How network shrinks our world, blurring the lines between one another's space. Where privacy is no longer a sacred place, but a privilege.

profileMichelle_Michy
ReadingList.zip

Reading List/.DS_Store

__MACOSX/Reading List/._.DS_Store

Reading List/061 Social Media (Lovink 2012).pdf

Geert Lovink

What Is the

Social in Social

Media?

Headlines, 2012: ÒNext time youÕre hiring, forget

personality tests, just check out the applicantÕs

Facebook profile instead.Ó Ð ÒStephanie

Watanabe spent nearly four hours Thursday night

unfriending about 700 of her Facebook friends Ð

and she isnÕt done yetÓ Ð ÒFacebook apology or

jail time: Ohio man gets to chooseÓ Ð ÒStudy:

Facebook users gettingÊless friendlyÓ Ð ÒWomen

tend to have stronger feelings regarding who has

access to their personal informationÓ (Mary

Madden) Ð ÒAll dressed up and no place to goÓ

(Wall Street Journal) Ð ÒIÕm making more of an

effort to be social these days, because I donÕt

want to be alone, and I want to meet peopleÓ

(Cindy Sherman) Ð Ò30 percent posted updates

that met the American Psychiatric AssociationÕs

criteria for a symptom of depression, reporting

feelings of worthlessness or hopelessness,

insomnia or sleeping too much, and difficulty

concentratingÓ Ð Control your patients: ÒDo you

hire someone in the clinic to look at Facebook all

day?Ó Dr. Moreno asked. ÒThatÕs not practical and

borders on creepy.Ó Ð ÒHunt for Berlin police

officer pictured giving Nazi salute on FacebookÓ Ð

Ò15-year-old takes to Facebook to curse and

complain about her parents. The disgusted father

later blasts her laptop with a gun.Ó

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe use of the word ÒsocialÓ in the context

of information technology goes back to the very

beginnings of cybernetics. It later pops up in the

1980s context of Ògroupware.Ó The recent

materialist school of Friedrich Kittler and others

dismissed the use of the word ÒsocialÓ as

irrelevant fluff Ð what computers do is calculate,

they do not interfere in human relations. Holistic

hippies, on the other hand, have ignored this

cynical machine knowledge and have advanced a

positive, humanistic view that emphasizes

computers as tools for personal liberation. This

individualistic emphasis on interface design,

usability, and so on was initially matched with an

interest in the community aspect of computer

networking. Before the Òdot-comÓ venture

capitalist takeover of the field in the second half

of the 1990s, progressive computing was

primarily seen as a tool for collaboration among

people.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIn a chapter entitled ÒHow Computer

Networks Became Social,Ó Sydney media theorist

Chris Chesher maps out the historical

development of computer networks, from

sociometry and social network analysis Ð an

ÒofflineÓ science (and a field of study that goes

back to the 1930s) that examines the dynamics

of human networks Ð to GranowetterÕs theory of

the strengths of weak links in 1973, to CastellsÕs

The Network Society in 1996, to the current

mapping efforts of the techno-scientists that

gather under the umbrella of Actor Network

Theory.

1

The conceptual leap relevant here

e -

f l u

x j o

u r n

a l #

4 0

Ñ

d

e c

e m

b e

r 2

0 1

2 Ê G

e e

r t L

o v

i n

k

W h

a t I s

t h

e S

o c

i a

l i n

S

o c

i a

l M

e d

i a

?

0 1

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

Rand Corporation think tank employees brainstorming, 1958. CA, Santa Monica, US. Photo: Leonard Mccombe.

0 2

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

concerns the move from groups, lists, forums,

and communities to the emphasis on

empowering loosely connected individuals in

networks. This shift happened during the

neoliberal 1990s and was facilitated by growing

computing power, storage capacity, and internet

bandwidth, as well as easier interfaces on

smaller and smaller (mobile) devices. This is

where we enter the Empire of the Social. It must

also be said that Òthe socialÓ could only become

technical, and become so successful, after the

fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when state

communism no longer posed a (military) threat to

free-market capitalism.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIf we want to answer the question of what

the ÒsocialÓ in todayÕs Òsocial mediaÓ really

means, a starting point could be the notion of the

disappearance of the social as described by Jean

Baudrillard, the French sociologist who theorized

the changing role of the subject as consumer.

According to Baudrillard, at some point the

social lost its historical role and imploded into

the media. If the social is no longer the once

dangerous mix of politicized proletarians, of the

frustrated, unemployed, and dirty clochards that

hang out on the streets waiting for the next

opportunity to revolt under whatever banner,

then how do social elements manifest

themselves in the digital networked age?

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe Òsocial questionÓ may not have been

resolved, but for decades it felt as if it was

neutralized. In the West after World War II,

instrumental knowledge of how to manage the

social was seen as necessary, and this reduced

the intellectual range of the question to a

somewhat closed circle of professional experts.

Now, in the midst of a global economic

downturn, can we see a renaissance of the

social? Is all this talk about the rise of Òsocial

mediaÓ just a linguistic coincidence? Can we

speak, in the never-ending aftermath of the 2008

financial crisis, of a Òreturn of the socialÓ? Is

there a growing class awareness, and if so, can it

spread electronically? Despite widespread

unemployment, growing income disparities, and

the Occupy protests, it seems unlikely that we

will see a global networked uprising. Protests are

successful precisely because they are local,

despite their network presence. How can the two

separate entities of work and networked

communication connect?

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊWe can put such considerations into a

larger, strategic context that the Òsocial media

questionÓ poses. Do all these neatly

administrated contacts and address books at

some point spill over and leave the virtual realm,

as the popularity of dating sites seems to

suggest? Do we only share information,

experiences, and emotions, or do we also

conspire, as Òsocial swarms,Ó to raid reality in

order to create so-called real-world events? Will

contacts mutate into comrades? It seems that

social media solves the organizational problems

that the suburban baby-boom generation faced

fifty years ago: boredom, isolation, depression,

and desire. How do we come together, right now?

Do we unconsciously fear (or long for) the day

when our vital infrastructure breaks down and

we really need each other? Or should we read

this Simulacrum of the Social as an organized

agony over the loss of community after the

fragmentation of family, marriage, and

friendship? Why do we assemble these ever-

growing collections of contacts? Is the Other,

relabeled as Òfriend,Ó nothing more than a future

customer or business partner? What new forms

of social imaginary exist? At what point does the

administration of others mutate into something

different altogether? Will ÒfriendingÓ disappear

overnight, like so many new media-related

practices that vanished in the digital nirvana?

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe container concept Òsocial media,Ó

describing a fuzzy collection of websites like

Facebook, Digg, YouTube, Twitter, and Wikipedia,

is not a nostalgic project aimed at reviving the

once dangerous potential of Òthe social,Ó like an

angry mob that demands the end of economic

inequality. Instead, the social Ð to remain inside

BaudrillardÕs vocabulary Ð is reanimated as a

simulacrum of its own ability to create

meaningful and lasting social relations. Roaming

around in virtual global networks, we believe that

we are less and less committed to our roles in

traditional community formations such as the

family, church, and neighborhood. Historical

subjects, once defined as citizens or members of

a class possessing certain rights, have been

transformed into subjects with agency, dynamic

actors called Òusers,Ó customers who complain,

and Òprosumers.Ó The social is no longer a

reference to society Ð an insight that troubles us

theorists and critics who use empirical research

to prove that people, despite all their outward

behavior, remain firmly embedded in their

traditional, local structures.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe social no longer manifests itself

primarily as a class, movement, or mob. Neither

does it institutionalize itself anymore, as

happened during the postwar decades of the

welfare state. And even the postmodern phase of

disintegration and decay seems over. Nowadays,

the social manifests itself as a network.

Networked practices emerge outside the walls of

twentieth-century institutions, leading to a

Òcorrosion of conformity.Ó The network is the

actual shape of the social. What counts Ð for

instance, in politics and business Ð are the

Òsocial factsÓ as they present themselves

through network analysis and its corresponding

data visualizations. The institutional part of life

e -

f l u

x j o

u r n

a l #

4 0

Ñ

d

e c

e m

b e

r 2

0 1

2 Ê G

e e

r t L

o v

i n

k

W h

a t I s

t h

e S

o c

i a

l i n

S

o c

i a

l M

e d

i a

?

0 3

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

Still from the animation ÒBaby Cha-Cha.Ó The video was considered to be one of the first to go viral at the end of the 1990s.

0 4

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

is another matter, a realm that quickly falls

behind, becoming a parallel universe. It is

tempting to remain positive and portray a

synthesis, further down the road, between the

formalized power structures inside institutions

and the growing influence of informal networks.

But there is little evidence of this Third Way

approach coming to pass. The PR-driven belief

that social media will, one day, be integrated is

nothing more than New Age optimism in a time of

growing tensions over scarce resources. The

social, which used to be the glue for repairing

historical damage, can quickly turn into

unstable, explosive material. A total ban is nearly

impossible, even in authoritarian countries.

Ignoring social media as background noise also

backfires. This is why institutions, from hospitals

to universities, hire swarms of temporary

consultants to manage social media for them.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊSocial media fulfill the promise of

communication as an exchange; instead of

forbidding responses, they demand replies.

Similar to an early writing of BaudrillardÕs, social

media can be understood as Òreciprocal spaces

of speech and responseÓ that lure users to say

something, anything.

2

Later, Baudrillard changed

his position and no longer believed in the

emancipatory aspect of talking back to the

media. Restoring the symbolic exchange wasnÕt

enough Ð and this feature is precisely what

social media offer their users as an

emancipatory gesture. For the late Baudrillard,

what counted was the superior position of the

silent majority.

New York city police supply a generator so that victims of hurricane

Sandy can charge their cell phones.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIn their 2012 pamphlet Declaration, Michael

Hardt and Antonio Negri avoid discussing the

larger social dimensions of community, cohesion,

and society. What they witness is unconscious

slavery: ÒPeople sometimes strive for their

servitude as if it were their salvation.Ó

3

It is

primarily individual entitlement in social media

that interests these theorists, not the social at

large. ÒIs it possible that in their voluntary

communication and expression, in their blogging

and social media practices, people are

contributing to instead of contesting repressive

forces?Ó For us, the mediatized, work, and

leisure can no longer be separated. But what

about the equally obvious productive side of

being connected to others?

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊHardt and Negri make the mistake of

reducing social networking to a media question,

as if the internet and smartphones are only used

to look up and produce information. Concerning

the role of communication, they conclude that

Ònothing can beat the being together of bodies

and the corporeal communication that is the

basis of collective political intelligence and

action.Ó Social links are probably nothing but

fluff, a veritable world of sweet sassiness. In this

way, the true nature of social life online remains

out of sight, and thus unscrutinized. The meeting

of the social and the media doesnÕt have to be

sold as some Hegelian synthesis, a world-

historical evolution; however, the strong yet

abstract concentration of social activity on

todayÕs networked platforms is something that

needs to be theorized. Hardt and NegriÕs call to

refuse mediation will have to move further. ÒWe

need to make new truths, which can be created

by singularities in networks communicating and

being there.Ó We need both networking and

encampment. In their version of the social, Òwe

swarm like insectsÓ and act as Òa decentralized

multitude of singularities that communicates

horizontally.Ó

4

The actual power structures, and

frictions, that emerge out of this constellation

have yet to be addressed.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe search for the social online Ð it seems a

brave but ultimately unproductive project to look

for the remains of nineteenth-century European

social theory. This is what makes the Òprecarious

laborÓ debate about Marx and exploitation on

Facebook so tricky.

5

What we need to do instead

is take the process of socialization at face value

and refrain from well-meaning political

intentions (such as the ÒFacebook revolutionsÓ of

the 2011 Arab Spring and the movement of the

squares). The workings of social media are

subtle, informal, and indirect. How can we

understand the social turn in new media, beyond

good and evil, as something that is both cold and

intimate, as Israeli sociologist Eva Illouz

described it in her book Cold Intimacies?

6

Literature from the media industry and the IT

industry tends to shy away from the question

posed here. Virtues such as accessibility and

usability do not explain what people are looking

for Òout there.Ó There are similar limits to the

(professional) discourse of trust, which also tries

to bridge the informal sphere and the legal

0 5

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

0 6

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

sphere of rules and regulations.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe Òobliteration of the socialÓ has not led

to a disappearance of sociology, but it has

downgraded the importance of social theory in

critical debates. A Òweb sociologyÓ that has freed

itself of the real-virtual dichotomies, not limiting

its research scope to the Òsocial implications of

technologyÓ (such as, for example, internet

addiction), could play a critical role in developing

a better understanding of how Òclass analysisÓ

and mediatization are intertwined. As Eva Illouz

wrote to me in response to this question: ÒIf

sociology has traditionally called on us to exert

our shrewdness and vigilance in the art of

making distinctions (between use value and

exchange value; life world and colonization of the

life world, etc.), the challenge that awaits us is to

exercise the same vigilance in a social world

which consistently defeats these distinctions.Ó

7

Albert Benschop, the Amsterdam pioneer of web

sociology and editor of SocioSite.net, proposes

that we overcome the real-virtual distinction

altogether. He makes an analogy to the Thomas

theoreme, a classic theory in sociology, when he

says, ÒIf people define networks as real, they are

real in their consequences.Ó For Benschop, the

internet is not some Òsecond-hand world.Ó The

same could be said of the social. There is no

second life, with different social rules and

conventions. According to Benschop, this is why

there is, strictly speaking, no additional

discipline necessary.

8

The discussion about the

shape of the social relates to all of us; it should

not be cooked up Ð and owned Ð solely by geeks

and startup entrepreneurs. As Johan Sjerpstra

puts it:

Welcome to the social abyss. We can no

longer close our eyes for the real existing

stupidity out there. WeÕre in it all together.

Pierre Levy, please help us out: where is the

collective intelligence now that we need it?

The social is not merely the (digital) awareness of

the Other, even though the importance of Òdirect

contactÓ should not be underestimated. There

needs to be actual, real, existing interaction. This

is the main difference between old broadcast

media and the current social network paradigm.

ÒInterpassivity,Ó the concept which points at a

perceived growth of the delegation of passions

and desires to others (the outsourcing of affect)

as discussed, for instance, by Pfaller, Žižek, and

van Oenen, is a nice but harmless concept in this

(interactive) context.

9

To question the current

architectures and cultures of social media is not

to be motivated by some kind of hidden,

oppressed offline romanticist sentiment. Is there

something like a justified feeling of

overexposure, not just to information in general

but to others as well? We all need a break from

the social circus every now and then, but who

can afford to cut off ties indefinitely? In the

online context, the social requires our constant

involvement, in the form of clicking. We need to

make the actual link. Machines will not make the

vital connection for us, no matter how much we

delegate. It is no longer enough to build on your

existing social capital. What social media do is

algorithmically expand your reach Ð or at least

they promise to.

A gun integrating a 3D-printed part designed by its owner. 3D printing

is considered a ÒprosumerÓ technology expected to become

widespread in the near future.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊInstead of merely experiencing our personal

history as something that we reconcile with and

feel the need to overcome (think of family ties,

the village or suburb, school and college, church

and colleagues from work), the social is seen as

something that we are proud of, that we love to

represent and show off. Social networking is

experienced in terms of an actual potentiality: I

could contact this or that person (but I wonÕt).

From now on I will indicate my preferred brand

(even without being asked). The social is the

collective ability to imagine the connected

subjects as a temporary unity. The power of

connection is felt by many, and the simulations

of the social on websites and in graphs are not so

much secondary experiences or representations

of something real; they are probes into a post-

literate world ruled by images.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊMartin HeideggerÕs dictum ÒWe donÕt call,

we are being calledÓ runs empty here.

10

On the

internet, bots will contact you regardless, and

the status updates of others, relevant or not, will

pass before your eyes anyway. The filter failure is

real. Once inside the busy flow of social media,

the Call to Being comes from software and

invites you to reply. This is where the cool and

laid-back postmodern indifference of quasi-

subversive attitudes comes to an end. It is

e -

f l u

x j o

u r n

a l #

4 0

Ñ

d

e c

e m

b e

r 2

0 1

2 Ê G

e e

r t L

o v

i n

k

W h

a t I s

t h

e S

o c

i a

l i n

S

o c

i a

l M

e d

i a

?

0 7

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

Facebook check-in density in Manhattan. Times Square represents the highest peak on the map. Copyright: Spatial Information Design Lab, New York.

0 8

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

meaningless not to bother Ð we are not friends

anyway. Why stay on Facebook? Forget Twitter.

These are cool statements, but they are now

beside the point. The user is no longer in a Òstate

of stupor.Ó The silence of the masses that

Baudrillard spoke about has been broken. Social

media has been a clever trick to get them talking.

We have all been reactivated. The obscenity of

common opinions and the everyday prostitution

of private details is now firmly embedded in

software and in billions of users.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe example Baudrillard used was the

opinion poll, which he said undermines Òthe

authentic existence of the social.Ó Baudrillard

replaced the sad vision of the masses as an

alienated entity with an ironic and object-

centered vision. Now, thirty years deeper into the

media era, even this vision has become

internalized. In the Facebook age, surveys can be

done continuously Ð without peopleÕs direct

participation in questionnaires and the like Ð

through data mining. These algorithmic

calculations run in the background and measure

every single click, touch of the keyboard, and use

of a keyword. For Baudrillard, this Òpositive

absorption into the transparency of the

computerÓ is even worse than alienation.

11

The

public has become a database full of users. The

Òevil genius of the socialÓ has no other way to

express itself than to go back to the streets and

squares, guided and witnessed by the multitude

of viewpoints that tweeting smartphones and

recording digital cameras produce. In the same

way that Baudrillard questioned the outcome of

opinion polls as a subtle revenge of the common

people on the political/media system, we should

question the objective truth of the so-called Big

Data originating from Google, Twitter, and

Facebook. Most of the traffic on social media

originates from millions of computers talking to

each other. Active participation of ten percent of

the user base is high. These users are assisted

by an army of dutiful, hardworking software bots.

The rest are inactive accounts. This is what

object-oriented philosophy has yet come to

terms with: a critique of the useless contingency.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe social media system no longer Òplunges

us into a state of stupor,Ó as Baudrillard said of

media experience decades ago. Instead, it shows

us the way to cooler apps and other products

that elegantly make us forget yesterdayÕs flavor

of the day. We simply click, tap, and drag the

platform away, finding something else to distract

us. This is how we treat online services: we leave

them behind, if possible on abandoned

hardware. Within weeks we have forgotten the

icon, bookmark, or password. We do not have to

revolt against the media of the Web 2.0 era,

abandoning it in protest because of allegedly

intrusive privacy policies; rather, we can

confidently discard it, knowing it will eventually

join the good old HTML ghost towns of the

nineties.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊHere is Baudrillard parsing the situation

back in the old media days: ÒThis is our destiny,

subjected to opinion polls, information, publicity,

statistics: constantly confronted with the

anticipated statistical verification of our

behavior, absorbed by this permanent refraction

of our slightest movements, we are no longer

confronted with our own will.Ó He discusses the

move towards obscenity that is made in the

permanent display of oneÕs own preferences (in

our case, on social media platforms). There is a

Òredundancy of the social,Ó a Òcontinual

voyeurism of the group in relation to itself: it

must at all times know what it wants É The

social becomes obsessed with itself; through

this auto-information, this permanent auto-

intoxication.Ó

12

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe difference between the 1980s, when

Baudrillard wrote these theses, and thirty years

later can be found in the fact that all aspects of

life have opened up to the logic of opinion polls.

Not only do we have personal opinions about

every possible event, idea, or product, but these

informal judgments are also valuable to

databases and search engines. People start to

talk about products of their own accord; they no

longer need incentives from outside. Twitter goes

for the entire specter of life when it asks, ÒWhatÕs

happening?Ó Everything, even the tiniest info

spark provided by the online public, is

(potentially) relevant, ready to be earmarked as

viral and trending, destined to be data-mined

and, once stored, ready to be combined with

other details. These devices of capture are

totally indifferent to the content of what people

say Ð who cares about your views? ThatÕs

network relativism: in the end itÕs all just data,

their data, ready to be mined, recombined, and

flogged off. ÒVictor, are you still alive?Ó

13

This is

not about participation, remembrance, and

forgetting. What we transmit are the bare signals

indicating that we are still alive.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊA deconstructivist reading of social media

shouldnÕt venture, once again, to reread the

friendship discourse (Òfrom Socrates to

FacebookÓ) or to take apart the Online Self. No

matter how hard it is to resist the temptation,

theorists should shy away from their built-in

ÒinterpassiveÓ impulse to call for a break (Òbook

your offline holidayÓ). This position has played

itself out. Instead, we need cybernetics 2.0 Ð

initiatives such as a follow-up to the original

Macy conferences (1946 to 1953), but this time

with the aim of investigating the cultural logic

inside social media, inserting self-reflexivity in

code, and asking what software architectures

could be developed to radically alter the online

e -

f l u

x j o

u r n

a l #

4 0

Ñ

d

e c

e m

b e

r 2

0 1

2 Ê G

e e

r t L

o v

i n

k

W h

a t I s

t h

e S

o c

i a

l i n

S

o c

i a

l M

e d

i a

?

0 9

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

social experience. We need input from the

critical humanities and the social sciences;

these disciplines need to start a dialogue with

computer science. Are Òsoftware studiesÓ

initiatives up to such a task? Time will tell.

Digital humanities, with its one-sided emphasis

on data visualization, working with computer-

illiterate humanities scholars as innocent

victims, has so far made a bad start in this

respect. We do not need more tools; whatÕs

required are large research programs run by

technologically informed theorists that finally

put critical theory in the driverÕs seat. The

submissive attitude in the arts and humanities

towards the hard sciences and industries needs

to come to an end.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊAnd how can philosophy contribute? The

Western male self-disclosing subject no longer

needs to be taken apart and contrasted with the

liberated cyber-identity or ÒavatarÓ that roams

around the virtual game worlds. Interesting

players in the new media game can be found

across the globe, from Africa to Brazil, India, and

East Asia. For this, an IT-informed postcolonial

theory has yet to be assembled. We should look

todayÕs practices of the-social-as-electronic-

empathy right in the eyes. How do you shape and

administer your online affects? To put it in terms

of theory: we need to extend DerridaÕs

questioning of the Western subject to the non-

human agency of software (as described by

Bruno Latour and followers of his Actor Network

Theory). Only then we can get a better

understanding of the cultural policy of

aggregators, the role of search engines, and the

editing wars on Wikipedia.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊWith its emphasis on Big Data, we can read

the Òrenaissance of the socialÓ in the light of

sociology as the Òpositivist science of society.Ó

As of yet there is no critical school in sight that

could help us to properly read the social aura of

the citizen as user. The term ÒsocialÓ has

effectively been neutralized in its cynical

reduction to data porn. Reborn as a cool concept

in the media debate, the social manifests itself

neither as dissent nor as subcultural. The social

organizes the self as a techno-cultural entity, a

special effect of software, which is rendered

addictive by real-time feedback features. In the

internet context, the social is neither a reference

to the Social Question nor a hidden reminder of

socialism as a political program. The social is

precisely what it pretends to be: a calculated

opportunity in times of distributed

communication. In the end, the social turns out

to be a graph, a more or less random collection of

contacts on your screen that blabber on and on Ð

until you intervene and put your own statement

out there.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThanks to FacebookÕs simplicity, the online

experience is a deeply human experience: the

aim is to find the Other, not information. Ideally,

the Other is online, right now. Communication

works best if it is 24/7, global, mobile, fast, and

short. Most appreciated is instantaneous

exchange with ÒfriendedÓ users at chat-mode

speed. This is social media at its best. We are

invited to Òburp out the thought you have right

now Ð regardless of its quality, regardless of how

it connects to your other thoughts.Ó

14

The social

presence of young people is the default here

(according to the scholarly literature). We create

a social sculpture, and then, as we do with most

conceptual and participatory artworks, we

abandon it, leaving it to be trashed by

anonymous cleaners. This is similar to the faith

inherent in all social media: it will be

remembered as an individual experience of

online community in the post-9/11 decade. And

happily forgotten as the next distraction

consumes our perpetual present.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIt is said that social media has outgrown

virtual communities (as described by Howard

Rheingold in his 1993 book of the same name),

but who really cares about the larger historical

picture here? Many doubt whether Facebook and

Twitter, in their current manifestations as

platforms for the millions, still generate

authentic online community experiences. What

counts are the trending topics, the next platform,

and the latest apps. Silicon Valley historians will

one day explain the rise of Òsocial networking

sitesÓ out of the ashes of the dot-com crisis,

when a handful of survivors from the margins of

the e-commerce boom-and-bust reconfigured

viable concepts of the Web 1.0 era, stressing the

empowerment of the user as content producer.

The secret of Web 2.0, which kicked off in 2003,

is the combination of (free) uploads of digital

material with the ability to comment on other

peopleÕs efforts. Interactivity always consists of

these two components: action and reaction.

Chris Cree defines social media as

Òcommunication formats publishing user

generated content that allow some level of user

interaction,Ó a problematic definition that could

include most of early computer culture.

15

It is not

enough to limit social media to uploading and

self-promotion. It is the personal one-to-one

feedback and small-scale viral distribution

elements that are essential.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊAs Andrew Keen indicates in Digital Vertigo

(2012), the social in social media is first and

foremost an empty container; he adduces the

exemplary hollow platitude that says the internet

is Òbecoming the connective tissue of twenty-

first century life.Ó According to Keen, the social is

becoming a tidal wave that is flattening

everything in its path. Keen warns that we will

end up in an anti-social future, characterized by

e -

f l u

x j o

u r n

a l #

4 0

Ñ

d

e c

e m

b e

r 2

0 1

2 Ê G

e e

r t L

o v

i n

k

W h

a t I s

t h

e S

o c

i a

l i n

S

o c

i a

l M

e d

i a

?

1 0

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

the Òloneliness of the isolated man in the

connected crowd.Ó

16

Confined inside the

software cages of Facebook, Google, and their

clones, users are encouraged to reduce their

social life to ÒsharingÓ information. The self-

mediating citizen constantly broadcasts his or

her state of being to an amorphous, numb group

of Òfriends.Ó Keen is part of a growing number of

(mainly) US critics warning us of the side effects

of extensive social media use. From Sherry

TurkleÕs rant on loneliness, Nicholas CarrÕs

warnings on the loss of brain power and the

ability to concentrate, to Evgeny MorozovÕs

critique of the utopian NGO world, to Jaron

LanierÕs concern over the loss of creativity, what

unites these commentators is their avoidance of

what the social could alternatively be, were it not

defined by Facebook and Twitter. The problem

here is the disruptive nature of the social, which

returns as a revolt against an unknown and

unwanted agenda: vague, populist, radical-

Islamist, driven by good-for-nothing memes.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe Other as opportunity, channel, or

obstacle? You choose. Never has it been so easy

to Òauto-quantifyÓ oneÕs personal surroundings.

We follow our blog statistics and our Twitter

mentions, check out friends of friends on

Facebook, or go on eBay to purchase a few

hundred ÒfriendsÓ who will then ÒlikeÓ our latest

uploaded pictures and start a buzz about our

latest outfit. Listen to how Dave Winer sees the

future of news: ÒStart a river, aggregating the

feeds of the bloggers you most admire, and the

other news sources they read. Share your

sources with your readers, understanding that

almost no one is purely a source or purely a

reader. Mix it all up. Create a soup of ideas and

taste it frequently. Connect everyone thatÕs

important to you, as fast as you can, as

automatically as possible, and put the pedal to

the metal and take your foot off the brake.Ó

17

This

is how programmers these days loosely glue

everything together with code. Connect persons

to data objects to persons. ThatÕs the social

today.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ×

Geert Lovink is a Dutch-Australian media theorist and

critic. He is Professor at the European Graduate

School, Research Professor at the Hogeschool van

Amsterdam, where he is founding director of the

Institute of Network Cultures, and Associate Professor

in Media Studies (new media), University of

Amsterdam. Lovink is author of Dark Fiber (2002), My

First Recession (2003) and Zero Comments (2007). He

recently co-organized events and publications on

Wikipedia research, online video and the culture of

search. His forthcoming book investigates the rise of

Ôpopular hermeneuticsÕ inside Web 2.0, large scale

comment cultures and the shifting position of new

media (studies) inside the humanities.

e -

f l u

x j o

u r n

a l #

4 0

Ñ

d

e c

e m

b e

r 2

0 1

2 Ê G

e e

r t L

o v

i n

k

W h

a t I s

t h

e S

o c

i a

l i n

S

o c

i a

l M

e d

i a

?

1 1

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ1

Chris Chesher, ÒHow Computer

Networks Became Social,Ó in

Chris Chesher, Kate Crawford,

and Anne Dunn,ÊInternet

Transformations: Language,

Technology, Media and Power

(forthcoming from Palgrave

Macmillan in 2014).

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ2

Jean Baudrillard, ÒThe Masses:

Implosion of the Social in the

Media,ÓÊNew Literary History

16:3 (John Hopkins University

Press,Ê1985), 1.

SeeÊhttp://www.jstor.org/sta

ble/468841.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ3

All quotes here in and in the next

paragraph are from Michael

Hardt and Antonio

Negri,ÊDeclaration (New York:

Argo-Navis, 2012), 18Ð21.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ4

Ibid., 35 (both quotes).

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ5

See the exchangeÊÒThe $100bn

Facebook question: Will

capitalism survive Ôvalue

abundanceÕ?ÓÊon the nettime

email list, early March 2012.

Brian Holmes writes there in

various postings: ÒWhat I have

found very limiting in the

discourse around so-called web

2.0 is the use of MarxÕs notion of

exploitation in the strict sense,

where your labor power is

alienated into the production of

a commodity and you get an

exchange value in returnÓÉ ÒFor

years I have been dismayed by a

very common refusal to think.

The dismaying part is that itÕs

based on the work of European

historyÕs greatest political

philosopher, Karl Marx. It

consists in the assertion that

social media exploits you, that

play is labor, and that Facebook

is the new Ford Motor Co.Ó É

ÒThe Ôapparatus of capture,Õ

introduced by Deleuze and

Guattari and developed into a

veritable political economy by

the Italian Autonomists and the

Multitudes group in Paris, does

something very much like that,

though without using the

concept of exploitationÓ É

ÒSocial media do not exploit you

the way a boss does. It

emphatically _does_ sell

statistics about the ways you

and your friends and

correspondents make use of

your human faculties and

desires, to nasty corporations

that do attempt to capture your

attention, condition your

behavior and separate you from

your money. In that sense, it

does try to control you and you

do create value for it. Yet that is

not all that happens. Because

you too do something with it,

something of your own. The

dismaying thing in the theories

of playbour, etc, is that they

refuse to recognize that all of us,

in addition to being exploited

and controlled, are overflowing

sources of potentially

autonomous productive energy.

The refusal to think about this Ð

a refusal which mostly circulates

on the left, unfortunately Ð

leaves that autonomous

potential unexplored and

partially unrealized.Ó

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ6

Eva Illouz,ÊCold Intimacies: The

Making of Emotional Capitalism,

(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ7

Private email correspondence,

March 5, 2012.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ8

Albert Benschop, ÒVirtual

Communities.Ó

SeeÊhttp://www.sociosite.org

/network.php.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ9

SeeÊRobert Pfaller,ÊÄsthetik der

Interpassivit�t (Hamburg: Plilo

Fine Arts, 2008) (in German)

andÊGijs van Oenen,ÊNu even

niet! Over de interpassieve

samenleving (Amsterdam: van

Gennep, 2011) (in Dutch).

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ10

See Avital Ronell,ÊThe Telephone

Book (Lincoln, Nebraska:

University of Nebraska Press,

1989).

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ11

Jean Baudrillard, ÒThe Masses:

Implosion of the Social in the

Media,ÓÊNew Literary History,

16:3 (John Hopkins University

Press, 1985),Ê5.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ12

Ibid., 580.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ13

Standard phrase uttered by

Professor Professor, a Bavarian

character who speaks English

with a heavy German accent in

the BBC animated series ÒThe

Secret ShowÓ from 2007.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ14

SeeÊhttp://www.nytimes.com/2

012/02/25/us/25iht-currents2

5.html?_r=1.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ15

Read more

atÊhttp://successcreeations.

com/438/definition-of-social -

media/#ixzz1nJmIQl1c.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ16

Andrew Keen, Digital Vertigo

(New York: St. MartinÕs Press,

2012), 13.

ÊÊÊÊÊÊ17

SeeÊhttp://scripting.com/sto

ries/2012/02/24/whatNewsMust

Do.html.

e -

f l u

x j o

u r n

a l #

4 0

Ñ

d

e c

e m

b e

r 2

0 1

2 Ê G

e e

r t L

o v

i n

k

W h

a t I s

t h

e S

o c

i a

l i n

S

o c

i a

l M

e d

i a

?

1 2

/ 1

2

12.06.12 / 17:29:06 EST

__MACOSX/Reading List/._061 Social Media (Lovink 2012).pdf

Reading List/065 Air-Conditioned Nightmare (Scovell 2017).pdf

28 | Sight&Sound | November 2017

THE AIR-CONDITIONED NIGHTMARE The bland, sinister corporate locations used by Alan J. Pakula in his era-defining ‘paranoia trilogy’ – ‘Klute’, ‘The Parallax View’ and ‘All the President’s Men’ – perfectly capture the threats of everyday surveillance and political conspiracy in the 1970s By Adam Scovell

A man is following someone up an escalator. The space around them gleams with inhuman malevolence, as if it was designed for violence and conspiracy. Soon one of the men will be dead, yet somehow this fails to surprise us, for the building they are in is as cold and uncaring as the powers that built it. This scene is from the second entry in Alan J. Pakula’s powerful ‘paranoia trilogy’, The Parallax View (1974), a film that builds suspense by de- liberately playing on the banal malice of such spaces. Alongside Klute (1971) and All the President’s Men (1976), Pakula’s film captures the beginnings of an era in which we’re still living: the age of what can be called air-con spaces. These are the empty corporate zones that have become symbols of political underhandedness, unnerv- ing surveillance and a very secretive violence. Whether empty inner-city hotels, conference spaces filled with lonely escalators, vacant car parks or shopping malls after hours, these American spaces were the sites of the conspiracy and corruption that tainted the genuine po- litical reality of the early 1970s.

All three films deliberately play on the increased ten- sion within the country in this era. There is menace in the ordinary here, something malignant that has been brewing since the earliest provocations of the Cold War and accelerated by the assassinations that scarred American politics in the 1960s. These are the traumas in Pakula’s trilogy, a cathartic expression of concern over the political machinations deployed by US governments and organisations in this period. Yet it seems as though the very architecture itself came to define such politics, setting the blueprint for our contemporary spatial and political maladies.

Following his 1969 feature debut, The Sterile Cuckoo, Pakula began to express such concerns in Klute, an inner- city fable concerning a private detective (Donald Suther- land) and his search for a missing executive, who is connected to call-girl Bree Daniels (Jane Fonda) through several letters. Though the air-con spaces of this film are limited, they are essential in defining the contrasting worlds within the drama. The executive who ordered the investigation, Cable (Charles Cioffi), conducts a campaign of terror against the call-girl in order to hide his role in the disappearance and, crucially, this is shown to be overseen from his high-level boardroom: low-light, misty views, morally barren. The building is, in fact, 26 Church Street in Lower Manhattan and Pakula shot at the location while a much larger set of air-con spaces was RE

X F

E A

T U

R E

S (

2 )

91SIG1711264.pgs 27.09.2017 18:09 BLACK YELLOW MAGENTA CYAN

A R T

P R O

D U

C T

IO N

C L IE

N T

S U

B S

R E P R O

O P

V E R

S IO

N

T h

ri ll e r,

1

November 2017 | Sight&Sound | 29

THEY ARE OUT TO GET YOU Dustin Hoffman and Robert Redford in Alan J. Pakula’s All the President’s Men (1976, opposite), Jane Fonda in Klute (1971, top), and Warren Beatty and Anthony Zerbe in The Parallax View (1974, above)

being constructed adjacent to it, seen outside the execu- tive’s windows in this scene. Learning that these cranes were building the World Trade Centre only adds to the unnerving poignancy of Pakula’s film.

In one particularly effective moment, Cable is seen in the space listening to a revealing tape. The scene alerts the viewer to the fact that Bree’s paranoia about being secretly observed is in fact well justified. Her fears are far from delusional but part of the increasingly common re- ality of the Watergate era, a surveillance culture which haunts all three films. The camera observes the shady boardroom as Cable stands up; it then suggests he is looking down on the world below, before cutting to Bree’s homely apartment, which significantly is situated much lower down. This is the contrast – the suspicious individuals who inhabit these spaces have both a physi- cal and symbolic ability to observe all below them. As the cranes continue to build the Twin Towers over the road, Pakula captures the growing trend for such spaces, which are usually presented devoid of people, or at least large enough to disperse the people within them.

Pakula captures the ultimate air-con space in The Par- allax View, as the film’s culminating act of violence, one which defines the whole narrative, takes place in a con- ference centre. A journalist, Frady (Warren Beatty), has suspicions about the official explanation over a political candidate’s assassination in the Seattle Space Needle. He follows a trail of shady characters who lead ultimately to the so-called Parallax Organisation and to a further con- spiracy. Another assassination is due to take place in the conference centre, where a dress rehearsal is underway for a senator’s political rally. The centre is a vast and in- timidating space where men are half-seen, staring from behind curtains or from the shadows of the rafters. Even the outside of the building has a reflective, thoroughly alien quality. Pakula very deliberately frames the begin- ning of this final sequence from these dead exteriors. It’s actually a composite of two real buildings: the Central Civil West Courthouse and the Los Angeles Convention Centre – in this era Pakula was clearly spoilt for choice for potential locations.

Inside the space, the musical score dies down, making the most of the strange ambience of such places: the hum of lights, the swirl of fans, the breeze of the air-con, the drone of a vacuum cleaner somewhere deep inside the labyrinth. This is interrupted by the marching band’s practice for the evening rally in the main hall, while, behind the fanfare, men in suits are gathering in the cor- ners, haunting the corridors with an air of officialdom. They are organised, the space is theirs. When Pakula puts characters into these spaces, something curious happens. While Frady and the man he is following are on the escalator, their presence is unsettling, even incon- gruous. These spaces may possess all the usual trappings of human life but showing the facilities with only a small number of people highlights the absurdity in their scale. The rows and rows of empty tables prepared for the rally seem to underline the ultimate hollowness of the event, the senator’s voice occulted to a tape machine that rolls on even after the assassin’s bullets have ripped through his diaphragm. It is this vast scale that is ultimately the undoing of Frady, who is left scurrying in the building’s rafters and then shot after being framed for the assassi- nation, a tiny figure trapped by an immense conspiracy.

The two films lead naturally to All the President’s Men, with its dramatic rendering of the conspiracy of Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal. Interestingly, however, some- thing has changed. The fight-back against the unseen

powers threatening those who possess the information needed to bring the truth out into the open, also takes place within an air-con space: the office of the Washington Post reporters Carl Bernstein (Dustin Hoffman) and Bob Woodward (Robert Redford). But, given how important the war of information has become in this era, this shift is fitting. Much of the essential intelligence provided to the duo comes from secretive meetings conducted in an empty underground car park, lit with icy blue strip-lights that render the anonymous source a shadow. What is es- sential about Pakula’s use of this space is the way it helps to build tension, finding the thrilling in what is essen- tially mundane. Far from making these meetings safer, their quietude racks up the tension, making every sound and every element potentially malevolent.

The film opens with a perfect embodiment of the air- con space, the Democratic headquarters in the Water- gate building during the break-in, showing the moment when the trail of conspiracy first becomes evident. The office feels eerie as the five burglars make their way along the carpeted corridors, furnished with everyday corporate fittings and objects. The mundanity of such spaces is essential; their blandness seems harmless but is often anything but. The ubiquitous surveillance poten- tial identified in these films merges fiction and reality, capturing the spirit of the age. In the same year The Paral- lax View was released, Francis Ford Coppola defined this feeling of being permanently observed in The Conversa- tion (1974), a film full of windows hiding telescopes and audio-surveillance equipment. The architecture of this period seems purpose-built for surveillance, places that expose anyone ignorant of the reality of covert activities. Even Scorpio (Andy Robinson), the manic killer from Don Siegel’s Dirty Harry (1971), finds potential in the anonymity and surveillance opportunities of

91SIG1711265.pgs 27.09.2017 18:09 BLACK YELLOW MAGENTA CYAN

A R T

P R O

D U

C T

IO N

C L IE

N T

S U

B S

R E P R O

O P

V E R

S IO

N

T h

ri ll e r,

2

30 | Sight&Sound | November 2017

THE PARANOIA TRILOGYALAN J. PAKULA

these buildings, making his first killing from one of their rooftops. They favour psychopaths and

madmen, official or otherwise. Modernity is now defined by these air-con spaces, and

the events that happen within them become increasing- ly surreal. They are spaces in which Christopher Walken can literally fly through the air, as in Spike Jonze’s video for Fatboy Slim’s ‘Weapon of Choice’ (2001); the lobby of the L.A. Hotel vacant, allowing such a strange scenario to seem almost natural. Such spaces have become the norm, even in Europe, where designs have been import- ed from America. J.G. Ballard brilliantly examined this transition, in his last period of writing around the turn of the millennium. Though his earlier fiction seemed to be defined by such spaces literally degrading the moral- ity of their many occupants à la Crash (1973) and High- Rise (1975), his later novels bask in the violent potential of the newly gleaming corporate spaces. This comes to a head in his novel Super-Cannes (2000), in which the conference centre aesthetic has created such boredom for their middle-class occupants that they have reverted to extreme, racial violence as a form of release. In novels such as Cocaine Nights (1996) and Kingdom Come (2006), air-con spaces become surreal backdrops for middle- class terrorism and consumer fascism. Even the BFI Southbank becomes an air-con space for Ballard in Mil- lennium People (2003), the NFT 3 cinema now a place of unfolding psychological terrorism with its thin carpets and empty sofas.

Ballard was building on Pakula’s vision of such para- noid spaces – and as London is increasingly turned into

one vast air-con space taken over by empty luxury flats, huge shopping centres and conference centres, Pakula’s trilogy appears more and more prophetic in its warn- ing of the dangers of the corporatisation of space. This danger was also hinted at in Mike Leigh’s Naked (1993), when Johnny (David Thewlis) talks his way into an empty corporate high-rise and ventures through its cor- ridors with the night-watchman Brian (Peter Wight). Johnny seems even more manic in this space than in the rest of film, reverting to conspiracy and paranoia as he predicts the end of the world at the birth of the new mil- lennium. His delusions almost ring true – not because of any sense of compelling argument but because he is stating them in the empty air-con space of the tower block: the apocalyptic and the banal here sit incredibly comfortably together.

Such spaces breed paranoia and hidden malevolence – the assassination of a politician, the surveillance of a call-girl or a politically unscrupulous break-in – making these films both unnerving and thrilling. Arguably, it is because these spaces still dominate our modern world that the trilogy has aged so well. We are undoubtedly living in their shadow, now simply ghosts on closed cir- cuit TV, forever observed by persons unknown.

i � Pakula’s�‘paranoia�trilogy’�plays�at�BFI�Southbank,�

London,�in�October�and�November�as�part�of�the�

‘Who�Can�You�Trust?’�season�of�thrillers.�A�BFI�

Compendium�book�to�accompany�the�season,�with�

essays�by�Lee�Child,�Jake�Arnott,�Sarah�Weinman�

and�others,�is�available�from�the�BFI�Shop,�Amazon�

and�book�shops,�priced�£18.99

Such spaces breed paranoia and hidden malevolence – the assassination of a politician, the surveillance of a call-girl or a politically unscrupulous break-in

Charles�Cioffi’s�villain�appears�to�be�omniscient�as�he�sits�in�his�office,�as�if�he�has�a�god-like�ability�to�observe�Jane�Fonda’s�call-girl�in�her�flat�far�below

The�vast�conference�centre�at�the�film’s�close�suggests�a�near�inhuman�scale,�with�shadowy�figures�who�frame�Warren�Beatty’s�journalist�in�an�immense�conspiracy�

The�film�opens�in�the�air-conditioned�corridors�of�the�Democratic�headquarters�in�the�Watergate�building,�as�the�five�burglers�are�disturbed�mid�break-in

KLUTE

THE�PARALLAX�VIEW

ALL�THE�PRESIDENT’S�MEN

91SIG1711266.pgs 27.09.2017 18:45 BLACK YELLOW MAGENTA CYAN

A R T

P R O

D U

C T

IO N

C L IE

N T

S U

B S

R E P R O

O P

V E R

S IO

N

T h

ri ll e r,

3

Copyright of Sight & Sound is the property of British Film Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

__MACOSX/Reading List/._065 Air-Conditioned Nightmare (Scovell 2017).pdf

Reading List/064 Visualising Social Patterns (Krebs 2010).pdf

__MACOSX/Reading List/._064 Visualising Social Patterns (Krebs 2010).pdf

Reading List/062 Interaction Design (Murray 2012).pdf

__MACOSX/Reading List/._062 Interaction Design (Murray 2012).pdf

Reading List/063 Internet Ugly Aesthetic (Douglas 2014) (1).pdf

journal of visual culture

journal of visual culture [http://vcu.sagepub.com] SAGE Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Copyright © The Author(s), 2014. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalspermissions.nav Vol 13(3): 314 –339 DOI 10.1177/1470412914544516

It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit: The Internet Ugly Aesthetic

Nick Douglas

544516VCU0010.1177/1470412914544516Journal of Visual CultureDouglas research-article2014

Abstract The internet has long-term aesthetic trends, one of which is Internet Ugly, a previously unnamed style that runs through many separate pieces of online culture, but especially through memetic content. Internet Ugly can be created by amateurs without specific aesthetic intention, or by creators choosing it intentionally as a dialect. It spreads on the internet thanks to the medium’s unique bottom- up architecture. Many memes (and many specific creators’ bodies of work) begin in Internet Ugly but evolve away from it. Long- abandoned forms of Internet Ugly can reappear on new platforms or from referential creators. While the style can be co-opted by corporate and political interests and sold back to many of its consumers, its core practitioners often respond to such exploitation with public outcry, or simply drop the co-opted version of the style for a new one. Internet Ugly embodies core values of many online creators and communities; therefore, understanding this aesthetic is crucial to any study of online culture.

Keywords 4chan • democratization • memetics • New Aesthetic • photo manipulation • Reddit • trollpunk • user-generated content

What Is Internet Ugly?

There’s a definable aesthetic running through meme culture, a celebration of the sloppy and the amateurish. It is eclectic and contains many visual genres. Its major techniques over time have included freehand mouse

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 315

drawing, digital puppetry, scanned drawings, poor grammar and spelling,1 human-made glitches, and rough photo manipulation. All of these techniques show up in multiple well-known memes, often in combination. While these tools are mostly computer-specific, the look they create is not at all like the New Aesthetic, which uses QR codes, pixellation, and machine-readable images to reinterpret the physical world through the eyes of computers. Internet Ugly is nearly the opposite, an imposition of messy humanity upon an online world of smooth gradients, blemish-correcting Photoshop, and AutoCorrect. It exploits tools meant to smooth and beautify, using them to muss and distort. It’s much closer to ‘trollpunk’, defined by internet- culture analyst Adrian Chen (2013) as a ‘movement focused on the drama that occurs when you fuck shit up on the internet’, but it’s found in plenty of non-trolling culture. And it creates its own standard of beauty counter to, but not exactly reversing, the mainstream values of symmetry and purity. Even when cleverly imitated by those with skill, it expresses an authenticity. Rather than a genre, it’s a cultural dialect, used not just to frame certain propositional content but to communicate things about its user, and as such it has users who can code-switch but are distinct from users who cannot naturally speak the dialect (Wallace, 2001).

Internet Ugly, although not the only core aesthetic of the internet, is the one that best defines the internet against all other media. It is certainly the core aesthetic of memetic internet content. The ugliness of the amateur internet doesn’t destroy its credibility because it’s a byproduct of the medium’s advantages (speed and lack of gatekeepers), and even its visual accidents are prized by its most avid users and creators. As opposed to media like TV or print, where the amateurish is marginalized and audience attention centers on mainstream blockbusters, the internet is built to give outsized attention to the amateurish, the accidental, and the surprise hit. Creators with no traditional skill or talent often become online celebrities for their work, and creators with skill or talent often suppress their abilities or manufacture amateurish conditions to better achieve the Internet Ugly aesthetic. But as we’ll see, such work isn’t simple cooption but a creative choice accepted and celebrated by the online audience – so long as it still retains a certain authenticity.

The aesthetic isn’t practiced by a single defined school, but it develops in certain large incubators built to encourage amateur contribution, or ‘user generated content’. For most of the last decade, the best known source of such work was 4chan (birthplace of LOLcats and rage comics), which lets users be not just pseudonymous, but absolutely, no-telling-if-you’re- replying-to-your-own-post anonymous. Every thread is deleted within days or sometimes minutes; these constantly-disappearing pages encourage rapid iteration of ideas. Users frequently make quick-and-dirty cut-and-paste photo manipulation as conversational volleys. But these images are rarely sophisticated – polish your reply in Photoshop for an hour and the thread might be done before you are.

316 journal of visual culture 13(3)

Over the past half-decade, 4chan has been replaced in influence by Reddit, a much more organized and permanent forum with over 15 million unique visitors per month. Reddit keeps permanent archives and usernames, it’s organized into topical ‘subreddits’, and its voting system rewards effort and promotes crowd-pleasing content, all of which diminish Internet Ugly. But quick visual responses still have a significant advantage. More importantly, the site has an anti-authoritarian culture that invites parody, a genre that always leans grotesque. (Several subreddits archive notable 4chan threads, calcifying their memetic content but raising the chance of future discovery and reiteration.)

The blogging platform Tumblr is becoming nearly as influential as Reddit; its reblog system rewards iteration on others’ work, and its culture is heavy with fandoms, whose original fan art ranges from professional to stick- figure. Major aggregating sites like FunnyJunk, the Cheezburger network, BuzzFeed, and 9GAG occasionally start memes but mostly spread them to a wider population for further iteration. Another layer of thousands of bottom-feeder blogs re-aggregate these memes, dig up instances not previously caught by their major competitors, and are later aggregated in return. The aggregation process favors ugly by emphasizing quantity over quality and leaning on failure-based (or ‘FAIL’) content. All of these sites run on user-generated content (taking pains to lower the bar for participation) and frequent posting, two ways to skew content uglier.2 Some major user- generated-content sites are not Internet Ugly incubators: Pinterest, while memetic, promotes a middle-class home-catalog aesthetic. Vimeo targets professionals and ‘artists’ rather than webcam vloggers and TV-clip uploaders, and its lack of ‘suggested videos’ prevents memetic iteration. Such sites, while filled with content by users and not a staff, are built to celebrate professional content. In general, Internet Ugly is an amateur- driven aesthetic.

Although the internet continually matures and offers slicker tools to make amateur work look professional, users will always reach beyond their technological capabilities. If, for example, software eventually enables any user to create original, professional-looking freehand sketches, some user will misuse it to create a freshly ugly kind of image. Someone else will use a different tool to vandalize the beautiful freehand sketches. Others will share amateurish sketches on platforms that don’t support the software. As you’ll see, much of Internet Ugly culture has already evolved this way. So long as some creators have more ideas than capabilities, there will always be an Internet Ugly.

Examples of Internet Ugly

To define the tools and the boundaries of Internet Ugly, I’ll analyze some specific examples. While the aesthetic can be traced back to the first images created online (including ASCII art from the pre-browser era), I’d like to focus on the last half-decade, after the explosion of

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 317

social tools brought user-generated content to the front of the average internet user’s experience. We’ll see several uses of Internet Ugly: to democratize participation (as in Rage Comics and Snapchat), to give creators an excuse to practice their craft (as in Shitty_Watercolour), to innocently parody (as in the Shitty Network), to more critically satirize (as in the Bazinga comics), and to celebrate ugliness as authenticity (as in ‘Nailed It’). Because Internet Ugly can apply to content at every scale, these examples range from a platform with millions of users to a single Reddit account. Together, they help us understand why memetic culture so often works in the Internet Ugly mode, and how the aesthetic evolves as each incarnation matures.

1. Rage Comics

There’s a certain canon of ur-memes that became idioms, characteristic modes of expression used by thousands or millions of amateur creators.3 The most successful – the formats so identified with ‘memes’ that grandmothers and advertisers recognize them as such – include LOLcats, Advice Animals, and rage comics. Of these, rage comics are the easiest way to demonstrate Internet Ugly (see Figures 1–3).

The style is easily reproducible: stick figures, crudely drawn faces, cut-and-paste characters that anyone can slap a story onto, maybe with some original freehand sketches. The first rage comics (born on 4chan in 2008, near the height of that site’s influence), were four-panel strips ending in the same face screaming ‘FFFFUUUU-’. But once people got used to telling relatable stories with stick figures and copy-pasted faces, they expanded the form as far as possible. By 2011, 4chan and Reddit (specifically the subreddit /r/fffffffuuuuuuuuuuuu) were full of rage comics of all lengths and endings, and pure four-panel ‘FFFUUUU-’ strips were relegated to places like /r/classicrage. Several generators popped up, letting people create elaborate comics in their browsers.

The appeal is obvious: Everyone likes to tell personal stories (especially frustrations), comics are an engaging format for these stories, and the always-growing range of stock faces makes it increasingly unnecessary for the user to draw a single figure himself. The major faces form a pantheon of emotional archetypes. In 2011, an English instructor at a Japanese university had his students make rage comics as a teaching tool, citing their universal expressiveness, and created /r/EFLcomics to show his students’ work (Know Your Meme, 2013). These comics, written in beginner’s English and dramatically reinterpreting the stock drawings, doubled the corruption of communication. Reddit loved it, and other teachers noticed and joined in. Several students submitted their own work and pleasantly discussed them with the Reddit commenters (who helpfully corrected their grammar). The EFL comic below uses the traditional ‘[X] all the [Y]’ face (Know Your Meme, 2012: taken from the Internet Ugly webcomic Hyperbole and a Half, see Brosh, 2013) to indicate triumph (see Figure 4). The subreddit eventually limited submissions to certain approved users, thanks to English-fluent trolls submitting fakes. Such fakes are still authentically Internet Ugly, and, bonus, they’re trollpunk.

318 journal of visual culture 13(3)

Further layers of corruption depend on fluency in Internet Ugly. True connoisseurs will find themselves, when in the course of research, cackling at inanity like this gallery of alternate troll faces known as ‘Coaxed into a Snafu’ (see Figure 5; Caldwell and user El Ricardo, 2012–2014). This is the clearest example of how Internet Ugly contrasts with the New Aesthetic: while the latter explores how computers break down reality through pixellation and programming code, the former shows how humans corrupt ideas through imperfect reproduction. Internet Ugly could be seen as a reaction to the naturally occurring instances of the New Aesthetic. In an environment where information can easily be perfectly cut and pasted, users celebrate their human inability to make the same thing twice. These intentionally terrible rage faces express the separation of humans from machines as strongly as the analog beauty of an oil painting. (As I’ll explore later, the two approaches can be combined for a sweet-and-sour effect.)

The stick-figure, scrawled-in-MS-Paint style isn’t limited to Rage Comics. It’s a major strain of Internet Ugly that dominates Stoner Comics, Inglip,

Figure 1 Waiter Rage, a typical four-panel ‘classic rage’ ending with the original rage face. The portrayed experience is widely relatable and non- specific, which was as necessary for early rage comics as seasonal words are for haiku, in contrast to the ‘personal story’ mode now in vogue. Note the white background left in the stock photo of the plate of food, which could have been easily erased, but was left in to subtly emphasize the ‘minimal effort’ aesthetic. URL: Note the white background left in the stock photo of the plate of food, which could have easily been erased. To leave it in is to say, ‘you get the point’. It shows that the creator is giving the minimal information needed to tell the story. http://www.reddit.com/r/ classicrage/comments/ipzui/waiter_rage/

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 319

Figure 2 Published as ‘Forever Alone, but Rich’. Typical of ‘personal story’ comics that quickly overran the initial ‘relatable moment’ comics and now comprise almost all non-classic-format rages. The phrase ‘Aww yeahhh’ is ironically borrowed from a different rage face but placed next to ‘Forever Alone’, implying that the authors are aware their date decision was questionable. URL: http://ragecollection.com/508

320 journal of visual culture 13(3)

Breaking Bad Comics, Dolan, Spoderman, Behind the GIFs, Troll Physics, Delicious Cake, Hyperbole and a Half, and many other memes that deserve further research.4

2. Shitty_Watercolour

Internet Ugly is not just a way to let anyone participate in a meme. It’s even found in single-user internet phenomena. For example, in 2012, a Reddit user named Shitty_Watercolour (2013) started illustrating people’s comments and photos, starting with a comically bloated but recognizable Geordi La Forge

Figure 3 Another example of Troll Face, a trickster character who later got his own genre, ‘Troll Physics’. While every face here is pre-fabricated, the restaurant owner and ‘Mother of God’ figures are from a later, more slickly drawn generation than the rest, adding to the sloppy collage effect. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/fffffffuuuuuuuuuuuu/comments/ulv1d/this_kid_ is_a_genius/

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 321

(see Figure 6). The specific hilarity of this failed likeness became a constant goal, achieved with a specific process. Each painting took 20 minutes. Rather than letting each layer dry before applying the next, he took ‘one shot at doing it all in one go’ (Alfonso, 2012). He chose speed over quality. He was quickly rewarded with attention and praise on Reddit, and his work was widely covered on sites like BuzzFeed, the Daily Dot, the Huffington Post, and Wired (Pseudonym Shitty Watercolour, 2012). Shitty once battled with ShittierWatercolor, a user apparently drawing on an iPad (see Figure 7).

While Shitty’s version of Internet Ugly came from a non-computerized medium, Shittier’s sloppy use of a software tool – even one with beautifying features like fingertip input and varying opacity – was a more textbook example of Internet Ugly.

Two years later, Shitty’s work is no longer shitty, which he attributes partly to the constant practice on Reddit (User Shitty Watercolour, 2013). He’s become a very talented cartoonist, as shown in this early 2014 painting of pop star Lorde as a sloth (see Figure 8).

Thus Shitty_Watercolour, by embracing Internet Ugly, has practiced until he evolved out of it. As we’ll see, even when a meme is built by a group rather than an individual, it can cast off its Ugly component, often without losing its appeal to the original audience.

Figure 4 ‘Careless Girl’. The broom in panel 2 and the tossed-on hair in panels 1 and 2 drive home the symbolic, barely representational nature of these comics, while the hand-drawn bus handholds in panels 2 and 3 show some unusual attention to scenery. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/ EFLcomics/comments/letv1/careless_girl/

322 journal of visual culture 13(3)

Figure 5 Many other popular rage faces have been similarly corrupted. URL: http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/coaxed-into-a-snafu

Figure 6 From Shitty’s first day of Reddit watercolors. He claims he has only progressed as a cartoonist and is still terrible at realism. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/pics/comments/ psdgo/happy_birthday_you_magnificent_bastard/c3rx3eo

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 323

Figure 8 Shitty likes to draw people as sloths. He’s also a moderator on /r/sloths. URL: http:// www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1sydlx/ hey_im_lorde_ama/ce2giny

Figure 7 Shitty_Watercolour and ShittierWatercolor compete to fail to depict the half-sunken Costa Concordia. Out of context, the results seem abstract. Both accounts drew even more mangled versions, then switched to drawing penises and friendly insults. This is a typical exchange between Reddit novelty accounts. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/pics/comments/ pvgoo/my_friends_dad_was_flying_out_of_rome_and_snapped/c3sl20q

324 journal of visual culture 13(3)

3. The Shitty Network

On Reddit, anyone can create a subreddit, and many of these are actively opposed to each other. There are parody subreddits (some goofy, some vitriolic) and parodies of parody subreddits and so on – a real Bakhtinian carnival. There are organized networks of parody subreddits, like The Shitty Network, which collects subreddits like /r/ShittyPoetry, /r/ShittyRageComics, /r/ShittyWallpapers, and /r/ShittyEarthPorn (Reddit, 2012–2014). From the last of those comes a post, ‘Beautiful Sunset Outside My Door This Morning’ (see Figure 9), a breathless Instagram-ready title that technically does not describe the anything-but-breathtaking photo above. The photo looks like (and maybe was) an accidental shot, made while fumbling with a phone..

Shitty Network image posts are often captioned with ironic braggadocio or false false modesty. One /r/ShittyWallpapers entry came with the description:

these are some of my custom movie walpapers please feel free to use them yes i did make them myself no i am not getting payed to do this i do it in my free time. i take requests as well they are all in 1024x768

Figure 9 Commenters noted that a morning sunset is indeed quite a rarity. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/ ShittyEarthPorn/comments/spgbu/beautiful _sunset_outside_my_door_this_morning/

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 325

as that is what most pc moniters are. please let me know if you want to use them. (User Fealiks, 2013)

It contained images like this Sean of the Dead wallpaper (see Figure 10). Here we see intentionally poor use of computer-only tools: an image has been stretched into the wrong aspect ratio, saved at the wrong canvas size leaving blank space, and captioned with an arbitrary title placed at random over Simon Pegg’s face in inappropriate font in a color that gets lost in the image. The creator has put painstaking attention into imitating a total lack of attention. The submission text typifies ‘nailed it’- style humor, which exploits the gap between intentions (or self-image) and reality.

4. Nailed It

‘Nailed It’, aka ‘Expectations vs. Reality,’ is its own meme format. Each ‘Nailed It’ image compares an intended result to an actual one (see Figure 11). Many ‘Nailed It’ images are framed as failed recreations of images from Pinterest (a site where an older, female-skewed userbase makes aspirational ‘inspiration boards’ of magazine-ready photos of beautiful products, crafts, and meals). The more beautiful parts of the internet are thus cast as less real than the parts where people are an incompetent embarrassing mess. The difference in photo quality between the two halves of any ‘Nailed It’ image drives this home: beauty is only captured with careful lighting and expensive cameras, but any idiot with a smartphone can capture reality. This message is explicitly reinforced by comparisons of images before and after dramatic Photoshop touchups. Such comparisons often go viral, and only rarely originate outside the internet.

Figure 10 The original image includes faux-unintentional white space. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/ Shittywallpapers/comments/19vue0/ these_are_some_of_my_custom_ movie_walpapers/

326 journal of visual culture 13(3)

Figure 11 Three popular ‘Nailed It’ images sum up the human condition. The cupcakes seem like a good-faith effort, while the duct-taped crayons were clearly the work of a child or an intentional satirist. The third image shows not just a human failure but even nature’s failure to provide gleaming blue water and a glowing sky. Even natural beauty is artifice. URL: http://www.smosh. com/smosh-pit/photos/21-hilarious-nailed-its — http://knowyourmeme.com/ memes/nailed-it — http://www.quickmeme.com/meme/3r0mut

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 327

‘Nailed It’ achieves a major goal of Internet Ugly: to normalize imperfection, counteracting the effect of magazines, TV shows, and corporate websites that use technical tools to build an unattainable simulacrum of the world. As consumer brands expand their social media marketing, especially the discounted marketing of social media profiles on sites like Facebook and Twitter, they try to co-opt memes while retaining a level of on-brand polish. This tends to work fine with casual users, but it often alienates the core creators of Internet Ugly content. Memes invented by corporate advertisers are rarely built in the mode of Internet Ugly. More on corporate meme use later.

5. Bazinga Comics

4chan’s ‘Big Bang Theory’ comics aren’t an especially popular meme. But they’re a perfect example of people using computer tools to create the human expressions of Internet Ugly.

The comics parody CBS sitcom The Big Bang Theory and main character Sheldon Cooper’s catchphrase, ‘Bazinga’. Like parody comic ‘Garfield Minus Garfield’ and Twitter account @Seinfeld2000, the Bazinga comics subvert formulaic popular comedy by replacing its central elements with absurdity (see Figures 12, 13).5

The copy-paste jobs and sloppy resizings here are a ‘fuck you’ to traditional standards of photomanipulation. Like datamoshing or glitch art, they draw attention to inaccuracies in reproduction or transmission, but instead of emphasizing machine imperfections, they emphasize human messiness. These techniques show up in the New Aesthetic, but here they aren’t used to comment on machine vision. They’re used for expressing a very human attitude about a very human creation.6

These aesthetic choices effectively critique the bland, safe formulas of their subject. They rip Sheldon and his fellow characters out of their original context and refuse to provide a sensible new one. The Sheldon of these

Figure 12 Deleting the system32 folder will render Windows unusable. Sheldon’s advice is identical to a typical low-effort, but occasionally high- reward trolling response given to anyone seeking tech support on 4chan. URL: http://imgur.com/a/qVX7b

328 journal of visual culture 13(3)

comics exists in his own universe, where he is a cackling Loki figure with powers of body manipulation and a new catchphrase for every episode.

‘Bazinga’ corruptions not shown here include ‘bronchitis’, ‘zambingo’, ‘hydrangea’, ‘bedwangles’, ‘pop-a-squat’, ‘banana’, ‘bruschetta’, ‘bartsimpson’, ‘genocide’, ‘bilbo baggins’, ‘gimbaza’, ‘monorail’, ‘souvlaki’, ‘crabapple’, ‘salamy’, ‘balogna’, ‘jumanji’, ‘bukkake’ (this one actually related to the unsavory comic it ends), ‘blopckgzor’, ‘bazzango’, and ‘cowabazunga’. Each of these is formatted in a different text style. The written dialect mimics the visual aesthetic: everything is unsettlingly mutable and contextless. While there are definable rules for making one of these comics, they can’t be traced back to The Big Bang Theory, or to nearly any source outside the earlier comics. These comics speak their own idiolect.

6. Snapchat

Snapchat is harder to analyze memetically, since it’s even more ephemeral than 4chan – each image is only visible to a handful of people for 1 to 10 seconds. The images that users screencap and publish are a non-

Figure 13 A snaking chain of copy-pasted heads is common for online trickster characters; another characteristic is wavy, impossibly looping arms. Penny’s eyes and mouth are swapped for no apparent reason beyond added chaos. URL: http://imgur.com/a/qVX7b

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 329

representative sample. Much more so are the ones that make it through the churn of blog aggregation. But a rough sample of photo lists and slideshows still reveals a celebration of ugly (see Figure 14).

Snapchat photos are firmly in the ‘reality’ half of the ‘Nailed It’ dichotomy. They’re popular because their ugliness is relatable and replicable. They’re Pinterest inspiration boards for the rest of us.

Despite its anti-memetic self-destruction feature, Snapchat is possibly the simplest, most effective meme-creator yet, and everything that makes it ephemeral encourages a lack of care, slickness, or beauty without actually preventing images from leaking to the rest of the internet. The creators advertise the app with magazine-ready pictures of beautiful young people partying at the beach, but there are already better apps for such photos. Pretty vacation pictures go on Instagram and Facebook where you can show your mom and scroll through them years later; a throwaway gross-face contest goes on Snapchat. We can only see the cream of strangers’ Snapchat exchanges, but the ones we don’t see are micromemes that disappear minutes after their inception.

Causes of Internet Ugly

The democratizing force of the internet is by now an accepted truism. But it’s important to note that previously, when someone had an idea they couldn’t elegantly execute, they were usually left without an audience. The near-zero production and distribution cost of the internet removes the

Figure 14 It’s typical to find the same memetic images with multiple sites’ watermarks, often overlapping on the same copy. ‘Fresh out of the shower’ is a parody of more earnest selfies taken by many young women. Each image was posted in a collection despite, or even because of, its aesthetic amateurishness. URL: http://www.brainwreck.com/lists/556/17-Pics-That- Prove-Snapchat-Is-Really-Dumb-But-Also-The-Best-App-Ever/3 — http:// sneaky-snaps.com/fresh-out-of-the-shower-no-make-up-funny-snapchats/ — http://izismile.com/2013/11/18/daily_picdump_99_pics.html

330 journal of visual culture 13(3)

barrier. Someone with a very clever idea for a comic strip can successfully spread that comic strip without a single editor deeming the art worthy. Rage Comics would never find first publication in a newspaper or on TV. So the most basic cause of Internet Ugly is that unpolished executions of good ideas can now be seen by millions.

The second cause begins with another banal truth: in addition to being a broadcast tool, the internet is home to many forms of one-to-one and small-group communications. But with few exceptions, anything created in those small groups is easily shared with different groups or the internet at large. (For example, thousands of private chats and Facebook threads are posted publicly to Reddit and Tumblr every day.) The obvious effect is that the former chaff of communication can go viral. The less obvious effect is that content previously classifiable as an unpublishable draft (a half-drawn portrait, an unshot script, doodles, 30 seconds of a song, a game with glitches) is now viable for publication. Take, for example, the fandom that sprang up in January 2014 around three color drawings from an imagined cartoon called ‘Miss Officer and Mr. Truffles’ (Ami, 2011–2014). In under a week, fans made hundreds of pieces of fan art, fanfiction, fanimation, imagined plotlines, scenes, backstory, supporting characters, theme music, audition videos, and cosplay for a cartoon that at that point didn’t actually exist. A good idea doesn’t need to be in its final draft to take off; it can still be a rough sketch. Like Rebecca Black’s ‘Friday,’ it can be something only intended for a small, forgiving audience (see Larsen, 2013) – or, in the case of Star Wars Kid (Bennett, 2010) intended for no audience. It can still be ugly. But the draft can still be treated as a draft – and in further iterations, it may shed its ugliness.

How Ugly Changes, Disappears, and Returns

As any meme grows, it may spread to more unfamiliar amateurs who uglify it. But it will also eventually reach participants with talent, time, and a love of beauty. Illustrator Sam Spratt, for example, painted elegant ‘photorealistic’ renditions of the most popular rage faces (see Figure 15). In his piece, titled ‘The Art of Internet Memes’, he retained the cartoonish features, adding baggy eyes, rough teeth, spittle and wrinkles. The effect is deliciously ugly.

Almost every popular meme has at one point been illustrated with care and talent. Others that rely on original drawings, like SFW Porn (Porn SFW 2008–2011) – where users paint over the naked bodies of porn actors so that a man is, say, simply holding a bottle of soda at waist height for two thirsty women – were first drawn by amateurs, then later iterated by talented artists. The amount of sheer effort and talent that went into such iterations was seen as a joke in itself. A novelty Reddit account called HandDrawnRage (2011–2013) earned wide praise on /r/classicrage for drawing charming original cartoons that followed the original rage comic format but looked slick, often even colored or shaded.

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 331

Memes can also go through a larger shift that affects even the most amateurish iterations. The baseline aesthetic for a meme can improve as technologies are crafted for a specific expression. For example, the standardized image macros known as Advice Animals or Advice Memes began in 2006 with Advice Dog, a choppily cropped puppy head thrown onto a color-wheel background (Kim and Caldwell, 2011). Different iterations of Advice Dog used different fonts, effects, and text placements. The next several advice animals similarly displayed non-standardized text, sloppy crop jobs, and rough color-wheel backgrounds. But over the next three years, new advice animals became more sophisticated. The popular meme Courage Wolf was redesigned with a higher-quality, better-cropped copy of the original wolf face and a flashier backdrop (see Figure 16).

In 2009, Meme Generator (2009–2014) launched, making Advice Animal generation extremely simple for non-Photoshop users, and locking in the aesthetic by setting default text for new memes: centered all-caps white Impact type with a feathered black border, placed comfortably below the top and bottom edges of the image. (Other than the feathering, this was already the dominant formatting for advice animals, likely inherited from older macros like LOLcats.) Competitors like Quickmeme (2011–2014) adopted the same standards, and for the past three years advice memes have been as visually clean and uniform as Facebook pages. (Meanwhile, the content has devolved into personal stories and cliché – the downside of a meme going mainstream.)

The same standardization (a zen-like beautification that deletes imperfections) happens to major internet idioms. Sometimes the change is cultural, as when MySpace’s colorful but chaotic customized user pages were replaced by the whitewashed nested boxes of Facebook. Usually the changes are the simple result of technological improvements: text- heavy flat-color blog designs were replaced by gorgeous gradient-filled Tumblr themes. Typical YouTube uploads went from 240p to 720p or even 1080p – sharper than HDTV, and with ever-improving camerawork and postproduction. The GIF image format, responsible for grainy spinning ‘email us’ envelopes and animated under-construction workers, is now used for high-resolution TV and film clips. Reddit’s /r/highqualitygifs collects massive beautiful animated GIFs, and Vimeo uses the format for video thumbnails. Photographer Jamie Beck and designer Kevin Burg co-created a genre of beautiful, cinematic GIFs called ‘cinemagraphs’ (see Flock, 2011).

But new technologies, especially new platforms, can also revert the norms of beauty to ones from years ago. Most obviously, the mobile internet has yanked us back into the world of tiny screens and awkward inputs. Games like Draw Something revived the MS Paint aesthetic. Snapchat revived sloppy photography just when Instagram had nearly filtered the whole human experience into identically beautiful sunkissed Polaroids. For millions of photo sharers, Snapchat made ugly cool again.

332 journal of visual culture 13(3)

Machinima (animation made within video game environments) similarly rebooted computer animation by letting amateurs play with tools previously only available to professionals. Much machinima is made in officially-released ‘sandbox’ versions of mainstream games. One of the most popular machinima videos of all time is a 10-second clip titled ‘nope. avi’ (note the ‘casual’ lack of filename cleanup) with over 8 million views on YouTube (User Jimbomcb, 2010). The video is set in the beautifully designed world of the multiplayer first-person shooter Team Fortress 2, a game with a slick Tex Avery feel. The engineer character runs onscreen, but then his hardhat floats up and his neck stretches to meet it. The

Figure 15 Sam Spratt’s rage faces add detail without adding information. He is canonizing the original faces as equal to the pop culture icons of film, TV and music that he draws in similar styles. URL: http://samspratt. tumblr.com/post/7763194845/the- art-of-internet-memes

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 333

effect is done without polish; it feels like something has gone wrong; it’s a bit ugly. This is the essence of the TF2 machinima genre, where amateur humans replace the smooth computer-controlled animation of the game with their own awkward puppetry. It resembles the awkward art of early professional computer animators. (Such animations will inevitably become slicker, and the cycle may repeat with some not-yet- invented platform.)

As machinima demonstrates, as tools previously limited to professionals become available to amateurs, those tools are used amateurishly. Torrenting made Photoshop ‘affordable’ for anyone with an hour to spend on properly installing a pirated copy without alerting Adobe. It’s highly doubtful that every amateur participating in Fark.com’s no-finesse-required Photoshop contests paid $700 for a legal copy (Fark, 2001–2014). Unlike the more aesthetically focused contests on sites like Worth1000, where winners are often chosen for their elegant executions, Fark’s contests are won by the best ideas. In fact, the sloppy execution of such ideas can be part of the charm. In other circles, Photoshop is intentionally misused, like the gradient fills and custom brushes in ‘Bazinga’ or the use of Content Aware Fill to create body-horror patterns (User BlastedContentAware, 2010). These misuses are then incorporated into more mainstream work and accepted as intended tool uses, inspiring further tools.

Video editing has similarly trickled down to amateurs, not just through Final Cut/Premiere piracy but also thanks to relatively powerful consumer-priced tools like iMovie (free with a Mac),7 and the built-in editing tools on online recording systems like YouTube.

Finally, old kinds of Internet Ugly can return through nostalgic affectation. Designer Catherine Frazier (2012–2014) created the blog Animated Text in 2013 to turn funny or bizarre phrases into animated word art. In animated GIFs, floating, waving, or rotating text declares, ‘help! im in love with a fictional princess’ or ‘i before e if you want the d.’

Figure 16 Three versions of Courage Wolf: an early version; a version with a previous caption sloppily erased; and the current standard. URL: http://memedump.com/v/courage+wolf/courage- wolf-24.jpg.html — http://goteaminternet.com/show/61616 — http:// memegenerator.net/Courage-Wolf

334 journal of visual culture 13(3)

Frazier was inspired by ‘old ’90s websites on internetarchaeology.org’, according to her interview with the Daily Dot:

Here were websites with people who did not consider themselves designers but felt empowered enough to make a flaming ‘My boy is hot’ text GIF or ‘The O’Neals’ text animation and put it on their family reunion homepage … That’s why I decided to make animated text requests for my followers, many of whom don’t feel empowered [by] creativity because they’re not designers. I also like the idea of collaboration on the Internet. My followers’ role in contributing text requests is just as important as my role the creator. (Fenn, 2013)

As in the offline world, this nostalgia cycle will likely continue as each generation rediscovers the tools of its youth and replicates their effects with new tools. Internet creators use nostalgia, constricted platforms, and trickled-down professional tools to invent unintended uses for tools, redevelop forgotten methods, and create internet culture outside the ‘best practices’ of professionals working with cutting-edge tools. The results are passed around and further uglified or beautified in a perpetual cycle.

When Ugly Sells Out

Part of the aesthetic cycle of internet content is its co-option by corporate and political interests, whose goals are often at odds with those of internet creators. The dialectical purposes of Internet Ugly, as we’ve seen, include glorifying the amateur, validating the unglamorous, and mocking the self-serious, formulaic, and mainstream. Its practitioners will try to punish any entity that runs counter to these or similar purposes, yet tries to hijack their aesthetic.

In 2010, Hot Topic put Rage Guy on a t-shirt. They apparently figured that since no one could identify the drawing’s rightsholder, they had a popular character without any licensing costs. Of course they miscalculated: hundreds of 4chan and Reddit users felt ownership over Rage Guy and resented its corporate exploitation. They took revenge. They turned Rage Guy into Race Guy, making new racist rage comics and posting on Hot Topic’s Facebook page threatening boycotts (see Kim B and user ArtyHaire, 2010). Two days later, Hot Topic (2010a) announced in a Facebook post that it would drop the shirt due to the ‘newest iteration’. The next day, however, Hot Topic (2010b) announced that Race Guy was a hoax and they would continue selling the shirt. Four years later, while Rage Guy is no longer available, Hot Topic (2014) sells several other rage comic characters on shirts, including Trollface, Forever Alone, and Y U NO. The faces are slightly smoothed from their original versions, but are otherwise just as they appeared online. After their initial setback, Hot Topic has successfully co-opted Internet Ugly.

This is the fate of many Internet Ugly memes: To get slicked up and diluted for use in commercials, products, and political agendas. For instance, Republican

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 335

Congressional representatives Tom Massie and Steve Stockman both used Doge images for political ends in late 2013: Stockman criticized Senator John Cornyn for supporting Obamacare and disliking Rand Paul, while Massie (mistakenly applying the Advice Meme caption style rather than Doge’s Comic Sans) protested a bipartisan spending bill (see Horowitz, 2013). MNSBC reporter Adam Serwer tweeted, ‘ok so doge just died’ (Serwer, 2013), other Twitter users critiqued the correct spelling (see Pool, 2013), and the Huffington Post wrote that the representatives had ‘ruined’ Doge by ‘trying to be hip’.

The criticism of Massie and Stockman was not just over outsiders ‘exploiting’ the meme, but over their failure to understand the aesthetic they were trying to exploit. This criticism is leveled even more often within the bounds of the Internet Ugly production machine; 4chan’s userbase has long hated eBaumsWorld and the Cheezburger Network, accusing them of the same exploitation and theft as Hot Topic’s. Tumblr and 4chan had a brief war that fizzled out when Tumblr gleefully embraced 4chan. Many redditors loathe 9GAG, Cheezburger, Gawker, and often BuzzFeed (though other redditors link to those sites). Gawker writers rage against Reddit while their colleagues mine it for stories. Encyclopedia Dramatica, a meme cataloguer predating the now-dominant Know Your Meme, defends 4chan against all other contenders – its leaders have even organized harassment of Know Your Meme employees, their friends, and their families.

In any of these rivalries, the hostilities are usually lopsided. Gawker makes no claim to superiority in meme creation, and Cheezburger often credits Reddit. The accusers usually paint themselves as the true practitioners of internet culture, and the others as the pretender and exploiter. The accuser claims their culture is illegible to the outsider, whose attempt to catalog or define the subject will always grossly oversimplify it (whether through the mistakes of a hapless academic or the intentional revisionism of a cultural appropriator), then popularize the oversimplified version, to the detriment of the subject. This is why 4chan frequently reacts by spreading misinformation; the users know that outsiders seek authenticity and, if confused, may retreat. Of course, to the true outsider audience, it doesn’t matter whether a meme came from 9GAG or 4chan, and on average, this audience will choose the more palatable form of the meme. This carelessness and ‘tastelessness’ enrages the insider who feels that the outsider has ‘stolen’ and ‘ruined’ their culture.

These intramural fights show that practitioners view Internet Ugly use as an earned privilege. Newcomers can’t simply appropriate the meme, but must do the work of engaging with it on its own level. In this way, the aesthetic is a dialect: As David Foster Wallace (2001) wrote, ‘A dialect of English is learned and used either because it's your native vernacular or because it’s the dialect of a Group by which you wish (with some degree of plausibility) to be accepted.’ And some would-be interlopers, by trying to exploit the dialect for their own agenda before they understand it, offend the community they wanted to break into.

336 journal of visual culture 13(3)

Advertisers and politicians adopting Internet Ugly for their own agenda will inevitably come across as posers. They present their own cause in earnest terms, already a violation of most subsections of Internet Ugly, which value irony and self-deprecation. They will also prioritize their message over accurate imitation of the aesthetic, so they will inevitably mangle the aesthetic.8 They are nakedly seeking acceptance from a social group they haven’t actually joined, one they will abandon when it’s no longer popular and desirable. They research Internet Ugly through its most accessible outlets like Know Your Meme, BuzzFeed, and Gawker. So insular sites like 4chan will always hate sites that catalogue their culture, because to them, these sites are aiding the enemy. By codifying the rules of a still- evolving meme, these sites usurp the originating site’s authority over the meme, handing it to ‘posers’ who skipped over the primary source and treat the secondary account as gospel. Of course, eventually these new users overwhelm the old, the meme is redefined, sometimes repackaged for an even more mainstream audience, and the original meme-makers move onto something new and restart the cycle.

Conclusion

The websites, apps, and communication platforms that make up the internet – in technologist David Weinberger’s (2002) words, ‘small pieces loosely joined’ – all exist somewhat independently but constantly share content and users and are thus never truly independent. They develop regionalisms, but those regionalisms spread more quickly than in the physical world, as most internet users have more than one online ‘home’. (For example, 4chan and Reddit share thousands of users; DeviantArt users tend to also have Tumblrs; nearly every internet creator has a Twitter account.) The works of Internet Ugly could be characterized as the internet’s ‘folk art’: they reflect the cultures of the sites that invent and reshape them, they have purposes outside serious aesthetics, and they’re often made by amateurs.

While it has no self-appointed school of practitioners, the Internet Ugly aesthetic is a major through-line of meme culture. It can appear and disappear from a developing meme, and these shifts can (as in the case of Advice Animals) carbon-date a meme’s spread into the mainstream. It’s a visual dialect with social and cultural implications, as it telegraphs the practitioner’s casualness, capacity for irony, and internet savvy. And it is a tool of the rebel that, like all such tools, will be co-opted by the objects of rebellion. The success of those co-options will depend on their sophistication and timeliness, and it will not preclude further rebellion.

The tools of Internet Ugly will continue to shift as new technologies become the available default. As software publishers upgrade or replace tools like iMovie and Photoshop, the standards for engineered beauty will continue to escalate, but creators will use the same new tools to question and subvert those standards. As old forums for creativity wither, new ones will crop

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 337

up. New platforms will continue to reintroduce old constraints and revive old aesthetics, and new online communities will create their own voluntary constraints and affected visual carelessness.

Internet Ugly will look very different in 10 years, but it will remain distinct from most non-memetic or corporately produced content. It’s the aesthetic of the mundane conversation and idle doodlings that have always existed, but which the internet makes shareable by default. While it will evolve unpredictably, it won’t disappear as long as public ideas continue to outpace perfect execution.

Notes

1. Internet Ugly’s linguistic counterpart deserves its own rich study, which TechCrunch columnist Jon Evans kicked off well in ‘Such DFW. Very Orwell. So Doge. Wow.’ (http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/11/such-dfw-very-orwell- so-doge-wow/). Examples of this parallel dialect include Weird Twitter, copypasta, Hipster Runoff, and YouTube comments. For this piece, I’ll simply explore it as an aspect of the visual dialect of Internet Ugly, which often combines pictures and words.

2. The process also strips most content of context and source attribution, and spreads lower-quality (shrunk, compressed, and watermarked) copies of the original image. It’s a great backup system, but it’s a scholar’s nightmare. It’s also uglifying.

3. There used to be a semi-definable canon of all internet culture. Greg Rutter took a stab at codifying a reading list in 2009 with YouShouldHaveSeenThis.com; a year later he made a second list of 99. In 2012, I asked him about sequels; he said there were far too many must-sees now to pick merely 99 at a time.

4. The way other people evangelize Breaking Bad, I evangelize Breaking Bad Comics, with equal justification.

5. Not the more popular pastiche @ModernSeinfeld. 6. The New Aesthetic has been collaboratively defined, largely by example,

over the past four years: — http://www.riglondon.com/blog/2011/05/06/ the-new-aesthetic/ — http://booktwo.org/notebook/sxaesthetic/http://new- aesthetic.tumblr.com/ — http://www.wired.com/2012/04/an-essay-on-the-new- aesthetic/

7. As the editor of a YouTube channel with dozens of freelance contributors, I’ve been shocked to learn how many talented contributors are still getting by with this rudimentary software.

8. The most famous and successful corporate meme, Old Spice Guy, entirely avoided appropriation, instead starting with original content, then engaging internet users and personalities without any impersonation of their dialect or aesthetic. Old Spice Guy traded videos with webcammers, but he remained in his slick studio. He did not sit in a computer chair or quote Advice Animals.

References

Alfonso F (2012) He turns posts into paintings on Reddit. The Daily Dot, 21 February. Available at: http://www.dailydot.com/entertainment/shitty- watercolour-watercolor-reddit/ (accessed 25 January 2014).

338 journal of visual culture 13(3)

Ami (2011–2014) Miss Officer and Mr. Truffles. In: LemonTeaFlower. Available at: http://lemonteaflower.tumblr.com/post/73263702852/a-continuation-of-this- miss-officer-and-mr (accessed 28 January 2013).

Bennett J (2010) The dark side of web fame. Newsweek, 21 February. Available at: http:// www.newsweek.com/dark-side-web-fame-93505 (accessed 12 December 2013).

Brosh A (2013) Hyperbole and a half. Available at: http://hyperboleandahalf. blogspot.com/ (accessed 15 January 2014)

Caldwell D and user El Ricardo (2012–2014) Coaxed into a snafu. Available at: http:// knowyourmeme.com/memes/coaxed-into-a-snafu (accessed 5 December 2013).

Chen A (2013) Trollpunk is the new cyberpunk. In: The World of Today. Available at: http://worldoftoday.tumblr.com/post/24514056899/trollpunk-is-the-new- cyberpunk (accessed 10 January 2014).

Fark (2001–2014) Photoshop contest browser. Available at: http://www.fark.com/ psbrowser (accessed 20 January 2014).

Fenn M (2013) AnimatedText makes pop culture phrases actually pop. The Daily Dot, 31 May. Available at: http://www.dailydot.com/lol/animated-text-tumblr- catherine-frazier/ (accessed 31 January 2014).

Flock E (2011) Cinemagraphs: What it looks like when a photo moves. Washington Post, 12 July. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/ post/cinemagraphs-what-it-looks-like-when-a-photo-moves/2011/07/08/ gIQAONez3H_blog.html (accessed 2 February 2014).

Frazier C (2012-2014) Animated text. Available at: http://animatedtext.tumblr. com/ (accessed 31 January 2014).

Horowitz A (2013) GOPers ruin beloved internet meme. The Huffington Post, 23 December. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/23/gop- meme_n_4493685.html (accessed 23 December 2014).

Hot Topic (2010a) Status update. In: Facebook. Available at: https://www. facebook.com/hottopic/posts/168697763150369 (accessed 21 January 2014).

Hot Topic (2010b) Status update. In: Facebook. Available at: https://www. facebook.com/hottopic/posts/166746040022412 (accessed 21 January 2014).

Hot Topic (2014) Web sensation tees. Available at: http://www.hottopic.com/ hottopic/Guys/Tees/WebSensationsTees.jsp (accessed 19 January 2014).

Kim B and Caldwell D (2011) Advice animals. In: Know Your Meme. Available at: http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/advice-animals (accessed 9 December 2013).

Kim B and user ArtyHaire (2010) Race guy. In: Know Your Meme. Available at: http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/race-guy (accessed 20 January 2014).

Know Your Meme (2012) X all the Y. Available at: http://knowyourmeme.com/ memes/x-all-the-y (accessed 20 January 2014).

Know Your Meme (2013) Rage comics. Available at: http://knowyourmeme.com/ memes/rage-comics (accessed 5 January 2014).

Larsen P (2013) O.C.’s Rebecca Black talks about ‘Friday’. Orange County Register, 17 March. Available at: http://www.ocregister.com/entertainment/-292662–. html (accessed 12 December 2013).

Meme Generator (2009–2014) Front page. Available at: http://memegenerator.net/ (accessed 20 November 2013).

Pool D (2013) Tweet. Available at: https://twitter.com/dubpool/status/415160685 908471810 (accessed 23 December 2013).

Porn SFW (2008-2011) Front page. Available at: http://pornsfw.com/ (accessed 15 December 2014).

Pseudonym Shitty Watercolour (2012) About page. Available at: http:// shittywatercolour.com/notable (accessed 25 January 2014).

Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 339

Quickmeme (2011-2014) Front page. Available at: http://www.quickmeme.com/ (accessed 6 January 2014).

Reddit (2012–2014) ShittyHub. Available at: http://www.reddit.com/r/shittyhub (accessed 19 December 2014).

Serwer A (2013) Tweet. Available at: https://twitter.com/AdamSerwer/ status/415158936774246400 (accessed 23 December 2013).

User BlastedContentAware (2010) Bahh! Adobe’s content aware just isn’t good enough. In: Reddit. Available at: http://www.reddit.com/r/pics/comments/ bqz2j/bahh_adobes_content_aware_just_isnt_good_enough/ (accessed 1 February 2014).

User HandDrawnRage (2011–2013) User submissions. Available at: http://www. reddit.com/user/HandDrawnRage/submitted/ (accessed 10 January 2014).

User Jimbomcb (2010) Nope.avi. In: YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=gvdf5n-zI14 (accessed 25 January 2014).

User Shitty Watercolour (2013a) The story of how Shitty Watercolour got less shitty. In: YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BB7XUnZVrNU (accessed 22 January 2014).

User Shitty_Watercolour (2013b) User submissions and comments. Available at: http://www.reddit.com/user/Shitty_Watercolour (accessed 25 January 2014).

Wallace DF (2001) Tense Present: Democracy, English, and the Wars over Usage. Harper’s, April.

Weinberger D (2002) Small Pieces Loosely Joined. New York: Basic Books.

Nick Douglas runs Slacktory, a YouTube comedy channel and comedy aggregation blog. He is the former editor of the Silicon Valley gossip blog Valleywag (2006) and the internet culture blog Urlesque (2009–2011). In two of these jobs he got paid to invent Advice Animals.

Email: [email protected]

__MACOSX/Reading List/._063 Internet Ugly Aesthetic (Douglas 2014) (1).pdf