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Reference Chapter 2

2 Ethnocentrism:Seeing the World From Where We Stand

Kenneth D. Keith

There is an old Asian proverb about the frog that lives in the well. The frog, it seems, is quite happy because, after all, the well is a perfectly good place, and the patch of sky he can see from the bottom of his well is a perfectly nice bit of sky. The frog has no need for, nor any interest in, any place but his own. Like the frog in the well, we are all prone to elevate our own place or our own culture as the standard against which we judge others, and to see our own as superior to others. This tendency is known as ethnocentrism (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002). In this chapter, we discuss the concept of ethnocentrism: Who is ethnocentric, how do we become ethnocentric, and how can we reduce ethnocentrism?

Ethnocentrism is likely universal among humans (LeVine & Campbell, 1972) and first appeared in the literature more than a century ago in the writings of W. G. Sumner (1906), although it was even earlier that Charles Darwin (1874) noted that tribes tended to be more sympathetic to their own groups. Ethnocentrism often serves to create perceptions of cross-cultural difference, with resulting intercultural conflict and negative stereotypes (Triandis, 1994); it is thus important to successful intergroup relationships, and our efforts to improve them, that we develop an understanding of ethnocentrism: its characteristics, causes, and amelioration.

What are the Characteristics of Ethnocentrism?

The classic perspective

Ethnocentrism has its roots in words implying feelings and judgments that are centered (“centrism”) in an individual’s own cultural or ethnic (“ethno”) context (Brislin, 2000), and frequently involves: (a) perceiving outsiders with suspicion (Price & Crapo, 2002) and (b) individual tendencies toward group self-centeredness (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2007). Further, we seem to want to be near others who are like us, and we feel different from, and sometimes fearful of, those who are not like us (Strickland, 2000).

The result, Sumner (1906) suggested, is a division between in-groups and out-groups, in which in-group members consider their own practices the standard against which they measure out-groups. Members of the in-group are likely to see themselves as superior to (Hooghe, 2008), and more possessed of virtue than (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006), out-group members. The traditional Sumnerian view includes not only elevation of one’s own group, but also negative attitudes toward the “other,” the out-group. The potential for negative assessment increases with greater differences between the groups (Berry et al., 2002). And, as Raden (2003) noted, Sumner concerned himself primarily with unitary, homogeneous groups with clearly external out-groups. This was likely due, at least in part, to the fact that Sumner studied groups that found it necessary to unite against other groups in the interest of survival—an idea consistent with the finding of Pratto and Glasford (2008) that individuals value the lives of their in-group members more than those of an out-group when the groups are in competition. Sumner (1906) pointed out, for example, that Jews divided people between themselves (ingroup) and Gentiles (out-group), and that the Greeks and Romans (in-groups) saw all others as barbarians (out-groups).

A contemporary view

Research today, particularly in cultures as diverse as the U.S., often involves studies in which one racial or ethnic subgroup is the in-group, and other groups, although internal to the country, are out-groups (Raden, 2003); and studies have generally continued to support the notion that positive feelings for the in-group and negative feelings for out-groups bear a reciprocal relationship to each other (Brewer, 1999). However, as Brewer (1999; 2007) reported, data from many groups have shown that, although individuals tend to be differentially positive toward their in-group, these attitudes may be independent of their attitudes toward out-groups. In other words, we can have positive feelings toward members of our in-groups without corresponding attitudes of disdain or hostility toward out-groups—a perspective supported by the work of Khan and Liu (2008), who found, in a study of Indians and Pakistanis, more support for favoring the in-group than for disfavoring the out-group.

Bizumic and Duckitt (2007), in a study of three varieties of group self-centeredness (ethnocentrism, fundamentalism, and anthropocentrism) among Australian university students, found that individuals who strongly favor their own human groups over others also tend to favor humans over other species. Thus, prejudice against animals was related to self-centeredness in relation to human out-groups. However, ethnocentrism, like the other forms of self-centeredness, correlated with negative feelings toward specific relevant out-groups, but not toward out-groups in general. Further, although Raden (2003) found classic (Sumnerian) ethnocentrism (i.e., positive attitudes toward the in-group, hostility toward the out-group) among some subgroups of a large probability sample of white Americans, in-group bias (without the implication of unfavorable views of out-groups) was more prevalent in his sample. This finding led Raden to point up the methodological importance of the distinction between the classic form of ethnocentrism and the more common in-group bias, suggesting that the latter may be a midpoint between the extremes of classic ethnocentrism and the absence of ethnocentrism. Such current work indicates that the occurrence of ethnocentrism, in its contemporary incarnation, is more complex and more nuanced than the Sumnerian perspective might suggest.

Who is ethnocentric?

Many writers have discussed the universal tendency of humans to be ethnocentric (e.g., LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Neuliep, Hintz, & McCroskey, 2005; Shuya, 2007). Researchers have studied ethnocentrism in relation to ethnic minorities within the United States (Gittler, 1972; Hraba, 1972; Mutisya & Ross, 2005; Prothro, 1952; Raden, 2003), across nationalities (Beswick, 1972; Cashdan, 2001; Khan & Liu, 2008; Li & Liu, 1975), in the tendencies of consumers to buy domestic products (Chryssochoidis, Krystallis, & Perreas, 2007; Hsu & Nien, 2008; Nguyen, Nguyen, & Barrett, 2008; Vida, 2008), and toward people with disabilities (Chesler, 1965). Ethnocentrism has also been manifest in perceptions of intercultural attractiveness and competence of individuals from other cultures (Neuliep et al., 2005).

Sumner (1906) recounted a long list of cultural groups (including Lapps, Kiowa, Caribs, Greenlanders, Jews, Seri, and others) that developed terms denoting their respective groups as uniquely “men,” “people,” “chosen,” or otherwise superior.

And of course researchers, being human themselves, are also subject to ethnocentrism (Hofstede, 2007). Thus, ethnocentric bias exists not only at the levels of the individual and intergroup relations, but also at the level of the scientists who study psychological phenomena across cultures (e.g., Berry et al., 2002; Hofstede, 2007). Campbell (1970), among others, has proposed research methodologies designed to ameliorate the contaminating influence of ethnocentrism in social science investigations.

Everyone, it seems, is ethnocentric or at least potentially susceptible to ethnocentrism. It seems clear, as Matsumoto and Juang (2004) suggested, that culture serves much like a lens, or filter, “distorting, rotating, and coloring” (p. 65) our view of the world, leading us inevitably to see it from the only vantage point we know—our own.

How Does Ethnocentrism Develop?

Biological perspectives

Ethnocentrism may seem to be “automatic” (LeBaron, 2003), as a part of the enculturation of children within a society; a process in which some see the child learning its culture and its attitudes as a kind of tabula rasa (LeVine, 1982). On the other hand, some writers have argued for an evolutionary basis for ethnocentrism. Wilson (1978), for example, raised the possibility that biological advantage might accrue to ethnocentric tribal groups, not only from aggression but also from other associated behaviors. Wilson argued that particular behaviors (e.g., specific forms of aggression) are not genetically transmitted, but that cultural structures supporting them may have been. Thus, successful groups were those that successfully divided the world between “us” and “them.” Similarly, Thayer (2004) set forth the proposition that evolution has equipped humans with an affinity for those who are biologically related; thus, this view would suggest, people should be expected to support first their immediate family, then other relatives, then their ethnic group, and finally others. This perspective, Thayer said, does not mean ethnocentrism is not subject to environmental influence (e.g., culture, religion, political beliefs), but it does recognize the natural tendency to favor those who are biologically related, and there is some evidence to suggest that an ethnically homogeneous culture (in which people might be assumed to be more biologically similar) may manifest higher levels of ethnocentrism than a more diverse one (Neuliep, Chaudoir, & McCroskey, 2001).

Perceived vulnerability to disease may give rise to negative attitudes toward out-group members (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004). Navarrette, Fessler, and Eng (2007), in a study testing this disease-threat model for intergroup attitudes, found that pregnant women were most ethnocentric during the first trimester of their pregnancy—a finding consistent with the model and supportive of the role of biological factors as an influence on ethnocentrism. In another investigation, Navarrette and Fessler (2006) gathered data indicating an increase in ethnocentrism in individuals who perceived an increased vulnerability to disease— supporting the notion that, because in-group members may present less risk of disease than out-group contacts, individuals may have mental approach and avoidance mechanisms that predispose them to ethnocentric behaviors (e.g., Faulkner et al., 2004). And, although such cognitive processes might be assumed to be involved in ethnocentrism, there is some evidence simply for an individual predisposition to favor in-groups (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006).

On the other hand, Roberts (1997) did not find a significant correlation between ethnocentrism and reproductive success in a study of two distinct ethnic groups in India—perhaps casting doubt on the presumption of evolutionary advantage of ethnocentrism (although such an advantage may well have once existed for such groups). Ross (1991), in suggesting the incompleteness of a sociobiological explanation for ethnocentrism, argued instead for the possibility of a cultural evolutionary process. Simon (1980), in discussing the relationship between genetics and human nature, enumerated several cultural universals and suggested that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that they are or are not genetically based. Ethnocentrism may well be one such universal and, as we will see in chapter 7, it is likely that biological and psychological influences bear a reciprocal relationship to each other in the evolution of culture and psychological processes.

Psychological variables

Scientists have studied a number of psychosocial variables that appear to be related to the behaviors we call ethnocentrism. Some of these are narcissism, religious fundamentalism, major personality traits, intolerance for ambiguity, and authoritarianism. Numerous studies have shown that ethnocentrism may decrease over time, as group members develop experience with both the in-group and out-groups, and views of out-groups may become more positive with experience (Ryan & Bogart, 1997). Perhaps more interesting is the fact that researchers have found ethnocentrism related in various ways to characteristics that we might place on a continuum of “open-mindedness.” For example, Bizumic and Duckitt (2008), in a sample of university students in New Zealand, found a positive relationship between narcissism (self-centeredness) and intergroup ethnocentrism, leading the researchers to suggest that narcissism may predispose individuals to hold ethnocentric attitudes. Similarly, Altemeyer (2003), studying Canadian students, found significant correlations between religious fundamentalism, Manitoba ethnocentrism (Altemeyer, 1996), and religious ethnocentrism; in other words, those scoring high on religious fundamentalism also tended to be ethnocentric—toward other religions and other sociocultural groups. Altemeyer’s (2003) religious fundamentalist participants reported coming from homes in which religion was a focus of emphasis from an early age, and, he said, have a “very small ‘us’ and quite a large ‘them’ when it comes to faith” (p. 27). The connection between religion and ethnocentrism is not limited to Canadians. For example, working in India with Hindu and Muslim adolescents, and comparing them to nonreligious individuals, Hasnain (2007) found religious persons in both groups to be significantly more prejudiced and ethnocentric than the nonreligious participants.

In a study investigating the attitudes of American university students toward foreign-born and domestic instructors, de Oliveira, Braun, Carlson, and de Oliveira (2009) measured Big Five personality traits of the students (McCrae & Costa, 1999) as well as attitudes toward the instructors. Among their findings, these researchers found an ethnocentric bias against the foreign-born instructors (whom students apparently saw as out-group members), and the student traits of agreeableness and conscientiousness were positively correlated with positive attitudes toward the foreign-born teachers. de Oliveira et al. also reported an inverse relationship between attitudes toward the two instructor conditions (i.e., students who liked one instructor group more tended to like the other instructor group less)—a finding that would seem consistent with the classical version of ethnocentrism.

There is a long history of research investigating the relationship of other personal traits to ethnocentrism. Noting the similarity in descriptions of intolerance for ambiguity and for ethnocentrism, Block and Block (1951) designed research to study the relationship between these characteristics. Using a laboratory task and a sample of American university students, these investigators reported that participants considered intolerant of ambiguity were more ethnocentric than those considered tolerant of ambiguity. Taft (1956) employed a variation on the methods used by Block and Block (1951) to study ethnocentrism and intolerance of ambiguity in an Australian group, with similar conclusions: Those intolerant of ambiguity also scored significantly higher on a measure of ethnocentrism. O’Connor (1952), studying a sample of American students, also found similar results: She reported a significant correlation between intolerance for ambiguity and ethnocentrism; she also noted a significant difference between people assessed as high in ethnocentrism and those low in ethnocentrism on a measure of intolerance of ambiguity (Those high in ethnocentrism scored higher on intolerance of ambiguity.)

Parents, of course, play a role in the development of ethnocentrism in their children, and researchers have studied parental characteristics and parenting styles in this context. Thomas (1975) assessed parents for authoritarianism (the tendency to favor absolute obedience to authority) in seven Pacific Island cultures, finding authoritarian parenting characteristics in three of the groups (Tahiti, Cook Islands, and Samoa). In each of these three cultures, authoritarianism was positively correlated with ethnocentrism. A number of studies have shown a relationship between parental characteristics and behavior and ethnocentrism in their children. Epstein and Komorita (1966), for example, found that childhood ethnocentrism was related to the interaction between parental ethnocentrism and punitiveness. In particular, parents who used moderately punitive disciplinary approaches were more likely to have children who shared their parents’ ethnocentric attitudes. Mosher and Scodel (1960), in a study of Midwestern American schoolchildren and their mothers, found that the children’s ethnocentrism was correlated with that of their mothers, but not with the mothers’ authoritarianism.

Finally, in two Dutch samples, Van IJzendoorn (2001) found significant correlations between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism in both high school and university students. This study also revealed negative correlations, for both groups, between moral judgment and both ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. Likewise, in an investigation measuring ethnocentrism and authoritarianism of adolescents and parents in two Hungarian cities, both groups showed a significant relationship between these two variables (Todosijevic´ & Enyedi, 2002).

Summary

In summary, we can say that scientists of various points of view have proposed numerous explanations for ethnocentrism. It seems likely that ethnocentrism has evolutionary underpinnings, but it is equally evident that it is linked to a variety of environmental/cultural and personal influences, including parental characteristics and individual traits. Bias favoring the in-group may help individuals to organize their experience and reduce uncertainty (Druckman, 2006)—perhaps contributing to efforts to explain the relationship of highly structured views, in the form of authoritarianism and fundamentalism, to ethnocentrism.

Although ethnocentrism may contribute, via evolutionary mechanisms, to the survival and integrity of groups, there is nevertheless abundant evidence of the challenges and obstacles posed by ethnocentrism at the interpersonal and intercultural levels. This state of affairs of course presents concerns for intergroup understanding and relations (Brewer & Brown, 1998). We might, therefore, logically ask whether there are ways to overcome the effects of this universal phenomenon.

Can We Reduce Our Ethnocentrism?

Cross-cultural psychology has made efforts not only to understand the ethnocentric limits of our cultural/scientific knowledge (Berry et al., 2002), but also to find ways to decrease ethnocentrism among individuals. Brislin (2000) has pointed out that interaction with people of other cultures is likely to challenge our ethnocentric perspectives, and numerous writers have suggested that such contact will reduce ethnocentrism. This is not always the case, however (Brewer & Brown, 1998). In this section, we review the potential effects of education and related variables on the ethnocentrism of individual people.

Role of education

Higher education

Hooghe (2008) reported that high levels of education may reduce ethnocentrism. This assertion was borne out by two studies conducted by Plant (1958a, 1958b) more than a half century ago. In one of these studies, Plant (1958b) administered the ethnocentrism scale from The authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) to a sample of American college students, 755 of whom were still available for testing two years later. Of the 755, 505 had completed two years of college, and showed significantly reduced ethnocentrism at follow-up. The remaining 250 participants did not continue in college or withdrew before the two-year follow-up; this group showed no significant changes in measured ethnocentrism. In this study, Plant also found a significant sex difference, with men showing higher levels of ethnocentrism than women—a finding consistent with other (Hooghe, 2008) discussions of ethnocentrism.

In the second study, Plant (1958a) used a modified version of the Total Ethnocentrism Scale: Public Opinion Questionnaire E, again from the work of Adorno et al. (1950). Of 1,030 students completing the measure as entering college students, Plant invited 315 to be retested at the end of their four-year college career. Of the 315 eligible students, 271 (86%) completed the retest. Both male and female students produced significantly lower ethnocentrism scores following their four years of college. Scores for men were higher than those for women at the time of both the initial testing and the retesting, and Plant’s analysis of the difference in shift scores indicated that female students’ scores were reduced significantly more than those of males. We should note that in this study, Plant did not report scores for a non-student control group.

Specific courses

In another study, designed to more specifically examine the effects of studying cross-cultural psychology on ethnocentrism, Pettijohn and Naples (2009) conducted a comparative investigation across two undergraduate courses: cross-cultural psychology and introductory psychology. Fifty-nine students in these two courses completed the U.S. Ethnocentrism Scale (Neuliep & McCroskey, 1997) and the revised Generalized Ethnocentrism Scale (Neuliep, 2002) at the beginning and completion of their respective courses. These researchers found a significantly greater decrease in ethnocentrism, on both measures, for the cross-cultural students (who decreased their scores on both tests) than for the introductory psychology students (whose scores did not decrease significantly on either measure). This study had numerous flaws, including a number of preexisting differences between the groups; nevertheless, it suggests that exposure to the content material of cross-cultural psychology may have the capacity to aid in overcoming ethnocentrism.

Borden (2007) reported another educational effort aimed toward reduction of ethnocentrism. She studied university students in two sections of an intercultural communication course, evaluating effects on ethnocentrism of their experience in service learning projects conducted in community settings serving ethnic minorities and international students. Borden used the Generalized Ethnocentrism Scale (Neuliep, 2002) as a pretest and posttest, administering it to students at the beginning of the course and again at the end. This report was essentially an effort to test the so-called “contact hypothesis”—the notion that contact between groups may reduce tension between them (Allport, 1954). The results indicated a significant reduction in ethnocentrism in students completing the service learning experience, suggesting a possible role for such exposure as a means to reduce ethnocentrism. However, the absence of a comparison group and other standard control measures makes it necessary to interpret this project with caution.

Further, as Brewer and Brown (1998) pointed out, the contact hypothesis has often been contradicted by experience. Specifically, as Brewer and Brown explained, the contact hypothesis, or simple exposure to other groups, is likely to succeed only if certain additional factors (social and institutional support, potential for meaningful relationships, equal status between groups, and intergroup cooperation) are in place.

Predictive variables

Finally, Dong, Day, and Collaço (2008) investigated the possible role of intercultural communication sensitivity and multiculturalism as predictors of ethnocentrism. They administered the Intercultural Sensitivity Scale (Chen & Starosta, 2000), a multicultural ideology scale (Berry & Kalin, 1995), and the Generalized Ethnocentrism Scale (Neuliep, 2002) to 419 American undergraduate students, most of them Caucasians and Asian Americans.

Dong et al. reported significant correlations between both the intercultural sensitivity and multicultural ideology measures and the Generalized Ethnocentrism Scale, and suggested the possibility that increasing intercultural sensitivity and multicultural appreciation (e.g., through educational advocacy, neighborhood and community education, and one-to-one intercultural experience) might reduce ethnocentrism. However, this correlational study, while perhaps identifying promising variables for future research, did not demonstrate a causal connection among these measures. It may simply be the case that individuals who are more ethnocentric are naturally less interculturally sensitive and less multiculturally ideologic, and that all these traits are the product of some other cause. Dong et al. were correct, however, in observing that few empirical studies have investigated specific variables that could decrease levels of ethnocentrism.

Summary

Despite the universality of ethnocentrism, we have some evidence that culture and experience may influence its occurrence. Thus, students in different cultures show differing levels of ethnocentrism. Specifically, Japanese students have shown higher levels of ethnocentrism than Americans (Neuliep et al., 2001), as have Chinese students (Li & Liu, 1975; Shuya, 2007). Thus, although the evidence suggests the universality of ethnocentrism, levels seem to vary from culture to culture. And some research findings have indicated tentative relationships between education as a mitigating factor and ethnocentrism, and between ethnocentrism and experience in specific courses. However, although exposure to cultural subgroups may hold promise in the effort to overcome ethnocentrism, we know we must be skeptical of claims that exposure alone will achieve this end. Nevertheless, exposure to people and their diversity is likely to play a contributing role in reducing ethnocentrism.

Conclusion

Ethnocentrism has appeared in the sociocultural literature for more than a century, and we believe it to be a universal human phenomenon. We have seen that ethnocentrism may take different forms—specifically with or without hostility toward out-groups—but always involving the tendency to elevate one’s own group (in-group). Although ethnocentrism may have evolutionary roots, researchers have identified a number of psychological traits and conditions associated with it. Studies investigating these psychological variables have generally been correlational in nature, or have lacked sufficient experimental  controls to allow causal inferences; research has nevertheless suggested a connection between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism and between ethnocentrism and fundamentalism.

Although ethnocentrism has sometimes diminished with educational experience and intergroup exposure, the studies demonstrating this have lacked the scientific rigor necessary to show causal connections. Further, intergroup exposure seems to require additional supports and relationships to reliably influence out-group prejudice. The base of empirical research directed toward reducing ethnocentrism is sparse; more work will be needed if we are to fully understand this important cultural phenomenon. Only then perhaps, unlike the proverbial frog, will we get beyond our isolated well and our own little patch of sky.

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Part II Approaches to Cross-Cultural Research

For many years, Western psychological research, particularly research originating in North America, presented its work as natural fact, even when the studies included few, if any, participants from other cultures. Further, studies often had the additional limitations associated with homogeneity of race (the subjects were usually white) and age (the subjects were often college undergraduates). In Part II, we will explore some of the limitations of Western research, and we will try to understand some of the reasons why researchers have not considered culture in their work.

Given the amazing diversity of people, not only across cultures around the world, but within such diverse countries as the United States and the United Kingdom, it becomes increasingly important that investigators make efforts to make their research more inclusive. Old assumptions about psychological principles and their universality are giving way to a more sophisticated understanding of the relation between universal and culture-specific truths.

Cross-cultural researchers face a variety of special difficulties as they try to untangle and isolate the many facets and dimensions of culture that may influence behavior, and they must use care to avoid confusing cultural variables with others (like socioeconomic status, population density, age, and education) that may also be determinants of human activity. These efforts to improve research design are critical to the ability of investigators to rule out non-cultural alternative hypotheses and to understand the interplay between culture and other characteristics like language and gender identity.

Increasingly, researchers need a level of cultural competence that they would have rarely considered a few years ago. This means they must have some understanding of the cultures they study and the language issues essential to development of fair and meaningful measures, and sensitivity to their own ideological and value-based biases. Organized psychology has made some strides toward achievement of these aims, but important questions and issues remain.

What, for example, are the special ethical issues associated with cross-cultural research? How can researchers maximize the generalizability of their findings? What do investigators do about populations that may be “hidden” by cultural repression or discrimination? And how should behavioral scientists deal with the construct of race, which is often erroneously equated with culture? These are representative of the issues we will encounter in Part II.

3 Methodological and Conceptual Issues in Cross-Cultural Research

Bernard C. Beins

Culture exerts a notable impact on virtually every aspect of one’s behavior, thought, and attitude. Curiously, though, psychologists lost sight of this proposition for much of the twentieth century. This chapter will identify some of the issues that the current generation of psychologists has rediscovered as being critical in researching and understanding the wide variety of human psychological experience.

Several issues merit attention here. First, psychologists will benefit by understanding the degree to which psychological responses reflect tendencies that are universal as opposed to particular to a given culture. Psychologists have concluded in some cases that they identified universals, but upon closer examination, the certainty has faded.

Second, one’s Weltanschauung clearly drives one’s thought processes. Of specific attention has been the difference in perspective as a function of whether one’s origins are within a collectivistic or individualistic culture. Again, what seemed to have been relatively clear distinctions have blurred as psychologists have moved from the level of culture to the level of the individual. A third important element in cultural research involves the very pattern of thought processes in people of different cultures. What is obvious and apparent to one is foreign to another.

Fourth, methodological issues per se have turned out to be of importance in understanding psychological processes. New techniques like neural imaging appear to affect even basic processes that one might assume are impervious to culture. Furthermore, on a larger level, how one categorizes participants from different cultures is a thorny issue that remains unsolved. Finally, ethical issues involved in research lurk in unexpected ways. What might be ethical according to one set of standards may not be in another.

Researchers have identified these various issues, but it would be premature to claim that they have achieved resolution. The discipline has made notable progress, but as with any complex area, more questions remain than have been answered with certainty.

Historical Elements

Cross-cultural research in psychology is growing in scope and quantity, but it has had only a short history. Consequently, psychology is still grappling with fundamental methodological and conceptual issues pertaining to culturally relevant research. PsycINFO© indicates only 12 articles in peer-reviewed journals with a descriptor of cross-cultural research through 1959. In contrast, in 2008, there were 95 peer-reviewed articles listed. Naturally, a single descriptor represents only a minute slice of relevant research, but this datum reveals the trend.

Social researchers used to know that behaviors differed across cultures and that those behaviors were mediated by cultural factors. As Linton (1945) noted, “personalities, cultures and societies are all configurations in which the patterning and organization of the whole is more important than any of the component parts” (p. 2). But for a number of decades, many psychologists forgot this fact. During the heyday of behaviorism, it seemed that there was little need to attend to culture for two important reasons.

First, animals did not have cultures, so researchers studying rats (which themselves were white) did not have to consider this construct. Second, if behaviors resulted from reinforcement contingencies, researchers may have reasoned that they needed only to understand reward and punishment, and culture would not have been particularly germane in many cases.

Even among users of projective tests like the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), there was some belief that cultural background may not have played a role in responses. For instance, Riess, Schwartz, and Cottingham (1950) administered the TAT to Black and White participants and recorded the lengths of participants’ responses; the results revealed that the length of utterances did not relate to race. This reliance on the quite objective and measurable number of words uttered was characteristic of the behavioral approach. Interestingly, the researchers did not attend to the content of those responses.

The lack of attention to culture belies the awareness by earlier psychological researchers and by anthropologists that studying culture was an intrinsic part of studying people. Current students of culture would undoubtedly disagree with some interpretations of differences, but the important issue here is that the researchers recognized the importance of those differences. For example, Tylor (1889) attributed differences across cultures through the perspective of Herbert Spencer’s model of cultural evolution, with Western “races” at the pinnacle. However, Thomas’s (1937) ideas anticipated current thoughts about differences in culture leading to different behaviors; he did not accord different status to what others called the “higher” and “lower” races.

By the 1930s, psychology had adopted a tone that resembles today’s. For example, Herskovits (1935) dismissed the notion that African cultures (of which there were many) were primitive or savage. Rather, he noted that strong family ties, strong adherence to governmental and legal principles, and established religions characterized African cultures of that era. He also distinguished the cultures of Black people in Africa and North America, noting that cultures change as people from one culture come into contact with people from another.

Revisions in the ideas about people of non-Western or of southern and eastern European descent in the 1930s seem to have resulted from the influx of a new type of psychologist. Psychology became populated with people from a wide range of ethnicities, particularly Jewish psychologists, who may have been more sensitized to the different life experiences of minorities, and therefore more aware of the cultural factors that eventuate in particular behaviors (Samelson, 1978).

The current focus in psychology on the importance of culture in affecting behavior may similarly result from the influx of a different set of ethnic minorities. Between 1996 and 2004, there was an increase in doctoral degrees among American minorities of 16.6%, an increase in master’s level degrees of 90.8%, and an increase in bachelor’s degrees of 36% (American Psychological Association, 2008). In addition, as an organization, the American Psychological Association (APA) has focused on the internationalization of the discipline, as evidenced by its 2008 Education Leadership Conference that focused on international connections in psychology.

The current cultural climate in psychology will pave the way for changes in two important aspects of research—the way psychologists conduct their research and the way they interpret their results. Just as understanding the relation between culture and behavior is complex, so must be the way psychologists develop research questions, identify appropriate methodologies, and interpret their data.

Universals and Measurements Across Cultures

Cross-cultural research poses difficulties that much other research may not face because, in addition to developing designs that show high levels of internal validity, cross-cultural psychologists have to worry about appropriate external validity. There are also practical issues of generating appropriate participant samples from varied cultures. Furthermore, drawing inferences from data can be difficult because researchers need to understand the intricacies of each culture. Attention to cross-cultural research is relatively new in psychology, thus the methodological and interpretive issues still merit critical scrutiny.

An important component of both the internal and the external validity is the nature of measurements across cultures. As Chen (2008) has noted, measurements across cultures may not be comparable because of factors such as translation issues, failure of items being measured to capture the same construct across cultures, different response styles, and social desirability.

Compounding this dilemma is the fact that some apparently etic traits have emic components in a particular culture that may be irrelevant in another. For instance, in Chinese culture, the etic construct of dependability includes emic components like being gracious to others, truthful, and family oriented (Cheung & Leung, 1998).

Some cross-cultural investigations on universal processes (e.g., Ekman’s, 1972, work on recognition of emotions) have attained the status of “classic” research. But conclusions even about the supposed universality of the ability to recognize emotions must be modified to take culture into account. Ekman’s (1972) research on how accurately people recognize facial expression of emotions provides an appropriate backdrop with which to begin a discussion of how questions evolve across the various phases of culturally oriented research. Ekman discovered that some emotions are universally recognized. He displayed faces to people in five different cultures and asked them to identify the emotion expressed in the picture. Respondents from the United States, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Japan all identified the emotions at well above chance levels, implying that a display of emotion has a universality that transcends individual cultures.

As Elfenbein and Ambady (2003) pointed out, though, cultural factors are not irrelevant to the recognition of emotion. For example, the various groups identified the emotions with noticeably different accuracy, with Americans showing the highest average degree of accuracy (86%) and the Japanese the lowest (78%). Elfenbein and Ambady noted, however, that the task involved the recognition of emotions expressed by Americans. It turns out that there is a reliable in-group effect such that, although people are accurate in identifying emotional expressions in general, they tend to be better at identifying those emotions when expressed by people within their own culture. Furthermore, even though there is consistently high recognition of emotions in photographs, the accuracy rate is affected by how many generations a family of Chinese origin had lived in the United States and by whether the emotional expressions were displayed by people living in China or in the U.S.

Similarly, John Bowlby’s (1988) conceptualization and Mary Ainsworth’s research on attachment (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) are predicated on the universality of the construct. Ainsworth’s findings seem descriptively useful, but some (e.g., Keller, 2008) have argued that the conclusions regarding differences in attachment styles across cultures represent a bias toward Western culture. Keller stated that some conclusions include a heavy dose of judgment. For example, she suggested that inferences about maternal sensitivity associated with attachment reflect “a judgment on maternal adequacy, a way of distinguishing good from bad mothers” (p. 410).

An assessment of the research findings and subsequent interpretations suggests that attachment behaviors deemed undesirable or even pathological in one culture may be desirable and entirely acceptable in another (Rothbaum, Weisz, Pott, Kiyake, & Morelli, 2000). Thus, one could convincingly argue that attachment theory, often regarded as culture-free, is highly culture-bound.

Psychologists have regarded recognition of emotion and attachment styles as being universal. Thus, one might conclude that these topics should be easy to research: It would not matter where one conducted the research because people would not differ notably across different cultures. Unfortunately, current research on these topics belies the idea that cultural specifics are irrelevant. Consideration of attachment and of recognition of emotion reveals the difficulty that researchers face in trying to study constructs that may have some degree of universality.

A further indication of the complexity of these issues is that constructs that may be regarded as similar may require very different cultural assessment. For example, Smith, Spillane, and Annus (2006) have argued that anorexia nervosa is culturally invariant but that bulimia nervosa is highly Western in origin and prevalence.

Issues in Culturally Relevant Research: Individualism and Collectivism

Psychologists have developed an awareness that they need to exercise caution in discussing supposedly universal traits or patterns of behavior. Even apparently simple cognitive acts like categorizing stimuli or remembering details of an experience involve important cultural components. For instance Ji, Zhang, and Nisbett (2004) reported that Chinese participants may group words according to how they relate whereas American participants group them according to taxonomy (e.g., in a monkey–banana–panda triad, Chinese participants group monkey–banana, but Americans pair monkey–panda).

Considerations of complex personality issues raise even more difficulties. For example, researchers have assumed that the need for self-esteem is a universal trait because the well-established body of literature has consistently shown such a need. However, that literature is based on North American culture; when psychologists have investigated self-esteem among the Japanese, the results diverge in critical ways from those involving North American participants (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). In fact, self-esteem as conceptualized in Western psychology may be fairly irrelevant in Eastern psychology.

Given that psychological theory is typically Western-based, the constructs that psychologists use and even the language may make it difficult to understand cultural differences and even to speak about them. Thus, researchers may be discussing what they think are etics that are really emics. In fact, there is still disagreement as to whether some psychological constructs are basically universal with different cultural manifestations or whether they are largely cultural (Smith et al., 2006).

One of the dimensions receiving considerable attention because of its cultural relevance involves the role of individualism and collectivism. According to Matsumoto and Yoo (2006), this is the most widely studied dimension in the field, and varied research projects have illustrated consistent behavioral differences associated with the individualistic-collectivist (IC) continuum. It will serve as a useful illustration of the nature of the problems associated with studying behaviors across cultures.

An initial caveat in discussing the effects of one’s location on the IC continuum is that one must recognize that attributing differences in behavior to IC orientation is difficult because the investigator must be able to separate effects of culture (e.g., IC orientation) from other sources of variability. On an ecological level, there is a myriad of factors that affect behavior in different countries including affluence, population density, religious practice, and climate. As psychologists define culture, these ecological variables stand apart from cultural variables (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006, p. 237).

Research on individualism and collectivism has revealed that people from collectivist cultures remember events differently than people from individualistic cultures. Individualist people tend to remember situations from the viewpoint of themselves as part of the situation. On the other hand, collectivist people tend to focus on the social situation with the perspective of an outsider looking in. A typical interpretation is that individualists focus on self and collectivists focus on other. If this difference in memory is true, then simple measurement of memories may be problematic across cultures because of the different ways that people conceptualize their world (Cohen & Gunz, 2002).

However, even if one were to resolve this dilemma, another problem arises in cultural research. Multiple cultures may exist and notable individual differences appear within a given country; unfortunately, researchers often equate country with culture, making the assumption that what is true generally within a country reflects differences in culture compared to another country. Thus, Iwata and Higuchi (2000) studied state and trait anxiety, finding that their Japanese participants had less positive views of themselves and higher levels of both state and trait anxiety than Americans. They attributed the variation across countries to differences in Japan and the United States on the IC continuum. But, as Matsumoto and Yoo (2006) pointed out, Iwata and Higuchi interpreted their data under the assumption that Japan is a collectivist society in which people are compliant in order to maintain social harmony and underestimate their own positive traits.

Matsumoto and Yoo identified seven assumptions that Iwata and Higuchi made regarding Japanese people. None of these assumptions was empirically tested. Matsumoto and Yoo did point out that Iwata and Higuchi’s assumptions may be correct and that differences between Japanese and American students resulted from the relevant differences on the IC continuum. Their point was that psychologists should engage in research to verify such assumptions. The attribution of differences across groups to cultural factors when there is no empirical support for such an interpretation is known as the cultural attribution fallacy, a specific case of a larger problem that Campbell (1961) called the ecological fallacy.

Interestingly, Iwata and Higuchi (2000) couched their discussion of the Japanese-American differences using the American pattern as the norm. This type of inference poses behaviors of Americans as a standard against which others are compared, which Arnett (2008) has pointed out is common in discussing and interpreting research findings. This orientation to interpretation of research holds true for other types of comparisons as well, including gender differences (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006).

Another complicating factor here is that the IC dimension, as dominant as it is in cultural research, may not be the only construct with explanatory power. For example, as Matsumoto and Yoo (2006) pointed out, psychologists have listed 25 additional dimensions that distinguish cultures. As they noted, countries that differ on one dimension may also differ on others. For instance, on the IC continuum, the United States stands at first in individualism, whereas Japan is 27th out of 70 countries (which puts both Japan and the United States below the median in collectivist tendencies). At the same time, Japan is 8th in uncertainty avoidance, whereas the United States is 59th (Hofstede, 2001). Matsumoto and Yoo also noted that Japan ranks 4th in long-versus short-term orientation, with the United States at 26th out of 36 countries, which might explain differences in anxiety level differences among Japanese and Americans (Iwata & Higuchi, 2000) as well as or better than IC.

Finally, researchers must provide empirical assessment of characteristics of people in a particular culture in order to draw inferences about behaviors based on perceived differences across countries. Noting the great within-group variability in traits within a culture and, often, small across-group differences, McCrae and Terraccianno (2006) demonstrated that “there does not appear to be even a kernel of truth in the stereotypes of national character” (p. 160). There may be consensus about people in a given culture (e.g., the belief by Americans that the English have no sense of humor), but McCrae and Terraccianno note that consensus (i.e., reliability) does not equal validity. Hence, valid measurements of traits in a sample must accompany inferences of behaviors based on those traits.

Culture and Its Relation to Thought and Language

The discussion above centers on the role of culture in attitudes, behaviors, and personality. But there is reason to believe that culture may affect the way people actually think about the world. The belief that Inuit people have a multitude of words for snow and that this linguistic abundance leads them to conceptualize their snow-filled world differently than people in moderate climates is just a myth. But the point behind that myth has a reality. One’s cultural background, including one’s language, seems to be causal in the development of a world view.

For example, as noted previously, Ji et al. (2004) presented their participants with word triads such as monkey–panda–banana. Participants selected two items that formed a group. A grouping like monkey–panda is categorical, whereas a grouping like monkey–banana is relational. The question that the researchers addressed was whether people of Chinese background and of American background responded similarly. The results confirmed that the Chinese participants were more likely to choose relational pairings (e.g., monkey–banana because monkeys eat bananas), whereas the American participants favored categorical pairings (e.g., monkey– panda because both are animals).

These results support the notion that people of East Asian backgrounds preferentially focus on overall context but that those with Western backgrounds make use of taxonomic concepts. Such findings are compatible with a collectivist, context-oriented perspective versus an individualistic perspective. Such sensitivity to context has appeared in numerous studies, including accuracy in identifying one’s orientation in a rod-and-frame test (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000) and memory for focal versus background elements in visual display (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).

However, explanations are always fraught with rival hypotheses. Simply because Ji et al.’s (2004) participants may have differed on the IC continuum, it does not necessarily follow that the differences in their patterns of responses in choosing a pair of words from the triad were due to collectivism versus individualism. Drawing such a conclusion may reflect an example of the cultural attribution fallacy.

For example, Matsumoto and Yoo (2006) have speculated that differences in memory for individual items in a visual display between Japanese and American participants may be due either to the greater emphasis on rote memorization in schools or on the visual computer game culture in Japan. Such memorial differences may be consistent across cultures, but those differences do not always signal cultural differences (as the term culture is used by psychologists). This difficulty with interpretations lies at the heart of the interpretation paradox (van de Vijver & Leung, 2000), which reflects the fact that large differences across groups are easy to spot, but hard to explain, whereas small differences are hard to spot, but easy to explain.

Similarly, differences in responses to stimuli may reflect a combination of culture and other factors. As noted above, Ji et al. (2004) reported that Chinese participants organized words relationally but Americans organized words categorically. At the same time, the language in which participants were tested affected their responses. Response patterns of some Chinese participants differed depending on whether the language of the experimental session was Chinese or English. This finding corresponds to differences that other investigators have noted. For instance, Marian and Neisser (2000) found that language itself provides a context for recall. When Russian–English bilinguals received a prompt in Russian, their memories for autobiographical details associated with living in Russia, whereas English prompts spurred better memory for events associated with speaking English. In addition, the researchers have noted differences in cognitive processes associated with language itself.

Similarly, cross-cultural research has revealed differences in recognition of emotions. Matsumoto, Anguas-Wong, and Martinez (2008) discovered that Spanish– English bilinguals recognized facial emotions more accurately when they were tested in English than in Spanish, and Matsumoto and Assar (1992) showed that Hindi–English bilinguals recognized facial emotions more accurately when tested in English than in Hindi.

These results based on language may extend beyond language itself. That is, it is possible that bilinguals who are bicultural engage in a kind of cultural frame switching, viewing their world in different ways depending on the context.

For example, Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, and Morris, (2002) assessed the degree to which participants saw their two cultures as being consistent with one another or contradictory to one another. They characterized the participants as either high in bicultural identity integration (BII, cultures were consistent) or low in BII (cultures were contradictory). In the experimental session, the researchers primed participants to think either of American culture (e.g., by presenting pictures of Mickey Mouse, the U.S. Capitol, etc.) or Chinese culture (e.g., by presenting pictures of a rice farmer, the Great Wall of China, etc.). Participants subsequently viewed an animation of a single fish swimming in front of a school of fish, and then the participants gave an explanation as to why the single fish was leading the pack. The researchers coded the responses as involving factors that were either internal (personal characteristics of the fish) or external (the fish being influenced by other fish).

The results revealed that people who saw their two cultures as consistent with one another (those high in BII) responded with internal attributes of the fish when primed with American symbols and with external attributes when primed with Chinese symbols. On the other hand, participants who saw their two cultures as contradictory (those low in BII) showed internal attributions when primed with Chinese symbols and external attributions when primed with American symbols.

The researchers concluded that those high in BII readily engaged in cultural frame switching because they were comfortable with both worldviews. In contrast, those low in BII reacted to cues in one culture by drawing to mind their affiliation with the other culture. This response resembles the behavior of tourists to foreign countries who have a heightened awareness of their affiliation with their culture but who rarely think of that affiliation in their home country. As Markus (2008) pointed out, ethnicity can affect the psychological experience even when people are not aware of it.

As these results show, culture plays a significant role in how people observe and respond to the world around them. But the issue is complex because behaviors change due to individual differences like the language that the person uses and the degree to which the person feels assimilated into the various cultures to which he or she is exposed. Depending on the sample used in a research project, results might show vastly different patterns. Furthermore, the nature of a prime could affect the outcome significantly. For example, Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady (1999) primed women of Asian descent to their gender identities or to their cultural identities before asking them to solve math problems. When the women received the gender prime, they performed less well on the math task than when they received the culture prime.

Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000) provided an example of what may be a very subtle prime that had a major effect on women’s math performance. Simply being in the presence of men depressed women’s math performance compared to being in a single-sex research session.

Priming is a useful technique for assessing the effect of group membership. Much of the work on performance after a prime as it systematically affects different groups has involved sex and gender (e.g., Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000); it is well known, but less studied, in the context of race (e.g., Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, Steele, & Brown, 1999; Steele & Aronson, 1995). There is a collection of additional research on other cultural groups whose members are affected by appropriate primes, including Canadian (Walsh, Hickey, & Duffy, 1999), Chinese (Lee & Ottati, 1995), French (Croizet & Claire, 1998), German (Keller, 2007), Italian (Muzzatti & Agnoli, 2007), and poor people (Croizet & Claire, 1998).

This complex pattern of factors that influence one’s outlook and behavior reveals the caution one must exercise in attributing differences in performance simply to culture. As noted before, culture might be very important, but differences in behavior may reflect the moderating effect of other variables and of individual differences among participants. Thus, significant differences across groups might actually reflect a confounding variable that is correlated with cultural affiliation but the differences may not be due to that affiliation itself.

The Council of National Psychological Associations for the Advancement of Ethnic Minority Interests (2000) has developed guidelines for research in ethnic minority communities in the U.S. These guidelines were developed in the context of American culture, but they pertain to cross-cultural research of any kind. The principles involve (a) avoidance of treating all members of a group as being the same, (b) development of cultural competence by researchers, (c) use of multiple, valid, convergent measurements, (d) understanding of cultural context, (e) use of representative samples, and (f) avoidance of using race as a predictive construct.

Methodological Issues

The cognitive and intellectual effects of culture on thought and behavior pose serious issues in interpretations of research results. But methodological questions that appear fairly simple in research with samples from a single culture turn out to be complicated in and of themselves. Failure to account for the effects of methodology across cultures can result in data that are, at best, uninterpretable or, at worst, entirely misleading. The present discussion of cross-cultural research will include a broad definition of cross-cultural, accepting that different cultures can exist across countries but also within countries.

In describing their research, authors should provide enough demographic information about participants to (a) allow valid interpretation of results, (b) generalize the results, and (c) provide useful information for further research in the area (American Psychological Association, 2010, pp. 29–30). This information includes variables like age, race or ethnicity, sex, and socioeconomic status. As noted below, race and ethnicity are not useful explanatory constructs, but when demographic information appears in a published article, readers can use that information to put the results into context regarding to what groups the results might pertain.

A cursory examination of most research reports reveals a paucity of such information. Interestingly, the third edition of APA’s publication manual (American Psychological Association, 1983) makes no mention of the importance of including culturally relevant information about participants. Not until the fourth edition does the manual provide detailed guidance about describing cultural characteristics of participants (American Psychological Association, 1994). This change across the publication manuals mirrors the increase in attention to the importance of culture in research.

The importance of these variables in behavior is obvious. But there are also potential surprises lurking where researchers are not likely to expect them. For example, Park and Gutchess (2006) have noted that the results of brain imaging studies show that culture is associated with differences in neural processing. Consequently, failure to recognize such cultural effects could blind researchers to confounding variables and problems in drawing inferences, and failure to indicate both age and ethnicity in a research report could hamper further research in the area.

Furthermore, some psychologists have questioned whether culturally relevant research involving race (as opposed to ethnicity) is well grounded. That is, does race actually represent a “naturally occurring” causal variable? Helms, Jernigan, and Mascher (2005) have argued that there are methodological problems associated with conceptualizing people from a given racial category as constituting an intact group. As a rule, researchers do not use empirical measures to verify that the members in a group actually share important characteristics other than race.

Even when investigators report demographics, one needs to be aware of potential problems with this information. When people self-report their race, they may alter their choices depending on type of question (e.g., forced choice vs. selecting all that apply) or perceived advantage of a given selection in a particular situation (Panter, Daye, Allen, Deo,& Wightman, 2009; Phinney, 1996). Thus, even if race is a viable conceptual variable, assignment to racial categories, whether by the researchers or by the participants, may be problematic. In fact, with respect to health-related research, Shields et al. (2005) have recommended that self-reported race may be useful for recruiting research participants, but that statistical analysis should not be based on self-reported race.

Another, related problem with categorizing by race or ethnicity is that such categories are often based on bureaucratic rather than on systematic and scientific denotations. Rodriguez (2000) pointed out that, if a researcher uses categories established by the United States government, the same individual may fall into different groups depending on what agency has collected the data. The Census Bureau does not include Hispanic as a racial category, but agencies responsible for civil rights issues do include such a racial category.

The Pew Research Center has illustrated the problem with categorization with a “quick primer” related to being Hispanic, at least in the eyes of the U.S. Census Bureau:

Q: I immigrated to Phoenix from Mexico. Am I Hispanic?

A: You are if you say so.

Q: My parents moved to New York from Puerto Rico. Am I Hispanic?

A: You are if you say so.

Q: My grandparents were born in Spain but I grew up in California. Am I Hispanic?

A: You are if you say so.

Q: I was born in Maryland and married an immigrant from El Salvador. Am I Hispanic?

A: You are if you say so.

Q: I was born in Argentina but grew up in Texas. I don’t consider myself Hispanic. Does the Census count me as an Hispanic?

A: Not if you say you aren’t. (Passel & Taylor, 2009)

With research involving comparisons across countries, the situation is equally or more murky. Researchers have often equated country and culture, so that all participants from a given country are seen as having the same cultural roots. Chang (2000) provided an example of the drawback in this approach, explaining that there is really no single cultural group that one can designate as Chinese. Considering historic, linguistic, and anthropological factors, one could identify over 50 different ethnic groups that are all labeled Chinese. In fact, some of these groups speak variants of Chinese that would be mutually incomprehensible. Some researchers have used strategies like labeling as Asian anybody who was born in Asia, which could include people from a vast array of countries that show notable cultural differences among themselves (Cohen & Gunz, 2002; Kim, Atkinson, & Yang, 1999).

Further difficulties arise in interpreting data based on cultural category. Kim et al. (1999) suggested that as people from Asian countries become familiar with the culture in the U.S., their behaviors may change quickly. However, their attitudes may change slowly, if at all. So in one sense, they become members of both cultures, with an outlook that may differ across individuals, depending on the degree to which they feel comfortable in both cultures (Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002).

Stimulus Materials

A further, significant issue in cross-cultural research involves the materials (e.g., psychological tests, experimental stimuli) that investigators use. These materials might seem straightforward and noncontroversial within the context of single-culture research, but there are notable reasons to attend to them in cross-cultural research.

Researchers who measure a construct across different groups often assume that the measurement is invariant across groups (Chen, 2008). A second assumption is that the construct itself is the same across the groups (Arnett, 2008; Heine & Buchtel, 2009). Neither of these assumptions is guaranteed. For instance, Chen has pointed out regarding the question of measurement invariance that reliability (hence validity) is generally lower in educational measurement in underperforming groups. Furthermore, across groups, different factors may underlie a construct like self-esteem, so measuring the construct comparably in the different cultures is difficult or maybe not even possible (Smith et al., 2006).

When it is possible to assess personality across cultures that are related (e.g., American and European), language and stimulus issues can still be important. Studies of the Big Five model of personality lead to somewhat different results as a function of translating English words into other European languages (Peabody & De Raad, 2002). Similarly, the addition of contextual or situational information in self-reports of personal characteristics can affect the reliability of the measurements of the Big Five traits (De Raad, Sullot, & Barelds, 2008).

In addition to the problem of characterizing a construct, if a measurement instrument is to be used in groups with different languages, translation issues arise. The concept of feeling blue has been used to exemplify linguistic concerns. How does one translate it? A direct translation into Chinese produces an item with little meaning (Chen, 2008); trying to render it directly into Spanish leads to problems because the word for blue, azul, does not carry the same connotation as in English (Rogler, 1999). The use of back translation can help (Banville, Desrosiers, & Genet-Volet, 2000), although there are still reasons for concern when researchers attempt this. For example, Rogler reported that 36% of test items on the Spanish version of the Clinical Analysis Questionnaire had grammatical errors or direct translation of idioms that made no sense in Spanish.

There is a growing literature regarding the adequacy of assessment materials across cultures, but the issue is far from settled. The question of cultural competence on many levels in research remains an important concern.

Ethics

A final set of issues in cross-cultural research revolves around ethics in research. In the present context, these issues are not associated with anonymity, confidentiality, informed consent, and other elements of planning and conducting research, although researchers must attend to them. Rather, the discussion here involves the implications of research with diverse populations.

Markus (2008) raised the question of whether research on race and ethnicity, in and of itself, leads to stereotyping or other ethically troublesome outcomes. The question is not moot. For example, Kirmayer and Young (1998) reported that somatization of psychiatric symptoms varies across cultures. In addition, some behaviors that are stereotypically associated with certain ethnic groups in the United States are also associated with personality disorders (Iwamasa, Larrabee, & Merritt, 2000). Researchers who are not sensitive to cultural variations could draw inferences that result in stigmatization and generally unwarranted conclusions. APA’s ethical principles and standards are especially relevant here.

First, among the aspirational general principles cited by APA (2002), the issue of justice is quite relevant here. That is, psychologists need to recognize the limitations to their expertise and competence and to recognize their biases.

Second, psychologists must respect people’s rights and dignity. This principle pertains to recognition of and respect for individual differences associated with “age, gender, gender identity, race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language, and socioeconomic status” (p. 1063). Furthermore, psychologists are enjoined to consider these factors when working with members of such groups.

Within the enforceable ethical standards set forth by APA, there are several specific elements related to culturally relevant research, including competence (boundaries and maintenance of competence, bases for scientific judgments) and assessments (use of assessments, interpreting assessment results, assessment by unqualified persons).

Researchers should not ignore the fact that research on populations with which they are unfamiliar is fraught with potential conceptual and methodological problems. The conclusions based on research with participants from diverse backgrounds have both theoretical and social implications that are connected to ethical issues.

Conclusion

Cross-cultural research in American psychology has moved through several stages over the past century, from a relatively simple, descriptive depiction of people in varied cultures to a complex and nuanced recognition of the complex interplay between culture and behavior. The recent impetus among many psychologists to consider the relation of culture and behavior seems to mirror society’s increased interest in cultural issues as American society has become more diverse; along the way ethnicity has become a more prominent facet of many people’s lives.

Kim (2007; see also Chapter 1, this volume) has suggested that, just as societal ideas change, so do research ideas, positing that there are four “cultures” of cultural research. These so-called cultures include (a) the pre-encounter research culture: “I’m not interested”; (b) the initial encounter: “culture is a nuisance”; (c) the Captain Cook research culture: “let’s explore and compare”; and (d) the paradigm shift research culture: “beyond ethnocentric paradigms.” One might argue that psychology has entered the exploration/comparison phase. Development of ideas that may move psychological theory beyond ethnocentric paradigms would require a paradigm shift, according to Kim. So it is not immediately clear what the next phase would look like.

However, within the current paradigm, psychologists are only now successfully separating some culture-independent and -dependent processes. It has become apparent that some supposedly universal processes (e.g., recognition of facial emotions) are more intertwined with specifics of language than initially supposed, as shown in the recent research on the Big Five model of personality (Peabody & De Raad, 2002).

Furthermore, the use of an American-centered model of psychological processes still predominates. Models of attitude, personality, and behavior may undergo additional modification when what is considered standard (i.e., the American perspective) instead becomes simply one of many useful perspectives. And as researchers compare and explore psychological processes across cultures, it will be critical to define samples precisely and to document the validity of assumptions that participants show certain cultural characteristics, a practice that is largely honored in the breach.

Finally, because issues of race and ethnicity carry considerable emotional valence, researchers must show awareness of the implications of their findings. Obviously, all researchers need to show such awareness, but problems with stereotyping, prejudice, or simple misunderstanding are largely irrelevant in monocultural research with participants of the dominant culture.

Breaking new ground in any area of research poses distinct challenges. Cross-cultural research is no different than any other area. As noted here, psychologists have identified problems and posed solutions to a constellation of new issues with which researchers must contend when expanding the horizons of psychology to include the study and understanding of behavior across cultures.

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4 Why Diversity Matters:The Power of Inclusion in Research Methods

Linda M. Woolf and Michael R. Hulsizer

As we look around the globe, one fact becomes immediately apparent— remarkable diversity, as well as similarity, characterizes humanity. The term diversity often refers to the varieties of human characteristics found within a culture, but also sometimes implies similar variety across cultures. Just within the United States, the population reflects a strikingly diverse tapestry composed of variations in gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, language, ability, income, culture, and other elements of diversity. We live in a multicultural and international community with multi-layered, intersecting threads representing potential areas of study and understanding. Researchers may elect to study not only one element of diversity but also how this element may differ across cultures and/or interact with other elements of diversity. For example, one might choose to study gender differences within a culture, differences between two or more cultures related to gender, or the intersection of gender and sexual orientation either within or across cultures. Regardless, it is imperative that researchers conduct their investigations in a methodologically valid and culturally appropriate manner. It is not enough simply to include some element of diversity as a variable to study. Rather investigators must take care to insure that the methods chosen to research that variable are adequate, appropriate, and ethical. Failure to conduct cross-cultural or diversity research with an eye toward appropriate methodology may result in faulty results and erroneous conclusions.

Despite the spectrum of diversity as one looks around the globe, psychological research and study within the U.S. has failed to reflect that diversity. According to Louis Kincannon, Director of the United States Census Bureau (2007a),

About one in three U.S. residents is a minority. To put this into perspective, there are more minorities in this country today than there were people in the United States in 1910. In fact, the minority population in the U.S. is larger than the total population of all but 11 countries. (para. 1)

The U.S. Census Bureau (2007b) also reported that the minority population is not localized in one region. Indeed, “nearly one in every 10 of the nation’s 3,141 counties has a population that is more than 50 percent minority” (para. 1). Despite these figures, several researchers have noted a paucity of published research focusing on racial or ethnic minorities within psychology journals (e.g., Bernal, Trimble, Burlew, & Leong, 2003; Carter, Akinsulure-Smith, Smailes, & Clauss, 1998; Graham, 1992, Sue, 1999). According to a number of investigators, some researchers simply fail to report the racial and ethnic background of study participants (Buboltz, Miller, & Williams, 1999; Delgado-Romero, Galván, Maschino, & Rowland, 2005; Munley et al., 2002). Delgado-Romero and colleagues (2005) reported that only 57% of examined counseling articles published between 1990 and 1999 reported race and ethnicity. The results of their analysis revealed that White and Asian Americans were overrepresented, whereas African Americans, Hispanics, and Native American Indians tended to be underrepresented as compared to the U.S. population. Finally, it is also important to note that much of the traditional psychological curriculum has historically neglected issues of diversity (Guthrie, 1998). For example, despite the fact that approximately 45% of articles indexed in PsycINFO© included authors from outside the United States (Adair, Coelho, & Luna, 2002), introduction to psychology, life-span developmental psychology, and social psychology textbooks included little of this research (Woolf, Hulsizer, & McCarthy, 2002). Ultimately, it would seem that Betancourt and López’s (1993) assertion that “the study of culture and related variables occupies at best a secondary place in American (mainstream) psychology” (p. 629) is as true today as it was almost two decades ago.

Fortunately, there has been a recent push to increase both an awareness of and research concerning diversity, cross-cultural issues, and international research within psychology. In January 2000, the Council of National Psychological Associations for the Advancement of Ethnic Minority Interests (CNPAAEMI) produced the Guidelines for research in ethnic minority communities. Five ethnic minority associations within the American Psychological Association (APA) collaboratively worked to create a document reflecting issues relevant to research with African American, Asian American, Hispanic, and American Indian populations. In 2003, the APA published the Guidelines on multicultural education, training, research, practice, and organizational change for psychologists and in 2005 and 2008 hosted Education Leadership Conferences devoted to diversity and international issues, respectively. Indeed, the APA (2009) vision statement now identifies the Association as

A principal leader and global partner promoting psychological knowledge and methods to facilitate the resolution of personal, societal and global challenges in diverse, multicultural and international contexts. (para. 9)

In 2005, the APA Working Group on Internationalizing the Undergraduate Psychology Curriculum, in concert with the American Council on Education (ACE), published a set of recommended learning outcomes for psychology courses (Lutsky et al., 2005). The report noted that psychology has long been international both as a science and as a profession with early psychologists working in such diverse countries as Argentina, India, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Russia. Goal 2 of the report focused on research methods and highlighted that “Students should be aware of research methods and skills necessary for international research competence” (p. 3). The report presented five learning outcomes in relation to research methods, specifically that students will develop: (1) the ability to access and read journals published outside the United States; (2) the ability to identify and appreciate the range of research methodologies used by psychologists around the globe (e.g., ethnographies, observations); (3) an awareness of ethical issues that may be of concern in other countries (e.g., protection from harm); (4) an understanding that many constructs may have different meanings in different cultures; and (5) an appreciation of the dangers associated with making broad generalizations based on small and potentially unrepresentative samples.

In this chapter, we focus on a number of issues related to the role of diversity in understanding research methods. It is important to note that we do not discuss all issues related to diversity concerns and research. Rather, we seek to introduce the topic by providing representative examples which highlight the complexity involved in conducting research responsibly—particularly research that involves diverse populations. Moreover, much of what we discuss in each section below describes research focusing on differences between groups (e.g., differences between two cultures). However, we would like to highlight that this does not negate the need for research to be more inclusive of diverse populations in non-diversity focused research. It is important that researchers endeavor to be more inclusive of diverse populations in all of their work.

Validity

Marsella (2001) suggested that many psychologists are unwilling to “accept a very basic ‘truth’—that western psychology is rooted in an ideology of individualism, rationality, and empiricism that has little resonance in many of the more than 5,000 cultures found in today’s world” (p. 7). Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 1, psychology textbooks and journals are filled with psychological concepts, theories, and research findings that, at the surface, appear to be applicable to all humans. Yet, there is a great deal of cross-cultural as well as intra-cultural variability. Moreover, there is growing awareness that the use of homogeneous samples (e.g., introductory psychology students within the U.S.) has painted a somewhat distorted picture of psychological phenomena (Graham, 1992; Sears, 1986). Unfortunately, although homogeneous samples may increase the internal validity of a study, it is often at the expense of the ability to generalize to a range of diverse populations. All of the above highlights concerns related to the topic of research validity, specifically construct, internal, and external validity.

Construct validity

Construct validity typically refers to the degree to which a variable has been operationally defined so that it captures the essence of a hypothetical construct under study. For example, does a particular depression scale adequately measure depression or is an IQ test a good measure of intelligence? If the answer is “yes,” then the measure has good construct validity. If the answer is “no,” then any research conclusions drawn from the use of the measure are, at best, limited. An examination of construct validity is necessary in any cross-cultural or diversity research.

When conducting cross-cultural research, experimenters must monitor the degree to which their methodology is equivalent across cultures and groups. In fact, Matsumoto (2003) suggested that researchers should strive to create the perfect cross-cultural study. To that end, Brislin (2000) asserted that investigators need to develop an awareness of three sources of nonequivalence—translation, conceptual, and metric. Translation equivalence is necessary when conducting research on one population using experimental measures developed and standardized with another population. For example, if a researcher plans to use a standardized questionnaire developed in the U.S., translation equivalence needs to be achieved prior to its use in another country. So, how should the researcher go about translating a scale or experimental measure? According to the Guidelines for research in ethnic minority communities (CNPAAEMI, 2000), the proper translation of experimental measures involves the use of the back-translation method. First, a bilingual translator converts the measure to the target language. Next, a second translator converts the translated measure back to the original language. Finally, a researcher compares the original version to the back-translated version to examine any existing differences. The process is repeated until translation equivalence is achieved.

Conceptual equivalence is the degree to which theoretical concepts or constructs are the same between two cultures. Unfortunately, researchers can introduce conceptual nonequivalence in a variety ways, even through something as seemingly innocuous as demographics. Although it is often useful to control for certain demographic variables, such as age, sex, and religious orientation, this may become problematic when conducting cross-cultural research. For example, a demographic question such as “age” would seem relatively innocuous. Yet, for the Ju/’hoansi, also known as the !Kung of the Kalahari, this would be not be a useful question, as the Ju/’hoansi use a culturally specific age categorization system as opposed to thinking of age in chronological years (Hames & Draper, 2004). The inclusion of an indigenous (local) investigator or collaborator may serve to increase the validity of cross-cultural research because this inclusion can better enable the research team to ask the right questions (CNPAAEMI, 2000).

Finally, researchers need to be concerned with metric equivalence—the ability to compare the specific scores on a scale of interest across cultures. For example, would a researcher interpret a score of 25 on the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) the same way across cultures? Would individuals living under repressive regimes, where government intrusion is a daily occurrence, score differently on the paranoia scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2; Butcher et al., 2001)? Additionally, metric equivalence may not exist within a culture when studying diverse populations. For example, researchers have rarely standardized measures of assessment used in research, particularly those related to personality assessment and psychopathology, for use with a disabled population (Elliott & Umlauf, 1995; Pullin, 2002). In addition, disabled individuals may score differently than others on the Hypochondriasis Scale of the MMPI-2 (Butcher et al., 2001), with seeming obsession over body functions. Varying cultural norms about time, differences in physical ability, and age may all impact completion of timed tests of intellectual ability.

Inadequately standardized measures that lack a representative normative group threaten construct validity by introducing the possibility that individuals are evaluated on performance as opposed to ability. Unfortunately, researchers rarely design studies to accommodate participants who are differently abled. Tasks designed to measure cognitive, personality, or other psychological abilities may instead be measuring primarily noncognitive or nonpsychological variables in research inclusive of participants with a range of abilities. For example, research on memory using computers to present stimuli may be more challenging for some older adults due to an increased incidence in susceptibility to glare from cataracts. Research participants of any age who are in ill health may fatigue more easily and perform poorly on outcome measures. Thus, differences found between participants may reflect visual or health differences as opposed to memory differences. Unless the researcher takes into account the impact of disability, age, or other factors, the resulting research conclusions may be biased and inaccurate.

Internal validity

Internal validity reflects the confidence with which we can draw cause and effect conclusions from our research results. Of primary concern for researchers is the ability to eliminate, minimize, or hold constant all extraneous or confounding variables. Unfortunately, studies examining differences between various elements of diversity (e.g., gender, culture) are by their very nature quasi-experimental and hence limited in relation to cause and effect conclusions. Indeed, this issue may contribute to the paucity of diversity research within psychology. In a provocative article, Chang and Sue (2005) suggested that the current scientific paradigm, with its focus on experimental designs, has introduced a bias in psychology. Specifically, they asserted that mainstream journals systematically exclude multicultural research, thus devaluing existing multicultural research and impeding the growth of research in this area. Ideally, experimental research should be high in both internal validity and external validity. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to achieve both in experimental designs, and extremely problematic when using alternative designs (e.g., quasi-experimental, correlational, observational, ethnographic). Chang and Sue argued that the importance psychologists have placed on determining causality has led researchers to value internal validity over external validity.

Chang and Sue (2005) further asserted that the emphasis psychology places on causality (internal validity) has led to a host of additional research problems, which only serve to devalue external validity and the very nature of multicultural research. The problems they discussed included: (a) overuse of college students as research participants; (b) willingness to assume research conducted on one population (e.g., White, middle-class, U.S. citizens) can be generalized to other groups or contexts; (c) disregard for research seeking to explore cross-cultural differences as opposed to explaining such differences; (d) the tendency of journal reviewers to insist that researchers add a White control group when conducting research on ethnic minority groups; and (e) the formation of aggregate non-White populations to obtain a large enough sample size. The last issue is especially problematic due to the implied assumption of homogeneity among the non-White population, when in fact non-White groups may differ widely. Although the exclusion of diverse participants may enhance internal validity, the resultant homogeneous sample does not reflect the diversity of human experience.

External validity

External validity is the degree to which research results can be generalized beyond one’s sample. Often psychology focuses on the universality of human cognition and behavior. Researchers often refer to these universal concepts as etics. Concepts thought to be specific to a particular culture are called emics. Matsumoto (1994) suggested that, “most cross-cultural psychologists would agree that there are just as many, if not more, emics as there are etics” (p. 5). Many psychology textbook authors present traditional descriptions and recommended treatments for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as universal, or etics. Yet, PTSD symptoms and treatment are frequently culture-specific (Atlani & Rousseau, 2000; Bracken, 1998). The primary lesson of external validity is that researchers should exercise great care when extrapolating beyond their sample and this is particularly true when conducting cross-cultural or diversity research.

One of the primary issues at the core of external validity in relation to cross-cultural research is that variability exists within cultures. For example, the Guidelines for research in ethnic minority communities (CNPAAEMI, 2000), in relation to issues of using Hispanics or Asian/Pacific Islanders in research, stated that above all else, researchers need to be aware of the diversity of these populations. These broadly defined groups vary with respect to acculturation, language, race/ethnicity, beliefs, socioeconomic status, and educational background. Indeed, they do not represent homogenous cultures. Anyone critiquing research involving Asian/Pacific Islander or Hispanic participants must consider all these issues. These same issues are also fundamental to research guidelines associated with Native American Indians. In addition to research design concerns, investigators need to be prepared for small sample sizes. In fact, researchers may end up dealing with a single and consequently small population, given the fact that each tribe is a distinct cultural entity.

The issue of external validity also applies to diversity research within cultures. For example, Eichler (1991) cited the problem of overgeneralization in gender research—the propensity to extend concepts, theories, and research developed from studies involving participants of one gender to all individuals. Examples of overgeneralization ranged from the use of sexist language to the tendency of researchers to generalize the results of a study to all individuals when in fact the initial sample was composed only of men. Hyde (1996) also asserted that researchers often employ a “female deficit model” when drawing conclusions—the tendency to frame the results in such a fashion that women’s behavior is seen as deficient or non-normative. Research conducted in highly patriarchal cultures may magnify this issue.

Methodological Design Concerns

Many of the concerns we have discussed under validity intersect with methodological design concerns. However, several topics deserve further discussion and include methodological concerns related to demographics and sampling, experimenter bias, and the use of quasi-experimental design.

Demographics and sampling

At first glance, the issue of demographics and sampling may appear to be simple. However, when one includes diverse populations or studies diversity both between and within cultures, these are highly complex and require careful thought and foresight. Some of the major issues impacting demographics and sampling involve:

(1) self-identification; (2) hidden populations; (3) exclusion; and (4) faulty biologically based conclusions. Experimenter preconceptions about groups and cultures influence all of these issues.

When conducting research, it is important that investigators use culturally relevant and appropriate demographic categories regardless of whether the research involves participants within or between cultures. Particularly important is an appreciation for the role that culture may play in shaping a participant’s self-identification. For example, if you are conducting cross-cultural research, is it more appropriate to use the word “Hispanic” or “Latino/a” in the United States? Can you include a broad category such as Asian or does one need to be more specific: “Japanese,” “Chinese,” “Hmong,” or “Karen” (noting that this listing represents just a tiny fraction of the various ethnicities/cultures often lumped together under the term “Asian”)? To better address questions such as these, researchers often collaborate with individuals who are native or knowledgeable about the cultures under study. Familiarity with the culture, including diversity within the culture under study (e.g., ethnic groups, language, religion), is essential to avoid bias and stereotypes on the part of the experimenter.

The issue of self-identification applies not just to cultural differences but also variations within culture, such as gender and sexual orientation. Gays and lesbians have often eschewed the term “homosexuality” because “homosexuality” has been historically associated with disease and mental illness. Today, some researchers elect to use “queer” as a more inclusive term replacing gay and lesbian and inclusive of bisexuals and transgendered individuals (Grace, Hill, Johnson, & Lewis, 2004). Moreover, it is not uncommon to see the abbreviation GLBTQI (gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered or transsexual, queer or questioning, intersex) used by sexual minorities within the U.S. Even more challenging, from a research perspective, is the fact that some individuals who have had same-sex sexual relationships may still self-identify as heterosexual (Savin-Williams, 2001) and transgendered or intersex (biological sex is ambiguous) individuals may identify as either male or female. This ambiguity and interplay among all these constructs makes simple, non-fluid gender and sexual orientation self-identification more ambiguous. Certainly, the juxtaposition of identity issues and the need for demographics creates the basis for problematic research hypotheses and sampling challenges. Nonetheless, researchers should avoid overly simplistic categorizations for the sake of expediency as this may introduce a source of bias into a research project.

Many groups around the globe are hidden from view due to cultural, religious, or legal strictures. For example, in some cultures, adultery may result in honor killings, homosexuality is punishable by death or banishment, and certain religious groups face imprisonment. Therefore, these populations often remain hidden as a matter of safety and to avoid oppression. Attempts to include and study such populations are thus difficult.

Even within the U.S., there remain hidden populations due to stigma and stereotype (see Chapter 12 in this volume). For example, attitudes concerning the subject of sexual orientation have changed significantly in the past 20 years. According to recent Gallup Polls (Saad, 2008), Americans have become increasingly more tolerant of homosexuality. In 1982, only 34% of participants agreed that homosexuality was an acceptable alternative lifestyle. This number had risen to 57% when participants responded to the same question in 2008. Despite these changing attitudes, research inclusive of or concerning sexual orientation remains a small fraction of the literature and appears largely in specialized journals or special issues of journals (Bowman, 2003). Many individuals may be reticent to self-identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual due to fears concerning confidentiality or internalized homophobia. Thus, researchers are often limited to a very select group of the population who self-identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual—typically White, formally educated, urban, and upper middle class. In response to the challenges associated with obtaining a representative sample, researchers are currently exploring new methodologies such as the use of the Internet for research purposes (Koch & Emrey, 2001) and the use of alternative and qualitative methodologies related to the study of sexual orientation (Morrow, 2003). It is important to note that this reflects just one instance of the difficulty of sampling hidden populations. Researchers studying any number of populations (e.g., the mentally ill or minority religions) that are not immediately identifiable based on some external characteristic, but belong to a class of individuals socially stigmatized because of group status, will experience difficulties, particularly with regard to sampling.

Unfortunately, researchers often exclude individuals, both intentionally and unintentionally, from research participation based on a variety of factors. Such factors include, but are not limited to, the ability to get to the site of the research, literacy, gender, language, political oppression, socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, and disability. Such exclusions limit the generalizability of the research. The pool of available participants may be limited if participants are unable to read a questionnaire, lack the means to travel to the research site, or fear governmental reprisals for taking part in a research study. Consequently, those who become involved in the research may be different than those individuals who do not elect to or cannot participate.

Individuals with disabilities are often systematically excluded from research both in the U.S. and abroad. According to the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons (United Nations, 2009) at least 10% of the world’s population is impaired by a physical, mental, or sensory disability. Within the U.S., researchers estimate that there are almost 44.1 million community dwelling people (5 years and older) with disabilities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007c). Within the U.S. definitions of disability include sensory, physical, mental, self-care, homebound, and employment categories. Disabilities can be visible or hidden (e.g., heart defect), and individuals may or may not define themselves as disabled depending on the degree of limitation the disability has on their lives. Nonetheless, some investigators fail to accommodate disabled participants, thereby systematically excluding them from research. Other researchers simply bar individuals with disabilities from research participation altogether, often as the result of experimenter bias—the assumption that disability has broad negative effects on cognition, personality, affect, or ability. Of course, this assumption is grounded largely in stereotype rather than reality (Dunn, 2000).

The five ethnic minority associations that compose the CNPAAEMI worked collaboratively to create the Guidelines for research in ethnic minority communities (2000). The guidelines provided a wealth of information concerning research with ethnically diverse populations, with an important caveat. The CNPAAEMI warned that it is important for researchers to take care when using race as a demographic category, lest the variable become a proxy for biological explanations of behavior (Wang & Sue, 2005). Similar concerns surround the use of gender in psychological research. For example, McHugh and Cosgrove (2002) suggested that by attributing differences in men and women to gender differences “we risk essentializing gender, promoting a view of women as a homogenous group, and reinforcing the very mechanisms of oppression against which we are fighting” (p. 13) and note that the use of only “male/men” or “female/women” as categorical terms excludes those who identify as transsexual, transgender, or intersex.

Certainly, race and gender as variables are focal social and cultural constructs that, if used judiciously, can provide a wealth of information. The Guidelines for research in ethnic minority communities invited researchers to learn more about the rich diversity among individuals defined as belonging to a particular race and avoid treating racial categories as homogenous groups. They also recommended that researchers avoid non-representative but perhaps easy-to-reach samples. For example, it may be easy to conduct research on adolescents abroad, using as a sample those who attend a private English-speaking boarding school in another country, but this population may not be representative of the majority population in that country.

Experimenter bias

In addition to the impact on participant demographics and samples, experimenter bias can also affect the nature of an investigator’s worldview and subsequent research hypotheses. For any cross-cultural study, researchers must be familiar with all aspects of the society (e.g., language, religion, kinship patterns, etc.). Without such knowledge, any research questions, methods, and conclusions may be biased and untrustworthy. Moreover, it is imperative that researchers take into consideration the role of other diversity concerns within that culture as well. For example, research around the globe may be impacted by what Eichler (1991) termed androcentricity—the tendency for researchers to view the world from a male perspective. The research process perpetuates androcentrism in many ways. In an influential article, Denmark, Russo, Frieze, and Sechzer (1988) discussed several examples of sexism in research. For instance, the authors discussed the tendency for researchers to examine concepts such as leadership style in a fashion emphasizing male stereotypes (e.g., dominance, aggression) as opposed to a range of leadership styles, including those that are more egalitarian. Another example cited by Denmark and colleagues involved the propensity for some researchers to assume that topics relevant to White males are inherently more important than issues related to other groups. Binion (2006) argued that cultures have traditionally viewed women’s human rights (e.g., marital rape and other forms of domestic abuse) as existing within the private sphere of the home outside of public view, and hence have often ignored them. The false dichotomy of public/private sphere has unfortunately negatively influenced the actions of communities and law enforcement, and has limited political asylum opportunities for women around the globe.

Experimenter bias has also impacted the conclusions reached by researchers studying disability both within and outside of the United States. According to Dunn (2000), “Insiders (people with disabilities) know what disability is like, whereas outsiders (people without disabilities) make assumptions, including erroneous ones, about it” (p. 574). Most notably, non-disabled individuals overestimate the effect of a disability on an individual’s capacities and well-being. In addition, researchers explicitly studying participants with known disabilities may fail to consider all possible alternative explanations, such as cultural, situational, or interpersonal factors, and simply attribute the results to the disability. For example, researchers comparing math scores among disabled and non-disabled populations need to take into account the role of stereotype threat (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002) when discussing any performance differences between the groups.

Research design

Typically, research examining cross-cultural differences or focusing on diversity-related variables such as gender, age, or sexual orientation, employs a quasi-experimental design. A researcher examining differences in age may compare younger and older adults or a cross-cultural psychologist may research differences between ethnic groups either within or across nations. Unfortunately, the use of distinct samples in a quasi-experimental design typically results in low internal validity. These samples may differ on any number of variables other than the one under investigation. In a cross-sectional study (in which two or more age groups are compared), age differences may be confounded with generational, non-shared cultural, or historical cohort experiences—making it difficult to determine causality. For example, early cross-sectional studies suggested progressive declines in intelligence following late adolescence and early young adulthood. However, research taking account of cohort effects (e.g., differences in educational levels) did not support this gloomy picture (Schaie, 1986; 2000).

Similarly, comparisons of ethnic groups or race within a culture may be confounded by differences in religion, language, socioeconomic status, or other factors not under study by the researchers. Unfortunately, researchers may assume differences in heredity or genetics to explain the results of cross-cultural studies or those involving race or ethnicity. This faulty assumption can lead to erroneous and potentially damaging conclusions. For example, throughout the twentieth century some researchers were still asserting that White Americans were intellectually superior to minority groups—specifically African Americans (e.g., Hernstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969). However, Sternberg, Grigorenko, and Kidd (2005) noted, “Race is a social construction, not a biological construct, and studies currently indicating alleged genetic bases of racial differences in intelligence fail to make their point even for these social defined groups” (p. 57).

Meta-analyses have become an increasingly popular tool for psychologists. For example, a search of PsycINFO© revealed dozens of meta-analyses examining gender as well as cultural differences across a variety of issues. Although meta-analyses have almost certainly added to psychologists’ knowledge of humanity, researchers need to exercise caution when drawing conclusions from such studies. For example, in relation to gender, Halpern (1995) expressed concern that researchers ignore context when using benchmarks to determine whether a gender-related effect size is meaningful or important. The tendency to ignore context is further compounded by the fact that gender research often fails to use representative samples. Halpern cautioned that “as long as the research literature is based on a narrow selection of participants and assessment procedures, the results of any analysis will be biased” (p. 83).

Research Ethics

The APA’s Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct (2002) highlights a range of research ethics topics such as confidentiality, informed consent, the use of deception, and the obligation to be accurate in reporting results. Moreover, according to the Ethical principles, all psychologists must “strive to benefit those with whom they work and take care to do no harm” (p. 3). Although all of these concerns are fundamental to psychological research, issues of informed consent and confidentiality are especially important in cross-cultural research, particularly in relation to protection from harm.

In addition, according to the Ethical principles, researchers conducting any project must inform participants about a variety of features such as purpose, procedures, risks and benefits, the limits of confidentiality, and the right to withdraw from participation. As with all statements of informed consent, it is essential that the document be clear and unambiguous—this is particularly important in cross-cultural research. Researchers must develop consent forms with an understanding of the culture of participants in mind, inclusive of special needs related to language, reading ability, nation-specific legal standards, and cultural norms. Consequently, a “boiler-plate” statement simply translated into a different language often does not meet the standards of informed consent. Moreover, in some cultures, women may not be culturally free to give informed consent but must first receive the consent of a male guardian.

Individuals with developmental or cognitive disabilities represent a challenge to informed consent (Dresser, 2001). Informed consent rests on the premise that research participants can fully understand the procedures, risks, and benefits associated with a particular study and agree to participate. Unfortunately, individuals with significant cognitive impairment due to developmental disabilities, injury, or dementia may not fully understand the material provided to give informed consent. Researchers must take special care to protect participants who are unable to provide consent on their own, including situations where a guardian provides consent but the participants undergo experimental testing without their knowledge. Unfortunately, due to the potential risks involved, many researchers simply avoid research with cognitively disabled populations (Yan & Munir, 2004).

Researchers need to be particularly aware of issues of confidentiality when conducting cross-cultural research. Seltzer and Anderson (2001) noted that researchers should use care even with aggregate data, as some individuals or small groups may remain identifiable. Within this discussion, they highlighted the role that official statistics have played in historical incidents of forced migration, internment, and genocide. The United Nations Statistical Commission (1994) passed the Fundamental principles of official statistics, which stated, “Official statistics provide an indispensable element in the information system of a democratic society, serving the government, the economy and the public with data about the economic, demographic, social and environmental situation.” Nonetheless, the UNSC asserted that researchers must protect individuals’ privacy and guard against the misuse of statistics. It is clear that researchers must carefully protect the confidentiality of all participants (e.g., including no easily identifiable information about the participants on forms, questionnaires, etc.) in cultures where the researcher’s data may be taken by family members, religious officials, or governmental agents for use against the well-being of the participant.

Conclusion

Increasingly, we hear that we are living within a global community. If this is to be a true and inclusive statement, then research needs to reflect the tapestry of human existence, noting variations across a range of biological and social constructs (e.g., sex and race, respectively) and cultures. In this chapter, we have discussed a host of constructs such as gender and race but this does not represent the full spectrum of human expression. Other areas of diversity significantly impacting individuals’ identities and their place in communities include, but are by no means limited to, socioeconomic status, linguistic variability, educational level, differing sects within religious groups, profession, marital status, physical and mental health, social class/caste, computer literacy, access to resources, political affiliation, and physical appearance. Ultimately, how we identify ourselves is incredibly variable and influenced by the currents of time, our communities, and our culture.

To become an effective and critical consumer and producer of research today requires cross-cultural and diversity-related understanding, knowledge, and skills. Individuals need to expand their horizons by reading research from around the globe, on a variety of topics and perhaps inclusive of research from related fields such as sociology, anthropology, history, and international studies. It is important to think of psychological research not so much as a template through which all topics can be studied (e.g., independent/dependent variables; experimental/ control groups) but as a flexible tool that can be used creatively to explore topics of relevance across a range of populations and communities. With an awareness of alternative methodologies, input from collaborators with varying backgrounds, and an understanding of the unique ethical concerns involved in cross-cultural research, individuals can engage in exciting and important research that is both inclusive and reflective of human diversity across the global community.

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Part III Development

In every culture, children are born, grow, develop to the extent their circumstances allow, and eventually die. Psychological researchers have studied development extensively, especially in the areas of cognition, psychosocial development, attachment, and temperament. And researchers interested in lifespan development have investigated various aspects of adulthood and aging. In Part III we will examine child development in some depth, and then go on to explore some of the fascinating cultural variations in perceptions of aging.

Nearly every psychology student studies development, including a common core of theoretical and empirical work in the areas noted above. However, in recent years investigators have begun to question to what extent these theoretical perspectives embody ethnocentric assumptions about their generality across cultures. Are traditional findings limited, for example, by the fact that many studies have been conducted on middle-class European American children? Fortunately, the field has advanced toward an appreciation of a much wider range of human settings, and the realization that there are significant developmental variations that must be understood in the cultural context.

In this section we will explore, then, the extent to which culture may shape cognitive development, psychosocial development, attachment, and temperament. We will also see that developmental aims or ideals may not be the same for all cultures. And of course we will raise the question: How universal is our understanding of human development?

We will also note coming changes in the population of elderly people in the world, with forecasters predicting large increases in the next few years. How will these people be perceived? How will they be treated? What role does culture play in determining the answers to these questions? And what are the effects of social, political, and economic variables on views of aging?

Culture, we will find, may shape the roles played by the elderly. They may be seen, for example, as grandparents, as advice-givers, or as sources of wisdom. Their relationship to younger generations may also vary across cultures, and their perceptions of death may be intertwined with religion, living arrangements, cultural values, and retirement policies.

In short, development is a fascinating, multi-faceted process. It is intimately related to, and strongly shaped by, culture; and it remains dynamic and malleable from birth to death.

5 Child Development Across Cultures

Adriana Molitor and Hui-Chin Hsu

During the latter half of the last century, developmental psychology earnestly began cross-cultural explorations. Although much remains unknown, great strides have been made in identifying similarities and variations in the development of children around the world. Despite the field’s awareness of limitations in the universality of traditional theories and findings, the developmental phenomena and patterns discussed in undergraduate courses are often implicitly regarded as capturing unequivocal regularities in child development. However, the bulk of developmental knowledge has derived from research and theory focused on a small segment of the world’s people—most often, middle-class European American children and families. This chapter considers the cross-cultural applicability of some of the most popular content addressed in undergraduate developmental psychology and reviews research that has revealed similarities and differences across cultures.

According to Super and Harkness (1986, 1994, 1997), three interconnected components of culture work together as a system (i.e., a developmental niche) to influence children’s development. Customs and practices refer to normative and individual child-rearing practices within a culture that range from pragmatic strategies to symbolic or religious rituals. These culturally regulated behavioral practices incorporate sleeping and feeding routines, childcare arrangements, interpersonal interaction styles, and teaching approaches. Settings capture the physical, economic, and social contexts in which the child resides and include ecology, living space, family composition, and objects. Lastly, caretaker psychology encompasses not merely the psychological attributes of a parent but wider cultural belief systems, particularly shared understandings about the development and needs of children. These include implicit “ethnotheories” about how competencies unfold (e.g., nature vs nurture), timetables for expectations, desired competencies, and ultimate goals for development. Super and Harkness (1986, 1997) emphasized that the three components do not operate independently; rather, socialization practices are intimately tied to the cultural beliefs and ecology of a child’s developmental niche.

Unfortunately, however, the interconnections are not consistently studied or uncovered in psychological research. As we review reports of cross-cultural differences in child development, it is nevertheless important to recognize that connections exist between cultural practices, beliefs, and settings even if they are not, as yet, fully understood.

Cognitive Development

Piaget’s stages

The study of children’s thinking traces its origins and inspiration to the pioneering research and prolific writings of Jean Piaget. Among the basic tenets of his integrative theoretical perspective (see Flavell, 1963, for a comprehensive review) is the renowned proposition that intellectual processes advance qualitatively in a series of four progressive stages. Although much of his research was conducted on his own children and children in Geneva, Switzerland, Piaget assumed he was uncovering universal patterns of thought and development (Crain, 2005; Dasen, 1994). Cross-cultural investigations indicate that in some respects, Piaget was correct in his depiction of cognitive growth; however, many aspects of his theory have not been supported even within Western samples. His perspective has been enormously influential, but the modern study of cognitive development now considers Piaget’s stage portrayal inaccurate and insufficient in accounting for the full range of transformations in children’s cognition.

Sensorimotor intelligence

Piaget described the period between birth and the second birthday as sensorimotor because infants rely on basic sensory and motor abilities to understand the world. He proposed that infants initially do not “think” about objects apart from acting on or perceiving them. Instead, thinking and behavior are fused as the dominant cognitive structures are simple action schemes. The ultimate achievement of this stage is the enduring and flexible capacity for symbolic schemes, enabling the toddler to internally represent objects, actions on those objects, and other complex experiences via mental imagery and symbols, including words (Piaget, 1964/1969). One means of displaying this cognitive advancement is the retrieval of hidden and invisibly displaced objects.

Although research by others has suggested that Piaget underestimated infants’ capacity to represent and understand the object world (and social world) because of his reliance on infants’ physical-motor execution, his description of sensorimotor task performance is considered universal. For example, in a well-known study of the rural Baoulé culture in Côte d’Ivoire, West Africa (see Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992), infants displayed the same sequence of sensorimotor substages proposed by Piaget. Minor variation occurred in the average month of onset with the Baoulé infants performing earlier on some tasks requiring object use—believed to be tied to these infants’ extensive access to non-toy objects (Berry et al., 1992). Studies of infants in India (Kopp, Khoka, & Sigman, 1977), Guatemala (Kagan, 1977), and Zambia (Goldberg, 1972) also have reported similar unfolding of sensorimotor abilities in terms of sequencing, although with occasional delays in timing. Kopp et al. (1977) argued that cultural caregiving practices likely accounted for onset differences between Indian and American samples. For example, Indian mothers indirectly terminated hidden-object tasks by quickly comforting infants’ frustration elicited by the give-and-take of these tasks.

Dasen and Heron (1981) pointed out that even at this first stage, performance is not driven entirely by maturational or equilibration factors (e.g., assimilation and accommodation). Rather, cultural experiences alter the rate of progression of particular substages, albeit minorly. Dasen and Heron otherwise emphasized the remarkable commonality among findings, not only in substage order but in the specific manipulative and exploratory behaviors described. Even chimpanzees exhibit the same sequence of sensorimotor performance described by Piaget (Cole, 2006).

Preoperational thinking

The second cognitive stage is marked by the pervasive, enduring, and flexible use of symbolism to mentally represent objects and experiences. Thus, children in this stage (approximately 2 to 6 years) think in the conventional sense; they can reflect on absent objects and people, recall the past, and imagine future events. Symbolic capacity is evident in burgeoning language, imitation, and creative/ imaginative play activities. Piaget, however, referred to this stage as preoperational because thought yet lacks operational structures enabling linked, reversible mental actions on objects (Piaget, 1964/1969). Overt limitations include unidimensional and end-state focusing, perception-bound reasoning, transductive causality, and egocentrism (see Trawick-Smith, 2010). Cognitive constraints lead to semi-logical thinking about objects and events, which is evident in basic scientific reasoning tasks.

The preoperational stage has been argued as universal (Dasen & Heron, 1981); however, this conclusion is chiefly supported by studies confirming that young children across cultures fail logical problem-solving tasks such as conservation of properties (i.e., that amount, number, etc. remain the same despite changes in appearance), multidimensional classification, and/or spatial reasoning. Nevertheless, available research supports the universality of some additional features of preoperational functioning. For example, in terms of the rapid development of language during this stage, psycholinguists confirm that by age 5 children around the world have mastered most of the basic rules of syntax of their native language (Trawick-Smith, 2010). In terms of emerging symbolism in play, Dasen and his colleagues (see Dasen & Heron, 1981) found that young children in the Baoulé culture of West Africa displayed the same sequence of development (from conventional to symbolic play with objects) at about the same ages as French children even as the content differed.

Further preoperational depictions are equivocally supported within Western samples, although similarities in traditional conceptualizations have been found across cultures. For example, 3-to 5-year-olds across cultures display similar patterns of errors and age improvements in distinguishing appearance from reality (e.g., Flavell, Zhang, Zou, Dong, & Qi, 1983). Yet methodological probing of Western samples suggests that in some circumstances preschoolers can readily distinguish appearance from reality (see Deák, 2006). Cross-cultural studies also support the universality of traditional notions of egocentrism (i.e., viewing the world only through one’s perspective). For example, Fahrmeier (1978) and Greenfield and Childs (1977) respectively found reversed linear age trends for egocentrism among children of the Hassau (Nigeria) and Zinacanteco Mayan (Mexico) cultures. Nonetheless, modern research suggests that young children are not as consistently egocentric as Piaget originally proposed, while it also confirms that perspective-taking and knowledge about the mind greatly increase with age (Flavell, 2000).

Concrete operations

In Piaget’s third stage (beginning at approximately 5 to 7 years), the capacity for cognitive operations appears; that is, children can now perform linked, reversible mental actions on objects (Piaget, 1964/1969). Thus, thinking is no longer constrained by the limitations of the preoperational period and children can now understand the process of transformations, reversibility, etc. (see Trawick-Smith, 2010). This new operational capacity is evident in logical problem-solving and successful performance in basic scientific reasoning tasks. Nevertheless, Piaget referred to this stage as concrete because operations (and thus logical and systematic thinking) are limited to tangible objects and activities (i.e., real or readily imagined) and do not extend to ideas and hypothetical propositions (Crain, 2005; Piaget, 1964/1968).

Cross-cultural studies on concrete operational thinking are abundant and typically incorporate tasks assessing conservation, classification, and spatial skills. Considerable commonality has been found in children’s performance, particularly among those who receive formal schooling. For example, Shayer, Demetriou, and Pervez (1988) uncovered strikingly similar patterns of emerging operations for British, Greek, Australian, and Pakistani school children (ages 6–12), regardless of socioeconomic background. Still, it is at this stage that remarkable cross-cultural heterogeneity appears particularly between Western and non-Western societies; however, disparate findings are not explained by this distinction alone.

Some studies of non-Western cultures have reported similar task performance for classification or conservation as in Western samples, including the same sequence of emergence (e.g., conservation of number, length, weight, area, then volume) and average age of onset. For example, comparable findings have been found for communities in Nigeria, Zambia (see Dasen, 1972), and Kenya (Kiminyo, 1977). Other studies of non-Western cultures have found concrete operations emerging at later ages than in Western samples. For example, in Papua New Guinea, conservation of number (which typically comes first) appears approximately three years later than in Western samples, while mastery of more complex tasks (e.g., conservation of area, volume) appears as much as six years later (Shea, 1985). Similarly later onsets, ranging from one to six years, also have been reported for other groups in non-Western cultures (e.g., Senegal, Algeria, Uganda) for various operational tasks (e.g., classification, conservation) (see Dasen, 1972). The eventual achievement of concrete operations (as well as the observation that tasks which are more difficult for Western children also are more difficult for many groups) suggests some degree of commonality across cultures (Shea, 1985).

The cross-cultural heterogeneity in operational mastery and onset rates is sometimes exacerbated by factors such as urban versus rural living, or years of schooling (e.g., Shea, 1985); however, these factors have not consistently led to differences (e.g., Kiminyo, 1977). On the other hand, immediate contextual factors seem to affect performance. For example, assessments using children’s native language are associated with improved task execution (Gardiner & Kosmitzki, 2008). Even more so, children’s performance seems to be greatly enhanced by familiarity of task materials (Rogoff, 2003). In terms of underlying developmental differences, Dasen and colleagues (Dasen 1977; Dasen & Heron, 1981; Segall, Dasen, Berry, & Poortinga, 1999) have argued that ecological demands, particularly those which are uniform within subsistence economies, may explain the diverse emergence of various domains of concrete operational reasoning. In their comparison of data from five cultures—the indigenous Aranda of Australia, the Inuit of Canada, the Ebrié and the Baoulé of Côte d’Ivoire, and the Kikuya of Kenya (Dasen, 1975; Segall et al., 1999)—Dasen and colleagues found that children’s development of spatial and conservation reasoning varied according to the ecological pressures confronting the different subsistence groups (e.g., nomadic, hunting-gathering versus sedentary, agricultural farming). Overall, the strictly agricultural groups (Kikuyu and Baoulé) showed relatively rapid development of conservation reasoning (e.g., quantity), while the hunting and gathering groups (Aranda and Inuit) exhibited relatively later onsets. The researchers observed the opposite trend for spatial reasoning. The ecocultural relevance of spatial reasoning appeared to be driving its rapid development among nomadic people, while the meaningfulness of conservation promoted its earlier onset among agriculturalists (Dasen & Heron, 1981). Thus, diverse cultural rates of development of operational domains may reflect the salience of what is, and is not, adaptive and valued within particular societies (Dasen, 1994).

Formal operations

In Piaget’s final stage (beginning around the time of puberty), cognitive operations are no longer limited to the physical realm. Thus, the adolescent can conduct mental actions not merely on objects, but on wholly abstract and hypothetical ideas; these ideas need no longer be attached to vivid representations that are supplied by external reality (Piaget, 1964/1968). Indeed, mental operations on operations become possible (Kuhn, 2008). “Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action” (Piaget, 1964/1968, p. 174). Formal operational structures include combinatorial and propositional logic (Piaget, 1972) and lead to various behavioral markers—hypothetical reasoning, isolation and control of variables, systematic combination (Kuhn, 2008), often collectively referred to as “scientific thinking.”

Given the wide cross-cultural heterogeneity that began appearing in the concrete stage, it should be no surprise that researchers have not universally observed Piaget’s final stage. Among unschooled subjects in traditional non-Western cultures, formal operational reasoning is typically not evidenced when assessed by standard tasks (Dasen, 1972; Dasen & Heron, 1981). Shea (1985) argued that such findings do not necessarily mean the absence of formal reasoning among entire cultures. In fact, formal-level thinking may be present in some remote non-Western communities when assessed via unconventional measures. For example, Tulkin and Konner (1973) suggested that preliterate tribal hunters of the Kalahari (Africa) displayed reasoning consistent with formal operations when working through issues dealing with the tracking of prey. Likewise, Saxe (1981) reported signs of a developmental trend in formal reasoning among Ponam islanders (ages 8–23) in Papua New Guinea. Specifically, combinatorial reasoning seemed evident by late adolescence during a task requiring construction of hypothetical families using an indigenous birth-order naming system for children. Although such findings are provocative in suggesting the development of formal operations even within remote settings, Segall et al. (1999) cautioned against assuming formal-level reasoning in the absence of standard criteria.

The achievement of Piaget’s final stage seems to be strongly related to schooling. Among well-educated samples in non-Western cultures, evidence for formal operations does emerge. Orbell (1981) reported that 63% of high-achieving Zimbabwean male students in their fourth year of secondary education demonstrated formal operational thinking. Other researchers have reported similar evidence of formal operations among African students drawn from universities in Botswana, Kenya, and South Africa (e.g., Cherian, Kibria, Kiriuki, & Mwamwenda, 1988). However, secondary-level schooling alone is not sufficient to promote formal operational thinking, as it is not always evident even among educated non-Western samples (Dasen & Heron, 1981; Segall et al., 1999; Shea, 1985).

The cross-cultural trends mimic those within Western cultures. That is, most individuals do not achieve Piaget’s final stage. Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, and Haan (1977) found that only about a third of adults in their U.S. sample showed consolidated formal operations. Though many appeared “transitional,” a considerable percentage exhibited no signs of formal thinking. The general consensus is that, even among well-educated Americans, only a fraction display formal operations as assessed by traditional Piagetian tasks (Dasen & Heron, 1981; Neimark, 1979). When formal operations are employed, they tend to be exhibited in an area of specialty. For example, among college students, science majors outperformed non-science majors when tested on a traditional Piagetian balance task, and among non-science majors, seniors did not perform any better than freshmen (White & Ferstenberg, 1978). When assessments used formal-level tasks representing a range of specialty content, De Lisi and Staudt (1980) found that college students tended to exhibit formal reasoning only in tasks that corresponded to their major.

In response to emerging trends, Piaget (1972) acknowledged that his final cognitive stage may not be universally manifest, but believed it likely that all individuals eventually attain formal operations in an area of specialization. Thus, one’s ultimate level of cognitive functioning would be reflected only under favorable circumstances (Berry et al., 1992; Dasen & Heron, 1981). The evidence available to date is insufficient to clarify this issue (Kuhn, 2008) and modern scholars have moved away from an assumption of generality in cognitive development and focused their scientific inquiry into domain-and context-specific processing (Rogoff, 2003).

Modern approaches to cognitive development

A sociocultural perspective of cognitive development emphasizes that mental abilities do not develop in a vacuum. Rather, children learn, practice thinking, and develop their skills through participation in everyday activities organized by cultural conventions and routines (Gauvain, 1998; Rogoff, 2003). Cultural practices not only provide opportunities to support and maintain desired patterns of learning, but also impose constraints on cognitive growth (Gauvain, 2001). As a result, culture and cognition are inextricably interlinked. The development of two cognitive processes—attention and autobiographical memory—serve as illustrations of cultural influences.

Attention

Mothers in different cultures employ different strategies to guide their infants’ attention. For example, American mothers tend to encourage their infants to attend to the environment, whereas Japanese mothers tend to shift infants’ attention away from the environment and toward the mother’s face (Bornstein, Toda, Azuma, Tamis-Lemonda, & Ogino, 1990; Fernald & Morikawa, 1993). American and British mothers also show a preference for attention-following, where infants lead and mothers follow their infants’ focus. By contrast, Chinese and Korean mothers prefer a style of attention-directing, where mothers scaffold their infants’ attention to the object or event of their choice (Sung & Hsu, 2009; Vigil, 2002). These maternal attention regulation styles may reflect cultural values. Western mothers’ style of following the child’s lead encourages exploratory initiative and reinforces individual interests and choices. By contrast, Asian mothers’ style of using a directive tactic may strengthen mother–infant interpersonal connections and ensure the achievement of interpersonal harmony by considering the needs of others.

Childhood attention-deployment strategies also vary cross-culturally. For example, in response to several ongoing competing social events, Guatemalan Mayan toddlers and their mothers showed a pattern of simultaneous attention to multiple events, whereas middle-class European American dyads demonstrated a style of exclusive attention to one event at a time and alternating attention between events (Chavajay & Rogoff, 1999; Rogoff, Mistry, Göncü, & Mosier, 1993). American children with Mexican heritage also were more likely to display simultaneous attention than those with European heritage (Correa-Chávez, Rogoff, & Arauz, 2005). Furthermore, Mayan children spent more time in sustained attention to interactions not directed toward them, whereas middle-class European American children spent the majority of time either not attending to activity not involving them or only sporadically glancing at it (Correa-Chávez & Rogoff, 2009). These attentional patterns may reflect different cultural practices. In the traditional Mayan community, children are included in almost all activities. However, because learning situations are not specially designed, children are expected to learn by observing ongoing activity and keeping their attention broadly focused. In contrast, European American children tend to be the target of adults’ exclusive attention. They are encouraged to focus on a particular age-appropriate task and sustain their attention.

Cultural differences in attentional socialization practices may contribute to contrasting adult cognitive styles (Cole & Cagigas, 2010). For example, East Asians exhibit a holistic or field dependent style that divides attention between contextual information and a focal object, whereas North Americans display an analytic or field independent style that emphasizes focal information about objects and is less sensitive to context (e.g., Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Research indicates that American and Japanese children older than age 6 exhibit marked cultural differences in attention strategy that are similar to those of adults in their respective cultures, whereas those younger than 6 years do not (Duffy, Toriyama, Itakura, & Kitayama, 2009). This evidence supports the view that cultural socialization practices during very early childhood permanently shape how individuals allocate their attention and what information they process.

Autobiographical memory

An information-processing approach to memory focuses on encoding, recall, and recognition. People tend to remember things that are meaningful and relevant to their concerns. Culture can affect why and what people remember, and whether and how people use their past experiences to guide everyday decisions and actions. Studies regarding the effects of culture on children’s memory have focused chiefly on autobiographical memory—recollections of personal events that occurred in one’s past.

Our personal memories from early childhood are sparse. The inability of adults to recall events that occurred prior to age 3 is known as infantile amnesia, and seems to be a universal phenomenon (Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Wang, 2003). However, the onset and content of autobiographical memory varies cross-culturally. Adults from Western cultures with an emphasis on independence have an earlier age of first memory. On average, the earliest memory reported by American adults occurs at 3.5 years, six months earlier than those reported by Asians (Wang, 2003; Wang & Ross, 2007). Additionally, childhood memories reported by American adults tend to be more specific, detailed, and focused on self. By contrast, memories reported by individuals from Asian cultures tend to be more skeletal, generic, and centered on social relationships (Wang, 2003; Wang & Ross, 2007). Similar findings are observed in childhood. For example, American preschoolers reported more specific autobiographic memories than did Korean and Chinese preschoolers (Han, Leichtman, & Wang, 1998). Variations in belief systems, particularly “self-views,” may account for cultural differences in memory onset and content. A social-cultural-developmental perspective (Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Wang, 2003) argues that cultural differences in how self is defined are reflected in how early and well people remember their past. Independent cultures place an emphasis on individuality. Thus, an autonomous sense of self guides cognitive resources into processing and remembering significant personal experiences. By contrast, in interdependent cultures such as China and Korea, because self is defined by people’s social role and status in the family and community, a relational sense of self motivates individuals to prioritize information about significant others and social groups (Wang & Ross, 2007).

Early parent–child memory sharing is also critical to the development of autobiographical memory (Fivush & Nelson, 2004). Across cultures, memory conversations between parent and child differ in their style, content, and degree of maternal elaboration and support (e.g., Wang & Fivush, 2005). For example, European American mothers are likely to take a cognitive approach in memory sharing by engaging in elaborative talks with their children about positive and negative past events. These mothers tend to ask many questions and provide a great deal of nuanced information. They also frequently discuss children’s desires, thinking, and feelings, highlighting them as separate and unique individuals. By contrast, Chinese mothers tend to use a behavioral approach during memory conversations. They are more likely to focus on moral lessons, discussing past wrong-doings and directing attention to behavioral conduct to avoid negative emotions in the future without giving causal explanations for the emotion itself. The style and content of children’s memory reports mirror those observed in early parent–child reminiscing (e.g., Han et al., 1998; Wang, 2006; Wang & Leichtman, 2000). Compared to Asian children, American children provided elaborative and specific accounts of the past, more references to their own feelings, opinions, and preferences, and more mentions of themselves relative to others.

Summary

In summary, modern scholars argue that cognitive development cannot be fully or even meaningfully understood outside its cultural context. Researchers no longer question whether culture plays a role in the development of children’s attention, thinking, and memory. Different cognitive tendencies and abilities develop in different social and cultural settings, depending on the demands placed on an individual’s life. Through conversations and interactions with parents and others in their communities, children learn to pay attention, think, and remember in a culturally acceptable way. Continued research will increasingly clarify how culture-specific practices and cognitive processes are developmentally interlinked.

Erikson’s Stages of Psychosocial Development

In his classic reformulation and expansion of Freud’s psychosexual stages, Erik Erikson (1963) proposed eight critical developmental tasks that individuals must sequentially resolve for healthy psychosocial adjustment. According to Erikson, each crisis is dominated by a subconscious struggle between opposing psychological attributes, and ultimately individuals must emerge from each stage possessing a favorable balance of the positive over the negative alternative (Crain, 2005). Erikson’s field studies included the Sioux of South Dakota and Yurok of northern California and he believed his stages to be culturally universal. Erikson’s efforts to explore the lives of healthy individuals into adulthood and in different cultural settings led his theory to be well-received beyond psychoanalytic circles. Nonetheless, authors have pointed out that Erikson takes an etic approach which imposes preformulated developmental themes, principally generated from observations of middle-class European and European American cultures, onto individuals of non-Western cultures (Gardiner & Kosmitzki, 2008). Such psychological issues may not be linearly addressed (e.g., Wang & Viney, 1997) and may not all be critical concerns within non-Western cultures that do not equally value free self-expression (Shiraev & Levy, 2007).

Childhood crises

Four of Erikson’s stages occur in childhood: trust versus mistrust in infancy, autonomy versus shame/doubt in toddlerhood, initiative versus guilt during preschool, and industry versus inferiority during school-age. The issue of forming trust by an infant toward his/her caregiver has been conceptualized and investigated more fully via the concept of secure attachment, now widely accepted as a basic and universal developmental task. Other developmental issues of childhood, prior to the onset of the proposed adolescent identity crisis, have generated less universal appeal and research scrutiny.

Autonomy vs shame and doubt

According to Erikson, the issue of autonomy comes to a peak during the second and third year as biological maturation encourages the young child to act independently without parental control or assistance. This stage is characterized by a “sudden violent wish to have a choice” and becomes “decisive for the ratio of love and hate, cooperation and willfulness, freedom of self-expression and its suppression” (Erikson, 1963, pp. 252–254). Over-control by others during this period purportedly leads to a lasting propensity for doubt and shame. Although all societies, to some extent, manage to meet this basic human need for autonomous functioning or personal agency (Kagitcibasi, 2005), the idealization of autonomy comes from a Western perspective and is not universally valued or encouraged across cultures (Rogoff, 2003). For example, while European Americans typically advocate the importance of sleeping alone for a young child’s developing self-reliance, co-sleeping is promoted within collectivist cultures. In fact, Guatemalan Mayan parents consider it cruel that American infants and young children are typically required to sleep in separate quarters (Morelli, Rogoff, Oppenheim, & Goldsmith, 1992; Rogoff, 2003).

Cultural differences in support for toddler autonomy also can be seen in subtle parental practices. During unstructured play times, Liu et al. (2005) reported that Chinese mothers exhibited greater overall involvement and encouraged more connectedness compared to Canadian mothers who encouraged more autonomy. Not surprisingly, the Chinese toddlers spent more time in connected joint play and less in autonomous activities. During meal-time interactions, Wang, Wiley, and Zhou (2007) found that European American viewers considered parental restraint of a toddler’s autonomy as intrusive while Chinese Americans equated parental intervention as sensitivity. Thus, not only is the value of autonomy potentially contested across cultures, it has not been established even within Western samples that a lack of support for it during the toddler years, in particular, leads to heightened doubt and shame. Moreover, autonomy is often depicted as a developmental progression that continues through adolescence (e.g., Roer-Strier & Rivlis, 1998) rather than a critical task principally tackled in toddlerhood.

Initiative vs guilt

In Erikson’s third stage, children between 3 and 6 years experience a vigorous urge to contemplate goals and fantasize, and accordingly they take action via planning, constructing, and emulating with exuberance. “Initiative adds to autonomy the quality of undertaking, planning and ‘attacking’ a task for the sake of being active” (Erikson, 1963, p. 255). These pursuits naturally challenge what is permissible and, in resolution, children internalize social prohibitions; however, excessive external restriction risks engendering extreme guilt in the child (Crain, 2005; Erikson, 1963). To many developmentalists, preschoolers’ need to express initiative is typically seen in their strong tendencies to solicit engagement and play with peers (Trawick-Smith, 2010) and those who fail to do so have been found to experience adjustment problems, including rejection by peers (Rubin et al., 2006). However, like autonomy, social initiative is not equally valued among cultures, particularly in East Asian and Latin American collectivistic societies (Chen & French, 2008). For example, in contrast to North American or Italian parents, Chinese parents consider restrained and cautious social behavior desirable (Rubin et al., 2006) and shy-inhibited Chinese children are likewise positively evaluated and accepted by peers and teachers (Chen, DeSouza, Chen, & Wang, 2006; Chen, Rubin, & Li, 1995).

In terms of creative initiative, Erikson’s depiction of the young child’s need to construct and plan is potentially supported by studies of children’s play. For example, in her analyses of archived data from the classic anthropological six-culture study, Edwards (2000) reported that children in all six communities (located within Kenya, Mexico, Philippines, Okinawa, India, and the United States) showed strong tendencies for self-directed constructive play activities. Specifically, while role play subsided at whatever age children were required to make a significant contribution to the household and fantasy play was rarely observed in three of the samples, creative-constructive play was evident in all six communities. “Children seemed to have a developmental need to make and combine things, to make marks and draw, and to handle and reshape materials that could not be subdued” (Edwards, 2000, p. 336). Edwards further conjectured that in such creative-constructive pursuits, children’s minds may have been “actively constructing stories or event scenarios for themselves and thus, either role play or fantasy play was taking place implicitly” (Edwards, 2000, p. 336).

Other studies affirm that pretend or fantasy play is not equally observed across cultures, even at preschool ages. In a study of Yucatec Mayan children, Gaskins (2000) reported that although play became the dominant activity during ages 3–5 and then receded, very little of it was pretend. Any pretend play was more likely initiated by older children, and still was relatively infrequent. Mayan children’s play, in general, was not supported and was even discouraged, as it often conflicted with needed work and because Mayan parents did not view it as important for development (Gaskins, 2000). Similarly, Farver and colleagues (1995; 1997) consistently found that Korean American preschoolers engaged in more parallel play and less social and pretend play compared to European American counterparts. The dissimilarity is believed to reflect cultural differences in attitudes regarding play and thus corresponding differences in the ways that the preschool setting is physically and temporally structured (Farver et al., 1995; Farver & Shin, 1997).

Together, the findings suggest that although children across cultures spend time playing, often in the company of peers, cultural beliefs and conditions influence the frequency and type of peer engagement and play activities. It remains unclear how such attitudes or constraints influence children’s long-term socioemotional functioning (Farver & Shin, 2000). As yet, there is no evidence to suggest that cultural restriction of children’s social or creative initiative yields guilt or dysfunction.

Industry vs inferiority

According to Erikson (1963), the child around age 6 becomes ready to master skills, tools, and tasks, “which go far beyond the mere playful expression of his organ modes or limbs. His exuberant imagination is tamed and harnessed … to the inorganic laws of the tool world” (pp. 258–259). It is in this striving for mastery and productivity that the preadolescent child unfortunately risks developing a sense of inadequacy due to executing an imbalance of achievements relative to disappointments. Modern psychologists recognize that self-evaluation is universal to the development of individuals across cultures, yet it is more complex and multi-faceted than Erikson depicted. Rather than merely possessing a global sense of self-worth, self-concept and its corresponding appraisal are believed to become increasingly differentiated and hierarchical in childhood with the individual developing self-esteem in various domains of competence (Harter, 1998, 2003, 2006; Marsh, Ellis, & Craven, 2002). Consistent with Erikson’s discussion of differences between the tools of literate and preliterate societies, psychologists recognize that children across cultures do not base their self-evaluations on the same criteria. Moreover, just as ethnic minorities often do not equally value the same domains as the dominant culture (Trawick-Smith, 2010), children within cultures assign differential importance to various competency domains (Harter, 1998, 2003, 2006).

Empirical studies support Erikson’s suggestion that self-evaluation becomes increasingly realistic during middle childhood as “the child must forget past hopes and wishes” (Erikson, 1963, p. 258). Preschoolers hold an inflated sense of what they can do compared to those in middle childhood and these elevated views are likely tied to an inability for extensive social and temporal comparison (Butler, 1998; Harter, 1998, 2006). Interestingly, researchers have found that East Asian children and adults (e.g., from Japan, China, and Korea) evaluate themselves less positively than counterparts in Western culture and that these self-critical effects are found even when there is no issue of self-presentation (Kitayama & Uchida, 2003). However, recent research that examines explicit versus implicit indicators of self-esteem suggests that implicit positive self-regard may be universally reported and needed (Kitayama & Uchida, 2003; Yamaguchi et al., 2007) despite cultural differences in explicit markers. Moreover, the issue of developing competence does not appear to be limited to grade school, particularly in other cultures. For example, in a study of Eriksonian tasks among Chinese children ages 6–18, Wang and Viney (1997) found that resolution of industry versus inferiority was the main focus of all the research participants, including those in late adolescence.

Adolescent identity crisis

“With the advent of puberty, childhood proper comes to an end” and adolescents must define themselves as members of the society (Erikson, 1963, p. 261). Erikson (1968) argued that adolescents’ critical task is to develop an integrated identity, with the ultimate goal being an individuated and separated self. Based on Erikson’s emphasis on stable adherence to roles following a search, Marcia (1966) articulated four progressively mature identity statuses: diffusion (i.e., neither commitment nor search), foreclosure (i.e., commitment without exploration/questioning), moratorium (i.e., exploration), and finally identity achievement (i.e., commitment following crisis). Erikson’s depiction of identity formation has received considerable scrutiny and is now viewed as inconsistent with experiences in diverse cultures and biased toward the upper social classes of Western societies (Schwartz & Hilda, 2006). In contrast to Erikson’s conceptualization, the timing, degree, and psychological correlates of identity development differ markedly across cultures. For example, in a large-scale study of white and black men and women in South Africa, Ochse and Plug (1986) found that tasks described by Erikson as developing in childhood were strongly integrated only in white adolescents. On average, Black South African men resolved the identity crisis after age 40. Moreover, healthy psychosocial development as defined by Erikson related to well-being in White, but not Black, South Africans.

The modern version of Erikson’s theory points to the central role of society and culture in identity formation (Côté, 1996). To achieve a coherent sense of self, adolescents actively select and modify their identities based on what would allow them to do best in the cultural context (Baumeister & Muraven, 1996). For example, in independent cultures where individualization and differentiation are valued, teenagers are encouraged to pursue personal choices. Consequently, following traditional goals and standards is viewed as insufficient in identity formation. By contrast, in interdependent cultures where familial values and cultural traditions still have a strong presence, adolescents are encouraged to conform to others’ ideals. As a result, pursuit of personal goals and life plans is not encouraged when adolescents are in search for a meaningful self.

Research supports the idea that identity formation is an active cultural adaptation. For example, Hofter, Kärtner, Chasiotis, Busch, and Kiessling (2007) examined identity status among college students in Cameroon (Africa) and Germany. Cameroonian parents emphasize obedience and respect toward parents and elders, featuring socialization practices of an interdependent culture. By contrast, German parents emphasize individual distinctness and autonomy, representing the characteristics of an independent culture. As hypothesized, Cameroonian students reported more pronounced levels of foreclosure than German students, likely due to their greater acceptance of socially prescribed values and standards. Interestingly, more pronounced foreclosure was related to higher levels of negative affect among German students; yet, foreclosure was not related to well-being among Cameroonian students. Portes, Dunham, and Castillo (2000) likewise reported that American and Haitian adolescents scored significantly higher on commitment scores than did Colombians, even when age and socioeconomic status were controlled. Similarly, Taylor and Oskay (1995) found fewer Turkish, compared to American, college students attained the higher identity statuses of achievement and moratorium, with more classified as foreclosed. Thus, youth from interdependent cultures (e.g., Cameroon, Colombia, Turkey) tended to show patterns that were adaptive to their local cultural belief systems.

Even among independent cultures, domain-specific identity development varies. For example, both the U.S. and the Netherlands can be categorized as Western, democratic, and industrial/technological societies. Indeed, adolescents in both contexts showed decreased diffusion in the domains of relational and societal identity (Meeus, Iedema, Helsen, & Vollebergh, 1999). However, compared to Americans, Dutch adolescents displayed increased foreclosure in the domain of societal but not relational identity. Such cross-cultural differences appear due to the fact that Dutch youth experience greater imposed restrictions related to schooling and work. Because it is not always possible to contemplate commitments or make personal choices, Dutch adolescents are likely to remain in foreclosure in the domain of societal identity. Thus, both foreclosure and achievement served as the endpoint of identity development among Dutch adolescents. Similar patterns were observed when comparing American and South African college students’ identity development (Low, Akande, & Hill, 2005). South Africans showed a greater tendency to be foreclosed in interpersonal domains of friendship and dating, yet achieved in ideological domains related to political issues and lifestyles. When making decisions about relationships, South African adolescents are more likely to rely on family and traditions. By contrast, social autonomy is highly valued in the U.S.; thus, dating and friendship are likely to be personal choices. On the other hand, because political responsibility is highly valued within the indigenous African populations in South Africa, these adolescents tended to achieve a higher status in this domain.

In summary, although the concept of identity formation is believed to apply to individuals across cultures, it is evident that universality does not exist in its development—whether in terms of timing, quality, progression, or psychological correlates. The findings clearly suggest that identity achievement is not necessarily the endpoint of development in all cultures, not even in all Western cultures. Healthy identity development during adolescence may be best viewed as a fit between personal needs and cultural demands. Positive adaptation to socially and culturally accepted guiding principles and constraints likely facilitates optimal development (Baumeister & Muraven, 1996; Schwartz & Hilda, 2006).

Attachment

Attachment theory

Attachment refers to the young child’s emotional tie to his/her primary caregiver and was theorized by John Bowlby (1969/1982) to have a lasting impact on psychosocial development. He argued that an infant is biologically predisposed, as a result of natural selection, to form an attachment because it motivates proximity maintenance to the caregiver which facilitates protection during times of threat. Ultimately, the bond includes cognitive representations or “internal working models” (IWMs) of the attachment figure, self, and their relations. Constructed in the context of child–caregiver interactions, IWMs encompass relationship expectations, strategies, heuristics etc. and form the basis for how an individual maintains a close relationship with others (see Bretherton & Munholland, 2008). Bowlby’s (1969/1982) theory underscores the role of the caregiver to serve as a “secure base” from which the infant can explore and learn about the environment.

Bowlby (1969/1982) distinguished four attachment phases: undifferentiated reactivity (0 to 2–3 months), discriminating social responsiveness (3 to 6–7 months), clear-cut attachment (7 months to 3 years), and finally a goal-corrected partnership (beginning around age 3). Attachment research has focused predominantly on phase three when infants demonstrate active maintenance of proximity and physical contact with a specific figure as well as evidence of using the figure as a base from which to explore. It is also when infants display separation and stranger anxieties. Attachment theory proposes important flexibility in the nature of the attachments that are formed in phase three as a result of caregiving (Ainsworth, 1967; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1969/1982). The most widely used assessment of attachment variation is the Strange Situation, developed by Mary Ainsworth (1967; Ainsworth et al., 1978). In this procedure, an infant (12–24 months) is faced with an unfamiliar setting, a stranger, and brief separations from his/her caregiver. Three attachment patterns are traditionally classified (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Infants who express their distress, readily seek and achieve comfort from their caregivers upon reunion, and use the caregiver as a secure base for returning to exploration are classified as secure. Insecurely attached infants fail to use their attachment figure as a secure base for active exploration. Moreover, infants who convey little distress and avoid the caregiver upon reunion are classified as insecure-avoidant. Those who seek much proximity/contact with their caregivers yet resist interaction, exploration, and feeling comforted are classified as insecure-resistant (formerly ambivalent). They are often extremely distressed when separating from the caregiver; however, their reaction to reunion gives an impression that they find little security in the caregiver’s return. According to a classic meta-analysis by Van IJzendoorn and Kroonenberg (1988), the aggregate global distribution of patterns is approximately 65% secure, 21% insecure-avoidant, and 14% insecure-resistant.

Limits to the universality of attachment theory?

Ainsworth’s (1967) groundbreaking observations of Ugandan mothers and infants supported Bowlby’s theory that infants develop attachment relationships in the phases described and that the majority develop a secure attachment with their mothers. A multitude of cross-cultural studies in Africa, East Asia, and Indonesia have since followed and indeed confirm that attachment is a universal phenomenon (i.e., the universality hypothesis) (Van IJzendoorn & Sagi-Schwartz, 2008). Nevertheless, important issues remain concerning the cross-cultural accuracy of other hypotheses of attachment theory. To date, researchers argue that a substantial core of attachment organization is exempt from cultural influence, including its nature (i.e., secure base hypothesis), optimality (i.e., secure-as-normative hypothesis), origins (i.e., sensitivity hypothesis), and consequences (i.e., competence hypothesis) (e.g., Van IJzendoorn & Sagi, 1999; Van IJzendoorn & Sagi-Schwartz, 2008). Even so, available evidence both supports and questions the universality of these core assumptions.

Nature

The nature of attachment is captured by the secure base hypothesis, which presumes infants use the caregiver as a secure base from which to safely explore the environment (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Bowlby, 1969/1982). Many studies confirm that the secure base phenomenon is observable in infant–mother dyads of industrialized nations, developing countries, and traditionally isolated societies (e.g., Kermoian & Leiderman, 1986; Posada et al., 1995; Valenzuela, 1997). Nevertheless, several cross-cultural researchers have contended that the focus on secure base relations to represent attachment quality places a biased emphasis on European American values of individuation and independence (e.g., Harwood, 1992; Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake, & Weisz, 2000; Takahashi, 1990). In fact, cultures differ widely in the extent of exploration in everyday situations. For example, because of significant danger in immediate living situations (e.g., snakes), Dogon infants of Mali in West Africa are generally not permitted to explore freely (True, Pisani, & Oumar, 2001). The behavioral manifestation of secure base phenomenon in infant–mother dyads also varies across cultures. For example, whereas American infants increase maternal physical contact in an unfamiliar situation, infants in Germany increase visual reference to mothers (Zach & Keller, 1999). Finally, the link between attachment and dependence, rather than exploration, is more primary in non-Western cultures (e.g., Mizuta, Zahn-Waxler, Cole, & Hiruma, 1996). For example, Puerto Rican mothers prefer infants whose behaviors are inclined toward proximity maintenance rather than exploration (Harwood, 1992). Thus, the conception and expression of secure base behavior appears to be largely influenced by cultural context.

Optimality

Strange Situation assessments gathered from more than 20 countries indicate that approximately two thirds of infants are classified as securely attached (Van IJzendoorn & Kroonenberg, 1988; Van IJzendoorn & Sagi, 1999). Attachment theorists view secure attachment as reflecting an appropriate balance between autonomy and relatedness in the infant–mother relationship, whereas insecure-avoidance represents high autonomy with low relatedness and insecure-resistant reflects the reverse (Lamb, Thompson, Gardner, & Charnov, 1985). Yet significant cross-cultural differences have been found in the distribution of attachment patterns, with more insecure-resistant infants in Japan and more insecure-avoidant infants in Germany and Israel (e.g., Grossmann, Grossmann, Spangler, Suess, & Unzner, 1985; Miyake, Chen, & Campos, 1985; Sagi et al., 1985; Sagi, Van IJzendoorn, Aviezer, Donnell, & Mayseless, 1994).

Several cross-cultural researchers have challenged the assumption that there is a single universal pattern of optimal functioning. They believe the labeling of a particular pattern as secure is merely a judgment regarding prevailing cultural ideals for child rearing and development (e.g., LeVine & Norman, 2008). For example, while self-reliance and obedience in infants are highly encouraged by German parents, interpersonal closeness and affective communication are discouraged. An insecure-avoidant attachment pattern exemplifying these ideal behaviors is likely to result (LeVine & Norman, 2008). By contrast, interpersonal harmony is emphasized in Japan (Rothbaum et al., 2000). Among Japanese infants, an insecure-resistant pattern may simply capture heightened emotional closeness and dependency in relating to their mothers. Finally, a social network of multiple caregivers who keep constant and close physical contact with infants is common among some traditional African communities (e.g., Keller, 2007; Tronick, Morelli, & Ivey, 1992; Tronick, Morelli, & Winn, 2008; True et al., 2001). As a result, Dogon infants do not approach their mothers during reunion as readily as do infants in other cultures (True et al., 2001). Thus, it appears that the optimal attachment organization may be constructed on the basis of cultural beliefs and socialization goals.

Origins

One of the central tenets of attachment theory is that variations in caregivers’ sensitivity predict attachment quality (i.e., the sensitivity hypothesis) (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Indeed, a comprehensive meta-analysis confirmed that maternal sensitivity is modestly yet significantly associated with infant attachment security (De Wolff & Van IJzendoorn, 1997). Moreover, observations based on middle-class and very poor families in Colombia (Posada et al., 1999; Posada et al., 2002), chronically underweight Chilean infants living in urban poverty (Valenzuela, 1990, 1997), Dogon infants in Africa whose mothers have experienced multiple offspring losses (True et al., 2001), and well-educated Japanese mothers (Vereijken, Riksen-Walraven, & Kondo-Ikemura, 1997) all consistently reported that maternal sensitivity was associated with secure attachment.

Nevertheless, several cross-cultural researchers (e.g., Keller, 2007; Rothbaum & Morelli, 2005; Rothbaum et al., 2000) have questioned the Western conceptualization of sensitivity as a universal ideal for parenting. They argue that sensitivity as described by attachment theorists assumes that infants have both momentary and elemental needs that caregivers ought to fulfill and respect, and that these needs are readily agreed upon. However, because interpretations of sensitive caregiving incorporate varying cultural socialization goals, definitions may vary. For example, in the eyes of attachment theorists, mothers in both Japan and Puerto Rico may seem insensitive: Japanese mothers perhaps over-indulgent and Puerto Rican mothers over-controlling (Harwood, 1992; Rothbaum et al., 2000). Yet both styles may be appropriate for promoting socialization goals other than individuation and autonomy. In fact, greater maternal physical control was associated with secure attachment in middle-class Puerto Rican infants (Carlson & Harwood, 2003). From a sociocultural perspective, Puerto Rican mothers’ persistent physical control is viewed as effective in raising a child well-accepted by the community (Harwood, 1992). Cameroonian rural Nso mothers also believe that a caretaker-centered concept of responsive control is the best parenting strategy for promoting optimal outcomes of obedience, respectfulness, and responsibility in children (Yovsi, Kärtner, Keller, & Lohaus, 2009). Taken together, an appreciation for culture-specific ideals of sensitive caregiving appears to be an important foundation for a better understanding of the sensitivity–security link.

Consequences

Bowlby (1969/1982) and Ainsworth (Ainsworth et al., 1978) hypothesized that securely attached infants would become more socially and emotionally competent children and adults than those who were insecurely attached. Studies conducted in industrialized, independent cultures support the competence hypothesis. However, Rothbaum and colleagues (Rothbaum et al., 2000; Rothbaum & Morelli, 2005) have argued that the security–competence link needs to be considered within cultural contexts. For example, secure attachment has been theorized to be linked to direct communication and emotional openness (e.g., Bretherton, 1990). Yet, in cultures such as Puerto Rico, attachment security is associated with respect, obedience, and calmness, rather than self-expression (Harwood, 1992). And in Japan, coordinating one’s needs with those of others is seen as essential to the goals of interpersonal unity and harmony. Thus, negative feelings are kept to oneself or expressed indirectly. Dependence on others is also more likely to be associated with attachment competence as prescribed in Japanese culture (Rothbaum, Kakinuma, Nagaoka, & Azuma, 2007). Thus, as with other propositions, the impact of attachment organization needs to be fully explored from a sociocultural as well as a universal perspective.

Summary

Focusing on the regularities of behaviors, attachment theorists tend to draw attention to the universality of attachment propositions. Nevertheless, the development of attachment may be best described as the interplay between biological and cultural input (Van IJzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Sagi-Schwartz, 2006). The recent call for reconsideration of cultural variations points to potentially divergent expressions and interpretations of secure attachment and sensitive caregiving. Moreover, the competence hypothesis is insufficiently tested cross-culturally and research is needed to examine the issue of sequelae more fully (Van IJzendoorn & Sagi-Schwartz, 2008).

Temperament

Thomas and Chess’ Profiles

One of the most important contributions to the field of child development was the recognition that individual personality differences are evident at birth and do not simply emerge due to varying parental practices. Widespread appreciation of temperament can be traced to the pioneering work of child psychiatrists Alexander Thomas and Stella Chess in the New York Longitudinal Study. Since their introduction of the concept (Thomas & Chess, and colleagues, 1963, 1968, 1970, 1977), specific definitions of temperament have varied (see Goldsmith et al., 1987) but it is generally agreed that it refers to relatively consistent and stable behavioral differences among individuals that are genetically and biologically based.

From parental interviews, Thomas and Chess proposed nine dimensions on which infants appeared to differ (sensory threshold, approach-withdrawal, reaction intensity, adaptability, predominant mood, rhythmicity, activity, distractibility, and persistence). Based on clustering of these attributes, they clinically identified three temperament constellations. Infants with an easy temperament eagerly approach and adapt to novelty, exhibit low-to-moderate intensity reactions, are generally positive in mood, and readily establish routines. In contrast, difficult infants reject novel experiences, display intense and frequent negative reactions, and exhibit irregularity in their daily patterns. Finally, slow-to-warm-up infants have low activity levels, low-intensity reactions, respond to novelty with mild negativity, and adapt to it slowly. Thomas and Chess acknowledged that temperament was not immutable; environmental qualities could moderate or heighten characteristics. Nonetheless, they argued that a basic constancy of attributes was seen for most children. In terms of the distribution of profiles among the 141 infants in their sample, they found that approximately 40% qualified as easy, 15% as slow-to-warm-up, and 10% as difficult (Thomas et al., 1970).

In addition to formulating temperament profiles, Thomas and Chess proposed a connection to long-term adjustment. Of the nearly 30% of their sample who longitudinally showed clinical-level disturbances, those with a difficult constellation accounted for the largest proportion and those labeled slow-to-warm-up the next largest. An astounding 70% of difficult children, compared to 18% of easy participants, presented with problems requiring clinical intervention (Thomas et al., 1970). However, rather than suggesting that temperament alone predicted adjustment, Thomas and Chess proposed the concept of goodness-of-fit. That is, how well a child’s environment accommodates his/her dispositional make-up greatly influences healthy psychosocial adjustment. A given set of circumstances will not have an identical impact on all children. It is the severity and duration of dissonance between environmental demand characteristics and a child’s temperamental qualities that predict the likelihood of ensuing problems (Thomas et al., 1968, 1970).

Thomas and Chess based their work on a homogeneous sample of predominantly Jewish, educated, middle-and upper-class New York City families. Although Thomas and colleagues (Thomas et al., 1970) suggested that their dimensions and profiles could be used to characterize a range of populations, the ultimate utility of their approach has been challenged (Sanson, Hemphill, & Smart, 2002). The broad typologies have not been consistently useful in capturing temperament differences in other cultures. For example, in one study of Italian infants (Axia & Weisner, 2002), an overwhelming majority (90%) were easy. Other work suggested that many Chinese, Japanese, and Navajo neonates would be similarly characterized in this way (see Freedman & DeBoer, 1979), although much of this anthropological work preceded the popularity of Thomas and Chess’ descriptions. Such findings not only suggest cultural differences in temperament, but also imply that within some cultures, the range of infant dispositional differences when using Thomas and Chess’ broad typologies would be insufficient to study the role of temperament in developmental outcomes (Axia & Weisner, 2002).

The general consensus is that Thomas and Chess’ dimensions and clusters are not universally applicable across cultures. One issue is that some traits may be interpreted, and thus measured, quite differently outside the U.S. For example, in a study of Malay infants (Bank, 1989), high sensory thresholds for responsiveness were not ascribed because infants and children were expected and presumed to be extremely aware of stimuli, especially anything uncomfortable. Malay parents also typically did not challenge infants’ rejection of non-social experiences (e.g., new foods) because rejection was considered decisive; thus the concept of adaptability may not have been comparably measured. A further issue is that components of the difficult profile might not be considered elements of diagnostic difficulty within a different culture (Attili, 1989), and follow-up studies of U.S. samples have failed to support the constellations (Sanson et al., 2002). For example, rhythmicity and intensity— key components of the original conceptualization of difficultness—did not consistently relate to its other components (Daniels, Plomin, & Greenhalgh, 1984). Thus, developmentalists today concur that infants differ in temperament both within and across cultures, but do not advocate the framework established by Thomas and Chess. Recall that even a large percentage of the original sample (35%) could not be categorized into one of the three profiles (Thomas et al., 1970).

Further research on developmental outcomes soon suggested that the original clusters and their labels are inappropriately value-laden especially cross-culturally (Sanson et al., 2002). For example, in a study of working-class Puerto-Rican families in the U.S. (Korn & Gannon, 1983), characteristics of difficultness were not perceived as problematic and were not associated with later adjustment problems. Rather, because Puerto Rican parents made relatively few demands of their young children, the rearing environment did not conflict with the difficult constellation. Similarly, in his classic study of Masai infants in Kenya, DeVries (1984) also reported findings counter to Western expectations that infants with difficult temperaments are at greater risk for problems. On the contrary, mortality was greater for infants with an easy temperament because they received less attention and feeding compared to difficult counterparts. Such findings lent strong support for Thomas and Chess’ proposition of goodness-of-fit; i.e., that different temperament characteristics are desirable depending on the context (Sanson et al., 2002) and that it is dissonance between environmental demands and temperament that leads to problems (Thomas et al., 1970). Despite the rejection of typologies (see Daniels et al., 1984), Thomas and Chess’ conceptualization of the impact of temperament on a child’s transactions with his/her environment is considered universally applicable both within and across cultures.

Modern perspectives on temperament

In contrast to Thomas and Chess’ clinical method, Mary Rothbart and her colleagues took a theoretical approach to identifying core constructs of temperament. Using a series of questionnaires developed to assess behavioral patterns in infants, toddlers, preschoolers, and school-aged children, a three-factor temperament structure emerged in data from infancy through childhood (Rothbart, 2007; Sanson et al., 2002). Negative reactivity reflects emotional mood and intensity and may be differentiated into anger and fearfulness. Effortful control refers to behavioral or physiological processes involving self-regulation that can modulate reactivity. Inhibition/sociability captures the tendency to approach or withdraw from novel situations and people, and includes positive affectivity. Rothbart (2007) has argued that although individual variations in components are genetic predispositions, environmental influences can further alter individual characteristics.

When using translated questionnaires, similar broad dimensions of temperament are often found in parental assessments across cultures. For example, the dimensions of emotionality and sociability were meaningfully derived from reports by American and Russian mothers of 3-to-12-month-olds (Gartstein, Knyazev, & Slobodskaya, 2005). A similar basic structure of temperament characteristics also emerged from Chinese, Japanese, and Australian parents’ reports of their preschool-and school-aged children. Despite some minor variation, the three broad dimensions were extroversion/surgency, negative affectivity, and effortful control (Ahadi, Rothbart, & Ye, 1993; Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & Fisher, 2001; Sanson, Smart, Prior, Oberklaid, & Pedlow, 1994). Thus, when taking an etic approach, where instruments devised in the U.S. were translated and applied directly to another culture, similar broad dimensions of temperament described infants and children within other cultures. However, these efforts have not resulted in identifying temperament characteristics or constellations that are unique to diverse cultures.

In taking an emic approach to potentially capture culture-specific aspects of temperament, Shwalb, Shwalb, and Shoji (1994) first asked Japanese mothers to freely describe their infants’ behavioral styles; a standardized inventory followed. Many dimensions that emerged from analysis were similar to those found when using Western instruments. Yet, unique dimensions also appeared such as dependency/indulgence, which may be a reflection of the cultural emphasis on symbiotic harmony (Rothbaum et al., 2000) and on intense relatedness within Japanese mother–infant dyads. Even for dimensions that were conceptually similar to those found in Western research, the content differed. For example, “buries head in neck when embraced” is an item for assessing sociability. The findings suggest that the perceptual salience of infant behaviors varies depending on culture. The Japanese mothers tended to focus on tendencies related to the mother–child relationship.

Cultures vary in their temperament ideals and parents are indeed motivated to observe child characteristics that are culturally desirable (Kohnstamm, 1989). For example, in Russia, happiness is perceived as a transient, fleeting phenomenon that should be hidden and concealed from others. Thus, it is not surprising that compared to American parents, Russian parents reported lower positive emotionality and higher negative emotionality in their infants (Gartstein, Slobodskaya, & Kinsht, 2003). Anchored in Asian cultural ideals for compliant, obedient, and reserved behavior, Chinese mothers rated their infants as more sootheable, fearful, and prone to distress than did parents from the U.S. and Spain (Gartstein et al., 2006; Hsu, Soong, Stigler, Hong, & Liang, 1981). Chinese mothers and fathers also rated their preschoolers as less emotional than their American counterparts (Porter et al., 2005). Additionally, Japanese mothers rated their preschoolers as more withdrawal-oriented and as expressing less positive affect than did American mothers (Windle, Iwawaki, & Lerner, 1988).

Although the above differences in parental perception of child temperament may be tainted by cultural values, standardized laboratory observations have confirmed cultural differences. Most researchers agree that Chinese, Japanese, and Korean infants and toddlers are less behaviorally reactive, excitable, expressive, and irritable than their American and European counterparts (e.g., Camras et al. 1998; Kagan et al., 1994). Genetic differences may account for the distinction (see Kagan, 2009) although molecular genetic techniques have not been employed to substantiate this argument. Consistent with previous findings, when responding to inoculation, Japanese 4-month-olds showed less intense initial negative affect and took less time to quiet down than American infants. Surprisingly, their cortisol response was greater than that of American infants (Lewis, Ramsay, & Kawakami, 1993). This finding suggests that Japanese infants are not less reactive than their American counterparts; they are simply less behaviorally reactive. Differences in cultural values and socialization practices can contribute to variations in reactivity. For example, maternal encouragement of interdependence and thus closer infant–mother proximity (e.g., Rothbaum et al., 2000) may lead to Japanese infants’ reduced signaling of distress compared to European American counterparts (Lewis et al., 1993). Indeed, mothers’ interaction styles that are unique to their cultures can influence the development of self-regulation (e.g., Feldman, Masalha, & Alony, 2006).

The relation between temperament and developmental consequences has revealed both universal patterns and cultural differences. In terms of commonality, dispositional regulation and emotionality are consistently linked to social and emotional outcomes. Similar to European American children, low negative emotionality combined with high regulatory control predicted greater social competence and behavioral adjustment in Chinese (Zhou, Eisenberg, Wang, & Reiser, 2004; Zhou et al., 2008) and Indonesian children (Eisenberg, Liew, & Pidada, 2004; Eisenberg, Pidada, & Liew, 2001). The linkage of low positive emotionality to internalizing problems, and low regulation combined with high negative emotionality to externalizing problems, are also consistently found in both American and Chinese school-aged children (Zhou, Lengua, & Wang, 2009).

Nevertheless, the relation of temperament to adjustment also has demonstrated cross-cultural differences. For example, based on teachers’ reports, Chinese children with externalizing problems displayed higher positive and negative emotionality than those with no adjustment problems, whereas the two groups did not differ among European American children (Zhou et al., 2009). In addition, the three core dimensions of temperament exhibited different association patterns among American and Chinese children. American children who were high in effortful control tended to exhibit lower negative affectivity, whereas Chinese children who were high in effortful control were more likely to show lower extraversion/surgency (Ahadi et al., 1993; Rothbart, 2007). Such patterns suggest that developmental outcomes are guided by cultural preferences: temperament characterized by low distress is favored in American culture, whereas low outgoing behavior and high inhibition are valued in Chinese culture.

Summary

In sum, even though temperament reflects constitutionally based individual differences, culture may influence its expression and outcome by determining adaptive values. Cultural values have a significant impact on socialization goals and practices, which may alter the expression of temperamental traits. Additionally, the fit between children’s biology and cultural ideals—or lack thereof—plays a role in the consequent adjustment of children. The same temperamental predisposition may contribute to adaptive or maladaptive outcomes in different cultures, depending on the attached positive or negative connotations and meanings that ultimately influence socialization experiences (Chen & French, 2008).

Conclusions

Traditionally, the field of developmental psychology has been dominated by knowledge generated from Western European or European American theorists and researchers studying middle-class children of similar heritage. Fortunately, the last half-century has seen an exploding interest in moving beyond ethnocentric assumptions of generality and toward an appreciation of child development within a wide range of human settings. Although the state of our knowledge is far from ideal, the field has made great progress in identifying and understanding similarities and variations in the development of children worldwide.

A review of several topics popularly addressed in undergraduate courses leads to a conclusion often applied in reviews of specific developmental domains— that is, child development is neither entirely uniform around the world, nor totally culturally unique (Berry et al., 1992). Commonalities emerged within each content area. As Piaget observed, the development of cognition undergoes some remarkably similar transitions and tendencies particularly during early childhood. It also appears that Erikson identified some important human developmental tasks or trends such as developing trust in one’s caregivers, creating and constructing through play, building and assessing one’s competence compared to others, and identifying one’s integrated beliefs and sense of purpose as a grown member of society. Likewise, as Bowlby and Ainsworth elaborated, all young humans face the essential task of forming an attachment and thus develop strategies and expectations for close relationships and for relating to the social world. Infants within all cultures also display biologically based dispositional differences. Moreover, as Thomas and Chess argued, these temperamental qualities have ramifications on children’s later well-being because they greatly impact their rearing transactions.

A review of research across cultures also elucidates some of the inadequacies and errors associated with our most popular assumptions regarding regularities in children’s development. As Super and Harkness (1994) astutely remarked, “In all societies, most children grow up to be competent adults; an important contribution of systematic cross-cultural comparisons has been to show how competence can be variously defined and how children come to achieve it” (p. 96). Indeed there are differences in developmental goals and outcomes across cultures. For example, it is evident that ideal reasoning and cognitive problem-solving skills may differ according to culture, as do emerging patterns of attending and remembering. Moreover, we see that issues surrounding autonomy or identity are often not viewed with the same ideals or timetables as observed in European American culture. Likewise, issues of personal initiative may not have the same indispensability to humans in all settings, and thus may not be imbued with the significance that Erikson supposed. Further, we can recognize the potential for societal conceptions of parental sensitivity to differ as well as the potential for diverging cross-cultural models regarding security and human relationships. Finally, it clear that temperament ideals vary across cultures and many European American preferences such as heightened positivity or sociability are not equally desired by all communities.

Beyond simply identifying global similarities and differences, the field has come to appreciate the cultural structuring of child development (Super & Harkness, 1997) and thus recognizes that significant variations must ultimately be understood within the cultural context in which they are observed. Different paths of development are not arbitrarily linked to different socialization experiences. Rather, rearing practices emerge from the settings and values of the larger cultural community. As Super and Harkness (1986, 1997) articulated in their conceptualization of the developmental niche, the subcomponents operate as an integrated system. Interconnections between cultural practices, beliefs and settings must be understood in order to appreciate the variations in developmental patterns and outcomes. Otherwise, a decontextualized approach offers little meaning (Super & Harkness, 1997).

References

Ahadi, S., Rothbart, M. K., & Ye, R. (1993). Children’s temperament in the U.S. and China: Similarities and differences. European Journal of Personality, 7, 359–377.

Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1967). Infancy in Uganda: Infant care and the growth of love. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C, Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the Strange Situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

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