How network shrinks our world, blurring the lines between one another's space. Where privacy is no longer a sacred place, but a privilege.
Reading List/.DS_Store
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Reading List/061 Social Media (Lovink 2012).pdf
Geert Lovink
What Is the
Social in Social
Media?
Headlines, 2012: ÒNext time youÕre hiring, forget
personality tests, just check out the applicantÕs
Facebook profile instead.Ó Ð ÒStephanie
Watanabe spent nearly four hours Thursday night
unfriending about 700 of her Facebook friends Ð
and she isnÕt done yetÓ Ð ÒFacebook apology or
jail time: Ohio man gets to chooseÓ Ð ÒStudy:
Facebook users gettingÊless friendlyÓ Ð ÒWomen
tend to have stronger feelings regarding who has
access to their personal informationÓ (Mary
Madden) Ð ÒAll dressed up and no place to goÓ
(Wall Street Journal) Ð ÒIÕm making more of an
effort to be social these days, because I donÕt
want to be alone, and I want to meet peopleÓ
(Cindy Sherman) Ð Ò30 percent posted updates
that met the American Psychiatric AssociationÕs
criteria for a symptom of depression, reporting
feelings of worthlessness or hopelessness,
insomnia or sleeping too much, and difficulty
concentratingÓ Ð Control your patients: ÒDo you
hire someone in the clinic to look at Facebook all
day?Ó Dr. Moreno asked. ÒThatÕs not practical and
borders on creepy.Ó Ð ÒHunt for Berlin police
officer pictured giving Nazi salute on FacebookÓ Ð
Ò15-year-old takes to Facebook to curse and
complain about her parents. The disgusted father
later blasts her laptop with a gun.Ó
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe use of the word ÒsocialÓ in the context
of information technology goes back to the very
beginnings of cybernetics. It later pops up in the
1980s context of Ògroupware.Ó The recent
materialist school of Friedrich Kittler and others
dismissed the use of the word ÒsocialÓ as
irrelevant fluff Ð what computers do is calculate,
they do not interfere in human relations. Holistic
hippies, on the other hand, have ignored this
cynical machine knowledge and have advanced a
positive, humanistic view that emphasizes
computers as tools for personal liberation. This
individualistic emphasis on interface design,
usability, and so on was initially matched with an
interest in the community aspect of computer
networking. Before the Òdot-comÓ venture
capitalist takeover of the field in the second half
of the 1990s, progressive computing was
primarily seen as a tool for collaboration among
people.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIn a chapter entitled ÒHow Computer
Networks Became Social,Ó Sydney media theorist
Chris Chesher maps out the historical
development of computer networks, from
sociometry and social network analysis Ð an
ÒofflineÓ science (and a field of study that goes
back to the 1930s) that examines the dynamics
of human networks Ð to GranowetterÕs theory of
the strengths of weak links in 1973, to CastellsÕs
The Network Society in 1996, to the current
mapping efforts of the techno-scientists that
gather under the umbrella of Actor Network
Theory.
1
The conceptual leap relevant here
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Rand Corporation think tank employees brainstorming, 1958. CA, Santa Monica, US. Photo: Leonard Mccombe.
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concerns the move from groups, lists, forums,
and communities to the emphasis on
empowering loosely connected individuals in
networks. This shift happened during the
neoliberal 1990s and was facilitated by growing
computing power, storage capacity, and internet
bandwidth, as well as easier interfaces on
smaller and smaller (mobile) devices. This is
where we enter the Empire of the Social. It must
also be said that Òthe socialÓ could only become
technical, and become so successful, after the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when state
communism no longer posed a (military) threat to
free-market capitalism.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIf we want to answer the question of what
the ÒsocialÓ in todayÕs Òsocial mediaÓ really
means, a starting point could be the notion of the
disappearance of the social as described by Jean
Baudrillard, the French sociologist who theorized
the changing role of the subject as consumer.
According to Baudrillard, at some point the
social lost its historical role and imploded into
the media. If the social is no longer the once
dangerous mix of politicized proletarians, of the
frustrated, unemployed, and dirty clochards that
hang out on the streets waiting for the next
opportunity to revolt under whatever banner,
then how do social elements manifest
themselves in the digital networked age?
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe Òsocial questionÓ may not have been
resolved, but for decades it felt as if it was
neutralized. In the West after World War II,
instrumental knowledge of how to manage the
social was seen as necessary, and this reduced
the intellectual range of the question to a
somewhat closed circle of professional experts.
Now, in the midst of a global economic
downturn, can we see a renaissance of the
social? Is all this talk about the rise of Òsocial
mediaÓ just a linguistic coincidence? Can we
speak, in the never-ending aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis, of a Òreturn of the socialÓ? Is
there a growing class awareness, and if so, can it
spread electronically? Despite widespread
unemployment, growing income disparities, and
the Occupy protests, it seems unlikely that we
will see a global networked uprising. Protests are
successful precisely because they are local,
despite their network presence. How can the two
separate entities of work and networked
communication connect?
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊWe can put such considerations into a
larger, strategic context that the Òsocial media
questionÓ poses. Do all these neatly
administrated contacts and address books at
some point spill over and leave the virtual realm,
as the popularity of dating sites seems to
suggest? Do we only share information,
experiences, and emotions, or do we also
conspire, as Òsocial swarms,Ó to raid reality in
order to create so-called real-world events? Will
contacts mutate into comrades? It seems that
social media solves the organizational problems
that the suburban baby-boom generation faced
fifty years ago: boredom, isolation, depression,
and desire. How do we come together, right now?
Do we unconsciously fear (or long for) the day
when our vital infrastructure breaks down and
we really need each other? Or should we read
this Simulacrum of the Social as an organized
agony over the loss of community after the
fragmentation of family, marriage, and
friendship? Why do we assemble these ever-
growing collections of contacts? Is the Other,
relabeled as Òfriend,Ó nothing more than a future
customer or business partner? What new forms
of social imaginary exist? At what point does the
administration of others mutate into something
different altogether? Will ÒfriendingÓ disappear
overnight, like so many new media-related
practices that vanished in the digital nirvana?
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe container concept Òsocial media,Ó
describing a fuzzy collection of websites like
Facebook, Digg, YouTube, Twitter, and Wikipedia,
is not a nostalgic project aimed at reviving the
once dangerous potential of Òthe social,Ó like an
angry mob that demands the end of economic
inequality. Instead, the social Ð to remain inside
BaudrillardÕs vocabulary Ð is reanimated as a
simulacrum of its own ability to create
meaningful and lasting social relations. Roaming
around in virtual global networks, we believe that
we are less and less committed to our roles in
traditional community formations such as the
family, church, and neighborhood. Historical
subjects, once defined as citizens or members of
a class possessing certain rights, have been
transformed into subjects with agency, dynamic
actors called Òusers,Ó customers who complain,
and Òprosumers.Ó The social is no longer a
reference to society Ð an insight that troubles us
theorists and critics who use empirical research
to prove that people, despite all their outward
behavior, remain firmly embedded in their
traditional, local structures.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe social no longer manifests itself
primarily as a class, movement, or mob. Neither
does it institutionalize itself anymore, as
happened during the postwar decades of the
welfare state. And even the postmodern phase of
disintegration and decay seems over. Nowadays,
the social manifests itself as a network.
Networked practices emerge outside the walls of
twentieth-century institutions, leading to a
Òcorrosion of conformity.Ó The network is the
actual shape of the social. What counts Ð for
instance, in politics and business Ð are the
Òsocial factsÓ as they present themselves
through network analysis and its corresponding
data visualizations. The institutional part of life
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Still from the animation ÒBaby Cha-Cha.Ó The video was considered to be one of the first to go viral at the end of the 1990s.
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is another matter, a realm that quickly falls
behind, becoming a parallel universe. It is
tempting to remain positive and portray a
synthesis, further down the road, between the
formalized power structures inside institutions
and the growing influence of informal networks.
But there is little evidence of this Third Way
approach coming to pass. The PR-driven belief
that social media will, one day, be integrated is
nothing more than New Age optimism in a time of
growing tensions over scarce resources. The
social, which used to be the glue for repairing
historical damage, can quickly turn into
unstable, explosive material. A total ban is nearly
impossible, even in authoritarian countries.
Ignoring social media as background noise also
backfires. This is why institutions, from hospitals
to universities, hire swarms of temporary
consultants to manage social media for them.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊSocial media fulfill the promise of
communication as an exchange; instead of
forbidding responses, they demand replies.
Similar to an early writing of BaudrillardÕs, social
media can be understood as Òreciprocal spaces
of speech and responseÓ that lure users to say
something, anything.
2
Later, Baudrillard changed
his position and no longer believed in the
emancipatory aspect of talking back to the
media. Restoring the symbolic exchange wasnÕt
enough Ð and this feature is precisely what
social media offer their users as an
emancipatory gesture. For the late Baudrillard,
what counted was the superior position of the
silent majority.
New York city police supply a generator so that victims of hurricane
Sandy can charge their cell phones.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIn their 2012 pamphlet Declaration, Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri avoid discussing the
larger social dimensions of community, cohesion,
and society. What they witness is unconscious
slavery: ÒPeople sometimes strive for their
servitude as if it were their salvation.Ó
3
It is
primarily individual entitlement in social media
that interests these theorists, not the social at
large. ÒIs it possible that in their voluntary
communication and expression, in their blogging
and social media practices, people are
contributing to instead of contesting repressive
forces?Ó For us, the mediatized, work, and
leisure can no longer be separated. But what
about the equally obvious productive side of
being connected to others?
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊHardt and Negri make the mistake of
reducing social networking to a media question,
as if the internet and smartphones are only used
to look up and produce information. Concerning
the role of communication, they conclude that
Ònothing can beat the being together of bodies
and the corporeal communication that is the
basis of collective political intelligence and
action.Ó Social links are probably nothing but
fluff, a veritable world of sweet sassiness. In this
way, the true nature of social life online remains
out of sight, and thus unscrutinized. The meeting
of the social and the media doesnÕt have to be
sold as some Hegelian synthesis, a world-
historical evolution; however, the strong yet
abstract concentration of social activity on
todayÕs networked platforms is something that
needs to be theorized. Hardt and NegriÕs call to
refuse mediation will have to move further. ÒWe
need to make new truths, which can be created
by singularities in networks communicating and
being there.Ó We need both networking and
encampment. In their version of the social, Òwe
swarm like insectsÓ and act as Òa decentralized
multitude of singularities that communicates
horizontally.Ó
4
The actual power structures, and
frictions, that emerge out of this constellation
have yet to be addressed.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe search for the social online Ð it seems a
brave but ultimately unproductive project to look
for the remains of nineteenth-century European
social theory. This is what makes the Òprecarious
laborÓ debate about Marx and exploitation on
Facebook so tricky.
5
What we need to do instead
is take the process of socialization at face value
and refrain from well-meaning political
intentions (such as the ÒFacebook revolutionsÓ of
the 2011 Arab Spring and the movement of the
squares). The workings of social media are
subtle, informal, and indirect. How can we
understand the social turn in new media, beyond
good and evil, as something that is both cold and
intimate, as Israeli sociologist Eva Illouz
described it in her book Cold Intimacies?
6
Literature from the media industry and the IT
industry tends to shy away from the question
posed here. Virtues such as accessibility and
usability do not explain what people are looking
for Òout there.Ó There are similar limits to the
(professional) discourse of trust, which also tries
to bridge the informal sphere and the legal
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sphere of rules and regulations.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe Òobliteration of the socialÓ has not led
to a disappearance of sociology, but it has
downgraded the importance of social theory in
critical debates. A Òweb sociologyÓ that has freed
itself of the real-virtual dichotomies, not limiting
its research scope to the Òsocial implications of
technologyÓ (such as, for example, internet
addiction), could play a critical role in developing
a better understanding of how Òclass analysisÓ
and mediatization are intertwined. As Eva Illouz
wrote to me in response to this question: ÒIf
sociology has traditionally called on us to exert
our shrewdness and vigilance in the art of
making distinctions (between use value and
exchange value; life world and colonization of the
life world, etc.), the challenge that awaits us is to
exercise the same vigilance in a social world
which consistently defeats these distinctions.Ó
7
Albert Benschop, the Amsterdam pioneer of web
sociology and editor of SocioSite.net, proposes
that we overcome the real-virtual distinction
altogether. He makes an analogy to the Thomas
theoreme, a classic theory in sociology, when he
says, ÒIf people define networks as real, they are
real in their consequences.Ó For Benschop, the
internet is not some Òsecond-hand world.Ó The
same could be said of the social. There is no
second life, with different social rules and
conventions. According to Benschop, this is why
there is, strictly speaking, no additional
discipline necessary.
8
The discussion about the
shape of the social relates to all of us; it should
not be cooked up Ð and owned Ð solely by geeks
and startup entrepreneurs. As Johan Sjerpstra
puts it:
Welcome to the social abyss. We can no
longer close our eyes for the real existing
stupidity out there. WeÕre in it all together.
Pierre Levy, please help us out: where is the
collective intelligence now that we need it?
The social is not merely the (digital) awareness of
the Other, even though the importance of Òdirect
contactÓ should not be underestimated. There
needs to be actual, real, existing interaction. This
is the main difference between old broadcast
media and the current social network paradigm.
ÒInterpassivity,Ó the concept which points at a
perceived growth of the delegation of passions
and desires to others (the outsourcing of affect)
as discussed, for instance, by Pfaller, Žižek, and
van Oenen, is a nice but harmless concept in this
(interactive) context.
9
To question the current
architectures and cultures of social media is not
to be motivated by some kind of hidden,
oppressed offline romanticist sentiment. Is there
something like a justified feeling of
overexposure, not just to information in general
but to others as well? We all need a break from
the social circus every now and then, but who
can afford to cut off ties indefinitely? In the
online context, the social requires our constant
involvement, in the form of clicking. We need to
make the actual link. Machines will not make the
vital connection for us, no matter how much we
delegate. It is no longer enough to build on your
existing social capital. What social media do is
algorithmically expand your reach Ð or at least
they promise to.
A gun integrating a 3D-printed part designed by its owner. 3D printing
is considered a ÒprosumerÓ technology expected to become
widespread in the near future.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊInstead of merely experiencing our personal
history as something that we reconcile with and
feel the need to overcome (think of family ties,
the village or suburb, school and college, church
and colleagues from work), the social is seen as
something that we are proud of, that we love to
represent and show off. Social networking is
experienced in terms of an actual potentiality: I
could contact this or that person (but I wonÕt).
From now on I will indicate my preferred brand
(even without being asked). The social is the
collective ability to imagine the connected
subjects as a temporary unity. The power of
connection is felt by many, and the simulations
of the social on websites and in graphs are not so
much secondary experiences or representations
of something real; they are probes into a post-
literate world ruled by images.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊMartin HeideggerÕs dictum ÒWe donÕt call,
we are being calledÓ runs empty here.
10
On the
internet, bots will contact you regardless, and
the status updates of others, relevant or not, will
pass before your eyes anyway. The filter failure is
real. Once inside the busy flow of social media,
the Call to Being comes from software and
invites you to reply. This is where the cool and
laid-back postmodern indifference of quasi-
subversive attitudes comes to an end. It is
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Facebook check-in density in Manhattan. Times Square represents the highest peak on the map. Copyright: Spatial Information Design Lab, New York.
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meaningless not to bother Ð we are not friends
anyway. Why stay on Facebook? Forget Twitter.
These are cool statements, but they are now
beside the point. The user is no longer in a Òstate
of stupor.Ó The silence of the masses that
Baudrillard spoke about has been broken. Social
media has been a clever trick to get them talking.
We have all been reactivated. The obscenity of
common opinions and the everyday prostitution
of private details is now firmly embedded in
software and in billions of users.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe example Baudrillard used was the
opinion poll, which he said undermines Òthe
authentic existence of the social.Ó Baudrillard
replaced the sad vision of the masses as an
alienated entity with an ironic and object-
centered vision. Now, thirty years deeper into the
media era, even this vision has become
internalized. In the Facebook age, surveys can be
done continuously Ð without peopleÕs direct
participation in questionnaires and the like Ð
through data mining. These algorithmic
calculations run in the background and measure
every single click, touch of the keyboard, and use
of a keyword. For Baudrillard, this Òpositive
absorption into the transparency of the
computerÓ is even worse than alienation.
11
The
public has become a database full of users. The
Òevil genius of the socialÓ has no other way to
express itself than to go back to the streets and
squares, guided and witnessed by the multitude
of viewpoints that tweeting smartphones and
recording digital cameras produce. In the same
way that Baudrillard questioned the outcome of
opinion polls as a subtle revenge of the common
people on the political/media system, we should
question the objective truth of the so-called Big
Data originating from Google, Twitter, and
Facebook. Most of the traffic on social media
originates from millions of computers talking to
each other. Active participation of ten percent of
the user base is high. These users are assisted
by an army of dutiful, hardworking software bots.
The rest are inactive accounts. This is what
object-oriented philosophy has yet come to
terms with: a critique of the useless contingency.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe social media system no longer Òplunges
us into a state of stupor,Ó as Baudrillard said of
media experience decades ago. Instead, it shows
us the way to cooler apps and other products
that elegantly make us forget yesterdayÕs flavor
of the day. We simply click, tap, and drag the
platform away, finding something else to distract
us. This is how we treat online services: we leave
them behind, if possible on abandoned
hardware. Within weeks we have forgotten the
icon, bookmark, or password. We do not have to
revolt against the media of the Web 2.0 era,
abandoning it in protest because of allegedly
intrusive privacy policies; rather, we can
confidently discard it, knowing it will eventually
join the good old HTML ghost towns of the
nineties.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊHere is Baudrillard parsing the situation
back in the old media days: ÒThis is our destiny,
subjected to opinion polls, information, publicity,
statistics: constantly confronted with the
anticipated statistical verification of our
behavior, absorbed by this permanent refraction
of our slightest movements, we are no longer
confronted with our own will.Ó He discusses the
move towards obscenity that is made in the
permanent display of oneÕs own preferences (in
our case, on social media platforms). There is a
Òredundancy of the social,Ó a Òcontinual
voyeurism of the group in relation to itself: it
must at all times know what it wants É The
social becomes obsessed with itself; through
this auto-information, this permanent auto-
intoxication.Ó
12
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe difference between the 1980s, when
Baudrillard wrote these theses, and thirty years
later can be found in the fact that all aspects of
life have opened up to the logic of opinion polls.
Not only do we have personal opinions about
every possible event, idea, or product, but these
informal judgments are also valuable to
databases and search engines. People start to
talk about products of their own accord; they no
longer need incentives from outside. Twitter goes
for the entire specter of life when it asks, ÒWhatÕs
happening?Ó Everything, even the tiniest info
spark provided by the online public, is
(potentially) relevant, ready to be earmarked as
viral and trending, destined to be data-mined
and, once stored, ready to be combined with
other details. These devices of capture are
totally indifferent to the content of what people
say Ð who cares about your views? ThatÕs
network relativism: in the end itÕs all just data,
their data, ready to be mined, recombined, and
flogged off. ÒVictor, are you still alive?Ó
13
This is
not about participation, remembrance, and
forgetting. What we transmit are the bare signals
indicating that we are still alive.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊA deconstructivist reading of social media
shouldnÕt venture, once again, to reread the
friendship discourse (Òfrom Socrates to
FacebookÓ) or to take apart the Online Self. No
matter how hard it is to resist the temptation,
theorists should shy away from their built-in
ÒinterpassiveÓ impulse to call for a break (Òbook
your offline holidayÓ). This position has played
itself out. Instead, we need cybernetics 2.0 Ð
initiatives such as a follow-up to the original
Macy conferences (1946 to 1953), but this time
with the aim of investigating the cultural logic
inside social media, inserting self-reflexivity in
code, and asking what software architectures
could be developed to radically alter the online
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social experience. We need input from the
critical humanities and the social sciences;
these disciplines need to start a dialogue with
computer science. Are Òsoftware studiesÓ
initiatives up to such a task? Time will tell.
Digital humanities, with its one-sided emphasis
on data visualization, working with computer-
illiterate humanities scholars as innocent
victims, has so far made a bad start in this
respect. We do not need more tools; whatÕs
required are large research programs run by
technologically informed theorists that finally
put critical theory in the driverÕs seat. The
submissive attitude in the arts and humanities
towards the hard sciences and industries needs
to come to an end.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊAnd how can philosophy contribute? The
Western male self-disclosing subject no longer
needs to be taken apart and contrasted with the
liberated cyber-identity or ÒavatarÓ that roams
around the virtual game worlds. Interesting
players in the new media game can be found
across the globe, from Africa to Brazil, India, and
East Asia. For this, an IT-informed postcolonial
theory has yet to be assembled. We should look
todayÕs practices of the-social-as-electronic-
empathy right in the eyes. How do you shape and
administer your online affects? To put it in terms
of theory: we need to extend DerridaÕs
questioning of the Western subject to the non-
human agency of software (as described by
Bruno Latour and followers of his Actor Network
Theory). Only then we can get a better
understanding of the cultural policy of
aggregators, the role of search engines, and the
editing wars on Wikipedia.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊWith its emphasis on Big Data, we can read
the Òrenaissance of the socialÓ in the light of
sociology as the Òpositivist science of society.Ó
As of yet there is no critical school in sight that
could help us to properly read the social aura of
the citizen as user. The term ÒsocialÓ has
effectively been neutralized in its cynical
reduction to data porn. Reborn as a cool concept
in the media debate, the social manifests itself
neither as dissent nor as subcultural. The social
organizes the self as a techno-cultural entity, a
special effect of software, which is rendered
addictive by real-time feedback features. In the
internet context, the social is neither a reference
to the Social Question nor a hidden reminder of
socialism as a political program. The social is
precisely what it pretends to be: a calculated
opportunity in times of distributed
communication. In the end, the social turns out
to be a graph, a more or less random collection of
contacts on your screen that blabber on and on Ð
until you intervene and put your own statement
out there.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThanks to FacebookÕs simplicity, the online
experience is a deeply human experience: the
aim is to find the Other, not information. Ideally,
the Other is online, right now. Communication
works best if it is 24/7, global, mobile, fast, and
short. Most appreciated is instantaneous
exchange with ÒfriendedÓ users at chat-mode
speed. This is social media at its best. We are
invited to Òburp out the thought you have right
now Ð regardless of its quality, regardless of how
it connects to your other thoughts.Ó
14
The social
presence of young people is the default here
(according to the scholarly literature). We create
a social sculpture, and then, as we do with most
conceptual and participatory artworks, we
abandon it, leaving it to be trashed by
anonymous cleaners. This is similar to the faith
inherent in all social media: it will be
remembered as an individual experience of
online community in the post-9/11 decade. And
happily forgotten as the next distraction
consumes our perpetual present.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIt is said that social media has outgrown
virtual communities (as described by Howard
Rheingold in his 1993 book of the same name),
but who really cares about the larger historical
picture here? Many doubt whether Facebook and
Twitter, in their current manifestations as
platforms for the millions, still generate
authentic online community experiences. What
counts are the trending topics, the next platform,
and the latest apps. Silicon Valley historians will
one day explain the rise of Òsocial networking
sitesÓ out of the ashes of the dot-com crisis,
when a handful of survivors from the margins of
the e-commerce boom-and-bust reconfigured
viable concepts of the Web 1.0 era, stressing the
empowerment of the user as content producer.
The secret of Web 2.0, which kicked off in 2003,
is the combination of (free) uploads of digital
material with the ability to comment on other
peopleÕs efforts. Interactivity always consists of
these two components: action and reaction.
Chris Cree defines social media as
Òcommunication formats publishing user
generated content that allow some level of user
interaction,Ó a problematic definition that could
include most of early computer culture.
15
It is not
enough to limit social media to uploading and
self-promotion. It is the personal one-to-one
feedback and small-scale viral distribution
elements that are essential.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊAs Andrew Keen indicates in Digital Vertigo
(2012), the social in social media is first and
foremost an empty container; he adduces the
exemplary hollow platitude that says the internet
is Òbecoming the connective tissue of twenty-
first century life.Ó According to Keen, the social is
becoming a tidal wave that is flattening
everything in its path. Keen warns that we will
end up in an anti-social future, characterized by
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the Òloneliness of the isolated man in the
connected crowd.Ó
16
Confined inside the
software cages of Facebook, Google, and their
clones, users are encouraged to reduce their
social life to ÒsharingÓ information. The self-
mediating citizen constantly broadcasts his or
her state of being to an amorphous, numb group
of Òfriends.Ó Keen is part of a growing number of
(mainly) US critics warning us of the side effects
of extensive social media use. From Sherry
TurkleÕs rant on loneliness, Nicholas CarrÕs
warnings on the loss of brain power and the
ability to concentrate, to Evgeny MorozovÕs
critique of the utopian NGO world, to Jaron
LanierÕs concern over the loss of creativity, what
unites these commentators is their avoidance of
what the social could alternatively be, were it not
defined by Facebook and Twitter. The problem
here is the disruptive nature of the social, which
returns as a revolt against an unknown and
unwanted agenda: vague, populist, radical-
Islamist, driven by good-for-nothing memes.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe Other as opportunity, channel, or
obstacle? You choose. Never has it been so easy
to Òauto-quantifyÓ oneÕs personal surroundings.
We follow our blog statistics and our Twitter
mentions, check out friends of friends on
Facebook, or go on eBay to purchase a few
hundred ÒfriendsÓ who will then ÒlikeÓ our latest
uploaded pictures and start a buzz about our
latest outfit. Listen to how Dave Winer sees the
future of news: ÒStart a river, aggregating the
feeds of the bloggers you most admire, and the
other news sources they read. Share your
sources with your readers, understanding that
almost no one is purely a source or purely a
reader. Mix it all up. Create a soup of ideas and
taste it frequently. Connect everyone thatÕs
important to you, as fast as you can, as
automatically as possible, and put the pedal to
the metal and take your foot off the brake.Ó
17
This
is how programmers these days loosely glue
everything together with code. Connect persons
to data objects to persons. ThatÕs the social
today.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ×
Geert Lovink is a Dutch-Australian media theorist and
critic. He is Professor at the European Graduate
School, Research Professor at the Hogeschool van
Amsterdam, where he is founding director of the
Institute of Network Cultures, and Associate Professor
in Media Studies (new media), University of
Amsterdam. Lovink is author of Dark Fiber (2002), My
First Recession (2003) and Zero Comments (2007). He
recently co-organized events and publications on
Wikipedia research, online video and the culture of
search. His forthcoming book investigates the rise of
Ôpopular hermeneuticsÕ inside Web 2.0, large scale
comment cultures and the shifting position of new
media (studies) inside the humanities.
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ÊÊÊÊÊÊ1
Chris Chesher, ÒHow Computer
Networks Became Social,Ó in
Chris Chesher, Kate Crawford,
and Anne Dunn,ÊInternet
Transformations: Language,
Technology, Media and Power
(forthcoming from Palgrave
Macmillan in 2014).
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ2
Jean Baudrillard, ÒThe Masses:
Implosion of the Social in the
Media,ÓÊNew Literary History
16:3 (John Hopkins University
Press,Ê1985), 1.
SeeÊhttp://www.jstor.org/sta
ble/468841.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ3
All quotes here in and in the next
paragraph are from Michael
Hardt and Antonio
Negri,ÊDeclaration (New York:
Argo-Navis, 2012), 18Ð21.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ4
Ibid., 35 (both quotes).
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ5
See the exchangeÊÒThe $100bn
Facebook question: Will
capitalism survive Ôvalue
abundanceÕ?ÓÊon the nettime
email list, early March 2012.
Brian Holmes writes there in
various postings: ÒWhat I have
found very limiting in the
discourse around so-called web
2.0 is the use of MarxÕs notion of
exploitation in the strict sense,
where your labor power is
alienated into the production of
a commodity and you get an
exchange value in returnÓÉ ÒFor
years I have been dismayed by a
very common refusal to think.
The dismaying part is that itÕs
based on the work of European
historyÕs greatest political
philosopher, Karl Marx. It
consists in the assertion that
social media exploits you, that
play is labor, and that Facebook
is the new Ford Motor Co.Ó É
ÒThe Ôapparatus of capture,Õ
introduced by Deleuze and
Guattari and developed into a
veritable political economy by
the Italian Autonomists and the
Multitudes group in Paris, does
something very much like that,
though without using the
concept of exploitationÓ É
ÒSocial media do not exploit you
the way a boss does. It
emphatically _does_ sell
statistics about the ways you
and your friends and
correspondents make use of
your human faculties and
desires, to nasty corporations
that do attempt to capture your
attention, condition your
behavior and separate you from
your money. In that sense, it
does try to control you and you
do create value for it. Yet that is
not all that happens. Because
you too do something with it,
something of your own. The
dismaying thing in the theories
of playbour, etc, is that they
refuse to recognize that all of us,
in addition to being exploited
and controlled, are overflowing
sources of potentially
autonomous productive energy.
The refusal to think about this Ð
a refusal which mostly circulates
on the left, unfortunately Ð
leaves that autonomous
potential unexplored and
partially unrealized.Ó
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ6
Eva Illouz,ÊCold Intimacies: The
Making of Emotional Capitalism,
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ7
Private email correspondence,
March 5, 2012.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ8
Albert Benschop, ÒVirtual
Communities.Ó
SeeÊhttp://www.sociosite.org
/network.php.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ9
SeeÊRobert Pfaller,ÊÄsthetik der
Interpassivit�t (Hamburg: Plilo
Fine Arts, 2008) (in German)
andÊGijs van Oenen,ÊNu even
niet! Over de interpassieve
samenleving (Amsterdam: van
Gennep, 2011) (in Dutch).
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ10
See Avital Ronell,ÊThe Telephone
Book (Lincoln, Nebraska:
University of Nebraska Press,
1989).
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ11
Jean Baudrillard, ÒThe Masses:
Implosion of the Social in the
Media,ÓÊNew Literary History,
16:3 (John Hopkins University
Press, 1985),Ê5.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ12
Ibid., 580.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ13
Standard phrase uttered by
Professor Professor, a Bavarian
character who speaks English
with a heavy German accent in
the BBC animated series ÒThe
Secret ShowÓ from 2007.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ14
SeeÊhttp://www.nytimes.com/2
012/02/25/us/25iht-currents2
5.html?_r=1.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ15
Read more
atÊhttp://successcreeations.
com/438/definition-of-social -
media/#ixzz1nJmIQl1c.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ16
Andrew Keen, Digital Vertigo
(New York: St. MartinÕs Press,
2012), 13.
ÊÊÊÊÊÊ17
SeeÊhttp://scripting.com/sto
ries/2012/02/24/whatNewsMust
Do.html.
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__MACOSX/Reading List/._061 Social Media (Lovink 2012).pdf
Reading List/065 Air-Conditioned Nightmare (Scovell 2017).pdf
28 | Sight&Sound | November 2017
THE AIR-CONDITIONED NIGHTMARE The bland, sinister corporate locations used by Alan J. Pakula in his era-defining ‘paranoia trilogy’ – ‘Klute’, ‘The Parallax View’ and ‘All the President’s Men’ – perfectly capture the threats of everyday surveillance and political conspiracy in the 1970s By Adam Scovell
A man is following someone up an escalator. The space around them gleams with inhuman malevolence, as if it was designed for violence and conspiracy. Soon one of the men will be dead, yet somehow this fails to surprise us, for the building they are in is as cold and uncaring as the powers that built it. This scene is from the second entry in Alan J. Pakula’s powerful ‘paranoia trilogy’, The Parallax View (1974), a film that builds suspense by de- liberately playing on the banal malice of such spaces. Alongside Klute (1971) and All the President’s Men (1976), Pakula’s film captures the beginnings of an era in which we’re still living: the age of what can be called air-con spaces. These are the empty corporate zones that have become symbols of political underhandedness, unnerv- ing surveillance and a very secretive violence. Whether empty inner-city hotels, conference spaces filled with lonely escalators, vacant car parks or shopping malls after hours, these American spaces were the sites of the conspiracy and corruption that tainted the genuine po- litical reality of the early 1970s.
All three films deliberately play on the increased ten- sion within the country in this era. There is menace in the ordinary here, something malignant that has been brewing since the earliest provocations of the Cold War and accelerated by the assassinations that scarred American politics in the 1960s. These are the traumas in Pakula’s trilogy, a cathartic expression of concern over the political machinations deployed by US governments and organisations in this period. Yet it seems as though the very architecture itself came to define such politics, setting the blueprint for our contemporary spatial and political maladies.
Following his 1969 feature debut, The Sterile Cuckoo, Pakula began to express such concerns in Klute, an inner- city fable concerning a private detective (Donald Suther- land) and his search for a missing executive, who is connected to call-girl Bree Daniels (Jane Fonda) through several letters. Though the air-con spaces of this film are limited, they are essential in defining the contrasting worlds within the drama. The executive who ordered the investigation, Cable (Charles Cioffi), conducts a campaign of terror against the call-girl in order to hide his role in the disappearance and, crucially, this is shown to be overseen from his high-level boardroom: low-light, misty views, morally barren. The building is, in fact, 26 Church Street in Lower Manhattan and Pakula shot at the location while a much larger set of air-con spaces was RE
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November 2017 | Sight&Sound | 29
THEY ARE OUT TO GET YOU Dustin Hoffman and Robert Redford in Alan J. Pakula’s All the President’s Men (1976, opposite), Jane Fonda in Klute (1971, top), and Warren Beatty and Anthony Zerbe in The Parallax View (1974, above)
being constructed adjacent to it, seen outside the execu- tive’s windows in this scene. Learning that these cranes were building the World Trade Centre only adds to the unnerving poignancy of Pakula’s film.
In one particularly effective moment, Cable is seen in the space listening to a revealing tape. The scene alerts the viewer to the fact that Bree’s paranoia about being secretly observed is in fact well justified. Her fears are far from delusional but part of the increasingly common re- ality of the Watergate era, a surveillance culture which haunts all three films. The camera observes the shady boardroom as Cable stands up; it then suggests he is looking down on the world below, before cutting to Bree’s homely apartment, which significantly is situated much lower down. This is the contrast – the suspicious individuals who inhabit these spaces have both a physi- cal and symbolic ability to observe all below them. As the cranes continue to build the Twin Towers over the road, Pakula captures the growing trend for such spaces, which are usually presented devoid of people, or at least large enough to disperse the people within them.
Pakula captures the ultimate air-con space in The Par- allax View, as the film’s culminating act of violence, one which defines the whole narrative, takes place in a con- ference centre. A journalist, Frady (Warren Beatty), has suspicions about the official explanation over a political candidate’s assassination in the Seattle Space Needle. He follows a trail of shady characters who lead ultimately to the so-called Parallax Organisation and to a further con- spiracy. Another assassination is due to take place in the conference centre, where a dress rehearsal is underway for a senator’s political rally. The centre is a vast and in- timidating space where men are half-seen, staring from behind curtains or from the shadows of the rafters. Even the outside of the building has a reflective, thoroughly alien quality. Pakula very deliberately frames the begin- ning of this final sequence from these dead exteriors. It’s actually a composite of two real buildings: the Central Civil West Courthouse and the Los Angeles Convention Centre – in this era Pakula was clearly spoilt for choice for potential locations.
Inside the space, the musical score dies down, making the most of the strange ambience of such places: the hum of lights, the swirl of fans, the breeze of the air-con, the drone of a vacuum cleaner somewhere deep inside the labyrinth. This is interrupted by the marching band’s practice for the evening rally in the main hall, while, behind the fanfare, men in suits are gathering in the cor- ners, haunting the corridors with an air of officialdom. They are organised, the space is theirs. When Pakula puts characters into these spaces, something curious happens. While Frady and the man he is following are on the escalator, their presence is unsettling, even incon- gruous. These spaces may possess all the usual trappings of human life but showing the facilities with only a small number of people highlights the absurdity in their scale. The rows and rows of empty tables prepared for the rally seem to underline the ultimate hollowness of the event, the senator’s voice occulted to a tape machine that rolls on even after the assassin’s bullets have ripped through his diaphragm. It is this vast scale that is ultimately the undoing of Frady, who is left scurrying in the building’s rafters and then shot after being framed for the assassi- nation, a tiny figure trapped by an immense conspiracy.
The two films lead naturally to All the President’s Men, with its dramatic rendering of the conspiracy of Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal. Interestingly, however, some- thing has changed. The fight-back against the unseen
powers threatening those who possess the information needed to bring the truth out into the open, also takes place within an air-con space: the office of the Washington Post reporters Carl Bernstein (Dustin Hoffman) and Bob Woodward (Robert Redford). But, given how important the war of information has become in this era, this shift is fitting. Much of the essential intelligence provided to the duo comes from secretive meetings conducted in an empty underground car park, lit with icy blue strip-lights that render the anonymous source a shadow. What is es- sential about Pakula’s use of this space is the way it helps to build tension, finding the thrilling in what is essen- tially mundane. Far from making these meetings safer, their quietude racks up the tension, making every sound and every element potentially malevolent.
The film opens with a perfect embodiment of the air- con space, the Democratic headquarters in the Water- gate building during the break-in, showing the moment when the trail of conspiracy first becomes evident. The office feels eerie as the five burglars make their way along the carpeted corridors, furnished with everyday corporate fittings and objects. The mundanity of such spaces is essential; their blandness seems harmless but is often anything but. The ubiquitous surveillance poten- tial identified in these films merges fiction and reality, capturing the spirit of the age. In the same year The Paral- lax View was released, Francis Ford Coppola defined this feeling of being permanently observed in The Conversa- tion (1974), a film full of windows hiding telescopes and audio-surveillance equipment. The architecture of this period seems purpose-built for surveillance, places that expose anyone ignorant of the reality of covert activities. Even Scorpio (Andy Robinson), the manic killer from Don Siegel’s Dirty Harry (1971), finds potential in the anonymity and surveillance opportunities of
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30 | Sight&Sound | November 2017
THE PARANOIA TRILOGYALAN J. PAKULA
these buildings, making his first killing from one of their rooftops. They favour psychopaths and
madmen, official or otherwise. Modernity is now defined by these air-con spaces, and
the events that happen within them become increasing- ly surreal. They are spaces in which Christopher Walken can literally fly through the air, as in Spike Jonze’s video for Fatboy Slim’s ‘Weapon of Choice’ (2001); the lobby of the L.A. Hotel vacant, allowing such a strange scenario to seem almost natural. Such spaces have become the norm, even in Europe, where designs have been import- ed from America. J.G. Ballard brilliantly examined this transition, in his last period of writing around the turn of the millennium. Though his earlier fiction seemed to be defined by such spaces literally degrading the moral- ity of their many occupants à la Crash (1973) and High- Rise (1975), his later novels bask in the violent potential of the newly gleaming corporate spaces. This comes to a head in his novel Super-Cannes (2000), in which the conference centre aesthetic has created such boredom for their middle-class occupants that they have reverted to extreme, racial violence as a form of release. In novels such as Cocaine Nights (1996) and Kingdom Come (2006), air-con spaces become surreal backdrops for middle- class terrorism and consumer fascism. Even the BFI Southbank becomes an air-con space for Ballard in Mil- lennium People (2003), the NFT 3 cinema now a place of unfolding psychological terrorism with its thin carpets and empty sofas.
Ballard was building on Pakula’s vision of such para- noid spaces – and as London is increasingly turned into
one vast air-con space taken over by empty luxury flats, huge shopping centres and conference centres, Pakula’s trilogy appears more and more prophetic in its warn- ing of the dangers of the corporatisation of space. This danger was also hinted at in Mike Leigh’s Naked (1993), when Johnny (David Thewlis) talks his way into an empty corporate high-rise and ventures through its cor- ridors with the night-watchman Brian (Peter Wight). Johnny seems even more manic in this space than in the rest of film, reverting to conspiracy and paranoia as he predicts the end of the world at the birth of the new mil- lennium. His delusions almost ring true – not because of any sense of compelling argument but because he is stating them in the empty air-con space of the tower block: the apocalyptic and the banal here sit incredibly comfortably together.
Such spaces breed paranoia and hidden malevolence – the assassination of a politician, the surveillance of a call-girl or a politically unscrupulous break-in – making these films both unnerving and thrilling. Arguably, it is because these spaces still dominate our modern world that the trilogy has aged so well. We are undoubtedly living in their shadow, now simply ghosts on closed cir- cuit TV, forever observed by persons unknown.
i � Pakula’s�‘paranoia�trilogy’�plays�at�BFI�Southbank,�
London,�in�October�and�November�as�part�of�the�
‘Who�Can�You�Trust?’�season�of�thrillers.�A�BFI�
Compendium�book�to�accompany�the�season,�with�
essays�by�Lee�Child,�Jake�Arnott,�Sarah�Weinman�
and�others,�is�available�from�the�BFI�Shop,�Amazon�
and�book�shops,�priced�£18.99
Such spaces breed paranoia and hidden malevolence – the assassination of a politician, the surveillance of a call-girl or a politically unscrupulous break-in
Charles�Cioffi’s�villain�appears�to�be�omniscient�as�he�sits�in�his�office,�as�if�he�has�a�god-like�ability�to�observe�Jane�Fonda’s�call-girl�in�her�flat�far�below
The�vast�conference�centre�at�the�film’s�close�suggests�a�near�inhuman�scale,�with�shadowy�figures�who�frame�Warren�Beatty’s�journalist�in�an�immense�conspiracy�
The�film�opens�in�the�air-conditioned�corridors�of�the�Democratic�headquarters�in�the�Watergate�building,�as�the�five�burglers�are�disturbed�mid�break-in
KLUTE
THE�PARALLAX�VIEW
ALL�THE�PRESIDENT’S�MEN
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__MACOSX/Reading List/._065 Air-Conditioned Nightmare (Scovell 2017).pdf
Reading List/064 Visualising Social Patterns (Krebs 2010).pdf
__MACOSX/Reading List/._064 Visualising Social Patterns (Krebs 2010).pdf
Reading List/062 Interaction Design (Murray 2012).pdf
__MACOSX/Reading List/._062 Interaction Design (Murray 2012).pdf
Reading List/063 Internet Ugly Aesthetic (Douglas 2014) (1).pdf
journal of visual culture
journal of visual culture [http://vcu.sagepub.com] SAGE Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Copyright © The Author(s), 2014. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalspermissions.nav Vol 13(3): 314 –339 DOI 10.1177/1470412914544516
It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit: The Internet Ugly Aesthetic
Nick Douglas
544516VCU0010.1177/1470412914544516Journal of Visual CultureDouglas research-article2014
Abstract The internet has long-term aesthetic trends, one of which is Internet Ugly, a previously unnamed style that runs through many separate pieces of online culture, but especially through memetic content. Internet Ugly can be created by amateurs without specific aesthetic intention, or by creators choosing it intentionally as a dialect. It spreads on the internet thanks to the medium’s unique bottom- up architecture. Many memes (and many specific creators’ bodies of work) begin in Internet Ugly but evolve away from it. Long- abandoned forms of Internet Ugly can reappear on new platforms or from referential creators. While the style can be co-opted by corporate and political interests and sold back to many of its consumers, its core practitioners often respond to such exploitation with public outcry, or simply drop the co-opted version of the style for a new one. Internet Ugly embodies core values of many online creators and communities; therefore, understanding this aesthetic is crucial to any study of online culture.
Keywords 4chan • democratization • memetics • New Aesthetic • photo manipulation • Reddit • trollpunk • user-generated content
What Is Internet Ugly?
There’s a definable aesthetic running through meme culture, a celebration of the sloppy and the amateurish. It is eclectic and contains many visual genres. Its major techniques over time have included freehand mouse
Douglas It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit 315
drawing, digital puppetry, scanned drawings, poor grammar and spelling,1 human-made glitches, and rough photo manipulation. All of these techniques show up in multiple well-known memes, often in combination. While these tools are mostly computer-specific, the look they create is not at all like the New Aesthetic, which uses QR codes, pixellation, and machine-readable images to reinterpret the physical world through the eyes of computers. Internet Ugly is nearly the opposite, an imposition of messy humanity upon an online world of smooth gradients, blemish-correcting Photoshop, and AutoCorrect. It exploits tools meant to smooth and beautify, using them to muss and distort. It’s much closer to ‘trollpunk’, defined by internet- culture analyst Adrian Chen (2013) as a ‘movement focused on the drama that occurs when you fuck shit up on the internet’, but it’s found in plenty of non-trolling culture. And it creates its own standard of beauty counter to, but not exactly reversing, the mainstream values of symmetry and purity. Even when cleverly imitated by those with skill, it expresses an authenticity. Rather than a genre, it’s a cultural dialect, used not just to frame certain propositional content but to communicate things about its user, and as such it has users who can code-switch but are distinct from users who cannot naturally speak the dialect (Wallace, 2001).
Internet Ugly, although not the only core aesthetic of the internet, is the one that best defines the internet against all other media. It is certainly the core aesthetic of memetic internet content. The ugliness of the amateur internet doesn’t destroy its credibility because it’s a byproduct of the medium’s advantages (speed and lack of gatekeepers), and even its visual accidents are prized by its most avid users and creators. As opposed to media like TV or print, where the amateurish is marginalized and audience attention centers on mainstream blockbusters, the internet is built to give outsized attention to the amateurish, the accidental, and the surprise hit. Creators with no traditional skill or talent often become online celebrities for their work, and creators with skill or talent often suppress their abilities or manufacture amateurish conditions to better achieve the Internet Ugly aesthetic. But as we’ll see, such work isn’t simple cooption but a creative choice accepted and celebrated by the online audience – so long as it still retains a certain authenticity.
The aesthetic isn’t practiced by a single defined school, but it develops in certain large incubators built to encourage amateur contribution, or ‘user generated content’. For most of the last decade, the best known source of such work was 4chan (birthplace of LOLcats and rage comics), which lets users be not just pseudonymous, but absolutely, no-telling-if-you’re- replying-to-your-own-post anonymous. Every thread is deleted within days or sometimes minutes; these constantly-disappearing pages encourage rapid iteration of ideas. Users frequently make quick-and-dirty cut-and-paste photo manipulation as conversational volleys. But these images are rarely sophisticated – polish your reply in Photoshop for an hour and the thread might be done before you are.
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Over the past half-decade, 4chan has been replaced in influence by Reddit, a much more organized and permanent forum with over 15 million unique visitors per month. Reddit keeps permanent archives and usernames, it’s organized into topical ‘subreddits’, and its voting system rewards effort and promotes crowd-pleasing content, all of which diminish Internet Ugly. But quick visual responses still have a significant advantage. More importantly, the site has an anti-authoritarian culture that invites parody, a genre that always leans grotesque. (Several subreddits archive notable 4chan threads, calcifying their memetic content but raising the chance of future discovery and reiteration.)
The blogging platform Tumblr is becoming nearly as influential as Reddit; its reblog system rewards iteration on others’ work, and its culture is heavy with fandoms, whose original fan art ranges from professional to stick- figure. Major aggregating sites like FunnyJunk, the Cheezburger network, BuzzFeed, and 9GAG occasionally start memes but mostly spread them to a wider population for further iteration. Another layer of thousands of bottom-feeder blogs re-aggregate these memes, dig up instances not previously caught by their major competitors, and are later aggregated in return. The aggregation process favors ugly by emphasizing quantity over quality and leaning on failure-based (or ‘FAIL’) content. All of these sites run on user-generated content (taking pains to lower the bar for participation) and frequent posting, two ways to skew content uglier.2 Some major user- generated-content sites are not Internet Ugly incubators: Pinterest, while memetic, promotes a middle-class home-catalog aesthetic. Vimeo targets professionals and ‘artists’ rather than webcam vloggers and TV-clip uploaders, and its lack of ‘suggested videos’ prevents memetic iteration. Such sites, while filled with content by users and not a staff, are built to celebrate professional content. In general, Internet Ugly is an amateur- driven aesthetic.
Although the internet continually matures and offers slicker tools to make amateur work look professional, users will always reach beyond their technological capabilities. If, for example, software eventually enables any user to create original, professional-looking freehand sketches, some user will misuse it to create a freshly ugly kind of image. Someone else will use a different tool to vandalize the beautiful freehand sketches. Others will share amateurish sketches on platforms that don’t support the software. As you’ll see, much of Internet Ugly culture has already evolved this way. So long as some creators have more ideas than capabilities, there will always be an Internet Ugly.
Examples of Internet Ugly
To define the tools and the boundaries of Internet Ugly, I’ll analyze some specific examples. While the aesthetic can be traced back to the first images created online (including ASCII art from the pre-browser era), I’d like to focus on the last half-decade, after the explosion of
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social tools brought user-generated content to the front of the average internet user’s experience. We’ll see several uses of Internet Ugly: to democratize participation (as in Rage Comics and Snapchat), to give creators an excuse to practice their craft (as in Shitty_Watercolour), to innocently parody (as in the Shitty Network), to more critically satirize (as in the Bazinga comics), and to celebrate ugliness as authenticity (as in ‘Nailed It’). Because Internet Ugly can apply to content at every scale, these examples range from a platform with millions of users to a single Reddit account. Together, they help us understand why memetic culture so often works in the Internet Ugly mode, and how the aesthetic evolves as each incarnation matures.
1. Rage Comics
There’s a certain canon of ur-memes that became idioms, characteristic modes of expression used by thousands or millions of amateur creators.3 The most successful – the formats so identified with ‘memes’ that grandmothers and advertisers recognize them as such – include LOLcats, Advice Animals, and rage comics. Of these, rage comics are the easiest way to demonstrate Internet Ugly (see Figures 1–3).
The style is easily reproducible: stick figures, crudely drawn faces, cut-and-paste characters that anyone can slap a story onto, maybe with some original freehand sketches. The first rage comics (born on 4chan in 2008, near the height of that site’s influence), were four-panel strips ending in the same face screaming ‘FFFFUUUU-’. But once people got used to telling relatable stories with stick figures and copy-pasted faces, they expanded the form as far as possible. By 2011, 4chan and Reddit (specifically the subreddit /r/fffffffuuuuuuuuuuuu) were full of rage comics of all lengths and endings, and pure four-panel ‘FFFUUUU-’ strips were relegated to places like /r/classicrage. Several generators popped up, letting people create elaborate comics in their browsers.
The appeal is obvious: Everyone likes to tell personal stories (especially frustrations), comics are an engaging format for these stories, and the always-growing range of stock faces makes it increasingly unnecessary for the user to draw a single figure himself. The major faces form a pantheon of emotional archetypes. In 2011, an English instructor at a Japanese university had his students make rage comics as a teaching tool, citing their universal expressiveness, and created /r/EFLcomics to show his students’ work (Know Your Meme, 2013). These comics, written in beginner’s English and dramatically reinterpreting the stock drawings, doubled the corruption of communication. Reddit loved it, and other teachers noticed and joined in. Several students submitted their own work and pleasantly discussed them with the Reddit commenters (who helpfully corrected their grammar). The EFL comic below uses the traditional ‘[X] all the [Y]’ face (Know Your Meme, 2012: taken from the Internet Ugly webcomic Hyperbole and a Half, see Brosh, 2013) to indicate triumph (see Figure 4). The subreddit eventually limited submissions to certain approved users, thanks to English-fluent trolls submitting fakes. Such fakes are still authentically Internet Ugly, and, bonus, they’re trollpunk.
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Further layers of corruption depend on fluency in Internet Ugly. True connoisseurs will find themselves, when in the course of research, cackling at inanity like this gallery of alternate troll faces known as ‘Coaxed into a Snafu’ (see Figure 5; Caldwell and user El Ricardo, 2012–2014). This is the clearest example of how Internet Ugly contrasts with the New Aesthetic: while the latter explores how computers break down reality through pixellation and programming code, the former shows how humans corrupt ideas through imperfect reproduction. Internet Ugly could be seen as a reaction to the naturally occurring instances of the New Aesthetic. In an environment where information can easily be perfectly cut and pasted, users celebrate their human inability to make the same thing twice. These intentionally terrible rage faces express the separation of humans from machines as strongly as the analog beauty of an oil painting. (As I’ll explore later, the two approaches can be combined for a sweet-and-sour effect.)
The stick-figure, scrawled-in-MS-Paint style isn’t limited to Rage Comics. It’s a major strain of Internet Ugly that dominates Stoner Comics, Inglip,
Figure 1 Waiter Rage, a typical four-panel ‘classic rage’ ending with the original rage face. The portrayed experience is widely relatable and non- specific, which was as necessary for early rage comics as seasonal words are for haiku, in contrast to the ‘personal story’ mode now in vogue. Note the white background left in the stock photo of the plate of food, which could have been easily erased, but was left in to subtly emphasize the ‘minimal effort’ aesthetic. URL: Note the white background left in the stock photo of the plate of food, which could have easily been erased. To leave it in is to say, ‘you get the point’. It shows that the creator is giving the minimal information needed to tell the story. http://www.reddit.com/r/ classicrage/comments/ipzui/waiter_rage/
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Figure 2 Published as ‘Forever Alone, but Rich’. Typical of ‘personal story’ comics that quickly overran the initial ‘relatable moment’ comics and now comprise almost all non-classic-format rages. The phrase ‘Aww yeahhh’ is ironically borrowed from a different rage face but placed next to ‘Forever Alone’, implying that the authors are aware their date decision was questionable. URL: http://ragecollection.com/508
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Breaking Bad Comics, Dolan, Spoderman, Behind the GIFs, Troll Physics, Delicious Cake, Hyperbole and a Half, and many other memes that deserve further research.4
2. Shitty_Watercolour
Internet Ugly is not just a way to let anyone participate in a meme. It’s even found in single-user internet phenomena. For example, in 2012, a Reddit user named Shitty_Watercolour (2013) started illustrating people’s comments and photos, starting with a comically bloated but recognizable Geordi La Forge
Figure 3 Another example of Troll Face, a trickster character who later got his own genre, ‘Troll Physics’. While every face here is pre-fabricated, the restaurant owner and ‘Mother of God’ figures are from a later, more slickly drawn generation than the rest, adding to the sloppy collage effect. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/fffffffuuuuuuuuuuuu/comments/ulv1d/this_kid_ is_a_genius/
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(see Figure 6). The specific hilarity of this failed likeness became a constant goal, achieved with a specific process. Each painting took 20 minutes. Rather than letting each layer dry before applying the next, he took ‘one shot at doing it all in one go’ (Alfonso, 2012). He chose speed over quality. He was quickly rewarded with attention and praise on Reddit, and his work was widely covered on sites like BuzzFeed, the Daily Dot, the Huffington Post, and Wired (Pseudonym Shitty Watercolour, 2012). Shitty once battled with ShittierWatercolor, a user apparently drawing on an iPad (see Figure 7).
While Shitty’s version of Internet Ugly came from a non-computerized medium, Shittier’s sloppy use of a software tool – even one with beautifying features like fingertip input and varying opacity – was a more textbook example of Internet Ugly.
Two years later, Shitty’s work is no longer shitty, which he attributes partly to the constant practice on Reddit (User Shitty Watercolour, 2013). He’s become a very talented cartoonist, as shown in this early 2014 painting of pop star Lorde as a sloth (see Figure 8).
Thus Shitty_Watercolour, by embracing Internet Ugly, has practiced until he evolved out of it. As we’ll see, even when a meme is built by a group rather than an individual, it can cast off its Ugly component, often without losing its appeal to the original audience.
Figure 4 ‘Careless Girl’. The broom in panel 2 and the tossed-on hair in panels 1 and 2 drive home the symbolic, barely representational nature of these comics, while the hand-drawn bus handholds in panels 2 and 3 show some unusual attention to scenery. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/ EFLcomics/comments/letv1/careless_girl/
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Figure 5 Many other popular rage faces have been similarly corrupted. URL: http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/coaxed-into-a-snafu
Figure 6 From Shitty’s first day of Reddit watercolors. He claims he has only progressed as a cartoonist and is still terrible at realism. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/pics/comments/ psdgo/happy_birthday_you_magnificent_bastard/c3rx3eo
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Figure 8 Shitty likes to draw people as sloths. He’s also a moderator on /r/sloths. URL: http:// www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1sydlx/ hey_im_lorde_ama/ce2giny
Figure 7 Shitty_Watercolour and ShittierWatercolor compete to fail to depict the half-sunken Costa Concordia. Out of context, the results seem abstract. Both accounts drew even more mangled versions, then switched to drawing penises and friendly insults. This is a typical exchange between Reddit novelty accounts. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/pics/comments/ pvgoo/my_friends_dad_was_flying_out_of_rome_and_snapped/c3sl20q
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3. The Shitty Network
On Reddit, anyone can create a subreddit, and many of these are actively opposed to each other. There are parody subreddits (some goofy, some vitriolic) and parodies of parody subreddits and so on – a real Bakhtinian carnival. There are organized networks of parody subreddits, like The Shitty Network, which collects subreddits like /r/ShittyPoetry, /r/ShittyRageComics, /r/ShittyWallpapers, and /r/ShittyEarthPorn (Reddit, 2012–2014). From the last of those comes a post, ‘Beautiful Sunset Outside My Door This Morning’ (see Figure 9), a breathless Instagram-ready title that technically does not describe the anything-but-breathtaking photo above. The photo looks like (and maybe was) an accidental shot, made while fumbling with a phone..
Shitty Network image posts are often captioned with ironic braggadocio or false false modesty. One /r/ShittyWallpapers entry came with the description:
these are some of my custom movie walpapers please feel free to use them yes i did make them myself no i am not getting payed to do this i do it in my free time. i take requests as well they are all in 1024x768
Figure 9 Commenters noted that a morning sunset is indeed quite a rarity. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/ ShittyEarthPorn/comments/spgbu/beautiful _sunset_outside_my_door_this_morning/
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as that is what most pc moniters are. please let me know if you want to use them. (User Fealiks, 2013)
It contained images like this Sean of the Dead wallpaper (see Figure 10). Here we see intentionally poor use of computer-only tools: an image has been stretched into the wrong aspect ratio, saved at the wrong canvas size leaving blank space, and captioned with an arbitrary title placed at random over Simon Pegg’s face in inappropriate font in a color that gets lost in the image. The creator has put painstaking attention into imitating a total lack of attention. The submission text typifies ‘nailed it’- style humor, which exploits the gap between intentions (or self-image) and reality.
4. Nailed It
‘Nailed It’, aka ‘Expectations vs. Reality,’ is its own meme format. Each ‘Nailed It’ image compares an intended result to an actual one (see Figure 11). Many ‘Nailed It’ images are framed as failed recreations of images from Pinterest (a site where an older, female-skewed userbase makes aspirational ‘inspiration boards’ of magazine-ready photos of beautiful products, crafts, and meals). The more beautiful parts of the internet are thus cast as less real than the parts where people are an incompetent embarrassing mess. The difference in photo quality between the two halves of any ‘Nailed It’ image drives this home: beauty is only captured with careful lighting and expensive cameras, but any idiot with a smartphone can capture reality. This message is explicitly reinforced by comparisons of images before and after dramatic Photoshop touchups. Such comparisons often go viral, and only rarely originate outside the internet.
Figure 10 The original image includes faux-unintentional white space. URL: http://www.reddit.com/r/ Shittywallpapers/comments/19vue0/ these_are_some_of_my_custom_ movie_walpapers/
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Figure 11 Three popular ‘Nailed It’ images sum up the human condition. The cupcakes seem like a good-faith effort, while the duct-taped crayons were clearly the work of a child or an intentional satirist. The third image shows not just a human failure but even nature’s failure to provide gleaming blue water and a glowing sky. Even natural beauty is artifice. URL: http://www.smosh. com/smosh-pit/photos/21-hilarious-nailed-its — http://knowyourmeme.com/ memes/nailed-it — http://www.quickmeme.com/meme/3r0mut
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‘Nailed It’ achieves a major goal of Internet Ugly: to normalize imperfection, counteracting the effect of magazines, TV shows, and corporate websites that use technical tools to build an unattainable simulacrum of the world. As consumer brands expand their social media marketing, especially the discounted marketing of social media profiles on sites like Facebook and Twitter, they try to co-opt memes while retaining a level of on-brand polish. This tends to work fine with casual users, but it often alienates the core creators of Internet Ugly content. Memes invented by corporate advertisers are rarely built in the mode of Internet Ugly. More on corporate meme use later.
5. Bazinga Comics
4chan’s ‘Big Bang Theory’ comics aren’t an especially popular meme. But they’re a perfect example of people using computer tools to create the human expressions of Internet Ugly.
The comics parody CBS sitcom The Big Bang Theory and main character Sheldon Cooper’s catchphrase, ‘Bazinga’. Like parody comic ‘Garfield Minus Garfield’ and Twitter account @Seinfeld2000, the Bazinga comics subvert formulaic popular comedy by replacing its central elements with absurdity (see Figures 12, 13).5
The copy-paste jobs and sloppy resizings here are a ‘fuck you’ to traditional standards of photomanipulation. Like datamoshing or glitch art, they draw attention to inaccuracies in reproduction or transmission, but instead of emphasizing machine imperfections, they emphasize human messiness. These techniques show up in the New Aesthetic, but here they aren’t used to comment on machine vision. They’re used for expressing a very human attitude about a very human creation.6
These aesthetic choices effectively critique the bland, safe formulas of their subject. They rip Sheldon and his fellow characters out of their original context and refuse to provide a sensible new one. The Sheldon of these
Figure 12 Deleting the system32 folder will render Windows unusable. Sheldon’s advice is identical to a typical low-effort, but occasionally high- reward trolling response given to anyone seeking tech support on 4chan. URL: http://imgur.com/a/qVX7b
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comics exists in his own universe, where he is a cackling Loki figure with powers of body manipulation and a new catchphrase for every episode.
‘Bazinga’ corruptions not shown here include ‘bronchitis’, ‘zambingo’, ‘hydrangea’, ‘bedwangles’, ‘pop-a-squat’, ‘banana’, ‘bruschetta’, ‘bartsimpson’, ‘genocide’, ‘bilbo baggins’, ‘gimbaza’, ‘monorail’, ‘souvlaki’, ‘crabapple’, ‘salamy’, ‘balogna’, ‘jumanji’, ‘bukkake’ (this one actually related to the unsavory comic it ends), ‘blopckgzor’, ‘bazzango’, and ‘cowabazunga’. Each of these is formatted in a different text style. The written dialect mimics the visual aesthetic: everything is unsettlingly mutable and contextless. While there are definable rules for making one of these comics, they can’t be traced back to The Big Bang Theory, or to nearly any source outside the earlier comics. These comics speak their own idiolect.
6. Snapchat
Snapchat is harder to analyze memetically, since it’s even more ephemeral than 4chan – each image is only visible to a handful of people for 1 to 10 seconds. The images that users screencap and publish are a non-
Figure 13 A snaking chain of copy-pasted heads is common for online trickster characters; another characteristic is wavy, impossibly looping arms. Penny’s eyes and mouth are swapped for no apparent reason beyond added chaos. URL: http://imgur.com/a/qVX7b
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representative sample. Much more so are the ones that make it through the churn of blog aggregation. But a rough sample of photo lists and slideshows still reveals a celebration of ugly (see Figure 14).
Snapchat photos are firmly in the ‘reality’ half of the ‘Nailed It’ dichotomy. They’re popular because their ugliness is relatable and replicable. They’re Pinterest inspiration boards for the rest of us.
Despite its anti-memetic self-destruction feature, Snapchat is possibly the simplest, most effective meme-creator yet, and everything that makes it ephemeral encourages a lack of care, slickness, or beauty without actually preventing images from leaking to the rest of the internet. The creators advertise the app with magazine-ready pictures of beautiful young people partying at the beach, but there are already better apps for such photos. Pretty vacation pictures go on Instagram and Facebook where you can show your mom and scroll through them years later; a throwaway gross-face contest goes on Snapchat. We can only see the cream of strangers’ Snapchat exchanges, but the ones we don’t see are micromemes that disappear minutes after their inception.
Causes of Internet Ugly
The democratizing force of the internet is by now an accepted truism. But it’s important to note that previously, when someone had an idea they couldn’t elegantly execute, they were usually left without an audience. The near-zero production and distribution cost of the internet removes the
Figure 14 It’s typical to find the same memetic images with multiple sites’ watermarks, often overlapping on the same copy. ‘Fresh out of the shower’ is a parody of more earnest selfies taken by many young women. Each image was posted in a collection despite, or even because of, its aesthetic amateurishness. URL: http://www.brainwreck.com/lists/556/17-Pics-That- Prove-Snapchat-Is-Really-Dumb-But-Also-The-Best-App-Ever/3 — http:// sneaky-snaps.com/fresh-out-of-the-shower-no-make-up-funny-snapchats/ — http://izismile.com/2013/11/18/daily_picdump_99_pics.html
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barrier. Someone with a very clever idea for a comic strip can successfully spread that comic strip without a single editor deeming the art worthy. Rage Comics would never find first publication in a newspaper or on TV. So the most basic cause of Internet Ugly is that unpolished executions of good ideas can now be seen by millions.
The second cause begins with another banal truth: in addition to being a broadcast tool, the internet is home to many forms of one-to-one and small-group communications. But with few exceptions, anything created in those small groups is easily shared with different groups or the internet at large. (For example, thousands of private chats and Facebook threads are posted publicly to Reddit and Tumblr every day.) The obvious effect is that the former chaff of communication can go viral. The less obvious effect is that content previously classifiable as an unpublishable draft (a half-drawn portrait, an unshot script, doodles, 30 seconds of a song, a game with glitches) is now viable for publication. Take, for example, the fandom that sprang up in January 2014 around three color drawings from an imagined cartoon called ‘Miss Officer and Mr. Truffles’ (Ami, 2011–2014). In under a week, fans made hundreds of pieces of fan art, fanfiction, fanimation, imagined plotlines, scenes, backstory, supporting characters, theme music, audition videos, and cosplay for a cartoon that at that point didn’t actually exist. A good idea doesn’t need to be in its final draft to take off; it can still be a rough sketch. Like Rebecca Black’s ‘Friday,’ it can be something only intended for a small, forgiving audience (see Larsen, 2013) – or, in the case of Star Wars Kid (Bennett, 2010) intended for no audience. It can still be ugly. But the draft can still be treated as a draft – and in further iterations, it may shed its ugliness.
How Ugly Changes, Disappears, and Returns
As any meme grows, it may spread to more unfamiliar amateurs who uglify it. But it will also eventually reach participants with talent, time, and a love of beauty. Illustrator Sam Spratt, for example, painted elegant ‘photorealistic’ renditions of the most popular rage faces (see Figure 15). In his piece, titled ‘The Art of Internet Memes’, he retained the cartoonish features, adding baggy eyes, rough teeth, spittle and wrinkles. The effect is deliciously ugly.
Almost every popular meme has at one point been illustrated with care and talent. Others that rely on original drawings, like SFW Porn (Porn SFW 2008–2011) – where users paint over the naked bodies of porn actors so that a man is, say, simply holding a bottle of soda at waist height for two thirsty women – were first drawn by amateurs, then later iterated by talented artists. The amount of sheer effort and talent that went into such iterations was seen as a joke in itself. A novelty Reddit account called HandDrawnRage (2011–2013) earned wide praise on /r/classicrage for drawing charming original cartoons that followed the original rage comic format but looked slick, often even colored or shaded.
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Memes can also go through a larger shift that affects even the most amateurish iterations. The baseline aesthetic for a meme can improve as technologies are crafted for a specific expression. For example, the standardized image macros known as Advice Animals or Advice Memes began in 2006 with Advice Dog, a choppily cropped puppy head thrown onto a color-wheel background (Kim and Caldwell, 2011). Different iterations of Advice Dog used different fonts, effects, and text placements. The next several advice animals similarly displayed non-standardized text, sloppy crop jobs, and rough color-wheel backgrounds. But over the next three years, new advice animals became more sophisticated. The popular meme Courage Wolf was redesigned with a higher-quality, better-cropped copy of the original wolf face and a flashier backdrop (see Figure 16).
In 2009, Meme Generator (2009–2014) launched, making Advice Animal generation extremely simple for non-Photoshop users, and locking in the aesthetic by setting default text for new memes: centered all-caps white Impact type with a feathered black border, placed comfortably below the top and bottom edges of the image. (Other than the feathering, this was already the dominant formatting for advice animals, likely inherited from older macros like LOLcats.) Competitors like Quickmeme (2011–2014) adopted the same standards, and for the past three years advice memes have been as visually clean and uniform as Facebook pages. (Meanwhile, the content has devolved into personal stories and cliché – the downside of a meme going mainstream.)
The same standardization (a zen-like beautification that deletes imperfections) happens to major internet idioms. Sometimes the change is cultural, as when MySpace’s colorful but chaotic customized user pages were replaced by the whitewashed nested boxes of Facebook. Usually the changes are the simple result of technological improvements: text- heavy flat-color blog designs were replaced by gorgeous gradient-filled Tumblr themes. Typical YouTube uploads went from 240p to 720p or even 1080p – sharper than HDTV, and with ever-improving camerawork and postproduction. The GIF image format, responsible for grainy spinning ‘email us’ envelopes and animated under-construction workers, is now used for high-resolution TV and film clips. Reddit’s /r/highqualitygifs collects massive beautiful animated GIFs, and Vimeo uses the format for video thumbnails. Photographer Jamie Beck and designer Kevin Burg co-created a genre of beautiful, cinematic GIFs called ‘cinemagraphs’ (see Flock, 2011).
But new technologies, especially new platforms, can also revert the norms of beauty to ones from years ago. Most obviously, the mobile internet has yanked us back into the world of tiny screens and awkward inputs. Games like Draw Something revived the MS Paint aesthetic. Snapchat revived sloppy photography just when Instagram had nearly filtered the whole human experience into identically beautiful sunkissed Polaroids. For millions of photo sharers, Snapchat made ugly cool again.
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Machinima (animation made within video game environments) similarly rebooted computer animation by letting amateurs play with tools previously only available to professionals. Much machinima is made in officially-released ‘sandbox’ versions of mainstream games. One of the most popular machinima videos of all time is a 10-second clip titled ‘nope. avi’ (note the ‘casual’ lack of filename cleanup) with over 8 million views on YouTube (User Jimbomcb, 2010). The video is set in the beautifully designed world of the multiplayer first-person shooter Team Fortress 2, a game with a slick Tex Avery feel. The engineer character runs onscreen, but then his hardhat floats up and his neck stretches to meet it. The
Figure 15 Sam Spratt’s rage faces add detail without adding information. He is canonizing the original faces as equal to the pop culture icons of film, TV and music that he draws in similar styles. URL: http://samspratt. tumblr.com/post/7763194845/the- art-of-internet-memes
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effect is done without polish; it feels like something has gone wrong; it’s a bit ugly. This is the essence of the TF2 machinima genre, where amateur humans replace the smooth computer-controlled animation of the game with their own awkward puppetry. It resembles the awkward art of early professional computer animators. (Such animations will inevitably become slicker, and the cycle may repeat with some not-yet- invented platform.)
As machinima demonstrates, as tools previously limited to professionals become available to amateurs, those tools are used amateurishly. Torrenting made Photoshop ‘affordable’ for anyone with an hour to spend on properly installing a pirated copy without alerting Adobe. It’s highly doubtful that every amateur participating in Fark.com’s no-finesse-required Photoshop contests paid $700 for a legal copy (Fark, 2001–2014). Unlike the more aesthetically focused contests on sites like Worth1000, where winners are often chosen for their elegant executions, Fark’s contests are won by the best ideas. In fact, the sloppy execution of such ideas can be part of the charm. In other circles, Photoshop is intentionally misused, like the gradient fills and custom brushes in ‘Bazinga’ or the use of Content Aware Fill to create body-horror patterns (User BlastedContentAware, 2010). These misuses are then incorporated into more mainstream work and accepted as intended tool uses, inspiring further tools.
Video editing has similarly trickled down to amateurs, not just through Final Cut/Premiere piracy but also thanks to relatively powerful consumer-priced tools like iMovie (free with a Mac),7 and the built-in editing tools on online recording systems like YouTube.
Finally, old kinds of Internet Ugly can return through nostalgic affectation. Designer Catherine Frazier (2012–2014) created the blog Animated Text in 2013 to turn funny or bizarre phrases into animated word art. In animated GIFs, floating, waving, or rotating text declares, ‘help! im in love with a fictional princess’ or ‘i before e if you want the d.’
Figure 16 Three versions of Courage Wolf: an early version; a version with a previous caption sloppily erased; and the current standard. URL: http://memedump.com/v/courage+wolf/courage- wolf-24.jpg.html — http://goteaminternet.com/show/61616 — http:// memegenerator.net/Courage-Wolf
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Frazier was inspired by ‘old ’90s websites on internetarchaeology.org’, according to her interview with the Daily Dot:
Here were websites with people who did not consider themselves designers but felt empowered enough to make a flaming ‘My boy is hot’ text GIF or ‘The O’Neals’ text animation and put it on their family reunion homepage … That’s why I decided to make animated text requests for my followers, many of whom don’t feel empowered [by] creativity because they’re not designers. I also like the idea of collaboration on the Internet. My followers’ role in contributing text requests is just as important as my role the creator. (Fenn, 2013)
As in the offline world, this nostalgia cycle will likely continue as each generation rediscovers the tools of its youth and replicates their effects with new tools. Internet creators use nostalgia, constricted platforms, and trickled-down professional tools to invent unintended uses for tools, redevelop forgotten methods, and create internet culture outside the ‘best practices’ of professionals working with cutting-edge tools. The results are passed around and further uglified or beautified in a perpetual cycle.
When Ugly Sells Out
Part of the aesthetic cycle of internet content is its co-option by corporate and political interests, whose goals are often at odds with those of internet creators. The dialectical purposes of Internet Ugly, as we’ve seen, include glorifying the amateur, validating the unglamorous, and mocking the self-serious, formulaic, and mainstream. Its practitioners will try to punish any entity that runs counter to these or similar purposes, yet tries to hijack their aesthetic.
In 2010, Hot Topic put Rage Guy on a t-shirt. They apparently figured that since no one could identify the drawing’s rightsholder, they had a popular character without any licensing costs. Of course they miscalculated: hundreds of 4chan and Reddit users felt ownership over Rage Guy and resented its corporate exploitation. They took revenge. They turned Rage Guy into Race Guy, making new racist rage comics and posting on Hot Topic’s Facebook page threatening boycotts (see Kim B and user ArtyHaire, 2010). Two days later, Hot Topic (2010a) announced in a Facebook post that it would drop the shirt due to the ‘newest iteration’. The next day, however, Hot Topic (2010b) announced that Race Guy was a hoax and they would continue selling the shirt. Four years later, while Rage Guy is no longer available, Hot Topic (2014) sells several other rage comic characters on shirts, including Trollface, Forever Alone, and Y U NO. The faces are slightly smoothed from their original versions, but are otherwise just as they appeared online. After their initial setback, Hot Topic has successfully co-opted Internet Ugly.
This is the fate of many Internet Ugly memes: To get slicked up and diluted for use in commercials, products, and political agendas. For instance, Republican
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Congressional representatives Tom Massie and Steve Stockman both used Doge images for political ends in late 2013: Stockman criticized Senator John Cornyn for supporting Obamacare and disliking Rand Paul, while Massie (mistakenly applying the Advice Meme caption style rather than Doge’s Comic Sans) protested a bipartisan spending bill (see Horowitz, 2013). MNSBC reporter Adam Serwer tweeted, ‘ok so doge just died’ (Serwer, 2013), other Twitter users critiqued the correct spelling (see Pool, 2013), and the Huffington Post wrote that the representatives had ‘ruined’ Doge by ‘trying to be hip’.
The criticism of Massie and Stockman was not just over outsiders ‘exploiting’ the meme, but over their failure to understand the aesthetic they were trying to exploit. This criticism is leveled even more often within the bounds of the Internet Ugly production machine; 4chan’s userbase has long hated eBaumsWorld and the Cheezburger Network, accusing them of the same exploitation and theft as Hot Topic’s. Tumblr and 4chan had a brief war that fizzled out when Tumblr gleefully embraced 4chan. Many redditors loathe 9GAG, Cheezburger, Gawker, and often BuzzFeed (though other redditors link to those sites). Gawker writers rage against Reddit while their colleagues mine it for stories. Encyclopedia Dramatica, a meme cataloguer predating the now-dominant Know Your Meme, defends 4chan against all other contenders – its leaders have even organized harassment of Know Your Meme employees, their friends, and their families.
In any of these rivalries, the hostilities are usually lopsided. Gawker makes no claim to superiority in meme creation, and Cheezburger often credits Reddit. The accusers usually paint themselves as the true practitioners of internet culture, and the others as the pretender and exploiter. The accuser claims their culture is illegible to the outsider, whose attempt to catalog or define the subject will always grossly oversimplify it (whether through the mistakes of a hapless academic or the intentional revisionism of a cultural appropriator), then popularize the oversimplified version, to the detriment of the subject. This is why 4chan frequently reacts by spreading misinformation; the users know that outsiders seek authenticity and, if confused, may retreat. Of course, to the true outsider audience, it doesn’t matter whether a meme came from 9GAG or 4chan, and on average, this audience will choose the more palatable form of the meme. This carelessness and ‘tastelessness’ enrages the insider who feels that the outsider has ‘stolen’ and ‘ruined’ their culture.
These intramural fights show that practitioners view Internet Ugly use as an earned privilege. Newcomers can’t simply appropriate the meme, but must do the work of engaging with it on its own level. In this way, the aesthetic is a dialect: As David Foster Wallace (2001) wrote, ‘A dialect of English is learned and used either because it's your native vernacular or because it’s the dialect of a Group by which you wish (with some degree of plausibility) to be accepted.’ And some would-be interlopers, by trying to exploit the dialect for their own agenda before they understand it, offend the community they wanted to break into.
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Advertisers and politicians adopting Internet Ugly for their own agenda will inevitably come across as posers. They present their own cause in earnest terms, already a violation of most subsections of Internet Ugly, which value irony and self-deprecation. They will also prioritize their message over accurate imitation of the aesthetic, so they will inevitably mangle the aesthetic.8 They are nakedly seeking acceptance from a social group they haven’t actually joined, one they will abandon when it’s no longer popular and desirable. They research Internet Ugly through its most accessible outlets like Know Your Meme, BuzzFeed, and Gawker. So insular sites like 4chan will always hate sites that catalogue their culture, because to them, these sites are aiding the enemy. By codifying the rules of a still- evolving meme, these sites usurp the originating site’s authority over the meme, handing it to ‘posers’ who skipped over the primary source and treat the secondary account as gospel. Of course, eventually these new users overwhelm the old, the meme is redefined, sometimes repackaged for an even more mainstream audience, and the original meme-makers move onto something new and restart the cycle.
Conclusion
The websites, apps, and communication platforms that make up the internet – in technologist David Weinberger’s (2002) words, ‘small pieces loosely joined’ – all exist somewhat independently but constantly share content and users and are thus never truly independent. They develop regionalisms, but those regionalisms spread more quickly than in the physical world, as most internet users have more than one online ‘home’. (For example, 4chan and Reddit share thousands of users; DeviantArt users tend to also have Tumblrs; nearly every internet creator has a Twitter account.) The works of Internet Ugly could be characterized as the internet’s ‘folk art’: they reflect the cultures of the sites that invent and reshape them, they have purposes outside serious aesthetics, and they’re often made by amateurs.
While it has no self-appointed school of practitioners, the Internet Ugly aesthetic is a major through-line of meme culture. It can appear and disappear from a developing meme, and these shifts can (as in the case of Advice Animals) carbon-date a meme’s spread into the mainstream. It’s a visual dialect with social and cultural implications, as it telegraphs the practitioner’s casualness, capacity for irony, and internet savvy. And it is a tool of the rebel that, like all such tools, will be co-opted by the objects of rebellion. The success of those co-options will depend on their sophistication and timeliness, and it will not preclude further rebellion.
The tools of Internet Ugly will continue to shift as new technologies become the available default. As software publishers upgrade or replace tools like iMovie and Photoshop, the standards for engineered beauty will continue to escalate, but creators will use the same new tools to question and subvert those standards. As old forums for creativity wither, new ones will crop
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up. New platforms will continue to reintroduce old constraints and revive old aesthetics, and new online communities will create their own voluntary constraints and affected visual carelessness.
Internet Ugly will look very different in 10 years, but it will remain distinct from most non-memetic or corporately produced content. It’s the aesthetic of the mundane conversation and idle doodlings that have always existed, but which the internet makes shareable by default. While it will evolve unpredictably, it won’t disappear as long as public ideas continue to outpace perfect execution.
Notes
1. Internet Ugly’s linguistic counterpart deserves its own rich study, which TechCrunch columnist Jon Evans kicked off well in ‘Such DFW. Very Orwell. So Doge. Wow.’ (http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/11/such-dfw-very-orwell- so-doge-wow/). Examples of this parallel dialect include Weird Twitter, copypasta, Hipster Runoff, and YouTube comments. For this piece, I’ll simply explore it as an aspect of the visual dialect of Internet Ugly, which often combines pictures and words.
2. The process also strips most content of context and source attribution, and spreads lower-quality (shrunk, compressed, and watermarked) copies of the original image. It’s a great backup system, but it’s a scholar’s nightmare. It’s also uglifying.
3. There used to be a semi-definable canon of all internet culture. Greg Rutter took a stab at codifying a reading list in 2009 with YouShouldHaveSeenThis.com; a year later he made a second list of 99. In 2012, I asked him about sequels; he said there were far too many must-sees now to pick merely 99 at a time.
4. The way other people evangelize Breaking Bad, I evangelize Breaking Bad Comics, with equal justification.
5. Not the more popular pastiche @ModernSeinfeld. 6. The New Aesthetic has been collaboratively defined, largely by example,
over the past four years: — http://www.riglondon.com/blog/2011/05/06/ the-new-aesthetic/ — http://booktwo.org/notebook/sxaesthetic/http://new- aesthetic.tumblr.com/ — http://www.wired.com/2012/04/an-essay-on-the-new- aesthetic/
7. As the editor of a YouTube channel with dozens of freelance contributors, I’ve been shocked to learn how many talented contributors are still getting by with this rudimentary software.
8. The most famous and successful corporate meme, Old Spice Guy, entirely avoided appropriation, instead starting with original content, then engaging internet users and personalities without any impersonation of their dialect or aesthetic. Old Spice Guy traded videos with webcammers, but he remained in his slick studio. He did not sit in a computer chair or quote Advice Animals.
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Nick Douglas runs Slacktory, a YouTube comedy channel and comedy aggregation blog. He is the former editor of the Silicon Valley gossip blog Valleywag (2006) and the internet culture blog Urlesque (2009–2011). In two of these jobs he got paid to invent Advice Animals.
Email: [email protected]