Assignment: An Ideal Judicial System

Article

Perceptions of Democracy and Trust in the Criminal Justice System: A Comparison Between Mainland China and Taiwan

Ming-Li Hsieh 1,2

and Francis D. Boateng 1

Abstract For more than 50 years, research has been accumulating on how regime differences impact Mainland China and Taiwan in terms of socioeconomic transformation, the development of politics and constitutions, and diverse issues of foreign policy. Much less is known, however, about differences in public confidence in the criminal justice system. To address the obvious gap, this study utilized second-wave data collected by the Asian Barometer cross-national survey. Findings demonstrated that Chinese citizens reflect higher levels of trust in criminal justice institutions than their Taiwanese counterparts and public perceptions of the degree of democracy had a positive effect on public attitudes. Citizens who acknowledge more satisfaction with institutional performance also tend to have more trust in the criminal justice system.

Keywords trust in criminal justice system, trust in police, trust in courts, democracy, institutional performance, regime impact, public perceptions

Introduction

Mainland China (here referred to as China) and Taiwan were one nation before 1949 (see Lai, Cao, & Zhao, 2010). Over the past 6 decades, Taiwan has been transformed from an authoritarian political power to a democratic and free society with a president directly elected by the people. The journey toward democracy has been slow but steady. The successful democratic transition has earned recog- nition worldwide.1 In the meantime, China is experiencing an economic boom in the market environ- ment by implementing a series of economic reform policies during the 1960s and 1970s. To date, China has transformed from a closed-market economy into the world’s second biggest economy

1 Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA, USA

2 Washington State Institute for Criminal Justice, Spokane, WA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Ming-Li Hsieh, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA, USA.

Email: [email protected]

International Criminal Justice Review 2015, Vol. 25(2) 153-173 ª 2015 Georgia State University Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1057567715570050 icj.sagepub.com

based on Gross Domestic Product (Wang & Yao, 2013), despite the fact that political power in China remains an authoritarian regime with a one-party system.

The different nature of their political entities has spurred interest in a wide array of comparative studies across various disciplines along with the growing literature in the Greater China area. Research has attempted to analyze the way political differences between these two Chinese societies impact socioeconomic transformations (Bishop & Chiou, 2004; Wang, 2003), the development of politics and constitutions (Shi, 2001; Shih, 1995), diverse issues of foreign policies (DeLisle, 2010; Tseng & Ou, 2010; Weng, 2002), business cooperation (Chang, Hsu, & Lin, 2011), and inter- national courts as well as the law (Hsieh, 2007).

In terms of the criminal justice discipline, however, very few comparative studies have been con- ducted in the impact of regime difference between China and Taiwan. Certain issues have been explored but appear to be limited in scope, focusing primarily on corruption (Quah, 2011), trust in police and courts (Wu, 2014), and confidence in police (Wu, Poteyeva, & Sun, 2012). Only one study assesses the impact of a political entity on trust in legal authorities (Lai et al., 2010). In addition, it is not enough to assess different government operations in general; rather a more specific look at per- ceptions of justice is needed. In fact, it appears that there are no prior studies that assess both regime impact and public perceptions toward the criminal justice system. This study attempts to shed some light in this regard.

The criminal justice system projects an image of government, political power, and regime that informs the public as to how police mandates will be carried out including social services related to both crime and noncrime problems, community safety, social disorder, and quality of life. There are also cues as to how the courts will practice law (“doing justice”), effectively punishing offenders and whether there will be fair outcomes (Crank, 2003) or experiences in judicial corruption (Brauer & Loh, 2001). Therefore, an understanding of public perceptions has been acknowledged as a common and the easiest way to get insight into the performance of a criminal justice system (i.e., police and courts; Tyler, 1990). The public commonly uses crime control effectiveness and individual’s fear of crime, degree of safety, and experiences with victimization to evaluate overall institutional perfor- mance in terms of their trust and satisfaction with legal authorities and law enforcement. This is noted as an institutional performance explanation, whereby the degree of trust in criminal justice institutions conventionally would be dependent on how the public perceives institutional performance (Wu et al., 2012).

On the other hand, it has been argued that perceptions of the criminal justice system are shaped by a more holistic view of satisfaction with democracy in all facets of civic life (Weaver, Hacker, & Wildeman, 2014). There is a close correlation between a sense of democracy and trust in criminal justice institutions (Almond & Verba, 1989). For instance, people living in a country with a fully dem- ocratic political culture (e.g., the United States) seem to reflect greater trust in legal authorities com- pared to people who live in authoritarian regimes (e.g., China; Cao & Hou, 2001). Another pattern, however, has been noted in democratic capitalist societies with a prior history of political regime tran- sition2 (e.g., Japan). In these areas, the public would have a lower level of trust in the police compared to their counterparts without prior histories of regime transition (e.g., America; Cao, Stack, & Sun, 1998). This may be because “democracy” reflects certain expectations related to the degree of con- fidence in the criminal justice system in terms of effective crime control, due process, lower levels of corruption, and the protection of human rights (Karstedt & LaFree, 2006).

The objectives of this study are to fill this comparative literature gap by employing the second wave of data from the Asian Barometer cross-national survey from 2005 to 2008. Collectively, this study (1) examined the difference between Chinese and Taiwanese public trust toward the criminal justice system, (2) examined “democratic explanations” regarding public perceptions of the degree of democracy and how that would impact citizen trust in the criminal justice system in general, and (3) examined “institutional performance explanations” regarding how the level of citizen satisfaction

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with institutional performance (i.e., police performance and government effectiveness and integrity) in general (Tyler, 1990; Wu et al., 2012) would impact their trust in the criminal justice system.

Different Political Entities in Two Chinese States

The Nationalist party sustained a political defeat, lost what was literally a civil war with the Com- munists and retreated from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. Since then, Taiwan and China have been led by two independent political powers as two completely separate political entities and observe the anniversary of their separation internally (Lai et al., 2010). Regime differences shape the nature of public views and perceptions of the function of government. Specifically, public trust in criminal jus- tice institutions has been found to be impacted by public perceptions toward political power.

Authoritarian Regime and Public Trust in China

According to the 2012 Democracy Index (The Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU], 2013), which is a reputable annual international survey on levels of democracy, China has zero points on electoral process and pluralism, and 1.4 out of 10 points on civil liberties. China was ranked 142nd as an authoritarian regime of the 167 countries. Cuba, North Korea, and Syria were also categorized as authoritarian states. In other words, China is a highly policed state, whereby law enforcement adopts all necessary means to control local riots and suppress any “potential and possible” anticommunist activities and maintains close ties with the courts (Cao & Hou, 2001). Casey (2010, p. 14) explained that China is an example of authoritarian policing, whereby it is “centralized and militarized, with legitimacy based on government force.” Law enforcement significantly “focuses on controlling dis- sent [in the community], which is often repressed brutally, including through torture and extra-judicial killings.” Despite the fact that the police in China do not have the brutal “killing fields” documented in other countries, it is still authoritarian compared to more subtle forms of democratic policing (i.e., Anglo-Peelian policing3). Chinese police possess substantial power, authority, and discretion over ordinary citizens and their decision making is unlikely to be reviewed (Biddulph, 1993; Cao & Hou, 2001).

Within the communist regime, the party exercises considerable control over the police and the courts by promoting judicial interventionism insofar as justices serve the best interests of the political leadership (Wong, 2004). Lai, Cao, and Zhao (2010, p. 936) note that the courts, as an institution, “did not enjoy an independent judiciary” and more literally, “worked as an auxiliary for the police and delivered the punishment to political opponents.” In Hong Kong, people began to report a diminish- ing level of trust in the criminal justice system as Hong Kong was handed over to China in 1997 (Zheng & Wong, 2002). The citizens of Hong Kong believed the integrity, fairness, and transparency of their criminal justice system (before 1997) could not continue as it had under British control because the Chinese government had a long political history with a one-party system, a communist system (see Wong, 2004).

Historically, the Laogai system (i.e., reform-through-labor) has been used by the Communists in China as a means of social control (see Cohen & Lewis, 2013) that allows the Party to preserve the power of the status quo and to maintain law and order within society. Police work closely with pro- secutorial and judicial authorities and are able to arrest, seize, question, investigate, interrogate, sanc- tion, and detain ordinary citizens in the Laogai camps4 without a court order or authorized warrant. A consequence of the Laogai system is the potential for intimidation by authorities. Citizens may expe- rience political fear (Wu & Sun, 2009) and fear of prosecution (Lai et al., 2010) if they believe that they might be considered as “suspects” who were not faithful to the Party. Given this social context, however, a majority of citizens still reported high levels of confidence in legal authorities (Wu & Sun, 2009). Political power, as Wu and Sun (2009) explained, was a significant factor that had a positive

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impact on citizen perceptions in a cross-national survey. In this study, those who held a greater level of trust in law enforcement would perceive themselves as having greater political influence. In addition, prior studies have revealed that Chinese citizens have a higher level of trust toward criminal justice institutions compared to those citizens in states such as Taiwan without the Laogai system (Lai et al., 2010; Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012).

Overall, it would be prudent to conclude that mixed results have been found regarding the Chinese peoples’ trust in legal authorities in the current transitional society. In one early study, public attitudes reflected less trust in the police. Only about 18% of citizens reported that they fully trusted govern- ment and legal authorities in the 1990s, which was attributed to the impact of the Tiananmen incident (Zheng & Wong, 2002). The younger generation, particularly college students as identified by Wu and Sun (2010), was found to possess more negative perceptions of police effectiveness and integrity. Public perceptions of the police appear to be significantly influenced by the individual’s experiences with the criminal justice system in general.

Democratic Regime and Public Trust in Taiwan

From the early 1990s to the present, Taiwan has transitioned toward a low policing phase with a democratic government and a wider range of civil liberties (Cao & Dai, 2006; Lai et al., 2010). Judi- cial discretion is independent, transparent, and “largely free from the influence of the executive branch of the government” and political interest groups (Lai et al., 2010, p. 936). Law enforcement adopted community-oriented policing strategies and committed to performing with accountably and professionalism (Alarid & Wang, 2000). The journey toward democracy has been slow but steady. Based on the evaluation of the degree of democracy, Taiwan was classified as a flawed democracy as was France and Greece based on the Democracy Index in 2012 (EIU, 2013). Based on a 10-point scale, Taiwan has 9.58 points on electoral process pluralism, 9.41 points on civil liberties, and 7.14 points on governmental functioning. In terms of the average democratic assessment, Taiwan (7.57) is only.54 lower than the United States (8.11). The United States is ranked 21st while Taiwan is ranked 35th.

In terms of trust in police, Cao and Dai (2006) evaluated public attitudes and discovered that Tai- wan, as a democratic regime, held a decent confidence level among 50 countries. Taiwan was found to have a significantly higher level of trust in law enforcement than other Asian and European countries with a prior history of a democratic transition but slightly lower than the United Staes, Finland, Japan, and China. Sun, Jou, Hou, and Chang (2014, p. 137) noted that the public trust in democratic policing in Taiwan was established in “an open society with effective, efficient, and fair” criminal justice sys- tems in general. The public has recognized procedural-based policing as being attached to democratic values as legitimatized police–citizen encounters which has resulted in enhanced public trust in police (Sun, Jou, Hou, and Chang, 2014).

Surprisingly, in a democratic state, the public did not possess a higher level of trust in legal author- ities. One source of information in this issue is an annual survey conducted by the Judicial Yuan5 with respect to perceptions of the Taiwanese criminal justice system (The Judicial Yuan, 2013). In the 2012 study, approximately 45% of citizens reported that they trusted the courts, while 48% did not trust the courts. The lower level of trust in the courts, as Hung (2012) argues, might be explained by the med- ia’s influence at certain points in time and in particular scenarios. This is especially true when the media are focused on repeatedly reporting a certain social event or criminal case that might implicate criminal justice officials. In line with this study, Wu (2014) found that the media have considerable influence on public perceptions in terms of confidence in legal authorities. Wu also noted that the degree of trust in police and courts was dependent upon how trustful people were of the information conveyed by the media and how much they were influenced by media propaganda.

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In Taiwan, Huang (2012) indicated that individual party orientation might further impact levels of trust toward the criminal justice system. Citizens who support the opposition party would more likely be viewed as “hostile populations” who may hold more antagonistic perceptions of law enforcement and legal authorities compared to supporters of the ruling party. Those citizens would be less likely to be deferential to authorities, would be skeptical about the operations of government institutions, and to request an array of policy reforms. In fact, Huang (2014) noted these populations fit with the dem- ocratic characteristics of “critical citizens” (see Norris, 1999) in Western society who highly support the ideology of democracy; however, they are dissatisfied with the way democratic governance and institutional performance are being carried out. Contemporarily, it may be that the voice of critical citizens or hostile populations has the effect of discouraging the Taiwanese public from trusting in a regime, its politics, and criminal justice system (Huang, 2014; Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012).

Explaining Public Trust in Criminal Justice

Political entities shape public perceptions of the criminal justice system within these two Chinese states. It is true that regime differences are fundamental and dictate how the public would interact with their state and with the shared beliefs about operations of law enforcements and legal authorities (Sung, 2006). In addition to regime differences, institutional performance in terms of safety concerns, victimization (Sun et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2012), and government integrity (Wu et al., 2012) are con- ventional explanations for variation in this regard. Opponents, however, have endorsed democratic explanations, arguing that the degree to which the public is satisfied with or supports democracy would impact their attitudes toward the government and the criminal justice system (Tankebe, 2014).

Democratic Explanations and Public Trust

The term “democracy” connotes certain expectations for the degree of confidence one would have in the criminal justice system and perceptions of its effectiveness in crime control, due process, com- batting corruption, and protecting of human rights (Karstedt & LaFree, 2006). In other words, there is a complex relationship between public trust, democracy, and criminal justice that can be summarized as trust in the nature of democracy as a symbol of a “liberal, beneficial, and just society.” Given a democratic state, the criminal justice system is expected to have low-profile policing, a transparent judiciary and what Walker (2011) refers to as a stable “going rate” for sentences. The system should also be well developed and resourceful (Sung, 2006). Citizens who live in such a democratic state and believe their criminal justice system stands for these “democratic” values would have a more positive perception of government agencies (Almond & Verba, 1989). For example, people living in a country with a fully democratic political culture (e.g., the United States) appear to reflect greater trust in legal authorities compared to people who live in authoritarian regimes (e.g., China; Cao & Hou, 2001).

Tyler (1990, 2011) indicated that procedural justice is another important concept attached to “democracy” under the framework of criminal justice institutions. When ordinary citizens indicate a higher level of trust in the criminal justice system, it is assumed that they would be more willing to cooperate with legal authorities and be in compliance with the law. Tankebe (2014) revealed that along with a high level of satisfaction with democracy, police officers would be more likely to support their organization. This is because, as Marks and Fleming (2006) noted, officers would trust the rights that democracy brings to personnel and agencies in the same way that the public enjoys democratic rights. However, Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, and Quinton (2010, p. 204) argue that “a moral or ethical obligation or commitment” is the main reason for people’s compliance with institutional authority; and as a “consequence,” public trust in criminal justice institutions has nothing to do with the perception of democracy.

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Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri, and Tessler (2008) further explored the relationship between public perceptions and democracy. They found that those who were satisfied with or supported democracy also seemed to perceive of economic changes at the individual level or national level; and this might not be related to the perceived legitimacy of democratic criminal justice institutions noted by Tyler (1990, 2011). The public may have more trust in governance and political institutions because of eco- nomic improvements and economic development (Chu et al., 2008; Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010). This might “misrepresent” their support for democracy. It might even lead to misunderstanding of the meaning of democracy such as legitimized institutions and procedures of democratic governance that emphasize freedom and liberty (see Dalton, Shin, & Jou, 2007).

Nevertheless, there are times when even a democratic public does not have confidence and positive attitudes toward their criminal justice system. Norris (2011) argued that in some democratic societies, there is a gap between citizen’s aspirations for democracy and the reality of the way democracy works which are referred to as “democratic deficits”. Citizens who endorse and understand democracy may set a high bar in scrutinizing democracy, and they can be dissatisfied or disaffected with the quality of democratic governance and the criminal justice system. These people are known as “critical citizens” (Norris, 1999). Critical citizens often have low levels of support for political entities and general regime principles. They may also possess skeptical attitudes toward the performance of government agencies and be less trustful of state institutions (e.g., courts, parliaments, law enforcements, and civil service).

Institutional Performance Explanations and Public Trust

Institutional performance has been acknowledged as an indicator for assessing public attitudes toward the performance of political institutions (Wu et al., 2012). The public commonly uses crime control effectiveness to evaluate overall institutional performance and individual’s fear of crime, degree of safety, and experiences with victimization are thought to impact their trust in and satis- faction with legal authorities and law enforcement. Therefore, the measure of institutional perfor- mance, Wu, Poteyeva, and Sun (2012) note, is conventionally examined by crime victimization, perception of safety, and corruption (Chang & Chu, 2006). Moreover, these variables have consis- tently demonstrated predictive effect size in studies regarding public perceptions toward criminal justice institutions even without using the measurement of institutional performance (Carter, 1985; Priest & Carter, 1999; Sun et al., 2014; Sun, Hu, &Wu, 2012; Wu, 2014; Wu & Sun, 2009, 2010).

In fact, when the public has a sense of safety, with fewer victimization experiences, and perceives a less agency corruption in their region, collectively it would lead to overall satisfaction with institu- tional performance and further, it would reflect more trustful attitudes toward police and courts (Wu et al., 2012). A cross-national pattern identified by Ivković (2008) found that citizens who reported higher levels of safety would be more likely to have positive attitudes toward police com- pared to those who reported less safety in 28 countries. Lower levels of fear could be explained as the result of effective crime control and less victimization which would relatively increase levels of safety among citizens (Ivković, 2008). This study echoed institutional performance explanations that citizens who had endorsed agency performance were more likely to express more trust and satis- faction toward the overall performance of the legal system and other government institutions (e.g., parliament, armed forces).

Another comparative study examined public trust and institutional performance in two Chi- nese states; however, regime differences might affect, to some degree, how the public perceives the criminal justice system’s performance. In this study, Wu et al. (2012) concluded that (1) a sense of safety and fear of crime had a positive effect on trust in the Chinese police, while it had no effect on the level of trust in Taiwanese police, (2) a sense of victimization did not affect

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public perceptions toward criminal justice institutions in either states, and (3) beliefs about insti- tutional corruption had a negative impact on both states in this regard. In line with this study, Wu (2014) determined that public trust in courts would be affected by certain types of institutional per- formance, especially the degree of safety and perception of government corruption.

In terms of institutional performance, it has been argued that the effect of institutional integ- rity is considered to be one of the most significant factors for the reduction of trust in the crim- inal justice system. Citizens who perceived and experienced or vicariously experienced any form of police misconduct (Smith & Hawkins, 1973) and judicial corruption (Brauer & Loh, 2001) had a reduced level of confidence in institutional performance. Another study included in Chang and Chu’s (2006) research examined corruption and confidence in political institutions (e.g., courts, police, military, and parliament) between five democratic states (i.e., Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Philippines). Their analysis revealed “the corrosive effect of corrup- tion on citizens’ trust in institutions,” especially public perceptions of corrupt institutional performance and activities. This finding held uniformly among all states (Chang & Chu, 2006, p. 269).

On the other hand, a study conducted by Henderson, Cullen, Cao, Browning, and Kopache (1997) with regard to public perceptions of the criminal justice system concluded that citizen attitudes would not be influenced by their contact with the criminal justice system. Sun and Wu (2006) also examined public perceptions of the court to further this line of argument. Despite the fact that Sun and Wu had argued that court experiences would not affect overall eva- luation of the courts in terms of favorable court performance, contact with the courts did nega- tively impact citizen attitudes in terms of procedural justice, fair outcomes, and human respect. Moreover, they revealed that citizen perceptions of police performance and perceived police mis- conduct would substantially shape public attitudes toward the entire criminal justice system.

Methods

This study attempted to determine whether there were differences between Chinese and Taiwanese public perceptions of their respective criminal justice systems. Moreover, this study explored two explanations of public perceptions toward the criminal justice system in general. First, it assesses whether public perceptions of the degree of democracy would impact citizen trust in the criminal jus- tice system. Second, it looks at whether the level of citizen satisfaction with institutional performance in general would impact trust in the criminal justice system. In order to fulfill these goals, the follow- ing hypotheses were examined in the current study:

Hypothesis 1: Chinese citizens will demonstrate a higher level of trust in their criminal justice system than their Taiwanese counterparts.

Hypothesis 1-1: Chinese citizens will demonstrate a higher level of trust in police than their Taiwanese counterparts. Hypothesis 1-2: Chinese citizens will demonstrate a higher level of trust in courts than their Taiwanese counterparts.

Hypothesis 2: Citizens who express greater satisfaction with respect to the level of democracy in a given state will have a higher level of trust in the criminal justice system.

Hypothesis 2-1: Citizens who perceive a higher level of democracy will express more trust in police compared to those who perceive a lower level of democracy. Hypothesis 2-2: Citizens who perceive a higher level of democracy will express more trust in the courts compared to those who perceive a lower level of democracy.

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Hypothesis 3: People with a higher level of satisfaction regarding institutional performance will also express more confidence in the criminal justice system.

Hypothesis 3-1: Citizens who believe that government officials have high integrity will express increased feelings of trust in the criminal justice system when compared to those who do not believe so. Hypothesis 3-2: People who perceive a higher level of safety will express more trust in the criminal justice system compared to those who perceive a lower level of safety. Hypothesis 3-3: Citizens who have been previously victimized will express less trust in the criminal justice system compared to those who have no criminal victimization experience.

Data

This study utilized data collected from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). It is a part of the global barometer surveys that include different regional barometers such as Afrobarnometer, Asian Barometer, and the Latinobarnometer (Shin & Cho, 2010). Since 2003, the ABS is the largest cross-national survey conducted to analyze public opinion on values (e.g., trust, satisfac- tion, support, preference) toward politics, regimen power, social problems, government, reform, criminal justice institutions, economic evaluations, social capital, and democracy among 13 East Asian countries and 5 South Asian countries. Over 2 billion Asians have been surveyed. The ABS has gained an academic reputation and the United Nations Development Programme (UNPD) has also included the ABS in its publication as one of the important research indexes (UNPD, 2007).

To ensure comparability of data collected, the survey module and methodology are consis- tently and identically employed across countries with well-trained interviewers and researchers. The selection method in either state was multistage sampling with probabilities proportional to size measure. In each of the sites, representative samples of adults were selected and interviewed using face-to-face interviewing techniques to elicit the required information regarding respon- dents’ opinions on a variety of issues. Given rigorous research protocols and survey quality con- trol, the ABS data have been widely adopted in prior studies such as public perceptions toward democracy (Chu et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 2007; Shin & Cho, 2010), public support on regimen legitimacy (Chang, Chu, & Welsh, 2013), and public trust in law enforcement and legal author- ities (Wu, 2014; Wu & Sun, 2009; Wu et al., 2012) in Asia. Hence, in this study scope with respect to public trust toward criminal justice intuitions, the second wave of the ABS conducted from 2005 to 2008 was utilized. This survey resulted in a sample of 5,098 and 1,587 respondents in China and Taiwan, respectively, making up a total sample of 6,685 respondents for the entire study.

Measures

Dependent variables. Public trust in the legitimacy of the criminal justice system predominately relies on the functions of two institutions, namely, police and courts (see Packer, 1968; Van de Walle & Raine, 2008). Hence, the outcome variable, trust in the criminal jsutice system, is a composite mea- sure derived from the 2 subset items measuring trust in the police and in the courts. First, trust in the police was presented by asking respondents “how much trust do you have in the police?” Second, trust in the court was presented by asking respondents “how much trust do you have in the court?” These 2 items were measured by scales from 1 = none at all, 2 = not very much trust, 3 = quite a lot of trust, to 4 = a great deal of trust. The higher scores reflected that the public place a higher level of trust in criminal justice institutions. The 2 items were loaded onto the same latent variable, with factor

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loadings of .896 each. The criminal justice system composite scale obtained an α value of .76, indi- cating good internal reliability.

Independent variables. There were three independent variables employed in this study. First, nation was measured as a dichotomous variable, 0 = Taiwan and 1 = China. Second, perception of democ- racy was measured as an index variable with 2 items asking respondents to indicate their satisfaction with and level of democracy in their country. The first item “on the whole, how satisfied or dissatis- fied are you with the way democracy works in your country?” was measured by a scale from 1 = not at all satisfied, 2 = not very satisfied, 3 = fairly satisfied, to 4 = very satisfied. The second item, “in your opinion, how democratic is your country?” was measured by a scale from 1 = full democracy, 2 = a democracy with minor problems, 3 = a democracy with major problems, to 4 = not a democracy. This item was reverse coded to consistently maintain a positive direction with other items measured in the study. Responses for these 2 items were summed up to form an additive index for democracy. The factor loadings were .88 each, and the α value was .71, indicating an acceptable level of internal con- sistency of the scaled items.

Third, instiitutional performance was measured by public perceptions derived from three vari- ables, namely, government integrity, perception of safety, and crime victimization (Wu et al., 2012). Government integrity was measured as an index variable with 2 items asking respondents to express their opinions about the extent to which they believed corruption was widespread in their country. The first item was “how widespread do you think corruption and bribe taking are in your local/municipal government?” The second item was “how widespread do you think corruption and bribe taking are in the national government.” The measurements of these items were 1 = almost every- one is corrupt, 2 = most officials are corrupt, 3 = not a lot of officials are corrupt, and 4 = hardly anyone is involved. Responses to both items were summed up to form an additive index for govern- ment integrity. The factor loadings were .89 each, and the α value was .74, indicating a good internal reliability for the scaled items. Perception of safety was asking respondents to express their opinions about safety issues in their communities and presented by “generally speaking, how safe is living in this city/town/village?” This item was measured with a single 4-point Likert-type scale as 1 = very safe, 2 = safe, 3 = unsafe, and 4 = very unsafe. In order to keep the measurement in a positive direc- tion, this item was reverse coded. Crime victimization was measured by asking respondents to indi- cate whether they or any member of their family have been a victim in the last 12 months (0 = no, 1 = yes).

Control Variables. Given prior studies findings that social capital (Sun et al., 2012), media (Wu, 2014), and economic development (Wu et al., 2012) might affect public perceptions of trust in crim- inal justice institutions, this study controlled these three variables in the model. Social capital was measured as an index variable with 3 items asking respondents how much trust they have in their (a) relatives, (b) neighbors, and (c) other people they interact with. Response categories included 1 = none at all, 2 = not very much trust, 3 = quite a lot of trust, and 4 = a great deal of trust. The higher score represents higher social capital and the lower score represents lower social capital. These items were combined to form the social capital index with factor loadings ranging from .71 to .86 and an α value of .68.

Media trust was measured with 2 items asking respondents to indicate their level of trust in (a) the television and (b) newspaper. Response categories included 1 = none at all, 2 = not very much trust, 3 = quite a lot of trust, and 4 = a great deal of trust. The higher score represents higher media trust and the lower score represents lower media trust. These items were combined to form the media trust index with factor loadings of .95 each, and an α value of .90, indicating a very high internal consis- tency of the scaled items.

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Economic evaluation was measured by a 5-point Likert-type scale with 3 items asking respondents (a) How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today? (1 = very bad, 2 = bad, 3 = not good nor bad, 4 = good, and 5 = very good); (b) How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years? (1 = much worse, 2 = a little worse, 3 = about the same, 4 = a little better, and 5 = much better); and (c) What do you think will be the state of our country’s economic condition a few years from now? (1 = much worse, 2 = a little worse, 3 = about the same, 4 = a little better, and 5 = much better). All 3 items loaded on the same construct with factor loadings ranging from .84 to .89. The items were combined to form a summary index for economic evaluation with an α value of .83, indicating a very high internal consistency. In addition, demographic variables such as age (measured in terms of years), gender (0 = female, 1 = male), and marital status (0 = not married, 1 = married) were also included.

Table 1 presented descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the entire sample. The majority of Chinese respondents expressed having “quite a lot” to “a great deal” of trust in the police and in the court, roughly 72% and 77%, respectively. However, less than half of the Taiwanese respondents indi- cated that they had “quite a lot” to “a great deal” of trust in the police and in the court, about 49% and 34%, respectively. Moreover, the Chinese respondents expressed they were fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in their state and reported a slightly higher level of satisfaction about democ- racy than their Taiwanese counterparts (6.1 vs. 5.1). The public in China and Taiwan perceive similar levels of safety (3.0 vs. 3.1); however, the Chinese citizens had fewer victimization experiences than their counterparts (26% vs. 46%). In addition, the government integrity index indicates that the Chi- nese perceived a certain degree of corrupt activities among civil and criminal justice officials and reported slightly higher scores than their Taiwanese counterparts (5.9 vs. 4.5). In terms of demo- graphics, half of the respondents were male and on average, respondents were around middle age (46- to 47-years-old) in both Chinese states. Also, most of the respondents in China and Taiwan were married, about 69% and 82%, respectively.6

Analytic Plan. In order to identify influential factors affecting trust in criminal justice systems and to examine the sets of hypotheses, multivariate analysis was employed in this study. For the trust in police and court model, given the dependent variable was measured by ordinal scales in each model, ordinal logistic regression was conducted.

For the primary interest model (trust in the criminal justice system), because the dependent vari- able was a continuous measure, a series of ordinary least squares regression models were used to examine the relationship between public perceptions regarding democracy and institutional perfor- mance and the degree of public trust in the criminal justice system in two Chinese states.

Results

First, Table 2 explored similarities and differences between China and Taiwan in terms of factors that influence public trust in the criminal justice system. Panel A provided the results for Taiwan; and across all three models, citizens’ perceptions of democracy, government integrity, social capital, media trust, and economic evaluation were positively and significantly related to their trust in the police, courts, and in the criminal justice system in general. For instance, a unit increase in citizens’ perceptions of democracy in Taiwan corresponds to an increase of .24 in their trust in the police, .36 in their trust in the court, and .20 in their trust in the criminal justice system in general. Further, gender, age, and marital status of respondents do not appear to have an impact on citizens’ trust in the criminal justice system.

Panel B presented the factors that influence citizens’ trust in the criminal justice system in China. Overall, in China, the five positive influential variables that were consistent with their Taiwan coun- terparts were found across all three models. Contradicting conventional understanding, perceptions of

162 International Criminal Justice Review 25(2)

safety with respect to living in certain neighborhoods did not influence Chinese’ trust in the police but did influence their trust in courts and the criminal justice system.

In summary, despite the fact that influential factor variation exists among individual institutions in two Chinese societies, more commonalities than differences can be found with respect to the criminal justice system in general. Predictors such as perception of democracy, government integrity, media trust, and economic evaluation were found as positive influential factors toward trust in the criminal justice system. In contrast, individual’s victimization experiences and demographic predictors (i.e., gender, age, marital status) did not appear to impact citizen’s trust in the criminal justice system in general.

To test the three hypotheses, Table 3 presented a series of regression models7 by utilizing an entire sample compiled with the two Chinese states. Model 1 demonstrated the effects on citizens’ trust in the police. The model was found to be significant (−2 LL = 2,354.48, χ2 = 1,068.53, p < .001) and accounting for 40% of the variation. When controlling all other variables in the model, Chinese respondents did not express a higher trust in the police compared to their Taiwanese counterparts. Respondents who perceived higher levels of democracy in their country (β = .35, p < .001) and attrib- uted higher levels of integrity to the government (β = .29, p < .001) were found to hold a higher level of trust in the police. Moreover, male respondents (β = .01, p < .05) and participants who acknowl- edged a greater sense of social capital (β = .17, p < .001), more media trust (β = .47, p < .001), reported favorable economic evaluations (β = .11, p < .001), and were married (β = .24, p < .05) were found to have more trust in the police. However, older respondents indicated less trust in the police compared to younger respondents (β = −.17, p < .05).

Model 2 examined public confidence in the court, and the model was significant (−2 LL = 2335.85, χχ2 = 1203.55, p < .001) accounting for 44% of the variation. Most of the variables found to be sig- nificant were the same as Model 1 identified, such as Nation (β = .84, p < .001), perception of

Table 1. Descriptive Characteristics of Study Participants (N ¼ 6,685). Taiwan China Total %/M (SE) %/M (SE) %/M (SE)

Nation (1 ¼ China) 23.7 76.3 — Trust in criminal justice system 4.7 (.03) 6.2 (.02) 5.9 (.02) Trust in the police None at all 7.3 1.9 3.2 Not very much 43.8 25.9 30.2 Quite a lot 42.6 35.8 37.4 A great deal 6.3 36.4 29.2

Trust in the court None at all 12.3 1.8 4.3 Not very much 53.1 21.5 28.9 Quite a lot 30.7 38.7 36.9 A great deal 3.8 37.9 30.0

Perception of democracy 5.1 (.03) 6.1 (.02) 5.8 (.02) Government integrity 4.5 (.03) 5.9 (.03) 5.3 (.03) Perception of safety 3.1 (.02) 3.0 (.01) 3.0 (.03) Crime victimization 46.2 25.5 30.4 Social capital 8.8 (.04) 7.4 (.02) 7.8 (.02) Media trust 4.4 (.03) 5.4 (.02) 5.1 (.02) Economic evaluation 7.7 (.06) 12.9 (.02) 11.6 (.04) Age 45.7 (.41) 47.1 (.21) 46.7 (.19) Male 50.2 51.2 51.0 Married 69.1 81.5 78.5

Hsieh and Boateng 163

T a b le

2 . In fl u e n ti al F ac to rs

T o w ar d T ru st

in C ri m in al Ju st ic e S ys te m : B y S ta te s.

P an e l A : T ai w an

(n ¼

1 ,5 8 7 )

P an e l B : C h in a (n

¼ 5 ,0 9 8 )

P o lic e a

C o u rt a

C J S ys te m

b P o lic e a

C o u rt a

C J S ys te m

b

b (S E )

W al d

b (S E )

W al d

b (S E )

b b (S E )

W al d

b (S E )

W al d

b (S E )

b

P e rc e p ti o n o f d e m o cr ac y

.2 4 (. 0 6 )

1 7 .8 0 ** *

.3 6 (. 0 6 )

3 6 .5 3 ** *

.2 0 (. 0 3 )* **

.2 0

.4 6 (. 0 6 )

5 8 .8 2 ** *

.2 8 (. 0 6 )

2 3 .7 2 ** *

.2 4 (. 0 3 )* **

.1 9

G o ve rn m e n t in te gr it y

.1 6 (. 0 6 )

8 .1 9 **

.2 1 (. 0 6 )

1 2 .5 7 ** *

.1 0 (. 0 3 )* *

.1 0

.3 4 (0 5 )

5 4 .2 6 ** *

.2 5 (. 0 4 )

3 0 .4 9 ** *

.2 1 (. 0 3 )* **

.2 0

P e rc e p ti o n o f sa fe ty

.0 2 (. 1 0 )

0 .0 3

.0 1 (. 1 0 )

0 .0 1

.0 2 (. 0 6 )

.0 1

.1 3 (. 1 1 )

1 .2 2

.2 7 (. 1 1 )

6 .0 2 *

.1 5 (. 0 6 )*

.0 6

C ri m e vi ct im iz at io n

.0 2 (. 0 7 )

0 .0 4

�0 7 (. 0 8 )

0 .7 9

�. 0 1 (. 0 7 )

�. 0 1

�. 0 6 (. 0 9 )

0 .3 9

.0 3 (. 0 9 )

0 .1 6

.0 1 (. 0 7 )

.0 0

S o ci al ca p it al

.2 6 (. 0 5 )

3 0 .6 4 ** *

.1 5 (. 0 5 )

1 1 .2 2 **

.1 4 (. 0 2 )* **

.1 7

.1 0 (. 0 4 )

5 .0 4 *

.1 9 (. 0 4 )

2 0 .6 6 ** *

.1 1 (. 0 2 )* **

.1 1

M e d ia tr u st

.2 8 (. 0 5 )

2 9 .3 7 ** *

.3 2 (. 0 5 )

3 8 .6 3 ** *

.2 0 (. 0 3 )* **

.2 1

.6 0 (. 0 5 )

1 6 8 .2 7 ** *

.4 7 (. 0 4 )

1 1 3 .0 5 ** *

.3 4 (. 0 2 )* **

.3 4

E co n o m ic e va lu at io n

.1 0 (. 0 3 )

1 2 .0 2 **

.1 3 (. 0 3 )

1 8 .3 8 ** *

.0 8 (. 0 2 )* **

.1 5

.1 6 (. 0 4 )

1 5 .1 7 ** *

.1 3 (. 0 4 )

1 0 .5 0 **

.1 0 (. 0 2 )* **

.1 0

M al e

.0 2 (. 0 1 )

1 0 .0 4 **

�. 0 1 (. 0 1 )

3 .7 3 *

�. 1 3 (. 0 7 )

�. 0 5

�. 1 0 (. 1 1 )

0 .8 6

�. 1 3 (. 1 1 )

1 .4 5

�. 0 9 (. 0 6 )

�. 0 3

A ge

�. 1 9 (. 1 2 )

2 .3 2

�. 2 1 (1 3 )

2 .6 6

.0 0 (. 0 0 )

.0 4

�. 0 0 (. 0 0 )

0 .1 8

.0 0 (. 0 0 )

0 .0 1

�. 0 0 (. 0 0 )

�. 0 1

M ar ri e d

.3 4 (. 1 6 )

4 .6 0 *

�. 1 5 (. 1 6 )

0 .8 5

.0 6 (. 0 9 )

.0 3

�. 0 7 (. 1 5 )

0 .2 2

�. 0 2 (. 1 5 )

0 .0 3

�. 0 4 (. 0 8 )

�. 0 1

C o n st an t

— —

— —

.3 8 (. 2 9 )

— —

— —

— �. 7 3 (. 3 5 )*

– T h re sh o ld

N o n e at

al l

4 .3 0 (. 5 6 )

5 8 .1 6 ** *

3 .5 3 (. 5 6 )

3 9 .7 7 ** *

— —

5 .7 5 (. 7 1 )

6 5 .8 3 ** *

4 .7 2 (. 6 9 )

4 6 .1 9 ** *

— —

N o t ve ry

m u ch

tr u st

7 .3 2 (. 5 9 )

1 5 4 .6 6 ** *

6 .4 9 (. 5 9 )

1 2 2 .6 2 ** *

— —

9 .6 7 (. 7 1 )

1 8 5 .6 8 ** *

8 .0 4 (. 6 8 )

1 3 9 .6 9 ** *

— —

Q u it e a lo t tr u st

1 0 .2 6 (. 6 4 )

2 5 9 .9 4 ** *

9 .2 4 (. 6 3 )

2 1 6 .1 7 ** *

— —

1 1 .7 6 (. 7 3 )

2 5 6 .2 5 ** *

1 0 .2 2 (. 7 0 )

2 1 1 .4 3 ** *

— —

M o d e l F it

�2 L L

1 6 3 1 .6 3

1 0 1 5 .3 3

— 1 2 6 2 .0 3

1 3 0 3 .6 2

— F- te st /w

2 1 9 5 .3 6 ** *

2 0 9 .3 8 ** *

2 9 .6 5 ** *

5 7 5 .0 4 ** *

4 0 4 .7 9 ** *

8 5 .7 0 ** *

R 2

.1 9 3

.2 0 9

.2 2 8

.3 8 5

.2 9 1

.3 8 6

a O rd in al lo gi st ic re gr e ss io n w as

co n d u ct e d . b O rd in ar y le as t sq u ar e d re gr e ss io n w as

co n d u ct e d .

*p < .0 5 . ** p < .0 1 . ** *p

< .0 0 1 .

164

democracy (β = .34, p < .001), government integrity (β = .23, p < .001), social capital (β = .17, p < .001), media trust (β = .42, p < .001), economic evaluation (β = .13, p < .001), and age (β = −.17, p < .05), and these variables were associated with citizens’ trust in the court. Specifically, Chinese respon- dents reflected a higher level of trust in the court than their Taiwanese counterparts. In addition, respondents who were older perceived higher levels of democracy, government integrity, and social capital, more media trust and reported favorable economic evaluations. They also appeared to have more trust in the courts.

Model 3 tested independent variables for predicting public trust in the criminal justice system. The model was significant, F(11, 2,380) = 198.94, p < .001, and it explained 48% of the variance in the dependent variable by the predictors included in the model. Consistently, Nation (β = .43, p < .001) was found to be a significant predictor, whereby Chinese respondents reported higher levels of trust in the criminal justice system compared to their Taiwanese counterparts. Respondents also reported higher levels of trust in the criminal justice system when those who perceived higher levels of satisfaction in the level of democracy in their state (β = .23, p < .001). In terms of institutional per- formance, respondents who believed their government had more integrity with less corruption (β = .18, p < .001) and sensed higher levels of safety living in the community (β = .08, p < .05) expressed higher levels of trust in the criminal justice system. In addition, male respondents still acknowledged lower levels of trust in the criminal justice system compared to female respondents (β = −.12, p < .01). Other variables such as media trust (β = .29, p < .001) and economic evaluation (β = .08, p < .001) were also found to have a positive impact on citizens’ trust in the criminal justice system.

In summary, the regression analyses confirmed (1) Hypothesis 1, whereby Chinese citizens demonstrated higher levels of trust in their criminal justice system than their Taiwanese counterparts,

Table 3. Regression Analysis: Public Trust in the Criminal Justice System (N ¼ 6,685). Model 1

a Model 2

a Model 3

b

Police Court CJ System

b (SE) Wald b (SE) Wald b (SE) Beta

Nation (China ¼ 1) .11 (.16) 0.53 .84 (.16) 29.04*** .43 (.09)*** .14 Perception of democracy .35 (.04) 73.19*** .34 (.04) 66.51*** .23 (.02)*** .19 Government integrity .29 (.03) 67.30*** .23 (.04) 42.19*** .18 (.02)*** .17 Perception of safety .08 (.07) 1.03 .11 (.07) 1.98 .08 (.04)* .03 Crime victimization �.03 (.06) 0.31 �.02 (.06) 0.18 �.02 (.05) �.01 Social capital .17 (.03) 31.28*** .17 (.03) 31.57*** .13 (.02)*** .13 Media trust .47 (.03) 194.01*** .42 (.03) 157.27*** .29 (.02)*** .27 Economic evaluation .11 (.02) 20.13*** .13 (.02) 29.71*** .08 (.01)*** .17 Male .01 (.00) 4.39* �.01 (.00) 2.18 �.12 (.05)** �.04 Age �.17 (.08) 4.33* �.17 (.08) 4.36* .00 (.00) .01 Married .24 (.10) 5.09* �.11 (.11) 1.08 .04 (.06) .01 Constant — — — — .42 (.21)* — Thresholds: None at all 4.97 (.40) 151.29*** 4.66 (.40) 136.67*** — — Not very much trust 8.30 (.42) 393.78*** 7.75 (.42) 347.94*** — — Quite a lot trust 10.60 (.44) 575.76*** 10.06 (.44) 529.15*** — —

Model Fit �2 LL 2354.48 2335.85 — w2/F-test 1068.53*** 1203.55*** 198.94*** R 2

.395 .436 .479

a Ordinal Logistic Regression was conducted.

b Ordinary Least-squared Regression was conducted.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Hsieh and Boateng 165

(2) Hypothesis 2, whereby citizens who were more satisfied with respect to the level of democracy in a given state had more trust in their criminal justice system compared to citizens with lower levels of satisfaction, and (3) Hypothesis 3, whereby citizens who expressed more satisfaction with institu- tional performance would have higher levels of trust in their criminal justice system. However, it is worthwhile to note that victimization experiences did not appear to impact trust in the police, courts, and even in the criminal justice system, instead, government integrity demonstrated a stronger mag- nitude of explanatory power across institutions in this regard.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study addressed a comparative literature gap and attempted to explain the differences between China and Taiwan in terms of understanding how regime differences in the two societies would impact public trust in the criminal justice system. Despite the barriers of comparative analysis, such as appropriately explaining the causes of differences or even similarities (see Cao, Lai, & Zhao, 2012), the findings identified in this study contribute insights into public views of the criminal justice field. In this study, we found that regime differences do influence citizens’ attitudes toward criminal justice institutions. Chinese respondents who lived in an authoritarian regime reported higher levels of trust in the police, in the courts, and in criminal justice system as a whole compared to their Taiwanese counterparts who lived in a democratic regime. This finding was consistent with Lai and colleagues (2010) study, utilizing the World Values Surveys to reveal the impact of political entity on confidence in legal authorities (e.g., police and courts).

One possible explanation about the impact of authoritarian ruling in this regard is the potential for intimidation and political fear (Wu & Sun, 2009) derived from the historical effects of the Laogai system (Cohen & Lewis, 2013), which would result in less critical opinions, less truthful answers, and less willingness to respond in Chinese society. In other words, Chinese citizens may be reacting to a “fear of prosecution” (Lai et al., 2010), especially if individuals express negative views in their attitudes toward government agencies, regional leadership, criminal justice officials, and commun- ism. Moreover, our study found media trust was a powerful influential factor on public trust as is echoed in Wu’s (2014) study. Wu (2014, p. 97) further revealed that the Chinese government uses the media as a mean of propaganda which is aimed “at nurturing supportive sentiments toward the authorities”; and this would have an “actual impact on public opinion on the authorities” in an author- itarian state. Given this twofold influence, the potential for intimidation and media-driven “lecturing,” we speculated that the public would be less likely to be free with their speech and represent their per- sonal feelings, instead, they might show more support for legal authorities in order to disguise their feelings on public and social affairs. This may also explain, to a certain extent, why Chinese citizens expressed more trust in the courts than their Taiwanese counterparts.

On the other hand, one reason for the Taiwanese public’s lower level of trust in criminal justice institutions compared to their Chinese counterparts might be the influence of party orientation. Party preferences in politics are usually heightened through the media. For a state with a democratic regime like Taiwan, people are actually more likely be impacted by media differences in reporting, and the messages they choose to convey, and by the debates they focus on related to crime and safety (Heath, Kavanagh, & Thompson, 2001), criminal justice issues (Huang, 2012; Wu, 2014; Wu, Sun, & Smith, 2011) and political orientation and party support (Hsu, 2010; Huang, 2012). Contemporarily, the potential “political bias” (see Graber, 1976) within the media would further the image building of “hostile populations” in the opposition party and characterized them as being less likely to respect the authorities. This image would include reckless behavior at some political events and the tendency to support the Independence Movement in Taiwan (Shih & Hsu, 2002) as well as incriminating the “personality cult” of a political leader (see Taylor, 2006) as a star in the ruling party. The Taiwanese public appears to have been influenced by such a media environment (Hsu, 2010; Huang, 2012).

166 International Criminal Justice Review 25(2)

Citizens who receive more propaganda from the media that endorse the ruling party would express higher levels of trust in criminal justice institutions and greater support for government agencies com- pared to those who receive information from rival media that support the opposition party and vice versa (Huang, 2012). Individual party orientation and personal political preferences did exert consid- erable impact on levels of trust toward the criminal justice system in Taiwan (see Huang, 2012), although this study did not examine the interrelationship between political party orientation, media, and public perceptions. This is worthy of future research.

Another contribution in this study is the conclusion that citizen perceptions of greater degrees of democracy have a positive impact on levels of trust toward criminal justice systems in gen- eral; this result was in line with prior studies regarding the importance of democracy and its potential influence on government agencies (Almond & Verba, 1989; Norris, 1999, 2011; Tan- kebe, 2014). However, we must be cautious when drawing conclusions from this result because the two Chinese societies have different regime backgrounds and may offer disparate views of the nature of democracy.

Under the framework of an authoritarian regime, the Chinese might “misrepresent” their support for democracy because they have interwoven satisfaction with economic improvements with support for the government and considered it as the essential value of democracy (Chu et al., 2008; Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010) rather than collectively pursuing procedural justice, freedom, human rights, and other values which have to be attached along with the whole picture of democracy (see Dalton et al., 2007). It has been acknowledged that “maintaining economic prosperity can win people’s sup- port” and trust in various social affairs and political perspectives as a communitarian strategy to ensure the consolidation of regime (Huang, Chu, & Chang, 2013, p. 152). Given evidence that (1) China is the worlds’ second biggest economy and (2) economic evaluations have been found to have a positive effect in the current study, perceptions of an economic boom may play a role in the way the public sees themselves as experiencing higher levels of democracy that further contribute to higher levels of trust toward the criminal justice system. For them, communitarian conceptions of democracy are the reality (see Shin & Cho, 2010).

Consistent with Cao et al.’s (2012) study, we found that a democratic society, such as Taiwan did not necessarily display higher levels of satisfaction and support for democracy than the more author- itarian regime, although citizens perceive high degrees of democracy. Critical citizens, as noted by Norris (1999), were responsible for a certain degree of the lower trust in the law enforcement and legal authorities because citizens also feel free to share their dissatisfaction and their attitudes would tend to be more critical about the criminal justice system in general. As long as Taiwan is persistently moving toward a true avenue of democracy, critical citizenship might not diminish for some time (Huang et al., 2013; Norris, 1999); however, the public would more likely give positive credit to the criminal justice intuitions (Lai et al., 2010) as with the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Fin- land all which have a long-term, stable, free, and liberal societies (Cao et al., 2012). It has been acknowledged that the relationship between democracy and public trust in the criminal justice system in Taiwan are associated with a U-shaped convex curvilinear relationship (see Cao et al., 2012). Given this time point, it could be argued that Taiwan did not actually have lower levels of trust in legal authorities compared to China, rather, they do not appear to have a mature democracy that would allow them to reveal an equivalent level of trust toward criminal justice intuitions that would represent their confidence in this regard.

In an Asian context, “a government that satisfies its people’s needs” (Huang et al., 2013, p. 169) would shape public attitudes toward democracy by developing diffuse support (see Easton, 1975) in terms of the expression of greater trust within and between criminal justice institutions rather than regime type. A state that is experiencing improvements in the quality of institutional performance, effectiveness of governance, institutional integrity, living standards, and economic development (Huang et al., 2013) would be more likely to gain regime legitimacy and enhanced

Hsieh and Boateng 167

public support toward public and criminal justice institutions. For instance, people in Singapore expressed a high level of satisfaction toward life, prosperity of society and governmental intuitions, perceived lower levels of corruption and higher levels of safety and about 95% of citizens reported a relatively high level of trust in law enforcement and authorities (The Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development [OECD], 2014) although Singapore is an electoral authoritarian regime without a genuine democracy. The findings in this study indirectly support this explanation. The higher and more diffuse levels of support found in China rather in Taiwan may result from the Chi- nese citizens’ perceptions of greater life and needs satisfaction that have been provided by the gov- ernment, especially if the Chinese people are more concerned about economic performance and living standards rather than the empowerment of citizens, procedural justice, fair electoral processes, and pluralism that are the central values of democracy (Chu et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2013).

In terms of institutional performance, this study was in accordance with Wu and associates’ (2012) comparative study between China and Taiwan, where they failed to find that victimization experi- ences were significant factors in shaping citizens’ attitudes toward institutional confidence. We did not mean to say that this conventional predictor does not matter in terms of influencing citizens’ per- ceptions or level of trust toward criminal justice institutions, rather there were no significant results when the model was controlled by other variables in this study. In fact, victimization experiences would affect pubic attitudes; however, the effectiveness of community policing and social cohesion (which is the case in these two Chinese states) might reduce the fear of crime and make victimization experiences less sensitive to one’s evaluation of institutional performance (Sun et al., 2014). It is worthy to note that a sense of safety, however, had a positive affect on trust in courts and trust in the criminal justice system in China and had no impact in Taiwan. This result was in line with prior stud- ies (Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012). A possible explanation is the influence of political power. The Chi- nese citizens’ sense of security might be intertwined with the fear of prosecution and political fear in the community as discussed earlier (Lai et al., 2010). Chinese citizens “who have higher levels of perceived political power and influence are more likely to have favorable attitudes toward police,” legal authorities, and governmental institutions (Wu & Sun, 2009, p. 184). In this sense, this explana- tion could extend to the current finding (higher levels of trust in courts and criminal justice system in general found in the current study) although the political fear hypothesis would require further research in the future.

Nevertheless, this study provides strong evidence and endorses the institutional performance explanation of public trust in criminal justice institutions. More importantly, this study identified that government integrity with fewer corruption scandals is a significant vehicle for enhancing trust in the criminal justice system, both in China and in Taiwan. This finding was in line with Chang and Chu’s (2006) study as corruption had the most explanatory power and significant negative impact on insti- tutional trust when one used a cross-national approach. Given the nature of the police as a gatekeeper for the criminal justice system, citizens would osmotically extend their satisfaction in and support of the police to the courts and other institutions (Cao & Zhao, 2005; Ivković, 2008; Sun & Wu, 2006). Citizens who did not experience or perceive, either directly or indirectly, bribe-related incidents or did not engage in other forms of misconduct with law enforcement officials would hold greater respect for the legitimacy of policing (Kleining, 1996; Klockars, 1980), and correspondingly, this may also lead to an elevated level of trust in the criminal justice system as a whole.

These findings are not without limitations. First of all, there are limitations in the way the criminal justice system was operationalized in this study, employing only two subcomponents, the police and the courts (Packer, 1968). However, acknowledging the systems’ complexities, several scholars have noted that the criminal justice systems usually focus on two dimensions of the law, enforcement and legal authorities (Packer, 1968; Walker, 1992). Still, correctional institutions, another important sub- component of criminal justice system, are lacking. This study could not include correctional institu- tions into the model as currently that data are not available.

168 International Criminal Justice Review 25(2)

In explaining the variations in trust in criminal justice institutions, Jang, Joo, and Zhao (2010) noted, country-level variables would significantly affect individual’s perceptions of government agencies. Unfortunately, the current study was unable to control each potential and influential country-level variable that would predict different levels of trust when comparing China and Taiwan. This study could not identify whether some other contextual factors cause the Taiwanese public to possess different levels of confidence in the criminal justice system compared to their Chinese coun- terparts or vice versa. Future models should control for more country-level variables, especially homi- cide rates (Jang et al., 2010), that may have confounding effects on examined outcomes. Also, future study should consider exploring the relationship between public opinion and the criminal justice sys- tem as a whole through longitudinal approaches and the identification of latent events that may affect public trust in law enforcement and legal authorities.

Acknowledgment

Data analyzed in this article were collected by the Asian Barometer Project (2005-2008), which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Tai- wan's Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office (www.asianbarometer.org) is solely responsible for the data distribution. The views expressed herein are the authors' own. The authors appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. The White House (2008) referred to the Taiwanese democratic transition as “a beacon of democracy to Asia and the world” and Taiwan stands out as “one of the great success stories of Asia” (The White House, 2012).

2. A contemporary democratic country with a prior political history of regime transition/democratic transition includes government transitions from Fascist governments, Soviet government, Feudality or other forms of regimes to the current democracy.

3. The American policing style is democratic Anglo-Peelian policing. Casey (2010, p. 14) noted that American policing is “citizen-focused policing that combines crime control and crime prevention with a welfare and service role” and this model would lead to “significant variations in operational approaches and relations with the communities served.”

4. The prisoners of the Laogai camps are deprived of human rights, subject to cruel treatments, experience brutal violence and have high mortality rates in general (Pejan, 2000). These horrifying images of Laogai camps have been long and deeply rooted in Chinese society.

5. The Judicial Yuan is Taiwan’s highest judicial power overseeing courts and administrative courts at all levels as well as the Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries. It is responsible for the adjudication of civil, criminal, and administrative litigation, as well as the discipline of civil servants. The nature of this sur- vey is similar to another evaluation on “perceptions of the USA justice system” conducted by the American Bar Association (see The Judicial Yuan, 2013). In Taiwan, the sample size for the judicial survey is 5,243.

6. Research in China has consistently found a high marriage rate compared to the most nations in the West when examining sample demographics (Cao, 2007). Although this may raise concerns of skewed samples for some,

Hsieh and Boateng 169

the high marriage rate in this study is consistent with prior studies (Cao, 2007; Cao & Hou, 2001; Wu, 2014; Wu et al., 2012) which did not find this factor to have any impact that would bias the analysis results.

7. The intercorrelations among the independent variables were examined through zero-order correlations and there are no bivariate correlations above .7. By further examining multicollinearity, none of the Variance Infla- tion Factor (VIF) scores is above 10, which means there was no potential multicollinearity issue. Results are available upon request to the authors.

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Author Biographies

Ming-Li Hsieh is a Doctoral candidate in Criminal Justice and Criminology at Washington State University and is the Senior Research Associate of the Washington State Institute for Criminal Justice. Her research includes an examination of gender gap trends, risk assessment instruments, crime control polices and comparative policing. Her recent work has been published in Criminal Justice Policy Review.

Francis D. Boateng is a PhD candidate in the Department of Criminal Justice & Criminology at Washington State University. His most recent publications have appeared in International Criminal Justice Review-ICJS, Criminal Justice Review-CJR, Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies, and Victims & Offen- ders: An International Journal of Evidence-based Research, Policy, and Practice. His manuscripts have been scheduled to appear in International Review of Victimology, and CJR. His research interests include comparative criminal justice, comparative policing, Police legitimacy, international security, sexual assault, quantitative research, crime, law and justice. He is currently working on his dissertation, which focuses on the causes of trust and distrust in the police.

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