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Social Work Values: Equity or Equality? A Response to Solas.
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Contents
1. A Primary Value or a Plurality of Values?
2. Equity as the Pursuit of Complex Fairness
3. The Capabilities Approach: Reading Nussbaum for Social Work
5. References
Full Text
In his very interesting and challenging article, Solas ([ 7 ]) has argued that the statement of values contained in the Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW) Code of Ethics 1999 (AASW, [ 1 ]) is misconceived. Its focus on "equity", it is claimed, prevents social work from pursuing "radical egalitarianism", which, Solas asserts, should be the proper goal of social work.
In this brief, invited response to Solas' article I want to suggest that parts of Solas' argument do, indeed, assist us in further developing our thinking about social work values but, at the same time, he is mistaken in aspects of his critique. Consequently, as it stands, his analysis cannot be accepted completely. I must disclose from the outset that I was part of the committee that undertook the 2002 revision of the 1999 Code (although I was not involved in the original 1999 version). However, I am not seeking simply to defend my own work or that of colleagues where it is not defensible, and I hope that from the following discussion it will be clear that I am attempting to sketch out how such a critique can and must be taken seriously.
A Primary Value or a Plurality of Values?
A pivotal question in the debate that will unfold from Solas' argument is whether the values as presented in the Code of Ethics (AASW, [ 1 ]) constitute a rank ordering. Solas clearly views the location of "social justice" as the second of five values as indicating a subordinated status relative to "human dignity and worth". However, although it may seem plausible to read the textual ordering in that way, there is nothing in the text itself to suggest that one is a primary value and the others secondary. Indeed, Section 5.1 (AASW, [ 1 ], p. 22) explicitly addresses situations where different decisions may be supported by different values, each of which is core to social work ethics.
Nevertheless, there is an issue to be faced in balancing these two principles and the others stated by the Code of Ethics, in that they are founded on different conceptions of the good and the right. The ideas of human worth, and consequently of human rights, are absolute and universalistic. The concept of social justice is necessarily teleological—that is, it must be understood in terms of the outcomes of ideas and actions—and often relativistic. The former argues that each of us is a moral end in ourselves and we cannot be used against our will as the means to achieve another person's ends. The latter, however, states that the rights of some can be privileged over the rights of another in order to achieve the end of justice. Despite Solas' wish to jettison utilitarianism (a particular form of teleology), in this respect "radical egalitarianism" is no less teleological than a notion such as "equity", although it seeks to avoid relativism.
I suggest that what we actually have in the AASW Code of Ethics may, more reasonably, be seen as a plural statement of values in which the profession as a whole and its individual members must do the hard work of balancing the different, and sometimes competing, demands of a plural range of primary values (e.g., compare with Nagel, [ 3 ], Ch. 9).
Equity as the Pursuit of Complex Fairness
The idea of a primary value is important to Solas' argument, because he wishes to place "radical egalitarianism" in such a position for social work to be the principle to which all other values would be subordinated. However, if we begin from the notion that these values are plural, then the pursuit of "equity" as compared with "radical egalitarianism" is perhaps a little easier to understand. "Equity" in this sense can be translated as "complex fairness" (Gray, [ 2 ]). This is a position that recognises both that absolute equality cannot be achieved practically and that, in any case, we may not all agree that it is the best goal.
Briefly, the first of these points is illustrated by Solas' own qualification of equality when he states that, in the case of social assistance for a person with an acquired disability, although we ought to pursue levels of help that go well beyond an austere minimum, "compensation would not be unlimited". Yet, although this argument is appropriately seeking to define what would be enough to enable someone to achieve a dignified life, the acceptance of limitations returns us to utilitarian principles. We can agree with Solas (and I do) that someone in this situation should not be forced to accept an undignified response to their needs, irrespective of any sense of responsibility for the situation. Even if the person has made an error of judgement, no matter how foolish it may appear with the luxury of hindsight, this is precisely the sort of situation that Nussbaum ([ 5 ]) identifies as a "plight" that can be understood as such in terms of our common humanity. Nussbaum's radical reconceptualisation of "compassion" as the recognition of a common human plight and a response of ethical solidarity (i.e., the antithesis of "pity") would repay further detailed analysis. However, utilitarianism originates in recognising that resources are always limited to some degree ("the realm of necessity"), even in very wealthy societies such as Australia. Who is to set the line of what counts as "good enough" and how is this to be differentiated from "unlimited" are key issues at stake here. Combining the tensions between the recognition of common human plight and the need for dignity with the necessity of balancing scarce resources makes our decision making morally pluralistic—as, I would argue, is much of social work.
Then, the second point: would we all agree on the goal of absolute equality? What of other circumstances in which social workers exercise responsibilities that are less easily seen as a common human plight? I am thinking, for example, about perpetrators of domestic violence or abuse against children. And we could find many examples in the moral ground between. No matter how heinous we may consider the actions involved, the perpetrator of domestic violence or abuse against children is fully entitled to fair dealing in law and when convicted to legal redress that is as nondemeaning as possible (people go to prison as the punishment, not in order to be punished in the way they are treated when they are there). However, in so far as sentencing takes account of individual circumstances, then it should be understood as pursuing "equity" not "equality" (e.g., in achieving justice for victims). Other aspects of social work and the human services will produce further detailed and different examples.
The Capabilities Approach: Reading Nussbaum for Social Work
I would suggest that the work of Nussbaum, to whom Solas refers, is very important in addressing these questions. In particular, with Sen (e.g., Sen, [ 6 ]), she has argued for an approach that is able to deal with the plurality of values that people from diverse cultures may hold but deals with common issues of humanity (Nussbaum, [ 4 ]). This has become known as the "capabilities approach" and is very clearly summarised by Solas (2008). It refers to the nonmoral goods that can be understood as commonly necessary for all human beings to lead a normal dignified life, as well as the pursuit of moral goods (such as truth, justice, and so on).
Nussbaum is very clear that her vision of human capabilities as basic is grounded in a universal view of humanity, in that such capabilities apply to " each and every person" seen as moral ends in themselves (2000, p. 74; emphasis in original). At the same time, the way in which human capabilities are experienced and understood varies enormously between cultures. So, what counts as appropriate emotional expression or a sense of play (both examples of capabilities identified by Nussbaum) will appropriately be different for different people. However, Solas ([ 7 ]) appears to ignore Nussbaum's own stated pluralism (e.g., Nussbaum, [ 4 ], pp. 87–88). Moreover, the connections, contradictions, or both, between her concept and the idea of "radical egalitarianism" are not articulated. Nussbaum's vision of justice is that of complex fairness and could be said to refer to a radical equality only in so far as she asserts the right of all human beings to live lives in which they can realise the capabilities that can be agreed as the common basis of a human life. Beyond that, she argues, pluralism does not require the sort of utilitarianism that Solas identifies with it but, rather, enables each person to fulfil their own preferences for a dignified human life.
This argument also leads Nussbaum to assert also that the pursuit of human capabilities for " each and every person" does not apply in the same way to collectives such as families or communities as it does to individuals (2000, p. 74; emphasis in original). Thus, the importance of the valuing of diversity, on which I agree completely with Solas, does not depend on "collective rights" as a trump card. As Nussbaum points out, if the position of each and every person is not attended to, then human capabilities will not be a reality for many people because cultural traditions (including those in many parts of the West) often are disadvantageous to women, children, gay and lesbian people, older people, people with disabilities, ethnic and racial minorities, people of minority religions and spiritual beliefs, and others. The constitutional guarantee that ought by now to have been accorded to Aboriginal Australians, and to the shame of all other Australians has not, does not stand on the idea that "collective rights" are primary over all other rights and obligations. It has a much stronger foundation in a rejection of the way in which the legacy of colonialism has been dehumanising and has prevented Aboriginal Australians from achieving the core human capabilities that are accessible to the "mainstream", at least in aggregate. (But of course, that aggregation itself needs to be disentangled critically: see my point above about tradition, culture, and discrimination.) Diversity is more effectively supported and protected by this approach than by a notion of "radical egalitarianism", precisely because it requires a positive and affirmative concept of difference.
In this very brief response to Solas, I have tried to sketch out the basis of a defence of the notion of "equity" as used in the Code of Ethics 1999 (AASW, [ 1 ]). But, in doing so, I have gone beyond the terms of the Code itself. This points to the significance of Solas' critique, in that it identifies the way in which any code must be a living document, subject to challenge and debate. In so far as the Code lacks clarity or is open to critique of the kind Solas has proposed, then it must be debated. In any case, it must always be open to further development. Solas' argument is valuable because it moves us forward, causing us to reflect on the ethics and values of social work. This brief response is offered not to close down conversation, but to map out some of the ways in which that could be pursued. For me, on the basis that I have outlined here, the notion of "equity" serves us better in grasping the complexities of fairness and justice in the ongoing dialogue; it is also capable of relating to the diversity between social workers as individuals and as members of different communities, as well as the range of practices and the issues to which social work responds.
1 Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW). 2002. Code of Ethics 1999(Rev. ed.). Kingston, ACT: AASW.
2 Gray, J.1996. After social democracy, London: Demos.
3 Nagel, T.1979. Mortal questions, Cambridge, , UK: Cambridge University Press.
4 Nussbaum, M.2000. Women and human development, Cambridge, , UK: Cambridge University Press.
5 Nussbaum, M.2001. Upheavals of thought, New York: Cambridge University Press.
6 Sen, A.1993. Capability and well-being. InM.Nussbaum & A.SenThe quality of life (pp. 30–53). Oxford, , UK: Clarendon Press.
7 Solas, J.2008. Social work and social justice: What are we fighting for?. Australian Social Work, 61: 124–136.
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By Richard Hugman
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