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Is Equity Just Enough for Social Work? A Response to Those Who Think it is!
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Contents
1. The Value of Social Justice
4. Are There no Limits to Equality?
5. No Contest
6. References
7. Footnotes
Full Text
Before offering a response to what I take to be a central question posed in my paper and the responses to it, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Richard Hugman and Jim Ife for their insightful and penetrating comments and the Editor for the opportunity to extend the discussion of my paper. Nevertheless, it seems that the latter's views are more in keeping with my own than those of the former. Although I do not wish to minimise the points of departure made by both respondents, I will focus on Hugman's because these appear to be more distant than either Ife's or mine. In so doing, I want to make it clear that my critique is directed at the Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW) Code of Ethics (AASW, [ 1 ]), not those who, along with Richard Hugman, participated in drafting it.
There are two fundamental criticisms I wish to make in response. The first concerns the value of social justice. I argue that although social justice is a cardinal social work value, it ought to be accorded priority, rather than remain one that is relative to others. The second contention is that although the pursuit of equity has merit, it is not, even in its most complex formulations, just enough.
There were two pivotal questions I sought to raise in regard to social justice. These were "why, and how much, does social justice matter to social work?" A point of unequivocal agreement between Hugman ([ 3 ]), Ife ([ 4 ]), and me is that social justice is not considered pre-eminent either in Australian society generally or in the current version of the AASW Code of Ethics (AASW, [ 1 ]) in particular. What separates us is that I contend that social justice ought to have priority. What further justification could there be for the pre-eminence of social justice than the dire fate that individuals face without recourse to it? It is hard to imagine how social workers would be able to promote and defend their own and others' worth, dignity, integrity, competence, and service to humanity in the absence of an overriding sense of social justice. Social justice constitutes a fundamental good to which everyone has an equal right. It is precisely the interdependence between the right and the good that distinguishes radical egalitarian from other conceptions of social justice, particularly those derived from utilitarianism (which Hugman ([ 3 ]) quite rightly labels as purely "teleological").
A question those of us bent on pursing a concept of social justice that is radically egalitarian seek to press is "why accept anything less than full equality?" The grounds upon which responses such as Hugman's (2008) rest are well trodden and are familiar to those acquainted with the standard objections against egalitarianism (see Kekes, [ 5 ]). A principal objection is that "absolute equality cannot be achieved practically and that, in any case, we may not all agree that it is the best goal" (Hugman, [ 3 ]). A preferable and more practical goal for social work to pursue is equity (Hugman, [ 3 ]). Indeed, if I read him correctly, Hugman ([ 3 ]) suggested that social work should aim for nothing more. However, striving for equity rather than equality ensures that social work remains firmly fixed within the limited confines of a utilitarian concept of social justice (i.e., "the greatest good for the greatest number"). Again, Hugman ([ 3 ]) did not appear to argue otherwise. Equity is not, it must be recalled, equality. On the contrary, equity allows inequality ample latitude.
The point of equality is twofold. The first is to end domination. The second is to create an egalitarian society in which people stand in relations that are commensurate. If equality is aimed for, then it must be against those who possess means that exceed the average in a society that others have a legitimate complaint. Were the poorest to demand redistribution from those who were below average but somewhat better off than themselves, then they would seem more likely to be motivated by envy than equality.[ 1 ] However, if all those below the average demanded an equal redistribution towards themselves only from those above, the overall level of inequality, envy, and, most importantly, injustice would be reduced accordingly.
It is as regrettable as it is common that quality is confused with sameness (Ife, [ 4 ]). It is simply nonsense to think that homogeneity is possible, let alone desirable, even under conditions of strict equality. Equal means are, however, what radical egalitarianism seeks to secure and are what enables natural differences (as opposed to artificial divisions) to flourish. Means entail considerably more than utilities, such as capital and income. Of greater importance are the "capabilities" that such resources foster (i.e., what individuals are capable of being and doing given the resources available to them; Nussbaum & Sen, [ 7 ]). A major advantage of the capabilities approach to equality is that it allows us to analyse injustices in terms other than the distribution of material resources. The question is " which capabilities does a radically egalitarian society have an obligation to equalise?" Some people care about playing cards well, others about enjoying luxury vacations. Must radical egalitarians support the development of these capabilities for the sake of equal freedom? The short answer is no.
Nussbaum ([ 6 ]) identified 10 capabilities that societies have an obligation to support.[ 2 ] The minimum threshold that a radically egalitarian society would be obliged to reach must be sufficient to guarantee effective access to levels of functioning that would enable its citizens to stand as equals to each other. Moreover, such a society would seek to guarantee effective access to the capabilities sufficient for equal standing over the course of an entire life. And, access to these capabilities would be market inalienable (Radin, [ 8 ]). That is, capabilities cannot be bargained with.
Are There no Limits to Equality?
Does a radically egalitarian form of social justice contain any limits? Following Ife ([ 4 ]), one is obliged to declare that it is limited by the residue of natural resources available; although, it is far more environmentally conscious than either resource- (distributional) or preference-based (utilitarian) doctrines. More to the point, "the stand as equals to each other" view taken here does posit a very strong criterion of equality. There are, nonetheless, conceivable limits. However, contrary to Hugman ([ 3 ]), these are of a nonutilitarian kind, because they affect everyone equally and no minority more so. Dworkin ([ 2 ]), for example, urged egalitarians to consider imposing limits on the amount of support extended to individuals who are exceedingly inefficient at converting resources into capabilities:
Suppose that the welfare (on any interpretation) of an entirely paralysed but conscious person is vastly less than the welfare of anyone else in the community, that putting more and more money at his or her disposal would steadily increase his or her welfare but only for very small amounts, and that if s/he had at his or her disposal all the resources beyond those needed simply to keep the others alive s/he would still have vastly less welfare than they. (Dworkin, [ 2 ], p. 242)
Reflection on the positive and negative aims of radical egalitarianism would, I suggest, serve as another way of setting practical limits on equality. Negatively, people are entitled to whatever capabilities are necessary for them to be free of oppression. Positively, they are entitled to the capabilities necessary for functioning as an equal citizen in civil society. Although the two aims are dichotomous, there is overlap between them. As Elizabeth Anderson (1999) pointed out:
If functioning as an equal citizen were all that radical egalitarians were concerned about, they could not object to forced clitoridectomy, by which men control women's sexuality in private relations. But they also aim to abolish private relations of domination, and therefore support the functionings needed for individual sexual autonomy. If having the capabilities needed to avoid oppression were all that mattered, then radical egalitarians would not oppose discrimination among the relatively privileged—for example, the glass ceiling for female executives. (pp. 316–317)
There those who, like Hugman ([ 3 ]), are content to pursue equity, which ineluctably leaves room for inequality. Conversely, egalitarians, particularly the more radical among them, are intolerant of inequality. Although neither equity nor equality has been achieved, the question is, "which ideal is the more economically, politically, and socially just for a professional like our own to pursue?" Utilitarian principles may be equitable, but adherence to them will never produce full equality.
1 Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW). 2002. Code of Ethics 1999(Rev. ed.). Kingston, ACT: AASW.
2 Dworkin, R.1981. What is equality? Part 1: Equality of welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10: 185–246.
3 Hugman, R.2008. Social work values: Equity or equality? A response to Solas. Australian Social Work, 61: 141–145.
4 Ife, J.2008. Comments on John Solas: "What are we fighting for?". Australian Social Work, 61: 137–140.
5 Kekes, J.2003. The illusions of egalitarianism, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
6 Nussbaum, M.2001. Upheavals of thought, New York: Cambridge University Press.
7 Nussbaum, M., & Sen, A.1993. The quality of life. Oxford, , UK: Clarendon Press.
8 Radin, M.1987. Market inalienability. Harvard Law Review, 100: 1849–1937.
1Suffice to say that although those above the average, but below the best off, also have something to complain about, they could hardly claim to be more aggrieved than the poor about such inequity. If, in fact, they are not envious of the better off, then they share the plight of the poor.
2The capabilities that Nussbaum ([6]) sees as central to a dignified human life are (a) life; (b) bodily health; (c) bodily integrity; (d) senses, imagination, and thought; (e) emotions; (f) practical reason; (g) affiliation; (h) other species; (i) play; and (j) control over one's environment (pp. 416–418).
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By John Solas
Reported by Author
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