Philosophy-PowerPoints-Presentation

Philosophers of education have traditionally viewed the fostering of good thinking as an aim of education, and the views of John Dewey, John Passmore, and Israel Scheffler are precursors to contemporary work on critical thinking. Contemporary interest in and debate about critical thinking was initiated largely by the work of Robert Ennis, in particular “A Concept of Critical Thinking” (1962), in which he put forward a detailed conception of critical thinking.

Theorists working in the field of informal logic also contributed significantly to the development of critical thinking theory and practice. The approach that they have taken to critical thinking centers on argumentation. A recognition of the limitations of formal deductive logic has prompted them to focus on the interpretation, evaluation, and construction of arguments in natural language.

The issue of how critical thinking should be conceptualized is a primary philosophical issue in this area. Although a variety of definitions and conceptualizations have been proposed, there are some common features that distinguish philosophical conceptions from more psychologically inspired accounts. All the main philosophical conceptions of critical thinking have as a central concept the idea of good reasons; they are, thus, explicitly normative. Psychological views, on the other hand, focus on the processes or mental operations involved in thinking. These views have been criticized by philosophers on a number of grounds. First, it is impossible to determine what mental operations correlate with particular cases of good thinking. Second, any particular operation can be performed critically or uncritically. What determines whether thinking is critical is the quality of the reasoning and not whether particular mental operations have been performed. All the main philosophical accounts of critical thinking depend, thus, on the concept of reason, and focus on the norms and standards of good thinking.

Robert Ennis, for example, highlights the assessment of reasons in his conception of critical thinking. In his 1962 paper, Ennis defines critical thinking as “the correct assessing of statements.” He described twelve aspects involved in critical thinking, which he categorized according to three dimensions: the logical (understanding relationships between meanings of words and statements), the criterial (having knowledge of the criteria for judging statements), and the pragmatic (judging sufficiency in light of the purpose of the judgment). Ennis subsequently broadened the scope of critical thinking, and by 1985 he was defining critical thinking as “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do.” The list of abilities he proposes as basic to critical thinking is categorized under the headings elementary clarification, basic support, inference, advanced clarification, and strategies and tactics. They include the following: (1) focusing on a question; (2) analyzing arguments; (3) asking and answering questions of clarification and challenge; (4) judging the credibility of a source; (5) observing and judging observation reports; (6) deducing and judging deductions; (7) inducing and judging inductions; (8) making and judging value judgments; (9) defining terms and judging definitions; (10) identifying assumptions; (11) deciding on an action; and (12) interacting with others. Ennis also views judgment as necessary to critical thinking.

Harvey Siegel also puts reason at the center of his account of critical thinking. For Siegel, the critical thinker is one who is appropriately moved by reasons, and one of the main aspects of critical thinking for Siegel is the reason assessment component. This means that the critical thinker is able to properly assess reasons and their ability to warrant beliefs, claims, and actions. Siegel views critical thinking as the educational correlate to rationality.

The assessment of reasons is also central to the conception of critical thinking put forward by Richard Paul, but for Paul such assessment must go beyond finding weaknesses in views with which one disagrees in order to reinforce one’s own views. The latter Paul characterizes as critical thinking in the weak sense. He advocates, instead, critical thinking in the strong sense, which is thinking that probes the egocentric and sociocentric assumptions that underpin beliefs, including one’s own, and that examines the world views in which beliefs are embedded. Strong-sense critical thinking involves dealing with issues from multiple perspectives and is, thus, dialectical and dialogical.

Criteria and standards are particularly prominent in the account of critical thinking proposed by Matthew Lipman. Lipman’s view differs from the views previously described in that it focuses on judgment rather than on belief and action. He defines critical thinking as thinking that facilitates judgment because it relies on criteria, is self-correcting, and is sensitive to context.

John McPeck defines critical thinking as the appropriate use of reflective skepticism within the problem area under consideration. This definition limits the domain of critical thinking somewhat in that, for McPeck, critical thinking is not coextensive with rationality, but is a subspecies of rational thought that is used only when one encounters problems in the normal course of reasoning. According to McPeck, all rational thinking is not critical thinking.

Another commonality among the main philosophical conceptions of critical thinking is that dispositions are seen as constituting an important dimension of critical thinking. Siegel proposes the notion of the critical spirit to capture this dispositional dimension, which he sees as being of equal importance with the reason assessment component. The critical spirit indicates that a critical thinker values good reasoning and is disposed to assess reasons and to govern beliefs and actions on the basis of such assessment. Ennis includes a list of tendencies or dispositions in his conception of critical thinking. It includes the disposition to seek a clear statement of the statement or question, to seek reasons, to try to be well-informed, to use credible sources and mention them, to take into account the total situation, to try to remain relevant to the main point, to keep in mind the original or basic concern, to look for alternatives, to be open-minded, to take a position when the evidence and reasons are sufficient, to seek as much precision as the subject permits, to deal in an orderly manner with the parts of a complex whole, and to be sensitive to the feelings, level of knowledge, and degree of sophistication of others. And dispositions, values, and traits of character are central to Paul’s strong-sense critical thinking. Strong sense critical thinking involves not just a set of intellectual or technical skills but certain central dispositions or habits of mind. These include open-mindedness, sensitivity to the possibility of self-deception, and willingness to empathetically understand points of view with which one disagrees.

Another issue with respect to the conceptualization of critical thinking involves the relationship between critical thinking and creative thinking. Early accounts, (such as that of Ennis, 1962), tended to view them as distinct, but theorists have begun to argue that they are interrelated, and that good thinking has both generative and evaluative dimensions. For example, Lipman maintains that critical thinking has an intuitive, spontaneous dimension and that creative thinking has rational aspects.

The relationship between informal logic and critical thinking is another important issue. Informal logic has been defined by J. A. Blair and R.H. Johnson as the normative study of argument, which involves the development of standards, criteria, and procedures for the interpretation, evaluation, and construction of arguments and argumentation used in natural language. Most theorists see logic and argumentation as important and necessary but not sufficient for critical thinking, the scope of critical thinking extending beyond the analysis of arguments. McPeck, however, argues that argument analysis plays a relatively minor role in critical thinking.

The main area of philosophical contention with respect to critical thinking relates to the issue of whether critical thinking is generalizable—that is, whether there are criteria, principles, or skills of critical thinking that apply across domains or subjects. Ennis, an upholder of generalizability, argues that the proficiencies and dispositions he describes are relevant to a variety of areas. McPeck deploys a number of arguments against the existence of general skills: (1) Because all thinking is thinking about something, the idea of a general skill that is not applied to any particular subject is incoherent; (2) Because knowledge of the particular subject is necessary for critical thinking, a general ability to think critically can not exist; and (3) Different fields rely on different epistemologies, using different kinds of reasons and different types of arguments, so what is involved in critical thinking varies from field to field.

In response to these arguments, Ennis, Siegel, and others have argued the following: (1) The fact that critical thinking must have an object does not imply that there cannot be critical thinking principles that are relevant to more than one area; (2) Supporters of generalizability acknowledge that knowledge is necessary for critical thinking, but the necessity of knowledge does not imply that there are no general skills; (3) The fact that there are some types of reasons and arguments that are specific to particular fields does not preclude the possibility that there are also principles that apply to many fields.

The issue of generalizability has implications for how critical thinking can best be fostered & through education. The subject-specificity thesis would seem to point to the conclusion that students would have to learn to think critically through actually engaging in an in-depth and critical manner with the particular subject matter. The existence of general principles might seem to lend support to the use of separate courses or instructional units designed specifically to develop critical thinking (for example, informal logic courses). Nonetheless, it might be that general principles are best learned in particular contexts, a conclusion that might support an infusion approach in which particular subject matter is taught in a manner that highlights the relevant critical principles and encourages the relevant dispositions. A different approach to developing critical thinking takes the form of attempts to engage children in philosophical inquiry. Such inquiry is thought to be useful in the development of an inquiring attitude, the ability to be self-critical, and the ability to reflect on methodology, and thus, ultimately, in the development of judgment. The choice of approach would be dependent on whether there are general principles of critical thinking, the importance of the epistemologies of particular disciplines, the role of background knowledge, and the extent to which principles of critical thinking will transfer between areas and to everyday contexts. These are to some extent empirical as well as conceptual questions.

The issue of how and to what extent critical thinking can be evaluated has also been the subject of philosophical investigation. The most widely used instruments for assessing critical thinking are the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests and the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal, but their multiple-choice format has been criticized for failing to capture the reasoning involved and for missing some important dimensions of critical thinking. New methods for assessment, such as essay tests, multiple-choice tests requiring written justifications, and various types of authentic measures are being developed.

Much current debate about critical thinking centers on issues of justification. Although the ideal of critical thinking is implicit in some prominent philosophical conceptions of education (such as those of Israel Scheffler and R.S. Peters), one of the few theorists to tackle the issue of justification explicitly is Siegel. The justification that Siegel offers rests on the following grounds: (1) The principle of respect for persons entails respect for students’ right to question and to seek reasons and justification; (2) Critical thinking is necessary for the development of the independent judgment required for self-sufficiency in adulthood; (3) Critical thinking contributes to the development of skills and dispositions necessary for initiation into the rational traditions; and (4) The ability to think critically is vital for citizens in a democracy.

Much recent discussion about critical thinking has taken the form of challenges to the prevailing conceptions and to their justification. One criticism is that prevailing conceptions are excessively individualistic and that critical thinking is better viewed as a social practice that is constituted through dialogue and community.

Another form of challenge takes the form of charges that critical thinking is biased, in particular with respect to gender and culture. Thus it is claimed that current conceptions conceive of critical thinking in terms that favor traditionally advantaged groups and thus fail to recognize certain important aspects of critical thinking. For example, it is claimed that current conceptions neglect emotion, are overly confrontational, privilege personal autonomy over relationships, downplay concrete experience, and fail to acknowledge subjectivity and situational differences.

Another sort of challenge is to the place claimed for critical thinking as universal and as the primary educational ideal. It has been argued that there are other ideals, for example caring, that are at least equally important, and further, that to propose critical thinking as a universal idea is culturally biased because critical thinking is not central to all cultures. Thus critical thinking is viewed as one ideology among others and its advocacy viewed as a kind of cultural imposition. These types of criticisms raise fundamental philosophical issues regarding the nature and role of rationality. Responses on the part of advocates of critical thinking point to the self-correcting nature of reason, the fallibilist nature of critical thinking (that the standards are themselves subject to improvement), that there may be numerous ways to be rational, that reason is presupposed in any criticisms, even of reason itself, and that any proposed alternatives to critical thinking would themselves have to be assessed on the basis of standards and principles of critical thinking.

 Thayer-Bacon, Barbara. “Caring and Its Relationship to Critical Thinking.” Educational Theory 43 (1993): 323-40. 

Sharon Bailin

 Copyright © 1996 J.J. Chambliss