Benchmark - Grant Writing Process

Organizational transformation will only be achieved when more effective performance patterns are identified and adopted. This will depend upon what is actually done to Institutionalization will necessitate a well-planned sequence of events, organizational restructuring, meetings, policy and personnel decisions, training, and other activities. These should be designed to help employees and management adjust to the new vision and adopt new perspectives, skills, attitudes, and behaviors. In this manner, the organization’s vision will be translated into reality, mission into action, and core philosophy into practice. Institutionalization requires the development and implementation of an organizational strategy that will translate the department’s vision, goals, and objectives into the day-to-day action of its members.

Crafting Organizational Strategy

The purpose of an organizational strategy is to integrate the vision, mission, action sequences (tactics), and people into a cohesive whole focused on effectively achieving the department’s mission and desired outcomes. It is the primary instrument of institutionalization that unites the department’s operational units and support units in order to make maximum use of these assets. In some organizations, it also defines how the department relates to its employees, stakeholders, and customers. It responds to the critical leadership question; “How does the department achieve its desired goals and objectives in light of its current capabilities and resources?” An organizational strategy seeks to define for the department what it will be and how it will achieve its mission and vision.17 It is a tool for creating a results-oriented organization whose performance expectations have meaning and value to organizational members as well as external stakeholders. The strategy should address these questions:

· How will we define our mission in performance outcomes?

· How will we accomplish these outcomes?

· How should we organize to accomplish these outcomes?

· Who should be accountable for achieving these outcomes?

· How will performance outcomes be measured?

A strategy is more than just a plan developed in advance that contains a set of intended actions to be carried out. In the dynamic environment of today’s police organization, new circumstances always emerge, and the future is not always what it is expected to be. Therefore, an organizational strategy should be thought as being both proactive (intended) and reactive (adaptive). It should be envisioned as a combination of intended planned actions and on-the-spot reactions to developing information and circumstances. Strategy development is an interactive process that creates an action plan and then adapts it as events unfold. It is something managers shape and reshape as they evaluate driving factors and problems that emerge outside and inside the organization. This is why monitoring work demand, analyzing information, creating feedback systems, and maintaining continuous organizational communications are important leadership activities. The leadership team and operational commanders must consistently seek to identify the best ways to use organizational assets to meet challenges or exploit opportunities in the department’s environment.

For example, if the department holds a commanding officer accountable for a specific geographical area, all other department units within and without this command that function in this area should be aligned operationally to support the commander’s objectives. Support unit commanders should be directed to work closely with the area commanding officer, sharing intelligence and taking part in the analysis of information, the development of tactics, and the evaluation of results. Thus, the area district commander’s strategy operates as a full team effort instead of in competition with other units seeking to achieve their individual unit objectives. Jack Maple concluded as a result of his the secret to achieving effective mission focus and operational performance lies with the commander’s ability to establish unity of command over all area resources.18

Crafting organizational strategy is an exercise in outside-in thinking. Operational managers must be knowledgeable of and understand the factors creating their unit’s work demand and how it impacts on their ability to achieve their mission, goals, and objectives. Effective managers keep their strategies, tactics, and deployment of resources closely matched to their organization’s external driving forces. External driving forces involve a variety of public safety needs that include incidents of crime, social disorder, and needs of specific communities; crime hot spots, career criminals, special events, and external political initiatives; shifting demographics; and projected future demands.

Moore and Trojanowics19 observe that in policing, executives often assume that the organization’s basic purpose and operating objectives were set long ago and now remain fixed. They see their job as optimizing performance with respect to these objectives, not to consider new challenges within their organizations. Police managers also assume that in managing their organization’s functions, they are restricted to established policies and procedures. While they may institute a few innovative programs, these are rarely seen as part of a sustained, unified effort to change the organization’s basic methods of operating.

An organization cannot effectively respond to the demands of its environment unless it actively engages that environment and seeks information through intelligence gathering, crime analysis, community surveys, and communication networks. Accurate and timely information must be collected and coded for type of incident, location, time of day, and day of the week. In the Los Angeles Police Department, timely information means

· providing commanders, supervisors, and street officers with accurate information of when particular types of crimes are occurring;

· pinpointing where the crimes are being committed;

· establishing how the crimes are being committed; and

· identifying who are committing the crimes.20

This information is provided to operational commanders who are responsible for developing tactical decisions. It is the critical difference between proactive and reactive policing. Proactive managers constantly engage and analyze their external environment, seek intelligence, and integrate this knowledge into their action plans and tactics. Reactive managers seldom prepare for the future but instead react to the crises at hand. As a result, they often become victims of the external driving forces that they have failed to anticipate.21

Strategy development depends on accurate and timely information (intelligence) gathering and analysis. The faster conditions change in a department’s external environment, the more critical it becomes for that department to be good at gathering and diagnosing shifting conditions and adjusting to these. As a result, information gathering and data analysis have emerged as an important activity of effective policing. Crime mapping (GIS) or spatial analysis software can provide a department with data summary reports and maps that identify crime trends, problem locations, and various factors upon which to base tactical decisions and resource deployment.22 The use of crime mapping allows the analysts to display aggregate data that show the spatial and temporal relationships of various crimes. This provides objective data upon which decision-makers can direct their crime reduction and prevention tactics to specific locations, times, incidents, and persons.23 Advancements in GIS technology have allowed police departments to use mapping as a tool for tactical development. Assessing the external environment includes clearly identifying the following:

· community crime and quality-of-life issues

· special population needs

· special events needs

· linked series of crimes and incidents

· potential crises areas

· political impact issues

· persistent criminal offenders

Paying attention to these factors and responding to them appropriately enhances the effectiveness of the department’s service to the community. Successful response and control of these external conditions can serve as benchmarks for identifying the relative position and value of the police organization in the eyes of citizens as well as the law enforcement profession.

For example, the NYPD’s “Operation Impact” deploys members of the graduating classes of NYPD’s recruit-training academy in units to carefully selected “hot spots” in precincts around the City. Operation Impact focused on particular times, places, and types of crime that have been found to be concentrated in a very small fraction of the total area policed by NYPD. This targeted deployment tactic has been consistently successful throughout its implementation for all categories of violent crime. Precincts that were assigned Impact Zones starting in 2003 experienced 24% decline in murder rates, a more than doubling of the rate of decline in rapes and grand larcenies, a 21% decline of the robbery rate, and 23% in the assault rate by 2006. An assessment of this deployment process concluded that Operation Impact has earned its place as an empirically validated crimereduction tool, worthy of continued adaptation in New York City and emulation in other cities facing resurgent crime rates, provided they have the capacity to replicate the kind of careful analysis on which the implementation of Operation Impact was launched and its implementation has been tracked and managed.24This initiative worked because timely and accurate intelligence identified the high-crime locations (hot spots), and the department responded with concentrated, synchronized, and focused deployment that led to the reduction of crime in these areas. Deploying resources in the right place at the right time is an important element of effective policing.

Creating a strategy is also dependent upon inside-out thinking because a part of strategy development is the planned use of internal resources and organizational strengths to respond to external driving forces. This requires that managers have a clear understanding of their organization’s strengths, capabilities, and weaknesses. An organizational strength is something a police department is good at doing or a characteristic that provides it with enhanced ability to achieve objectives and fulfill its mission. Organizational strengths can take any of several forms such as the following:

Human capital—This refers to the quality of employees measured in terms of their application of knowledge, education, training, motivation, skills, and expertise to their work. The employees’ knowledge, expertise, and training enhance their ability to engage in problem solving and providing quality service to the community.

Leadership—Managerial knowledge, skills, and collective learning and expertise of the leadership team are important strengths. Their direction of the department and identification of its performance expectations must be clear and understandable. The executive team’s leadership ability is reflected in the employees’ commitment and performance. This type of value is assessed in terms of the department’s reputation, accomplishments, employee loyalty, morale, work climate, community orientation, citizen support, cooperative managerial team, organizational culture, and learning process, all of which contribute to the department’s value in the eyes of the community.

Organizational culture—The department personnel adhere to a set of positive Organizational culture is the hidden energy that moves people to act. It provides a meaning to what people do and why they do it. The effective organization’s culture consists of shared values, beliefs, assumptions, perceptions, norms, and patterns of behavior that support the department’s mission, direction, and effectiveness. Physical assets—This refers to the department’s state-of-the-art computer technology physical plant, equipment, and vehicles that assist the processing of its operational demand.

Structure—There is coordination, cooperation, and communication between functional subdivisions and units. Teamwork and mutual support exist between units and employees throughout the department.

Taken together, a department’s strengths, skills and expertise, leadership direction, collection of physical assets, operational capabilities, culture, and achievements determine its performance capacity. Strengths determine how well the department will be able to respond to the demands of the external environment within which it exists.

An organizational weakness is anything internally that detracts from the department’s ability to perform its mission with efficiency and effectiveness. It may be something a department lacks (such as a crime analysis unit) or does not do (such as providing adequate managerial development) or a condition that puts it at a disadvantage (such as reduced budget, low wages, or a poor benefits package.) A department’s weaknesses can reflect deficiencies in personnel recruitment, selection, training and certification, managerial development, lack of workforce skills or expertise, such as poor decision-making, ineffective operational strategies, or problem solving. It can also be a lack of important physical, human, organizational, political, or intangible assets. A department may be dysfunctional because it lacks a clear strategic vision and/or has a negative organizational culture, obsolete facilities, outmoded operating procedures, limited budgetary resources, internal operating problems, managerial infighting, high employee turnover, and poor employee motivation. Each of these factors will have the potential to affect the department’s ability to successfully maintain effectiveness and fulfill its mission.

To implement an organizational strategy, the executive team must have a clear understanding of both their external and internal environments. This knowledge forms the basis for decisions regarding changes in unit leadership, structure, employee assignment, reward systems, accountability, budget allocations, policy, and procedures during the implementation of the change strategy.

However, organizational managers should be aware of the danger of exclusively engaging in inside-out thinking. Bureaucratic managers are cautious by nature. They usually focus most of their time and energy inward on internal problems, improving organizational processes and procedures, and taking care of daily administrative duties. They are caught up in the day-to-day organizational management, and whatever actions they do decide to initiate are heavily dictated by policy and procedure considerations. Their management decisions serve the purpose of accommodating their own fears and political concerns.26 This style of management will lock the organization into maintaining the status quo. How boldly managers recognize and meet the challenge of strategic opportunities and threats are good indicators of their leadership ability and value to the department.

Phyllis McDonald in her work Managing Police Operations cites an old police adage: “What is counted is what is performed.” In other words, she suggested that organizations do only what is expected. McDonald claims that if the police are serious about crime control and the quality of life in their communities, then police chiefs must empower and reward the operational commander for his or her ability to organize, create, implement, and execute In order to become a strategy-focused organization, the leadership team must put strategy at the center of its organization’s management process. Developing organizational strategy is a disciplined process based upon a logical set of connected activities. Without a carefully planned approach to strategy development, implementation, and assessment and reassessment of the process and results, strategic goals will not be attained. Successful execution involves decisions about strategy, structure, and coordination and informationsharing incentives and controls. These decisions take place within an organizational context of power, culture, leadership, and the ability to manage change.

Analysis of crime and quality-of-life data identifies problems, their source, and the times and places they occur most frequently. However, crime analysts and operational commanders, investigators, supervisors, and officers must work together to look beyond the raw data to see causal connections. Operational commanders must be empowered with the authority to develop clear, effective tactics to address the driving factors affecting their organization. Effective tactics are those that have proven over time to have achieved the results that they are designed to achieve. In order to bring about permanent change and to avoid merely displacing crime and quality-of-life problems, tactics must be comprehensive, flexible, and adaptable to the shifting crime trends that have been identified and monitored. This is not simply a numbers game of achieving output statistics. Each tactic or program developed by operational commanders should be assessed as to its impact. Results should be evaluated in light of its contribution to the commander’s operational goals and the department’s mission. This calls for the identification of who must achieve what, by when, and using what resources and deciding who is accountable and clearly setting that accountability is a critical step in the institutionalization process because it aligns the organizational mission and objectives to the operational commanders. However, establishing accountability is only half the battle. Managers must be held accountable by the command staff for both their accomplishments and failures, both of which should be analyzed for continuance of the strategy or redirection of the effort to overcome failure.

Implementing the Organizational Strategy

An important factor in managing effective police operations is defining the mission in terms of specific objectives. This requires that the chief executive and the command staff identify in performance outcome terms what needs to be accomplished to maximize organizational effectiveness. Outcome objectives must be spelled out clearly and communicated to those responsible for achieving them. This is the key activity by which the vision and mission are translated into operational terms. For example, to focus the NYPD and maximize its potential for reducing crime and improving the quality of life (broad organizational goals) in New York City, the commissioner’s executive team developed Ten

Crime-Control and Quality-of-Life strategies.28

· getting guns off the streets

· curbing youth violence in the schools and on the streets

· driving drug dealers out of the city

· breaking the cycle of domestic violence

· reclaiming public spaces

· reducing auto-related crime

· rooting out corruption; building organizational integrity in the New York City Police Department

· reclaiming the roads of New York City

· courtesy, professionalism, and respect

Bratton noted that establishing these strategic initiatives resulted in the entire NYPD becoming focused on how to attack crime and disorder problems, deployment of resources, disruption of criminal enterprises, and obtaining information from each arrest they made that would lead to other criminals and arrests.29

The objective of a strategy implementation process is to achieve alignment between the department’s operational demand, tactical plans, and its strategic objectives. One way to accomplish this is for the chief executive and the command staff to conduct departmentwide strategy meetings on a regular basis with operational commanders. The executive staff member(s) or the chief executive conducting these meeting should interview, review, and evaluate each operational commander’s problem identification, tactical knowledge, action plans, and accomplishments. Commanders should be held accountable and responsible for the following:

· crime and quality-of-life problem control

· the quality of their tactical plans

· the quality of their efforts toward crime and problem reduction

· their managerial oversight of operations (including evaluation and feedback)

· the results they obtain30

During these meetings, the operational commander should identify the crime and qualityof-life problems they are focusing on, the tactical action plan they have developed, and the projected and actual results obtained from their past efforts. Successful tactics and results are shared with other commanders present. Commanders must also be prepared to present alternative tactics to resolve the problem if their original strategy was not successful. Failed tactics should be altered or eliminated and successful tactics continued and replicated. Reporting on current intelligence, adapting tactics to changing conditions, and closely reviewing operational results should evolve into a continual process at these meetings. These assessment meetings should be attended by all who are responsible for the management and supervision of strategy and tactical development and implementation. A free flow of information must be maintained so that a process of organizational assessment and learning takes place. If not, the goals and strategies formulated at the meetings or follow-up sessions will be diluted or diverted as they make their way down to the rank and file officers.31 At the end of these meetings, all the commanders should know what they have accomplished, what they must do in the future to achieve their command objectives, and their evaluation by the command staff.32

NYPD’s organizational strategy, Compstat, emerged out of the crime strategy meetings that were created by the department’s executive team to enhance the department’s focus on crime control. It is a performance-based management system that is radically different from the accepted concepts and practices that have guided police administration through most of it existence. It involves a mixture of traditional and new methods and strategies police executives can use to address operational service demand. The department-wide strategy meetings emerged as the vital link between information, intelligence, strategic thinking, data-driven decision-making, command accountability, and assessment of the department’s effectiveness. Compstat changed the NYPD’s flow of information, decision-making, and organizational culture, while creating one of the more successful organization change efforts in policing.33

The strategy implementation process ideally should involve all levels of the organization as follows:

Level 1 (executive and command staff): The department’s chief executive and his or her leadership team set departmental direction by formulating a clear vision and priorities for the organization to address and measure. The chief executive must then empower operational commanders with the authority and resources to develop strategies and tactics to meet these objectives. They must supply their commanders with accurate and timely intelligence upon which to base their tactical plans. The operational commander’s tactical plans and the results achieved become the basis for their evaluation at department-wide strategy assessment meetings. At these meetings, executives assess tactical effectiveness and accomplishments as well as make strategic adjustments where needed. This assessment is used to modify or replace tactics rather than punishing staff (unless serious incompetence is evidenced). The executive team must be willing to reallocate resources, support creative solutions to problems, track progress, and integrate functions within the agency to support their commanders.

Level 2 (subdivision commander): Operational subdivision commanders should hold their own strategy meetings in which they establish their command’s vision and direction, set performance objectives, analyze and share intelligence and empower, and interview and assess their unit commanders regarding their specific tactical plans and desired outcomes. Unit commanders should be accountable for the development of unit tactical action plans, the results they achieve, and the resources they use to achieve them. These meetings should develop teamwork, accountability, and establish unity of command. Working together, the unit commanders’ efforts should be focused in a synergistic effort to achieve their objectives.34

Level 3 (unit commanders): The unit commanders should meet on a regular basis with their sergeants and officers, share intelligence, set objectives, empower individuals to accomplish objectives, develop action plans, and assess operational outcomes. A critical point of analysis at this level is the tactical deployment of resources to address conditions requiring police attention in the areas for which the unit is accountable.

Level 4 (line supervisor): The line supervisors (sergeants) on a daily basis communicate and work with their officers to obtain and share intelligence, define and implement strategy, as well as develop crime-control measures for specific conditions. A critical duty for these supervisors is the sharing of intelligence and analysis, both down and up the organizational command structure. This ensures that upper managers are constantly being informed of changing operational conditions at the point of service delivery. The sergeant and his or her team are the department’s basic functional unit. It is therefore critical that they be involved in this process because they are the individuals whose actions will produce the desired outcomes and maintain appropriate levels of organizational effectiveness.35

The strategy meetings thus become a reengineering device designed to implement and control the organizational strategy as well as develop a critical mass of creativity, innovation, communication, and dedication throughout the organization. They should provide the dynamics for command accountability at all levels of the organization and an arena for testing the ability of each commander and the capabilities of each unit. It provides the executive team with a process to match positions with the commanders who have the skill, experience, expertise, and personality to manage them proficiently. Overall, strategic guidance should flow down to all areas of the department through this process, while successful tactics are disseminated upward and throughout the organization. Engaging this process to develop and enact crime-control strategies can help agencies of all sizes to address hot spots, patterns, and trends. However, in less hierarchical organizations, this process can be adjusted to fit a smaller organizational structure.

Lastly, the institutionalization of the organizational strategy requires the emergence

This will require a well-planned process that employs the use of the following tools to create the new organizational reality and culture of effectiveness:

· Selection and advancement systems

· Managerial communication systems

· Organizational policy and procedures

· Decision-making and problem-solving processes

· Accountability systems

· Measurement and follow-up systems

· Reward and discipline systems

Measuring Progress

The continuous monitoring, measuring, and evaluation of performance are keys to creating effective organizations. Performance measurement forms the basis for deciding if the organization has accomplished what it set out to do. It is also a means for communicating police effectiveness to elected officials and the public. It is the responsibility of the executive team and each commanding officer to continually follow up and assess the effectiveness of their activities to know when things are going well, where improvement is needed, and when changing demand requires a different strategy and tactics. Data are the basis for the assessment of the effectiveness of managerial strategies. A process will need to be designed to provide feedback on tactical execution and performance results. This requires the department’s executive team to identify appropriate quantitative and qualitative measures that link performance activities to specific desired goals and objectives. Indications of inadequate performance or too little progress may require adjustments in goals, objectives, and tactics that are more realistic in light of actual experience, changing conditions, new ideas, and new opportunities.36

When trying to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of their strategies, law enforcement managers are confronted with several basic questions. These include the following:

· Did we identify the appropriate strategic response?

· Are we achieving the outcomes we intended to accomplish?

· Are our organizational units aligned with our strategy?

· What data do we need to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of our performance and impact?

· How do we know what strategies or tactical plans work and why?

All managerial activities should be conducted with evaluation in mind. Feedback systems and measurable objectives should always be part of an organizational strategy. Administrators should avoid setting expectations that are unrealistic and unattainable by encouraging the development of tactical strategies that incorporate realistic and attainable objectives as system elements. Goals and objectives should be established to provide the manager with a way to assess progress accurately, cite success, identify strategies that work, and refocus resources as needed.

Goals are broad statements of desired performance outcomes that are intended to provide direction. They are an extremely important part of changing a low-performing organization to a higher level of accomplishment and revitalization. Goals become a means not only of measuring success but also of replacing unproductive or counterproductive behaviors with effective goal-oriented activity.37 They should be based upon timely and accurate analysis of service demand information. Performance goals should be attainable, an organization and its people stretch to accomplish them. They clarify what must be done and why. For example, the strategic plan of the City of Greensboro Police Department, North Carolina, identifies the following goals for the department:

· enhancing human capital

· exploit technology

· tailor police services to fit our community

· develop sustainable partnerships

· manage personnel and other resources effectively.38

Objectives are more specific than goals. They should define clearly and concisely exactly what outcome is to be achieved and by when. Thus objectives must always be measurable and specific. Objectives should include four major components:

1. A time frame: date by which the objective will be accomplished.

2. A target: this can be a hot spot, specific individuals, quality-of-life conditions, or a specific crime trend.

3. A result: the key outcome intended, a specific change in the problem.

4. A criterion: a standard for measuring successful achievement of the result.39

There is also a distinction between process and outcome objectives. Process objectives refer to short-term tasks that must be completed in order to implement a strategy or action plan. For example, the identification of a unit commander and/or the selection and assignment of officers for a tactical team required to address a specific problem area. Outcome objectives refer to a specific, measurable change in the problem. Objectives set performance targets to be accomplished over a period of time. They act as milestones or benchmarks that serve as indicators of progress. They should be specific, measurable, and established for a defined time period.40 For example, The department will reduce incidents of auto theft in the city by 10 percent during the first six months of the year 2011.

Crime analysis data should not be gathered solely for record keeping and reporting. It needs to form the basis of accurate and timely intelligence that is disseminated to the right people in the organization, and diagnosed and discussed to evaluate current accomplishments and identify areas for future improvements. This facilitates organizational dialogue, learning, creativity, and change.41 Reporting on performance activities and results should take place at the organizational strategy meeting as well as through the department’s established reporting system.

Appropriate baseline measures that record conditions before change is implemented must be identified so that a before-and-after comparison of relevant changes can be made. Lastly, all performance measures should relate to organizational and operational unit mission, goals, and objectives. The design and implementation of evaluations depend upon the specific purpose they are intended to serve. They must measure what matters and what gives managers the information that they need to make performance decisions. All else is a waste of time, budget, and organizational resources.

Evaluating Effectiveness

Evaluation of law enforcement operations is more than a technical matter of choosing appropriate measurement criteria and methodologies. It involves controversial decisions about what the department should be doing (strategy) and how it should be doing it (tactics). For example, suppose we have a location, a hot spot, that generates numerous incidents of drug sales, assaults, robberies, disorderly conduct, citizen complaints, and is how should he or she handle this problem? A quick way is to use a tactical strike, involving assignment of numerous officers to sweep the area and make arrests. This will result in producing a number of traditional performance output statistics (arrests) that measure the department’s response to the problem. However, given sufficient time, the problem may resurface or be displaced to another area because still there would be customers seeking dealers and individuals willing to sell them drugs.42 Thus, the problem will still exist for the department and the community.

An alternative strategy would be to form a problem-solving team of officers and concerned community partners under the direction of a team manager from the area command to find a long-term solution. Whatever strategy is selected, it should not be based on a knee-jerk response to pressure for a quick fix. Instead, there should be a clear assessment of the intelligence about the location, agreement among the command staff as to the desired short-term and long-term outcomes, and the development of an appropriate strategy to accomplish these outcomes. Once the strategy is selected, it must be implemented and evaluated for its effectiveness.

Planning For Evaluation

Valid and reliable evaluation of police organizational performance requires the following:

1. clearly defined goals and objectives

2. fixed command accountability for the achievement of the goals and objectives

3. identification of appropriate measurement data that will tell us how effective we are (i.e., data indicators of conditions before and after a tactical response)

4. creation of a reporting system that will monitor tactical implementation and impact (organizational strategy meetings)

5. managerial oversight through implementation, follow-up, and assessment

Goals and objectives should be realistically set to provide the organization with a way to assess progress. Command accountability and timelines must be established as well as decisions regarding who would be responsible for the implementation of the tactical action plan and achievement of the objectives. Appropriate baseline measures that describe what conditions existed before operations began should be identified so that a before-and-after comparison of relevant factors is possible. This data should be contained in crime analysis reports, intelligence summaries, survey responses, and area observations. Individual measures should always be linked to department- and unit-desired outcomes. When a specific tactic is directed at crime-related problems, the amount of prevention and control of that problem is the basis for judging its effectiveness. This is usually measured by data that compare the crime or incidence level after operations with what statistically existed (prevalence) before the strategy was implemented. Incidence refers to the number of new cases of a problem within a specific time period. Prevalence is the existing number of cases of a particular problem as of a specific date.43 However, if the tactic is attempting to reduce fear of crime and enhance community resident’s sense of personal safety, then the measures will be different.

Experienced operational commanders know that usually problems are not isolated incidents. For example, as noted earlier, an open-air drug market can produce a variety of criminal activities, disorder, and enhanced citizen fear of crime. As a result, the strategic goal to eliminate the drug market may have a number of objective outcomes that could include elimination of the distribution center, reduction of ancillary criminal incidents, stabilization of the neighborhood, reduction of citizens’ fear, and increased use of neighborhood space by ordinary citizens. Operational tactics and plans are expected to measured. Measurement criteria should identify whether or not the department has accomplished what it had set out to do.

In the case of the drug market, the operational commander should build into his or her performance plan the collection of data (complaint reports, location observations, measures of citizen attitudes, offender descriptions, activity reports, arrests statistics, investigations, and case closure reports) that defines the prevalence of the problem or conditions before the department’s strategic response is implemented. Once the problem is defined, the commander should seek the participation and input from different individuals and organizations that will have a role in developing the response plan. Next, the specific desired outcome to be obtained by the tactical response should be defined. After the operation is implemented, the command should analyze the outcomes and compare the performance result data to the baseline data. Analysis will indicate what changes, if any, have occurred in the conditions the department was seeking to correct.

Efficiency and legality are also important evaluation issues. The cost–benefit (efficiency) analysis of operational strategies is a necessary consideration when deciding how to best evaluate the use of resources. An operational strategy may be a very efficient use of resources or a terrible waste of them. A planned strategy evaluation that provides data on implementation, resource use, and associated costs (direct and indirect) will provide the information needed to determine efficiency of operations in a timely manner. Police managers must also make sure that their strategy meets appropriate legal and ethical standards. The ends do not justify the means if the officers violated legal and ethical standards of conduct to achieve performance results.

Strategic Evaluation

Strategic evaluation is generally defined as the systematic attempt to examine a strategy’s process, implementation, and impact. Managers need this information in order to judge the operational performance of their strategic initiatives and to make changes in the way day-today activities are conducted. Ideally, strategic evaluation should focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of the strategy. It seeks to determine the answer to the following questions:

1. Did the strategy have an impact on the problems or conditions that it was created to address?

2. To what extent was the impact (decrease or increase in percent)?

3. Was the process and service delivery consistent with strategy design specifications? Here a comparison is made between planned and actual events.

4. What is the cost–benefit analysis of expended resources to strategy outcomes?

5. Were organizational resources used properly?

6. Were targeted populations or neighborhood groups reached?

7. How did the officers actually perform?

It should be clear that evaluation is centered on the identification and measurement of what has, in fact, occurred as opposed to what should have occurred. This will permit managers to identify and correct problems that occurred during implementation and plan to avoid them in the future.

Relentless Follow-Up and Assessment

Silverman identified Compstat as an agent of change that generated key reform processes such as new strategies, reengineering, and reorganization in the NYPD.44 He claims that Compstat served as the glue that has bonded all of these changes together. This is because Double-loop learning involves questioning basic operating assumptions, entertaining different approaches, and experimenting with different arrangements.45 As a result of the constant examination and reexamination of strategies and tactics that took place at the NYPD’s meetings, a deeper focus on operational performance and organizational transformation occurred.

The crime strategy meeting’s success as an organizational reengineering tool is based upon the ongoing process of follow-up and assessment of operational tactics and the results they achieved. The meetings focused constantly on what is being done, who has done it, and what are the results. This process identifies what is successful and what is not. By knowing how well a particular tactic worked on a particular crime or quality-of-life problem, and by knowing which specific elements of the tactical response worked most effectively, managers should be better able to construct and implement effective responses for similar problems in the future. The follow-up and assessment process also permits the redeployment of resources to meet newly identified challenges once a problem has been resolved, all of which serves to institutionalize the department’s transformational process and create a culture of effectiveness.

In many police departments currently employing the Compstat organizational strategy, follow-up, assessment, and double-loop learning are accomplished at strategy meetings that are held at the headquarters and divisional level. The meetings are usually scheduled weekly and are conducted by the chief executive or member(s) of the executive team. At these meetings, operational divisional commanders are asked to identify and define the problems in their areas and present potential solutions. Department and division-level GIS analysts prepare crime analyses for these meetings based on GIS mapping. The lag time between an incident and GIS analysis is usually less than 24 hours, allowing operational commanders to examine the results of crime incidents quickly. Crime analysis data are used to identify three problem areas. One problem is the so-called hot spot where criminal events are identified in a relatively small geographic area. The hot spot can have the same type of criminal offense repeatedly or several different types of offenses simultaneously. The second problem is the crime pattern in which a certain type of crime is committed in several areas and by the same person or persons. The common element of a pattern is the criminal offense occurring in several locations rather than in one hot spot. The third is a crime trend, where crimes have certain characteristics in common. One example of a trend would be an increase in juvenile offenses such as vandalism, drug use, and after-school burglaries.46 In addition to problem identification, the data create accountability and responsibility for tactical development and operational outcomes.

At these meetings, the following events should take place:

1. Review of the crime statistics and analysis of each command attending the crime strategy meeting.

2. Analysis of current cases of interest, crime patterns, or situations requiring attention.

3. Reporting on measures taken to act on a specific case or address a specific crime pattern or situation.

4. Following up questions about cases, crime patterns, or situations that were mentioned at previous meetings.47

Strategy meetings should be a forum in which creative problem solving and organizational learning can take place. They are a catalyst for organizational reengineering that is designed to develop a critical mass of creativity, innovation, and dedication throughout the department. At these meetings, difficulties and obstacles are identified, positions strategies designed, and solutions are defined and delivered. Department executives and commanders at all levels have a forum to assess their results and change tactics and deployment based on the communication and analysis that takes place.

A major factor in the success of NYPD’s Compstat was that the innovated executives Bratton assembled around him understood the tremendous importance of teamwork, employee participation, and accurately measuring performance.48 They considered communication, teamwork, and empowerment critical to maintaining a focus on the department’s mission. They transformed the NYPD into an open-systems learning organization that employed a continuous double-loop learning system (crime strategy meetings) that set and reset strategy and assessed results.

A properly implemented follow-up and assessment process provides the dynamics for command accountability and an arena for testing the ability of each commander through the weekly crime strategy meetings. It provides the executive team with a process to match positions with the commanders who have the skill, experience, expertise, and personality to manage them proficiently. As a management tool, the strategy meetings merge quantitative information on crime locations and times with police deployment arrangements and qualitative quality-of-life information. The operational commander’s problem solving can be weighed and evaluated against available resources and the responsibilities, information sharing, and interaction of different department units. Operational managers should be encouraged to focus, manage, and direct their unit’s problem-solving process. This process blends traditional command managerial oversight responsibility with the flexibility of community and problem-oriented policing strategies. A principal objective of this process is to identify and maintain operational tactics that effectively provide public safety in the community.

Three levels of measurement are typically used in policing; these are objective measures, general measures, and specific measures.

Objective Measures are direct measures of overall agency activities. Examples of these include the following: calls for service, arrest data, crime rates, cases cleared, victimization rates, cost of services, and sustained complaints about employee behavior. Most of these are traditional law enforcement measures that are still valid indicators of police performance. However, it has been suggested that the following indicators can also tell us how successful a police department is in providing public safety:

real estate values public utilization of common space community commercial activity49

General Measures are broad indicators of effectiveness based on the subjective reflection of people’s impressions of quality-of-life conditions, accomplishments, service levels, and participation in police activities. Examples of these measures include the following:

citizen perception of community safety citizen fear levels percent of citizens assisting in problem-solving activities satisfaction with police activities

Since these measures are subjective, they must not be taken on face validity. People may respond based upon what others have told them or incidents seen by them in the media, not actual conditions or police activity they have witnessed.

Specific Measures are designed to evaluate individual and unit performance. These measures should be developed at all levels of the organization; however, they are extremely important for operational units. These include performance goals and measurement indicators that should be established by the executive team as well as divisional commanders and supervisors to evaluate the success of operational units and personnel. Examples of these measures include the following:

incidents of crime in a specific geographical area numbers of identified and resolved incidents of social or physical disorder percentage of problems identified and resolved in a specific geographical area specific performance outputs achieved (numbers arrests, citations, officers deployed, etc.) specific performance outcomes achieved (reduction in calls per service, drug market activity, crime rates, incidents of disorder, etc.)

Lastly, all performance measures must relate to department, program, and operational unit’s mission, goals, and objectives. The design and implementation of evaluations depend upon the specific purpose they are to serve. They will differ according to the specific strategy and the type of measurement information needed by the manager.

In the measurement of police operational performance, outcomes generate the most concern. Political and community stakeholders as well as police executives want to know the following, for instance: Did crime go down, was disorder reduced, and do citizens feel safe? Police executives need to know what worked and what did not. In order to answer these questions, police departments should perform the following:

1. Take maximum advantage of the data routinely collected.

2. Analyze and disseminate this data to operational commanders who need it in a timely and understandable fashion.

3. Look for cost-effective ways to enhance the data collection and intelligence analysis.

4. Use hard data to support operational decision-making.

5. Employ GIS systems.

6. Set realistic outcomes and objectives to provide the organization with a way to assess progress accurately, cite success, identify effective strategies, and refocus resources accordingly.

7. Remember to establish appropriate baseline measures so that a before-and-after comparison of relevant factors is possible.

Performance measurement is a management tool. It is only as good as its design and the individual(s) who use it. The measurement of effectiveness is concerned with outcomes rather than outputs. It is not just the numbers of arrest made but the condition of the community after the arrests were made that should be of concern. Has the safety and security of the citizens in that community increased in a measurable way because of the arrests? Have we displaced the problem to another place that will require a new strategy pathway to a more effective law enforcement department. It is used best when it is a feedback mechanism to help decision-makers focus on goals, strategies, and resource allocation to accomplish the department mission and improve service to the community.

C A SE ST U DY Effective Policing “Focus on Four,” Tampa Police Department, Florida

408 chapter fifteen developing effective organizations

developing effective organizations chapter fifteen 407

1314189 - Pearson Education Limited ©

1314189 - Pearson Education Limited ©

1314189 - Pearson Education Limited ©

The Tampa Police Department in 2004 began an effort to create a safer city through the development of a more effective approach to crime reduction. It created an organizational strategy that decentralized the department, increased accountability, focused on proactive community policing, and addressed all crime with a sense of urgency. The executive leadership team employed a transitional process that reengineered the department to ensure that the new approach became integrated into every aspect of the organization. They provided the tools and the technology need to accomplish their goals and then asked the officers to develop innovative initiatives to address the crime problems in their areas.

Out of this initiative, an evolving organizational strategy developed that became known as the “Focus on Four” because of its emphasis on four high-volume pattern crimes. This strategy primarily targeted four crimes: burglary, robbery, auto burglary, and auto theft. Historical crime analysis shows that people who commit more violent crimes commit a large percentage of these four crimes. While the reduction of those crimes alone had a dramatic impact on the Tampa community, the ripple effect of appending and convicting individuals responsible for these four targeted crimes had a profound impact on the reduction of more violent crime and helped drive down all crime in the city. At the same time, it changed the department’s culture from a traditional, reactive mode to a proactive approach. The reengineered Tampa Police Department became a very dynamic organization, able to adapt to ever-changing crime trends and issues. As a result, the City of Tampa, Florida, has experienced a 56% reduction in crime over the past seven years. This reduction translates into 20,000 fewer crime victims.

The department’s transition began with the development of a mission statement that focused on crime reduction but was simple enough for the entire department and community to understand, internalize, and embrace. The mission of the Tampa Police Department is to reduce crime and improve the quality of life through a cooperative partnership with all citizens.This statement established measurable crime reduction as the basic goal of the department. Lack of follow-through often causes many good plans to fade away. To avoid this from happening, the department’s executive leadership team made every effort to engrain the mission in every aspect of the department and developed it into the organization’s guiding principle.

The Reorganization Plan

The executive staff engaged in the following steps to implement their reorganization plan. They redistributed tactical resources, employed Intelligence-led policing, engaged in proactive and preventive policing initiatives, and partnered with the community. To solicit buy-in from the department and the community, the staff displayed aconsistent and unwavering commitment to the Focus-onFour plan. The plan became a way of life that was communicated on a daily basis, from roll calls to community forums. Every member of the department understood how his or her job performance would impact the crime rate.

Redistribution of Tactical Resources

The Tampa Police Department was restructured into three smaller, more manageable geographic districts.The majors in command of these districts were provided specialized resources and the latitude to deploy them as they deemed necessary to address unique district issues. Managers and officers were held responsible for tracking crimes in their area and then devising daily attack plans to solve those crimes and prevent future offenses. The goal was to attack emerging crime patterns and trends that were unique to each geographical area. As part of this process, specialized resources were moved out of central police headquarters and redistributed to the districts. The officers and employees also adopted a more proactive approach to policing. Using a "swarm" mentality, all available units would respond to in-progress calls to increase the chance of capturing the suspect and preventing future crimes. In addition, most offenses were investigated from start to finish at the time of the initial report. Very few cases were referred to a detective for latent investigation. The decentralization of resources also placed officers and employees in close proximity to the citizens they served. This allowed the formation of intimate working relationships and a firsthand knowledge of the issues in the assigned geographic areas of responsibility.

Intelligence-Led Policing

Tracking offenses as they occurred became a critical element of the department’s new crime-reducing tactics. Real-time intelligence on emerging crime patterns and trends became the basis for the district major’s deployment of the resources. To provide intelligence information, the department formed the crime analysis unit and assigned each district an analyst to provide daily intelligence. A daily report was created that detailed crimes committed in a 24-hour period and identified when particular crimes were occurring, how and where the crimes were being committed, and who the likely offenders were.These reports compared each day’s crimes to the previous month and to the same month from the prior year. This information allowed for a much more efficient and effective deployment of crime-fighting resources at the district level.

Supervisors were responsible for closely following the BigFour crimes. Success was evaluated based on the crime rate reduction for that month, as compared to the same month the prior year. The computer mapping of crime data was completed on a weekly and monthly basis. Commanders and officers easily determined where crimes were being committed geographically

C A SE ST U DY Continued

and were able to utilize the information to assist in decisionmaking and in devising strategies.

In order to ensure accountability, the Tampa Police

Department instituted a monthly review process termed “the

Comprehensive Police Performance Effectiveness Review” or COPPER for short. The COPPER reports contained high-level detail on all crime and related responses for each district. The assistant chief of operations reviewed these reports at monthly COPPER meetings. This allowed for a department-wide review and analysis to make sure each district was doing its part to effectively reduce crime. In essence, they became the report cards for district commanders and their staff.

Proactive and Preventive Policing Initiatives

Each officer and employee was rewarded for displaying initiative that embraced the Tampa Police Department’s annual crime reduction goals. These goals are distributed department-wide to ensure each officer developed a vested interest in reaching them. The department then launched a series of proactive initiatives that focused on the Big Four. Each of these operations indirectly reduced violent offenses because criminals who commit a series of burglaries may be more likely to commit an aggravated assault or worse.

A department-wide cultural shift from only responding to 911 calls to a new, proactive approach energized the officers. They are armed with intelligence about repeat offenders and crime patterns in their zones so they can more rapidly identify suspects, solve crimes, and prevent additional crimes from occurring. As they saw their efforts making a difference, the enthusiasm and morale grew. That momentum prompted officers

SUMMARY

to develop initiatives to address crime problems specific to their assigned areas. A tactical lieutenant oversees the day-to-day crime patterns and deployment. These commanders coordinate between Patrol and District Detective Squads to ensure all entities are sharing intelligence and working together to address crime patterns. The lieutenant also serves as a key point of contact for citizens. This has resulted in an enhanced working relationship with the community.

Partnering with Community

A department-wide philosophy of community-oriented policing permeates the organization. Proactive communication with community leaders and cooperative partnership with neighborhoods help the department’s effort to reduce crime in the community and improve the quality of life. The department’s communityoriented policing philosophy established and maintained an open line of communication and mutual trust with the community. These positive relationships continue to be a cornerstone of the department’s crime reduction success. By virtue of this partnership with the community, the department’s mission of crime reduction became the community’s mission as well. The collaboration of residents, neighborhood watch members, civic association groups, business partners, and neighborhood mobile patrols was critical to the department’s crime reduction success. The community shared in both celebrating the successes and shouldering responsibility for areas that still need improvement.

Compare and contrast the transition of the Tampa Police Department with the activities discussed in the first part of this chapter.

During the latter part of the 20th century, a new era, entitled “strategic policing,” emerged in response to changing public safety demands. Police executives experimented with different organizational strategies involving the restructuring of organizations and utilization of performance-based management systems. These efforts led to the creation of two organizational strategies, Compstat and Intelligence-led policing. A redefinition of police organizational effectiveness resulted. An effective police organization is now seen as one that is skilled at adapting to the demands of its external environment by initiating and reshaping its operational processes in ways that increase its value to the public it serves.

Police organizations are increasingly employing an organizational strategy that involves creating, acquiring, analyzing, and transferring timely and accurate information to operational commanders who then plan to respond to these demands with the capabilities and resources of the department. The operational activities of the department and its commanders are constantly monitored and evaluated by the organization’s executive team as to their effectiveness and accomplishments. This marriage of information, tactics, and assessment allows the law enforcement agency to initiate and reshape its operational In order for an organization to become strategy focused, it must put strategy at the center of the organization’s management process. Setting strategic direction is a disciplined process, based upon a logical set of connected activities. Without a careful, planned approach to strategy implementation, strategic goals cannot be attained. Successful execution involves decisions about strategy, structure, accountability, coordination, information sharing incentives, and controls. These decisions take place within an organizational context of power, culture, leadership, and the ability to manage change. At the heart of this transformational process are the following basic tasks:

· creation of a strategic vision

· mobilization of commitment

· institutionalization of the change

· measurement of progress

The executive team is responsible for setting the department’s strategic direction by clarifying the desired outcome measures for the program. This involves the formulation of a clear vision expressed as objectives or goals that become the priorities that guide department operations. This mission clarification demonstrates management’s commitment to specific goals for which the organization and its leaders can be held accountable. The reason for mission clarification through the setting of objectives is to align the internal capabilities of the department with the external demands of crime control and community safety.

The success of “strategic policing” is based upon the executive’s ability to get others not only to see and understand a different organizational vision but also to commit to it. This requires the mobilization of key stakeholders within and without of the organization to accept and work toward achieving the new vision. All levels of the organization must be involved in the strategy. Crime strategy meetings must be held on regular bases where a process of feedback, evaluation, tactical adjustment, and organizational learning takes place. Lastly, these changes should be institutionalized so that the change will last over time. If not, “strategic policing” will become a statistical driven system that reinforces the negative aspects associated with traditional police bureaucratic command and control management systems.

A department’s vision, objectives, strategy, and execution are never final; evaluating performance, monitoring changes in the surrounding environment, and making adjustments are normal and necessary parts of the strategic management process. Proficient strategy execution is always the product of organizational learning. It is achieved unevenly, coming quickly in some areas and proving bothersome in others. Follow-up and assessment, ongoing searches for ways to continuously improve, and corrective adjustments are thus normal. A final requirement is assessment of the results obtained by directly evaluating the tactics and operations of area commanders. What happens to crime and the community’s quality of life is considered to be a direct measure of the department’s effectiveness.

DISCUSSION TOPICS AND QUESTIONS

1. What is the definition of an effective police organization?

2. What are the activities associated with organizational transformation?

4. How is organizational effectiveness measured?

5. What are the criteria for valid and reliable measures of organizational performance?

FOR FURTHER READING

Ken Blanchard, Leading at a Higher Level (Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2007).

Leading at a Higher Level translates decades of research and 25 years of global experience into simple, practical, and powerful strategies to equip leaders at every level to build organizations that produce bottom-line results.

David K. Banner and T. Elaine Gagne, Designing Effective Organizations: Traditional and Transformational Views (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).

This book develops a transformational perspective which focuses on the organizational world as a projection of each organizational member’s consciousness. While covering all the basic topics of organization theory, the author’s approach reflects today’s changing management paradigms.

John Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

This book is a guide for organizational leaders to help them to transform their stagnant, ineffective, and hierarchical organizations into more effective, responsive, and team-oriented ones. To help organizations and leaders make this transition, he presents eight sequential steps that must be followed in order and done well.

NOTES

1. See Chuck Wexler, MaryAnn Wycoff, and Craig Fischer,

Good to Great Policing: Application of Business Management Principles in the Public Sector (Washington, DC: Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and Police Executive Research Forum, 2007).

2. Paul E. O’Connell and Frank Straub, Performance-Based Management for Police Organizations (Long Grove,

IL: Waveland, 2007).

3. David Weisburd and John E. Eck, “What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.

593, No. 1 (2004), pp. 42–65.

4. Richard L. Draft, The Leadership Experience, 2nd ed.

(New York: Harcourt, 2002), pp. 476–477.

5. Ken Blanchard, Leading at a Higher Level (Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2007), p. 22

6. Ibid., pp. 21–36.

7. Personal interview of Chief Jane Castor Tampa Police Department, April 19, 2010. Chief Castor claimed that this vision was developed during her predecessor Stephen Hough’s tenure. The chief stated that she and her command staff constantly refer to it on a daily basis so that it is engrained in every aspect of the department.

8. Vincent E. Henry, The Compstat Paradigm: Management Accountability in Policing, Business and the Public Sector

(Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications, 2002), p. 12.

9. Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston, MA: Little Brown,

2000).

10. W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, “Tipping Point Leadership,” Harvard Business Review, Vol. 81 (April

2003), pp. 3–11.

11 Gennaro F Vito William F Walsh and Julie Kunselman Journal of Police Science and Management, Vol. 7, No. 3

(2005), pp. 187–196.

12. Michael Beer, Leading Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Gary Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice

Hall 2009), p. 292.

13. See Peter M. Senge, Art Kleiner, Charlotte Roberts, Richard Ross, and Bryan Smith, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook (New York: Doubleday, 1994), for a discussion of the use of dialogue in creating organizational change, pp. 357–364.

14. John Kotter and Dan P. Cohen, The Heart of Change

(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2002).

15. John Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), p. 21.

16. Pat Zigarmi and Judd Hoekstra, “Strategies for Managing Change,” in Ken Blanchard, ed. Leading at a Higher Level (Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2007), pp. 220–245.

17. Mark H. Moore and Robert C. Trojanowicz, Corporate Strategies for Policing (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1988), p. 2.

18. Jack Maple and Chris Mitchell, The Crime Fighter (New York: Doubleday, 1999), p. 138.

19. Moore and Trojanowicz, Corporate Strategies for Policing, p. 2.

20. Walter Schick, “CompStat in the Los Angeles Police Department,” The Police Chief, Vol. 71, No. 1 (January

2004), p. 10.

21. Patrick O’Hara, Why Law Enforcement Organizations Fail: Mapping the Organizational Fault Lines in Policing

(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005).

22. Keith Harries and James LeBeau, “Issues in the Geographic Profiling of Crime: Review and Commentary,” Police

Practice and Research, Vol 8, No 4 (September 2007),

23. Jerry Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing (Portland, OR: Willan, 2008), p. 8.

24. Dennis C. Smith and Robert Purtell, “An Empirical Assessment of NYPD’s ‘Operation Impact’: A Targeted Zone Crime Reduction Strategy” (June 2007) wagner. nyu.edu/faculty/publications.

25. Yoash Wiener, “Forms of Value Systems: A Focus on

Organizational Effectiveness and Culture Change and Maintenance,” Academy of Management, Vol. 13 (1988), pp. 434–545.

26. Malcolm K. Sparrow, Mark K. Moore, and David H. Kennedy, Beyond, 911: A New Era for Policing (New York: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 170–171.

27. Phyllis P. McDonald, Managing Police Operations: Implementing the New York Crime Control ModelCompStat (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002), p. 12.

28. Henry, The Compstat Paradigm: 2002, pp. 227–229.

29. William J. Bratton, “Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police Departments Can Lead to a Decrease in Crime,” in Robert H. Langworthy, ed.

Measuring What Matters: Proceedings From the Policing

Research Institute Meetings (Rockville, MD: National Institute of Justice, 1999), p. 14.

30. William Bratton with Peter Knobler, Turnaround (New York: Random House, 1998).

31. Dean Dabney, “Observations Regarding Key Operational Realities in a Compstat Model of Policing,” Justice Quarterly, Vol. 27, No.1 (2010), pp. 28–51.

32. Howard Safir, “Goal-Oriented Community Policing: The NYPD Approach,” The Police Chief, Vol. 64 (1997, December), pp. 31–58.

33. O’Connell and Straub, Performance-Based Management for Police Organizations, p. 62.

34. Stephen R. Covey, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 262–284.

35. For the application of this process, see Bratton with Knobler, Turnaround, p. 239.

36. Mark H. Moore and Anthony A. Braga, “Measuring and Improving Police Performance: The Lessons of Compstat and Its Progeny,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2003), pp. 439–453.

37. Bratton, “Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police Departments Can Lead to a Decrease in Crime,” pp. 11–26.

38. http://www.greensboro-nc.gov.

39. Wayne N. Welsh and Philip H. Harris, Criminal Justice Policy & Planning, 3rd ed. (Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2008), p. 99.

40. Ibid., p. 40.

41. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1990), pp. 238–249.

42. Robert Barr and Ken Pease, “Crime Placement, Displacement, and Deflection,” in Michael Tonry and

Normal Morris, eds. Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 12 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1990), pp. 146–175.

43. Welsh and Harris, Criminal Justice Policy & Planning, p. 40.

44. Eli B. Silverman, NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999).

45. Chris Argyris, Increasing Leadership Effectiveness (New York: Wiley, 1976).

46. Phyllis P. McDonald, Implementing CompStat: Critical Points to Consider. The Police Chief (January 2004), pp. 33–37.

47. Jon M. Shane, “Compstat Design,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Vol. 73, No. 5 (May 2004), pp. 12–19.

48. Henry, The Compstat Paradigm, p. 13.

49. David H. Bayley, “Measuring Overall Effectiveness or Police Force Show and Tell,” in Larry T. Hoover, ed. Quantifying Quality in Policing (Washington, DC: PERF, 1996), pp. 37–54.

Index

A

Abilities, motivation and, 158

Accommodation, 139

Accommodators (“teddy bears”), conflict management and, 233

Accomplishment, 320

Accountability in performance management

environment, 388 levels of, 386–388 tools, 388–389

Achieved status, 328

Achievement, need for (nAch), 168

Achievement-oriented leadership, 85

Acquired needs theory, 168–172

Adams, J. Stacy, 179

Adaptive leadership, 81

Administrative school, 5–7

Aerobic exercises, 209–210

Affiliation formal, 319 informal, 319 need for (nAff), 168

Affinity, 338

Affirmative action, 137, 201, 338, 353

Age Discrimination in Employment

Act, 269

Aggression, 219

Alarm stages of life, 193

Albanese, Robert, 86, 88–89, 318, 339

Aldag, Ramon J., 179, 350

Alderfer, Clayton, 167–168,

173–174, 183

Allison, Graham T., 241

Allport, Gordon, 109–110

Alternative solutions choosing, 251 designing, 250 evaluating, 250

Ambivalent individuals, 204

American Police Administration (Graper), 8

Anomie, 254

Applewhite, Phillip, 74

Area, organizing by, 17

Argot, 329, 340

Argyris, Chris, 55

Artley, Will, 372, 386

Ascendant individuals, 202–203

Ascribed status, 328

Assertiveness, as power tactic, 282

Association, attitudes and, 135

Attitudes, 128, 133. See also Organizational culture, managers acquiring, 134–135 benefits of attitude analysis, 137 decision-making and, 244–245 five-step process for changing, 149–150

functions and characteristics of,

135–137

management’s role in changing,

146–148 motivation and, 159 work and, 137–138

Authority, leadership and, 64

Autocratic leadership, 73

Avoidance, 107–108 as conflict-management technique, 230

Avoiders (“turtles”), conflict management and, 233

Azar, Beth, 104

B

Bargaining, as power tactic, 284

Barnard, Chester I., 65, 240, 288–289

Baron, Robert, 72

Basic functions, management, 6 Beer, Michael, 364

Behavior, 123–124, 133–134, 145–146. See also Organizational behavior definition of, 123 inherited, 124 learned, 124

management’s role in changing,

146–147

steps in formation of, 145–146

Behavioral change, as conflict management technique, 232

Behavioralists, human relations, 224

Behavioral symptoms of stress, 205–206

Beliefs, 130–131 definition of, 132–133

Benson, Herbert, 207–208

Beschen, Darrell, 391

B = F(P × E), operant behavior, 146

Blake, Robert, 55, 77–79

Blanchard, Kenneth, 75

Bounded rationality, 254–255

Brainstorming, 261–262

Bratton, William J., 27, 42–43, 409–410,

416, 423

Breathing exercises, 208

Buffing individuals, 283

Bureaucracy, 3–5

Bureaucratic orientation, personality and, 117–118

C

Cardiovascular system, stress and, 204

Carlyle, Thomas, 70

Cartwright, Dorwin, 332

Centrality of attitudes, 137

Champion, Dean, 324

Change (changing), 349–366 attitudes and behavior, 146–147 behavioral, as conflict-management technique, 232

case studies, 350, 358, 363–364 definition of, 349–350 evaluation of, 365–366 forces influencing, 351–355 initiating, 149–150 planned, 350–351, 355–362 reactive, 350, 355 resistance to, 362–364 sources of, 351–352 structural, as conflict-management

technique, 232

targeting, 356–357 technological, sociocultural, and orga-

nizational factors in, 352–355

Change agents, 127, 350–351

Channels, communication, 297–298

Charisma, 277

Choice, in Vroom’s expectancy theory,

176

Christie, Richard, 115

Civil Rights Act (1964), 269

Claims, groups and, 323

Classical organization theory, 2–6

Clientele, organizing by responding to the, 16, 18

Cliques, 316–317

Closed groups, 317

Closure effect, 142

Coalition, as power tactic, 281

Coercive power, 274–275 exercising, 275

Cognitive dissonance, 136, 179

Cohen, Dan P., 410

Cohesiveness of groups, 339–340

Collaboration, 219 group, 332–333

Collaborators (“owls”), conflict management and, 233

Collective bargaining, 226–227

Collective behavior, group performance, 312

Command and control in management style, 7

Command groups, 321

Commission on Accreditation for Law

Enforcement Agencies (CALEA),

211, 214, 382

Commitment, power management, 271

Communication

interpersonal, 53

managerial. See Managerial

communication Communicators, 149

Community policing, 23–26

Community policing era, organizational strategy of the, 19

Community relations, 200

Comparative analysis, decision making, 251 Competition, 227

Competitors (“sharks”), 233 conflict management and, 233

Complexity of tasks, groups and, 337

Compliance (with lawful orders), 276 instrumental, 176

Composition, work group, 338

Compromise, as conflict-management technique, 231

Compromisers (“foxes”), conflict management and, 233

CompStat, 27–29, 41, 46

Conceptual skills, 46–47, 67–69

Conflict, 126, 219–237 aftermath of, 223 bifurcation of subunit interests and, 227–228

case studies, 220, 229–230, 236 causes of, 225–228 competition for scarce resources

and, 227

constructive, 225 culture and, 225–226 drive for autonomy and, 227 dysfunctional, 228–229 felt, 223 in formal organizations, 224–225 between groups, 221–222 between individuals, 221–222 between individuals and groups,

221–222

interpersonal, 221–224, 226,

228–229, 231, 234 latent, 223

managerial styles and management of,

233–234

manifest, 223 organizational ambiguity and, 226–227 perceived, 223 power and, 225–226

problem employees as source of,

234–236 reacting to and managing, 228–233 role, 194–195 status and, 225–226

Conflict-development cycle,

222–224

Conflict resolution, 223 horizontal communication and, 303

Conformty, 336

Congruent individual, 112

Conscientiousness, 61, 111–112, 161

Content theories of motivation,

162–163, 166–167, 172–175, 183

Contingency management (contingency approach), 14–15, 55–56, 81–84,

233–234

Contingency theory, 14–15

Continuity effect, 142

Control function activities, 40

Control, managerial communication and, 289

Controlling, as management function,

40–41

Cooley, Charles H., 319 Cooperation, 342–343 Cosner, James, 160

Counseling, 212–213

Countervailing needs, 165

Country club management, 77

Courts, stress and, 190

Crime strategy meetings, 416–417,

420–423, 427

Criminal justice system, stress and, 200

Criterion, outcome objectives, 419

Critical life events scale, law enforcement, 191

Critical mass, 409

Culture conflict and differences in, 225–226

definition of, 132 group, 328–329

D

Data collection, performance management

analysis, 392 model, 392–393 plan, 390–392 process, 389–390 report, 392 review, 392

Davis, Ralph C., 71

Day, Richard, 391

Deadly force, use of, 196, 389–390

Decentralization, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 88,

90, 202, 363

Decision matrix, 251, 252

Decision premise, power management, 280

Decisions (decision-making), 239–266 awareness of the need to make, 248 building blocks for effective, 256 case studies, 240, 254, 264 definition of, 240–241 group, 247–248, 256–264

heuristic versus objective, 246–247 implementing, 251–252 influences on, 242–245 organizational, 241–242 programmed and nonprogrammed,

245–246

rational, problem solving through,

248–256

reactive versus proactive, 247–248 types of, 245–248

Decoding, 298

Defense mechanisms, 107–108

Delphi technique, 262–264

Democratic leadership, 73–74

Denhardt, Robert B., 161, 256, 363

Depersonalization, organizational politics, 283

Dessler, Gary, 70, 352

Determinance of attitudes, 137

Devil’s advocate, 323

Diagonal communication, 303–304

Diagnosis, planned change, 358, 360–362 phase 1, 360 phase 2, 360 phase 3, 361 phase 4, 361 phase 5, 361 phase 6, 361–362

Direct experience, attitudes and, 134–135

Discrimination, 137 gender-based, 178

Disenchantment stage, stress Dissatisfaction, organizational efficiency, 410

Distributive fairness, 178

Divorce, stress and, 192

Dominance, as conflict-management technique, 230

Dominating power, 271

“Do nothing” option, 146

Double-loop learning, 421–422

Downward communication, 300–302

Drive, 72

Drives, definition of, 160

Dual reporting system, 293–294 Dysfunctional conflict, 228

E

EAPs (employee assistance programs),

210–212, 234–236 Eck, John E., 383

Ecological power, 279

Economic self-interests, groups and, 320

Education, decision-making and, 244

Effective Organization. See Organizational efficiency

Effectiveness, of police managers, 41–42

Effective tactics, organizational strategy, 415

Ego, 106–107

Ego-defensive function of attitudes, 136

Ego needs (ego-esteem needs), 163

E-mail, 298

Emotional intelligence, 116–117

Emotional stability, 61, 111

Employee assistance programs

(EAPs), 210–212, 234–236 Empowering power, 271

Empowerment strategies, 92–93, 280

Encoding, 297

Enforcers, 317

Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 269

Environmental scanning, 374

Equity theory, 178–180

E.R.G. theory, 166–167 Eustress, 189, 194

Executive/strategic level of management, 41–42

Exercise, 208–210

Existence needs, 167

Existential philosophy, 132

Expectancy, 143 in Vroom’s expectancy theory, 176

Expectancy theory, 175–178

Expectations, managerial role, 47–48

Experience, decision-making and, 244 Expert power 63 272 278–279 External driving forces, 352, 412 External motivation, 160, 172

F

Facilitators, 323

Family relationships, stress and, 206–207

Fayol, Henri, 5–7, 39

Feedback horizontal communication and, 303 managerial communication and, 295,

296, 299 rational decision-making and, 249

Felt conflict, 223

Ferguson, R. Fred, 133

Fiedler, Fred, 55, 81–84

Field training officer (FTO) programs, 194

Fischer, Craig, 95

“Five factor” personality traits, 111

Five-step process, initiating changes improper attitude identification, 149 proper attitudes, rewarding, 150 root causes determination and weakening, 149–150

substitute offering, 150

Fleishman, E. A., 74–75

Focus on Four. See Organizational efficiency, case study

Folkways, 325

Follett, Mary Parker, 64, 88, 259

Followers, 63–65

Force, use of, 196

Force field analysis, 358 Formal groups, 322

Formal organizational communication,

300–304

Formation of groups, 329

Fosdick, Raymond, 8, 19

Frame of reference, 142–143

Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), 220

Freud, Sigmund, 106–107

Friendliness, as power tactic, 282

Friendship groups, 322

Frustration-regression principle, 167

Fuld, Leonhard F., 7, 19

Fulmer, Robert, 80, 315, 330–331 Functional conflict, 228

Functional leadership, 65

Functional management, 7

“Fundamental interpersonal orientation” theory of behavior (FIRO-B), 337

G

Galton, Francis, 70

Gatekeeping, 296–297

Gee, Diana, 395

Gender differences, improving communication and, 305

General adaptation syndrome (GAS), 204

Ghiselli, Edwin, 71

Gladwell, Malcolm, 409

Goals, definition of, 160

Goble, Frank, 164

Goode, Cecil, 71

Graf, Francis A., 193

Graper, Elmer D., 8

Grapevine, 304–305

Gray, Thomas, 338

Greiner, Larry E., 360, 361

Grievance procedures, 274, 302

Group behavior, 39–41 primary functions, 39–41

Group decision-making, 256–260 improving, 260–264

Group dynamics, 10, 329–331

Groups, 310–345 accepting and managing, 341–342 anatomy of, 322–324 case studies, 311, 324–325, 343 cliques, 316–317 closed, 321

cohesiveness of, 339–340 command, 321 conflict between, 221–222

conflict between individuals and,

221–222

culture of, 198–199 definition of, 312–314 formal or informal, 316–321 friendship, 321, 321 as functional units, 318–320 human relations school and, 331–332 influences on behavior in, 336–341 interest, 322 linking-pin principle and, 314 membership of, 313, 317 norms and values shared by, 325–327 open, 317 primary, 313 secondary, 313 social relationships in, 124–128 status in, 327–328 survival of, 320 task, 321–322 temporary or permanent, 314–315 types of, 321 voluntary or involuntary, 321

Group structure, formal affiliation, 338

Groupthink, 317, 340–341

Growth needs, 165, 166–167, 172

Gulick, Luther, 8

H

Habit workers, 362 Halo effect, 143

Harris, Phillip, 356

Hawthorne effect, 10

Hawthorne studies, 10–11, 163

Hegel, George Friedrich, 70, 259

Henry, Vincent E., 383

Heredity, personality and, 104

Hersey, Paul, 75

Herzberg, Frederick, 55, 67–68, 88,

172–174, 181, 183

Heuristic decisions, 246–247

Hierarchy of needs theory, 163–167,

171, 183

High-Mach personality, 115–116

Holden, Richard, 231

Holmes, T. H., 190

Holmes-Rahe inventory, 191, 213–214

Horizontal cliques, 316

Horizontal communication,

303–304

Human behavior. See Behavior

Humanistic theory, 111–112

Humanistic values, 132

Human relations school, group decision making and, 259, 331–333

Human relations school (or movement),

9–11, 159, 166

Human resource management, 10

Human skills, 46, 67, 68

I

Id, 106–107

Ideas, 128, 130–131

Illegitimate, political power, 283

Impoverished management, 77

Imprinting, 327

Incentives, definition of, 160

Incidence, strategy development, 420

Incongruent individual, 112

Indifferent individuals, 203 Individual behavior, 52–53 Indoctrination, 301

Influence, 318

Informal groups (cliques), 316–318 Informal leaders, 317, 342

Information power, 279

Inherited behavior, 124

In Search of Excellence (Peters and

Waterman), 129, 166 Inside-out thinking, 413

Instrumental compliance, 85

Instrumental function of attitudes, 135

Instrumentality, in Vroom’s expectancy theory 176

Intellectual capacity, decision-making and, 244

Intelligence-led policing, 14

Interactional psychology, 103–104

Interactionists, 224–225

Interdependence conflict, 225

Interest groups, 322

Internal motivation, 160

Interpersonal behavior, 53

Interpersonal conflict, 221–224

Interpretation, 144–145

Intervention, techniques for, 235

Intervention option, 232

Initiating structure, 74–75, 85, 87

Intimidation, 233

Introspection stage, stress management,

193–194

Intuitive decision-making, 248

J

Jargon, 291

Job design, 180–181, 357

Job dissatisfaction, stress and, 206

Job enlargement, 180–181

Job enrichment, 181

Job instructions, 300

Job rationale, 300

Job rotation, 181

Job satisfaction, 138

Johnson, D. W., 333

Jones, Kirkland, 395

Jordan, Gretchen, 391, 393

Justice Department (Bureau of Justice Statistics report 2010), 36

K

Katz, Robert, 69

Kelling, George L., 19, 21, 23, 42–43

Kelly, Joe, 72

Kennedy, David, 43

Kim, W. Chan, 409

Knowledge, power and, 281

Knowledge function of attitudes, 135

Kotter, John, 410

Kreitz, Doug, 395

Kuykendall, Jack, 78

Kuzuhara, Loren W., 179, 350

L

Labor unions economic interests of, 320 principles, 319

Laissez-faire leadership, 74

Language, 290

Latent conflict, 223

Law enforcement critical life events l 191

Leaders, informal, 317, 342

Leadership (leaders), 60–97, 328 case studies, 61–62, 76–77, 91–92 contingency approach to, 81–84 definition of, 63 functional, 65 leader behavior approach to, 72–76 managerial, 66–69 participative, 85–86 participatory, 87–89 path-goal theory of, 85–87 police administrators as, 65–66 situational approach to, 79–81 styles of, 73–74 theories of, 70–72 training of, group decision-making

and, 260–261

transactional, 92–94 transformational, 92–94

Leadership quadrants, 74–76

Leading, as management function, 40

Learned behavior, 124

Learning organizations, 49–50

Least preferred co-worker (LPC) scale, 82

LeBoeuf, Michael, 61

Legitimate power, 276–277 utilizing, 277

Legitimating tactics, power management, 282

Leonard, V. A., 9, 62, 83

Lewin, Kurt, 73, 357

Likert, Rensis, 55, 90–92, 96, 314

Lindblom, Charles E., 255

Line managers, 44, 245

Linking-pin principle, 314

Lippit, Ronald, 73, 332

Listening, improving communication by, 305

Locus of control, 113–114 Looking-glass self, 319

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD),

43, 377, 412–413

Lower-level (supervisory) managers, decision-making and, 242 Lynch, Ronald, 90

M

Machiavellianism, 115–116

Mach Scale, 115

Maintenance factors, in motivationhygiene theory, 176

Major process, organizing by, 18

Major purpose, organizing by, 16

Malstress, 194, 206

Management (managers) t di 37 56 57 Management (continued) functions of, 38–41 levels of, 41–44 line and staff, 44–46, 292–293 new emerging role of, 48–51 participatory, 87–89 people-oriented, 66–67

Management by exception, 94

Management systems model, 89–91

Managerial communication, 288–307 barriers to effective, 290–291 case studies, 289, 295, 306 channels of, 297–298 controlling function and, 294 decoding and, 298 definition of, 289–291 directing and, 294

distortions of, 290–291 downward, 300–302 encoding and, 297 feedback and, 299 formal, 300–304 horizontal, 303–304 improving, 305–306 in the informal organization,

304–305

managerial functions and,

291–294 organizing and, 292–294 planning and, 291–292 sender and, 296–297 upward, 302–303

Managerial Grid, 55, 77–79

Managerial leadership, 66–69

Managerial levels, 41–46

Managerial role expectations, 47–48

Managerial skills, 46–47 conceptual, 46–47 human, 46

technical, 46

Managerial styles, 233–234

Manifest conflict, 223

Manipulative people, 116

Maple, Jack, 411

Marshall, James R., 193

Maslow, Abraham H., 54, 88, 90–91,

163, 173–174, 183, 259 hierarchy of needs theory, 88, 163–167,

171, 183

Maturity stage of group development, 80

Mauborgne, Renee, 409

Mayo, Elton, 10, 88, 259, 331

McClelland, David, 168, 270–271

McDonald, Phyllis P., 414

McGregor, Douglas, 54, 88, 131,

169 174 180 183 259 341 Measurement criteria, organizational efficiency, 423–424

general, 423–424

objective, 423

specific, 424

Measuring progress, organizational efficiency, 418–419

goals, 418–419 objectives, 419

Melville, Dalton, 316

Mental health, decision-making and, 244

Mentoring and coaching, 93, 97

Messages, 300–302

Middle-level managers, decision-making and, 242

Middle management/administrative level, 41–43

Middle-of-the-road management, 77–78

Minority groups, 201

Mobilization, stress and, 189

Modeling, 148

Moore, Mark H., 19, 21, 26–27, 42–43

Morale (job satisfaction), 138, 146

More, Harry, 62, 83, 264

Mores, 325

Motivation, 54–55, 151, 154–183, 61 case studies, 155, 170, 182 content theories of, 163–180, 183 decision-making and, 245 definition of, 158–159 equity theory of, 178–180 E.R.G. theory of, 166–167 expectancy theory of, 175–178

hierarchy of needs theory,

163–166

mediating factors and, 158

organizations as social entities and, 157

process theories of, 174–175 of public-sector workers, 161–162 pursuing excellence and, 155–156 terminology related to, 159–160 theories of, 162–163 to work, 156–157

Motivational factors, in motivation hygiene theory, 173–174

Motivation cycle, 160–161

Motivation-hygiene theory, 88, 173–174

Motivation process, 157–158

Motives, 128, 137–140 definition of, 160

Mouton, Jane Srygley, 55, 77–78

Moving, 359–360 M l i li i f i d 136

N

Need(s)

for achievement (nAch), 168 acquired needs theory, 168–172 for affiliation (nAff), 168 attitudes and, 136 countervailing, 165 definition of, 160 ego-esteem, 164 of group members, 337 growth, 167 hierarchy of needs theory, 163–166 managerial leadership and, 66–67 for power (nPower), 168 satisfaction, 167 security, 164 self-actualization, 164–165 social, 164 survival, 163–164

Need-escalation principle, 167

Need orientation, work-group behavior, 337

Negotiation principled, 232–233

Nevell, Sergio, 395

New information, 390

New York City Police Department

(NYPD), 27, 28, 199, 409, 413

Noise, managerial communication and, 299–300

Nominal group technique (NGT), 262

Nonprogrammed decisions, 245–246

Norms, 80 group-shared, 323, 325–330, 332,

336, 338–340

O

Objective decisions, 246–247

Obligations, groups and, 323 O’Connor, Bill, 395

Odbert, H. S., 109

Ohio State leadership studies, 55, 75–76

Omnibus Crime Bill, 18 U.S.C.A §

1033(e), 24

Open groups, 317

Open-system organizational model,

12–13

Operant behavior, 146

B = F(P × E), 146

Operant conditioning theory, 175

Operational manager expectations, 50

Operation impact, 413

Opinions, 132–134

Organizational behavior, 51–57 definition of, 52

53 54

historical foundations of, 54–56 individual, 52–53 interpersonal, 53 organizational structure and, 54

Organizational change. See Change

(changing); Planned change

Organizational conflict. See also Conflict causes of, 225–226

Organizational culture, managers communication of, 148 core values of, 147–148 emotional intelligence of, 149 initiating changes, 149–150. See also

Five-step process, initiating changes modeling behavior of, 148 negative reinforcement by, 149 positive reinforcement by, 148–149

Organizational decision-making, 241–242

Organizational efficiency case study, 425–426 defined, 407 evaluating effectiveness, 419–420 follow-up and assessment, 421–423

implementing organizational strategy, 415–418

institutionalization of the change, 410 411 measurement criteria, 423 424 measuring considerations, 424 425

measuring progress, 418–419 mobilization of commitment, 409–410 organizational strategy for, 411–415

organizational strength, 413–414 planning for evaluation, 420–421 strategic evaluation, 421

strategic vision, creation, 407–408

transformational process, 407

Organizational humanism, 129

Organizational politics, 283–284

Organizational strategy, implementation,

415–418. See also Los Angeles Police

Department (LAPD); New York City

Police Department (NYPD) level 1, 416–417 level 2, 417 level 3, 417 level 4, 417

Organizational strength, organizational efficiency

human capital, 413 leadership, 413 organizational culture, 413–414 physical assets, 414 structure, 414

Organizational stress, 189–190 O i i l 15 18 45 Organizations, as social entities, 157

Organizing, as management function, 39

Outcomes, in Vroom’s expectancy theory, 176

Outside-in thinking, 412

Overload, work, 195–196

P

Paradigms, decision making, 139 shifting of, 139

Participation, 180, 257

Participative techniques, 180

Participatory leadership, 87–89, 96

Participatory management, 88–89

Path-goal theory of leadership, 85–87

Peer counseling, 212–213

Peer leadership group (PLG), 315

People-oriented management, 128–130

Perceived conflict, 223

Perceiver, 140–143

Perception(s), 138, 140–145 case study, 143–144 decision-making and, 244–245 motivation and, 158 process of, 140–145

Perceptual distortion, 140, 144

Perceptual organization, 141–142

Performance definition of, 159 stress and, 205–206

Performance management accountability, 385–386 benchmarking, 394–395 benefits of, 373 case study, 370, 384–385 data collection, 389–392 elements, 398–400 establishment and maintenance

steps, 372

guiding principles, 371 improvement, information usage,

393–394

integrated measurement system,

381–385 measureable standards, 397–398 mission statement, 375–377 organizational mission, 373–375 roles, 398 strategic goals or objectives, 379–381 units and sworn personnel, 395–397 value statements, 377–378 vision statements, 378–379 working of, 397

Personality, 101–119 bureaucratic orientation and, 117–118 di 102 109 118

definition of, 102–103 determinants of, 103–104 dimensions of, 113–115 motivation and, 158 theories of, 106–110

Personalization stage, stress management, 193

Personal power, 278–280

Personal role conflict, 195

Personal value system, 132

Personal variables, decision-making and, 243–245

Peters, Thomas J., 129–130, 166

Physical exercise, 208–210

Physical factors, stress and, 196–197

Physical fitness, 210

Physiological symptoms of stress, 204

Planned change, 349–365 dynamics of, 360–362 implementing, 364–365 process of, 357–360 recognizing the need for, 355–356

Planned interventions, 232

Planning as management function, 39 managerial communication and, 291–292

PLG (Peer leadership group), 315

Plunkett, Richard W., 63, 78, 84, 342

Police administration, 9

Police Administration (Fuld), 7

Political era, organizational strategy of the, 19–20

Political power, 282–283

POSDCORB, 8–9

Positional power, 277–278, 279, 281

Power, 269–285 case studies, 270, 280–281 coercive, 274–275, 280, 285 conflict and differences in, 335–226 definitions of, 270–272 dominating, 270–271 empowering, 270–271 expert, 278–279 leadership and, 63–64 legitimate, 276–277 need for, 319 need for (nPower), 168 personal, 278–279, 282 positional, 276–277, 279, 281 referent, 277–278, 280, 285 reward, 272–273, 280 sources of, 279–282 subordinate, 278 types of, 272–279 tili i 271 280

Pressure tactics, power management, 282

Preston, Frederick, 312

Prevalence, strategy development, 420

Prevette, Steven, 393

Primary groups, 313

Principled negotiation, 232–233

Proactive accountability, 388

Proactive decisions, 247–248

Proactive managers, 351

Problem employees, as source of conflict, 234–236

Problem-oriented policing (POP), 359

Problems, identifying existing, 248

Problem solving. See also Decisions

(decision-making) decision-making and, 241 through rational decision-making,

248–255

Procedures and practices, 300

Process theories, 174–180

Process theories of motivation, 162

Productivity, 10

Programmed decisions, 246

Progressive fulfillment, 165

Projection, 107, 143

Proximity effect, 142

Psychoanalytical theory, 106–108

Psychological symptoms of stress,

206–207

Psychosocial needs, 163

Pygmalion effect, 143, 172

Q

Qualitative overload, 195

Quality of work life (QWL), 132, 134 Quantitative overload, 195

R

Rahe, R. H., 190–191, 213–214

Rainey, Hal G., 290–291, 362, 364

Ramsey, Charles H., 382, 387

Random cliques, 317

Rational decision-making limitations on, 254–256 problem solving through, 248–253

Reactive change, 350, 355

Reactive decisions, 247

Realists, 226

Receivers, of messages, 298

Reciprocal response, 64

Referent power, 277–278, 280, 285

Reform era, 20–23

Refreezing, 360

Relatedness needs, 167

Relaxation techniques, 207–208

Representative power 279

Resource acquisition, as conflict management technique, 231

Result, outcome objectives, 419

Reward power, 272–273 exercising, 273

Risk taking, 114, 245, 259–260, 263

Robbins, Stephen P., 159–160

Roberg, Roy, 78

Roberts, David J., 384, 393

Roethlisberger, F. J., 10

Rogers, Carl, 111–112

Rohm, Howard, 391

Role ambiguity, 86, 195, 283

Role conflict, 194–195, 324 personal, 195

Role pressures, 194–195

Roles of group members, 323–325 managerial, expectations of, 47–48

Role set, 323–324 Rumors, 305

S

SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment), 359, 383 Satisfaction deficit, 165

Satisfaction-progression principle, 167

Satisficing, 255–256

Scapegoat, 283

Schmidt, Warren, 74

Schutz, William C., 337

Scientific management, 5

Screening process, personality, 110

Secondary groups, 313

Security need for, 164, 319 resistance to change and, 362

Security needs, 164

Selective attention, 141

Selective perception, 141, 143, 150 Self-actualization needs, 164–165

Self-actualized individual, 54

Self-concept, 319–320 motivation and, 158–159

Self-esteem, need for, 319

Selye, Hans, 204

Senders, 300

Senge, Peter, 49, 129

Sensing, perception formation process and, 140

Sewell, James D., 119, 204

Sexual harassment, 235

Shift work, stress and, 197

Silverman, Eli B., 50, 421

Similarity effect, 142 Simon Herbert 240–241 245 Situation (situational variables) decision-making and, 243 perception and, 140 personality and, 105–106

Situational leadership approach, 79–80

Situational factors, personality, 103

Skills. See Managerial skills

Skolnick, Jerome, 338

Sleep disturbances, stress and, 206

Smith, Ronald, 312

Social entities, 157

Social groups, 328, 331

Social interactionists, 318, 344

Socialization, 126, 327 significant others, 124 Social learning, 232 attitudes and, 135

Social needs, 164

Social relationships, 124–128

Sociocultural changes, 352–353

Soldiering, 5

Soothing, as conflict-management technique, 231

Souryal, Sam, 66, 246

Span of management, 292

Sparrow, Malcolm K., 42–43

Staff managers, 44–46, 292–293 Status conflict and differences in,

225–226 in groups, 327–328

Stereotyping, 143

Stogdill, Ralph M., 71, 75

Strategic policing era, 26–27

Strategic transformation, 407

Strategic vision, 407

Stress, 187–214 case studies, 188, 198, 213 definitions of, 189–190 early warning signs of, 205 reduction of, 207–210 symptoms of, 206–207

transitory stages of life and, 193 unique to police work, 190–194 work-related stressors, 194–207

Structural change, as conflict management technique, 232

Subordinate-superior relationships,

270–280

Superego, 106–107

Superordinate goals, as conflict management technique, 231–232

Supervisory/technical level, 41

Supportive leadership, 85

Survey feedback, improving

Survival needs, 163–164

Swank, Calvin, 160

Swanson, Charles R., 69, 92

Synergistic effect, 126, 263

Systems management, 13–14 Systems theory, 11–12

T

Taboos, 326

Taking charge of one’s own life, 207

Tannenbaum, Robert, 74

Targeting change, 357–358

Target outcome objectives, 419 of perception, 140

Targeting change administrator’s role in, 357 goals, 357 job design, 357 people, 357 strategies, 357 structure technology, 357

Task groups, 321–322

Task-oriented management, 77

TAT (Thematic Apperception Test), 168

Taylor, Frederick W., 5, 21, 92, 158,

163, 175

Team building, in group process,

334–335

Team management, 78

Teamwork, horizontal communication and, 303

Technical/operational level of management, 43

Technical skills, 46, 69

Technological change, 352–353

Temporary work groups, 314

Tension, definition of, 160

Termination, 274

Territo, Leonard, 92, 204

Thematic Apperception Test

(TAT), 168

Theory X, 54, 88, 90, 130, 132,

169–172, 183, 224, 341

Theory Y, 54–55, 88, 90, 169–172, 180,

183, 341

Thibault, Edward, 329

Time frame, outcome objectives, 419

Time, organizing by, 17

TOPSIS (technique for preference by similarity to an ideal solution), 384

Training, 149

Trait theory, 109–110

Trait theory of leadership, 70–72

Transactional leadership, 92–94

Transformational leadership, 92–94

Traditionalists, human relations, 224

Transitory stages of life, 193

Type A behavior, 114–115

Type B behavior, 114–115

U

Underload, work, 195–196

Unfreezing, 359, 360

Unions. See Labor unions

Unity of command, 412

Universal leadership, 72, 81

Upper-level managers, decision-making and, 241–242

Upward communication, 302–303 Urwick, L., 8

V

Valences of attitudes, 136 in Vroom’s expectancy theory, 176

Value-expressive function of attitudes, 135

Values, 128, 130–131, 134 decision-making and, 245 definition of, 132 group-shared, 325–327 humanistic, 132 learning, 327 organizational efficiency, 408 Value systems, 131 definition of, 83 evolving, 83–86

Van Ness, Bob, 395

Vertical cliques, 317

Violanti, John M., 193

Vollmer, August, 4, 9, 277 Vroom, Victor, 176

W

Waterman, Robert H., Jr., 129, 166

Weber, Max, 3–4, 21, 247 Welsh, Wayne, 356

Wexler, Chuck, 95

Whisenand, Paul M., 80–81, 133, 157,

161, 173, 233, 240, 283, 288, 298,

303–304, 320, 326, 365 White, Ralph, 73

Wilson, O. W., 4, 9, 20–21, 23, 277

Women

authority, formal, 64 community-policing era, 23 male administrators versus, 137 organizational culture and, 105, 353 organizational politics and, 283 personality structure, 127 physical condition of, 210 socialization of, 327 social learning and, 135 stress and, 191, 200–201 trait theory and, 70

Woodward, Steve, 393

Work groups. See Groups

Work overload and underload, 195–196

Work preferences, dominant need and, 169–170

Wren, Daniel, 91 Wycoff, MaryAnn, 95

Y

Yukl, Gary, 72, 354

Z

Zone of acceptance, 64–65

1314189 - Pearson Education Limited ©

1314189 - Pearson Education Limited ©

1314189 - Pearson Education Limited ©