Research Paper

Sri Lanka AttacksAuthor(s): Amresh Gunasingham

Source: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses , Vol. 11, No. 6 (June 2019), pp. 8-13

Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26662255

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Sri Lanka Attacks: An Analysis of the Aftermath

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Synopsis This article examines the recent Easter bomb attacks in Sri Lanka, which have heightened post-war ethnic tensions and resurfaced civil war traumas amidst an ongoing political crisis. The scale and coordination of the bombings indicate an advanced logistical capability and structure among domestic Islamist networks, which will have to be effectively dismantled to prevent more devastating attacks in future. Against this backdrop, the motivations behind the terrorist attack as well as its implications for an already fragile post-war order in Sri Lanka are assessed in this article. To enhance long-term prospects for peace and stability, the country needs a comprehensive National Security framework, which should include initiatives to foster ethnic reconciliation and tougher counter-terrorism legislation. Introduction One of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka in decades shattered a period of relative peace in the island on Easter Sunday, reviving sectarian tensions that fueled a three- decade civil war in the island-state. In all, eight men and one woman belonging to local Islamist groups detonated bombs almost simultaneously in several parts of the country, killing themselves and more than 250 others.1 The terrorist attack, which targeted Christian worshippers and tourists, suggests a new front in Sri Lanka’s long and complex history of inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence. A previous civil war had pitted the government against a separatist movement from the

1 “Sri Lanka attacks: What we know about the Easter bombings,” BBC News, 28 April 2019,

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48010697. 2 “Sri Lanka’s Saudi Connections revealed in latest arrest over Easter Bombings,” South China Morning Post, 12 May 2019,

https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast- asia/article/3009906/sri-lankas-saudi-connections- revealed-latest-arrest-over.

minority Tamil community who pioneered modern-day suicide attacks. The involvement of an Islamist cell, reportedly affiliated with the Islamic State, was a surprise to many observers. Previously, Islamist extremism had not been a prominent feature in Sri Lanka as it has been elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia. Although a legacy of the civil war, the marginalisation of minority groups, political upheaval and security lapses have cultivated fertile ground for a militant movement to emerge.2 Sri Lanka’s population cannot be neatly divided by race, faith and language. Over 70 percent are Sinhalese, who are mostly Buddhist although a minority are Christian. A further 15 percent are Tamil, who are largely Hindu and Christian. Muslims comprise 10 percent and are considered ethnically distinct even though many speak Tamil.3 Going forward, the attack will become an essential part of Sri Lanka’s conflict dynamic and could go on to have lasting and destabilising effects.4 It will also strengthen the hand of hard-line groups within the Sinhala Buddhist community, who have instigated a wave of revenge attacks targeting Muslims in the intervening weeks. Urgent mitigating measures will have to be undertaken by the government, community leaders and the populace to prevent a new era of violence from emerging. Missed Signals A network of 150 people belonging to two previously little-known domestic Islamist groups – National Thawheedh Jamaath (NTJ) and Jaamiyathul Millathu Ibrahim (JMI) -

3 “A Horrific Flashback in Sri Lanka,” The Atlantic, 21 April, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/201 9/04/sri-lanka-attacks/587677/ 4 Alan Keenan, “Sri Lanka’s Easter Bombings: Peaceful Co-Existence Under Attack,” International Crisis Group, 23 April, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri- lanka/sri-lankas-easter-bombings-peaceful- coexistence-under-attack

Sri Lanka Attacks: An Analysis of the Aftermath

Amresh Gunasingham

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Sri Lanka Attacks: An Analysis of the Aftermath

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coordinated and executed the attacks, likely with support from IS, the government said.5 Police had also recovered explosives, weapons and other materials during several raids. Investigations also revealed that the suicide bombs used contained ball bearings, iron nails and triacetone triperoxide, commonly known as TATP, which is the explosive of choice for IS-inspired attackers. The explosive was also used by the IS terrorist cell behind the deadly bomb attacks in Paris in November 2015. Several of the Easter Sunday attackers were part of family units radicalised by extremist ideology, operating as part of a larger network.6 Information was said to be tightly protected within these networks bonded by family ties that transcended their ideological motivations. The group’s leader, Zahran Hashim, was a highly charismatic radical ideologue known for his YouTube videos that articulated a hard-line interpretation of Islam, mainly in the Tamil language. Hashim is believed to have recruited for IS since at least 2015 and was said to be well-known within Tamil-speaking communities in the South Asia region. In their recruitment efforts, Hashim and his group were effective in targeting relatively affluent men living in urban areas. For many Sri Lankans, the larger question of how an attack of this scale, brutality and lethality, which would have required an extensive network of planners, handlers and use of safe houses as well as bomb-making expertise and significant funding, went undetected by the authorities looms large.7 One factor was the state’s overwhelming focus on suppressing any revival of Tamil separatism in the decade following the war, that led to an emerging radical Islamist threat being underestimated. Another is the power struggle which has bedeviled the present

5 “Sri Lanka Bombings,” Al-Jazeera News, 2 May, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/sri- lanka-bombings-latest-updates- 190421092621543.html. 6 “Sri Lanka Attacks: The Family Networks Behind the Bombings,” BBC News, 11 May, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48218907. 7 ibid 8 “Sri Lanka PM Not Alerted to Warnings of Attack,” Reuters, 22 April, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-blasts- politics/sri-lanka-pm-not-alerted-to-warning-of-attack- because-of-feud-minister-idUSKCN1RY15D.

coalition government since the end of last year. President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe belong to different political parties and have a tenuous relationship.8 According to observers, this created a communications gap among key security agencies such as the military, police and possibly, the intelligence services. The government has admitted that several warnings from Indian intelligence sources of an imminent terrorist attack in the preceding weeks were not shared among the agencies and acted upon. Motivations Wahhabi Factor Sri Lanka’s Muslims, largely Sunnis, have peacefully co-existed with other communities through most of the country’s history. Since the 1980s, however, the oil boom and resultant inflow of Middle Eastern funding has had a visible impact in Muslim towns along the East coast, with an increasing number of mosques and madrassas (religious schools) promoting a narrow, literalist interpretation of Islam underpinned by Wahhabism mushrooming in some areas. Local preachers and Sri Lankans who spent years studying and working in the Middle East “exposed to strict Wahhabi ideas also began to have a cumulative impact back home, including influencing dress codes and reducing inter- faith interaction.”9 Reports have highlighted Muslims in some towns isolating themselves from the wider community by, for example, attending segregated schools.10 A number of women began to also wear the burqa (full-body and face covering garment), previously uncommon among Sri Lankan Muslim women, who traditionally observed Sri Lankan dress practices.11

9 Kumar Ramakrishna, “The Easter Sunday Attacks: Struggle For The Soul of Sri Lankan Muslims,” RSIS Commentaries, 3 May, 2019, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/nssp/the- easter-sunday-attacks-struggle-for-the-soul-of-sri- lankan-muslims/#.XOIaA1wzZPY. 10 Amresh Gunasingham, “Arrest of Influential Religious Hardliner and Religious Extremism in Sri Lanka,” August 2018, Counter Terrorist Trends And Analyses, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp- content/uploads/2018/08/CTTA-August-2018.pdf. 11 Ibid

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Over the last decade, various forms of Wahhabi influence have exacerbated both ethnic tensions and divisions within Muslim communities, specifically between mainstream Sufi Muslims and Salafists12. Dennis McGilvray and Mirak Raheem observed in a 2007 paper for the East-West Centre in Washington that a series of attacks by Salafi groups since the early 2000s against mosques and Sufi shrines in some Muslim towns provided an early indication that violence by fundamentalist Muslim groups against Sufis might one day give rise to armed Islamist movements in Sri Lanka.13 Security experts also point out that the spread of more conservative Islamic values among some Muslim communities, particularly in the north and east of Sri Lanka, may have been tolerated by successive governments for several decades as a counter to the recruitment efforts of the Tamil separatists.14 Muslims never quite belonged to either side during the 26-year long conflict. Some joined and fought in the government’s security forces, while a sizeable number of Tamil Muslims were known to be in the ranks of the separatists. Anti-Muslim Violence In Sri Lanka, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism is the key ideology that has been exploited by ultra-nationalists within the Sinhalese community to fan ethno-religious tensions and promote a majoritarian agenda that has systematically marginalised minority groups. Ethno-centric policies pursued by successive governments complicit with the Sinhala Buddhist majority, such as the implementation of Sinhala as the country’s official language were, among other factors, the main spur for the Tamils’ separatist campaign.

12 Salafism is a puritanical interpretation of Islam closely linked to Wahhabism, that has often been cited as the ideology of radical Islamists worldwide. 13 Dennis McGilvray and Mirak Raheem, “Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict,” Policy Studies 41, 2007, Washington D.C.: East-West

Center. 14 Ranga Jayasuriya, “How Wahhabism Was Fostered Until It Was Too Late,” Daily Mirror, 30 April, 2019, http://www.dailymirror.lk/opinion/How- Wahhabism-was-fostered-until-it%E2%80%99s-too- late/172- 166180?fbclid=IwAR3OytbXRKAmY1hgqFahs_rkj67 u8N9w3YLSwPTzNPrtRZGO6nVd4-4SvnI.

Soon after the government defeated the Tamil Tiger separatists in May 2009, Sri Lanka’s Muslim community became the target of violence, hate speech and economic boycotts by hardline Sinhalese Buddhist groups like Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). These groups claimed that Muslims threatened the island’s stability and Buddhist character.15 The rise in Sinhala Buddhists’ animus against local Muslims coincided with IS’ expansion in Iraq and Syria, which fuelled a global Islamophobic discourse that was ripe for exploitation. In March 2018, the Sri Lankan government declared a country-wide state of emergency when hardline Buddhist mobs ransacked Muslim homes and businesses in the centrally located city of Kandy — reportedly in retaliation for the beating of a Buddhist by Muslim men. Earlier in 2014, at least two people were killed and 80 wounded during sectarian clashes in Dharga Town in the country’s southwest. According to analysts, given the scale of sustained violence and frustration within the Muslim community, the environment appeared ripe for fostering radicalism and militancy.16 Until the recent Easter attacks, however, violence committed by Islamist radical movements had hitherto been against other Muslims and not Sri Lankans of other faiths. The first signs of a shift came last December, when police investigations into attacks on Buddhist statues led to the arrest of several individuals with known links to local Islamist radical groups. Weeks later in mid- January, law enforcement seized over 100kg (220lb) of explosives and 100 detonators belonging to the same network, hidden in a coconut grove in the Puttalam district on the west coast of the country.17 These incidents, it would later emerge, were part of a larger terrorist operation that culminated in the Easter Sunday bombings.

15 Alan Keenan, “Sri Lanka’s Easter Bombings: Peaceful Co-existence Under Attack,” International Crisis Group, 23 April, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri- lanka/sri-lankas-easter-bombings-peaceful- coexistence-under-attack. 16 “Radicalisation Among Sri Lanka’s Muslims Was Slow And Steady,” AP News, 25 April, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/89a58ddbd39b4febae3f10 6fbda593ee 17 “Sri Lanka Seizes Explosives From Local Islamist Radicals, Dhaka Tribune, 19 January, 2019, https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/2019/01/19/sri- lanka-seize-explosives-from-local-islamist-radicals.

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IS Factor IS claimed the Sri Lanka attack in a video showing the attackers gathering in front of its flag to pledge allegiance to leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group added in a later statement it had "targeted nationals of the crusader alliance [anti-IS US-led coalition] and Christians in Sri Lanka".18 Observers speculate churches and luxury hotels that were bombed may have been deliberately targeted due to their perceived representation of Western culture. According to counter-terrorism experts tracking IS’ media operations prior to the Easter attacks, there had previously been little mention of Sri Lanka in the group’s propaganda discourse. For the most part, IS had channeled its vitriol against Christian communities living in the Middle East, Europe and more recently West Africa. However, evidence that Sri Lankan Muslims were being recruited, emerged in 2016 with reports of at least 32 Muslim citizens joining the group during the height of its caliphate operations.19 Although at the time the Sri Lankan government denied the presence of an active IS cell domestically, it has more recently said that some returnees from Syria as well as others with known connections to IS militants, had a role in radicalising the Easter bombers.20 The attackers, some of whom spent years living in Britain and Australia as well as parts of the Middle East, appeared to have been radicalised by IS’ vow for revenge following the collapse of its caliphate in Iraq and Syria. That several of them were "well educated" and "middle class" is also not surprising.21 Although poverty and lack of opportunities have been regularly cited as key drivers in the

18 “Sri Lanka Attacks: Bomber Studied in UK And Australia,” BBC News, 24 April, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48035043 19 “What’s Different About The Attacks In Sri Lanka, The Atlantic, 22 April, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/201 9/04/sri-lanka-hasnt-seen-kind-islamist- terrorism/587761/. 20 “’We Knew What Was Coming’: Sri Lanka sees ISIS’ Hand in Attacks,” The New York Times, 3 May, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/world/asia/sri- lanka-attacks-isis.html. 21 “Sri Lanka Suicide Bombers Included Two Sons of Wealthy Spice Tycoon, Today Online, 25 April, 2019,

radicalisation process, there are numerous examples of individuals abandoning a relatively comfortable lifestyle to take up a violent cause. According to analysts, the recruitment of networks from all strata of society in the Sri Lanka attacks demonstrates the lure of IS’ powerful ideology, and was accelerated by the group’s shift in strategy towards a global insurgency model on several new fronts following its loss of territories in Syria.22 Implications Climate of Fear In the aftermath of the Easter attacks, anti- Muslim sentiments and violence have surged, with mosques and Muslim-owned shops looted and burned by Sinhalese mobs in a series of organised attacks on Muslims and their premises which reports indicate were orchestrated by hardline groups.23 Such attacks have proliferated despite the imposition of nationwide curfews and the arrest of several rioters. Given the fragile atmosphere in Sri Lanka, many Muslims fear further retaliatory attacks. According to analysts, these attacks should not merely be viewed as direct retaliation for the Easter bombings; they follow previous patterns of anti-Muslim violence, fueled by opportunism and past prejudices among Sinhalese Buddhists against the Muslim community.24 It is in this context that reports of state complicity in the latest violence have emerged, with affected Muslims accusing the Sinhala-majority security forces of not adequately intervening to prevent mobs

https://www.todayonline.com/world/sri-lanka-suicide- bombers-included-two-sons-wealthy-spice-tycoon. 22 “Sri Lanka Attack Signals ISIS’ Widening Reach,” The New York Times, 25 April, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/world/asia/isis- sri-lanka.html. 23 “Mobs Attack Mosques, Muslim-owned Shops And Homes In Sri Lanka’s Kurunegala District,” The Hindu, 14 May, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/mobs- attack-mosques-muslim-owned-shops-and-homes- in-sri-lankas-kurunegala-district/article27119473.ece. 24 “Buddhist Anger Could Tear Sri Lanka Apart,” Foreign Policy, 20 May, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/20/buddhist-anger- could-tear-sri-lanka-apart/

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from running amok. These claims have been refuted by the authorities.25 Many of Sri Lanka's 15 million Buddhists also fear they could become a jihadist target, with fake news and misinformation circulating wildly in recent weeks, fueling communal tensions.26 The fear is that recent developments will embolden extremists on all sides, which could eventually spark a deadly cycle of inter-communal conflict. Firebrand Buddhist monks have already come out to publicly rebuke the government for failing to heed their repeated warnings about radicalisation among some Muslim communities.27 Such hardliners have long stoked hostilities by claiming that the influence of Wahhabi ideology has made the Muslim community more conservative and insular. Increased Militarisation When the civil war ended, many Sri Lankans yearned for a return to normalcy in which security concerns would take a backseat to socio-economic and developmental concerns.28 The previous Rajapaksa regime was thought to have over-emphasised the security state even after the threat posed by the Tamil separatist movement had passed.29 When President Mahinda Rajapaksa subsequently lost in the 2015 elections, Sirisena came to power presenting himself as a democratic reformer. However, according to an article in The New York Times, he may have been too quick to move Sri Lanka off its military footing –and sidelining a previously formidable intelligence apparatus.30 For his part, Sirisena has frequently accused his detractors of being insufficiently supportive of the country’s security apparatus in the face

25 “Sri Lanka’s Army Denies Colluding with Anti- Muslim Rioters,” Channel News Asia, 15 May, 2019, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/sri- lanka-army-denies-colluding-with-ant-muslim-rioters- 11535552. 26 “Suicide Bombers Fuel Fears Among Sri Lanka’s Majority Buddhists,” Colombo Page, 2 May, 2019, http://www.colombopage.com/NEW_LPC/NewsFiles 19/May02_1556803112.php. 27 Ibid 28 Greg Sheridan, “ISIS Needed No New Excuse For Carnage In Sri Lanka,” The Australian, 25 April, 2019, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/isis- needed-no-new-excuse-for-carnage-in-sri- lanka/news- story/f3929f47097654ac577986b682071dfc.

of demands from international human rights groups for credible investigations into allegations of possible abuses committed during the war.31 Following public calls for a strong security response after the Easter attack, Sirisena has taken a tougher stance, declaring an emergency that accords broad powers of arrest and detention to the security forces. He has also deployed military personnel at security check points around the island and heightened surveillance mechanisms. While investigations and tightened security measures are essential to reassure a frightened public, the Sri Lankan Muslim community is not a monolith and it is important to distinguish between the majority of peace- loving Muslims and the tiny proportion of extremists. As such, an overly militarised response amidst emerging calls for a severe legal and surveillance regime to be enacted, could be counterproductive and will likely only result in the securitisation of the Muslim community and their religious identity, which in turn may result in more reciprocal radicalisation in other communities.32 In this regard, Sirisena’s recent decision to impose a ban on Muslim women wearing the burqa and niqab (face veil) following the Easter attack risks further antagonizing? the community. The release from jail of the prominent hardline monk Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, following a Presidential pardon is likely to be another lightning rod for tensions. Gnanasara had faced accusations of stirring up violence against Muslims and Christians before his imprisonment, allegations he has denied. In another development, the country’s former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa who led the final push in the battle against the

29 Ibid 30 “We Knew What Was Coming: Sri Lanka sees ISIS’ Hand in Attacks,” The New York Times, 3 May, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/world/asia/sri- lanka-bombings.html. 31 “Sri Lanka Attacks: President Says Civil War Inquiries Left Country Vulnerable, The Guardian, 26 April, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/26/sri- lanka-attacks-president-says-civil-war-inquiries-left- country-vulnerable. 32 “The Religious Tensions Behind The Attacks in Sri Lanka, Foreign Affairs, 24 April, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/sri- lanka/2019-04-24/religious-tensions-behind-attacks- sri-lanka.

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Sri Lanka Attacks: An Analysis of the Aftermath

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Tamil Tiger separatists, has declared his intention to run in the next Presidential election, vowing to “tackle radical Islam” and rebuild the country’s intelligence apparatus.33 An opposition led by Rajapaksa stands to benefit from the climate of fear currently gripping the country. However, the return of a Rajapaksa regime could also endanger the current government’s modest efforts at post-war reconciliation between the various ethnic groups. During the tenure of the previous government between 2005-2015, militant Buddhist organisations such as BBS (Buddhist Power Force) were allowed to incite violence against Muslims with impunity. Outlook The terrorist attacks on Easter Sunday and the wave of anti-Muslim unrest left many Sri Lankans tense and in a state of suspicion. Thorough investigations and tightened security measures are essential to reassure an alarmed public, given reports of rising anger towards Muslims, particularly following IS’ claim of responsibility for the attack and police warnings of possible future attacks. Sri Lanka's deeply divided coalition government is under growing public pressure and needs to initiate sweeping reforms to the intelligence and security apparatus, if a similar disaster is to be averted in future. One counter-terrorism expert has proposed a comprehensive National Security Framework that includes tougher laws to tackle extremists of all denominations. Within this framework, Sri Lanka should enact legislation that criminalises hate speech and the incitement of racial tensions.34 Further, radical preachers coming into Sri Lanka should be more effectively screened to ensure they have no links to extremist groups, while local religious preachers should be suitably accredited.

In cyberspace, the government has repeatedly opted to suspend social media platforms in situations of emergency. Yet, the inability of platforms such as Facebook to effectively monitor and counter the spread of misinformation during times of crisis, continues to present a major challenge. To more effectively address the issue, individuals and groups posting inflammatory material online need to be censured by the law. Social media companies should also be held accountable for the proliferation of extremist content on their platforms. Going forward, the response of the government and the various communities in Sri Lanka to the Easter attacks will greatly affect future prospects for peace and stability in the country. A hardline stance that refuses to address systemic issues of bias and discrimination, will continue to fuel extremism. Similarly, if radical groups use the attacks to fuel fear of minorities and justify retaliatory attacks, a new period of communal strife could beckon in Sri Lanka. While the government needs to look at improving and strengthening various security and social structures in its counter-terrorism efforts, community leaders and religious organisations must be encouraged and facilitated to play a critical role in guiding their respective flocks to maintain peace and harmony within Sri Lanka. Amresh Gunasingham is an Associate Editor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].

33 “Gotabaya Rajapakse Confirms Presidential Run in Anxious Sri Lanka,” Al-Jazeera News, 18 May 2019, https://www.msn.com/en- gb/news/world/exclusive-sri-lankan-ex-defence-

chief-gotabaya-says-he-will-run-for-president-tackle- radical-islam/ar-BBWk5sX. 34 Interview conducted with Professor Rohan Gunaratna in Singapore on 18 May 2019

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