ANTIMATERIALISM ABOUT THE MIND

Introduction

At the very end of his fine book *Philosophy of Mind*, published in 2006, the distinguished American philosopher Jaegwon Kim writes that the "limit of physicalism" is qualia. Physicalism can be defended, he thinks, for everything except qualia. Qualia cannot, like everything else mental, such as intention, be functionally defined, Kim thinks, and qualia cannot be reduced to anything physical; nor can they be defined at all. Yet Kim is still a proponent of a naturalistic worldview, a worldview that includes mind. How can this be? He writes in *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*, that "physicalism is not the truth, but it is the truth near enough, and near enough ought to be good enough."[1] This is stylistically good stuff and a good way to end a book, but it simply will not do from a philosophical point of view.

Over here is a worldview, physicalism, which claims that everything is physical. Over there is a clear case, according to Kim himself, of something nonphysical, with a probably potentially infinite number of instances: all the colors, all the sounds, all the smells, all the tastes, all the objects of the other sensory modalities, and all the objects of sensory modalities that we do not experience, if there are any, for example the ultraviolet perception that bees have, their perception of polarization, and so on. To be fair we must also include all the *nonsensory* "what it is like's," all the shades and mixtures and degrees of anger, for example, or depression, or confusion, or elation, or delight, transport, ecstasy, joy, exhilaration, glee, bliss, and on and on. So we have a theory to which there is an infinitely extensible counterexample, and Kim says that is "near enough." Near enough to *what*, one wonders? Not the truth, most certainly. If we conjoin the truth of physicalism with the truth of the proposition that millions of nonphysical color qualia and all the rest can exist, then what we have, by straight logic, is a falsehood, since the second proposition contradicts the first. The conjunction of a truth and a falsehood is a falsehood. How is that falsehood "near enough" to the truth? It seems to amount to something like "If physicalism were only true, though it isn't, it would be true."

Kim is a philosopher with no phobia about metaphysics, so it is hard to understand why he did not start fresh, saying to himself, "Here is the situation. Everything

suggests physicalism; but it is false. For one very important class of irreducible entities stands against it." And *then* he might perhaps have asked the question, "How can *that* be? How on earth can that be how things are? How can it be that everything points one way, but the truth lies in the opposite direction?" Kim's blind spot about this may have to do with the fact that colors and the other qualia are apparently causally inactive. His own work has been devoted to the topic of causation and the application of the concept to a variety of philosophical problems; causal inactivity, I suspect, is for him "near enough" to nonexistence. But this is just prejudice against noncausal concepts.

Next I want to examine some well-known arguments, three in number, all going in roughly the same direction, that have produced what some have regarded as an antimaterialist or antiphysicalist tendency in the philosophy of mind recently. The three arguments that I will consider, in their different ways, record the fact that qualia are indeed a *problem* for physicalism, or worse, that the existence of qualia is a *counterexample* to the claim of physicalism that everything, including the mind, is physical. Proponents of these arguments have sometimes been lumped together by others as *mysterians*, but the label is unhelpful. None of the arguments has as its conclusion the proposition that anything is *mysterious*. Their only conclusion is the very unmysterious proposition that physicalism is false. Before looking at the arguments themselves, I will say something

about a view that shares with the three arguments the conclusion that physicalism is false, but has little or no appeal for most people, though it was the dominant philosophy in the religiously tinged philosophical atmosphere of more than a century ago.

Idealism

To be antimaterialist or antiphysicalist about the mind one does not have to accept the larger claim made by idealism. "Idealism" is a name given to a number of different philosophies of mind, prominent in the nineteenth century, and no single account of it has been universally accepted by philosophers. Idealism is a metaphysics that tells us something about the nature of reality, as a metaphysics is supposed to do. Just as physicalism tells us that everything is physical, and materialism tells us that everything is matter, idealism tells us that everything is spiritual, or that everything is mental. But what does this mean? A minimal way of stating the claim is that reality is nonphysical, so that idealism is the contrary of physicalism. At the least idealism is antiphysicalist.

This formulation of idealism has a big advantage. If we take reality to be everything that exists, then if the body exists, idealism asserts that the body is nonphysical. So if as we have seen the mind–body problem is the problem

Just as physicalism tells us that everything is physical, and materialism tells us that everything is matter, idealism tells us that everything is spiritual, or that everything is mental.

of squaring the four propositions in our inconsistent tetrad, idealism easily solves the problem by denying the first proposition, that the body is physical. For according to idealism, *nothing* is physical. So there is no difficulty about nonphysical and physical things interacting, since there are no nonphysical things.

Two big questions remain. The first one is how anyone could believe such a view. How could one believe that the body is nonphysical? In one extremely common English language usage "the body" is taken to *be* the physical part of the human being or the organism, whether or not there exists any part other than the physical part. In this usage it would actually be contradictory to say that the body is nonphysical, since that would be to say that the physical part of the human being, whether or not there exists any part other than the physical part, is nonphysical.

There is also a view called phenomenalism, however, descended from the work of George Berkeley and David Hume, which analyzes statements about bodies, including human bodies, into statements about actual and possible experiences or "ideas," in the terminology of John Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and the other British empiricists. If it were successful, this program of translation would *preserve* the truth of every statement about physical bodies, while understanding them at bottom as statements about possible or actual experiences or sense data. To say that there

is a sandwich in front of me is to say that there is a whitish-brown trapezoid in my visual field, with yellowish fringes (that's the cheese hanging out of the edges of the sandwich), and so on, and also to say that the whitish-brown trapezoid will disappear between two pink strips (that's my mouth, phenomenalistically interpreted) in the next ten minutes, and so on.

A number of objections to phenomenalism have carried a lot of weight, such a lot of weight that there are few phenomenalists (or idealists) left. To my mind the biggest objection is that there is no explanation as to why the experiences appear in the sequences they do. Nonphenomenalists will explain this by a very natural reference to physical objects and their behavior. The reason the perceptual trapezoid disappeared between the two pink strips in my field of vision, says the nonphenomenalist, is that the sandwich went into my mouth. But this explanation is not available to the phenomenalists. They will have to start by saying that the trapezoid disappeared between the pink strips because the sandwich went into my mouth, but then for them this second statement comes down to the statement that the trapezoid disappeared between the pink strips. However, a phenomenalist who takes the phenomena to be both sensed and unsensed objects of experience, or what Bertrand Russell called *sensibilia*, can deal with this worry. The forthcoming explanations are just the regular explanations of physics and the

other sciences, and of the common sense that goes along with them.

So there are ways to defend phenomenalism at this point, but to my mind a deeper question for idealism is how mind and body interact, given that *neither* is physical. If we are idealists, bodies do not have linear dimensions or a position in space. One still wants to know how minds and bodies interact. There is something very unclear about what idealism asserts, both about mind–body and body–mind causation or interaction. Physical things interact with physical things because physical particles push physical particles along. Does one thought interact with another by mind-particles pushing mind-particles along? But there are no mind-particles. Is it just a matter of magic, then? Behind these difficulties is a mystery about mind–*mind* interaction. How do mental things, such as feelings, interact with other mental things, such as thoughts, since neither of them possesses physical mass and energy to fuel the causing? This last question is of course a question not just for idealism, and so I shall set it aside as we look at the three arguments for antiphysicalism. Though the interaction of the mental with the mental is a fascinating problem, it is not really a part of the mind–body problem. The mind–body problem is not the mind–mind problem, whatever light it may shed on the mind–mind problem.

Three Important Antiphysicalist Arguments

At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the next, physicalism seems largely to have run its theoretical course as a solution to the mind–body problem. Although most philosophers are probably physicalists today in spite of this, when toward the end of the last century a number of significant antimaterialist arguments appeared (I discuss one from Thomas Nagel, one from David Chalmers, and one from Frank Jackson), there was no unanimity of response from the physicalists.[2] It would be worthwhile to have a study just of what the physicalist responses to the arguments were and how they worked, what in German is called a *Rezeptionsgeschichte*, a history of the reception of the arguments. The truth is that for physicalists the *Rezeption* seems to have been all over the map. Most of the critical responses *were* physicalist, of course, because typically the antiphysicalists like me were happy to see the arguments prospering philosophically, if generating controversy is what philosophical prospering is.

It is also important to know something about these arguments because they may tell us something about *what* it is that has eluded physicalism, and, just as importantly, they may tell us *why* it has eluded physicalism. The arguments themselves do not offer a solution to the mind–body problem, and they have been combined with a number of different solutions. For example, some have taken Nagel's

argument, inaccurately in my view, as a support for simple psychophysical dualism, whereas in reality it is an argument for skepticism about our grip on the mind–body problem, combined with some intriguing hints about how this skepticism can be overcome; Chalmers's argument has been offered in support of both functionalism (though not about qualia) and dualism of all sorts, not just his own "naturalistic dualism"; and so on.

Nagel's argument is perhaps the most dramatic of the three arguments, but it has the logically weakest conclusion of the three. His conclusion is not that physicalism is false, but that though it is true, we do not see how it *could* be true. We do not understand *how* it could be true that our experience is physical, much as someone leaving a chrysalis in a box might not understand how it could turn into a butterfly by morning. A physical explanation is objective, but "the phenomenological features of experience"—qualia—are subjective. They belong to a particular point of view, which is ours, and they cannot be detached from that point of view. The physical line of thought, however, will "gradually abandon" that point of view, leaving us with no understanding at all of the subjective.

Nagel asks us to imagine trying to understand what it is like to be a bat. The subjective experience of a bat, he claims, is one that is closed to us, with our entirely external knowledge of it. Objective phenomena, such as lightning and thunder, can be understood completely and

objectively. The subjective experience of the alien character of the bat's consciousness can be understood neither completely nor objectively.

> It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in the attic. Insofar as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me what it would be like for *me* to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a *bat* to be a bat.[3]

It seems to me one could have a vivid hallucinogenic experience, one that turned out to be exactly like the experience of a bat, though one might never know that it was accurate. The hallucination might even include the experience of living in a cave with other bats, an experience that one subsequently discovered to be completely accurate, perhaps by visiting the cave. It is doubtful whether there is any particular limit on what is imaginable, and that includes what is logically impossible. Philosophers are more or less agreed on the imaginability of the logically impossible. Seen from this point of view, Nagel's point really expresses

the dependence of imagination on sense experience. His problem is not the so-called other minds problem. That is the problem, like the mind–body problem going back in its most unregenerate form to Descartes, of how we can know the mind of another, in addition to knowing the external condition and behavior of that person's body, presented to us in experience. Nagel's problem is rather the problem of a systematic gap in our knowledge due to a particular biological limitation, a limitation we have as a group or species. We cannot know what it is like for bees to see ultraviolet light, for example, without to some extent—exactly to the extent that we come somehow to possess the ultraviolet perceptual systems of the bee and cease to be ourselves—*becoming* the bee.

However, one cannot argue that I cannot imagine what it is like to be you on the ground that then I would have to *be* you. With those we know well, perhaps especially when they are in trouble, we can imagine without difficulty what it is like to be them. We have a greater empathy than Nagel allows. Indeed, if his argument works, it establishes that we can never have *any* empathy at all, and that we are all psychopaths. If empathy is what it is commonsensically taken to be, which is to be able to feel the feelings that another has, then empathy is logically impossible.

I do agree with Nagel, however, that our experience cannot be reduced to the physical, though not for the reason he gives. The phenomena of sound cannot be reduced

to waves, color to electromagnetic radiation, and so on. But this is not because the phenomena express a particular point of view or subjectivity. It is instead a result of the simple fact that colors and sounds are not waves and they possess properties that are incompatible with the properties of waves. Sounds do not have amplitude, for example, though they do have volume, so it makes no sense to ask for the amplitude of a particular sound, rather than the volume. Colors do not have amplitude, though they do have brightness, so it makes no sense to ask for the amplitude of a particular color.

It may help to try to locate Nagel's view on the map of the mind–body problem given to us by the inconsistent tetrad with which we started. Nagel certainly accepts that the body is physical, and that the mind and the body interact. He also sees that physical and nonphysical things cannot interact. He accepts the gulf between the physical and the phenomenological. So he is stuck with the question how it can possibly be true that the mind is physical, which is what he wants to believe anyway. We cannot understand, he thinks, how it *could* be true that the mind is physical, though it is, despite the fact that we can understand and even have evidence that it *is* true. What is left is just that there is a difficulty for physicalism, and Nagel suggests that the path toward what he rather mysteriously calls an "objective phenomenology" is the right one to take.

I suspect that the concepts of *imagination* or *conception* and *possibility* may play very much the same role in the Australian philosopher David Chalmers's famous zombie argument against physicalism as they do in Nagel's argument. In Chalmers's article of 1995, "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness," and in his 1996 book *The Conscious Mind*, he argues that our world contains consciousness, but that we can conceive of a world exactly like it physically—*physically* identical—in which the creature corresponding to Chalmers, say, and identical to him physically, does not have consciousness.[4] This creature would be a Chalmers zombie. From the possible existence of this entirely physical creature, it follows that consciousness is not physical—for if it were, the zombie Chalmers would have consciousness in virtue of its physical characteristics, in particular the neurophysiological ones. Just by existing it would be conscious. The zombie argument, by the way, has a history before Chalmers that goes back earlier in twentieth-century philosophy, and can ultimately be traced to Descartes's considerations concerning the possibility that the mind should exist without the body.

There are interesting arguments against the possibility of zombies, but none of them are particularly convincing, to my mind. For example, suppose that Chalmers smells his morning coffee and says, "I smell coffee." What he says is true. But what about the zombie Chalmers? He (or it) does not smell coffee, in the sense that he has the

appropriate qualia, so when he says "I smell coffee," in this sense, his statement is false. So, the objection goes, the two beings are not physically identical. But of course there is no real difficulty here, since truth and falsity have never been supposed to be physical concepts, or not by many, rather than semantical ones, or if they have they should not have been. The difference between the truth of what Chalmers says and the falsity of what zombie Chalmers says does not constitute a legitimate *physical* difference. It consists of two logical relationships between what Chalmers says and what his zombie twin says, and the facts.

Much of the argument directed against Chalmers's zombies has been about the *possibility* of zombies, and has deployed sophisticated considerations concerning abstract possibility. *Are* zombies possible? Could they exist? If we say that they can, we seem to be begging the question against physicalism, for we are assuming that the physical zombie is not conscious, and that the physical part of the zombie is not responsible for the zombie's consciousness, since there is no such thing. If on the other hand we say that nonconscious zombies cannot exist, we seem to be begging the question against antiphysicalism, by just assuming physicalism.

A simpler though inconclusive argument against the zombie argument is that saying that the zombie is not conscious begs the question against physicalism. A central-state materialist, for example, will say that the

physical part of Chalmers, which includes his brain, *is* conscious, and that to say otherwise in a premise merely *states* but does not argue for the denial of physicalism. The trouble is that it will not do to assume that the zombie *is* conscious, for by the same token that would assume without argument that physicalism is true. It is not clear where the victory lies here, but what Chalmers has to say in later papers about a positive solution to the mind–body problem for qualia seems to be a form of property dualism. Mind and body interact, because they are not distinct, so Chalmers's position is not dualism. But the mind does have nonphysical properties, as shown by the zombie argument. For Chalmers the mental does not reduce to the physical. Chalmers is a property dualist, but with a difference. The difference is his treatment of the proposition that the mind is nonphysical. In one sense Chalmers denies this proposition. The mind is perfectly physical. But in another sense, he accepts the proposition: the mind is also nonphysical, in that claims about the mind do not *reduce* to claims about anything physical. We cannot take a proposition about what I am thinking, say, and *reduce* it to a proposition about the neural circuitry in the brain. Nevertheless, my thinking is the neural circuitry in my brain. This position is reminiscent of the earlier central-state materialist's view that though "gene" does not *mean* "DNA," nevertheless the gene is DNA, and that though "mind" does not *mean* "the relevant part of the central nervous

system" (CNS), nevertheless the mind *is* the relevant part of the CNS. Both the central-state materialists and Chalmers detect an ambiguity in the first proposition that the mind is nonphysical, and are able to have their cake and eat it, both affirming and denying the proposition, in the two different senses. In one sense, the property sense, the proposition is true, and in another, the substance or thing sense, the proposition is false.

It is still a troubling question, though, in what way mental states *could* be physical states. This is not a matter of what we say or think, but of the way we are to conceive of my thinking of my grandmother in Italy as a set of neurons firing, or for that matter anything "emerging" out of a set of neurons firing or "supervening" on them. That is Nagel's worry. We cannot imagine following a sequence of events in which the sequence of the events of the neurons firing followed far enough will continuously lead to the event of my thinking of my grandmother in Italy. For this reason, Nagel and those who followed him in a similar line of thought (Chalmers, Frank Jackson, Joseph Levine, and Colin McGinn are the most prominent) have been lumped together as "mysterians," who proclaim the mystery of consciousness. But the word is not really a good fit for Chalmers and Jackson, who would be better described simply as antiphysicalist.

Chalmers has also discussed a form of panpsychism that he calls "panprotopsychism." Panpsychism is the view

that fundamental physical objects have mental or conscious states, so that the mental is built into the world alongside the physical from the beginning. It is as though God could not help creating parallel mental states whenever he created the fundamental physical states. "Panprotopsychism" looks like a load of typographical errors, but it is not. It is the view that the fundamental physical objects have "protoconscious" states. These are the precursors of conscious states that, though they are not themselves conscious states, can together cause conscious states to emerge from their combination or collection. Collectively they *are* conscious states, but only collectively. Here it seems to me that Chalmers's view looks like a form of emergentism, or perhaps epiphenomenalism. It has some of the difficulties of those views, and perhaps the extra one of seeming to suggest that somehow the protoconscious states are thought to be in some more primitive sense already conscious. For if they lack consciousness individually it really is difficult to see how a collection of them could have it. (This sort of difficulty is known as "the combination problem.") And Chalmers's view seems to inflate the mind–body problem to cosmic proportions. The relation between mind and body will emerge for every part of the universe (this is the "pan" bit) that has a psychic part.

Chalmers himself does write that he is not sure that the arguments for panpsychism are sound, but he also is not sure that they are not sound. His remarks, read in context,

suggest at the least a tremendous sympathy with the arguments for panpsychism, to the extent that he seems to be giving his own view, whereas I do not feel the same rush of excitement in his arguments going in the other direction. His own project seems to be one of working out ways in which physical and nonphysical things can interact, or do something that plays the role of interaction. He offers, for example, the hypothesis that *information* might play the role of the fundamental something that has both physical states and states that carry qualia. So information could manifest itself in one way or the other, and this might be regarded as interaction of a sort. It is an interesting speculation, but no more, I think, because it is very hard to see how a sequence of bits in a bitstream—traveling optical information, for example in a telecommunications network, made up of a flicker of successive light and dark states at a point in the fiber, or 0s and 1s—could turn itself into a stream of qualia or consciousness. It would be an event of biblical proportions.

Chalmers is prepared to concede, however, that his is a very speculative theory, though it may just do work to mitigate the epiphenomenal implications of the zombie argument. The zombies behave physically like their conscious counterparts, but in that case there appears to be a problem in understanding how consciousness has any effect on the physical. Chalmers thinks as a result that we must work toward seeing how consciousness and the

physical can work together, or in what way it can be false that physical and nonphysical things cannot interact or do something as good as interact. I am not even a little bit convinced by all this, because I just cannot see how something digital like "information" (1s and 0s) could turn itself into the color red. This really is just nonsense. The information whizzing around in a CPU does not out of itself produce red. The color arises on the computer monitor, not from information as such, but from codes yielding coordinated physical and optical effects in the phosphor dots, plus the contribution of the eye, for example in the optical fusion of red and green to produce yellow. (Yellow is not physically present on a TV screen, as can be verified by examining it with a good magnifying glass.) *Which* effects occur is dependent on the information presented to the monitor, but the color that appears does so for the usual physical and psychological reasons detailed in the science of color, principally from the explanation of how the electron beams striking the phosphor dots produce different colors, not from pure information theory.

An argument related to the zombie argument was proposed by Frank Jackson, another Australian philosopher. (Why, I wonder, have two-thirds of the best arguments against physicalism come from Australians? Perhaps it is because the previous generation of philosophers in Australia had more leading physicalists than anywhere else, apart perhaps from the United States, so that the antiphysicalist

arguments were a reaction to the prevailing view. Or perhaps it is something in the beer.)

Of course, there are more than three arguments against physicalism, but the three I discuss here have been among the more influential and the most discussed. Jackson's argument in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" is simplicity itself. He asks us to imagine a brilliant color scientist, whom he calls Mary. Mary is brought up and lives in a black-and-white environment. She is "brilliant" in the sense that she possesses all the information given by a completed physical science of color, including neuroscience. She has all of this information at her fingertips. Now comes the day when she opens the door and leaves her achromatic environment. She steps into the fully colored world. It seems that she will acquire some new information, assuming that her color vision system starts to work fairly quickly; she learns something new. Perhaps we might wish to say, though Jackson does not, that she finally learns what red *is*, what blue *is*, and so on. In any case, she learns what these colors *look* like. But if she has learned something new, and gained information in addition to the totality of physical information, then not all information is physical information.

In a separate argument in the same paper Jackson also describes a character called Fred, who sees a color that "standard human observers" do not see. All the physical information in the world will not help an observer (I shall call him F-red) who does *not* see this new color—perhaps

it is a shade of red—to know what it is that Fred is seeing. F-red is like Mary before she leaves her room. F-red has all the physical information that there is or could be, but he still does not know what Fred sees. (Jackson is of course assuming that there *could* be a novel color, which is naturally something that has been argued about.)

Both of Jackson's arguments look valid, and if they are, they establish that the mind is nonphysical, or at least that we have nonphysical information about the mind. Sometime after publishing his argument, however, however, Jackson took it back. He had decided that it led to dualism and that the dualism it led to is epiphenomenalist. This meant that the qualitative states whose nonphysical character he had championed, though they exist, are without effect on human behavior. There they are, but they have no effects. Epiphenomenalism is hard to believe, however, not least because, as we saw earlier, it has all the problems of dualism, and more of its own. (*Two*-way epiphenomenalism might be better, but that is just dualist interactionism.) As part of his self-apostasy Jackson came to believe that sensory experience in general is *representation*, so that what is important about it is the information it gives, not its qualitative character. Or rather, its qualitative character *is* representation.

Is this a good line to take? Suppose that there existed a solipsistic two-entity universe, a world with only two things in it: a perceiver, and the perceiver's qualitative

experience, a single quale. There is *ex hypothesi* nothing for the quale to represent, but it seems undeniable that the perceiver experiences it. We might think that he could come to enjoy it.

One is bound to feel that the three antiphysicalist arguments have something in common. Their conclusions are not exactly the same, of course. Nagel's argument has the conclusion that we cannot see how our first proposition ("The mind is nonphysical") can be false. Yet it is, because physicalism is true.

The zombie argument starts with the fact that the Chalmers zombie is possible. If the zombie exists, he or perhaps "it" is not conscious. It is physically identical with the whole of Chalmers's physicality. But there is more to Chalmers; Chalmers is conscious. So consciousness is not physical. Like Jackson's argument, Chalmers's argument has as its conclusion the proposition that the mind is nonphysical and that physicalism is false. Jackson realized quickly the epiphenomenalist implications of his argument for the mind–body problem, and abandoned it. Chalmers took the heroic line of trying to see ways in which dualism could be true, and that is what has led him to consider panpsychism. His views come from someone who is no matter what prepared to take the mind–body very seriously, and panpsychism, though it may seem bizarre, is a reflection of this seriousness.

The mind–body problem is not going to be made to go away easily, and neither is consciousness. Consciousness may be less important in the general economy of the mind than the more enthusiastic of the "qualia freaks" suppose, but the three antimaterialist arguments attest to its reality and importance. For Nagel, the mind is physical, but we cannot see how that is possible, and that is the power of the mind–body problem. If we cannot see how something is possible, we are bound to respect the view of those who believe that it is possible. But this is not a solution to the mind–body problem. It is a declaration that physicalism is true, but incomprehensible. The second half of this claim is true, though, even if the first is false.

For Jackson and Chalmers, the qualitative part of the mind is nonphysical, and so they are dualists. Jackson's dualism is epiphenomenalist, and he found that in the end it was not a position he could live with.

Chalmers has stuck to his guns, and he has toyed with exotic theories such as panpsychism that build dualism into the fabric of things. The difficulty here is that he is not giving us an account of the very thing of which Descartes could not give us an account. Even the panpsychist ought to be able to give a coherent account of the relation between the mental and the physical, and he does not. His position is sound enough, to the extent that it does recognize the "data" (the inconsistent tetrad) that fuel the original problem. The trouble is that the mind–body problem

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metastasizes into the same problem across the entire universe. Why give us infinitely many more instances of the mind–body problem than we already have? It is of course open to the panpsychist to retort that if one instance of the problem is solved, they all are, so the numbers do not matter. Either way, though, it is better to look for a solution where one is to be found.

Let us look next at the scientific solutions that have been offered to the problem.