answer the three essay questions

problem definitions and asked: ‘[H]ow does a given condition get defined as a problem for which government action is an appropriate remedy?’ This perspective is congruent with that found, for example, in Baumgartner and Jones (1993). Thus, problems do not exist but have to be defined by someone. Before they become problems they are only conditions. The difference between a condition and a problem is that the latter is seen as something that we ought to do something about (Kingdon 2003: 109; cf. Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Wildavsky 1979). Two aspects are important here: (1) how this is done; and (2) who is doing it. According to Kingdon, ‘people define conditions as problems by comparing current con- ditions with their values concerning more ideal states of affairs, by comparing their own performance with that of other countries, or by putting the subject into one category rather than another’ (Kingdon 2003: 19; see also the discussion on pp. 110–113). To start this process, indicators, focusing events and feedback from enacted policies are crucial (Kingdon 2003: 90–100). Regarding the issue of who is doing the defining, Kingdon (2003: 115) points out that activists and policy entrepreneurs are highly important for bringing ‘problems to public and governmental attention’. However, his focus is not primarily on problem definition as such, or the people defining problems. Rather, he pays attention to people ‘in and around government’ and why they become interested in certain problems (Kingdon 2003: 90). He argues that the source of ideas is less important for explaining why certain problems are placed on the agenda than ‘the climate in government or the recep- tivity to ideas of a given type’ (Kingdon 2003: 72).

This leads Kingdon to emphasise the importance of coupling streams for agenda-setting. It is the package of problem and policy and the timing that explains why certain ideas get attention from policy makers. This article does not question this, but rather expands on what is already there. The argument developed here builds on the interdependence of streams. Leaving problem definition underdeveloped entails that coupling becomes the same act as defining problems. Thereby, the analytical separation between streams breaks down. The point is that by focusing only on policy entrepreneurs, we risk missing how policy entre- preneurs are enabled or limited by how problems are defined as well as how these defini- tions affect agenda-setting and policy making. By building on theories of problem definitions, framing and persuasion, the MSF will gain in clarity and applicability.

The problem broker

A problem broker is a role in which actors frame conditions as public problems and work to make policy makers accept these frames. Problem brokers thus define conditions as problems. One aspect is especially important in this definition: framing a condition as a public problem is done with the purpose of making policy makers accept it and, in the end, do something about it. Problem brokering is thereby a strategic act. A range of actors could play the role of problem broker, from those inside government to those on the outside. One advantage of seeing the problem broker as a role that can be enacted is that focus is placed on what actors do rather than on who these actors are.

In the academic literature, a number of concepts are used when trying to capture what the problem broker does. All these concepts have merits, but for different reasons work less well in the context of the MSF. ‘Epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992) and ‘advocacy

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coalitions’ (e.g., Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014) are two of these. Both of these concepts refer to groups of actors who share beliefs about a problem and its solution. This makes an ana- lytical separation between streams difficult, as well as between the tasks of problem defi- nition and suggesting packages of problems and solutions. These concepts therefore risk missing groups of actors who share views of the problem, but do not agree on the solution. In some studies, different categories of entrepreneurs are established. One example is the information entrepreneur (Crow 2010). This concept’s focus on information might lead to the other elements of problem definitions, which will be discussed later, being downplayed. In sociology, the concept of ‘claims-maker’ is used (e.g., Best 2001). In essence, it captures very well what a problem broker does. However, a claims-maker frames conditions as problems for society, and not necessarily as problems that need to be dealt with politically. Due to this, it is less suited for the MSF with its focus on public problems and the political agenda. Instead of stretching the definition of the concept, a different one is preferable. Problem broker signals a clear focus on the problem stream and places the role within the policy process. Therefore, this article advocates the concept of problem broker.

The difference between problem broker and policy entrepreneur is fine. In some cases problem definition and coupling will, in fact, be conducted by the same actor. In other cases there will be a major division of labour between actors defining problems and those coupling these with policies. It is therefore important to point out that the separation between problem and policy streams is analytical. Thus, one actor can be active in both streams without calling the independence of the streams into question as the separation is about tasks and not primarily who performs these tasks (cf. Ackrill & Kay 2011). The problem broker makes it possible to investigate independently what is going on in the problem stream. For some types of cases, the concept will be empirically also very useful. This applies where problems are new or heavily dependent on scientific knowledge. In these types of cases there will likely be a phase where a condition is defined as a problem without reference to more specific policy suggestions beyond the notion that something needs to be done by policy makers. In this lies the major difference between problem brokers and policy entrepreneurs: the former makes suggestions that something needs to be done, whereas the latter makes suggestions for particular policies.

I have argued elsewhere for the inclusion of the role of the ‘knowledge broker’ in the MSF (Knaggård 2013). This suggestion was based on a study of science-politics inter-relations in climate change policy making (Knaggård 2009, 2014), where it became apparent that some actors – primarily scientists – clearly advocated the problem as public, but still refrained from making any suggestions vis-à-vis policies. In other words, they deliberately refrained from acting as policy entrepreneurs. It was also clear that these actors played a significant role in determining how problems should be understood and thereby created opportunities for some policy entrepreneurs while making it more difficult for others. The concept of knowl- edge broker, as formulated by Litfin (1994), nicely captured what was going on.

In using the concept of knowledge broker we direct attention to a particular group of actors who define problems as public (i.e., scientists). Both Litfin’s and my studies were focused on scientific actors. This focus excludes other possible problem brokers. Even though it is possible to argue that scientists are more likely to limit themselves to problem definitions than other actors, this should not be taken for granted, but rather be studied empirically. A further reason for broadening the possible types of brokers is that knowledge

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is only one part of a problem frame. Therefore, the wider concept of problem broker is introduced.

Framing

Now we turn to what problem brokers do. As already stated, they define conditions as public problems. The process in which they do this can be understood as ‘framing’. The literatures on problem definition and framing overlap to a large extent. They share the basic premise that every problem can be defined, or framed, in a number of different ways, and that this has implications for policy making. The reason for using ‘framing’ instead of ‘problem definition’ is that it captures a process rather than a state. The process is also more universal. Defining a problem can thus be seen as one type of framing.

The literature on framing is divided along different lines. The most important division regards the focus (cf. Druckman 2001). Some scholars emphasise cognition and the indi- vidual level. They study how individuals come to frame problems to make sense of them and their world, as well as how the frames of others affect the way individuals perceive problems (e.g., Chong & Druckman 2007; Druckman 2001; Goffman 1974; Tversky & Kahneman 1981). Other scholars focus on an aggregated level. They study the role of framing either as the influence of media on the public (e.g., Entman 2004; Iyengar 1991) or as the influence of a number of different actors on agenda-setting and policy making (e.g., Baumgartner & Mahoney 2008; Benford & Snow 2000; Kangas et al. 2014; Schön & Rein 1994; Wolfe et al. 2013). The aggregated level is most relevant to this article.

There are a number of different definitions of framing, most of which are rather vague. Here framing will be understood, in the words of Entman (2004: 5; emphasis removed), as ‘selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making con- nections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution’. To frame a condition as a problem thus means to highlight some aspects over others. It implies defining the condition not just as a public problem, but as a specific public problem. In Kingdon’s (2003: 111) account, this idea can be found in his discussion of how subjects can be placed in different categories. Zahariadis, in his work on the MSF, has used framing as a tool that policy entrepreneurs utilise (e.g., Zahariadis 2003). He does not focus primarily on how problems are defined, but rather on the entire package of problem and solution. Entman’s definition is rather inclusive and refers to the general process of framing, which can incorporate the framing that Zahariadis discusses. In the context of the problem broker, framing is about problem definition.

The frames that problem brokers use – here referred to as ‘problem frames’ – have as their most important component a definition of the problem. It relates to what the problem is about, who is responsible (the public or someone else) and why we should do something about it (cf. Schön & Rein 1994). These aspects are seldom explicitly stated, but are important underlying components of frames. The frame thereby entails much more infor- mation than it expresses. Due to this, they come in many shapes and sizes, and it is not possible to determine one linguistic shape for all frames. What forms a frame will take have to be established empirically. This also necessitates a rather broad definition. A problem frame is very similar to Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993: 25ff) concept of ‘policy image’ as

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what determines how a policy is understood and discussed. Different groups can stress different images and thereby different understandings of a problem. Baumgartner and Jones argue that all policy images contain empirical information and emotive appeals. The information component can be compared to what the problem is about and the emotive component to why we should care. The main difference between the two concepts is that policy image does not emphasise an analytical separation between problem definitions and packages of problems and policies. Rather, Baumgartner and Jones use the concept for both of these activities.

The process of framing conditions as public problems is an ongoing one. There is a constant struggle over definitions. This is highlighted by, for example, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and in Schattschneider’s (1960) concept of the ‘mobilisation of bias’. Gusfield (1981: 15) states that: ‘The structure of public problems is . . . an arena of conflict in which a set of groups and institutions . . . compete and struggle over ownership and disownership, the acceptance of causal theories, and the fixation of responsibility.’ By ‘ownership’ he means a situation where the frame of a specific actor has come to dominate the under- standing of a problem.1 This struggle can result in the reframing of a problem. This, in turn, can open up possibilities to couple the problem to new types of policy alternatives. Framing delimits the span of conceivable policies that can be attached to a problem. Reframing can change that span, so that what previously were seen as valid solutions no longer can be seen in that way. However, Wolfe et al. (2013) suggest that even if reframing is possible it is often unlikely.

The issue of ownership highlights the important connection between framing and power. Framing can be a tool to control how an issue is understood by policy makers and the public, thereby molding the political debate. Problem brokers can, in a situation of ownership, function as gatekeepers who control what is perceived to be at stake and what arguments are valid.

Knowledge, values and emotions in framing

I argue that all problem frames, to some extent, include elements of knowledge, values and emotions. In the framing literature, it is most often elements of knowledge and values that are highlighted (e.g., Schön & Rein 1994). Issues of what the problem is about and what is at stake are common themes. In the problem definition, as well as in the persuasion literature, emotions are highlighted as important next to knowledge (e.g., Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Loseke 2003) and to some extent values (e.g., Gusfield 1981). Without the element of emotion, it is argued, policy images (Baumgartner & Jones 1993) or claims (Loseke 2003) will not take hold. This aspect is specifically important when we see framing as a strategic act to steer other actors’ view of a problem. Relying only on elements of knowledge will make it hard for a frame to take hold. Therefore, problem frames will be seen as incorporating elements of knowledge, but also of values and emotions. The balance between them, in particular, will vary to a great extent (cf. Baumgartner & Jones 1993: 26; Iyengar 1991). The balance depends on who acts as problem broker, what audience is targeted and what the problem area is. Before expanding on this, I will deal more in depth with knowledge, values and emotions as tools that problem brokers can use.

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Knowledge

There is no doubt that knowledge is a crucial part of almost all framing. A problem frame needs to entail some idea of what the problem is about, which is based on some form of knowledge about a condition. This knowledge can be based on personal or bureaucratic experience, or on scientific research. One of the most authoritative forms of knowledge is scientific. Goodwin et al. (2001: 15) argue that ‘science is the dominant language of legiti- mation and persuasion in today’s liberal societies’. The authority of science is based on the idea of science being neutral and thus able to judge between alternatives without partisan- ship (cf. Pielke 2004). Research has shown that scientists cannot be seen as neutral in this ideal typical way (e.g., Latour & Woolgar 1979). What is important for the authority of science is therefore not neutrality as such, but the belief in it. The point is that problem brokers can use the cognitive authority that science and scientific knowledge are seen to possess in order to strengthen the validity of their frames.

Knowledge about a condition does not have to be scientific. Many problems are rather framed through some form of bureaucratic experience or professional knowledge. For example, problems in health care due to an aging population are, to a large extent, not framed by science, but by people working within health care. This can be seen as a form of what Kingdon (2003: 90–100) would call ‘bureaucratic knowledge’, including routinely measured indicators and feedback concerning enacted policies. I would argue that profes- sional knowledge not only includes this aggregated understanding of the problem, but also individual perceptions of it. The experience of these professionals as they go about their work influences the more general perception of the problem. Jasanoff and Martello (2004) refer to this as ‘local knowledge’. It can be understood as ‘situated’ and based in particular experiences.2

Local knowledge also includes the everyday experience of lay people, both in the form of individual and collective experiences. Since this type of knowledge has a lower status than scientific knowledge, it will have less value in making persuasive framings. However, there are situations in which scientific knowledge is unavailable or unhelpful for substan- tiating a certain way of understanding a problem. Under these circumstances, local knowl- edge can be used instead. Also, local knowledge can be crucial in resisting already accepted frames. Lay people affected by political decisions might hold a different understanding of causal relationships based on their practical experience to that of policy makers. In efforts to reframe a problem, local knowledge can point to alternative understandings of the problem, and thus open up alternative policies.

Values

What is apparent in the concept of ‘problem framing’ is that knowledge is not enough for constructing a persuasive frame. Beyond an understanding of the problem, the frame needs to be based on ideas of why we should care – in other words, on values. These values not only tell us why a problem is important, but may also point out who is responsible for acting on the problem. To connect a problem to values means to state what is at stake – what is threatened by the condition or what needs to be protected. Values are connected to ‘more ideal states of affairs’, in Kingdon’s (2003: 19) words. It is the comparison between

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conditions and these ideal states that motivates action. Some values are more general than others in the sense that is hard to speak against them. Most values, though, are ideological in the sense that the same ideal state can be connected to different values depending on what one thinks is at stake. Education for everyone can be understood as an issue of freedom to choose or as an issue of equality.

Problem brokers – whether scientists, professionals or others – have to connect their knowledge of a problem to some value in order to demonstrate what is at stake and to motivate political action. Some problem brokers are comfortable emphasising values when they frame problems (e.g., policy makers), whereas others rather try to avoid them (e.g., scientists). Kangas et al. (2014) argue that values are often more effective than knowledge in making a frame become accepted because they are shared in society to a greater extent (cf. Rochefort & Cobb 1994: 5). Chong and Druckman (2007: 111) also argue that knowl- edge is often less important for making frames strong, whereas a connection to ideology can have that effect. This implies that actors connected to the policy sphere might be more successful as problem brokers.

Emotions

The third element in problem frames is emotions. Goodwin et al. (2001: 10) say that: ‘Emotions are part of the “stuff” connecting human beings to each other and the world around them, like an unseen lens that colors all our thoughts, actions, perspectives and judgments.’ Emotions colour frames and give them what Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 26) refer to as a ‘tone’. The emotional element of frames is therefore rather vague. Here, focus is placed on the effect of emotions on an aggregated or a collective level.3 Zahariadis (2003) clarifies how emotions can come to the fore in framing through the use of powerful symbols. He also discusses how negative emotions (in terms of loss) or positive emotions (in terms of gains) have different effects. An example of the effect of the emotional element in frames is that problems can seem more urgent. Urgency can be created through alluding to fear, which can move issues higher on the agenda (cf. Buzan et al. 1998). It also signals a sense of severity and crisis, which are important aspects for getting attention focused onto an issue (cf. Rochefort & Cobb 1994).

As in the case of values, the emotional element can be highly effective in creating acceptance for a problem frame. Problem brokers can also choose to emphasise emotions over knowledge and values. According to Loseke (2003: 77), fear about a problem, sympa- thy for those affected and anger towards those responsible are strong emotional elements that can be used. Emotions are not in opposition to knowledge. However, they can be used to motivate action even if there is limited knowledge about the problem. Chong and Druckman (2007: 111) state that: ‘Strong frames should not be confused with intellectually or morally superior arguments. They can be built around exaggerations and outright lies playing on the fears and prejudices of the public.’

The influence of problem brokers and their frames

We now turn to the question of what determines the influence of problem brokers over the establishment of a problem frame among policy makers and the people around them. Three

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elements are important to study: the problem broker, the audience and the frame. Here most attention will be paid to the problem broker and the relation to the audience. First some aspects of the problem frame are touched upon. Chong and Druckman (2007) argue that there is a lot of context-specific, but very limited general knowledge on successful framing. One way of understanding success is to see it as partly based on coincidence. In the MSF coincidence is an important aspect: who happens to be at a certain place at a certain point in time is crucial for agenda-setting. The context in terms of, for example, the national mood4 (Kingdon 2003) is important for the way a frame will be received and for the way problem brokers chose to frame problems. Due to the importance of context (cf. Wolfe et al. 2013), a general theoretical explanation of successful framing might be difficult to formulate.

Success can also be understood as the pervasiveness of a frame. Established frames based foremost on knowledge are more difficult to challenge as this has to be done through other knowledge claims that are perceived to have cognitive authority. Frames based primarily on values can easily be challenged by other values. For example, freedom is often seen in opposition to equality. Other values, like justice, are more difficult to challenge. Emotionally based frames are also easier to challenge because no specific authority is needed: it is individuals who feel emotions, which implies that everyone can challenge such frames. However, if a frame based on strong emotions takes hold it will probably be more difficult to reframe as it is not connected to knowledge or logic and therefore cannot be overthrown by knowledge claims.

The discussion of what signifies a successful problem broker will be structured by Dahl’s (1991 [1963]: 35ff) account of political influence. He divides factors into: (1) political resources, (2) skill in using those resources and (3) the willingness to use them.

Political resources of the problem broker

Building on Kingdon and research on science–policy interaction, discussed below, it is possible to argue that important political resources for the problem broker are persistence, access and credibility. Just as for policy entrepreneurs, persuading an audience to accept your frame can take time. Persistence is therefore crucial. Many studies of problem defini- tions show that it is often not easy to establish a problem frame (e.g., Harremoes et al. 2001; Knaggård 2009). Just as policy entrepreneurs soften up the system with repeated efforts to convince policy makers to adopt a certain policy (Kingdon 2003: 128), so too do problem brokers need to soften up the system to their problem frame.

A second crucial political resource is access to policy makers. According to Kingdon (2003: 56), scientists with what he calls an ‘inner-outer career’ – meaning a career both in academia and in the political system – will have an advantage over scientists who do not pursue such a double career. This also holds for other problem brokers, such as those in interest organisations or business. Through a double career, networks that can be utilised when brokering a problem frame in both systems can be established. Knaggård (2014), in a study of Swedish and international climate change policy making, shows that it was problem brokers on the inside of the government, or with well-established contacts with the gov- ernment, that can most easily influence the problem frame. One reason could be that people on the inside are more aware of the national mood. Someone on the inside would also have

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a better understanding of how to make policy makers accept a certain frame. It is also possible that direct communication has a positive influence on a problem broker’s level of success.

A final political resource is the credibility of a problem broker. Druckman (2001) argues that the credibility of a source is a prerequisite for successful framing. This indicates that it is not so much the frames that are important, but rather who plays the role as problem broker. When it comes to knowledge, Boswell (2012) has shown that policy makers often use it to lend legitimacy to decisions. Here it is not the quality of knowledge per se that is important, but the credibility, or status, of the problem broker. Loseke (2003: 36) argues that there is a hierarchy among problem brokers, or claims-makers, where scientists are the highest ranked. For certain issue, she argues, professionals are ranked higher. This hierarchy is based on the cognitive authority of science, as discussed above. Even if scientists are on top, this does not mean that all scientists hold such a position. There are struggles for ownership of problem frames within science as well. In the same way, there is a hierarchy among problem brokers who base their frames foremost on values or emotions. One possibility is that problem brokers, who are perceived to be victims or heroes, might have higher credibility than others. This has to be studied further.

The skill in using political resources

The second aspect of influence that Dahl highlights is the skill in using one’s political resources. One important aspect when it comes to problem brokers is to know their audience. This means to know who to talk to and how, as well as when to talk. Who to talk to is highly context dependent. Problem brokering is most effective when the audience has real influence over how a problem should be understood in the political context, preferably by someone who can couple streams. Depending on the issue, it could be civil servants at national agencies or within the government, but it could also be a politician interested in the issue. Who to talk to depends, among other things, on the country and on the issue. A problem broker with experience from the inside will have a better knowledge of how the system functions and who to talk to than problem brokers without experience from the inside.

When the problem broker has decided on an audience, a second aspect of using one’s political resources is to adjust the frame so that it fits that audience – in other words, how to talk. According to Loseke (2003: 27), ‘[a]udiences are critical because a . . . problem is created only when audience members evaluate claims as believable and important’. This means that if a problem broker fails to do this, the frame will not take hold. It is therefore crucial that the problem broker is able to adjust a frame to fit the intended audience. This is partly connected to the national mood. Simply put, it is probably more difficult to get attention focused onto a political problem if it is framed in a way that does not fit the national mood (cf. Benford & Snow 2000; Kangas et al. 2014). It is also important that the problem broker can frame the problem so that the audience can understand it. Overly technical language might be too difficult. Further, depending on the audience, the balance between knowledge, values and emotions has to be adjusted (e.g. Baumgartner & Mahoney 2008). If the audience consists of specialised civil servants, a knowledge-heavy frame works because these civil servants have the prerequisites for understanding those types of

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arguments and can use them to legitimise political action (cf. Boswell 2012). If the audience consists of politicians, the media or the public at large, then value and emotional elements become more important.

A final skill is to know when to talk – to have a sense of timing (cf. Kangas et al. 2014). A problem broker needs to be active long before the problem comes up for decision. One way to get ownership of a problem frame is to be the first in framing that particular condition as a public problem. At the point when policy makers have accepted a frame, it is difficult to make them accept a reframing (cf. Littoz-Monnet 2014; Wolfe et al. 2013). The skill of knowing when to talk is also connected to the concepts of ‘national mood’ and ‘policy window’ in Kingdon’s vocabulary. It is crucial to have some feeling for the national mood as it can open up possibilities as well as shut them down. ‘Policy window’ is a concept that captures moments in time when it is possible for policy entrepreneurs to couple a policy to a problem and get attention from policy makers. These policy windows can be regular events, like budget decisions or elections, but they can also be more random ones (Kingdon 2003: 166ff). A problem broker needs to know when such windows, or access points, are coming up. Windows that are especially important for problem brokers could be hearings or committee work.

Willingness to use political resources

The third aspect of influence is the extent to which one is willing to use one’s political resources. Scientists often have advantages as problem brokers as they hold high credibility and can use the cognitive authority of science to make an audience accept a frame. However, many scientists seem unwilling to act as problem brokers. One reason could be that they need to include value and emotional elements in the frame besides knowledge, which goes against the idea of the neutral scientist. Interest organisations, on the other hand, often have fewer resources than scientists for getting attention focused on their frames. Yet that is to some extent outweighed by the time they can spend on it and their willingness to do so.

Different actors hold different resources and skills in using them. They are also willing to use them to different degrees. The influence of particular problem brokers depends not only on these factors, but also on the competition from other problem brokers at a par- ticular moment. According to Souders and Dillard (2014), the existence of competing frames makes success more difficult. Without competition from stronger problem brokers, even those with fewer resources might succeed in gaining acceptance for their frames.

Empirical illustration

To illustrate the arguments made above, three examples are presented from a case study on the evolution of Swedish and international climate change policy making from 1975 to 2007 (Knaggård 2009, 2014). The first example, the creation of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) in 1988, illustrates the empirical value of including the problem broker in the MSF. The first chairman of the IPCC, Bert Bolin, strongly believed that the role of scientists was to inform policy makers, but to refrain from any policy suggestions

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(e.g., Bolin 1994a; cf. Agrawala 1999). According to him, ‘[s]cientists as well as politicians need to recognize their different roles. . . . Scientists need to inform politicians in a simple manner that can be readily understood, but the message must always be scientifically exact’ (Bolin 1994b: 27). This position was instrumental in the creation of the structure and objectives of the IPCC. The panel should make assessments of scientific knowledge and communicate them to policy makers. This structure enables problem brokering, but stays clear of policy entrepreneurship. It has had a major impact, for example, on the unwilling- ness of the IPCC to suggest global warming objectives (Knaggård 2014).

The second example is about the influence of Bert Bolin, Professor of Meteorology at Stockholm University, on the acceptance by Swedish policy makers of the frame of climate change as a public problem. It illustrates some of the resources and skills that successful problem brokers need. Bolin was acting as problem broker already in 1975, although this attempt to get political attention had limited success (Knaggård 2014). He worked persistently to establish climate change as a public problem all through the 1980s (Agrawala 1999). In 1986 he became affiliated with the Swedish Executive Office under the Social Democratic government as an expert – a position he retained until 1991 (Knaggård 2009). This position strengthened his access to policy makers and his knowl- edge about the system. Later, he took part in a Swedish expert committee on climate change and several parliamentary commissions (Knaggård 2009). In many other coun- tries, Bolin’s and the IPCC’s problem frame – seeing climate change as caused by human emissions with possibly serious effects and therefore a public problem – was challenged by problem brokers who, for example, emphasised natural causes of the problem and therefore downplayed the need for action (see Grundmann 2007; Skolnikoff 1997). This frame was also presented in the Swedish context, but received little attention (Knaggård 2009). The main reason for this was the presence of Bolin as problem broker. He was persistent in his attempts to frame the issue as a public problem and he had access to policy makers in government in the years 1986–1991 and later in the parliament through the parliamentary commissions. He also possessed high credibility as a scientist, being one of the leading international meteorologists and the chairman of the IPCC. Through his access to the scientific and policy spheres he had knowledge about who to talk to, how and when. Finally, he was also willing to act as a problem broker. The problem brokers who tried to establish alternative frames lacked access and, compared to Bolin, credibil- ity. Even if they were persistent and willing to act as problem brokers, this was not enough (Knaggård 2009).

The last example is intended to illustrate how knowledge, values and emotions interplay in framings. In most problem frames during the 1980s that defined climate change as caused by human emissions, focus was on knowledge and the scientific description of the problem (e.g., WMO 1986). However, these frames also played on emotions. For example, the so-called ‘Brundtland Report’ from 1987 frames climate change as a public problem and sets a tone of urgency by evoking emotions of fear for future climate change (WCED 1987: 177). The Brundtland Report does not explicitly mention certain values that should be protected, but the frame implicitly emphasises values like survival, food security and economic security. In the same way and at the same time, other problem brokers empha- sised urgency. This example illustrates how even knowledge-based frames include elements of values and emotions.

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Conclusion

By including the role of the problem broker into the MSF, two objectives can be reached. The first pertains to the analytical separation of streams within the MSF. Through the inclusion of agency in the problem stream and an account of how conditions become public problems, the difference between problem and policy streams can be analytically strength- ened. This is important as problem definitions and the work of problem brokers have an impact on policy entrepreneurs, and, by extension, on the forming of the agenda and decision making. The second objective is to enable a more elaborate analysis of actors who are framing conditions as public problems without making policy suggestions. Cases where policy entrepreneurs also frame problems can already be studied within the MSF, but without the problem broker we will miss what these other actors do. To study actors who only frame problems will be important, primarily in the early phases of problem definition and particularly in scientifically dominated issues like climate change. What this concept enables is a focus on what actors are actually doing rather than on who they are. This builds on the idea of roles, which are present in the MSF through the policy entrepreneur.

The article has further argued for the importance of studying elements of knowledge, values and emotions in frames. All frames must contain some reference to these three in order to get attention. By focusing only on knowledge, we will have difficulty in explaining why some problem frames get attention whereas others do not. As discussed, values and emotions are often more important for creating a successful frame. In order to be success- ful, problem brokers need to be persistent, have access to policy makers and be seen as credible. They also need to know who to talk to, how and when in order to make an impact. Finally, problem brokers need to be willing to frame conditions as public problems. This article has argued that these factors, to some extent, can explain why certain frames take hold. It is important, however, to also study the context. The audience matters, as does the national mood. Coincidence, in the sense of who happens to be at a certain place at a certain time, seems to be crucial, making it difficult to formulate a more general theory of successful problem framing. However, we can increase our understanding of factors necessary for successful problem brokering. This article has only been able to point at important factors, but lacks the empirical base that is needed for such theoretical development.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the participants at the workshop on ‘Decision-making under Ambiguity and Time Constraints: Assessing the Multiple Streams Framework’ at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in 2013 as well as three anonymous reviewers for their helpful and inspiring comments.

Notes

1. Compare also with ‘policy monopolies’, defined by Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 7) as a situation where a problem is controlled by one institution with the aid of a ‘powerful supporting idea’.

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2. Jasanoff and Martello (2004) argue that all knowledge – even scientific knowledge – is situated. 3. As with frames, emotions are always grounded in individual cognition, meaning that it is individuals who

feel emotions. When studying agenda-setting and policy making, it is the aggregated effects of emotions that are in focus.

4. By ‘national mood’, Kingdon (2003: 146) means ‘that a rather large number of people out in the country are thinking along common lines’.

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Address for correspondence: Åsa Knaggård, Department of Political Science, Lund University, Box 52, S-221 00 Lund, Sweden. E-mail: [email protected]

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