total quality management (TQM),
159–161, 374–376 Town hall meetings, 162–163 Toy factory, 150–151, 152, 154 Toyota, 34; NUMMI joint venture of,
160–161, 360 Tragedy, 295 Training: ethics, 401; in high-school prin-
cipal case study, 424; investing in, 148–149; for organizational change, 379–382; for progressive human resource practices, 161–164; for self-managing teams, 155; for team- building, 162
Transactional leaders, 368 Transforming leaders, 368 Transition rituals and ceremonies,
266–267, 390–391 Trophy husbands, 355 Trust: bargaining styles and, 223, 225;
and leadership, 346; organizational change and, 383
Tube wars, 281 Turbulence and rapid change: ad hoc struc-
tures in, 86; leadership and, 435–443; managers’ realities and, 312–313, 411; and need for organizational learning, 33; and need for structural change, 65; and person-organization relationship, 132, 145. See also Uncertainty
Turf confl ict: blaming, for organizational problems, 28; between FBI and CIA, 17, 29
Turnover: costs of, 143–144; poor fi t and, 143; poor human resource manage- ment and, 120, 121, 137; in software industry, 144
Tyco, 77 Tylenol, 256 Tyrants, 356
U U2, 295 Uncertainty: avoidance, 200, 273; cop-
ing with, 36–41; decision making in, 168; information technology and, 67; level of, and choice of frame, 318; organizational complexity and, 6, 32–33; politics and, 223; sources of organizational, 33, 49–50; structure and, 49–50, 65; symbols and, 253. See also Ambiguity; Turbulence and rapid change; Unexpected events
Unconscious, 252, 253 Underbounded systems, 205–206, 423 Unexpected events: dealing with, 36–41;
failure to imagine, 19–20; as organiza- tional characteristic, 31–32; reframing for, 311–312; standard operating pro- cedures and, 55
Unilateral action, 170, 171 United Airlines, 148, 157 United Automobile Workers (UAW): and
NUMMI, 161; and Saturn, 114 United Parcel Service, 50, 56 United States: corporate failures in,
8; diversity in, 158; failed policy initiatives of, 9–10; founders of, 279; metric system adoption in, 9–10, 373–374; multinational managers from, 273; space program of, 191–194. See also Government; Government agencies
U.S. Air Force, 258, 264–265 U.S. Army, 56, 100–101, 158
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Subject Index526
U.S. Congress: General Motors and, 365; initiation into, 262–263; lobbying of, 241; metric system legislation and, 9–10; 9/11 and, 252; politics in, 01, 220; space shuttle disasters and, 191, 192, 193, 195
U.S. Congressional Budget Offi ce, 133 U.S. Congressional Medal of
Honor, 258 U.S. Department of Education, 240 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 110 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, 239 U.S. Health and Human Services, 316 U.S. homeland defense organizations:
deception in, 32; failure of, to prevent 9/11 terrorist attacks, 19–20, 23–25, 27–28, 29; fl awed restructuring of, 72–73, 74; organizational complexity and, 31, 33; squabbling among, 16–18; suboptimization of, 53–54
U.S. House of Representatives, 355 U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 163 U.S. Justice Department, 17 U.S. Marine Corps, 264–265 U.S. Navy, 163, 294–295, 390–391 U.S. Postal Service, 163 U.S. presidents: campaign promises of,
374; election ceremonies and, 267; personal power of, 204; politics and, 189, 214, 215–216; 2008 Democratic candidates and, 340, 354
U.S. Senate, 192, 241, 262–263 Units: confl ict between, 207; quasi-
resolution of confl ict in, 200 Universities. See Colleges and universities University of California, Berkeley, 205 University of Michigan, Survey Research
Center, 163 Uplifting vision and strategy, 395 “Upper Echelons” (Hambrick and
Mason), 442
Urgency, sense of, 394–396 USS Kennedy, 45–46, 54, 69n.1
V Value: claiming, 221, 222–224; creating,
221–222, 224 Values: adaptability and, 435–443; appeal-
ing to, 337–338, 369–370, 427–428, 428, 430; loss of soul and, 397–399; as symbolic elements, 254–257, 408, 427–428; transmitting, through sto- ries, 260–261, 270, 284–285, 370–371. See also Culture, organizational
Vanderbilt University, 41, 259 Venezuela, health care participation in, 151 Vertical coordination, 54–56, 59; central-
ized organizations and, 358; lateral coordination versus, 60–68, 73
Vietnam War, 233–234, 258 Vinalhaven, Maine, 315–317 Violence, 414, 415, 417, 435 Vision: for change, 395; communicating,
346, 369–370, 395; effective leadership and, 345–346, 369–370; political lead- ership and, 214–216, 225; strategy and, 214, 215–216; as symbolic element, 254–257; symbolic leadership and, 369–370
Visionary companies, 320–321, 322, 436 Vivendi, 205 Volkswagen, 132 Volvo, 10
W Wal-Mart: discrimination lawsuit against,
158; ecosystem of, 237–238; image problems of, 229–230; power of, 229–230, 237–238, 245–246; Retail Link, 237; Sam’s Club, 144
Wal-Mart, Dukes vs., 158 “Wal-Mart effect,” 229
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Subject Index 527
Walker Information, 135 Washington Redskins, 108 Web of inclusion, 86–87, 88; restructuring
to, 94–96; star network and, 105 Wegmans, 122–123 Western cultures, unilateral worldview
in, 40 Westinghouse, 321 Whistleblowers, 32, 208 White House, 104, 216 Who Moved My Cheese? (Johnson),
380–381, 440, 443 Whole Foods: executive compensation at,
157; self-managing teams of, 113, 154 Wikipedia, 10 Wimps, 356, 360 Win-win approaches, 221–222, 224, 336 Windows NT, 211–213 “Wintel,” 236, 237 Wisdom of Teams, The (Katzenbach and
Smith), 111–112 Women: culture and, 273; discrimination
against, 158, 328, 354; glass ceiling for, 340, 353–355; interpersonal dynamics and, 169, 263, 328; as leaders, 351–355; power and, 353–354; prevalence of, in high positions, 353; reframing for, 340; structure and, 86
Work ethic, 131 Work-Out conferences, 162–163
Work redesign, 152–154, 156 Workforce characteristics: change in
requirements and, 132–133; diversity and, 158; organizational structure and, 63, 67–68; women and, 355
Workforce reduction strategies, 132, 137–138. See also Downsizing; Outsourcing
Workplace: accidents in, 148; democratic, 155–157; diversity in, 157–159
World Is Flat, The (Friedman), 443 World Trade Center: Mayor Giuliani and,
311–312, 341–342, 348, 368; rescue efforts at, 46, 258, 341–342; symbolic value of, 319. See also 9/11 terrorist attacks
World Trade Organization, 197 World War II, 279 WorldCom, 8, 22n.1, 90, 208
X Xerox, 199
Y Yale University, 300, 319
Z Zealots, 356, 367 Zones of indifference, 205
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This page constitutes a continuation of the copyright page.
Chapter Three text excerpts from Edmondson, 2006: From G. Edmondson, “BMW’s Dream Factory,” BusinessWeek, October 16, 2006. Copyright © 2006 McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Used with permission.
Figures 4-1 through 4-6: From Structuring of Organizations by Henry Mintzberg. Copyright © 1979. Published by Prentice Hall, Inc. Excerpted and reprinted by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ.
Exhibit 6-1: From Peak: How Great Companies Get Their Mojo from Maslow by Chip Conley. Copyright © 2007 by Chip Conley. Published by Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers. Used by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Chapter Six text excerpts from Hamper, 1992: From Rivethead: Tales from the Assembly Line by Ben Hamper. Copyright © 1986, 1987, 1988, 1991 by Ben Hamper. Reprinted by permission of Warner Books, Inc.
Chapter Seven text excerpts from Gunther, 2006: M. Gunther, “Queer Inc. How Corporate American Fell in Love with Gays and Lesbians. It’s a Movement,” Fortune, December 11, 2006. Copyright © 2006 Time Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
Chapter Eleven text excerpts from Fishman, 2006: C. Fishman, “The Wal-Mart Effect and a Decent Society: Who Knew Shopping Was So Important,” Academy of Management Perspectives, August, 2006. Copyright © 2006 Academy of Management. Permission conveyed via Copyright Clearance Center.
Chapter Thirteen text excerpts from Kidder, 1981: From The Soul of a New Machine by Tracy Kidder. Copyright © 1981 by John Tracy Kidder. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown and Company, Inc.
Chapter Seventeen text excerpts from Hoge, 2002: From W. Hoge, “Crashing, and Saving, the Old Lad’s Front Offi ce,” New York Times, September 14, 2002. Copyright © 2002 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted by permission.
Chapter Twenty Harvard Business School Case Study material: From Harvard Business School case study, copyright © 1974 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Harvard Business Case #9-474-183. This case was prepared by J. Gabarro as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Reprinted by permission of Harvard Business School.
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The Classic Leadership Resource Now In Its 4th Edition!
FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1984, Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal’s best-selling book has become a classic in the fi eld. Its four-
frame model examines organizations as factories, families, jungles, and theaters or temples:
• The Structural Frame: how to organize and structure groups and teams to get results
• The Human Resource Frame: how to tailor organizations to satisfy human needs, improve human resource
management, and build positive interpersonal and group dynamics
• The Political Frame: how to cope with power and confl ict, build coalitions, hone political skills, and deal with
internal and external politics
• The Symbolic Frame: how to shape a culture that gives purpose and meaning to work, stage organizational
drama for internal and external audiences, and build team spirit through ritual, ceremony, and story
This new edition contains a wealth of new examples from both the private and the nonprofi t sectors. In addition, the book
offers updated content and expanded discussions of self-managing teams, dramaturgical and institutional theory, change
theory, the “blink” process, “black swans,” and gay rights. There is an Instructor’s Guide available online.
The Authors
Lee G. Bolman holds the Marion Bloch Missouri Chair in Leadership
at the Bloch School of Business and Public Administration at the
University of Missouri–Kansas City. He consults worldwide to
corporations, public agencies, universities, and schools. He lives in
Kansas City, Missouri.
Terrence E. Deal is the retired Irving R. Melbo Clinical Professor at the
University of Southern California’s Rossier School of Education. He now
writes and makes wine in San Luis Obispo, California. He is the coauthor
of sixteen books, including the best-selling Corporate Cultures (with
A. A. Kennedy, 1982) and Managing the Hidden Organization (with W. A.
Jenkins, 1994). He lives in San Luis Obispo, California.
Reframing Organizations
R efra
m in
g O
rg a
n iza
tio n
s
Fourth Edition
LEE G. BOLMAN
TERRENCE E. DEAL Best-sel l ing authors of LEADING WITH SOUL
B O
LM A
N D
E A
L
Artistry, Choice, and Leadership Artistry, Choice, and Leadership
Fourth Edition
www.josseybass.com
MANAGEMENT/LEADERSHIP
- Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership, Fourth Edition
- Contents
- Preface
- Part One: Making Sense of Organizations
- Chapter 1: Introduction
- VIRTUES AND DRAWBACKS OF ORGANIZED ACTIVITY
- FRAMING
- SUMMARY
- NOTES
- Chapter 2: Simple Ideas, Complex Organizations
- COMMON FALLACIES IN EXPLAINING ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
- PECULIARITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS
- ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
- COPING WITH AMBIGUITY AND COMPLEXITY
- SUMMARY
- NOTES
- Part Two: The Structural Frame
- Chapter 3: Getting Organized
- STRUCTURAL ASSUMPTIONS
- ORIGINS OF THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE
- STRUCTURAL FORMS AND FUNCTIONS
- BASIC STRUCTURAL TENSIONS
- VERTICAL COORDINATION
- LATERAL COORDINATION
- DESIGNING A STRUCTURE THAT WORKS
- SUMMARY
- NOTE
- Chapter 4: Structure and Restructuring
- STRUCTURAL DILEMMAS
- STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATIONS
- GENERIC ISSUES IN RESTRUCTURING
- SUMMARY
- Chapter 5: Organizing Groups and Teams
- TASKS AND LINKAGES IN SMALL GROUPS
- TEAMWORK AND INTERDEPENDENCE
- DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL TEAMWORK
- TEAM STRUCTURE AND TOP PERFORMANCE
- SELF-MANAGING TEAMS: STRUCTURE OF THE FUTURE?
- SUMMARY
- Part Three: The Human Resource Frame
- Chapter 6: People and Organizations
- HUMAN RESOURCE ASSUMPTIONS
- HUMAN CAPACITY AND THE CHANGING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
- SUMMARY
- NOTE
- Chapter 7: Improving Human Resource Management
- GETTING IT RIGHT
- PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: TQM AND NUMMI
- GETTING THERE: TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
- SUMMARY
- NOTE
- Chapter 8: Interpersonal and Group Dynamics
- INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS
- MANAGEMENT STYLES
- GROUPS AND TEAMS IN ORGANIZATIONS
- SUMMARY
- Part Four: The Political Frame
- Chapter 9: Power, Conflict, and Coalition
- POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS
- ORGANIZATIONS AS COALITIONS
- POWER AND DECISION MAKING
- CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONS
- MORAL MAZES: THE POLITICS OF GETTING AHEAD
- SUMMARY
- Chapter 10: The Manager as Politician
- POLITICAL SKILLS
- MORALITY AND POLITICS
- SUMMARY
- Chapter 11: Organizations as Political Arenas and Political Agents
- ORGANIZATIONS AS ARENAS
- ORGANIZATIONS AS POLITICAL AGENTS
- POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS
- SUMMARY
- Part Five: The Symbolic Frame
- Chapter 12: Organizational Symbols and Culture
- SYMBOLIC ASSUMPTIONS
- ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOLS
- ORGANIZATIONS AS CULTURES
- SUMMARY
- NOTE
- Chapter 13: Culture in Action
- THE EAGLE GROUP’S SOURCES OF SUCCESS
- SUMMARY
- NOTE
- Chapter 14: Organization as Theater
- DRAMATURGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
- ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AS THEATER
- ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS AS THEATER
- SUMMARY
- Part Six: Improving Leadership Practice
- Chapter 15: Integrating Frames for Effective Practice
- LIFE AS MANAGERS KNOW IT
- ACROSS FRAMES: ORGANIZATIONS AS MULTIPLE REALITIES
- MATCHING FRAMES TO SITUATIONS
- EFFECTIVE MANAGERS AND ORGANIZATIONS
- MANAGERS’ FRAME PREFERENCES
- SUMMARY
- Chapter 16: Reframing in Action
- BENEFITS AND RISKS OF REFRAMING
- REFRAMING FOR NEWCOMERS AND OUTSIDERS
- SUMMARY
- Chapter 17: Reframing Leadership
- THE IDEA OF LEADERSHIP
- THE CONTEXT OF LEADERSHIP
- WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT GOOD LEADERSHIP?
- GENDER AND LEADERSHIP
- REFRAMING LEADERSHIP
- SUMMARY
- Chapter 18: Reframing Change in Organizations
- THE INNOVATION PROCESS
- CHANGE, TRAINING, AND PARTICIPATION
- CHANGE AND STRUCTURAL REALIGNMENT
- CHANGE AND CONFLICT
- CHANGE AND LOSS
- CHANGE STRATEGY
- SUMMARY
- Chapter 19: Reframing Ethics and Spirit
- SOUL AND SPIRIT IN ORGANIZATIONS
- SUMMARY
- NOTES
- Chapter 20: Bringing It All Together
- STRUCTURAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS
- HUMAN RESOURCE ISSUES AND OPTIONS
- POLITICAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS
- SYMBOLIC ISSUES AND OPTIONS
- A FOUR-FRAME APPROACH
- CONCLUSION: THE REFRAMING PROCESS
- NOTE
- Chapter 21: Epilogue
- COMMITMENT TO CORE BELIEFS
- MULTIFRAME THINKING
- Appendix: The Best of Organizational Studies
- SCHOLARS’ HITS
- SCHOLARS’ HITS
- POPULAR BEST-SELLERS
- References
- The Authors
- Name Index
- Subject Index