No.8 Ture False
S&P Financial Institution ERM Rating Criteria February 1, 2016.pdf
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General:
A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices
Primary Credit Analyst:
Richard Barnes, London (44) 20-7176-7227; [email protected]
Secondary Contact:
Michelle M Brennan, London (44) 20-7176-7205; [email protected]
Table Of Contents
ERM Evaluation Structure
Our ERM Evaluation Methodology And Assessment Guidance
A. Risk Governance
B. Operational Risk
C. Credit Risk
D. Market Risk
E. Liquidity And Funding
APPENDIX: CHANGE HISTORY
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 1
1611820 | 300070507
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General:
A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices (Editor's Note: We originally published this criteria article on May 3, 2007. We're republishing this article following our
periodic review completed on Feb. 1, 2016. As a result of our review, we updated the author contact information. Section VII G
headed, 'Risk Position' in the article titled "Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions," published Nov. 9, 2011, partially
supersedes this article. As a result of that change, we modified the five key assessment sections A through E to a "weaker" to
"stronger" attributes format, changing "weak" to "weaker" and "excellent" to "stronger". This criteria article supersedes the article
titled "Assessing Enterprise Risk Management Practices Of Financial Institutions," published on Sept. 22, 2006.)
This article provides further guidance on the key risk factors considered by Standard & Poor's Ratings Services when
assessing the risk management techniques at financial institutions.
As part of our ratings assessment, we consider how well the institution's risk policies, procedures, and tools fit its risk
profile and contribute to its strategic and commercial development. Here, we outline the "roadmap" of high-level issues
that we consider to form our opinion on the relative strength of the various parts of a financial institution's ERM
framework.
A Standard & Poor's ERM assessment centers on the following five key areas: risk governance; operational risk; market
risk; credit risk; and liquidity and funding.
This report lists the types of questions we consider to assess the institution's practices in each of these areas and
typical features that would affect our opinion of how the institution's practices align with its risk profile and how well
they compare with the industry. For each risk area, the roadmap also shows the types of features that are characteristic
of institutions with weaker to stronger attributes.
A financial institution's ERM capabilities are critical to its overall creditworthiness; thus our assessment of these
capabilities forms an important part of any credit rating. We view financial institution risk management practices from
a holistic perspective and recognize that ERM is a dynamic and forever evolving discipline. Our analytic framework
reflects various dialogues with financial services companies about the evolving nature of risk management practices
across the industry.
Evaluating an ERM framework is no different than conducting other types of credit risk analysis. Analysts make a
judgment about the robustness of an institution's risk management practices based on its risk profile, the
appropriateness of the risk framework to the risk profile, its processes for managing risk, and its ability to mitigate risk.
The assessment also considers best practices observed in the industry.
This article is a follow-up article to "Criteria: Assessing Enterprise Risk Management Practices of Financial
Institutions," our most comprehensive review to date of the analytical framework and criteria we use to assess
enterprise risk management (ERM) practices at financial institutions, which was published on Sept. 22, 2006.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 2
1611820 | 300070507
ERM Evaluation Structure
Standard & Poor's ERM assessment centers on the following five key areas:
A. Risk governance;
B. Operational risk;
C. Market risk;
D. Credit risk; and
E. Liquidity and funding.
In most cases, risk governance is the most critical area of our evaluation, as it typically drives the quality and strength
of an institution's risk management framework. The figure below depicts risk governance as the foundation of our ERM
evaluation structure. Here, we assess the institution's risk culture, risk appetite, quality of risk disclosure, and ability to
view its aggregate risks.
The other major areas of risk that are assessed are market risk, credit risk, funding and liquidity, and operational risk. A
structural defect in the operational risk approach can lead to a significant impact not just in one business silo, but
across the entire enterprise. Embedded within the analysis of these broader risk areas are assessments of an
institution's management of business, legal, and reputational risks.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 3
1611820 | 300070507
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General: A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices
Our ERM Evaluation Methodology And Assessment Guidance
The remainder of this document outlines some of the key questions Standard & Poor's analysts must address for each
of the five major components of our ERM assessment process. The examples provided by no means constitute a
complete set of the issues we would typically address, but show a selection of relevant issues.
We have included a "roadmap" for the qualitative considerations we employ in our analysis, illustrating how we
evaluate an institution's practices. The text shows the types of features that are characteristic of institutions arrayed
stronger to weaker. For example, an institution with weaker risk governance will tend to view risk management as a
cost center that adds little value. Such an institution will therefore have insufficient staffing and resources in its risk
functions. An institution with stronger risk governance will tend to involve risk management functions closely in
planning, and will have risk management professionals with high status within the firm.
A. Risk Governance
This component assesses an institution's risk culture, risk strategy, risk appetite, and risk awareness level.
Does the risk management function have sufficient stature within the firm?
• Weaker: Risk management is regarded as a policeman, or a cost center that adds little value. Staffing and resources are insufficient.
• Adequate: The risk management department stands independent of business units and is regarded as a valued partner. It enjoys access to senior management and is staffed by quality employees. There is a demonstrated
organizationwide commitment to risk management.
• Strong: The track record shows that the formal risk management department acts as a valued partner to the business units by advising them on both "local" and enterprisewide risks. Risk management is closely involved in
planning and budgeting, and risk professionals rank highly within the firm. Indicators of a strong framework can
include the existence of an Chief Risk Officer who reports directly to the CEO, and the existence of a Risk
Management Board with nonexecutive director representation that reports to the board. There is clear evidence of
board involvement in risk management issues.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in ensuring that risk management occupies an important niche in the firm.
How well does the firm establish and articulate its risk appetite? Is it consistent with the articulated business strategy, and what is the role of risk management in this process?
• Weaker: The company is unable to express aggregate risk tolerance. Risk management is minimally involved in evaluating the organization's risks and developing the business strategy.
• Adequate: Some kind of aggregate risk tolerance measure is available, but it is either based on insufficient data or defined relatively vaguely. Tolerance may not be defined well in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
• Strong: The risk appetite has been established following a rigorous, collective review of risk-reward trade-offs. The tolerance is well defined both qualitatively and quantitatively. Staff members are well able to express the risk
appetite of the firm.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry when it comes to the articulation of risk appetite.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 4
1611820 | 300070507
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General: A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices
Is the reach of the risk management function sufficiently wide across the group? Are the established policies of the business lines consistent with the group's stated risk appetite and business strategy?
• Weaker: Risk is monitored silo-by-silo. The entity has little ability to acquire a consolidated view of risks across the enterprise.
• Adequate: The firm monitors risk primarily by silo, but can monitor and aggregate some risks across the organization. Business lines' risk policies parallel group policies.
• Strong: The institution has a demonstrated track record of success in monitoring and aggregating risks across the organization, including smaller/remote subsidiaries. Risk management initiatives are well coordinated across the
entity. Business line risk policies parallel group policies, and strategies and commercial policies are consistent with
group risk appetite and objectives. Economic capital, a balanced business scorecard, or a similar approach is
actively used in the day-to-day management of the business.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in ensuring that risk is managed across the entire enterprise.
How well informed is senior management on risk issues? Is there effective internal reporting of risk issues? How good is external disclosure?
• Weaker: Meetings between senior management and risk staff are infrequent. Risk reporting is poor, and risk reports serve only a compliance role and are rarely perceived to have a wider business role.
• Adequate: Risk committee structures are in place, with improving metrics and report formats. Risk issues are discussed at a strategic forum. While there are regularly scheduled internal audits of the risk management function,
risk reporting may be more reactive than proactive.
• Strong: The institution employs high-quality internal and external risk management reporting, with regular discussions in risk committees. The reporting framework is strong and well supported by the business units,
showing visible improvements over time. The evaluation of risk issues is embedded in strategic decision making,
budgeting, and planning. Risk reports are expected to contain tangible strategic applications, with a demonstrated
link between risk reporting and commercial decisions. Risk issues that emerge are brought to the attention of senior
executives quickly, responses are timely, and there is a track record of effective action being taken. A good balance
has been struck between the measuring and modelling of risk, and the actual management of business risks.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in ensuring that senior management is kept apprised of potential enterprisewide risks.
B. Operational Risk
This component evaluates the level of operational risk management practices employed within the institution, the level
of awareness of the operational risk management processes, and the degree to which the institution uses its
operational risk management analysis in its decision-making process.
Does the firm have a usable definition of operational risk?
• Weaker: A lack of understanding of the firm's operational risks pervades the firm's staff. • Adequate: Business lines are developing or have improved their definitions of operational risk. • Strong: A clear and consistent firmwide definition avoids overlaps with credit risk and market risk, for example. • Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in
ensuring that the boundaries of operational risk are defined in a clear and usable manner.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 5
1611820 | 300070507
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General: A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices
Is there an effective framework in place to capture operational risk exposures and loss data?
• Weaker: No comprehensive data-gathering framework exists. Operational losses are sometimes disguised as credit risk or market risk losses.
• Adequate: A consistent structure for capturing loss data has been developed (this may have been slowed by acquisitions). Potential exposure is assessed through key risk indicators, and control self-assessments, for example.
• Strong: The firm coordinates its efforts across business lines to capture and track "trigger" events and risk indicator data. It maintains a consistent structure for capturing loss data, which is not undermined by recent acquisitions. A
transparent methodology has been developed for classifying key risk indicators.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in the strength of its operational risk evaluation framework.
Does the operational risk analysis affect decision making and controls?
• Weaker: The feedback mechanism linking loss data to operational controls is inadequate. Indeed, operational risk initiatives seem to be driven mainly by regulatory compliance.
• Adequate: The firm has shown clear responses to operational risk issues, but control improvements are mainly reactive. It is developing a process to allocate capital to the businesses for operational losses.
• Strong: A clear management focus and operational risk analysis via the use of operational risk dashboard reports drive control improvements. The firm has taken a proactive stance on operational risk issues, and a proven track
record of effective responses is also evident. In the case of operational losses, a process for allocating capital to the
businesses has been clearly articulated.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in integrating operational risk analysis into management decisions.
Which Basel II approach is the firm adopting?
The advanced measurement approach may be an indicator of good operational risk management practices.
Are there sufficient resources devoted to operational risk issues?
• Weaker: Back-office structures are not always independent of the businesses. Remote locations of the company have weaker structures.
• Adequate: A clear organizational structure for the back office, independent of the business, has been established. Several risk-related training opportunities are available to staff. The company is developing disaster recovery plans
and business continuity plans. It has demonstrated an ability to cope with emerging operational risk issues.
• Strong: High-quality personnel, and strong training and development structures are evident. Data-recovery processes and business continuity plans are in place and continue to show enhancements. The firm maintains well
documented and frequently (and preferably randomly) tested business continuity plans.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its commitment to provide the appropriate resources to mitigate operational risk.
Is there a well-defined approval process for new products? How are illiquid products valued?
• Weaker: New product definition is unclear and final sign-off is vested with the business. • Adequate: A new product approval process is in place, but can occasionally be circumvented. • Strong: The risk function, in conjunction with the other support functions, vets new products, and can provide final
sign-off. Risk management also vets pricing models, including data inputs.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in empowering the risk management function to provide input on new products.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 6
1611820 | 300070507
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General: A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices
C. Credit Risk
This component of the ERM evaluation structure looks at how an institution's underwriting practices are linked to its
credit risk appetite, as well as the robustness of the techniques used in monitoring and managing its credit portfolio.
Can the firm ensure that its underwriting criteria are consistent with its risk appetite?
• Weaker: Ineffective risk criteria. There is an apparent willingness to compromise underwriting standards to achieve short-term profit/growth targets.
• Adequate: Policies have been put in place, but may be not be sufficiently clear or subject to regular reviews. The number of exceptions to official policies may be sufficiently high to question their effectiveness.
• Strong: Clear risk and pricing policies have been established and are reviewed regularly. Effective credit scoring and delegated authorities are in evidence. Experienced and well-qualified personnel have implemented policies in a
consistent manner.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in establishing underwriting criteria consistent with its risk appetite.
Does the firm have appropriate structures in place to monitor its credit portfolio for potential problems?
• Weaker: The institution lacks the necessary metrics and data to monitor the evolution of its portfolio. The entity is hampered by its limited ability to extract segment data quickly.
• Adequate: The institution is improving its risk metrics, but its ability to track performance may be limited for some products/segments. Data may be stuck in silos or insufficiently flexible to respond to changing needs. Staffing may
be adequate, but some concerns exist about individuals' depth of experience, and the overall availability of
resources for collections/recoveries.
• Strong: Effective portfolio analytics have been developed to monitor performance by product and vintage, track watch-list credits, and transfer underperforming exposures to collections/recoveries. There is more-than-adequate
staffing of collections/recoveries units with experienced personnel in charge. The institution has conducted
extensive analysis into the adoption of a specific credit modelling approach, with assumptions and limitations
clearly documented. It boasts a solid track record of reserves/provisions versus actual losses.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in monitoring its credit portfolio for potential risks.
Does the institution have access to sufficient portfolio management techniques, including credit risk-mitigation tools?
• Weaker: Only reactive techniques for managing exposure to particular entities or sectors are available. Few conscious decisions about the appropriate levels of risk for the company are made, and the management of risk
concentrations is haphazard or insufficiently comprehensive.
• Adequate: Efforts have been made to manage the portfolio more proactively, with a conscious decision about the level of risk to be retained, but a limited range of tools or techniques are available. Risk concentrations are
monitored and managed at a group level.
• Strong: The enterprise has taken a highly proactive view of the credit risks in the portfolio and methodically controls exposure to particular segments through a range of potential tools. Policies regarding hold levels and arrangements
for sale of assets have been made clear, with teams' actions monitored closely. Reviews of particular portfolios are
conducted using stress tests.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in the techniques it uses in managing portfolio risk.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 7
1611820 | 300070507
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General: A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices
Does the credit risk management framework feed into decision making?
• Weaker: The feedback mechanism from credit risk metrics to commercial and strategic decisions is inadequate. The use of some credit risk metrics and models seems to be driven mainly by regulatory compliance.
• Adequate: Clear responses to credit risk issues, with a process to allocate capital to the businesses for credit risk. • Strong: Management understands credit metrics and processes well. It demonstrates a proactive approach as well
as having a solid track record of effective responses to credit risk issues. Use of more advanced Basel II approaches
typically indicate that the firm has more sophisticated data and risk management techniques, if backed by
demonstrated understanding by management, and clear business usage of the information.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its linking of its credit risk management into management decision making.
D. Market Risk
This component of the analysis assesses the quality of the risk management processes that the institution has
established for managing trading risk and structural interest rate risk.
Does the market risk function have a sufficiently broad reach?
• Weaker: The market risk function has a narrow remit, limited controls, and loose or inconsistent coverage. It relies on over-simplistic measurement techniques. Management has a limited understanding of the market risk reports.
• Adequate: Expanding coverage of market risk across the group is evident. Some areas may still be excluded. Management generally has an acceptable understanding of the market risk reports.
• Strong: The market risk framework captures risks borne by subsidiaries, including nonbanking subsidiaries. Market risks associated with pensions and other employee benefits are also captured, if relevant. Regular usable reports are
issued at a group level to assess the groupwide position.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in ensuring that its market risk function has a broad reach.
Can the firm express and manage its tolerance for structural interest rate risk? What about structural foreign-exchange risk and equity risk?
• Weaker: These risks are not measured or managed effectively. There is no defined remit. Limits or controls are loose and there are over-simplistic measurement techniques.
• Adequate: The firm has improved its measurement of structural interest rate risk (or foreign exchange or equity risk, as relevant), but it may still be only partial. Risk reports may give less effective guidance to management, and the
firm's tools are not sophisticated enough when compared with evolving industry standards. Metrics should be
appropriate for the risk type.
• Strong: The institution has designed a risk-adjusted approach to produce profits within risk parameters that have been agreed by the board and senior management. Structural interest rate risk is measured comprehensively, with
regular reporting and value-added metrics (typically with scenario analysis that is considered usable by the
business).
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in managing structural interest rate risk.
Is the firm's asset-liability management framework sufficiently robust, given the assumptions it has made on relevant factors such as duration and prepayments?
• Weaker: The firm uses unrealistic assumptions that heavily influence the reported exposures. • Adequate: Clear assumptions are made, but with more limited back-testing or use of stress testing.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 8
1611820 | 300070507
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General: A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices
• Strong: The firm uses assumptions that are back tested, stressed, and clearly articulated. The firm evaluates multiple scenarios, and takes into account behavioral characteristics rather than contractual characteristics only.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry when it comes to incorporating assumptions into its asset-liability management framework in a rigorous and robust manner.
Is there a robust approach to limits and the use of stress tests?
• Weaker: The business units have excessive authority. The usefulness of stress testing is limited by a view that stress tests are for regulatory compliance, not for adding value. Senior management neither understands nor appreciates
stress tests.
• Adequate: There is a clear process for assigning limits, and unambiguous (but restricted) procedures for the granting of exceptions. All excesses and breaches of limits are reported quickly to the appropriate executive level. Stress
tests are used, but may have insufficient granularity and only a small role in decision making.
• Strong: Close cooperation has been established between the business units and risk functions. Only risk management can approve excesses over key limits. Dual limit structures may be used. Regular stress testing of
macro, historical, and hypothetical scenarios is conducted. A range of stress tests is used, but are all considered
relevant. Stress tests and scenario analyses are run and revised at an appropriate level of granularity for the business
profile.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in conducting stress tests and using limit frameworks to support its businesses.
E. Liquidity And Funding
This attribute of the ERM assessment evaluates the integrity of the institution's risk management processes for
managing liquidity and funding risk.
Does the firm have a well-established funding policy? Does it place an appropriate emphasis on funding concentration and mix (by product, maturity, and investor, for example)?
• Weaker: The institution is overly focused on minimizing the cost of funds and possesses a limited understanding of liquidity risks. It also demonstrates difficulty or unwillingness to diversify the funding profile.
• Adequate: The institution has diversified its funding mix, but with a more reactive--rather than proactive--policy. Its views on the appropriate levels of funding concentration may not be rigorously formed.
• Strong: The institution maintains a diverse funding profile, without over-reliance on any single source. The firm has a proactive view toward its funding mix. It has clearly defined views about the optimal funding mix, with
appropriate limits and guidelines.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in creating the right mix of funding concentrations and managing its funding base proactively.
Does the firm have appropriate contingency plans for a liquidity crunch?
• Weaker: Underprepared for a liquidity crunch, this company uses insufficiently severe stress tests that do not prompt follow-up actions. Risk management techniques are slow to respond to growth in more sensitive funding
sources.
• Adequate: Contingency plans are used, but are either not very detailed or are not rolled out at the appropriate levels across the group (for example, by subsidiary or country). Exposure to a potential downgrade may only be monitored
in times of stress. Risk management techniques may still be adjusting to recent growth in the use of some more
sensitive funding sources.
• Strong: The firm undertakes detailed stress tests and liquidity continuity scenario planning. Demonstrated links
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 9
1611820 | 300070507
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General: A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices
between these tests and management actions have been established. With a clear-eyed view of the potential effects
of a downgrade, the entity has developed a plan to manage this exposure. The group's risk management framework
takes account of its reliance on sensitive funds.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in establishing contingency plans for a liquidity crunch.
Does the firm have sufficient liquidity capacity to raise emergency funds without damaging its franchise?
• Weaker: Inadequate emergency liquidity sources mean that the firm is overly reliant on committed bank lines and/or questionable liquidity sources.
• Adequate: Sufficient emergency liquidity sources have been earmarked, but they may be relatively concentrated. • Strong: The firm holds sufficient unencumbered liquid assets, as well as central bank lines and/or other sources of
emergency liquidity to meet stress outflows.
• Stronger: The organization exhibits all "strong" characteristics, and is an acknowledged leader in its industry in maintaining sufficient emergency liquidity capacity.
APPENDIX: CHANGE HISTORY
Feb. 1, 2016 – As a result of our review, we updated the author contact information. Section VII G headed, 'Risk
Position' in the article titled "Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions," published Nov. 9, 2011, partially
supersedes this article in areas related to scoring the characteristic attributes. As a result of that change, we modified
the 5 key assessment sections A through E to a "weaker" to "stronger" attributes format. This criteria article supersedes
the article titled "Assessing Enterprise Risk Management Practices Of Financial Institutions," published on Sept. 22,
2006.
Jan. 28, 2015 - As a result of our review, we updated the author contact information. Section VII G headed, 'Risk
Position' in the article titled "Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions," published Nov. 9, 2011, partially
supersedes this article. This criteria article supersedes the article titled "Assessing Enterprise Risk Management
Practices Of Financial Institutions," published on Sept. 22, 2006.
Additional Contact:
Financial Institutions Ratings Europe; [email protected]
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 10
1611820 | 300070507
Criteria | Financial Institutions | General: A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices
STANDARD & POOR'S, S&P and RATINGSDIRECT are registered trademarks of Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC.
S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P
reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites,
www.standardandpoors.com (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com and www.globalcreditportal.com (subscription) and www.spcapitaliq.com
(subscription) and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information
about our ratings fees is available at www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees.
S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective
activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established
policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.
To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain
regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P
Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any
damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.
Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and
not statements of fact. S&P's opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase,
hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to
update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment
and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does
not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be
reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives.
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or any part
thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval
system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be
used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or
agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not
responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for
the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an "as is" basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT'S FUNCTIONING
WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no
event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential
damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by
negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Copyright © 2016 by Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC. All rights reserved.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT MAY 3, 2007 11
1611820 | 300070507
- Research:
- ERM Evaluation Structure
- Our ERM Evaluation Methodology And Assessment Guidance
- A. Risk Governance
- Does the risk management function have sufficient stature within the firm?
- How well does the firm establish and articulate its risk appetite? Is it consistent with the articulated business strategy, and what is the role of risk management in this process?
- Is the reach of the risk management function sufficiently wide across the group? Are the established policies of the business lines consistent with the group's stated risk appetite and business strategy?
- How well informed is senior management on risk issues? Is there effective internal reporting of risk issues? How good is external disclosure?
- B. Operational Risk
- Does the firm have a usable definition of operational risk?
- Is there an effective framework in place to capture operational risk exposures and loss data?
- Does the operational risk analysis affect decision making and controls?
- Which Basel II approach is the firm adopting?
- Are there sufficient resources devoted to operational risk issues?
- Is there a well-defined approval process for new products? How are illiquid products valued?
- C. Credit Risk
- Can the firm ensure that its underwriting criteria are consistent with its risk appetite?
- Does the firm have appropriate structures in place to monitor its credit portfolio for potential problems?
- Does the institution have access to sufficient portfolio management techniques, including credit risk-mitigation tools?
- Does the credit risk management framework feed into decision making?
- D. Market Risk
- Does the market risk function have a sufficiently broad reach?
- Can the firm express and manage its tolerance for structural interest rate risk? What about structural foreign-exchange risk and equity risk?
- Is the firm's asset-liability management framework sufficiently robust, given the assumptions it has made on relevant factors such as duration and prepayments?
- Is there a robust approach to limits and the use of stress tests?
- E. Liquidity And Funding
- Does the firm have a well-established funding policy? Does it place an appropriate emphasis on funding concentration and mix (by product, maturity, and investor, for example)?
- Does the firm have appropriate contingency plans for a liquidity crunch?
- Does the firm have sufficient liquidity capacity to raise emergency funds without damaging its franchise?
- APPENDIX: CHANGE HISTORY
__MACOSX/._S&P Financial Institution ERM Rating Criteria February 1, 2016.pdf
S&P Financial Insitution Rating Criteria.pdf
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks:
Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions Primary Credit Analyst: Vandana Sharma, New York (1) 212-438-2250; [email protected]
Secondary Contacts: Terry Chan, Melbourne (61) 3-9631-2174; [email protected] Michelle Brennan, London (44) 20-7176-7205; [email protected] Arnaud De Toytot, Paris (33) 1-4420-6692; [email protected] Stefan Best, Frankfurt (49) 69-33-999-154; [email protected] Rodrigo Quintanilla, New York (1) 212-438-3090; [email protected] Xavier Chavee, New York (1) 212-438-6834; [email protected] Angelica Bala, Mexico City (52) 55-5081-4405; [email protected] Hans Wright, London (44) 20 7176 7015; [email protected]
Global Financial Institutions: Vandana Sharma, Criteria Officer, New York (1) 212-438-2250; [email protected]
Global Corporates & Governments: Colleen Woodell, Chief Credit Officer, New York (1) 212-438-2118; [email protected]
Table Of Contents
I. SCOPE OF THE CRITERIA
II. SUMMARY OF THE CRITERIA
III. CHANGES FROM REQUEST FOR COMMENT
IV. IMPACT ON OUTSTANDING RATINGS
V. EFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITION
VI. METHODOLOGY: SETTING THE ISSUER CREDIT RATING
VII. METHODOLOGY: STAND-ALONE CREDIT PROFILE
A. Economic Risk
B. Industry Risk
November 9, 2011
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 1
916400 | 300003452
Table Of Contents (cont.)
C. The Anchor SACP: Combining Economic Risk And Industry Risk
D. Bank-Specific Analysis: Building On The Anchor SACP
E. Business Position
F. Capital And Earnings
G. Risk Position
H. Funding And Liquidity
VIII. METHODOLOGY: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FRAMEWORK
A. Factoring Government Support Into The SACP
B. Factoring Government Support Into The Indicative ICR
C. Rating Banks Above The Sovereign
APPENDIX
RELATED CRITERIA AND RESEARCH
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 2
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks:
Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions (Editor's Note: This article supersedes and partially supersedes the articles listed in the Appendix.)
1. Standard & Poor's Ratings Services is updating its methodologies and assumptions for rating banks. This update
follows our request for comment "Banks: Rating Methodology," published Jan. 6, 2011. This article supersedes
those articles listed in the Appendix.
2. The criteria constitute specific methodologies and assumptions under "Principles Of Credit Ratings," published Feb.
16, 2011.
3. The criteria represent a significant change and aim to enhance the comparability of ratings on financial institutions
with ratings in other sectors (see "Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions," published June 3, 2009).
The criteria are designed to improve transparency of bank ratings globally.
4. The criteria articulate the steps in developing the stand-alone credit profile (SACP) and issuer credit rating (ICR) for
a bank, including a consideration of the potential for additional direct support from the bank's parent group or
sovereign government. The criteria place heightened emphasis on economic risk and industry risk in setting the
starting point or "anchor" in rating a financial institution. The anchor is then adjusted for bank-specific factors,
such as capitalization, management, risk position, and others, to determine the SACP (see "Stand-Alone Credit
Profiles: One Component Of A Rating," published Oct. 1, 2010). Lastly, the criteria apply analysis of an
institution's support framework, including both potential government support and corporate group support (see
chart 1).
5. The criteria place the SACP for an average bank in developed economies in the 'bbb' and 'a' categories; the
lowercase letters intentionally differentiate these credit profiles from the issuer credit ratings. As a result, only banks
with stronger business positions, and capitalization sufficient to withstand a scenario of severe or extreme stress
without reliance on external support, may be assigned higher SACPs. The potential for any extraordinary
government or group support will be factored into the ICR after the SACP has been determined.
6. The criteria limit rating movements on banks as a result of cyclical changes. Bank ratings of 'AAA' will still be
possible. But such a bank would have to possess credit characteristics, including capitalization levels, that are
significantly stronger than those maintained by most banks pre-2007.
I. SCOPE OF THE CRITERIA
7. The criteria apply to ratings on retail, commercial, and corporate and investment banks. The definition of a bank is
broad and includes the larger broker-dealers, mortgage lenders, trust banks, credit unions, building societies, and
custody banks. The criteria do not apply to ratings on finance companies, asset managers, exchanges,
clearinghouses, and regional securities brokers.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 3
916400 | 300003452
II. SUMMARY OF THE CRITERIA
8. The methodology consists of two key steps: determining the SACP and assessing extraordinary government or group
support. Once the likelihood of extraordinary support is established, then the criteria establish a bank's indicative
ICR. The indicative ICR is a component of the ICR derived by combining the SACP and support conclusions (see
¶193). In most cases, the ICR is at the same level as the indicative ICR (see chart 1). In some cases, set out in
¶¶19-24, the criteria allow for the assignment of an ICR that is one notch higher or lower than the criteria for the
SACP and extraordinary support imply.
9. Issue ratings on hybrid instruments and preferred stock reference the SACP while issue ratings on senior unsecured
instruments reference the ICR (see chart 1 and "Bank Hybrid Capital Methodology And Assumptions," published
Nov. 1, 2011).
10. The assessment of the SACP rests on six factors (see chart 2). The first two factors, economic risk and industry risk,
draw on the Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) methodology (see "Banking Industry Country
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 4
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Risk Assessment Methodology And Assumptions," published Nov. 9, 2011). They represent the strengths and
weaknesses of the broader operating environment that situate, or anchor, the SACP. The other four factors represent
bank-specific strengths and weaknesses. Based on the analysis of these factors, the SACP is notched up or down
relative to the anchor.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 5
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
11. The support framework considers both the relationship between a bank and its parent group or government and
how this relationship alters a bank's overall creditworthiness. Conclusions about support (beyond the support
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 6
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
included in the SACP, see ¶167) and the SACP combine in the assignment of the indicative ICR. The indicative ICR
is the same as the SACP unless the bank is likely to receive additional capital, liquidity, or risk relief from the
government or the parent group in a crisis. In practice, a bank normally receives help from either its parent group or
government. Accordingly, a bank that is a subsidiary receives the higher indicative ICR resulting from application of
either the group support framework or the government support framework (see chart 6).
III. CHANGES FROM REQUEST FOR COMMENT
12. On April 20, 2011, Standard & Poor's published "What's Happening With The New Bank Criteria? An Update On
Feedback And Implementation." A majority of investors and issuers who provided comments to Standard & Poor's
supported the increased transparency around bank ratings. The changes below (¶¶13-16) reflect market feedback on
various aspects of the criteria framework.
13. First, the anchor is no longer adjusted for investment banking activities. Instead, this adjustment is part of the
assessment of business position and risk position. A bank with significant investment banking activities may have a
riskier business position than a commercial bank whose business is focused on taking deposits and making loans.
14. Second, funding and liquidity are combined into one factor. In addition, the criteria now allow one notch of uplift
for a bank with above-average funding and strong liquidity and with an SACP of 'bbb-' and higher. However, such
uplift is likely to be rare in practice (see tables 15-17).
15. Third, a bank with an anchor SACP below 'bbb-' whose risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio is in the adequate or
higher category can receive an uplift of one or two notches (see table 3) if it maintains common equity regulatory
Tier 1 capital in excess of 7% (see ¶¶88-89).
16. Lastly, Standard & Poor's has also revised the BICRA methodology (see "Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment Methodology And Assumptions," published Nov. 9, 2011), which assesses the relative credit strengths
and weaknesses of national banking systems. The approach to analyzing economic risk and industry risk is an
important part of the bank criteria (see ¶¶29-41 and table 2).
IV. IMPACT ON OUTSTANDING RATINGS
17. These criteria will result in ratings changes that are broadly consistent with the ratings impact stated in the request
for comment "Banks: Rating Methodology," published Jan. 6, 2011, and updated in "How Standard & Poor's
Intends To Finalize Its Bank Criteria And Apply Them To Ratings In The Fourth Quarter Of 2011," published Nov.
1, 2011.
V. EFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITION
18. These criteria are effective immediately. We intend to complete our review of the bank ratings within the next six
months. Additional information related to the transition is provided in "How Standard & Poor's Intends To
Finalize Its Bank Criteria And Apply Them To Ratings In The Fourth Quarter Of 2011," published Nov. 1, 2011.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 7
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
VI. METHODOLOGY: SETTING THE ISSUER CREDIT RATING
19. The ICR is set at the same level as the indicative ICR (subject to the criteria shown in ¶¶206-212), or one notch
higher or lower in some cases, according to the criteria in ¶¶19-24. Most of the time, there will be no need to adjust
the indicative ICR up or down. If applied, the sum total of adjustments to the universe of banks that Standard &
Poor's rates will be roughly even, and if not, no greater than a 2:1 ratio of upward to downward adjustments.
20. The view of a bank's creditworthiness is refined by considering its relative credit standing among all banks with a
similar SACP, that is, the same or one notch higher or lower. For example, if a bank has a SACP of 'a-', it is
compared with other banks with SACPs of 'a', 'a-', and 'bbb+'.
21. In the final peer review, the capital sustainability ratio (see table 10 and ¶90) and the earnings buffer ratio (see table
11 and ¶¶105-110) are the primary metrics for the comparison. The combination of these earnings measures means
that stronger-than-average earnings are only recognized when a bank also maintains or grows capital.
22. The indicative ICR is higher by one notch when a bank is:
• In a positive transition that reduces risk or improves creditworthiness that is not already fully captured in the indicative ICR; or
• Subject to political, social, economic, or competitive trends that are strengthening creditworthiness; or • A sustained and projected outperformer in its peer group with ratios more reflective of the higher rating, unless
already captured elsewhere in the methodology.
23. A bank whose regulatory ratio is "at risk" (see table 8) or whose liquidity is "weak" (see table 16) would not
qualify for a one-notch uplift detailed in ¶22.
24. The indicative ICR is lower by one notch when a bank is:
• In a negative transition that increases risk or reduces creditworthiness that is not already fully captured in the indicative ICR; or
• Subject to political, social, economic, or competitive trends that are weakening creditworthiness; or • A poor performer in its peer group with ratios more reflective of the lower rating.
VII. METHODOLOGY: STAND-ALONE CREDIT PROFILE
25. Economic risk and industry risk represent macro analysis of the creditworthiness of a bank while business position,
capital and earnings, risk position, and funding and liquidity represent microanalysis (see the BICRA methodology).
26. These bank criteria use the BICRA's economic risk and industry risk scores to determine a bank's anchor SACP (see
table 2), the starting point in assigning an ICR. The anchor SACP is adjusted up or down the ratings scale after
taking into account a bank's specific strengths and weaknesses in the following factors:
• Business position, • Capital and earnings, • Risk position, and • Funding and liquidity.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 8
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
27. The criteria call for an SACP for most of the banks Standard & Poor's rates. There are some circumstances when
assigning an SACP is not meaningful because of a bank's high degree of operational or financial integration with a
parent or in a group. In these cases, the bank is economically a cost center or division, even though it may legally be
a separate company (see "Group Rating Methodology And Assumptions," published Nov. 9, 2011).
28. The result of the analysis described in ¶26 is a bank's SACP, an interim step in assessing a bank's overall
creditworthiness. This SACP includes government support as described in ¶167 but does not include extraordinary
support.
A. Economic Risk
29. Economic risk is the first factor in determining the SACP. A change in an economic risk score of a country might
result in a change in the anchor SACP, SACP, or ratings on a bank with business in that country.
30. The BICRA economic risk score of the country (or countries) where a bank operates captures the economic risk of
the bank. The BICRA economic risk scores range from group 1 (very low risk) to group 10 (extremely high risk).
31. Economic risk takes into account the stability and structure of a country's economy, its economic policy flexibility,
actual or potential imbalances, and the credit risk of economic participants--mainly households and enterprises. The
BICRA methodology seeks to identify the potential for adverse economic developments and the banking system's
capacity to adjust to them (see the BICRA methodology).
32. When a bank is active in more than one country, the economic risk score is calculated as a weighted average of the
economic risk scores--called weighted-average economic risk (see table 1). The proportion of a bank's business in
each country that represents its main economic risks is used to weight the economic risk scores. The economic risk
score should reflect the bank's underlying economic risks. The calculation only includes countries where a bank
conducts more than 5% of its business. All weightings are rounded to the nearest 5% before averaging.
Table 1
Hypothetical Example Of Weighted-Average Economic Risk For A Bank
Country Weighting (% of business) Economic risk* Weighted economic risk
France 45 2 0.9
U.S. 20 4 0.8
Switzerland 15 1 0.15
India 10 5 0.5
Japan 10 2 0.2
Weighted-average economic risk -- -- 2.55
*On a scale from 1-10, lowest to highest risk.
33. For a lending institution, the weighted average is calculated according to the proportion of loans in each country.
When lending activities are minor, other measures of underlying economic risks determine the weights. The analysis
is based on a geographic breakdown of a bank's loan book or the adjusted exposure used in risk-adjusted capital
analysis (see "Bank Capital Methodology And Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010). Adjustments are made for
likely changes in the bank's risk footprint--for example, as a result of acquisitions in new countries.
34. For stand-alone investment banks, the country where a bank has its headquarters determines its economic risk score.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 9
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Investment banking activities are defined as debt and equity underwriting, mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
advisory, sales and trading, principal investment, and proprietary trading.
35. In addition, the capital charges in the risk-adjusted capital framework (RACF), Standard & Poor's criteria for
assessing a bank's capital, are scaled using a country's economic risk score. Higher risk weights are applied to the
same exposures in countries with a higher economic risk assessment (¶74).
B. Industry Risk
36. Industry risk is the second factor in determining a bank's SACP, and a change in a country's industry risk score
might result in a change in the anchor SACP, SACP, or rating on the bank.
37. A bank's industry risk is determined by the BICRA industry risk score for the country where it is domiciled and
primarily regulated. The BICRA industry risk scores range from group 1 (very low risk) to group 10 (extremely high
risk).
38. Industry risk assesses three structural features of a country's banking industry: (1) the institutional framework or the
quality and effectiveness of bank regulation and the track record of authorities in managing financial sector turmoil;
(2) competitive dynamics or the competitive landscape and performance, financial products and practices, and the
role of nonbank financial institutions; and (3) funding through the debt markets or government, including the role
of the central bank and government.
39. As part of the analysis of industry risk, competitive dynamics determines the degree of use of complex products,
including financial derivatives. Aggressive use of complex products and derivatives contributes to higher industry
risk; the absence of complex products and derivatives supports a lower industry risk assessment.
40. Because industry risk addresses the range and strength of funding options available to banks in a country, including
the role of the central bank and government, the SACP includes elements of ongoing government support (see ¶167).
41. Unlike economic risk, industry risk is not calculated as a weighted average when a bank operates in more than one
country. The main reason for this is the importance of the bank's home regulatory framework.
C. The Anchor SACP: Combining Economic Risk And Industry Risk
42. Economic risk and industry risk anchor the creditworthiness of a bank in its operating environment. Specifically, the
bank's economic risk and industry risk scores are associated with a particular anchor SACP (see table 2). The anchor
SACP is a globally consistent, relative ranking of creditworthiness across national banking markets and ranges from
'a', the least risky, down to 'b-', the riskiest.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 10
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Table 2
Determining The Anchor SACP From Economic Risk And Industry Risk
Economic risk*
Industry risk* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 a a a- bbb+ bbb+ bbb
2 a a- a- bbb+ bbb bbb bbb-
3 a- a- bbb+ bbb+ bbb bbb- bbb- bb+
4 bbb+ bbb+ bbb+ bbb bbb bbb- bb+ bb bb
5 bbb+ bbb bbb bbb bbb- bbb- bb+ bb bb- b+
6 bbb bbb bbb- bbb- bbb- bb+ bb bb bb- b+
7 bbb- bbb- bb+ bb+ bb bb bb- b+ b+
8 bb+ bb bb bb bb- bb- b+ b
9 bb bb- bb- b+ b+ b+ b
10 b+ b+ b+ b b b-
*On a scale from 1-10, lowest to highest risk where economic risk and industry risk scores are rounded to the nearest whole number prior to the application of the table.
SACP--Stand-alone credit profile.
43. The 'a' level, the strongest anchor SACP, reflects the volatility of banking even in the strongest markets. By
embedding this notion of volatility into the anchor SACP, the criteria aim to ensure that lessons of the post-2007
economic downturn will not be forgotten as national economies recover and another period of favorable conditions
gives rise to growth and attractive headline banking profits. Banks will likely continue to respond more severely to
otherwise moderate economic shocks because they are confidence-sensitive and many carry high leverage.[1] In
recognition of credit stability as a key issue in ratings, Standard & Poor's does not assign a long-term ICR of 'AA'
where it would likely fall below 'A' within one year under moderate stress conditions. Similarly, Standard & Poor's
would not assign an 'A' rating where it will likely fall below 'BB' within one year under the same stress (see "Credit
Stability Criteria," published May 3, 2010). Significantly, observations of banking crises throughout history show
that the SACPs of many important banks in developed markets would have fallen below 'a' under this bank criteria.
Therefore, even in countries that offer the most favorable environment, the criteria set the anchor SACP no higher
than 'a'.
44. Serial banking crises throughout history demonstrate that depositors and investors can lose confidence
quickly--leading to bank failures, government bailouts, and dampened economic growth, as Reinhart and Rogoff
describe in their book, "This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly." Confidence sensitivity and
leverage in a banking system can turn a moderate stress into a more severe and protracted downturn.
45. Reinhart and Rogoff's empirical study of banking crises in 66 countries between 1800 and 2008 shows that they are
commonplace in both advanced and emerging economies. For example, since 1800, there have been 13 banking
crises in the U.S., 12 in the U.K., and 15 in France. This pattern of banking sector boom and bust and government
support will likely repeat itself in some fashion, regardless of governments' recent and emerging policy response.
New laws put in place following previous crises, such as deposit insurance, have not always prevented subsequent
downturns. Banking crises will likely happen again.
46. In addition, in response to the recent financial crisis, various supervisory authorities concluded that banks were
undercapitalized leading up to 2007. Many studies, including those by the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 11
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
the Swiss Commission of Experts, and the U.K.'s Independent Commission on Banking, suggest that capital
standards need to be raised materially to address the leveraged and interconnected nature of banks around the
world. Standard & Poor's analysis shows that despite banks' efforts to improve capital levels, their leverage
continues to be high in 2011. For example, the final report of the Swiss Commission of Experts for limiting the
economic risks posed by large companies concluded that the appropriate level of capital for institutions that are
"too big to fail" is 19%, consisting of 10% common equity and 9% contingent convertible bonds.[2] Likewise, the
U.K.'s Independent Commission on Banking recently recommended that large U.K. banking groups should have
"primary loss-absorbing capacity of at least 17%-20%."[3]
47. The anchor SACP integrates the reality that capital is generally not a ratings strength and that banking is an essential
yet volatile business. Banks play an important role in national economies through their conversion of shorter-term
deposits into longer-term loans. Providing interest to depositors protects the value of their savings from inflation,
and providing loans to governments and the private sector stimulates investment and growth. By operating with
increasingly high leverage--borrowing more from savers and the debt capital markets--banks can lend more, which
means greater economic growth. For their high-leverage business position to work, banks rely on the continuing
confidence of depositors and investors in their creditworthiness to roll over maturing deposits and refinance
maturing debt. And governments aim to boost this confidence through regulation and supervision to protect
economic growth.
D. Bank-Specific Analysis: Building On The Anchor SACP
48. After the determination of the anchor SACP, the criteria consider each bank-specific SACP rating factor--in other
words, an analysis of a bank's individual characteristics. The assessment of each factor can raise or lower the anchor
SACP by one or more notches--or have no effect in some cases (see table 3). These conclusions are expressed using
specific rankings and descriptors. These rankings and descriptors, in turn, determine the number of notches to apply
to the anchor SACP to determine the level of a specific bank's SACP.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 12
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
1. Comparative analysis and peer review 49. The main purpose of comparative analysis and the peer review is to provide context for assessing the bank-specific
rating factors and to set the ICR.
50. Comparative analysis, which takes on slightly different forms for each SACP rating factor (see table 4), helps
develop the bank-specific analysis. In some cases the analysis is relative, and in others it is absolute. Specifically, the
analyses for business position, risk position, and funding are all relative while the analyses for capital and earnings
and liquidity are absolute.
51. A bank is generally compared with all banks in its home country.
52. Once the indicative ICR is determined, the criteria also use a final peer review to set the ICR (see ¶¶19-24). Here,
the peer group is banks with a similar SACP, i.e., the same or one notch higher or lower (see ¶20).
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 13
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Table 4
The Focus Of Comparative Analysis For Each SACP Rating Factor
SACP rating factor Comparative group Guidance
Business position
Banks with similar industry risk*
The comparative analysis for business position comprises all banks with a similar industry risk score. A bank is generally compared with all banks in its home country.
Capital and earnings
All banks globally The comparative analysis for capital and earnings comprises all banks. Globally consistent metrics are used as absolute measures to benchmark performance for the capital and earnings assessment.
Risk position Banks with similar economic risk and product mix*
Comparative analysis supports the more qualitative conclusions about risk position with the more quantitative risk assumptions in capital and earnings analysis, to determine whether those assumptions are appropriate for a bank. A bank's loss experience and Standard & Poor's loss expectations that are lower than average imply lower risk. Conversely, larger comparative losses imply higher risk. The comparative analysis for risk position comprises all banks with a similar economic risk score and product mix.
Funding and liquidity
Funding: all banks in a country / Liquidity: all banks globally
The comparative analysis for funding comprises all banks in a country. Specifically, banks are compared with the domestic industry average so that this assessment of funding remains consistent with the BICRA funding assessment. The liquidity subfactor uses a bank's liquidity ratios and dependence on central bank funding to make a comparison with national and international banks. Accordingly, the comparative analysis for liquidity comprises all banks.
*When there are not enough domestic banks or when many similarities exist among national banking industries, the comparison can include international banks. The
relative creditworthiness between banking industry and economic risk is determined by the BICRA (Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment) criteria. A bank is compared
with banks within a category of the BICRA industry and economic risk scores. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile.
E. Business Position
53. The third SACP rating factor, business position, measures the strength of a bank's business operations. Business
position is the combination of specific features of the bank's business operations that add to or mitigate its industry
risk score. The criteria group these features into three subfactors: business stability, concentration or diversity, and
management and corporate strategy. Relative strength is assessed through a number of indicators (see table 5).
Where they are relevant and available, quantitative metrics are used; however, much of the assessment is qualitative.
Table 5
Business Position Subfactors And Indicators
Subfactors Explanation Indicators
Business stability (¶¶57-61) The stability or fragility of a bank's franchise
Revenue stability, market shares, and the customer base
Concentration or diversity (¶¶62-67)
The concentration or diversification of business activities
Contributions of different business lines and geographies to overall revenue
Management and corporate strategy (¶¶68-72)
The quality of management, strategy, and corporate governance
Strategic positioning, operational effectiveness, financial management, and governance and financial policies
To adjust the anchor for business position, see table 3, Using Bank-Specific Analysis To Determine The SACP.
54. For each bank, the strength of its business position is scored using one of six standard descriptors (see table 6),
based on conclusions about its strength relative to the comparative analysis described in table 4.
55. Though the three subfactors are assessed independently, it is important to understand how they may reinforce or
weaken each other. The assessment is not a simple addition of metrics for the three subfactors. For example, if the
concentration of revenues from a single region or a single line of business results in an even more negative view of a
weak business stability assessment, it will lead to a very weak score. In addition, stronger areas do not automatically
offset or "average out" weaker areas. Instead, the focus is on identifying risks and determining whether they
combine to further increase or reduce overall risk.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 14
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
56. An "adequate" business position means that the industry risk score appropriately captures the risk of a bank's
business activities. In other words, when compared against banks with a similar industry risk score, a bank's
business activities represent average risk. An assessment of "very strong" or "strong" means that a bank's business
activities are less risky than average. An assessment of "moderate," "weak," or "very weak" means that a bank's
business activities are riskier than average. Each descriptor determines the adjustment, in notches, to the anchor
SACP (see table 3).
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 15
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
1. Business stability 57. Business stability is the first subfactor in the business position assessment. Business stability is the predictability of
continuing business volumes in the face of economic and market fluctuations. This is important because the erosion
of confidence that a bank may suffer during times of market turbulence exposes it to the possibility of sudden
default risk. Customers and counterparties can walk away, and access to liquidity in the capital market can dry up.
A business position that contains this sudden default risk is inconsistent with an SACP in the 'a' category.
58. A key lesson of the banking crisis that started in 2007 was that differences in franchise stability and confidence
sensitivity significantly affect creditworthiness. Financial institutions with large trading operations--particularly in
derivatives--are sensitive to an erosion of confidence. A bank whose revenues are highly impervious to an economic
downturn or a period of market turbulence is associated with stronger business stability. On the other hand, a bank
whose revenues are susceptible to significant volatility during moderately adverse conditions is associated with
weaker business stability.
59. The criteria use measures of revenue stability, market share, and the customer base to compare a bank's business
stability with that of domestic banks and banks with a similar industry risk score in other countries. The
comparative analysis focuses on the underlying contribution of business lines to total revenues and earnings and on
Standard & Poor's estimates for their future contribution. Business lines with recurring fee income and net interest
income that have a strong annuity characteristic are more stable. In contrast, the following income sources are less
stable:
• Trading income, including interest income from trading activities; • Net interest income coming from above-average asset-liability mismatches; • Other market sensitive income; and • Fee income from off-balance-sheet financing.
60. Business stability supports an adequate or stronger business position when a bank has two or more of the following
characteristics:
• The customer base is demonstrably "sticky," that is, there are long-standing customer relationships and they generate a high proportion of revenues. There is strong evidence that customers are likely to stay with the bank
during a financial stress;
• Revenues are less sensitive to market perceptions of creditworthiness; • Favorable contractual terms, such as credit-related termination events or triggers, exist in many contracts with
customers and counterparties; and
• A bank is less reliant than the industry on pricing to retain customers.
61. Potential instability of business lines exists and can lead to a moderate or weaker business position when a bank has
two or more of the following characteristics:
• Customers can easily switch their business to other providers. There is no evidence that customers are likely to stay with a bank during a financial stress. The relationship between customers and a bank is based on a series of
one-off transactions open to market tender;
• There are few or no direct relationships between the end customer and the bank. A bank relies on third parties to supply business volumes;
• Recurring fee or interest income from long-standing customer relationships represent a lower proportion of
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 16
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
revenues than average in the industry;
• Revenues are more sensitive to market perceptions of creditworthiness than for the industry; • A bank relies more heavily on pricing to attract and retain customers than for the industry; and • Unfavorable contractual terms such as financial covenants, credit triggers, and collateral requirements that are
more demanding than for banks with a similar industry risk score carrying out the same types of trades.
2. Concentration and diversity of business activities 62. Concentration and diversity is the second subfactor of the business position assessment. Concentration and diversity
of business activities are measured by the contributions of different business lines and geographies to a bank's
revenues, compared with banks with a similar industry risk. Entities with a broader mix of business activity are
lower risk, and entities with a narrower mix are higher risk. Concentration in business activities can partly offset
many of the strengths in the business position assessment.
63. The concentration of business volumes or revenues can lead to less stable and predictable revenues, which weakens
the business position. On the other hand, successful diversification can lead to more stable and predictable revenues.
Successful diversification means that a bank's earnings were stronger than the industry during the last domestic
downturn and since then, management has not increased the bank's exposure or risk appetite materially.
64. The criteria treat a bank as more concentrated than average for the industry when it has a more limited product
range or geographic breadth, particularly for a bank with significant regional, product, or customer concentrations.
Even if concentration is in an attractive region, product, or customer segment, it may be a weakness. Regional
presence must be considered in the context of the size of the local or regional economy. For example, a focus on the
U.S. State of Texas is very different from, and far less concentrated than, a focus on a Swiss canton.
65. Business diversification can either be a strength or a weakness in a bank's business position. Successful and
continuing diversification supports a stronger business position. Such business diversification is often international
and is supported with evidence that the bank is overall less susceptible to volatility in domestic business and
economic conditions than is average for banks in the home industry. Poor diversification weakens the overall
business position. For example, a bank will weaken its overall business position if it enters new products and
countries where it has limited expertise and lacks critical mass to be a real competitor to the incumbent market
leaders. The weakness is greater when the new products or markets are riskier than the traditional core business.
66. Acquisitions can increase concentration risk if the acquired assets are similar to those in a bank's existing book and
particularly when the bank does not increase risk-adjusted capital in line with assets and risks.
67. Other areas of the methodology also look at concentration, but in different ways. For example, risk correlations
among risk exposures are analyzed in the assessment of risk position (see tables 12-14 and ¶¶118-121), and
concentrations in funding sources are addressed in the funding and liquidity section (see ¶¶144-145).
3. Management and strategy 68. The final subfactor in the business position assessment, management and strategy, considers management's ability to
execute operational plans in a consistent manner, a bank's strategic direction, management's risk appetite, and a
bank's ownership and governance. Management's strategic competence, risk management, and operational
effectiveness shape a bank's competitiveness in the marketplace and its financial condition.
69. This assessment is qualitative, but past performance and forward-looking targets provide some objective standards.
It is also relative. A bank's business position is compared with that of banks with similar industry risk. If
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 17
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
management plays a positive role in determining a bank's operational success, it is more likely to be able to manage
important strategic and operating risks in the future. Alternatively, a weak management with an ineffective
operating strategy or inability to execute its business plan effectively increases risk.
70. Management and strategy support an adequate or stronger business position when:
• The bank's risk appetite is more prudent and conservative than average in the industry. Management has proven execution capabilities and is a stable team. There is a track record of avoiding the strategic mistakes of other
banks;
• Returns have been, and are likely to be, less volatile than average in the industry. Both compensation and financial targets are focused on long-term value for all stakeholders (including bondholders); and
• Independent directors have strong influence, and a robust system of checks and balances exists in decision-making.
71. The assessment of management and strategy can lead to a moderate or weaker business position if:
• Management's risk appetite, strategies, financial targets--such as return on equity (ROE) and growth in earnings per share (EPS)--and acquisition strategies are more aggressive than average for the industry;
• The bank consistently outperforms the sector- or country-average ROE, particularly during a period of expansion;
• Governance standards compare negatively with the industry average (see ¶¶37-47 of "Management And Corporate Strategy Of Insurers: Methodology And Assumptions," published Jan. 20, 2011);
• The entity depends on continuing service from key individuals or small teams; • The organization operates with more complex corporate, legal, or tax structures; • Compensation schemes encourage short-term profit-taking; • There is unplanned management turnover in critical senior positions; and • The bank has made acquisitions at prices that reflect premiums to tangible book value, projected earnings, or
acquired core deposits, compared with prices paid for recent transactions of comparable size and nature.
72. Although this assessment is largely qualitative, it is informed by historical data on past performance and
forward-looking indicators of the attitude of management and owners toward risk, including financial targets such
as target ROE and EPS growth, as well as compensation schemes, management incentive schemes, and statements of
risk appetite. A study of reported ROE relative to average ROE for the sector or country can be a crude indicator of
risk appetite. Consistent outperformance of sector- or country-average ROE, particularly during a period of
expansion, can indicate higher management and strategy risk.
F. Capital And Earnings
73. Capital and earnings, the fourth SACP rating factor, measures a bank's ability to absorb losses. This ability provides
protection to senior creditors while the bank remains a going concern. The analysis of capital and earnings
comprises four steps: assessment of regulatory requirements, future risk-adjusted capital levels, quality of capital and
earnings, and earnings capacity. The projected risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio is the most important metric even
though there may be other measures of capital.
74. The RAC ratio compares a bank's capital to its risk-weighted assets (RWAs). Specifically, the criteria use a globally
consistent measure of capital, total adjusted capital (TAC) and Standard & Poor's RWAs (see "Bank Capital
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 18
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Methodology And Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010, for a full explanation). To arrive at the RWAs of a bank,
specified risk weights are applied to the bank's various exposures.
75. The criteria for this factor measure the degree to which a bank's capital and earnings would cover estimated losses
that would arise following a substantial economic stress for developed countries. By incorporating earnings based on
their capacity to absorb losses and build capital, the criteria make earnings a component of the capital analysis
rather than a separate rating factor. In theory, a bank's product pricing includes a margin sufficient to cover the
expected losses on its assets, which leaves capital to protect against unexpected losses.
76. The first step in analyzing capital and earnings is establishing how a bank performs against its regulatory
requirements. Meeting these requirements is a prerequisite for operating as a going concern. Any weakness here
would be an overriding factor limiting the SACP (see section F.1).
77. The second step is using the projected RAC ratio to form an opinion of a bank's future capital, as long as
performance against regulatory measures is adequate or better. The criteria introduce standards for how to interpret
the projected RAC ratio. Because earnings retention is the primary way that a bank builds or maintains capital, the
projected RAC ratio is aligned with the capital sustainability ratio (see ¶90 and table 10). That ratio looks at the
balance a bank is striking between growth, which weakens capital, and the buildup of capital through retained
earnings (see section F.2).
78. Third, the criteria assess the quality of capital and earnings by looking at the composition of, and trend, in TAC,
and the stability and predictability of earnings. When the projected RAC ratio is at the upper end of a scoring range,
high-quality capital can push the capital and earnings assessment into a stronger category. Conversely, when the
projected RAC ratio is at the lower end of a range, weaker quality of capital or earnings can push the assessment
into a weaker category (see section F.3).
79. Finally, the criteria assess earnings capacity, the first line of defense against losses and the primary way that a bank
builds or maintains capital. The earnings buffer (see ¶¶105-110 and table 11) is a metric that measures the capacity
of earnings to absorb "normalized losses" through the credit cycle. A bank's earnings buffer can be positive or
negative. When the bank's earnings buffer is negative, earnings are not sufficient to cover normalized losses. The
earnings buffer helps identify consistent out- and underperformers when setting the final ICR (see ¶¶19-24 and
section F.4).
80. The relevant metrics are combined in scoring capital and earnings on a six-point scale (see table 7).
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 19
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
1. Regulatory requirements 81. As a first step in the capital and earnings analysis, the criteria determine whether a bank is meeting minimum
regulatory requirements. A bank operating with capital close to or in breach of the minimum requirements of the
local regulator receives one of the following scores: "at risk," "subject to regulatory forbearance," or "insolvent."
The caps on the SACP associated with these scores are 'bb+', 'ccc+', and 'cc', respectively (see table 8). Banks
operating with capital somewhat greater than the local regulatory minimum requirements may have an SACP of
'bbb-' or higher. (But they may have a lower SACP because of other weaknesses.)
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 20
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
2. Capital 82. The second step, assessing capital with the RAC ratio, is the cornerstone of the capital and earnings criteria (see
"Bank Capital Methodology And Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010.
83. The assessment ranks a bank's level of capital using the projected RAC ratio before adjustments for concentration or
diversification (see table 9).
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 21
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
84. The criteria consider capital prospectively by focusing on a bank's projected RAC ratio. This might be much lower
than at the last reporting date during a period of growth, or higher than at the last reporting date during a recovery
or risk reduction, or a period of restructuring. Because a bank's major source of capital is its earnings, the projected
RAC ratios should be consistent with the bank's ability to grow or rebuild capital through internally generated
retained earnings. Capital projections also include external capital raising.
85. The risk-adjusted capital framework (RACF) applies Standard & Poor's risk weights to a bank's on- and
off-balance-sheet exposures to produce Standard & Poor's RWAs. The risk weights applied to each risk type and
asset class reflect their relative degree of risk.
86. In addition, the risk weights are calibrated according to Standard & Poor's stress scenarios that in turn are used to
maximize ratings comparability across sectors and over time. Specifically, the RWAs are calibrated to an 'A' or
substantial stress scenario (see Appendix IV of "Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions," published
June 3, 2009). An 8% RAC ratio, for example, implies that a bank in a developed country has sufficient capital to
withstand the 'A' or substantial stress scenario. By comparison, a 12% RAC ratio implies that a bank has sufficient
capital to withstand the criteria's 'AA' or severe stress in a developed country. These calibrations are based on our
observations that banking losses following 'AA' or severe stress are typically about 1.5x greater than following
substantial stress and about 2x more than after 'AAA' or extreme stress. Note that Standard & Poor's stress
scenarios generally hold for issuers or obligations in developed countries such as the U.S., Japan, Western Europe,
and Australia, and drive risk assumptions for banking losses in those economies (see ¶13 in "Bank Capital
Methodology And Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010).
87. To adjust the risk assumptions for structural differences--for example in credit culture, banking and bankruptcy
laws, and observed lower loss experience for some asset classes--the criteria incorporate the BICRA methodology to
assesses industry risk and economic risk, which set the anchor SACP. The BICRA methodology is also used to
modify the risk assumptions for the higher-risk characteristics of developing economies and the specific kinds of
exposures of banks operating in these countries.
88. When a bank's anchor SACP, derived from the BICRA methodology, is in the 'bb' category and its common equity
regulatory Tier 1 ratio is greater than the local regulatory requirements--or a minimum of 7% if this is higher than
local regulations--a moderate or adequate RAC ratio is neutral for the SACP. The anchor SACP is lowered by one
notch if the ratio is weak and by two notches if the ratio is very weak. If the RAC ratio is strong, the anchor SACP is
raised by one notch, and if the RAC ratio is very strong, it is raised by two notches (see table 3 and footnote in table
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 22
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
9).
89. When a bank's anchor SACP, derived from the BICRA methodology, is in the 'b' category and its common equity
regulatory Tier 1 ratio is greater than the local regulatory requirements--or a minimum of 7% if this is higher than
local regulations---a weak or moderate RAC ratio is neutral for the SACP. The anchor SACP is lowered by one
notch if the ratio is very weak (or by two notches if the RAC ratio is less than 2%). If the bank RAC ratio is
adequate, the anchor SACP is raised by one notch, and if the RAC ratio is strong or very strong, the anchor SACP is
raised by two notches (see table 3 and footnote in table 9).
90. The criteria evaluate whether the projected RAC ratio is consistent with the capital sustainability ratio. This
represents a forward-looking estimate of a bank's ability to grow or rebuild capital through retained earnings, and is
the difference between the buildup of capital and capital requirements (see table 10 for details on how this ratio is
calculated). The ratio is most relevant when a bank is growing and reporting profits. The ratio reflects estimates
about growth and earnings retention. There is usually a relationship between the capital sustainability ratio and the
projected RAC ratio, and one is a check for the other:
• When capital sustainability is between -30 basis points (bps) and +30 bps, the projected RAC ratio is likely to show little to no growth, unless the bank has announced plans to raise external capital or to achieve some other
means of capital growth and it is expected to be successful.
• When capital sustainability is lower than -30 bps, the projected RAC ratios will show a decline unless the bank has announced credible plans to raise external capital or to achieve some other means of capital growth.
• When capital sustainability is greater than 30 bps, the projected RAC ratios will show an increase based on internal capital generation.
• When the bank is generating losses, these rules do not apply. The projected RAC ratio decline is reflected in the capital assessment.
91. During periods of expansion, the assessment of capital relies on how much a bank uses retained earnings to both
fund growth and maintain capital ratios. To illustrate, if risk-weighted assets grow by 10%, capital needs to grow
by close to 10% to maintain capital ratios. Failure to grow capital via retained earnings at the same pace as growth
in the business indicates that capital will deteriorate--unless a bank has access to external sources to make up for the
deficiency. When a bank is taking on more risk and reporting greater returns, the calculation for capital
sustainability adjusts for this by increasing Standard & Poor's RWAs accordingly. The analysis focuses on earnings
growth and the pace of the bank's expansion. Growth beyond the capacity of management, infrastructure, and
capital is a leading indicator of increasing risk.
92. The credit loss estimates and projections in the second row of table 10 reflect the most likely scenario,
complemented by Standard & Poor's economic forecasts. They are point in time and country-specific, adjusted for
the economic and credit cycle. These country-level loss estimates for a specific bank can be modified for more severe
loss expectations based on bank-specific risks, including the need to strengthen loss reserves or increase impairments
if a bank's loan loss coverage is materially deficient.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 23
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
93. In contrast to the capital sustainability buffer, the earnings buffer calculation (¶¶105-110 and table 11) uses
"normalized losses" to adjust earnings based on a set of credit risk assumptions that do not move during the
economic or credit cycle.
94. Although the RAC ratio provides a globally consistent measure of capital, because of the limitations of all models,
the risk assumptions in the RACF are tested as part of the assessment of the risk position. The risk position analysis
essentially determines the degree to which the capital and earnings analysis understates or overstates bank-specific
risk (see tables 12-14). The capital and earnings analysis also includes qualitative judgments about the quality of
TAC and the quality of earnings.
3. Quality of capital and earnings 95. The quality of capital and earnings assessment is the third step in the capital and earnings analysis. This helps
determine whether the projected TAC has failed to capture additional strengths or weaknesses in earnings or the
capital base. Several characteristics help drive the assessment of the quality of capital as "high" or "low." The
contribution of the quality of earnings has a negative bias as the strengths are already incorporated into projected
TAC.
96. A bank's relative quality of capital and earnings is compared with other banks of a similar economic risk score to
determine whether it commands additional financial flexibility or demonstrates weaker earnings. When the
projected RAC ratio is borderline (within 25 basis points of the upper or lower end of the ranges in table 9 above),
high quality of capital can push the assessment of capital and earnings into the next strongest category while
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 24
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
low-quality capital or earnings can push the assessment into the next weakest category (see table 7).
97. The criteria associate high-quality capital or earnings with a combination of the following:
• The bank's core capital, as measured by adjusted common equity (ACE), comprises more than 85% of the bank's total adjusted capital (TAC).
• The investor base is more supportive of strong capital relative to other banks; investors have lower expectations for dividend yields and share buybacks are consistent with the projected RAC levels applied in table 9.
• The bank is able and willing to sell attractive assets, equivalent in value to about 10% or more of TAC, to raise funds that would not require restructuring or damage its competitive position. Several buyers are interested in
such assets--even in a period of economic and market turbulence.
• The bank has substantial economic capital in reserves of at least 10% of TAC that do not form part of the capital assessment in section F.2. These typically arise from tax optimization.
• The bank has issued hybrid instruments or preferred stock (which its regulator treats as capital) of at least 10% of TAC in the markets or with the government, which do not form part of the capital assessment in section F.2.
98. The criteria associate low-quality capital or earnings with a combination of the following:
• The bank's core capital, as measured by adjusted common equity (ACE), comprises less than 70% of the bank's total adjusted capital (TAC).
• Significant legal, tax, or regulatory constraints or characteristics of the group structure (for example, minority interests) constrain the flow of capital among group members to absorb losses.
• Dividend payouts or planned share buybacks may prevent the maintenance of strong capital. • An aggressive financial shareholder may be increasing its ownership and can pressure management to maintain
weaker capital in the future.
• The government may have contributed to TAC but expects repayment when possible. • The absolute size of the capital base is less than $100 million, bringing into question the bank's ability to
withstand significant shocks or events that other, larger players can more readily absorb.
• A bank holding company has high double leverage (see ¶¶99). • Revenues rely on one-off items, such as realized capital gains on securities holdings or fixed assets, producing a
lower level of risk-adjusted core earnings or more volatility in the earnings performance.
• More than 75% of revenues come from a relatively narrow business line especially when net interest income and fees and commissions account for less than 60% of revenues.
• Credit provisions (loan loss reserves) are materially deficient. • Unconsolidated subsidiaries are materially undercapitalized. • The bank has other substantial economic losses that the financial statements have not yet recognized.
99. The criteria introduce no changes to the treatment of double leverage (see "Analytical Approach To Assessing
Nonoperating Holding Companies," published March 17, 2009. Double leverage (DL) is defined as holding
company investments in subsidiaries divided by holding company (unconsolidated) shareholders' equity. DL renders
the nonoperating holding company (NOHC) dependent in part on dividends to meet interest payments on external
debt. DL is only relevant when TAC is not calculated on fully consolidated accounting data that combine holding
company financials with those of its operating banks.
100. High DL--of 120% or more--is a sign of aggressive liquidity and capital management and may increase the
possibility of liquidity stress, unless offset by liquidity at the parent. Similarly, if the absolute amount of DL of a
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 25
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
financial group with a NOHC exceeds two years' net income of the consolidated group, the NOHC parent would
need offsetting liquidity. Without this offsetting liquidity, the quality of a bank's capital is low.
101. When traditional earnings ratios are weaker than for other direct competitor banks, earnings quality is low. A bank
that demonstrates strong or very strong earnings on an absolute basis but is underperforming direct competitors on
a risk-adjusted basis is more vulnerable to any deterioration in the operating environment. Lower earnings based on
lower risk are generally positive for creditworthiness, and higher returns based on higher risk are generally negative
for creditworthiness.
102. The objective in carrying out the earnings peer analysis is to identify outliers through a variety of different measures.
A bank's overall relative positioning influences the assessment of earnings quality. However, under some
circumstances, a single feature may determine the conclusion about earnings quality. The earnings peer analysis
draws on the ratios enumerated below to help determine the bank's relative quality of earnings.
103. For the following metrics, the quality of earnings improves as the ratio increases:
• Net interest income/total revenue, • Fees and commissions/total revenues, • Core earnings/Standard & Poor's RWAs, • Core earnings/assets, and • Net operating income before loan loss provisions/assets.
104. For the following metrics, the quality of earnings deteriorates as these ratios increase:
• Trading gains/total revenues, • Other market-sensitive income/total revenues, • Other revenues/total revenues, and • Cost-income ratio.
4. Earnings capacity 105. An assessment of earnings capacity is the final step in the capital and earnings analysis. When earnings fail to cover
a bank's estimated normalized credit losses (see ¶¶106-108), the criteria add the deficit to the risk requirements that
capital needs to cover. A new metric, the earnings buffer, measures the capacity for earnings to cover normalized
losses (see table 11). When this ratio is negative, the criteria compensate for the deficiency by subtracting the
amount from TAC in calculating the RAC ratio (see the footnote in table 7).
Table 11
Computation Of The Earnings Buffer For A Hypothetical Bank
(Mil. €) Next year This year Last year
Preprovision operating income 1,180 1,105 905
One-off items 0 0 320
Normalized credit losses (579) (540) (521)
Normalized operating income (A) 601 565 704
Standard & Poor's RWAs (B) 30,000 28,000 27,500
Earnings buffer (%) (A/B) 2.00 2.02 2.56
3-year average earnings buffer (%) -- 2.19 --
RWAs--Risk-weighted assets.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 26
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
106. Normalized credit losses are a calculation of long-term average annualized credit-related losses (see ¶¶107-108). The
criteria estimate normalized loss rates for each asset class by country using an approach based on the average
"through the cycle" annual loss rate expected to occur for a given asset class. The average includes both the low and
the peak loss rates of the credit cycle. Where data is available, the estimates are derived using a 12-year credit cycle,
including three years of recession, to estimate normalized, through-the-cycle losses. This normalized,
through-the-cycle loss estimate is more conservative than an expected loss calculation based on a shorter time
horizon, which might exclude periods of recession.
107. The criteria estimate normalized credit losses to assess earnings through the cycle, or normalized operating income
(see Appendix C of "Bank Capital Methodology And Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010). The assessment of
earnings reflects an adjustment to determine underlying profitability. Starting with preprovision operating income,
the adjustment removes the impact of one-off items, including significant mark-to-market write-downs of securities,
and normalized losses. The next step is to compare the residual earnings to Standard & Poor's RWAs. This ratio is
then averaged over three years (last year, current year, and next year). (See earnings buffer calculation in table 11.)
108. The calculation of normalized loss for an asset class consists of:
• Looking back at the available data on historical loss experience in each market. • Adjusting the normalized loss rate upward or downward to factor in any changes or potential changes in
underwriting standards or risks in the economy.
• Extrapolating the loss rates from the BICRA economic risk score. The extrapolation starts with the same loss rates for assets in economies with the same economic risk score, but scales them across the 10 economic risk
groups by applying reduced rates in lower-risk countries and increased rates in higher-risk countries. This scaling
is in line with the RACF's risk weights.
109. Other market or operational losses are generally unexpected and therefore intended to be covered by capital.
Consequently, when earnings are most sensitive to market and operational risks, the criteria call for interpreting the
earnings buffer with caution. For banks with significant market risk, the earnings buffer may look relatively strong,
but the measure does not take into account the volatility associated with market risk. This volatility is assessed more
qualitatively in quality of earnings (see ¶¶95-104).
5. Example of standard risk assumptions 110. The risk assumptions used in the capital and earnings analysis are the combination of the RACF's capital charges
and the normalized loss rates used in the earnings buffer. For an illustration of these risk assumptions for a
hypothetical bank based in a country in BICRA group 3 and with an economic risk score of 3 (see table 20 and
¶¶117-119 of "Bank Capital Methodology And Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010).
G. Risk Position
111. Risk position is the fifth of six SACP rating factors and serves to refine the view of a bank's actual and specific risks
beyond the conclusion arising from the standard assumptions in the capital and earnings analysis. Those
assumptions do not always reflect or adequately capture the specific risk characteristics of a particular bank. The
analysis described in risk position is similar to that traditionally applied to assess the asset quality of a bank.
112. To differentiate a bank's unique risk position, five areas are analyzed:
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 27
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
• How the bank manages growth and changes in its risk positions; • The impact of risk concentrations or risk diversification; • How increased complexity adds additional risk; • Whether material risks are not adequately captured by RACF; and • Evidence of an adequate, strong, or very strong risk position, by comparing past and expected losses on the
current mix of business with those of peers and by comparing a bank's loss experience during past economic
downturns with Standard & Poor's standard risk assumptions. Greater-than-average losses may indicate a weaker
risk position.
113. The combination of the first five steps captures the degree to which the standard risk assumptions under- or
overstate a bank's specific risks. For guidance on how these five steps are combined to form a single opinion on risk
position, see tables 12-13. The descriptive characteristics are applied on a "best-fit" basis.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 28
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 29
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
114. The following example shows how the risk position assessment can combine with the capital and earnings
assessment to move the SACP. Both Bank A and Bank B have a healthy earnings buffer and adequate quality of
capital, and both maintain regulatory capital ratios comfortably above the regulatory requirement. However, Bank
A has an 11% projected RAC ratio and Bank B a 6% projected RAC ratio. Therefore, the capital and earnings
criteria view Bank A as "strong" and Bank B as "moderate." Following fundamental risk analysis, it becomes
evident that Bank A's loss experience is more volatile than peers'. While its risk management looks good, many
products are complex: There are large derivative exposures, a large and risky private equity portfolio, and a narrow
focus on advisory services, structured credit, and proprietary trading. Bank A, therefore, has a "moderate" risk
position. Alternatively, Bank B has a global retail and commercial franchise with market-leading positions in all of
its business units. The products are simple. Off-balance-sheet activity is low, and all derivatives hedge
customer-driven business. The bank has grown steadily through time, and often at a slower pace than aggressive
competitors. Volatility is lower, and losses are consistently less than average. Notably, Bank B continued reporting
profits during the previous two downturns. Bank B has a "very strong" risk position. The "moderate" and "very
strong" conclusions about risk position modify the "strong" and "moderate" capital and earnings conclusions
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 30
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
about Bank A and Bank B, respectively. All other things being equal, the effect of these two factors on Bank A is no
change to the anchor SACP and, for Bank B, the addition of one notch to the anchor SACP (see table 14).
Table 14
Impact On The SACP Of Combining Capital And Earnings And Risk Position Assessments
Bank A Bank B
Assessment Impact on SACP Assessment Impact on SACP
Capital and earnings Strong +1 notch Moderate -1 notch
Risk position Moderate -1 notch Very strong +2 notches
Combined impact No change +1 notch
1. Growth and changes in exposure 115. Since rapid expansion tends to presage outsized losses in both the banking and trading book, it is important to
monitor a bank's portfolio of risks and its movement and direction on the risk spectrum. A change in a bank's risk
means that the traditional expertise that has helped it to survive previous economic downturns may not help during
the next one.
116. Management has the capacity to manage risks associated with growth and changes in exposure when a bank is
displaying one or more of the trends below. This strength can compound other strengths to offset a weakness in the
bank's risk position:
• Showing lower recent organic or acquisitive growth and modest prospects for future growth than in the past and compared with peers with a similar economic risk score, when the lower growth is based on avoiding risk and
declining riskier growth opportunities that other banks are willing to take;
• Maintaining underwriting standards despite competitive pressures; • Reducing its risk exposure, for example by exiting risky activities or tightening underwriting standards; • Remaining focused on serving its core customer base with traditional expertise and limiting opportunistic
proprietary activities; or
• Keeping a similar portfolio of risks that limited losses experienced in previous economic downturns.
117. Management may not have the capacity to manage additional risk presented by growth or other changes in exposure
when a bank is displaying one or more of the following trends:
• Showing more aggressive recent organic or acquisitive growth and more significant prospects for future growth than in the past and compared with those of peers with a similar economic risk score;
• Moving materially into new product, customer, or market activities outside of its traditional area of expertise; or • Displaying weakening underwriting standards relative to peers with a similar economic risk score. Examples of
this include a prime mortgage lender materially weakening its standards on a loan applicant's capacity to pay,
borrower credit standing, or collateral coverage (e.g., as measured by a loan-to-value ratio, a senior secured
commercial real estate lender increasingly underwriting mezzanine or corporate development loans, or a
commercial bank increasingly underwriting larger or riskier transactions).
2. Risk concentrations and risk diversification 118. Risk concentrations of any type are a primary reason for bank failures. In contrast, some banks can demonstrate
that diversity of risks has led to lower overall losses than for less diverse peers. The criteria consider the impact of
risk concentration or diversification here because the capital and earnings analysis does not include it. The RACF
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 31
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
produces an adjustment for concentration or diversification that the risk position analysis uses as an input (see
Appendix B in "Bank Capital Methodology And Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010. The business position
rating factor captures concentrations or diversification in revenue contribution by business line (¶¶62-67) and uses
concentrated earnings sources as an indicator of low-quality earnings (¶98). The risk position factor focuses on the
concentration of exposures to individual debtors, counterparties, and industries or sectors, or aggregations of risk
across asset classes and risk types.
119. There is a risk diversification benefit when a bank has the following:
• The RACF adjustment for concentration and diversification indicates a reduction in Standard & Poor's RWAs; • Geographic diversification arises from exposures that are clearly connected with a client franchise abroad and not
from opportunistic product, tax, regulatory, or currency arbitrage; and
• Sector or risk-type diversification arises from operations in activities that are no more risky than the bank's traditional core business.
120. Material risk concentrations for a bank arise from one or more of the following:
• Risk exposures by sector, country, or single name in the loan portfolio, investment portfolio, and the trading book that are more concentrated than for peers with a similar economic risk score. The RACF adjustment for
diversification and concentration supports this comparison (see Appendix B of "Bank Capital Methodology And
Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010;
• Underlying risk that affects several risk types as in the commercial real estate example below (¶121). The RACF adjustment does not capture this aggregation of risk;
• A limited number but material amount of counterparties for derivatives and other trades as a share of total RWAs; and
• A capital base of less than $100 million in developed markets, which makes the bank more sensitive to concentration and event risk than larger peers in these markets.
121. The RACF's adjustment for concentration or diversification is a useful input to the analysis because it is a
quantitative measure, based on standard correlation matrices (see Appendix B in "Bank Capital Methodology And
Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010). This adjustment may not capture all concentration issues relevant for a
specific bank. Take the example of a bank that provides a loan to a corporate customer so it can purchase premises
or develop commercial property and that at the same time holds commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) on
its balance sheet. The RACF risk weights for the corporate loan exposure and the CMBS portfolio are not fine
enough to recognize the resulting concentration risk to commercial real estate. Similarly, the bank's reported
segmentation of exposure by industry, which is the data input for the RACF, may not capture certain concentrations
within a sector. For example, a bank's exposures to the broader transportation sector may hide a subsector
concentration in shipping finance.
3. Complexity 122. Greater scale may bring diversification benefits to a bank but also increase complexity. The ever-increasing level of
complexity in products, business lines, regions, and organizational structure has often outstripped the capacity of a
bank's management to manage risk. In recent years, much of the added complexity has stemmed from the growing
use of derivatives, off-balance-sheet activities, securitizations, and other exotic products. There is a danger in giving
too much credit for diversification to those highly complex institutions that are most difficult to manage.
Conversely, there is a danger in overpenalizing smaller, less complex institutions for concentration risk. The
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 32
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
opposite of complexity is the presentation of transparent and straightforward risks that are well-understood and
well-managed compared with those of peers with a similar economic risk score and product mix. However, the
absence of complexity in and of itself is rarely sufficient to improve a bank's overall risk position.
123. Management is exposed to additional risks associated with complexity when a bank has one or more of the
following:
• Business lines with complex products such as derivatives, securitizations, and structured credit such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that are important to the overall group;
• Limited transparency into underlying risk positions, risk management, or earnings generation; • A siloed approach to risk management, which may hinder a consistent measurement and management of risk
exposure;
• Material dependence on mathematical models and their underlying, often complex assumptions to measure and manage risk and to value assets and liabilities;
• A portfolio that contains risks with a low probability of occurrence but high loss severity, otherwise known as tail risk;
• Balance sheet strategies that are driven by regulatory arbitrage; and • Operations in many jurisdictions or with an organizational structure with many legal entities, which may grow
beyond management's capacity to control.
124. A high and increasing ratio of total managed assets to ACE that is not mirrored in a low and declining RAC ratio
can indicate additional risk from complexity. The ratio of total managed assets to ACE is a crude measure of
leverage, insensitive to risk and susceptible to definitional accounting inconsistencies. Nevertheless, trends in the
ratio or high multiples may uncover risk exposures that other metrics do not capture. In such cases, the risks, which
hurt creditworthiness, likely are the result of off-balance-sheet activities or large derivative positions, implying
complexity and opaque risks.
125. A bank's risk position will be moderate, at best, if it has material investment banking activities or makes
more-than-modest use of strategies with regulatory arbitrage as its main purpose. Investment banking activities are
material, according to the criteria, if they are likely to contribute more than 50% to revenues over the long term.
Regulatory arbitrage strategies are significant, for example, if a bank has a particularly high multiple of total
managed assets to ACE (see ¶124).
126. When investment banking activities are less than 50%, there is no automatic cap to risk position. Instead, the
criteria assess whether senior management has the expertise and tools to fully understand and manage these risks
and the degree of clarity about how and where the bank makes its profits. The criteria recognize the limitations in
the way that capital and earnings analysis quantifies market risk.
127. Further analysis of market risk for banks with significant trading operations may result in a weak score for risk
position. When trading is a significant activity, relying solely on Value-at-Risk (VaR) is incomplete. Deeper analysis
can include reviews of the results from a banks' stress and scenario testing; policies, risk limits, practices, and
organizational structure in trading risk management; and policies, practices, and supplemental VaR data. "Lifting
The Lid On Traded Market Risk," published Oct. 31, 2006, explains how supplemental VaR data offers insights
and opportunities for making comparisons.
128. In the RACF, the standard charge for trading activities is a multiple of a bank's VaR, as used by regulators. Despite
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 33
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
the known limitations of VaR (summarized in "Chasing Their Tails: Banks Look Beyond Value-At-Risk," published
July 12, 2005), it has the value of being widely available for financial institutions.
4. Risks the RACF does not cover 129. The most common risks that the RACF does not cover are interest rate and currency risk in the banking book and
the volatility of pension funding. There also may be other, less common, bank-specific risks relevant to an individual
bank or segment of the market that the capital framework does not capture. Such risks are material when they are
more significant for a bank than for peers with a similar economic risk score. A bank's scenario and stress testing
forms part of its risk management of these and other material contingent liabilities.
130. In addition, since the RACF equity charges are primarily based on the observed volatility in equity indices in each
country, they will not apply to a bank's equity portfolio if it is more or less risky than these indices.
a) Interest rate and currency risk in the banking book 131. The assessment of interest rate risk includes structural interest rate risk, which arises naturally from business lines
such as mortgage lending, and strategic interest rate risk, which the asset-liability management (ALM) function
strategically maintains and manages.
132. An analysis of interest rate risk includes a review of some or all of the following:
• The sensitivity of a bank's projected earnings to changes in interest rates or the shape of the yield curve based on its own stress testing;
• Senior management's engagement and awareness for setting and managing the amount of interest rate risk; • The degree of maturity gap between repricing assets and liabilities; and • The adequacy of a bank's risk management based on a review of its scenario and stress testing, optionality
characteristics of assets or liabilities with prepayment or extension options, or other behavioral characteristics
that differ from contractual ones.
133. For further guidance on the assessment of interest rate risk management, see "Assessing Enterprise Risk
Management Practices Of Financial Institutions," published Sept. 22, 2006, and "A Roadmap For Evaluating
Financial Institutions' ERM Practices, May 3, 2007.
134. The assessment of currency risk includes an examination of projected earnings to changes in currency exchange rates
based on a bank's own stress testing. Currency risk arises when assets in the loan portfolio and the bank's funding
are held in different currencies that are not hedged. The risk position of a bank is weaker when currency risk is
larger than for peers with a similar economic risk score.
b) Volatility of pension funding 135. The criteria deduct unfunded benefit scheme liabilities, including pension deficits, from TAC where a bank's
financial statements have not fully recognized them. However, the bank faces additional risk from potential
movements in the values of the scheme's assets and liabilities, particularly for defined benefit pensions, and the
RACF does not otherwise capture this risk.
136. This additional risk depends on the size of the scheme's liabilities; key actuarial assumptions including the discount
factor, life expectancy, or future salary increases; and other variables such as the investment policy and amount of
reinsurance used. When the size of the scheme's liabilities is large, a minor change in one of these variables can have
a material impact on a bank's financial strength. The pension scheme's valuation report identifies the impact on
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 34
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
scheme liabilities from changes in some of the assumptions and variables. An example of such a sensitivity test is the
impact on liabilities by increasing participant life expectancy by one year.
137. The ratio of the sensitivity tests to TAC is important. The risk position is relatively weaker when the impact on
scheme liabilities from any of the sensitivity tests identified in the valuation report relative to TAC is larger than for
peers with a similar economic risk score.
5. Evidence of stronger or weaker loss experience 138. Evidence of a stronger risk position is reflected in relatively lower recent and projected losses than for peers with a
similar economic score and similar product mix, and a better-than-average track record of losses during periods of
similar economic stress. Conversely, weaker risk positions are associated with losses that are greater than average
for peers with a similar economic risk score and similar product mix, or a worse-than-average track record of losses
during recent periods of similar economic stress.
139. Deviations from the average peer performance are explained by highlighting the root causes as any combination of
growth, concentration, and complexity, or by considering how bank-specific risk is materially different from the
standard risk assumptions in the RACF or Standard & Poor's calculation of normalized losses.
140. Examples of such material differences may be any of the following:
• Credit provisioning and loss recognition for a bank that may be more or less aggressive than for peers, • Volatility in the bank's equity portfolio that may be lower or higher than the RACF charges for equity in the
banking book,
• Legal or regulatory costs or fines that can be higher or lower than for peers in the same lines of business, or • Material insurance business (more than 10% of earnings) that can be undercapitalized compared with that for the
rest of the group.
H. Funding And Liquidity
141. Funding and liquidity, combined, are the sixth and final SACP rating factor. How a bank funds its business and the
confidence-sensitive nature of its liabilities directly affects its ability to maintain business volumes and to meet
obligations in adverse circumstances. The criteria continue the prior practice of combining an analysis of funding
and liquidity to assess financial risk.
142. The analysis of funding compares the strength and stability of a bank's funding mix, according to several metrics,
with the domestic industry average (see table 15). The criteria use that average to remain consistent with the BICRA
funding assessment.
143. The liquidity analysis centers on a bank's ability to manage its liquidity needs in adverse market and economic
conditions and its likelihood of survival over an extended period in such conditions. The analysis is both absolute
and relative to peers (see table 16).
1. Funding 144. The relative strength and potential volatility of funding are assessed by reviewing a bank's liabilities--or mixture of
retail and wholesale deposits, interbank loans, and secured and unsecured borrowing in capital markets. A bank
develops a mix of funding resulting from its strategic choices about what products and services to offer, and risk
management decisions about what funding options to use, given the availability of stable core deposit or term
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 35
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
funding and riskier short-term wholesale funding.
145. If a bank does not have access to a central bank's funding mechanism, the funding assessment is limited to below
average at best. That's because the criteria consider this mechanism to be an important source of contingent
liquidity, but not for funding ordinary business operations on an ongoing basis. A bank's dependence on central
bank funding is assessed as part of the liquidity analysis.
146. The criteria begin the assessment of a bank's funding profile using its loan-to-deposit ratio, long-term funding ratio,
reliance on short-term wholesale funding, and overall funding mix. When no specific bank-reported figures are
available, the analysis uses estimates.
147. The next step is ranking banks within a country's banking industry according to these metrics and comparing them
against the industry average, weighted by assets. These ratios set the relative position of players within an industry
before application of the more qualitative metrics (see table 15).
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 36
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
2. Liquidity 148. The main differentiators for liquidity are a bank's relative dependence on central bank funding and its ability to
access other liquidity sources (see table 16). Liquidity becomes progressively weaker as an institution increasingly
relies on funding support from the monetary authorities. This may be the case because funding from other sources is
unavailable or prohibitively expensive, particularly if other banks are not using the facilities to the same extent.
149. The criteria use standard liquidity ratios. Some ratios will not be available for certain banks because of differences in
public disclosure in different countries. However, two liquidity ratios should be available for all banks: liquid assets
to wholesale funding, and liquid assets to core deposits. When more detailed data are available, the analysis also
considers the following ratios: liquid assets to short-term wholesale funding, and short-term wholesale funding to
total wholesale funding.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 37
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 38
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
150. The assessments of funding and liquidity are combined to determine the impact on the SACP (see table 17). Even if a
bank has above-average funding, its SACP may be capped if its liquidity profile is judged to be moderate or weaker.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 39
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
151. When comparing uses and sources of liquidity, the analysis considers different survivability periods--e.g., 30 days,
three to six months, and 12 months--because there is no telling how long a market disruption or economic
downturn may persist. Where relevant, the analysis includes the potential for local or foreign currency mismatches.
In addition, noncontractual or reputational contingencies arising from management's perceived need to preserve
franchise value are important. Examples include:
• The repurchase of commercial paper in advance of maturities; • Calling long-term debt at the first call date, despite having no contractual obligation to do so; • The provision of support to money market funds, securitizations, tender option bonds, and auction rate securities; • Support of secondary markets in assets as a market-maker; or • Protecting investors from losses on asset-backed securitizations that a bank originates.
152. The criteria rarely treat liquidity for a bank as strong, even when liquidity is well-managed, because a key source of
contingent liquidity is based on support from the central bank or monetary authorities. In other words, banks are
not entirely self-supporting. High leverage and mismatched maturities of assets and liabilities--due to the
fundamental role of maturity transformation that most banks play--make them confidence-sensitive. This means a
bank relies heavily on depositor confidence to avoid having to repay all deposit liabilities on contractual maturity
(otherwise known as a run on the bank). As a central part of contingency planning for such an event, many banks
rely on support from third parties, notably the central bank or monetary authorities. In all but the most exceptional
cases, the criteria consider this reliance on third parties to cover the contingent liquidity requirements acceptable for
an adequate assessment, at best, for investment-grade banks.
153. Strong liquidity, however, is more likely to make a real difference in default risk for a weaker bank. If it is very
liquid, a bank generally can avoid default for a longer period of time than speculative-grade banks with liquidity
that is adequate or weak.
154. Financial institutions without formal access to central bank funding restrict their exposure to short-term calls on
their liquidity or rely on excess asset liquidity and committed bank facilities to cover liquidity requirements. As such
a nonbank financial institution that does not have access to central bank liquidity may have stronger liquidity than a
regulated bank.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 40
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
a) Comparing the uses and sources of liquidity 155. The analysis seeks to find the balance between a bank's expected and contingent uses for liquidity and its sources of
reliable liquidity during adverse market and economic conditions. The following two subsections explain the
criteria's assessment of the uses of liquidity and the sources of liquidity.
156. Given the contingent nature of a bank's liquidity requirements, the liquidity analysis focuses more on understanding
how a bank would size and manage liabilities under different stresses, and less on specific accounting-based
measures and ratios. Sizing the uses of liquidity is complicated by the choices that banks normally grant customers
and counterparties. For example, depositors are often able to withdraw their funds on demand or at relatively short
notice, wholesale investors are free to decide whether or not to roll over their funding, and customers may draw
down from committed loan facilities at any time. Meanwhile, under derivative contracts, changes in market prices or
credit perception can increase margin calls and collateral requirements.
157. If sources of liquidity are reliable, it is possible to determine how much unencumbered asset liquidity is on a bank's
balance sheet and to assess the strength of liquidity commitments made to it from other counterparties, even during
adverse conditions. An implicit part of this assessment is the strength of a bank's liquidity risk management
framework and controls, taking into account the type of business it undertakes and the markets where it operates.
b) Uses for liquidity 158. The analysis assesses the following potential uses of cash to determine a bank's contractual and contingent
short-term obligations:
• Deposit run-off and withdrawal. Deposit stability takes into account deposit composition: insured versus uninsured, international versus domestic, corporate versus retail, relationship-based versus rate-based. In each
case, the first is more stable than the second;
• Run-off of other customer funds, e.g., prime broker free credit balances. • Drawdown of credit commitments. The ability of the bank to reduce limits and the extent of undrawn
commitments to customers;
• The maturity profile of wholesale liabilities. Inability to roll over short-term unsecured borrowings (e.g., commercial paper, certificates of deposit, promissory notes) or to refinance maturing long-term unsecured debt;
• Market-driven inability to roll over maturing short-term secured debt or repurchase agreements. That is, the market can dry up altogether for lower-quality securities or, short of that, seek increased margins, collateral
requirements, or credit spreads;
• Company-specific, credit-driven increases in margin and collateral requirements, for example resulting from a breach of rating triggers;
• Settlement frictions as counterparties increasingly dispute marked-to-market valuations and delay payments; • Inability to refinance maturing securitizations backed by revolving assets; • Calls under guarantees to unrelated third parties such as standby letters of credit, performance guarantees,
securities lending indemnifications, and custody guarantees;
• Support payments to affiliates, including those that regulations require; guarantees; and keepwell or support agreements;
• Capital commitments under joint ventures; • Penalties resulting from regulatory sanctions; and • Judgments or settlements relating to litigation.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 41
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
c) Sources of liquidity 159. The review of a bank's sources of liquidity is focused on reliability, ranked according to dependability.
160. For purposes of table 16, the criteria include the following sources:
• Drawdown of unrestricted cash and short-term deposits; • Systemwide liquidity facilities at central banks or other government sources, both routine and extraordinary,
determined by unencumbered assets that the central bank would qualify as collateral and liquidity available in
exchange for these assets after central bank haircuts;
• Drawdown of committed credit facilities, subject to financial covenants and headline considerations; • The sale or repo of unencumbered high-quality liquid securities in the open market. Because banks make different
assumptions about what qualifies as liquid, these criteria aim to understand and compare them to those in the
market value criteria for rating transactions backed by securities;
• Within corporate groups, the ability to access funds from affiliates in the form of advances or capital, subject to regulatory and covenant restrictions;
• Liquidation of short-term advances to other financial institutions sold and reverse repos; • Cash available from maturing advances to customers; • Accessing the debt and stock markets to the extent still possible; • Accessing securitization or covered bond markets through established facilities or asset sales programs; and • Whole loan sales.
161. Where regulatory or accounting data exist, the aim of the criteria is to quantify the balance between the uses and
sources of liquidity. For an example, see "Liquidity Risk Analysis: Canadian Banks," published June 27, 2007.
VIII. METHODOLOGY: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FRAMEWORK
162. The support framework criteria factors in the likelihood of support from a government or parent group into the
ratings on a bank by assessing the relationship between the parties. This part (part VIII) of this article and "Rating
Government-Related Entities: Methodology And Assumptions," published Dec. 9, 2010, address government
support while "Group Rating Methodology And Assumptions," published Nov. 9, 2011, addresses group support.
The likelihood of government support is factored both into the SACP and ICR (see chart 4).
163. Government influence on banks is usually positive for sovereign creditworthiness but on occasion is negative. A
government may elect to support bank even if it erodes sovereign creditworthiness. This was the case in Ireland in
2010. (See "Republic of Ireland Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'AA-' On Higher Banking Sector Fiscal Costs,"
published Aug. 24, 2010.)
164. For a government-related financial institution that fulfills a public policy role or where the government ownership is
strategic and long-term, the likelihood of support is assessed using the methodology for rating GREs (see "Rating
Government-Related Entities: Methodology And Assumptions," Dec. 9, 2010). The importance of the bank to the
government and the strength of the link between the government and the bank determine the likelihood of
government support.
165. For a private-sector commercial bank (which does not qualify to be characterized as a GRE), the criteria assess the
likelihood of government support by drawing on assessments of both the bank's "systemic importance," that is, in
maintaining overall confidence in the financial system, and the government's tendency to support private-sector
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 42
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
commercial banks. The motivation for governments to support private-sector commercial banks is not as clear as
that for GREs. Governments act to support their national economies and financial systems. This often results in
added protection for senior creditors of systemically important commercial banks, but the link is by no means
certain.
166. The extraordinary government support a private-sector commercial bank is likely to receive is by no means certain.
This uncertainty means that the support uplift will never result in equal ratings on a non-GRE bank and on the
sovereign because of other variables. For example, the government may:
• Be less able to support a range of banks in a countrywide financial crisis because of its own balance sheet constraints or because an individual bank may be large relative to the domestic economy;
• Be less willing to provide financial support if the specific crisis affects a particular bank rather than all the banks in the national financial system and will have limited knock-on implications for the whole system;
• Change its attitude toward supporting the banking sector over time; or • Not provide support in time to prevent a default or may provide support that does not fully cover all senior
creditors.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 43
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 44
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
A. Factoring Government Support Into The SACP
167. The SACP includes four types of government support or negative interference:
• System support is the support which a government provides to all banks in a financial system. This type of support is assessed as part of economic risk and industry risk analysis in the BICRA methodology.
• Direct support is the targeted support which a government provides to a specific bank in crisis. Such support may manifest, and therefore be assessed, in the business position, capital and earnings, risk position, or funding and
liquidity SACP factors.
• Government interference may take the form of directed lending and actions that create market distortions. These are captured by industry risk in the BICRA methodology and business position and risk position in the SACP.
• Additional short-term support for banks with high or moderate systemic importance.
1. System support 168. The criteria include system support in the SACP. Governments support their financial systems to limit the long-term
damage of a banking crisis on the economy. Governments provide system support to financial institutions through
the legal infrastructure, banking regulatory frameworks, and their role in funding banks and maintaining confidence
in the financial system. System support is aimed at preserving confidence in the country's financial system, especially
during periods of economic stress.
169. The criteria consider any support available to the wider system as system support, whether it is ongoing or
extraordinary. In recent years, there have been many cases of system support that is extraordinary in nature and not
ongoing. Examples are increased depositor insurance, government-guaranteed liquidity and debt programs, and the
eligibility of lower-quality assets as central bank collateral.
170. The BICRA methodology assesses system support, which feeds directly into the SACP via economic risk and
industry risk rating factors. Therefore, under the BICRA methodology, changes in a government's support for the
country's financial system may result in SACP changes for banks with exposure to that country.
2. Direct support 171. The criteria include direct support in the SACP. Governments may provide direct support to an individual bank by
providing liquidity or capital injections, or by buying or insuring risky assets. These actions may lead to a
strengthening in the bank's stand-alone credit characteristics. The criteria aim to quantify this direct support and
factor it into the relevant rating factor: capital and earnings, risk position, or funding and liquidity.
172. Direct support is included in the SACP once the government has made a commitment to providing it. The criteria
treat government support as committed when it has received the appropriate political approvals, such as from
Congress or parliament. In some countries, laws exist to give the administration the authority to act without further
approvals.
173. However, it is unlikely that the direct support would raise the bank's SACP to the level it was before the difficulties
began. The bank's business position will likely be weaker than before the stress. The franchise will have been
damaged, and execution risk will remain for the bank in managing through the crisis and back to independence.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 45
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
3. Government interference 174. Various government actions can weaken a bank's creditworthiness by creating distortions or inefficiencies. These
can take various forms, including government actions that influence a bank's business decisions. Two specific
examples are directed lending and the creation of market distortions.
175. Directed lending. Governments can intervene via ownership or regulation and direct banks to lend to particular
borrowers or sectors for political purposes. This type of intervention, called directed lending, is a negative rating
factor for the SACP and is reflected under the business position rating factor (see table 6). Lending based on the
bank's assessment of the borrowers' ability to repay will generally lead to fewer credit losses than lending based on a
government's directions. Consequently, credit losses on directed lending will be greater than the industry average for
specific asset classes, which the risk position rating factor assesses (see tables 12-13).
176. Market distortions. A government can also influence the nature of competition in a banking market.
Government-owned or -controlled banks can compete on uneconomic terms, forcing a structurally low-margin
environment across the sector. BICRA addresses market distortions in industry risk as part of the consideration of
competitive dynamics. Therefore, it is reflected in a bank's anchor SACP.
4. Additional short-term support 177. If the SACP of a bank with high or moderate systemic importance declines rapidly (by more than two notches at a
single review) and Standard & Poor's expects the government to provide additional short-term support, the criteria
allow for additional temporary uplift of the SACP (see ¶¶197-203).
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 46
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
B. Factoring Government Support Into The Indicative ICR
178. In the case of a positive assessment of the likelihood that a bank would receive "future extraordinary support" in a
crisis from a sovereign government, the criteria may allow the addition of one or more notches to the SACP for
"support uplift" to determine the indicative ICR. On the other hand, the government may not offer such support.
Consequently, the indicative ICR will be the same as the SACP.
179. The indicative ICR results from adding notches for support uplift to the stand-alone credit profile (SACP). The
methodology for factoring in extraordinary government and group support consists of four steps (see chart 6):
• First, assess the likelihood for future extraordinary government support. • Second, assess the likelihood for future extraordinary group support (see "Group Rating Methodology And
Assumptions," published Nov. 9, 2011).
• Third, take the higher of the result from the first and second steps. • Fourth, apply the criteria shown in ¶¶206-212 to the indicative ICR for a bank.
180. Faced with a financial crisis, a government will often, but not always, provide additional support to protect
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 47
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
confidence in its economy, with the expectation that the cost of this additional support is less damaging to the
overall economy than allowing banks to fail. Financial institutions, in particular banks, fulfill the crucial functions
of safeguarding national savings, allocating savings and deposits to companies and individuals in the form of loans
and investments, and serving as intermediaries and agents in financial transactions. Governments implement
monetary policy via the banking industry. They also maintain lending arrangements for banks to balance their
books on a daily basis and meet short-term liquidity needs. Many governments closely regulate banks and most
other financial institutions to ensure that the industry as a whole can perform these crucial roles in a manner that
maintains the confidence on which the modern financial system depends.
181. A bank usually receives help from either its parent group or government--not both. Consequently, if a bank is a
subsidiary, its creditworthiness is determined using criteria for both government support and group support. The
indicative ICR is the strongest indicative ICR resulting from either the first approach or the second. The ICR can be
higher than the foreign currency rating on the sovereign where the bank is domiciled, only if the bank can meet the
conditions listed in ¶209. It is possible that the SACP can be stronger or the indicative ICR based on group support
can be stronger than the foreign currency rating of the sovereign where the bank is domiciled.
182. The criteria for determining rating notch uplift from the expectation of extraordinary government support comprise
five steps:
• First, determine the degree of a bank's systemic importance (section 1); • Second, determine a government's tendency to support private-sector banks (section 2); • Third, establish the likelihood that the government will provide support to a particular bank (section 3); • Fourth, determine whether additional short-term support is available (section 4); and • Fifth, link government-supported bank ratings to sovereign ratings (section 5).
183. A private-sector commercial bank is classified as having "high," "moderate," or "low" systemic importance as
defined below. A government's tendency to support such a bank falls into three categories: "highly supportive,"
"supportive," and "uncertain." The criteria then combine the two classifications to determine the likelihood of
direct government support in the future (see table 20).
1. Systemic importance 184. Systemic importance is the degree to which a bank's failure impacts all or parts of the financial system and the real
economy of the country where the bank operates. A bank has high, moderate, or low systemic importance. It is
possible that a bank classified as having high or moderate systemic importance might not receive support in a time
of stress because no one can predict with certainty whether a sovereign will provide it. On the other hand, in the
event of a crisis, the government may decide to support a bank even though it may have low systemic importance. A
bank is not automatically classified as having high, moderate, or low systemic importance if the government or local
market participants refer to it that way. Standard & Poor's classification will be determined in line with the criteria
(see table 18 and ¶¶185-190).
185. High systemic importance. The failure of a bank classified as having high systemic importance is likely to have a
high adverse impact on the financial system and the real economy. In particular, a bank has high systemic
importance if a default of its senior unsecured obligations is likely to weaken the country's financial system, limit the
availability of credit for the private sector, and trigger a significant financial stress at several other financial
institutions.
186. Although size is not the only determining factor, a bank with high systemic importance will usually be one that
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 48
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
maintains a substantial market share--typically more than 10%, particularly in retail banking--with a leading
position and brand recognition in the country. High systemic importance is also a factor of the level of
interconnectedness, or linkages of a financial institution with other parts of the financial system. For example, the
bank may be a significant counterparty within the country and international financial system or play a critical role
in the national payments system, such that its failure will lead to a loss of confidence in the financial system and
significant losses among other counterparties in the market. In addition to these factors, a bank may have high
systemic importance because no other institution can step into its key role in the economy if it fails.
187. Moderate systemic importance. The failure of a bank classified as having moderate systemic importance is likely to
have a material, but manageable, adverse impact on the financial system and the real economy. In particular, a bank
has moderate systemic importance if a default on its senior unsecured obligations is likely to lead to disruption in the
provision of financial services to a specific region or sector of the economy.
188. A bank with moderate systemic importance is likely to maintain a significant market share in retail banking at the
national level, or be a leading provider of banking services to a particular region or sector that plays a significant
role in the economy. The systemic implications of a default of such a bank will be more manageable at a national
level than a default of a bank with high systemic importance, but the effect in specific parts of the economy can be
considerable. Banks with moderate systemic importance may also be leading providers of politically sensitive
products, such as residential mortgages. A classification of moderate systemic importance for a bank means that if it
fails, other counterparties are likely to take on the failed bank's market role.
189. Low systemic importance. A bank has low systemic importance when it does not fit the criteria for high or
moderate systemic importance. The majority of banks in a banking industry are likely to be in this category.
However, if the market is particularly concentrated, fewer banks are likely to have low systemic importance.
190. The criteria recognize the difficulty in predicting sovereign support. In the event of a crisis, the sovereign may decide
to support a bank even though it may have low systemic importance. The classification of low systemic importance
reflects the lack of an obvious incentive for a sovereign government to prevent the failure of this type of bank.
Table 18
Systemic Importance
Descriptor Observations
High systemic importance
A loss of confidence in a bank is likely to lead to a loss of confidence in the entire national banking system. In particular, a default of a bank’s senior unsecured obligations is likely to weaken the country's financial system, limit the availability of credit for the private sector, and trigger a significant financial stress at several other financial institutions.
Moderate systemic importance
A loss of confidence in a bank may lead to a loss of confidence in the entire banking system. In particular, a default on a bank’s senior unsecured obligations can weaken the financial system and limit the supply of credit for the private sector.
Low systemic importance
A bank has low systemic importance when it does not fit the criteria for high or moderate systemic importance. The majority of banks in a banking industry are likely to be in this category. However, if the market is particularly concentrated, fewer banks are likely to have low systemic importance.
2. Government tendency to support private-sector banks 191. The tendency of governments to support financial institutions varies among countries and can change over time,
particularly as legislators respond to the effects of a banking crisis. The criteria assess the capacity and willingness of
sovereigns to support failing banks during a crisis and classify sovereigns into three groups, "highly supportive,"
"supportive," and "uncertain" (see table 19).
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 49
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
3. Likelihood of extraordinary government support in the future 192. The criteria classify the likelihood that a bank would receive extraordinary government support in the future as
high, moderately high, moderate, or low. That is determined by combining the assessments of a bank's systemic
importance and a government's tendency to support banks (see table 20).
Table 20
Likelihood Of Extraordinary Government Support In The Future
Government's tendency to support private-sector commercial banks
Systemic importance Highly supportive Supportive Uncertain
High High (table 21) Moderately high (table 22) Low
Moderate Moderately high (table 22) Moderate (table 23) Low
Low Low Low Low
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 50
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
193. The indicative ICR for banks with high, moderately high, or moderate likelihood of extraordinary support is
established by combining the SACP on the bank and the rating on the sovereign according to tables 21-23,
respectively.
Table 21
High Likelihood Of Extraordinary Government Support
Government's local currency rating
SACP AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B-
aaa AAA
aa+ AA+ AA+
aa AA+ AA AA
aa- AA AA AA- AA-
a+ AA- AA- AA- A+ A+
a AA- A+ A+ A+ A A
a- AA- A+ A+ A A A- A-
bbb+ A+ A+ A A A A- BBB+ BBB+
bbb A A A A- A- A- BBB+ BBB BBB
bbb- A- A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB- BBB-
bb+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB- BB+ BB+
bb BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BB+ BB BB
bb- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BB+ BB+ BB+ BB BB- BB-
b+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB BB BB- BB- B+ B+
b BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB- BB- BB- B+ B B
b- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- B+ B+ B B- B- B-
ccc+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B B B- B- B- CCC+
ccc B B B B B B B B B B B- B- B- CCC+ CCC+ CCC+
ccc- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC CCC CCC
cc B- B- B- B- CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC CCC CCC CCC- CCC- CC
SACP--Stand-alone credit profile.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 51
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Table 22
Moderately High Likelihood Of Extraordinary Government Support
Government's local currency rating
SACP AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B-
aaa AAA
aa+ AA+ AA+
aa AA AA AA
aa- AA AA- AA- AA-
a+ AA- AA- A+ A+ A+
a A+ A+ A+ A A A
a- A+ A A A A- A- A-
bbb+ A A A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
bbb A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB
bbb- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB-
bb+ BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BB+ BB+ BB+
bb BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BB+ BB+ BB+ BB BB BB
bb- BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB BB BB BB- BB- BB-
b+ BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB- BB- BB- B+ B+ B+
b BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- B+ B+ B+ B B B
b- B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B B B B- B- B-
ccc+ B B B B B B B B B B B- B- B- CCC+ CCC+ CCC+
ccc B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC CCC CCC
ccc- CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC CCC CCC CCC- CCC- CCC-
cc CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC- CCC- CCC- CC CC CC
SACP--Stand-alone credit profile.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 52
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Table 23
Moderate Likelihood Of Extraordinary Government Support
Government's local currency rating
SACP AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B-
aaa AAA
aa+ AA+ AA+
aa AA AA AA
aa- AA- AA- AA- AA-
a+ AA- A+ A+ A+ A+
a A+ A+ A A A A
a- A A A A- A- A- A-
bbb+ A- A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
bbb BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB
bbb- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
bb+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
bb BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB BB BB BB
bb- BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB- BB- BB- BB-
b+ BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- B+ B+ B+ B+
b B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B B B B
b- B B B B B B B B B B B B B- B- B- B-
ccc+ B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- CCC+ CCC+ CCC+
ccc CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ CCC CCC CCC
ccc- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC- CCC- CCC-
cc CCC- CCC- CCC- CCC- CCC- CCC- CCC- CCC- CCC- CCC- CC CC CC CC CC CC
SACP--Stand-alone credit profile.
194. For a bank with a low likelihood of support, the indicative ICR is the same as the SACP. But the ICR may be
different from the indicative ICR after applications of the criteria for group support (see "Group Rating
Methodology And Assumptions," published Nov. 9, 2011) or when the ICR is set (see ¶¶19-24).
195. Even if the likelihood of government support is "high" and the sovereign long-term local currency rating is 'AAA', a
bank with an SACP of 'aa+' will not receive an ICR of 'AAA'. This is in line with Standard & Poor's view that
government support for non-GRE banks cannot be predicted with certainty.
196. The indicative ICRs for banks shown in tables 21-23 are subject to the criteria shown in ¶¶206-212 below.
4. Additional short-term support for banks with high or moderate systemic importance 197. These criteria provide for additional short-term uplift of a bank's SACP (beyond the uplift shown in tables 21-23) if
all the following conditions are satisfied:
• If the bank is classified as having high or moderate systemic importance, • If the bank's SACP has declined rapidly by two or more notches in a single review, and • If the government is expected to provide additional short-term support.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 53
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
198. In practice, it can take some time for a government to make a specific commitment to provide additional short-term
support after a financial problem at a systemically important bank surfaces. In such cases, the criteria estimate the
amount or range of support.
199. For example, if a bank's SACP declines rapidly as described above, the ICR will likely be lowered by at least one
notch and likely placed on CreditWatch with negative implications. In conjunction with the CreditWatch action, the
criteria will likely require:
• A confirmation by the government of the importance of the bank through a public statement of support that covers the bank's obligations to its senior creditors,
• An estimate of the amount or range of support required to restore the bank's capital or liquidity to the regulatory minimum (see ¶202), and
• As assessment of whether the sovereign has sufficient capacity to provide this level of support.
200. If the government makes no public statement of support in the CreditWatch period, the assessment of systemic
importance is changed to low, uplift for government support is removed, and the ICR is lowered to the level of the
SACP.
201. If there are doubts about the sovereign's ability to support the institution, the ICR is lowered to the same level as the
SACP. In addition, uplift for all other banks with high or moderate systemic importance in that country is
reassessed.
202. If the government makes a clear statement of the intent to support the bank, the criteria allow for an estimate of the
monetary amount of support that will be made available. This estimate is based either on details provided by the
government or by a Standard & Poor's calculation of the amount of fresh capital or liquidity required to restore
capital or liquidity to the regulatory minimum--that is, the amount that will keep the bank a going concern
according to the regulators. The calculation is geared to the minimum regulatory requirement, unless there is
guidance that the regulator expects the bank to comply with a different requirement.
203. To establish the number of notches of temporary uplift for additional short-term support, this estimate is included in
the evaluation of capital, risk, or liquidity. As long as the government has not committed the support, total uplift to
the SACP comprises temporary uplift for additional short-term government support and the likelihood of
extraordinary government support in the future (see table 20). After the government commits the support, it is
factored into the SACP and the indicative ICR is set according to the relevant support table (see tables 21-23).
5. Linking government-supported bank ratings to sovereign ratings 204. The criteria for rating banks have a direct link with the criteria for rating sovereigns. Specifically, the sovereign
criteria assess the impact on a sovereign's rating of the contingent liabilities related the financial sector (see
"Sovereign Government Rating Methodology And Assumptions," ¶¶100-103, published June 30, 2011). This
assessment is done by estimating the potential recapitalization needs of the entire banking sector in case of a
systemic banking crisis associated with a stress level defined in the RACF (see. "Bank Capital Methodology And
Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010)
205. After determining the contingent liabilities related to the financial sector, the criteria evaluate the impact of the
overall level of contingent liabilities on the sovereign's fiscal profile, which affects its rating. The local currency
sovereign rating is combined with the SACP on a bank to determine its indicative ICR according to tables 21-23.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 54
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
C. Rating Banks Above The Sovereign
206. The criteria may result in an SACP or an ICR on a bank above the foreign currency rating on the sovereign where
the bank is domiciled.
207. Such cases are rare because the criteria acknowledge that banks are leveraged institutions that are dependent on the
sovereign government for liquidity and other forms of system support. In addition, the sovereign's regulatory and
supervisory powers may restrict a bank's or financial system's flexibility.
208. Banks are affected by many of the same economic factors that cause sovereign stress. This sovereign stress can cause,
among other things, a sharp deterioration in a bank's asset values, more expensive foreign currency liquidity,
shortages in local currency liquidity, a harsher regulatory environment, mandated changes in credit terms, higher
taxes, and declining public services. These developments can exacerbate domestic economic conditions and increase
bad debts for banks.
209. A bank will need to meet all of the following conditions to have ratings higher than the foreign currency ratings on
the country of domicile:
• Sufficient capital and liquidity to cover the stress that Standard & Poor's associates with a sovereign default scenario;
• Institutional characteristics, sovereign policy flexibility, or historical precedence suggest that there is a high likelihood that the sovereign will not interfere or acquire resources from the bank and that it is unlikely to require
additional support from the sovereign;
• The expectation that the financial sector, or at least the specific bank, will remain in a net external asset position; • Little loan or other asset exposure to the sovereign or the wider public sector, and an expectation that this will
not change;
• Earnings, capital, and other ratios are stronger than those of similarly rated banks in countries with lower-risk financial systems as measured by BICRA scores; and
• A country transfer and convertibility (T&C) risk assessment that does not cap the ratings on the bank at the rating of the sovereign (see ¶210).
210. The transfer and convertibility (T&C) risk assessment on the sovereign caps the foreign currency rating on the bank.
This assessment reflects Standard & Poor's view of the likelihood of a sovereign restricting access to foreign
exchange that a non-sovereign needs to satisfy debt service obligations. For most countries, Standard & Poor's
analysis concludes that this risk is less than the risk of sovereign default on foreign-currency obligations. Therefore,
most T&C assessments exceed the sovereign foreign currency rating (see "Criteria For Determining Transfer And
Convertibility Assessments," published May 18, 2009).
211. For a bank that is a subsidiary, the parent will need to meet those same preconditions for the subsidiary to have an
indicative ICR that is higher than the sovereign's foreign currency rating resulting from group support from a
foreign parent or affiliate. If the parent has not demonstrated its capacity and willingness to provide a subsidiary
with sufficient support to withstand the stress associated with a sovereign default, the ICR is capped by the foreign
currency rating on the sovereign where the subsidiary is domiciled.
212. Bank branches are subject to the same conditions as separate legal entities. The ratings on bank branches, as part of
the same legal entity, are at the same level as on a bank itself, unless the branch is located in another country. If a
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 55
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
branch is in another legal jurisdiction, the criteria consider whether actions of the "host" sovereign can affect the
ability of the branch to service its obligations. The criteria do not assign ratings to a branch that are higher than
those on the host sovereign unless the conditions listed above are met or the branch's creditors can--without
impediment--access all of their funds in a timely manner via any other branch located in another jurisdiction. In
most cases, the host sovereign foreign currency rating will cap the ratings on a branch. If the host sovereign has
higher ratings than the bank, the ratings on the branch and bank are equalized.
[1] "Causes of the Recent Financial and Economic Crisis," Ben S. Bernanke, Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2, 2010 (U.S. Congress).
[2] "Final report of the Commission of Experts for limiting the economic risks posed by large companies," Sept. 30,
2010 (Swiss Confederation).
[3] "Final Report Recommendations," Independent Commission on Banking, Sept. 12, 2011 (U.K.).
APPENDIX
The bank criteria supersede or partially supersede the articles below. All articles listed below are available on
RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal, unless otherwise stated.
Superseded
• Applying Group Methodology To Independent U.S. Investment Banks, June 2, 2008 • Assessing Trading Risk Management Practices Of Financial Institutions, Oct. 17, 2005 • Assumptions For Base-Case Credit Losses For Italian Banks, April 23, 2010 • Bank Survivability Criteria, March 24, 2004 • External Support Key In Rating Private Sector Banks Worldwide, Feb. 27, 2007 • FI Criteria: Bank Rating Analysis Methodology Profile, March 18, 2004 • Financial Institutions Bank Fundamental Strength Ratings, July 10, 2005 • Franchise Stability, Confidence Sensitivity, And The Treatment Of Hybrid Securities In A Downturn, Dec. 1,
2008
• How Systemic Importance Plays A Significant Role In Bank Ratings, July 3, 2007 • Securities Company Ratings Analysis Methodology Profile, April 29, 2004 • Sovereign Risk for Financial Institutions, Feb. 16, 2004 • The Ratings Approach To Australian Government-Guaranteed Debt (Updated), June 10, 2009 • The Ratings Approach To U.S. Financial Institutions' FDIC-Guaranteed Commercial Paper, April 6, 2009 • U.S. Mortgage Bank Rating Analysis Methodology Profile, March 18, 2004
Partially superseded
• A Roadmap For Evaluating Financial Institutions' ERM Practices, May 3, 2007 • Group Methodology, April 22, 2009; this article partially supersedes the criteria for banks but will not affect the
criteria for insurance companies
The following criteria articles are not affected by publication of this criteria article. They will therefore stand
alongside the bank criteria to represent the body of Standard & Poor's criteria governing financial institutions.
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 56
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
General
• Stand-Alone Credit Profiles: One Component Of A Rating, Oct. 1, 2010 • Credit Stability Criteria, May 3, 2010 • Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions, June 3, 2009 • Criteria For Determining Transfer And Convertibility Assessments, May 18, 2009 • Principles Of Corporate And Government Ratings, June 26, 2007
Financial institutions
• Analytical Approach To Assessing Nonoperating Holding Companies, March 17, 2009 • Assumptions: Analytical Adjustments For Captive Finance Operations, June 27, 2008 • Bank Spreadsheet Data Definitions, May 2, 2005 • Commercial Paper I: Banks, March 23, 2004 • Commercial Paper II: Finance Companies, March 22, 2004 • Counterparty And Debt Rating Methodology For Alternative Investment Organizations: Hedge Funds, Sept. 12,
2006
• Equity Credit for Hybrid Securities Issued by Asset Managers, Nov. 13, 2006 • Finance Company Ratios, March 18, 2004 • Issues Of Subordination for Hedge Fund Debt, Sept. 13, 2007 • Liquidity Risk Analysis: Canadian Banks, June 27, 2007 • Methodology For Analyzing Funding And Liquidity Positions Of Bank-Licensed Investment Companies, July 2,
2010
• Methodology For Mapping Short- And Long-Term Issuer Credit Ratings For Banks, May 4, 2010 • Methodology: Hybrid Capital Issue Features: Update On Dividend Stoppers, Look-Backs, And Pushers, Feb. 10,
2010
• Microfinance Institutions: Methodology And Assumptions: Key Credit Factors, Aug. 5, 2009 • Rating Asset Management Companies, March 18, 2004 • Rating Network Payment Providers, June 1, 2005 • Rating Private Equity Companies' Debt And Counterparty Obligations, March 11, 2008 • Rating Securities Companies, June 9, 2004 • Rating Sovereign-Guaranteed Debt, April 6, 2009 • Recovery Ratings For U.S. Finance Companies, June 19, 2008 • Standard & Poor's Updated Methodology For Rating Exchanges And Clearinghouses, July 10, 2006
RELATED CRITERIA AND RESEARCH
All articles listed below are available on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal, unless otherwise stated.
Criteria
• Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011 • Group Rating Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011 • Bank Hybrid Capital Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 1, 2011 • Sovereign Government Rating Methodology And Assumptions, June 30, 2011 • Rating Government-Related Entities: Methodology And Assumptions, Dec. 9, 2010 • Bank Capital Methodology And Assumptions, Dec. 6, 2010
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 57
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
Research
• The Evolving Landscape For Banks Requires A Robust Analytical Framework, Nov. 1, 2011 • How Standard & Poor's Intends To Finalize Its Bank Criteria And Apply Them To Ratings In The Fourth
Quarter Of 2011, Nov. 1, 2011
• For Universal Banks, The Recent Dominance Of Investment Banking Is Giving Way To More Balanced Earnings, June 30, 2011
• Bank Resolution Regimes: Potential Rating Implications As Sovereign Support Frameworks Evolve, March 16, 2011
Watch the related CreditMatters TV segment titled, "Standard & Poor's Publishes Its Revised Bank Ratings
Criteria," dated Nov. 9, 2011.
Listen to the related podcast titled, "Standard & Poor’s Updated Bank Rating Criteria: What's Behind The
Changes," dated Nov. 22, 2011.
These criteria represent the specific application of fundamental principles that define credit risk and ratings
opinions. Their use is determined by issuer- or issue-specific attributes as well as Standard & Poor's Ratings
Services' assessment of the credit and, if applicable, structural risks for a given issuer or issue rating. Methodology
and assumptions may change from time to time as a result of market and economic conditions, issuer- or
issue-specific factors, or new empirical evidence that would affect our credit judgment.
Additional Contact: Financial Institutions Ratings Europe; [email protected]
Standard & Poors | RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal | November 9, 2011 58
916400 | 300003452
Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions
S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain credit-related analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.standardandpoors.com (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com and www.globalcreditportal.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees.
S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain non-public information received in connection with each analytical process.
Credit-related analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P's opinions and analyses do not address the suitability of any security. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives.
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of S&P. The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P, its affiliates, and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions, regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an "as is" basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT'S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Copyright © 2011 by Standard & Poors Financial Services LLC (S&P), a subsidiary of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 59
916400 | 300003452
- Research:
- I. SCOPE OF THE CRITERIA
- II. SUMMARY OF THE CRITERIA
- III. CHANGES FROM REQUEST FOR COMMENT
- IV. IMPACT ON OUTSTANDING RATINGS
- V. EFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITION
- VI. METHODOLOGY: SETTING THE ISSUER CREDIT RATING
- VII. METHODOLOGY: STAND-ALONE CREDIT PROFILE
- A. Economic Risk
- B. Industry Risk
- C. The Anchor SACP: Combining Economic Risk And Industry Risk
- D. Bank-Specific Analysis: Building On The Anchor SACP
- 1. Comparative analysis and peer review
- E. Business Position
- 1. Business stability
- 2. Concentration and diversity of business activities
- 3. Management and strategy
- F. Capital And Earnings
- 1. Regulatory requirements
- 2. Capital
- 3. Quality of capital and earnings
- 4. Earnings capacity
- 5. Example of standard risk assumptions
- G. Risk Position
- 1. Growth and changes in exposure
- 2. Risk concentrations and risk diversification
- 3. Complexity
- 4. Risks the RACF does not cover
- a) Interest rate and currency risk in the banking book
- b) Volatility of pension funding
- 5. Evidence of stronger or weaker loss experience
- H. Funding And Liquidity
- 1. Funding
- 2. Liquidity
- a) Comparing the uses and sources of liquidity
- b) Uses for liquidity
- c) Sources of liquidity
- VIII. METHODOLOGY: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FRAMEWORK
- A. Factoring Government Support Into The SACP
- 1. System support
- 2. Direct support
- 3. Government interference
- 4. Additional short-term support
- B. Factoring Government Support Into The Indicative ICR
- 1. Systemic importance
- 2. Government tendency to support private-sector banks
- 3. Likelihood of extraordinary government support in the future
- 4. Additional short-term support for banks with high or moderate systemic importance
- 5. Linking government-supported bank ratings to sovereign ratings
- C. Rating Banks Above The Sovereign
- APPENDIX
- Superseded
- Partially superseded
- General
- Financial institutions
- RELATED CRITERIA AND RESEARCH
- Criteria
- Research
__MACOSX/._S&P Financial Insitution Rating Criteria.pdf
2014-27-08-Moody's -- The-Critical-Importance-of-Data in Bank ERM.pdf
27 MAY 2014
Enterprise Risk Management: The Critical Importance of Data Capturing and managing accurate, timely and relevant data is vital to effective ERM
Ask the senior management of a bank what they regard as the most important aspect of Enterprise Risk Management (‘ERM’) and the chances are they will tell you it is the ability to have a holistic view of the risks being run by the organization. Their perspective is typically a top-down view and seldom do they think of it in terms of the core bottom-up enabler for ERM data. Why? Because data is a given and we live with what is available.
Everyone knows that it would be nice to have more data, better data, and quicker data. However, the data issue is generally deemed to be a challenge that is separate from the immediate demands for improved ERM. This underestimates the critical importance of data to best practice ERM.
ARTICLE (as published on garp.com)
Charles Stewart Senior Director at Moody’s Analytics
Contact Us Americas +1.212.553.1658
EMEA +44.20.7772.5454
Asia (Excluding Japan) +85 2 2916 1121
Japan +81 3 5408 4100
2 27 MAY 2014 ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DATA
The increasing importance of Enterprise Risk Management
For various reasons, and not least as a consequence of the recent financial turmoil, banks have been investing in their management of risk with a view to improving their ERM. There are four broad drivers for change, all of which deserve consideration:
i. Survival, or self preservation, is something wanted by all stakeholders – staff, management, shareholders and customers. Nobody wants to deal with a risky bank. Recent history, with so many banks suffering from unexpected losses, whether those losses have been as a result of credit risk, liquidity risk (Northern Rock) or operational risk (the London whale at JP Morgan Chase), etc., has brought this home with a vengeance.
Banks are therefore constantly looking to minimize the potential for defaults and to reduce losses incurred, for whatever reason. This means revisiting data, process and procedure with a view to improving any or all of them. Likewise, banks recognize the need for more capital, to act as a cushion against financial shocks, and are therefore investing more in this as well.
ii. Regulation (Basel III, Dodd Frank, etc.) is also driving change. Regulators’ interest is mainly on behalf of depositors and in respect of the wider economy or for macro prudential purposes, and they want a whole lot more change than the banks are naturally inclined to volunteer. Consequently, there are ever increasing demands for extra information and reports, for additional stress tests, and for even more capital. But all these things come at a cost to the banks, whether in terms of people, systems or capital.
iii. Economics should also be a motivator. In the context of this article, this is about proactively improving profitability by better management of risk, by understanding return to risk dynamics of individual exposures up to the portfolio level and by ensuring more efficient use of capital. These things have not generally been considered, from an ERM perspective, as much as perhaps they should have been.
Much of the investment made to date has been as a result of overwhelming necessity, reactively for survival or in response to regulation, rather than proactively. There is therefore an opportunity for banks to revisit the economics of how they operate, in terms of how to drive better risk adjusted returns on scarce capital, and in terms of managing the data that feeds the information flows which inform these risk adjusted measures.
iv. Strategic drivers take a longer term view on investment. In line with the foregoing comment on banks being reactive, too much of the investment that has been made over the last five years has been tactical, in response to immediate needs (particularly regulatory-driven ones), with an eye to solving a specific problem in a very short timescale. Investments have often been made without consideration for the bigger picture requirements of a sound ERM framework, including the longer term strategic advantages of a solid data foundation.
Based on these drivers of change, it is clear that there is a strong business case for investment in ERM and the data that supports it. However, this business case has not been exploited as much as it might have been.
The Quest for Better-informed Decision Making
For an ERM framework to be deemed a success, it must be seen to deliver better informed and more timelier decision-making capabilities. Examples of sound ERM practice include the ability to monitor, in near real-time, the impact of day-to-day lending decisions being made by originators in a branch network, or alternatively, the cumulative effect of trading decisions being made on the trading floor, in aggregate, each day. ERM is about timely scrutiny, even on a systemized basis, of the extent to which concentrations are being built up, or whether industry or geography limits are being eroded too fast; or if pricing is too low (for profitability), or too high (for competitive positioning).
Automated and centralized, reporting enables these things to be visible at the enterprise-wide level, but only as long as such reporting is informed by granular, bottom-up data. It is therefore critically important to capture the right data at point of origination. Raw data on its own is insufficient, but without it one does not have the building blocks to inform enterprise level decisions in a timely way.
3 27 MAY 2014 ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DATA
So ERM requires the right data capture, feeding automated workflow type systems, to give operations management access to the data required for daily activity purposes and, in turn (via a central data repository), to give executive management access to the data required for business intelligence purposes.
In this way, the right people end up discussing, monitoring and managing the risks appropriate for consideration at each level of the organization; for example, business management has the opportunity to assess whether large deals are meeting the hurdle rates for different risk profiles, while executive management can review whether business for a particular segment or region is meeting its targeted risk adjusted returns, etc.. The ultimate objective - to ensure that unusual, unintended, or unacceptable risks are isolated and proactively managed - can then also be met.
Transforming Data into Information, into Business Intelligence = BEST PRACTICE DATA MANAGMENT
Data Silos Undermine ERM Effectiveness
Deficiencies in raw data are an obvious challenge, but another related obstacle to sound ERM is the management of risk in silos. These might be viewed in terms of operational entity (e.g., the freedom of individual geographic entities to manage their own risk), line of business (e.g., wholesale vs. retail vs. corporate) or by type of risk (e.g., credit, market, operational).
When silos exist, the end results is the separation of data management for finance and risk management. As a consequence, data management for the corporate and retail banking groups, or for country “A” and country “B”, or for liquidity management and for credit risk management, happen on systems that do not talk to each other.
To understand how limitations in data availability across the enterprise frustrated the holistic management of individual firms, one only needs look at the recent subprime crisis, which morphed into the liquidity crisis, and then the economic crisis (in which credit risk in one specific market was transformed into liquidity risk), which in turn led to the wider contagion that we experienced post 2008.
The point here is that risk managers and regulators now realize that it is necessary to analyze the combined impact of different risks, in order to understand the impact of possible scenarios on a bank’s balance sheet and P&L. If banks had not been so siloed, and if their stress testing and planning capabilities had been more holistic (and sophisticated), we might have avoided much of the pain associated with the sub-prime crisis. Ultimately, banks did not have access to the data needed to enable the robust management of risk across the enterprise.
4 27 MAY 2014 ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DATA
Data is the foundation
What is increasingly evident is that a bank needs access to good data from across the organization in order to function effectively at the enterprise level. Data is the foundation of and the enabler for good ERM. As alluded to earlier, this means banks need the ability to collate raw risk related data, combine it with non-risk data, model it to transform it into meaningful information, and then further aggregate it for business intelligence purposes.
This point about data being the foundation of all things ERM triggered the Bank for International Settlements’ January 2013 paper on risk data aggregation and risk reporting.This paper set out 14 principles to strengthen risk data management, in four broad categories: (1) overarching governance and infrastructure; (2) risk data aggregation capabilities; (3) risk reporting capabilities; and (4) supervisory review, tools and cooperation.
The aim of the BIS was to raise the bar (i.e., the overall standard of data management) because the global regulatory community, as a whole, also sees data as key to enhanced ERM and reporting. Although the paper was focused on Systematically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), it was overtly envisaged to apply to Domestically Important Financial Institutions as well. Furthermore, according to many regulators, they expect the principles to be generally adopted by all institutions under their supervision, given its high relevance.
Combining Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches for Stronger ERM Although the BIS paper seems at face value to be a top down perspective (on aggregation and reporting), it has at its heart the need for bottom up data flows. Regulators are also observing that ERM is, fundamentally, the ability to capture and manage all necessary risk related data. This process entails the following:
» aggregating data - and then slicing and dicing it - to perform bottom-up analysis, through multiple dimensions;
» performing top-down data management while monitoring the evolving balance sheet and P&L information; » understanding the behavior of the data under different scenarios (hence the need for stress testing and scenario analysis); » assessing the options for managing the consequences of undesirable movements in the metrics, as they are observed, in real
time; and
» maintaining the ability to execute on the aforementioned options.
This means that, at the centre of the bank, at the “press of a button,” management should be able to assess key risk dimensions and drill down in to them. How each bank defines “key” is institution- specific, so while the most important risk dimensions for one institution might be, say, industry concentrations or grade concentrations, another might put more weight on ratios such as risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) or risk- weighted assets to economic capital.
The point is that this data needs to be accessible, accurate and timely, enabling risk-adjusted performance management - both at the aggregate level and all the way down to individual customers or loans. In short, an organization’s reporting should enable it to fulfill this sort of drill-down capability - across business lines, across operational entities and across risk types. This is because, with the right data (or “business intelligence”) informing the right people, in a timely manner, one begins to achieve a meaningful ERM framework.
The biggest challenges is to be able to do this across all risk types, not just credit, market and operational risk, but for liquidity, capital, interest rate, settlement, IT and other risks. Of course this is much more easily said than done, and will only come with time, with the right ERM infrastructure and with the right “risk culture.” ERM requires investment in the model, data, IT and process frameworks in order to provide consistency across the organization.
By way of illustration, take regulatory stress testing. The heart of a well-functioning automated stress testing process is a single data repository in which the relevant risk and finance data required for the regulatory stress tests are consolidated and readily available. With the key data layer element in place, the models, the workflow tools, and the reporting modules can be layered on top. Once this structure is in place, banks are afforded a scalable and powerful capability, which enables them to run and effectively report on a broad array of enterprise-wide stress tests in a timely and cost efficient manner.
5 27 MAY 2014 ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DATA
In addition to supporting stress testing, this same capability also offers substantial insight to senior management about the bank’s risk profile and potential opportunities. It therefore facilitates the medium term planning and annual budget rounds, capital allocation, and wider enterprise management, consistently across the organization. None of this will work without good data, which brings us full circle back to the need look at data at the bottom end and for the ERM framework to be underpinned by increasingly accurate, relevant and timely data.
Closing Thoughts Delivering best practice ERM in a bank is about ensuring the key central functions within risk, finance and treasury have the data, models, tools and analytics that they need to fulfil their responsibilities. Good data management allows those responsible for taking bottom-up data and reporting on it (both internally, up to the board, and externally) to be effective and efficient.
Of course, all this needs to be within a strategic context, with consistent, well-informed policies, and with governance providing the right checks and balances. Holistic ERM ties in all these constituents and ensures that those responsible are all empowered with the bottom-up data and analytics they need - to report both internally and externally, and to do so as close to real time as possible.
An ERM vision is the appropriate response to the multiple strategic, economic and regulatory drivers referred to at the outset of this article. The good news is that raising the standard of the firm’s ERM framework is simply a case of taking advantage of established advances in risk management practices, moving from a silo approach to a holistic view of risk, and simultaneously increasing the focus on data and its management.
6 27 MAY 2014 SP28978/110228/WRD-103
AUTHOR Charles Stewart is a senior director at Moody’s Analytics. He joined Moody’s KMV in early 2006 from Barclays Bank PLC, where he worked in various capacities during his 28-year career there. Since joining Moody’s, he has worked with banks and regulators around the world. Drawing on his knowledge of both theory and the realities of day-to-day practice, he has used his extensive risk management experience and his familiarity with many of the challenges associated with commercial and corporate banking to help financial institutions with the development of their risk management planning and strategies.
© 2014 Moody’s Corporation, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Moody’s Analytics, Inc. and/or their licensors and affiliates (collectively, “MOODY’S”). All rights reserved.
CREDIT RATINGS ISSUED BY MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC. (“MIS”) AND ITS AFFILIATES ARE MOODY’S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES, AND CREDIT RATINGS AND RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS PUBLISHED BY MOODY’S (“MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS”) MAY INCLUDE MOODY’S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES. MOODY’S DEFINES CREDIT RISK AS THE RISK THAT AN ENTITY MAY NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL, FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AS THEY COME DUE AND ANY ESTIMATED FINANCIAL LOSS IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT ADDRESS ANY OTHER RISK, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: LIQUIDITY RISK, MARKET VALUE RISK, OR PRICE VOLATILITY. CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY’S OPINIONS INCLUDED IN MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT STATEMENTS OF CURRENT OR HISTORICAL FACT. MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS MAY ALSO INCLUDE QUANTITATIVE MODEL-BASED ESTIMATES OF CREDIT RISK AND RELATED OPINIONS OR COMMENTARY PUBLISHED BY MOODY’S ANALYTICS, INC. CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE OR PROVIDE INVESTMENT OR FINANCIAL ADVICE, AND CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT AND DO NOT PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PURCHASE, SELL, OR HOLD PARTICULAR SECURITIES. NEITHER CREDIT RATINGS NOR MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS COMMENT ON THE SUITABILITY OF AN INVESTMENT FOR ANY PARTICULAR INVESTOR. MOODY’S ISSUES ITS CREDIT RATINGS AND PUBLISHES MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS WITH THE EXPECTATION AND UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH INVESTOR WILL, WITH DUE CARE, MAKE ITS OWN STUDY AND EVALUATION OF EACH SECURITY THAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PURCHASE, HOLDING, OR SALE.
MOODY’S CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT INTENDED FOR USE BY RETAIL INVESTORS AND IT WOULD BE RECKLESS FOR RETAIL INVESTORS TO CONSIDER MOODY’S CREDIT RATINGS OR MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS IN MAKING ANY INVESTMENT DECISION. IF IN DOUBT YOU SHOULD CONTACT YOUR FINANCIAL OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL ADVISER.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROTECTED BY LAW, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND NONE OF SUCH INFORMATION MAY BE COPIED OR OTHERWISE REPRODUCED, REPACKAGED, FURTHER TRANSMITTED, TRANSFERRED, DISSEMINATED, REDISTRIBUTED OR RESOLD, OR STORED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE FOR ANY SUCH PURPOSE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN ANY FORM OR MANNER OR BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, BY ANY PERSON WITHOUT MOODY’S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT.
All information contained herein is obtained by MOODY’S from sources believed by it to be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as well as other factors, however, all information contained herein is provided “AS IS” without warranty of any kind. MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, MOODY’S is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process or in preparing the Moody’s Publications.
To the extent permitted by law, MOODY’S and its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability to any person or entity for any indirect, special, consequential, or incidental losses or damages whatsoever arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such information, even if MOODY’S or any of its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers is advised in advance of the possibility of such losses or damages, including but not limited to: (a) any loss of present or prospective profits or (b) any loss or damage arising where the relevant financial instrument is not the subject of a particular credit rating assigned by MOODY’S.
To the extent permitted by law, MOODY’S and its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability for any direct or compensatory losses or damages caused to any person or entity, including but not limited to by any negligence (but excluding fraud, willful misconduct or any other type of liability that, for the avoidance of doubt, by law cannot be excluded) on the part of, or any contingency within or beyond the control of, MOODY’S or any of its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers, arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such information.
NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY SUCH RATING OR OTHER OPINION OR INFORMATION IS GIVEN OR MADE BY MOODY’S IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER.
MIS, a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody’s Corporation (“MCO”), hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by MIS have, prior to assignment of any rating, agreed to pay to MIS for appraisal and rating services rendered by it fees ranging from $1,500 to approximately $2,500,000. MCO and MIS also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of MIS’s ratings and rating processes. Information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold ratings from MIS and have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is posted annually at www.moodys.com under the heading “Shareholder Relations — Corporate Governance — Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy.”
For Australia only: Any publication into Australia of this document is pursuant to the Australian Financial Services License of MOODY’S affiliate, Moody’s Investors Service Pty Limited ABN 61 003 399 657AFSL 336969 and/or Moody’s Analytics Australia Pty Ltd ABN 94 105 136 972 AFSL 383569 (as applicable). This document is intended to be provided only to “wholesale clients” within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. By continuing to access this document from within Australia, you represent to MOODY’S that you are, or are accessing the document as a representative of, a “wholesale client” and that neither you nor the entity you represent will directly or indirectly disseminate this document or its contents to “retail clients” within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. MOODY’S credit rating is an opinion as to the creditworthiness of a debt obligation of the issuer, not on the equity securities of the issuer or any form of security that is available to retail clients. It would be dangerous for “retail clients” to make any investment decision based on MOODY’S credit rating. If in doubt you should contact your financial or other professional adviser.