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238 Part IV: East Asia

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CHINA

239

CHRONOLOGY OF CHINESE HISTORY

4500

B.C.E.

Neolithic Yangshao, Longshan, Liangzhu Culture

Walled settlements, wheel thrown pottery

Xia 2200–1700 B.C.E.

1700

Shang 1700–1100 B.C.E.

Cities of 10,000; bronze; glazed pottery; silk; writing; horse chariot

1100

Zhou 1100–221 B.C.E.

Western Zhou 1100–771 B.C.E.

Eastern Zhou 771–221 B.C.E.

“Golden Age” of feudalism

Cast bronze coinage; stamped gold coins; glass; wrought iron; crossbow

Confucius (551–479)

Great Wall begun; Grand Canal begun

221

Qin 221–206 B.C.E.

First imperial unification under the “First Emperor,” Qin Shihuang; destruction of Confucian texts

Tomb of First Emperor at Xi’an [Chang’an]; completion of Great Wall

206 B.C.E.

C.E.

Han 206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.

Western Han 206 B.C.E.– 9 C.E.

Wang Mang Interregnum 9–21 C.E.

Eastern Han 23–220 C.E.

Sima Qian, “Grand Historian” Restoration of Confucianism Communication with West

65 C.E. White Horse Temple, first Buddhist monastery Paper, porcelain; tea; coal, wheelbarrow

268

Western Jin 268–317

Gunpowder

386

6 Dynasties

Block printing

399 Faxian to India; 401 Indian monk Kumarajiva

446 first Buddhist persecution; 574 second persecution

581

Sui 581–618

Beginning of “Golden Age of Buddhism”

618

Tang 618–906

627–645 Xuanzang to India 690–705 Empress Wu

Peak of Buddhism; paper money, canal locks Chang’an greatest city in the world

Beginning of Japanese cultural borrowing

868 Diamond Sutra, oldest printed book in world Meritocracy

906

5 Dynasties 906–960

960

Song 960–1280

Movable type printing Neo-Confucianism

1130–1200 Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals Examination system

Spread of foot binding

1200

Yuan 1280–1368

Kublai Khan conquers China, 1279; beginning of Mongol control; capital established in Beijing; embrace Tibetan Lamaism; rebuild Great Wall

Marco Polo

1368

Ming 1368–1644

Overthrow of the Mongol Yuan dynasty by Han-Chinese 1406–1420 Construction of Forbidden City

1644

Qing 1644–1912

Jesuit Mission

Emperor Kangxi (r. 1661–1722) Pu Yi, Last Emperor

1912

Republican Period

Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek

1949

Communist Period

Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping

he state is shattered; mountains and rivers remain.” These poetic words, written 1,200 years ago, express both a sense of the eternity of the Chinese landscape and the yearning for a stable centralized state

“T

that has characterized Chinese culture for over two millennia (Van Slyke 1988:43). More than any other people in human history, the Chinese have achieved a continuity of social and cultural identity even during periods when the state itself collapsed into anarchy or was grabbed by alien conquerors. To imagine a comparable achievement in the West, let’s suppose that the Greeks of Homer’s time (900 B.C.E.), with their small territorial chiefdoms, survived through the golden age of fifth-century Athens when Socrates, Plato, and Aris- totle lived and wrote; and then further suppose, in this scenario, that all the small Greek city-states and chiefdoms were eventually unified by a conqueror who carried this culture north and west through all of Europe, founding a state that continued to survive and call itself “Greek” for the next 2,100 years, so that even now, all the peoples of Europe consider themselves one “Greek nation.” Suppose further that all the languages derived from Greek and Latin came to be identified as mere dialects of Greek, allowing everyone to believe that in some sense they all speak the same language. Imagine further that as other ethnic groups came into the orbit of “Greek” culture, they assimilated and came to call themselves ethnically “Greek,” abandoning their earlier French, German, Danish, Swedish, and other ethnicities. (We shall allow Eng- land to be Japan in this scenario, retaining its distinctive identity but borrowing extravagantly from “Greek” culture.) The capital remains at Athens for long centuries, then perhaps shifts after a period of social disunity or conquest to Rome or Paris or Berlin, but it continues to view itself as “Greek” society. Dur- ing the invasion of “Greece” [Europe] in 1237–1242, suppose the Mongols succeeded in conquering the whole continent and ruling for several hundred years, eventually becoming as “Greek” as everyone else, losing their separate cultural identity. And throughout these two millennia, the social philosophy of Socrates is continually elaborated, becoming a kind of civil religion throughout this vast realm.

Of course it didn’t happen this way in the West, but something much like this hypothetical European history is what actually occurred in China with the early unification of small states, the spread of Chinese culture outward through the territories you now see on a map of China, the absorption and Sinicization of peripheral peoples, and the defining of nonmutually intelligible languages as mere “dialects” of Chinese with a text everyone can read (see chapter 2).

Chapter opener photo: Chinese scholar.

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A cultural unity among the Han Chinese is already apparent in Neolithic archaeological sites in North China. As long ago as 1600 B.C.E. the Chinese elite were asking questions of their ancestors by inscribing on oracle bones the earliest versions of the script still in use today. These oracle bones were usually the plastrons (or underbellies) of tortoises or the shoulder blades of the oxen that they used to plow their fields. A ritual master would inscribe a question on the bone and then apply heat until cracks ran across the inscribed surface. The cracks were interpreted as a resolution to the question in a way that was believed to represent the will of the ancestors or the gods. Writing and literacy early on became to the Chinese the supreme marker of civilization. It was the possession of civilization, in their view, that distinguished them from all other known peoples.

The Zhou dynasty text, Liji (Li Chi, or Book of Rites), provides a kind of ancient Chinese ethnographic classification of peoples in a system of “Five Regions.” At the center was the “Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo), that is, the

Taklamakan Desert

Anyang

Tibet

CHIN A

Map 7.1 China.

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a

l

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H

242 Part IV: East Asian Civilization

Box 7.1 Romanization of Chinese

In this volume, as in most news outlets, periodicals, and other non-Chinese-lan- guage publications, Chinese is rendered in a Romanization system called “pinyin” (lit- erally “spell sound”) or Hanyu pinyin. Throughout the centuries of contact between China and Europe, several Romanization systems (or rendering Chinese in Roman letters) have been established, used, and eventually discarded. Even today there is no universally shared system, though pinyin seems to have emerged on top.

Pinyin is specifically a Romanization system for Mandarin Chinese, or Putonghua (“common dialect”), and there are different systems for Romanizing other major Chi- nese dialects like Cantonese. Mandarin is the most common dialect spoken in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and originates from an amalgam of northern dia- lects that came to be the language of scholar-officials in imperial China. Chinese offi- cials came from all over the realm and spoke many different dialects. Speaking a standard guanhua (“official’s speech”) helped smooth daily operations. Early Jesuit visitors to China translated guanhua as “Mandarin,” since a mandarin was a term for a high official. This eventually led to the Western name for the current standard Chinese dialect. While the Romanization system used by these Jesuits did not stand the test of time, they do have a couple particularly prominent legacies in Romanization. As they translated the classic Chinese texts into Latin, several names occurred constantly, and they decided to render these with Latin endings, perhaps for the reader’s com- fort; so today instead of Kong Fuzi and Mengzi, we have the very un-Chinese-sound- ing names of Confucius and Mencius, which continue to be used in most Western references to the philosophers.

Mandarin pinyin, or Hanyu pinyin, was established systematically and completely by the linguist Zhou Youguang (1906–2017) in the 1950s, and it was subsequently adopted in the PRC, and gradually around the world. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the overseas Chinese community have been slow to completely adopt pinyin for a combi- nation of reasons, including dialect differences and political implications of a PRC Romanization system. The system is nonetheless commonplace to the Western reader today and used in newspapers of record and official communications, though it still may involve some confusion about uncommon pronunciations of some of the letters used.

Abbreviated Pinyin Pronunciation Guide

C is pronounced like the “ts” in “cats.”

Z is pronounced like the “ds” in “kids.”

X is pronounced like “sh” but with the tip of the tongue a bit closer to the front teeth.

Zh is pronounced like a “j” sound.

Q is pronounced like a “ch” sound.

These are just a few of the unfamiliar pronunciations of consonants in pinyin Romanization, and you can find a full pronunciation guide at this link: http://www.ctcfl.ox.ac.uk/Pinyin_Notes.htm

Chinese themselves, the people who had texts and thus civilization, who could record their history and communicate with their ancestors in writing. On their periphery to the north, south, east, and west were peoples lacking civilization. Their “wild” cultural state was evident in the physical markers describing them: their hair was unbound, they tattooed their foreheads or their whole bodies, they ate raw food, they did not eat grain, they wore skins of animals and lived in caves. One group even had their feet turned in upon each other (Legge 1885). Part of the great enterprise of Chinese civilization was the proj- ect of civilizing these barbarians, which gradually they accomplished, turning them into Han (Harrell 1995).

The philosophy that eventually provided the civil religion of Chinese civili- zation, the role that Socrates played in our hypothetical example of a “Greek” Europe, is the teachings of a fifth-century B.C.E. Chinese sage named Confucius (Kongfuzi, Kongzi). The writing and texts that were held to be so morally improving that civilization itself was identified with them—wen—were in large measure the writings and compilations of Confucius and his followers through- out the centuries.

Wen, however, implied more than an advanced culture; wen also implied social institutions for preserving harmony and ensuring a well-ordered polity. The state was the instrument for advancing and protecting Chinese civiliza- tion. States did sometimes shatter, as in the poignant opening words of this chapter by Du Fu (Tu Fu), writing from such a period of luan, or social chaos. But such periods filled Chinese with dread, and Chinese history is a chronicle of triumphs over disorder and turmoil by strong and virtuous dynastic founders who restore order and receive the Mandate of Heaven for their dynasties. Such exemplary periods never last for more than a few centuries before incompe- tence, corruption, disloyalty, or conquest cause their decay, hence their loss of Heaven’s mandate to rule. Each dynasty may be seen as a new experiment in ordering Chinese society, in seeking improved institutions that will better meet the needs of the state, hence the people. Always, however, there was the assumption that there could be only one “Son of Heaven,” one emperor, to whom all the people looked for moral guidance and benevolent rule. Regional movements and competitive secessionist states were relatively rare, partly because emperors experimented with ways to prevent regional contenders for power from emerging. As Fairbank writes:

The central myth of the Confucian state was that the ruler’s exemplary and benevolent conduct manifesting his personal virtue (de) drew the people to him and gave him the Mandate. This could be said as long as rebels could be suppressed, preferably by decapitation. (Fairbank and Golden 2006:111)

Suppression of rebels by decapitation suggests the nonideological side of the strong Chinese state. Although such ideological systems of thought as the Man- date of Heaven, the de (te) or mystical store of power of a ruler, and Confucian social ethics provide the moral underpinnings of the Chinese state, there was

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always also the state’s coercive fist. This is wu, which means force or military order. Confucius may have preferred a state based on the wisdom and virtue of a fatherly ruler and the moral cultivation of filial subjects, but because virtue often fails, social order may also be imposed and defended by force. The legalists and militarists sometimes rivaled the Confucian philosophers and brought a darker view of humanity in which peace could be won only through violence and the punishment of what they saw as the inherent wickedness of man.

Events of the present do not contradict these fundamental patterns of Chi- nese society. Even with the contradictions in China today regarding the rela- tionship between socialism and capitalism, there is a surprising degree of consensus regarding the validity of a strong central authority that provides moral leadership for the people. Mao Zedong had tremendous moral authority that has been criticized for its cultic qualities and its excesses during the Cul- tural Revolution. But many thoughtful Chinese now worry about the moral vacuum of capitalism and look back with a certain nostalgia on the social morality of Mao’s teachings contained in these words:

We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness. . . . A man’s ability may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests, a man who is of value to the people. (Mao Zedong 1965:337)

As Mao articulated a Communist morality that had strong resonance with themes of Confucian morality while also governing a coercive state, destroying enemies of the state, and suppressing dissident views, he and the Chinese Com- munist Party were following a very old pattern. We turn now to the establish- ment of these patterns in ancient times.

The Beginnings: Xia, Shang, Zhou, and Qin

The Chinese have always been interested in their past—worship of ances- tors is worship of origins—and have put extraordinary effort into recording his- tory in dynastic chronicles, gazetteers, travel accounts, and official records. The twentieth century provided a phenomenal growth of knowledge about the ori- gins of Chinese civilization from a new source, as archaeology opened to view palaces and tombs of the earliest dynasties. But the names of these ancient kings are not new to us; archaeology confirms the existence of rulers already chronicled in the first century B.C.E. by China’s “Grand Historian,” Sima Qian (145–89 B.C.E.). It was Sima Qian who rescued the name of Confucius from oblivion after the First Emperor, Qin Shihuang (259–210 B.C.E.), attempted to obliterate Confucian teachings and texts. Sima Qian gathered all the older doc- uments that were available to him as court historian and archivist to his Han dynasty emperor to write the Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian), an enor- mous work that would require two to three thousand pages for a complete Eng- lish translation (Wills 1994).

The Grand Historian wrote of the three earliest Chinese dynasties: Xia, Shang, and Zhou. His accounts of the Xia and Shang were so filled with fabu- lous stories that modern historians tended to discount them and begin their own historical accounts with the Zhou, the dynasty during which Confucius lived. After all, what can you make of the founder of the Shang dynasty, born from a mother who became pregnant after swallowing the egg of a black bird? Sima Qian seems to have told the stories as they came to him without passing judg- ment on their credibility. He had quite a lot of more concrete things to report about specific kings, their characters and actions, and their capital cities. While some records from the Shang exist (see below), the earlier Xia is recorded only through myths, and here the figure of Yu the Great (ca. 2200 B.C.E.) emerges most prominently. This legendary founder of the Xia is significantly remembered for his ability to “tame” the changeable Yellow River through dredging and dike construction. This mighty task has forever been essential to the good governance of northern China, and it became a crucial test of any ruler’s legitimacy.

“The Ruins of Yin”

Three and a half centuries after Sima Qian died, grave robbers plundered a royal tomb in an area long known as the “Ruins of Yin” in the lower Yellow River valley. They found strips of bamboo with writing on them, which made a handy torch while the robbers carted off treasures. Some bamboo strips, how- ever, were rescued; these turned out to be a chronology of Shang kings and became known as the “Bamboo Annals.” Sima Qian’s Shiji and the Bamboo Annals have long been the best sources on the Shang dynasty. But for 3,000 years, fear of ghosts and respect for the graves of the ancestors prevented any serious efforts at investigating the “Ruins of Yin,” leaving to twentieth-century archaeologists the discovery of the Shang dynasty (ca. 1600–1046 B.C.E.). The scholar Wang Yirong (Yi-jung) tracked “dragon bones” to the town of Anyang in the first years of the twentieth century and discovered what proved to be the royal archives of the Shang dynasty. This touched off a frenzy of treasure hunt- ing as well as some of the best archaeological research done anywhere in the world by Western and Chinese scholars.

First excavated in 1928, the Shang capital of Anyang is now one of the most important archaeological sites in the world. It is actually 17 different sites near the modern town of Anyang. One of these sites was the major palace complex; another was the royal cemetery. Several sites are bronze foundries where mag- nificently ornamented bronze vessels were manufactured. Nestled everywhere are humble workshops and residences of artisans and commoners. The old annals identified 12 kings of the Shang, one of whom was burned to death when Zhou invaders conquered Anyang. Imagine the delight of archaeologists to find, along with a thousand humbler graves, the remaining 11 royal tombs at Anyang.

These tombs are not monumental in the Egyptian sense, or even structures at all, but huge burial pits about 10 meters deep with long ramps leading down into the grave. The ramps on the north and south were longer, giving the burial

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Figure 7.1 Anyang site map. This cemetery, excavated in the 1930s, con- tained 10 large tombs of Shang dynasty kings. Figure 7.1 is the eastern section of the cemetery. The large cross-shaped tomb (1400) is a royal burial pit (as are 1129 and 1443). All royal tombs were oriented north-south, with ramps to facili- tate descending into the pit where the king was buried with elaborate grave goods (all robbed centuries ago). Additional goods were piled in the ramps.

The small graves were related to the big tombs one way or another, probably those of workers who built the tomb and/or sacrificial victims associated with the king’s mortuary rites. Of 643 individuals that could be classified, 209 were skulls only, 192 were bodies without skulls. There were also many horses, a few elephants, and chariots. Almost all were young adults, male and female, aver- aging 15 to 35 years old. The Shang clearly sacrificed live victims to accom- pany Shang kings to the afterlife (and also perhaps to keep the location of tombs secret). This practice was abandoned by the time of Qin Shihuang, who made pottery effigies of his army to accompany him to heaven.

pits a cross shape. A wooden chamber was built at the bottom with the coffin, also of wood, in the center. Most of the wood has disintegrated, along with the bodies of the kings, but other materials remained. The kings were buried with sacrificial victims, often decapitated and laid out in rows, with their heads arranged tidily elsewhere. Sacrificed dogs protected the entrances along the ramps. Some tombs were better protected; at Royal Tomb 11, eight chariots complete with two horses and two armed charioteers each were interred on the ramps. This king was accompanied to the afterlife by 160 decapitated victims.

In 1976 a new royal grave was discovered, the first one that had never pre- viously been plundered. It was the final resting place of Fu Hao, the favorite consort of the second Anyang king, Wu Ding, in the thirteenth century B.C.E. Lady Hao’s name was already known from oracle bone inscriptions, one of which asked whether she would be in good health after giving birth to her baby. That is typical enough, but Wu Ding also wants to know whether he will have success against the Qiang tribes when he sends Fu Hao at the head of the army. This extraordinary thirteenth-century B.C.E. woman was surrounded by 440 bronze ceremonial vessels, mirrors, bells, and weapons; 590 jades; 560 objects of bone; 7,000 cowry shells, which were probably used as currency; 16 humans; and six dogs.

At the end of the 1936 digging season, archaeologists stumbled on a trove of inscribed tortoise plastrons, though so compacted after millennia under- ground that they could not be removed one by one without damaging them. Instead, they were removed en masse—a three-ton block of 17,096 shells so well preserved that the vermilion sketches put on before they were incised could still be plainly seen. This was the vast official archive of Wu Ding’s reign. These finds, together with nearly 100,000 written texts from the oracle bones, enable us to know a great deal more about ancient Chinese civilization than we know about Indus Valley civilization, whose script remains undeci- phered, not a single name known, and only a few elusive clues about the nature

of their society and religion inferable from the excavations.

The Uses of Bronze

Surely it is appropriate to use the terms “state” and “civilization” to describe the Shang period. The consolidation of power in a single authority, the elimination or absorption of competing polities, and the extraordinary works of art and wealth monopolized by the nobility are evidence of this. The Shang state consisted of numerous walled towns, called yi, controlled by the great clans of the nobility. The state (guo) consisted of a hierarchy: the royal city, the walled towns of the nobility, and the unwalled hamlets of common folk carry- ing on from the earlier Neolithic pattern of life (Keightley 1982). Meanwhile, Shang rulers systematically expanded their domains and founded new towns by sending out populations to settle and begin farming the new regions.

Extreme variations of wealth are apparent in tombs and homes, from the palatial residences of great kings to the humble quarters of commoners. Bronze

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was the key to this difference in wealth. The Shang state sponsored copper and tin mining, and royal establishments monopolized bronze manufactures that, with jade and silk, were the main items of prestige accumulation. Bronze was used for two principal purposes: Weapons, in the form of swords, arrow tips, spears, and execution axes enabled the elite to dominate militarily, maintaining internal con- trol and prosecuting offensive action against external enemies. And bronze was the material for manufacturing the objects necessary to communicate with the ancestors, the spirits, and Heaven; heavily ornamented bronze vessels with tripod feet were used to offer them wine, meat, and other specialties from human society and thus tie them in continuing reciprocal relations with living people. These, too, were the prerogative of the ruling class. A third logical use of bronze comes to mind: bronze tools, like adzes, axes, chisels, and plows, for use in agricultural pro- duction. However, surprisingly few such tools have been found, and those that have were mostly found in royal graves. Keightley believes that even bronze tools were used for ceremonial purposes, such as ritual plowing of the first fields (or the king’s fields) in spring, and for digging royal graves and constructing the coffins and inner walls of the tomb. Thus, the use of bronze was the monopoly of the state, and particularly of the king, who already was known as the Son of Heaven.

Communicating with Heaven

The king’s legitimacy rested on his unique capacity to communicate with Heaven. His own royal ancestors resided there, where their de, their mystical store of power and virtue, remained available to shower blessings on their liv- ing descendants. These ancestors also had access to other heavenly powers that could assure well-being and harmony for all living members of the state. These heavenly powers were sometimes projected into a vaguely conceived “Heav- enly Emperor,” Shangdi (Shang-ti), but conceptions of Shangdi never con- gealed into a single, high, creator god as known in the West. When Shang kings died, they became themselves ancestors who would henceforth rule from heaven. Thus their tombs had to be filled with all the treasures a newly arrived king-ancestor would need, the first of centuries of gifts they would regularly receive from their living descendants. Their obligations to earth and their pow- ers now were greater than ever.

The record of Shang kings’ communications with Heaven can be read on the oracle bones in inscriptions up to 50 characters long. Most tended to be practical questions: “Will we get anything when we hunt at Gui? Will we not get anything when we hunt at Gui?” The heated metal prod was applied to the reverse side; with a “plop” the crackle-response would appear, and later, per- haps, the end result was reported: “On that day we hunted and killed one tiger, 40 deer, 164 wolves, 150 fawns, and a couple of foxes” (Chou 1979). Such accounts give an indirect glimpse of the life of the king and the nobility; it would have been quite a hunting party that killed so much wildlife.

Of course ordinary people did not live like this. Although the nobility was organized in large patrilineal clans held together by wealth, high status, and

collective worship of ancestors, commoners did not have these mechanisms by which to maintain the memory of long-term kinship connections. Their fami- lies were small and their ancestors forgotten after a few generations. Few grave goods accompanied their dead; the elegant bronze vessels for giving libations to ancestors were too expensive for commoners and probably restricted in any case as a prerogative of great families. Patricia Ebrey writes:

Kings were obliged to offer sacrifices of several kinds of meat to their founding ancestor and four most recent ancestors each month; lords, offi- cials, and officers (shih) could make progressively fewer and less varied offerings to progressively fewer ancestors. Commoners were not to make sacrifices of meat, but they could offer vegetables to deceased fathers once each season. (1991:52)

Idealized Zhou Feudalism

To the west of the major Shang centers were a number of tribal chiefdoms that at times fought and at other times tolerated each other. They made alli- ances with the powerful Shang through tribute and vassalage. The Zhou tribes were among these groups. But Shang rulers gradually became weaker, while the Zhou became stronger, and in about 1045 B.C.E., the Zhou conquered the Shang and established a new capital in the west at Chang’an (now Xi’an).

Where Shang kings had justified their rule through worship of their own divine ancestors, the Zhou invented the Mandate of Heaven (tianming). Although Heaven was not imagined as a creator god or as a divine personality, Heaven was on the side of righteousness and good government. According to Zhou revisionism, Heaven had withdrawn its support from the decadent Shang and bestowed it on them, thus creating the motif of the wicked last emperor of a dynasty gone bad and the virtuous founder-emperor of a new dynasty. In the case of the Shang, the last emperor (Di Xin) embodied all imaginable evils that would become commonplace in dynastic histories for centuries to come. He neglected the affairs of state in favor of the pleasures of his harem, and one wife in particular demanded his attention and matched him in wickedness. Orgies in the palace were hosted with boats floated on pools of wine, as the guests enjoyed the spectacle of diabolical and novel torture methods. These moral transgressions were funded by higher taxes, which led to unrest and eventually the overthrow of the Shang and the founding of the Zhou.

With this strong moral element (perhaps embellished by later historians),

Heaven’s favor thus made the new Zhou king the “Son of Heaven.” In his mediating role between Heaven and earth, he represented Heaven on earth in his obligation to provide good government, and he represented earth to Heaven in annual imperial rituals. He worshipped in the “threefold kneeling and nine- fold prostration” to Heaven. Twice a year, at the summer and winter solstices, the king gave a feast for Heaven of wine, soup, various delicious dishes, and animal sacrifice. In the spring he sacrificed on the Altar of Agriculture and

ploughed the first furrow of the year (a custom still performed by the emperor of Japan and the king of Thailand). If things went well, it was proof that the Mandate of Heaven continued with him. Thus, the Zhou established moral grounds as the test of legitimacy, which became the orthodox view to the pres- ent. The symbolic power of these Zhou royal rites remained central in imperial political theater through all dynasties down to the Qing.

The Zhou dynasty survived almost eight centuries (1040–256 B.C.E.), the longest-lasting dynasty in Chinese history. During the first two and a half cen-

Box 7.2 Cosmological Theater in the Forbidden City

Confucius said, “A virtuous ruler is like the Pole Star that remains fixed while all other stars circle reverently around it.” When the Imperial Palace was begun in Beijing in 1410 during the Ming dynasty it was laid out as the earthly plane of this cosmologi- cal structure. As the Pole Star is fixed in the north of the heavens facing south, the For- bidden City was located in the northern (yang) part of the city facing the south (yin) side, theoretically linked to Heaven by a cosmological axis with the Pole Star at Heaven’s end and the Son of Heaven at earth’s end. The emperor, representing earth, wears earth’s color, yellow (the color of the soil in the Yellow River basin). In the Hall of Supreme Harmony, the emperor always sat on the north facing south toward his min- isters, nobles, and subjects at the Great Audience three times a year and the Regular Audience three times a month.

The Son of Heaven was the only man on earth who could enact the mediating rites for all human society (i.e., for Zhongguo, the Middle Kingdom). Just before sunrise on the night of the winter solstice he sacrificed on the Altar of Heaven; at the summer sol- stice he sacrificed at the Altar of Earth. At the spring equinox he sacrificed at the Altar of the Sun and at the Altar of Agriculture; after cutting the first furrow in a ritual field just outside the city, farmers throughout the empire could begin their planting. The empress picked the first mulberry leaves of spring so that women throughout the empire could begin silkworm cultivation. At the autumnal equinox he sacrificed at the Altar of the Moon.

The city was laid out on the five points of the compass with the fifth point being the center of the earthly cosmological plane where the Son of Heaven dwells. The city is a series of cities within cities, each surrounded by a wall. The Forbidden “City” itself is actually a jumble of palaces, gardens, pavilions, and gates, though inside lived sev- eral thousands of the emperor’s children, empresses, consorts, and eunuchs. For them, the Forbidden City was a pleasure palace—and a prison, for they rarely could leave. It nests within the old city laid out like the old Zhou capital, with an Altar of Land and Grain on the west side of the gate and the Imperial Ancestral Temple on the east. This was the structure that was replicated in every Zhou vassal state for centuries.

All gates and altars on the north are devoted to earth, and on the south to Heaven. The Altar to the Sun is in the east, where the sun rises, and the altar to the Moon is in the west where the sun sets. The Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen, now Tianan- men Square since the gate was removed) is matched in the north by the Gate of Earthly Peace.

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turies it was called the Western Zhou because the capital was at Chang’an and new forms for organizing the state were worked out by the new elite class, which consisted of the new Zhou leaders and the former Shang nobility who had merged into a single class. For Zhou kings it was easier to capture a region than to govern it. Kinship ties of loyalty, rather than bureaucratic organization, were the cement that held society together. In theory, all the territory con- quered by the king belonged to him, but in order to control his territories, he gave his male kinsmen the right to colonize and govern lands in his name. These bonds of fealty were ritually enacted. At Chang’an, the Zhou king estab- lished an altar to the God of the Soil on the west side of his palace gate and an altar to his ancestors on the right side of the gate. When a younger brother or nephew established a vassal state, he took a clod of earth from the Son of Heaven’s altar to his own capital and built his own local altar to the God of the Soil. In performing rites to his local God of the Soil, he acknowledged the supremacy of the Son of Heaven at Chang’an. But he built a shrine to his own ancestors on the right side of his gate. There was little military force emanating from the capital to hold these vassal states to the center; it all depended on these bonds of loyalty, ritually enacted.

Ancestor worship thus had powerful political significance; only aristocratic lineages were entitled to worship their ancestors, and an elaborate code of rules linked a family’s rank in the Zhou state to the complexity of ancestral rites and the number of generations of ancestors that could be worshipped. Commoners were not entitled to worship ancestors beyond three generations, could not offer meat, and could worship only once each season. Ancestor worship throughout Chinese history changed in response to changes in the state and in the nature of elite classes, as we shall see.

During the last five centuries, called the Eastern Zhou because the capital moved to Luoyang, it all began to unravel. Thoughtful people looked back on those early decades of the Western Zhou when the feudal system still worked as a golden age.

The early Zhou system of linking vassal states to the king through bonds of loyalty and ritual action gradually dissolved as those many secondary states grew larger and more powerful than the Zhou king himself. It was an easy mat- ter to forget the old loyal bonds and begin to act autonomously; a prince had his own shrine to the God of the Soil and his own ancestral shrine outside his palace door. At one point over 170 states were operating independently, form- ing alliances against stronger states and absorbing weaker states until they began to eat one another up. This era, known by the ironically poetic name of the Spring-and-Autumn period (722–481 B.C.E.), gave way to the Warring States period (403–221 B.C.E.), when the competing states had worn each other down to only six. It was not surprising that people looked back with longing on the peaceful times when all states lived harmoniously under a single king.

Clearly the Zhou golden age was over. However, great strides were made in other areas of social life. Iron, a metal strong enough to make plows that could

Xu

Deng

Cao

Wei

Map 7.2 Fifth-century B.C.E. China.

Wu

Tan

Chu

Song

Chen Cai

Zhou Zheng

Qin

Yellow Sea

Lu

Qi

Jin

Yan

be pulled by oxen, was discovered, an invention that fueled another phase of the agricultural revolution and another round of population increase. The canals and irrigation works that had been going on for a very long time got a new boost; new areas came under intensive cultivation. A wealthy merchant class began to be documented in the oldest records, but since merchants pro- duced nothing and only made their wealth by the suspicious and undervalued process of trading things for other things, they were put at the bottom of the emerging class system:

warrior-administrators

peasants and primary producers artisans and secondary producers merchants

This class structure remained the frame of reference into the twentieth century, when even the Communists, who received their aversion to the bourgeois mer-

chant class from both Chinese tradition and Marx, tried to eliminate the mar- ket system from society.

Notably, the martial values of the Zhou gave way to the scholarly ideals of Confucianism, and while the highest class of administrators were sometimes trained as military leaders, their main claim to legitimacy was in their excellent mastery of history, ritual, and literary refinement. The greatest gains were intellectual. During the same century that Socrates and Plato were laying down the philosophical foundations for the West, and the Buddha was teaching a new path to salvation in India, Confucius was creating a civil religion for Chi- nese society.

Two Sages: Confucius and Laozi (Lao Tsu)

The times favored ruthless men of action, opportunists ready to use the arts of wu (war) for gain and glory. But everybody had to live in the chaotic condi- tions they created, including two men whose thoughtful reflections long out- lived the brief gains of conquest. Laozi (Lao Tsu) and Confucius, the two preeminent philosophers of ancient China, may have lived at roughly the same period. Their philosophies are opposite in many ways; Laozi’s is so different from Confucius’s that he seems almost Indian in his insistence on realities behind appearances and on relativizing society’s structures and demands.

The historian Sima Qian gives biographical sketches of both men. Some scholars have questioned whether Laozi was a single person or a composite of a number of hill-dwelling sages living disdainfully apart from society. The first part of his name, Lao, means “old and venerated”; the second half of his name, zi, means “master.” According to the Grand Historian, Laozi was the keeper of the imperial archives for the Zhou kings at Luoyang at the time when the emperor was becoming irrelevant and society was decaying around him. Sima Qian describes a visit by Confucius, and later followers record a number of their encounters, which turned out differently depending on who was telling the story. As the Zhou further declined, Laozi resolved to retreat to the moun- tains of the west, but at Hangu Pass the gatekeeper begged him: “As you are about to leave the world behind, could you write a book for my sake?” So he wrote a work in two books, setting out the meaning of the Way (dao or tao) and Virtue (de or te) in 5,000 characters, and then rode off and disappeared without a trace. The result was the Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) or “the classic of the Way and Virtue.”

Confucius lived to the east in the state of Lu (Shandong Province) where for a while he held high office. Sima Qian makes a tragic hero of Confucius as well as of himself in the autobiographical portion of the Shiji (Watson 1958:170). Both men were profound critics of the society of their times; one might use the modern term “dissident” to describe them. For while deeply loyal to Chinese civilization, they criticized—delicately—corruption, unjust punishment, and uncontrolled aggrandizement by political leaders. Sima Qian once unwisely defended a general who was in disfavor with the emperor. For

this offense he was sent to the “Room of the Silk Thread” and castrated. A man of his station would normally commit suicide under such humiliating cir- cumstances, but, as he explains in his history, he stayed alive in order to com- plete this great work.

In Lu Confucius attempted to implement good government by offering his services as advisor to regional rulers, but neighboring rivals plotted his over- throw. Entertainers and dancing girls were sent to distract the Duke of Lu from his responsibilities. Confucius resigned in disgust. For 10 years he and a band of disciples wandered from state to state seeking an opportunity in government service where they might apply their ideals, but they encountered opponents wherever they went whose arguments are recorded as lengthy speeches by Sima Qian. Toward the end of his life Confucius returned to Lu, resigned to political failure, and lived out his life peacefully writing and teaching his disciples. Only after his death, Sima Qian records with bitter irony, did Confucius achieve the respect he deserved. The Duke of Lu, who ignored him in life, sent an extrava- gant eulogy to be read at his funeral, recorded in its entirety by Sima Qian.

The immense Kong family, all descendants of Confucius, maintains a vast forest of a graveyard in Qufu, in Shan- dong Province, where graves go back to the Zhou dynasty. Confucius himself is buried in the hillock behind the stone column bearing his name (although during the Cultural Revolution, students dug it up looking for his bones but found nothing). In front of the inscription is a stone altar on which his descendants sacri- fice cattle, sheep, and pigs. His direct descendants in the main line now live in Taiwan, where Kung Tsui-chang, of the 79th generation, is the Sacrificial Official of Confucius.

Confucius and Laozi shared a contempt for their times but disagreed philo- sophically on what remedy was called for. Laozi was a mystic who attempted to relativize society much as Hindu renunciants did, holding that society was the sphere of manifest reality—metaphorized as “the ten thousand things”—but true reality was beyond: it was the source, the uncarved block, the way, the dao.

The Dao begot one. One begot two.

Two begot three.

And three begot the ten thousand things.

Confucius also spoke of the dao, but in a less metaphysical way than did Laozi, giving it less centrality in his philosophy, which focused instead on the morally perfectible person.

For Laozi, the relationship between the “uncarved block” (the dao) and the “ten thousand things” is or should be a natural, harmonious common identity. “The ten thousand things carry yin and embrace yang. They achieve harmony by combining these forces.” All manifest things form a unity with the dao; because they come from that Nameless Source, they model it and operate by its same principles. There should be no tension between them. However, Laozi did not view the ten thousand things as dangerous illusion, as Hindus did, but as good and natural manifestations of the dao. The only danger was in forget- ting the Source beyond; trouble comes from thinking the ten thousand things exist in and of themselves, disconnected from their Source.

What difference should this viewpoint make to the person living in the world? You should not forget that you, too, come from the dao:

Empty yourself of everything. Let the mind become still.

The ten thousand things rise and fall while the Self watches their return. They grow and flourish and then return to the Source.

Since the Self is also one of the ten thousand things, you, too, have a natural way of being:

Better stop short than fill to the brim.

Oversharpen the blade, and the edge will soon blunt. Amass a store of gold and jade, and no one can protect it. Claim wealth and titles and disaster will follow.

Retire when the work is done. This is the way of heaven.

Traditionally the 81 verses of the Daodejing were divided into two sections, the dao (1–37) and the de (38–81). De is usually translated as “virtue,” which in English has lost most of the Socratic impact it once had. De is written as a com- pound with, in part, the element for person and the element for heart; it implies inner strength of character, or even in the daoist view, a mystical store of power in the person of extraordinary virtue and wisdom. It is often used with the

founder of a new dynasty, or the sage-ancestors of society. In focusing on de in the second half of the Daodejing, attention turns to rulers and the state. “All things arise from dao. They are nourished by virtue (de).”

The role of rulers to use their de is depicted in verse 39:

These things from ancient times arise from one: The sky is whole and clear.

The earth is whole and firm. The spirit is whole and full.

The ten thousand things are whole and alive.

Kings and lords are whole, and the country is upright. All these are in virtue of [the de of] wholeness.

The clarity of the sky prevents its falling.

The firmness of the earth prevents its splitting.

The strength of the spirit prevents its being used up. The fullness of the valley prevents its running dry.

The growth of the ten thousand things prevents their dying out.

The leadership of kings and lords prevents the downfall of the country.

Therefore the humble is the root of the noble. The low is the foundation of the high.

Laozi does not question the right of rulers to exist but reminds them of the natural limits of their powers within a universe ordered by the dao. He trusts the dao in all things to make society function well: “If you want to be a great leader, you must learn to follow the dao. Stop trying to control. Let go of fixed plans and concepts, and the world will govern itself.” Or more simply and memorably, there is the image of the fish: “Governing a large country is like frying a small fish. You spoil it with too much poking.”

For Confucius, the central concept was not dao, but ren: man or humanity. “It is man that can make the dao great.” Ren is even less translatable than dao and de. It carries the sense of human moral perfectibility, of human potential, of the potent goodness of human beings who have been loved, nourished, and appropriately socialized. Confucius believed that humans are born with the potential for great goodness, and it is within a well-ordered society that human goodness flourishes.

The Analects of Confucius where his words are held to be preserved most authentically has nothing of the eloquence of the Daodejing. If one goes to the Analects—as to the Bible or Quran—expecting to hear the voice of divine authority, one will be disappointed. They are mostly pithy statements from a man who made no claims of divinity. Interpretation of his words was what later Confucian scholarship was all about. His ideas are most often embodied in little stories, such as the following:

17:6 Zizhang asked Confucius about humaneness (ren). Confucius said, “A person who can exercise these five things in his dealings with the world is acting humanely (ren).”

When Zizhang asked what “these five” were, Confucius said, “Cour- tesy, tolerance, trustworthiness, diligence, and kindness. Be courteous, and you avoid disrespect. Be tolerant, and you win over the multitude. Be trust- worthy, and you are trusted by others. Be diligent, and your work will go well. Be kind, and you will be able to employ others.” (Watson 2007:121)

The commonsense decency in this explanation of ren might mistakenly portray Confucius’s thought as little more than platitudes, which indeed is how he often comes across in older translations. But his thought is far more subtle, and far more Chinese, than merely an exotic version of the Golden Rule.

If ren is a state of moral awareness and cultivation, one achieves ren through li. Li is the distinctly Chinese concept giving Confucian thought the tremendous impact it had in Chinese civilization. The following passage from the Analects shows Confucius trying to explain the behavioral aspect of ren:

12:1 Yan Yuan asked about humaneness. The Master [Confucius] said, “To master the self and return to ritual (li) is to be humane (ren). For one day master the self and return to ritual (li), and the whole world will become humane (ren). Being humane (ren) proceeds from you yourself. How could it proceed from others?

Yan Yuan said: “May I ask how to go about this?”

The Master said, “If it is contrary to ritual (li), don’t look at it. If it is contrary to ritual, don’t listen to it. If it is contrary to ritual, don’t utter it. If it is contrary to ritual, don’t do it.” (Watson 2007:80)

What could li mean in the above passage? Translators attempt to make Confucius (or anyone being translated) speak English, but there are different “deep habits” of the two languages that make translation more difficult than just finding the right English word. So Confucius may sound pompous or the- atrical when a translation is too close to the original. In the case of li, the deep habits of English have changed in the last two centuries. The nineteenth-cen- tury translator, James Legge, translated li as “righteousness,” which gives the above passage a piety that sounds more Victorian than Chinese. (Try reading the passage again, inserting “righteousness” for li.) Still, righteousness is a valid sense of the meaning of Confucius.

More recent scholarship has focused on li as “ritual.” Western culture hardly knows what to make of a worldview in which “righteousness” and “ritual” could be squeezed into a single word, but that is exactly what makes the Confucian worldview so distinctive. Li, ceremonious conduct, is the behavioral expression of the inner moral quality of ren. “It regulates one’s daily life and interactions with others, channels emotions properly, distinguishes civilized patterns of behavior, and maintains the political order” (Chow 1994:10). When Confucius said in the passage quoted above, “to subdue oneself and return to li is ren,” he was suggest- ing that through self-governing by ritual, one transforms one’s own nature. Thus, ritual and righteous action are the same thing: a remedy for moral crisis.

The thing that a Westerner might object to in ritual—that its form is pre- scribed by society and the past—is what makes li so very Confucian. Westerners

are apt to describe ritual as “empty” and thus “inauthentic” to the self, or merely “going through the motions.” But for Confucians, the authority of society and the ancients is what constitutes morality, and the rituals that have come down from them to us are empowered by that authority and by Heaven itself. Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) said: “Ritual is the manifested authority of Heavenly principle.” There is no value in any “authentic selfhood” that does not come from these sources. The young may be born with the potential for goodness, but that poten- tial is not fulfilled in a vacuum. It is fulfilled in the moral forms given by society.

It is the rituals of social life that bind society together and bind individuals to the social order. It is the same li that structures society into a hierarchy of authority and power. “The order that li ought to bind together is not simply a ceremonial order—it is a sociopolitical order in the full sense of the term, involving hierarchies, authority, and power. The li must themselves support this authority and power” (Schwartz 1985:68). This fundamental and far-reaching system is summarized in the “Three Bonds”: official to monarch, son to father, and wife to husband. Li governed them all. Family and state were part of the same moral structure; all were ordained by Heaven. The man of virtue, who fulfilled li and ren, Confucius called by the term junzi (chun-tzu). Prior to Confu- cius, this was a title given to the hereditary nobility, a word meaning “prince,” but Confucius held that any morally cultivated person could become a junzi; thus it took on an individualistic, achieved sense. (Victorian translators used “gentleman,” another archaism to modern ears.) The junzi conducts himself morally and according to li in all his roles: as son, as father, as husband, as offi- cial. Women should also conduct themselves according to li, which limited their possibilities to daughter, wife, and mother. Much later, in the eighteenth century, Confucians began to obsess about women, and a cult of women’s purity arose, but Confucius himself had very little to say about women.

Confucius and Laozi provided the dominant strands coming down from the Eastern Zhou to later ages. It may have been the extraordinary influence of Sima Qian’s great history, the Shiji (Shi Chi), which kept them alive after the brief dark times to come in the Qin dynasty. Sima Qian brings their differences alive in stories, probably apocryphal, about their meeting. According to him, Confucius once went to Luoyang to consult with Laozi about the li of the ancients. Laozi scoffed that the ancients were now nothing but decaying bones. He said, “I’ve heard that merchants keep their goods buried deeply to make it look as if they have nothing, and that a junzi will pretend to be stupid. So give up your pretenses, your mannerisms, and your extravagant claims. They won’t do you any good. That’s my advice to you.” Confucius returned to his students and said: “I know that birds can fly and fish can swim and beasts can run. Snares can be set for things that run, nets for those that swim, and arrows for whatever flies. But dragons! I shall never know how they ride wind and cloud up into the sky. Today I saw Laozi. What a dragon!”

If, to Confucius, Laozi, with his lofty indifference to society, was an

ungraspable dragon, Confucius’s legacy was far greater. His teachings became

a civil religion that formed the moral foundation for Chinese civilization throughout the ages. But this did not happen immediately. His followers over the next several centuries kept his teachings alive by compiling his sayings and writing extensive commentaries on his insights. Eventually his tomb became a shrine, a center where lectures, festivals, sacrifice, and worship were conducted by his later followers, including princes and ministers from Han times onward, right up to the present. But before Confucian teachings came to dominate social values, a major political upheaval was to occur: the conquest of all the small, bitterly contesting domains and the founding of “China” as a centralized state under the genius of Qin Shihuang.

The First Emperor and the Unification of China

The First Emperor has always had a venerable place in Chinese history, but he came alive in our age in 1974 when members of an agricultural commune were digging a well not far from Xi’an. Thirteen feet down they were aston- ished to encounter a life-size terra-cotta warrior. This was not the first time farmers had encountered buried warriors. In 1914, as a farmer and his son were digging a well in the same place, a terra-cotta warrior emerged from the mud. As they kept digging, they broke through a watertight layer into an empty chamber, causing the water to suddenly drain away. Thinking they must have uncovered a demon, they dug it out and left it to decay in the elements. But by 1974 Chinese farmers were less worried about demons. Excavations began two years later, and eventually 1,100 warriors emerged into daylight after 22 centu- ries. They were the army of Qin Shihuang.

This site has been only partially excavated, awaiting better methods as archaeology continues to mature as a science, and also out of respect for the dead emperor. Probably an additional 5,000 soldiers are still buried. But of those already excavated, the world has been astonished. Two hundred are the vanguard of the emperor’s army, armed with crossbows. There were squads of spearmen, and files of archers, some resting on their knees. There are chariots, infantry, and cavalry, the horses and chariots at half-size scale. Most remark- ably, each face is unique, as if every soldier had stood for his own sculpture. This diversity, however, was the ingenuity of ancient Chinese craftsmen who worked from a number of separate molds for eyes, mouths, noses, beads, head shapes, and the like. By mixing and matching they made it look like thousands of distinct individuals. Qin Shihuang’s actual tomb under a nearby earthen pyr- amid has not been opened, though ancient historians described its contents:

The tomb was filled with models of palaces, pavilions, and offices, as well as fine vessels, precious stones, and rarities. Artisans were ordered to fix up crossbows so that any thief breaking in would be shot. All the country’s streams, including the Yellow River and the Yangzi, were reproduced in quicksilver [liquid flowing mercury] and by some mechanical means made to flow into a miniature ocean. The heavenly constellations were shown above and the regions of the earth below. (Topping 2013:5)

The army of Qin Shihuang was discovered by farmers digging a well in 1974. The terra-cotta army, more than 1,100 of them (and possibly 5,000 more), were a replacement for the living companions in the journey into the otherworld who accompanied earlier rulers. Qin himself remains respectfully unexcavated in his tomb nearby.

Who was the man for whom this astonishing tomb was built? By the third century B.C.E., the many competing small states had worn themselves down to six main survivors, each heavily armed and capable of fielding armies of 100,000 men. The western-most of these domains was the large state of Qin, which encompassed the old center of the Western Zhou. New ideas had been implemented in Qin to reduce the power of the hereditary aristocracy by creat- ing a bureaucracy of appointed officials dependent on the king for their power and survival. The ruler of Qin set out to conquer the other kingdoms, accom- plishing this by 221 B.C.E. He gave himself the name Qin (for his state) Shi (“First”) Huang (“Sovereign,” a replacement for wang, “king”), the First Emperor, and his name, became the name for China itself (Qin = China). He imagined he was founding a line of emperors to be numbered consecutively for- ever. By the Third Emperor, his dynasty was ripped apart by violence, but the title “huangdi” remained a title for the Chinese emperor until 1911.

He ruled only a little over a decade; so brief a reign might be dismissed as a historical blip, but he accomplished a restructuring of China whose basic out-

262 Part IV: East Asian Civilization

Chapter 7 China

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lines remained until the twentieth century. Determined to reduce the power of local lineages that might later form separatist regional states, he divided the realm into 36 districts. To administer these regions, he rejected the old aristoc- racy and instituted a meritocracy of men who had earned his respect by their work for him and had no power bases other than the emperor’s approval. This new class of administrators was appointed by the emperor and responsible to him. If they displeased him, they were easily removed. He attempted to solve the problem of the existing elites in the old feudal states by forcing 120,000 of these families to move to his capital. He saw that primogeniture—passing all a family’s property to its eldest son—was a means of accumulating wealth and consolidating power across a number of generations. To reduce such dangerous concentrations, he required families to divide their property when male chil- dren came of age (Chow 1994).

Those huge standing armies out in the old states were defanged by confis- cating and melting down their weapons, then using the metal to create 12 enor- mous human statues of 32 tons each. Believing that people needed clear laws, he codified them and had them inscribed on pillars. Believing laws were obeyed if penalties were severe, relatively light offenses (by current standards) brought flogging, mutilation, forced labor, castration, and decapitation. The emperor himself—as lawmaker, chief executive, and court of last appeal—was above and outside the law. He began the systematic registration of the entire population, encouraging families to adopt surnames by which they could be identified over subsequent generations; this new custom served to reinforce the patrilineal principle in kinship organization and made it easier to form descent groups based on patrilineality.

By the second century B.C.E., written Chinese had taken many forms, and texts from one place were often unreadable in another. To further unify his state, Qin Shihuang had the script regularized across the country, which accounts for the fact that today, however diverse Chinese “dialects” might be, all literate Chinese read the same script. But Qin Shihuang was determined they would not be reading the Confucian texts. Considering Confucius’s thought too soft-headed and dependent on individual goodness, he had these books burned. When scholars objected, several hundred were buried alive.

Recognizing the importance of trade and communications, he regularized weights and measures, built 5,000 miles of roads, and connected the various pieces of northern walls into the “Great Wall,” while destroying many walls that had divided the Chinese states. (This was only the forerunner of the Great Wall that tourists visit today, which was mainly built during the Ming dynasty.) The First Emperor was thus an organizational genius as well as a cruel ruler who has been remembered with both pride and horror. He accomplished in 221 B.C.E. what Chandragupta Maurya accomplished in India just one cen- tury earlier: the first imperial unification of the northern portion of the country. In subsequent centuries both countries would suffer “barbarian” (in India, mleccha) invasions from Central Asia and would be linked to each other by

Buddhist values and text-seeking monks and masters for centuries. Chandra- gupta’s grandson, Ashoka, became a model of the ideal Buddhist king through- out much of the Buddhist world, but his example carried little weight in China. Instead it is the conflicted model of Qin Shihuang, the organizational genius, whose governmental forms imposed on China persisted down to the overthrow the Qing dynasty in 1911 (Dull 1990:55).

To Confucian scholars who would later write the history of the brief Qin, its underpinning philosophy was the brutal and anti-intellectual “legalism” of proponents like Shang Yang, Li Si, and Han Feizi. This much maligned school of thought takes a pessimistic view of human nature and so endorses necessar- ily strict laws and brutal punishments. Confucian scholars would come to argue that human nature was good, and that self-cultivation and the study of the Five Confucian Classics would provide the scholar elites with the founda- tion to rule as paternalistic ministers and magistrates. The legalists had failed in their effort to crush Confucian teachings during the brief Qin, and in the Han, Confucianism would be enshrined as the dominant cultural tradition in Chinese dynasties and would remain so for over 2,000 years to come.

Emergence of the Confucian Elite (Shenshi)

Every large state struggles to keep control of its outer regions, while regional powers want autonomy to solve their own problems. Believing that the greatest danger comes from a powerful center, the founding fathers of the United States created constitutional limits through the tripartite structure of the federal government and by giving to states all powers not specifically allo- cated to the center. Even so, there are periodic ebbs and flows of power between Washington and the states. In China, historians have viewed the prob- lem the other way around; periods of social chaos are identified as those when the center is weak and the regions are strong.

After the excesses (and successes) of the Qin, the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.– 220 C.E.) had to backpedal a bit on the regional kingdoms, for regional loyalties had been partly responsible for the successful overthrow of the Qin. Since much of the old Zhou aristocracy had been destroyed, a new one emerged in the Han and the Tang dynasties out of the “meritocracy” instituted by the Qin. As part of the continuing struggle to limit the power of outlying territories, emperors began to raise up new councilors on the basis of merit and gave them authority over provinces. But especially in times of crisis, power regularly devolved back to the regional rulers. Pig farmers and slaves became imperial councilors and founded lineages, joining the new aristocracy. David Johnson (1977) writes about several hundred great aristocratic clans that composed the top stratum of society from the Qin to the Tang, some of whose genealogies were preserved over a thousand years at Dunhuang. Patricia Ebrey is able to trace the fortunes of the Cui clan of Boling for nearly a millennium from Tang times until they disappear from the scene in the early tenth century (Ebrey 1978).

Because the newly appointed bureaucrats regularly managed to turn them- selves into an aristocracy capable of eclipsing the emperor, Han emperors began maintaining private secretarial staffs to keep themselves informed. As this private secretariat slowly expanded into a central executive branch of the bureaucracy through the Han and Tang dynasties, many of the palace council- ors were scholars who came from the Hanlin Academy, which had been founded as a center of revived Confucian studies. This was a critical juncture in establishing Confucian scholarship as the basis of the future bureaucracy.

A new stage began with the Song dynasty (960–1279). The emperor’s pri- vate secretariat had continued to grow, with real power in the hands of five to nine grand councilors who supervised the burgeoning administration. As it grew it required an expanded pool of educated persons to fill it. The world’s first civil service system emerged to provide this talent. It was a three-stage pro- cess. Exams were given every three months at the prefecture level, for which youths all over China spent years studying, achieving this first degree around an average age of 24. Those who passed went on to the metropolitan exam in the capital. If you were good enough to pass that exam, the last stage was a pal- ace examination, occasionally even administered by the emperor himself. Every three years about 600 men were granted the most prestigious degree, the “Presented Scholar” (jinshi [chin-shih]). The average age for passing the second level was 30, and for passing the third level was 36—not unlike the BA, MA, and PhD degrees today. The examination system was thoroughly adopted in 605 by the brief Sui dynasty (581–618) and became a central element of the cul- ture and governance of every ensuing dynasty until the exam system’s abolition in 1905.

The social significance of these bureaucratic changes was immense. A whole new elite class emerged, whose philosophy was Confucianism (rujiao [ju chiao], in Chinese, meaning “the doctrine of the literati”). This elite was com- posed of two main privileged groups. One was the shen (official-gentry) who had passed all the exams, acquired degrees, and held government positions. These men were magistrates with typically county-level government posts, although the “law of avoidance” stipulated that a magistrate could not serve in his home county or province and could not even serve in a neighboring county of someone from the same home province. This was intended to prevent cor- ruption and nepotism. As the scholar class grew, the number of successful examinees far outstripped the actual available government posts to be filled; nevertheless, a classical education continued to be the hallmark of the gentry class. The other group consisted of learned men shi (shih, scholar-gentry) who were outside the government, often members of local landowning families. Handbooks prepared for magistrates recommended gaining the cooperation of shis in administering local areas, because they were not subject to the law of avoidance and were the link to common people; “the learned and virtuous scholars are exactly the ones to rely upon in persuading the people to follow the instructions of the officials,” wrote one handbook (Chang 1955:32). They

could also stir up trouble if annoyed. Together the shen and shi formed a large and influential class that vastly expanded over the next three dynasties—Song (960–1279), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1911).

The privileged status of the gentry was signified in their dress. They wore black gowns with blue borders, with various additional markers of rank, up to the nine pythons embroidered on the chest of officials of first rank. Only the gentry could wear sable, fox, or lynx. If a commoner needed to address a mem- ber of the gentry, he could check the buttons on his hat. The simple silver but- ton of the lower gentry required “Excellency” (lao ye). Gold buttons indicated holders of high academic degrees and titles; the wearer of a hat with a gold but- ton, a flower ornament, a ruby, and a pearl was an official of highest rank. All such titled officials were “Great Excellency” (da lao ye). Gentry privilege went beyond wardrobe; if they committed offenses, they could not be humiliated by corporal punishment. If a commoner injured another commoner, the penalty was 10 lashes; if a scholar-official, 70 lashes. Commoners could not testify against gentry in lawsuits. Scholar-officials paid lower taxes or were exempt altogether. They could not be required to perform corvée labor or engage in manual work.

This 1869 photograph by John Thomson, a pioneer in photojournalism, shows a scholar-official in elaborate dress.

Benefits of membership in the shenshi class were immense. Membership required passing at least the first level of examinations. And so sons were set to study hard to pass the examinations that led to official appointments. Because the families of scholar-officials benefited by shared status, wealth, and lineage prominence at local levels, tremendous pressure was placed on sons to succeed. The expansion of the class of scholars was assisted by the invention of the book made with cheap paper and woodblock printing.

We know something about life in the schools of Song China (Lee 1977). When a boy was five or six his family decided whether he was bright enough to warrant the expense of a classical (i.e., Confucian) education. (Girls could not sit for examinations. We return later to the life women led during these years.) The rich hired tutors. Sons of poor relatives might be allowed to study with these rich boys, and sometimes an extended family or lineage group would pool money in support of an especially promising boy’s education. The tutors were often young men further along the examination path. An advanced scholar who needed an income might rent a room or set up in a Buddhist tem- ple and recruit pupils from local families. Men who failed the later stages sometimes made a career of tutoring younger boys. There were a few govern- ment-sponsored elementary schools, such as one in Kaifeng with more than a thousand pupils.

Of course, most peasant boys went straight to the fields, and sons of old gentry families had some advantages over a first-generation scholar, much like today in the United States. Sons of scholar-officials might travel with their fathers and inherit their libraries. But in the end, it depended on the hard work, determination, and abilities of the boys themselves. They lived lives devoted to examinations. Men might sit for the examinations a dozen times or more before finally passing or giving up. A popular nineteenth-century novel describes a large lineage in which only two of 60 to 70 brothers and cousins entertained guests; all the rest stayed behind closed doors, studying for exams (Chang 1955:171).

All the exams were devoted to the Confucian Classics. It was as if the sec- retary of the interior, of treasury, of state, the state governors, and all public officials were appointed to these positions based on their expertise in the writ- ings of Plato and Aristotle. The system produced generalists, not specialists; what was wanted to govern the state were junzi (chun-tzu), morally cultivated gentlemen, not experts in irrigation, international relations, or commerce. “A gentleman is not a pot,” reads one of Confucius’s obscurer statements. He meant that a junzi is not trained to a particular purpose (a pot) but is a general- ist. As Stephen Owen wrote:

The same question resurfaced in the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s, transformed into the “Red versus expert” controversy, which asked whether public projects should be managed by good communists or by specialists. To the surprise of no one who knew the Chinese tradition, it was concluded that “not pot” communists would be the sounder choice. (Owen 1997:38)

Much as the middle class (or bourgeoisie) that emerged in the West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on a capitalist economic base constructed a new set of moral, religious, and cultural values, so the gentry developed its own moral, political, and educational preoccupations. It came in the form of a social conservatism seeking to discover and restore ancient moral practices, particularly in the domain of kinship. These were sufficiently new, and suffi- ciently based in Confucian ideas, that the Song transformations have come to be called Neo-Confucianism. Two features of Neo-Confucianism will interest us here: the new interpretations that linked personal and family morality to the state and the return to emphasis on li in family and lineage ideology. Those changes were triggered by a number of factors, but we will focus on two of them: the Buddhist challenge to Confucianism and the Mongol and Manchu challenge to Chinese cultural superiority.

The Buddhist Challenge to Confucian Civilization

It is unknown who first brought Buddhist ideas to China, but the earliest positive evidence of its existence there comes from the first century C.E. It is fairly certain that the news of this foreign faith would have come from the oasis towns of Central Asia, where Buddhism took root very early and where many important monasteries flourished, above all at Dunhuang. According to tradi- tional accounts, the Han Emperor Ming woke up one morning and called his advisors to him. A “golden man,” a divine being, had appeared to him in his sleep. This must be the Buddha, his advisors marveled. So Emperor Ming sent envoys to India who returned with two Indian masters, a white horse, and the Sutra in Forty-two Chapters. They founded the Monastery of the White Horse at Luoyang, where it exists to this day.

In its first few centuries at the end of the Han dynasty, Buddhism was weak and poorly understood. The Three Jewels of Buddhism—Buddha, dharma, and sangha—were known, but in a simplistic way only. It was a highly sophisti- cated and varied philosophy, but foreign to Chinese assumptions. India was very far away, and there was only a single text, not well translated. Initially, Buddhism was treated like some form of Daoism with its emphasis on purity, simplicity, and nonaction. But as the Han began its disintegration because of, as usual, the rise of regional powers that eclipsed the central dynasty, Buddhism came to have broader appeal. For the next four centuries, a variety of small and local dynasties came and went, while the “barbarian” Tuoba Turks founded the Northern Wei dynasty in the old heartland with their capital at Luoyang.

In both the southern Chinese dynasties and in Northern Wei, Buddhist monasteries sprang into existence. In 400, there were 17,000 monasteries and 80,000 monks and nuns in the south. In the north, Buddhism was even more successful: there were 30,000 monasteries and a million monks and nuns. The “great age of Buddhism” is the fifth to ninth centuries—Northern Wei, Sui, and the first half of the illustrious Tang dynasty—when emperors themselves converted to Buddhism and lavishly patronized Buddhist monasteries, carv-

ings, works of art, and translations of scriptures. The Tuoba Turks of Northern Wei embraced Buddhism vigorously, partly as a challenge to the Confucian values of the civilization they sought to emulate and control. These imperial sponsors, and later ones, brought to China the Indian practice of hollowing out sanctuaries in steep cliffs: Dunhuang was one example; the vast stone images of Buddha carved into the hills outside Luoyang were another.

It was, inevitably, a series of traveling monks—Indian, Chinese, and Cen- tral Asian—who did the intellectual work of making the full complexity of Indian Buddhism understood in China. Faxian went to India from 399 to 414 in search of texts he was certain must exist in so learned a land. Although he found a thriving Buddhist culture in which kings respectfully bowed down before monks—something that would never happen in China—he found very few texts. Instead, Indian masters orally transmitted the dharma to their follow- ers. But he learned Sanskrit, one of the few Chinese ever to master that difficult language, and managed to bring a few translations back. In the meantime, the great translator Kumarajiva arrived in Chang’an in 401 from Kucha in Central

Beginning in 493 B.C.E., Chinese emperors earned merit by sponsoring rock-carved images of the Buddha near the old capital of Luoyang. The colossal Buddha in the distance is the grandest of over 2,345 images carved into the rock cliff along the Yi River. Many of the images, carved in deep relief, were hacked away from the rock and carried off by European collectors. Fortunately this one, the grandest of all (the face is said to have been modeled after Empress Wu), was too huge to steal.

Asia. He introduced Madhyamaka philosophy and joined forces with disciples of the Chinese monk Dao’an in the greatest effort of translation in history. A single translation often took four people to divide the work: an Indian monk to orally recite the Sanskrit; another to write it down; another to translate the San- skrit into oral Chinese; and a fourth to record the text in written Chinese. When Xuanzang returned from India in the seventh century, there was another round of vigorous translation, for by then there were many written texts in India for him to collect. By the eighth century there was a canon of over a thou- sand Buddhist texts in good translations, which emperors ordered to be copied by official bureaus set up for the purpose. This became easier after the eighth- century invention of printing. It was first invented to reproduce charms and images cheaply and quickly, but its potential was quickly grasped. In 972 the first printing of the entire Buddhist canon was done by imperial order. The Dia- mond Sutra of 898 still exists in the British Museum (see chapter 2).

Religions grow out of the soil of indigenous social patterns and do not transplant easily. In China, the integration of religion and the sociopolitical order had been refined over a millennium. Buddhism was, first of all, a barbar- ian religion filled with bizarre notions. What did an Indian sage, this Buddha, have to teach a civilization that had Confucius and Laozi? Confucius had placed all emphasis on human life in society. Each person had one life to live, to be fulfilled in the community of family, lineage, and the state. He had refused to speculate on the gods, on Heaven, on the fate of the soul, or whether ancestors were actually sentient and capable of enjoying the gifts that must nev- ertheless be offered them. But here were Buddhists, denying the existence of all the here and now, proclaiming the utter unreality of all phenomena, plus a host of other outlandish ideas.

Monasticism was particularly un-Chinese. A monk was guilty of cutting off the family line, a sin against the ancestors and the height of social irresponsibil- ity. The exemplary Indian story of Prince Sudana shocked Chinese. Prince Sudana, like the Buddha himself, renounced his kingdom by giving his father’s property away, giving the war elephants to the enemy, and putting his wife and son into the care of others. The Chinese viewed this as not filial, not li, and not ren. Interpreters tried to explain: Sudana realized the world is transitory and wealth and properties do not truly belong to the self, which, incidentally, does not really exist, either. By giving all away and seeking enlightenment, he reached the point of becoming a Buddha. Then, through his enlightenment, he brought salvation to his parents, brothers, wife, and son. Is this not the epitome of filial devotion and humaneness?

The idea of reincarnation was particularly troublesome. The Chinese felt the soul was too tied to the body to survive its death. Further, the idea of rein- carnation was a big problem for ancestor worship; how could an ancestor return as someone else’s descendant? The concept of the Pure Land eventually solved that problem; instead of reincarnation into a new existence, one was reincarnated into the Pure Land, Heaven, a suitable abode for ancestors.

Buddhism in its second 500 years in India had developed ideas that made it appeal more to the masses than did earlier Buddhism. The Mahayanist notion of salvation through the intercession of bodhisattvas had powerful appeal to all classes. The theory that merit could be transferred from one person to another made this possible. Bodhisattvas could compassionately bestow some of their enormous stores of merit on their devotees. In China, the most beloved of all bodhisattvas was and is Guanyin, the beautiful Goddess of Mercy, portrayed in thousands of paintings and images. Her name means “taking heed of the

Guanyin of the Southern Sea. The Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art, Kansas City, MO.

Purchase: William Rockhill Nelson Trust, 34-10.

The most popular bodhisattva in China is certainly Guanyin, the Goddess of Mercy. She is the Chinese form of Avalokiteshvara, who probably merged with a popular Daoist goddess to become the most beloved bodhisattva in China.

sound,” the one who hears the cries of the suffering world and responds with compassion. In India she was the male bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara who merged with an early Daoist goddess to become Guanyin. In Japan she became Kannon. The other well-known Chinese Buddha, the slightly ridicu- lous “laughing Buddha,” developed in late imperial times. He began as the Buddhist messiah Maitreya who became identified with a tenth-century monk named Budai (Pu-tai), “Hemp Sack,” who had claimed to be an incarnation of Maitreya. “Hemp Sack” replaced Maitreya in the popular imagery of the pot- bellied Buddha who resembles the Hindu elephant-god Ganesh more than he does the great Buddha-to-come. Perhaps due to his statue’s ubiquity in the West, the plump tenth-century monk is often incorrectly identified in popular culture as being the Gautama Buddha, or Siddhartha Gautama, the original “awakened one” and first teacher of Buddhism, who of course lived 1,500 years earlier.

The Tiantai (Tien-t’ai) sect made the Lotus Sutra the most beloved of all Buddhist texts in East Asia. Though the central narrative of the Lotus Sutra is the Buddha Sakyamuni revealing a new, more authentic truth, the text was not written in India but in Central Asia some time before 250 B.C.E. This new truth is that there is only one path to salvation, not three as previously revealed. The one path lies in the heretofore unrevealed fact that everyone—not just monastic virtuosos—have the Buddha-nature and all will be saved and become Buddhas. Nirvana gets redefined; it is not extinction of existence at death, but extinction of ignorance in this life; that is, Enlightenment. And this enlightenment comes in the simplest of ways, by casting one’s faith in the Buddha. Long passages of the Lotus Sutra describe the people who have already received Buddhahood. There are the traditional hard ways: learning the law, practicing charity, per- fecting self-discipline, enduring forbearance and humiliation. But there are sim- pler ways: boys at play, making Buddha pagodas in the sand; installing Buddha images in the home; embroidering Buddha pictures; or singing the glory of the Buddha, even with a small sound. The simplicity of these teachings brought Buddhism to the common people and made the Lotus Sutra an icon as much as a sacred text.

One other development needs mention, since it became so important when borrowed by the Japanese. Early in the sixth century a mysterious Indian med- itation master named Bodhidharma visited China. Whatever it was he taught quickly blended with a fundamental Daoist idea: that ultimate truth is beyond words. “The Dao that can be told is not the eternal Dao.” But how can one reach that ineffable truth beyond words, beyond rationality, beyond the ten thousand things that distract us? Obviously all the words printed in books, even sacred ones, are beside the point; in fact, they obstruct the truth. Bizarre new forms of meditation were devised to break through the constructed world of words and reason to reach the intuitive, wordless, “no-mind” reality beyond. They meditated on paradoxes and non sequiturs in an effort to unravel the intellect in a sudden, explosive, obliterating breakthrough to radical unity of

272 Part IV: East Asian Civilization

Chapter 7 China

271

being. Ironically, the anti-intellectualism of this approach was of great interest to intellectuals, while uneducated people found it unfathomable. Known as Chan Buddhism in China, it still exists and has tremendous cross-cultural appeal today as Japanese Zen Buddhism.

Despite the glory days of Buddhism during the Sui and the Tang dynasties, Buddhism eventually began to fade. It never really stood a chance against Con- fucianism. It did not end because of persecution, though there were major per- secutions in 446, 574, and 845 when stupas were destroyed, monasteries were looted, and monks and nuns were “secularized” or killed. Even at its height, and with the support of many emperors, state and sangha had a natural antipa- thy. For one thing, the conceptual structure of the Chinese state did not leave room for institutions existing outside it, as Buddhist monasticism claimed to do. The life of idleness and begging for food was much criticized as parasitic on society; monasteries were criticized for hoarding copper, silver, and gold in rit- ual objects. The monasteries amassed enormous wealth through gifts from rich donors; they owned huge tracts of land that produced income through the labor of temple serfs and slaves. Using this wealth for moneylending and pawn- broking, monks who had taken vows of poverty played a significant role in the development of banking and established commercial enterprises like oil presses and water-powered mills. In Tang times Buddhists responded to these criti- cisms with practical ways of enacting Buddhist compassion; they founded clin- ics and hospitals, provided aid for the poor, and distributed food in famine times. Though the vinaya rules forbade manual labor, gathering firewood and drawing water became a central feature of Chan Buddhism.

With all this wealth, and close ties to emperors and rich patrons, it was inevitable that the sangha would be used for political purposes. Most notori- ous, perhaps, was Empress Wu, the only woman in all of Chinese history to rule as the supreme monarch. She spent seven years after her husband’s death inventing ways to justify her succession (rather than her sons’), then finally did rule from 690 to 705. First, she had a white stone “discovered” in the Luo River that, when cracked open, contained an inscription: “A sage Mother shall come to rule mankind; her rule shall bring eternal prosperity.” She then installed her commoner lover as the abbot of the venerable White Horse Mon- astery. He proceeded to recruit a thousand bodyguards whom he ordained as monks. As abbot, her lover proclaimed that the Great Cloud Sutra had prophe- sied the reincarnation of the Bodhisattva Maitreya as a woman, who would bring an era of peace and plenty. “All her subjects will give their allegiance to this woman as the successor to the imperial throne. Once she has taken the Right Way, the world will be awed into submission.” She immediately ordered a Great Cloud Temple to be built in every prefecture of the empire (Wills 1994:142–143). Although Empress Wu appears to have been a good adminis- trator, she was loathed by Confucians for the intolerable innovation of a woman ruling, executing her competitors, having affairs in old age just like a man, and of course her patronage of Buddhism. That she could manipulate

Is this Empress Wu? The main figure at the Luoyang caves is said to have been modeled after the

empress, who devised prophe- sies about herself as a “sage Mother come to rule man- kind” and a reincarnation of the bodhisattva Maitreya.

Buddhist symbols so boldly and successfully was simply one more thing wrong with Buddhism.

In late Tang times, the state was impoverished by civil war and turned to the wealth of Buddhist monasteries to replenish the treasury. At the same time, a more fundamental shift was taking place toward older Chinese values, Con- fucian ones. As Zurcher writes:

[Buddhism’s] decline was a gradual process—it petered out and slowly lost its intellectual vitality and creativity, and its social status, in a world in which the educated elite more and more turned away from it, and in which the best minds were attracted to the examination hall rather than to the monastery. (1984:205)

Buddhism continued to function more marginally in Chinese society. The theme of the messiah, Maitreya, was rich in revolutionary possibility. Secret sects formed, like the “White Lotus Society,” which played a role in the down- fall of the Yuan dynasty. Martial monk-heroes, such as the kung-fu monks of the Shaolin Monastery in Henan, became a theme in popular lore (bequeathed to modern action films), and came close to toppling the Qing dynasty at the begin- ning of the nineteenth century. However, even though the People’s Republic of China has liberalized its policies toward religion, most observers of China today view the prospects of a strong comeback of Chinese Buddhism as unlikely.

Neo-Confucianism

In the eleventh century Zhu Xi wrote in the part of Family Rituals devoted to funerals:

Do not perform Buddhist services. . . . If heaven’s palace does not exist, then that’s that. If it does, then men of virtue will ascend there. If hell does not exist, then that’s that; if it does, then inferior men will enter it. Contempo-

raries, when a man dies, pray to the Buddha. This is assuming one’s parent was not a person of virtue but an inferior person who had accumulated bad deeds and sins. Could there be a less kind way to treat one’s parents? And if in fact one’s parents had accumulated bad deeds and sins, how could they escape the consequences by your bribing the Buddha? (Ebrey 1991:79–80)

That Zhu Xi wrote his famous Family Rituals at all was part of the Confu- cian backlash. Patricia Ebrey, the translator, describes the work as “a militantly Confucian book to combat Buddhist rites and other non-Confucian practices.” The glitz of Buddhist culture—all the temples, images and icons, works of art, and showy festivals—prompted a Confucian response. Confucianism had mostly dwelt in the home, in public courtesies, in the texts, the examination halls, and in the discourse of the intellectual class. But in 630, at a time when there were well over 50,000 Buddhist monasteries, Emperor Tang Taizong ordered all counties and prefectures to erect temples for the worship of Confu- cius. The most famous one of all was at Qufu, in Confucius’s own hometown in Shandong Province. In 1684, Emperor Kangxi described visiting Qufu and meeting Confucius’s 64th-generation descendant, Kong Shangren, and being shown the wall where Confucius’s ninth-generation descendant hid the Clas- sics when Qin Shihuang burned all the books. During the Cultural Revolution, Qufu would have been destroyed by the Red Guards but for the intervention of Premier Zhou Enlai. It is once again a place of pilgrimage, now for “Confucian Capitalists” from Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. It would be as great a mistake to write off Confucianism in the twenty-first century as it was in the seventh century.

During Kangxi’s visit early in the Qing dynasty, Confucius’s descendants had a problem that was a typical preoccupation of the gentry during the seven- teenth century. They had maintained their large lineage ties so diligently for so many generations that they had now run out of burial space in the family cem- etery. There was simply no room to expand into lands registered to others (Spence 1974). The Kong family was the classic great lineage idealized by the Confucian elite throughout the centuries, although the actual existence of such lineages varied tremendously throughout Chinese history. Beginning with the Song dynasty, it had another period of flourishing, thanks to Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals. This movement was fueled during the Song as an answer to Buddhism, and during the Ming and Qing as an answer to successful invasions by Mon- gols and Manchus.

It may be a little hard to understand how China, at a cultural peak during the Song dynasty, could have been so easily conquered, first by the Jurchen Jin, then by the Mongols (1279). Chinese intellectuals, looking back on their own history during the Ming and Qing, also brooded about it but came to a different conclusion than modern historians. For the latter, the explanation, or part of it, lies in the emphasis on high culture, on virtue, and on peace in the thought of the shenshi and in the disdain in which wu, force or military prowess, was held. Warfare and military might was what had always troubled society from antiq-

uity on; the well-ordered, ideal society was a society at peace. The military was so devalued by the Confucian elite that it does not even have a place in the four- class structure: shi (scholar), nong (farmer), gong (artisan), shang (merchant). The brightest young men would not dream of going into the military; they studied for exams to become scholar-officials. Even the great technological invention of gunpowder, permitting tossing small bombs and fire lances at the nomadic enemy, was never integrated in a larger military strategy capable of keeping them out of China. All this meant that China was easy prey to aggressive tribal societies whose nomadic and hunting lifestyles made them excellent warriors.

China’s Yuan dynasty had its roots in a great gathering of Mongol tribes on the Kerulan River in Central Asia in 1206. One of the Mongol chiefs, Genghis Khan, was confirmed as “universal ruler” over all the Mongol tribes, the Mon- gol equivalent of Qin Shihuang’s great unification in 221 B.C.E. (see chapter 3). Genghis Khan’s grandson, Kublai Khan, conquered China and established the Yuan dynasty. Needing a capital more central to his empire, Beijing in the north of modern China became the seat of Yuan power, laid out in the classic style of the Chinese imperial capitals at Chang’an and Luoyang, and remains the capital to this day.

The Mongol Empire was a religiously diverse place; there were Muslims, Buddhists, Nestorian Christians, Jews, and now Confucians. Kublai Khan embraced Tibetan Buddhism but was tolerant of other faiths. Confucianism now came to have a strong ethnic component; it was the “faith” of the Han Chinese. Given the Confucian paradigm of the civilized state that left warfare and military might out of the scheme, perhaps it is not surprising that many scholar-officials went to work with great diligence and loyalty to their Mongol sovereigns. Yes, they hated them; they were “pockmarked and foul-smelling”; one did not want to be downwind of them. Yet, as de facto rulers, they had the Mandate of Heaven. John Langlois (1978) describes the life of one high-rank- ing official, Yu Ji (Yu Chi), in great detail. He helped the nine Mongol rulers whom he served understand the Confucian Classics, hoping this would lead to better administration of the realm. He covered over an ugly struggle among three brothers for succession to the throne by drafting an edict announcing the winner, laying “a polished veneer of Chinese civility and brotherly deference on the surface of the violent power struggle that had taken place.” Ultimately, it was not the gentry but the peasants who brought down the Mongols; peasant rebels led the movement that overthrew the Yuan dynasty after only 88 years; the Ming, a Han Chinese dynasty, would survive 276 years, before again being severely destabilized by peasant rebellions. Manchus (more barbarians) were invited from the northeast to Beijing to throw the rebels out, but decided to stay

and found the Qing dynasty.

Scholars analyzing their own history were perplexed: Why did barbarians so easily conquer China? From the Song through the Qing, situations were somewhat different and a variety of analyses were put forward, but a major theme of all of them was “nativist,” a return to the morality and the social struc-

tures of antiquity. The Confucian revival that began during the Song dynasty reached its peak in the wholesale social reform movement led by the gentry dur- ing the Ming (1368–1644) and the Qing (1644–1911). This movement, imagined as a return to the social morality of antiquity, required a flurry of scholarship to discover what morality had actually been during the Zhou and Han dynasties. What were the “authentic rituals” of the sages? It came to focus on three core values: filial devotion expressed in family and lineage rituals, loyalty to the mon- arch, and wifely fidelity that became a cult of female purity (Chow 1994).

The Confucian Model for Kinship and Gender

The Chinese family system has had to respond to innumerable pressures over the centuries, not least in the turbulent decades since the 1949 founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Any kinship system is molded by a vari- ety of forces. Family is, at bottom, the basic social unit of human survival; it must be an all-purpose institution for reproduction, child rearing, emotional support, and care for the elderly. During most of human history it has been the basic unit of production and consumption, playing a fundamental economic role. Through marital ties, it links groups together. It may be a family militia in troubled times. Thus, economic, military, and political factors are conditions families must respond to by formulating strategies for survival, for prosperity, and for achievement of prestige. Finally, family cultures are products of specific historic ideologies; families receive from the past sets of ideals—kinship ideolo- gies—for organizing biological relationships. These ideals may or may not be realizable in particular periods under particular circumstances, and they can change over time. It is essential to understand the ideals that people hold and try to emulate, as well as the conditioning factors that determine the empirical shape of families at given historical moments.

In China, patterns for organizing kinship have been decisively shaped by Confucian ethics. The moral imperative of xiao (hsiao), filial devotion, carried obligations between fathers and sons further in China than perhaps in any other Asian society. Even in Japan, to which these concepts were carried, loy- alty to one’s lord might require a suicide that left one’s parents destitute. But for Confucians in China, as Gilbert Rozman (1991) has put it, the debt to one’s parents can never be repaid. The debt goes on after death, manifested in the child’s obligation to parents to produce at least one son to continue the family line and to revere them as ancestors with gifts, with reports of current goings- on in the family, and, especially among common folk, with invitations to return in spirit form during the holidays.

The ideology of the family was decidedly patriarchal in that control of resources and the structure of authority were in male hands. Patricia Ebrey identifies four key features of Chinese patriarchy: (1) The conception that prop- erty, especially land, belongs to the family, not the individual. (2) This property belongs to the men of the family and must be divided equally among brothers,

Plate 1 Seismic activity along tectonic plate boundaries (see Box 1.2, p. 17).

Plate 2 The Fourteenth Dalai Lama. The exiled Dalai Lama, head of Tibetan

Buddhism and believed to be an incarnation of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara, teaches from a throne in Bodh Gaya, India (see pp. 102–104).

Plate 3 Tibetan Buddhists listen to Dalai Lama. Crowds of Tibetan Buddhists listen to teachings of the Dalai Lama in Leh, India. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army invaded Tibet in 1950; the Dalai Lama fled in 1959 (see pp. 102–104).

Plate 4 Miao in Guizhou, China. There are more than 9 million Miao in China, the fifth largest of China’s official 56 minzu (nationalities). This is more than Uighurs (8 million) and

Tibetans (5.4 million), though all are overshadowed by the 1.16 billion Han (see pp. 111–115).

Plate 5 Ram Lila performance, Mumbai. “Ram Lila” is a folk reenactment of the Ramayana story where actors play all the main roles and scenes may move around a number of sites. Afterward, the actors are revered as the gods they are portraying. Here, Ram, Sita, and Hanuman are worshipped at the end of a recent performance (see p. 160).

Plate 6 Krishna and Arjuna. The gods seated in the clouds observe the savagery of cousins killing cousins.

Prince Arjuna (with bow and arrow in chariot) has been reassured by Krishna (the charioteer) that “they are already slain by me”

(see Box 5.3, pp. 161–163).

Plate 7 “What Should Happen But Never Does.”

This contemporary Mithila painting deals with a very modern social problem. A young wife is about to be murdered by her husband and mother-in-law when neighbor women arrive to rescue and avenge her (see Box 5.8, p. 187).

Plate 8 Confucian scholars. Painting on silk by Ch’iu Ying, Ming dynasty, sixteenth century. Young Confucian scholars await the posting of the results of their civil service examination (see pp. 263–267).

Plate 9 Thousand Hands Guanyin at Lushan Temple, Yuelu Mountain, Changsha.

Guanyin (aka Avalokiteshvara) is the most variable of all the bodhisattvas. Images portray particular stories, such as this one about princess Miaoshan who attempted to cure her sick father, offering up her eyes and arms for a medicine. She was transformed into the Thousand Armed Guanyin, and vowed never to leave the world until all suffering has ended (see p. 270 for another version of Guanyin).

Plate 10 Khoo Kongsi clanhouse and temple, Penang, Malaysia.

Although the PRC made every attempt to stamp out the large clans in China, they have survived in many Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. This is the richly ornamented clanhouse for descendants of the Khoo clan, wealthy seventeenth-century Chinese traders. The clanhouse was built in 1851 and rebuilt in 1906 when the Khoos were at their peak of wealth and influence (see pp. 276–285).

Plate 11 Chinese clan jetties, Penang, Malaysia. Poorer members of a handful of Chinese clans still live on the jetties once built to receive trade goods (see pp. 276–285).

Plate 12 Scroll of the Lotus Sutra, twelfth-century Japan. Sutra copying became an art form and

an act of piety in China and Japan. This hand scroll was dyed indigo and inscribed in gold and silver ink. It is unrolled and read from right to left, with a frontispiece at the beginning. This is from the Devadatta chapter of the Lotus Sutra, in which the dragon girl gives a jewel to the Buddha and instantly achieves Buddhahood. (She is at center with rays exuding from her.)

(See pp. 314–318.)

Plate 13 Genji Viewing Snow from a Balcony, 1867. A woodblock print on paper by Toyohara Kunichika. The tenth- century novel of life in the Heian court, The Tale of Genji by Murasaki Shikibu was a popular source of themes for Japanese artists working in many styles (see pp. 320–325).

Plate 14 Engraving of Angkor Wat from Exploration de l’Indo-Chine, by Louis Delaporte, Cambodia.

The French launched an expedition in 1866 exploring the Mekong River from its delta to its source in China. This took them through the many Cambodian temple complexes. Louis Delaporte, a young artist, created this engraving of Angkor Wat as it might have looked before it fell into ruins (see pp. 386–388).

Plates 15 and 16 Two Views of Cambodian Temples: Ta Prohm Temple [top] and Angkor Wat Complex [bottom]. The jungles have torn apart temple complexes that once attempted to replicate the eternal Himalayan abode of the Hindu gods (see pp. 386–388).

Plate 17 The Emerald Buddha, Wat Phra Kaew, Bangkok. A properly Buddhist royal city must copy elements of the Buddhist heartland in India onto local soil, which then protects the state. The Emerald Buddha was passed from capital to capital until being installed in Bangkok by the new Chakri dynasty in 1784. Three times a year, the Thai king washes and changes the clothing of the Buddha, here in rainy season attire (see pp. 394–395)

Plate 18 Rumah Uluyong, a traditional Iban longhouse, Kapit, Sarawak, Borneo, Malaysia. Many Iban continue to live in longhouses like this one. Longhouses are actually individual family apart- ments with a long connecting verandah (see pp. 417–422).

Plate 19 Mortuary rites, Borneo. Secondary treatment of the body, a year or so after death, when the bones are removed from the coffin, washed, wrapped, and returned to the longhouse for final ceremonial honoring, during which the soul is directed to its

final abode in the ancestral village

(see pp. 418–421).

Plate 20 Map of British Empire, 1886. At the peak of empire, this map portrays Britain’s various colonies in pink and the empire as a goddess seated on a world throne. Native peoples, exoticized and eroticized, pay tribute. The map is an example of aesthetic Orientalism (see pp. 439–441).

if divided at all. (3) Fathers have legal authority over women and children, including the right to arrange the marriages of their children, sell their children, and dispose of their labor. (4) These structures are underwritten by the notion that women are morally and intellectually less capable than men and therefore must be under male control (Ebrey 1990).

The hierarchies that characterized Chinese society at large began in the family; everyone had a unique place in a domestic hierarchy whose two orga- nizing principles were age and gender. Xiao applied proportionately to relations between elder and younger siblings. Respect is due to anyone older than one- self, including the twin who was born five minutes ahead of you; kinship termi- nology distinguishes elder brother and younger brother, with many Chinese terms for the English “cousin,” “aunt,” “uncle,” and other relations, depending on gender and seniority. Traditionally and ideally, all the sons of a man con- tinue to live with him in a patrilocal joint family until he dies, at which time the sons divide the property equally and the process starts over again. This family, called jia, thus has a natural life cycle: a man and his wife have their children, hopefully many; as sons reach adulthood, wives are brought in for them, while daughters are married out to other households. Eventually a number of nuclear families are all living together in one large, well-ordered, and clearly hierarchi- cal household. The men are a tightly bonded unit of fathers and sons. The women who begin as strangers brought in from the outside to share their lives as mothers- , sisters- , and daughters-in-law become the loyal and fertile moth- ers of the lineage and eventually ancestresses as well.

The benefits of such great households were many. They shared a common

budget with the expenses of a single household. The eldest male was the chief executive officer of this family corporation, using the capital of several sons’ labors to make investments and expenditures for the welfare of the whole. This included a great house with four connected wings around a central courtyard, perhaps double-storied as well, allowing apartments for each married couple and their children. There was certain to be an ancestral shrine in a prominent location in the main hall. The fund of family capital may be used to buy land, invest in a business, educate the sons, provide dowries for all the daughters, support servants to do much of the labor, and perhaps provide an unofficial second “wife,” a concubine, for the head of household. Such a family, fulfilling the Confucian ideal, was what most Chinese aspired to throughout the ages; however, empirical studies suggest that this ideal was never within reach for most Chinese families. The ideal was far more frequently achieved in gentry families than in peasant families. If a family was poor, sons had to leave in search of work; a daughter might be sold into servanthood or given as a child- bride to another poor family who would bear the cost of feeding her to ensure a farm son would get a wife at all. Mortality rates, alone, were stacked against the ideal Confucian great family; the chances of a couple surviving to old age with several adult sons and many little grandchildren who survived the perils of infancy were a demographic long shot.

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Ancestor Worship

Ancestor worship was not left to custom by the shenshi. Detailed manuals pre- scribed each movement, garment, offering, and placement of ritual objects. Most authoritative of all was Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals written in the twelfth century. According to French missionary Jean-Francois Foucquet (1665–1741), it was to be found in every home in China, second only to the Analects in popularity (Ebrey 1991). The purpose of family rituals, according to Zhu Xi, is to “preserve status responsibilities” and to “give concrete form to love and respect through cappings [at age 20, an adulthood ceremony], weddings, funerals, and ancestral rites.” He hoped, he wrote in the preface, that this book might “make a small con- tribution to the state’s effort to transform and lead the people” (Ebrey 1991:4).

The book begins with detailed instructions on construction of the ancestral hall in the home.

When a man of virtue builds a house his first task is always to set up an offering hall to the east of the main room of his house. For this hall four altars to hold the spirit tablets of the ancestors are made; collateral relatives who died without descendants may have associated offerings made to them there according to their generational seniority. Sacrificial fields should be established and sacrificial utensils prepared. Once the hall is completed, early each morning the master enters the outer gate to pay a visit. All com- ings and goings are reported there. On New Year’s Day, the solstices, and

This preserved ancestral hall was once a mandarin’s home, where the family formally worshipped their ancestors according to principles laid down by Zhu Xi.

each new and full moon, visits are made. On the customary festivals, sea- sonal foods are offered, and when an event occurs, reports are made. Should there be flood, fire, robbers, or bandits, the offering hall is the first thing to be saved. The spirit tablets, inherited manuscripts, and then the sac- rificial utensils should be moved; only afterward may the family’s valuables be taken. As one generation succeeds another, the spirit tablets are rein- scribed and moved to their new places. (Ebrey 1991:14)

The ancestors, clearly still members of the family, required almost as much attention now that they were dead as they did when living. They needed to be checked in on daily by the head of household, who was to don a special robe and light incense. The offerings of tea, wine, and fruit were for the relatively simple fortnightly offerings. On major occasions such as New Year’s they had to be served rice, soup, vegetables, and several kinds of meat. The ancestors had to be informed of every significant event in the life of the family. Zhu Xi even provided some sample reports. Did a member of the family receive a promo- tion? Then they should say:

On such a day of such a month we received an edict conferring on such rela- tive such office . . . A, due to the instructions he received from his ancestors, holds a position at court beyond what he deserves. Through the grace of the sovereign, this honor has been conferred. A’s salary comes too late to support his parent, which leaves him unable to choke back his tears. (Ebrey 1991:19)

Occasionally, reporting to the ancestors was a form of confession. Did you lose your job? You should say you were “dismissed from such a post, that having dis- carded the ancestral teachings, one is in trepidation and uneasy” (Ebrey 1991:18).

The most significant feature of this mode of worship is the way in which it reinforced family hierarchies. A Western family might simply “gather round” the grave of a departed grandfather (probably only once). The Chinese did it in rank order, and with men and women segregated. When a man died, his eldest son became the presiding man at all ancestor worship, and his wife became the presiding woman. There might, however, be living family members who were senior to the presiding couple; if so, they stood in front of them. Behind them was everyone junior to them, in rank order. Family hierarchies, impressed on each person’s psyche through these somber rituals dozens of times every year, had sacred power. This was the power and force of li.

Though every family needed an ancestral altar in the home, everyone did

not have the same ritual obligations. Different ranks of gentry had different authority to perform rites: the higher the rank, generally, the heavier the ritual obligations; of course, this was also a matter of prestige. The eldest son wor- shipped on behalf of his brothers, and this right was passed down in the senior line. The youngest son of youngest sons never did ancestor worship by himself but had to join the senior men of the family at their household. When the next generation of elders died, the ancestors moved up, too; the ancestral tablets were shifted to the table to the west (to the left), while great-grandfather and

great-grandmother’s tablets were taken out to the gravesite and burned or deposited in the ancestral hall of the larger lineage, if there was one.

Wealth, Power, and Morality in the Large Lineage

In a famous eleventh-century essay philosopher Ouyang Xiu (Ou-yang Hsiu) urged that the hold of Buddhism should be loosened by local officials promoting Confucian rituals, including weddings, funerals, and ancestral rites. He blamed the decay of these rituals on allowing Buddhism to reach into the hearts of the common people. Instructing people in Confucian rituals “not only would prevent disorder but also would teach them to distinguish superior and inferior, old and young, and the ethics of social relations” (Ebrey 1991:xix). Buddhism’s efficient organization in monasteries, temples, charitable organiza- tions, and schools came to be countered by a truly Confucian institution: the large corporate lineage. This form of organization, though sanctioned by the Classics, had not been cultivated intensively during the centuries of Buddhism’s peak in China. The Confucian reforms of the Song dynasty, and later reforms in the Ming and Qing, emphasized lineage organization and Confucian rituals. Kinship had work to do, and a revival of the old large lineage took place.

According to the new kinship ideology, the lineage and the state were com- plementary to each other, not competitive. When lineages diminished in power, argued Gu Yanwu in 1652, so did the emperor’s control over the realm (Chow 1994:84). Remember that emperors from Qin Shihuang on did all they could to minimize the competing power of large regional aristocracies, which were kinship based. Now, it was theorized, the Ming had collapsed because of the failure of local resistance to the peasant rebellions and to the Manchus, which might have been mounted by powerful local lineages had they existed. Thus, unlikely as it seems, some gentry did in fact go about establishing lin- eages in these centuries. These social units represented the values of the state to the common folk, tutor them in Confucian ideals, and compete with Buddhist institutions as the case study of the He lineage will demonstrate.

Local lineages were also found to be effective strategies for economic

enhancement. Between the eleventh and nineteenth centuries, powerful lin- eages were established at local levels where they controlled land and resources. These lineages were first studied by British anthropologist Maurice Freedman, who seemed to have said the last word on them in a number of publications in the 1950s (Freedman 1958). However, after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, access to archives was revived, and scholars have been able to enrich our under- standing of these great families.

A team of historians and anthropologists including David Faure, Helen F. Siu, Ye Xian’en, and Liu Zhiwei undertook a major research endeavor in the Pearl River Delta area in southern China. This area lies in the heart of the vast Hong Kong-Guangzhou development region. In presocialist times there were huge corporate lineages each containing thousands of members and control- ling enormous wealth in lineage trusts called tangs. These scholars have traced

the history of several important lineages and uncovered the territorial bases of their wealth and power. By the late Qing (late nineteenth century) people with the He surname were the largest and wealthiest of half a dozen major lineages in the Shawan sands region southeast of Guangzhou in the Pearl River delta. The founding ancestor of He lineage, He Renjian (see figure 7.2), settled there in late Song times on 50 acres of land that he soon extended by another 50 acres. His descendants cultivated the river marshes, expanding their holdings by a variety of ways, but most remarkably and successfully by reclamation of the sands deposited naturally by the river. Laborers were hired to drop stones from boats, build dikes, and add upper layers of soil on which fruit trees were grown until the reclaimed land was suitable for cultivation. This land was regis- tered with the government when tax dodging became impossible and then leased out to cultivators of other surnames and to non-Han minority ethnic

He Chang of Nanxiong

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He Renjian

Song 1st

Dynasty gen

Bought first land as common lineage property

He Qilong

Earned first jinshi title

Nanxiong Branch

First ancestral hall built

He Zihai

Earned jinshi title

Wrote geneology for previous five generations

He Jieli and He Zhiming

Restore ancestral hall

He Ziyi

First mention of

He Chang of Nanxiong

Figure 7.2 Construction of He lineage by members of the literati.

Major peasant uprising decimates He lineage

Coastal evacuation

He Guangzhen

“Discovers” He Chang of Nanxiong

groups. The wealth in land was held in a lineage trust, the Liugeng tang. By the Republican period (1911–1949), the He lineage owned over 10,000 acres and was one of the richest lineages in the delta with vast ancestral estates.

The first step in founding a great lineage was establishing local wealth. He Renjian began the family fortune, but according to old lineage documents, it was his great-grandsons who built the first ancestral hall to honor this ancestor recent enough to be personally remembered by most people living. The family quickly moved into the shenshi or gentry status, with degree holders and wealth. Part of the family fortune was used to educate the sons, and this paid off in the achievement of jinshi status by the second generation. Most famous was He Zihai in the fifth generation. He Zihai wrote the first genealogy, going back only five generations to He Renjian, the empirical founder of the local lineage. In cit- ing the glories of the He lineage, he wrote: “several tens of descendants have written poetry, practiced the rituals, and served as officials. Other lineages have not been able to surpass this record” (Liu 1995:25). In the same passage he scoffs at some lineages who were creating fictional ancestors by searching out “reputable and virtuous people of past ages to serve as their ancestors” and refrained from doing so himself. Later descendants during the Ming heard rumors of people of the He surname elsewhere, most intriguingly at Nanxiong, and as scholar-officials they traveled frequently enough to have visited there and met some of them. However, nothing came of these discoveries immediately.

Besides genealogies, great lineages needed ancestral halls where collective

rites to the ancestors could be performed. The first ancestral hall, built in the fourth generation, was destroyed by warfare at the end of the Yuan dynasty, so it fell to the fifth generation in the early Ming—the same generation that pro- duced the first genealogy—to build a new ancestral hall. The fifth generation was the first to produce scholar-officials of high enough rank to be entitled by law to worship their ancestors farther back than the third generation.

People who worshipped their ancestors beyond their station could be punished and their temples destroyed, as the He lineage did to upstart servant lineages who tried to build an ancestor hall in the nineteenth century. Common people generally had no knowledge of their ancestral origins, no lineage organizations, no ancestral halls, and could not name their ancestors four generations back (Liu 1995).

But a new interpretation of the Classics allowed an innovation for the gen- try; this was the annual worship of the First Ancestor. This provided an institu- tional basis for a much larger kinship group than previously allowable (Chow 1994). It was not immediately clear who the “First Ancestor” would be in spe- cific cases, but it generally came to mean the first forebear to migrate to a locale: for example, He Renjian in 1223. This meant that as generations came and went and the number of He Renjian’s descendants multiplied, they continued to be linked by common worship activities and by shared membership in the ancestral estate. Any number of additional ancestor shrines to lower-order ancestors could theoretically be built, but this was expensive and was only accomplished by very wealthy lineages like the He, who had at least 87 ancestral halls. By the end of

the Ming dynasty the thirteenth generation had been reached, still keeping alive their sense of common descent and still sharing in the growing profits of the ancestral wealth; thus the lineage was “corporate” in a very real economic sense. But the transition from Ming to Qing was devastating to the He lineage.

The peasant rebellions in the north that led to the Manchu takeover had paral- lel movements in Guangdong Province; the He chronicler wrote of the “smell of blood” on the Shawan sands:

The bondservants who had belonged to the various surnames turned upon their masters. . . . Fierce young men in seven villages followed them, set up camps and walled compounds, robbed, and could not be controlled. . . . Every family departed from the village to escape their wrath. . . . They plundered our houses, slew our kin, burned our ancestral halls and turned our pavilions into ashes. (Liu 1995:30)

Social upheaval was followed by natural disaster. Severe floods required coastal evacuation that lasted from 1663 to 1669. Homes, villages, and ancestral halls were left in ruins, followed by looting and destruction by soldiers and robbers. As conditions stabilized after 1669, the He lineage had a great deal of rebuilding to do. In 1700 they built a lavish new temple with entrance hall, rit- ual gate, middle hall, back bedchamber, side halls, bell and drum tower, kitchen, and servants’ quarters. They also began tinkering with the written genealogy and produced a new apical ancestor. Fifteenth-generation He Guangzhen uncovered old documents referring to a He branch in Nanxiong and an even older “ancestor,” He Chang. He was identified as originally being from Kaifeng and dying in the service of the emperor in Guangdong. He Chang had everything needed in an ancestor: as an official at the court of the emperor, one could not ask higher origins or credentials. His Han ethnicity was certain, establishing that the He lineage folk were not non-Han parvenus from the south trying to become Han. And He Chang was the first forebear to estab- lish a line in Southern China, a true shizi. Finally, there were He living in Nanxiong to fuse with, and there was already a famous temple built to him because of the virtue (de) that allowed his corpse to flow upstream for 30 li at his death. One could not ask for a better First Ancestor. The details between He Chang and He Renjian were left to genealogists to fill in as best they could. In this way great lineages were constructed in the Ming and Qing dynasties.

Several facts are noteworthy: (1) They were constructed post hoc, by descen- dants who projected their line backward in time according to strategies allowed by existing cultural rules. (2) Large lineages grew by fusion as well as by fission; that is, they sought out distant branches to join with even in the absence of ver- ifiable links, while also growing ever more complex as new generations and new branches emerged. (3) They were subject to state-sponsored Confucian rules about who was entitled to specific rights of worship and group formation. Nongentry families were not allowed to form large lineages, even though a gen- try lineage could have segments that included commoners. (4) Even if all the class-based entitlements to play by these kinship rules were in place, it was the

Box 7.3 He Lineage Worships Its Ancestors

According to the recollections of some older people, about 15 days after the Qing- ming festival every year, lineage members would visit the graves in Guangzhou. After lineage heads decided on a date, they sent people to Guangzhou to hire a fleet of col- orful boats (known as the boats from Zidong, a village in Nanhal county) in which the literati types would sail to Guangzhou. The rest of the entourage would go in large fer- ries. Together they formed an elegant fleet, escorted by four armed boats equipped by the He lineage itself. They sailed to Guangzhou in this grand fashion and moored at a berth they had built for themselves. In the evening, they stayed at the four acade- mies, the four martial arts schools, and the Chang’an Inn, all of which belonged to the He lineage; some people would stay at the homes of relatives or friends. They would also have bribed the city guards to open the Small Northern Gate in the city wall ear- lier than usual at the fifth watch (just before dawn) the next day. Almost all the sedan- chair bearers in the city flocked on the occasion to provide service and were paid by the lineage managers. The entire group paraded through the Small Northern Gate to the Grave of the Sisters-in-Law to perform the grave rites. On the third day, they repeated the ceremonies at the graves of He Renjian and others. According to a 1911 record, the lineage spent more than 6,000 taels of silver for the grave visits that year. These extravagant public displays became important rallying points for the collective identity of the lineage as well as for demonstrating to others its power and influence.

Source: Liu Zhiwei 1995:39.

successful marshaling of economic resources, especially control of land, which enabled corporate lineages to grow large and survive over time.

The advantages of being a member of the He lineage are obvious. Members received regular income from lineage holdings; expenses of births, weddings, funerals, and education and examination costs were subsidized by the ancestral trusts (see box 7.3). The lineage maintained armed guards and a defense corps to patrol the sands and protect lineage property and members. They set up schools, hospitals, and orphanages. The lineage was a quasi-government that dominated the official government of the region, with many of its members serving on both sides. The security, prosperity, and prestige benefited everyone.

The Family in the Twentieth Century

The second half of the twentieth century was a rare historical moment of rapid-fire and sweeping interventions in the lives of a billion people. Prior to the 1949 Communist revolution, forms of kinship we call “traditional” were in place; these forms survived in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Following the revolu- tion, drastic reforms were initiated in the name of socialism under the moral inspiration of Mao Zedong, going much further than comparable movements in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In stages, private property was elimi- nated; the market was suppressed; all land and labor were collectivized; bureau-

cratic control by the Chinese Communist Party replaced traditional private entrepreneurial and kinship structures. The full socialist era lasted from 1958 to 1978. Family and lineage were decisively reorganized during those times; the great lineages were special targets of those reforms. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tried to destroy lineage solidarity by assigning each villager to a class category: poor peasant, middle peasant, rich peasant, landlord. The lower statuses were then made to attack, humiliate, and seize the property of the rich peasants and landlords who were their kinsmen. Ancestor worship was declared a superstition and forbidden. Cremation rather than burial was encour- aged, to save land and to undermine reverence of ancestors. Large expenditures for kinship ceremonies like weddings and funerals were harshly discouraged, and no one could afford them in any case. The Marriage Law of 1950 prohib- ited concubinage and child betrothal, which disappeared almost immediately, and permitted women to sue for divorce, prompting two million divorces in the first three years. Putting everyone to work in communes gave women the eco- nomic security to take advantage of the new opportunity for divorce.

All of these changes reduced or eliminated the economic logic of the tradi- tional family system, as well as rendering its ideology politically incorrect. Par- adoxically, however, some of these changes brought core family ideals within the grasp of many who had never managed to realize them before. Access to health care reduced mortality rates, which meant most people actually had larger kin networks than before. Restrictions on internal migration kept men in their home towns or villages; in the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian where large lineages had been most common in the past, these restric- tions on movement and the collectivization of citizens put kinsmen who sur- vived the earlier struggles to work in the same communes, thus preserving them, even though ancestral halls had been turned into work unit headquarters and genealogies had been burned. A few old women still worshipped their ancestors by burning mosquito coils, but in the early years of Communist rule, most people seemed to give up the old customs rather easily.

The next round of kinship changes, following the death of Mao in 1976, offered thrusts in two opposite directions. First, decollectivization in the early 1980s returned 80 percent of all agricultural lands to farm families on 15-year leases, and rural markets were reopened. Once again, farmers had economic incentives to work hard, invest in their farms, and raise livestock. Graham E. Johnson describes the effects of liberalization on lineage practices in the Pearl River delta:

While the full elaboration of all aspects of the operation of lineage cannot be contemplated, many of them are once again practiced. Graves have been repaired, rituals are performed at the graves of apical ancestors, ancestral halls are being restored, ritual feasts occur in the halls once more, lineage libraries are being refurbished, and lineage officers have begun to act as agents for mem- bers of the lineage, similar to the way the administrators of lineage trusts inter- vened on behalf of members in the period before 1949. (Johnson 1993:132)

Box 7.4 Confucianism in a Tumultuous Era

Confucius (Kong Fuzi, 551–479 B.C.E.) did not have a good twentieth century. The final years of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) brought the abolition of the Confucian civil service examination system in 1905, the 1,300-year-old narrow path to cultural status and political power in imperial China. Then in the 1910s, after the fall of the Qing, the New Culture and May Fourth movements were led by students whose main goal was the eradication of traditional Chinese culture including Confucianism, in favor of new and radical ideas, from democracy and socialism, to pragmatism and feminism.

Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), the military and political ruler of the Republic of China from 1927 until 1949 (and thereafter ruler of Taiwan until his death in 1975) tried to revitalize Confucianism in his New Life movement of the 1930s, even enshrining Confucianism as the state religion. But this effort fizzled with the urgency of revolution and resistance of the Japanese invasion. Following the victory of the Chinese Com- munist Party in 1949, Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, and all other faiths and tradi- tional cultural remnants, were targeted in political campaigns by the revolutionary, atheistic party.

Perhaps most devastating to Chinese culture was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution launched in 1966. Begun as an effort by Party Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976) to reassert his primacy by appealing to radical youngsters, the move- ment quickly spun out of control into a period of chaotic violence, score settling, and arbitrary persecution. Confucius was brought back only to be “struggled” against and rebuked by the Red Guards, the hastily assembled brigades of students from college, high school, and middle school. It seems that the fortunes of Confucius and Confu- cianism could not get any worse until Red Guards even desecrated the Kong lin- eage’s family tombs and shrines in Qufu, Shandong Province.

The chaos of the Cultural Revolution eventually subsided in the early 1970s, and then ended completely with Mao’s death in 1976. The “reform and opening” period of the 1980s and 1990s brought the People’s Republic of China onto the global stage as an economic powerhouse. The twenty-first century has already proven considerably better than the twentieth for Confucius. Confucianism has been revived in many aspects of Chinese life, with the revitalized study of Confucius and Confucianism, the reopening and refurbishing of Confucian temples, the observation of traditional holi- days like the Tomb-Sweeping Festival, and more recently with the establishment of Confucius Institutes around the world by the Chinese Ministry of Education.

These institutes, comparable in some ways to the Écoles Françaises and the Goethe Institutes, develop in bilateral agreements with hundreds of international part- ners, mainly universities around the world. They are a soft power initiative of the Chi- nese government to help cultivate a positive image of the PRC and to encourage the study of the Chinese language and culture among thousands of people around the world who would not otherwise have access to these studies. While controversy about Chinese government control has followed some of these institutes, the considerable matching financial commitments of the Ministry of Education are a very appealing prospect to institutions where Chinese language instruction and an infusion of fund- ing are welcome. After the buffeting that Confucius endured in the twentieth century, it is striking that a massive international goodwill initiative like the Confucius Institutes should bear his name.

Box 7.5 Qingming Festival

The Qingming Festival (literally “pure brightness”) is a centuries-old tradition of rit- ual mourning that falls in the first week of April every year. Although the festival is one of remembrance of deceased ancestors and family members, it is not necessarily bleak or joyless. Flying kites and enjoying a spring outing are common ways to pass the holiday. It is sometimes known as Tomb-Sweeping Day, because the living family visits the graves of the dead to tidy up and decorate it. Offerings are placed at the graves, including food, cigarettes, and liquor. Family members burn ceremonial money and other useful objects for the ancestors in the unseen world. This custom is as old as the ancient practice of sending servants, horses, and terra-cotta warriors into the afterlife with a dead king.

In 2008, the festival was officially reinstated as a national holiday, after having been banned following the 1949 ascension of the Chinese Communist Party, which attempted to stamp out all traces of ancestor veneration and Confucianism.

The festival survived and became especially important in the overseas Chinese community. The commemoration of ancestors is especially poignant when the living are not able to be near the ancestral home in China. One of the simplest and most beautiful Tang poems captures this bittersweet sentiment, and Chinese schoolchil- dren still memorize it as a lesson in beauty and concision.

“Quiet Night Thoughts”

Li Bai (Li Bo, 701–762 C.E.)

Before my bed there is bright moonlight So that it seems like frost on the ground: Lifting my head I watch the bright moon Lowering my head, I dream that I’m home.

Poem source: Arthur Cooper, tr. Li Bo and Du Fu. London: Penguin, 1973, 109.

The other change, however, was the most repressive intervention in private reproductive lives the world has ever seen; 100 million couples were affected. The one-child policy, begun in 1979 and formally ended on January 1, 2016, aimed to keep China’s population at 1.2 billion by 2000. In effect, however, it decreed that henceforth “only half of all families would have a son to carry on the family name, the sibling relationship would disappear, and failure to use contraceptives would be a capital offense” (Harrell and Davis 1993). Through much of rural China, bargaining between village families and local cadres resulted in softening the enforcement of the one-child policy, though in urban areas, the state more successfully enforced it. The total fertility of Chinese women—that is, the number of children a woman has over her reproductive years—dropped from about six to less than three. The outcomes of the reduc- tion in family size are evident in a number of ways today. The widespread new phenomenon of the “only child” has resulted in another new phenomenon, the spoiled child. And the traditional Chinese preference for males, which stimu- lated in vitro gender tests followed by abortion of female fetuses, produced a shortage of women at marrying age. Now we are seeing responses as varied as urban young women demanding good education and being choosy about whom they marry, to the sale of kidnapped girls as brides in remote and impov- erished areas. Patriarchal tradition still persists, however, with men being averse to marrying women who are wealthier or better educated than they are. This has led to a phenomenon known as “leftover women,” in which women who choose advanced education and a career may find it difficult or impossible to find a partner when they choose to do so. In 2015–2016, Beijing revised the one-child policy to allow couples to have two children, as an effort to address the rapidly aging population and the strain that this could put on the economy.

Women in Confucian China

The Chinese theory of gender differentiation is founded not in biology—a man’s body, a woman’s body—but in a more fundamental polarity, that of yin and yang, the complementary binary opposites that are the dynamic of the entire cosmos. The “ten thousand things” come swirling into existence through the tumbling energy of yin and yang. Gender is only one category of existence; yin is everything dark, cold, female, coarse, water, earth; yang is everything light, bright, heat, male, fire, heaven. Even the soul has a yin part, the po, the heavy, material, fetid part that sinks in the earth with the decaying body, capa- ble of becoming an angry ghost, and a yang part, hun, the light, spiritual part that floats heavenward and becomes a beneficent ancestor. Male and female bodies, natures, and appropriate social roles all follow from this cosmic dynamic. The rightness of male authority, of patriarchy, is thus derivative of the dominance of the strong, active principle of male yang over the passive gentle- ness of yin.

This is not to say that gender relations have been unchanging throughout

Chinese history or that they ride above the flux of changing political and eco-

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nomic realities; gender is as susceptible to reconstruction as other domains of culture. The nature of the ideal female, and thus the life experience of actual Chinese women, began to change during the Song dynasty, producing a pattern in late imperial times a good deal more extreme than in earlier periods.

As we have already seen, various changes in state policy nurtured an ever more defined patrilineal and patriarchal thrust in Chinese society. The spread of surnames aided the remembering of kinship bonds through males, with a corresponding weakening of bonds through female lines. Neo-Confucian revi- talization of ancestor worship spread patrilineality more broadly through elite classes and even among commoners, ritually reinforcing ever larger patrilineal descent groups. Confucian values supported by state regulation vested owner- ship of land in fathers and sons. This Confucian world was a “world authored by men,” in C. Fred Blake’s phrase (Blake 1994); everything that strengthened it rendered women correspondingly “other” and outside the structure.

For example, patrilineality often renders women nameless and identity-less. There is no pool of personal names (like Bella, Jacob, Michael, . . .). Instead everyone gets a surname (Cheng, Li, Wang, etc.) plus one or two characters as an individual name, which are generally poetic, descriptive, or even political: Blue Sky, Lotus Blossom, East [is] Red. In a study of naming customs in rural Hong Kong New Territories, Rubie Watson (1986) found that men gained a variety of names over a lifetime; a diviner may recommend adding wood, fire, or another element to the name of a sickly child to strengthen him. A man takes a marriage name in a ceremony on the first day of wedding rites. He may earn a nickname from the community that interacts with him; at middle age, if he is successful, he may acquire other names, called “courtesy” (hao) names, and a great man receives additional honorific names at death. These names convey a man’s many public identities and achievements; they are recorded on his tablets and in lineage genealogies and so remembered by posterity.

But for women, identity was different. A woman was given a name at the age of one month, which ceased to be used when she married. At marriage, as her husband received his marriage name, she learned all the kinship terms in her husband’s family and henceforth was called by his kinship terms. Her name may never have been written down, not on birth certificates or legal documents or in genealogies or ancestral tablets; it often was not clear what characters would be used if her name were to be written down. In old age she was known as ah po (“old woman”); when she died only her father’s surname was written on her tablet (“Family of Lim”). Not even a name survived as testimony of her exis- tence as a person. While these practices were in flux, as seen in Watson’s study, they certainly were carried well into the Communist era and the recent past.

The decline in the status of women during the Song received further impe- tus after the conquest of China by the Mongols. The same reforms that brought social conservatism and a new preoccupation with Confucian rituals focused moral concern on women. A new cult of women’s purity urged widows not to remarry, exhorted women not to read novels, watch dramas, or go out in pub-

lic, extolled female self-sacrifice in widespread morality tales, encouraged ultrafeminization of women, and supported a widening custom of foot bind- ing. The causes of these changes were various and are in dispute among schol- ars, but a few likely causes can be mentioned.

The successful Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, followed by the Manchu invasion in the seventeenth century, each resulting in alien dynasties, put Han Chinese culture on the defensive and generated various cultural responses. Even earlier, the cosmopolitan Tang with its prevalent (foreign) Bud- dhism was also a major source of anxiety and identity crisis for Confucian Chi- nese elites. What did it mean to be Chinese after the Tang and in contrast with later Mongol and Manchu rulers? In what did Chinese cultural superiority con- sist, if not in the political strength to resist invasion? New notions of both male- ness and femaleness emerged, according to Patricia Ebrey; male models characterized by barbarian men were replaced by a new literati male “who could be refined, bookish, contemplative, or artistic but need not be strong, quick, or dominating” (Ebrey 1990:221). Hunting declined in popularity. As males moved toward the “effeminate” pole, women became even more deli- cate, reticent, and confined. Women became visible symbols of Han identity, vulnerable to rape and pillage by aggressive, ultramasculine warrior cultures.

A recognizable genre emerged in the late Ming: the young heroine who is dedicated to Confucian virtues and undergoes horrific ordeals in their defense. Katherine Carlitz recounts some of these stories in “Desire, Danger, and the Body: Stories of Women’s Virtue in Late Ming China” (1994). In a fifteenth- century play called Five Relationships Completed and Perfected, a concubine travel- ing to join her master is captured by an invader who demands her in marriage. Her mother exclaims that no Chinese can marry a barbarian; she bites her fin- ger, writes a poem of fidelity in blood, then drowns herself. A late Ming wife, touched on the arm by a bandit, bites off and spits out the flesh of her arm. These motifs were not random themes; a Qing dynasty bibliography lists 36,000 stories of virtuous women, one-third of whom commit suicide or are murdered while resisting rape.

There were not just stories but actually recorded increases in suicide among women. In 1405 a Confucian conduct book for women included detailed instructions on self-immolation. Thirty-eight concubines committed suicide at the death of the first Ming emperor. Resisting rape and resisting pres- sures to remarry were other idealized reasons for committing suicide. As Cor- litz argues, “woman’s body is a site or theater used by the imperium to constitute itself, asserting the impenetrability of its borders, undergirding the idealized Chinese pyramid of loyalties” (1994:104). Woman’s body was “a site where the drama of resistance to invasion could be acted out.”

But the most renowned stage for the enacting of culture on the woman’s body in late imperial China focused on the foot. In western Hunan, little girls, like little boys, were presented with writing brushes. For the boy, it represented the beginning of his life as a reader, writer, scholar, speaker: the power of the

word. For the girl, it signified the tiny points of her three-inch “lotus blossom” feet as they would look when finished at puberty: the power of her body when fully refashioned for her role in the Confucian household. Daughters, like sons, submitted to a Confucian world of obedience, self-discipline, and self-sacrifice

Box 7.6 Toes Like Dead Caterpillars

Born into an old-fashioned family at P’ing-hsi, I was inflicted with the pain of foot binding when I was seven years old. . . . Binding started in the second lunar month; mother consulted references in order to select an auspicious day for it. I wept and hid in a neighbor’s home, but mother found me, scolded me, and dragged me home. She shut the bedroom door, boiled water, and from a box withdrew binding, shoes, knife, needle, and thread. . . . She washed and placed alum on my feet and cut the toe- nails. She then bent my toes toward the plantar with a binding cloth 10 feet long and two inches wide, doing the right foot first and then the left. She finished binding and ordered me to walk, but when I did the pain proved unbearable.

That night, mother wouldn’t let me remove the shoes. My feet felt on fire and I couldn’t sleep; mother struck me for crying. On the following days, I tried to hide but was forced to walk on my feet. Mother hit me on my hands and feet for resisting. Beat- ings and curses were my lot for covertly loosening the wrappings. The feet were washed and rebound after three or four days, with alum added. After several months, all toes but the big one were pressed against the inner surface. Whenever I ate fish or freshly killed meat, my feet would swell, and the pus would drip. Mother criticized me for placing pressure on the heel in walking, saying that my feet would never assume a pretty shape. Mother would remove the bindings and wipe the blood and pus which dripped from my feet. She told me that only with removal of the flesh could my feet become slender. If I mistakenly punctured a sore, the blood gushed like a stream. My somewhat-fleshy big toes were bound with small pieces of cloth and forced upwards, to assume a new moon shape.

Every two weeks, I changed to new shoes. Each new pair was one- to two-tenths of an inch smaller than the previous one. The shoes were unyielding, and it took pres- sure to get into them. Though I wanted to sit passively by the k’ang, Mother forced me to move around. After changing more than 10 pairs of shoes, my feet were reduced to a little over four inches. I had been binding for a month when my younger sister started; when no one was around, we would weep together. In summer, my feet smelled offensively because of pus and blood; in winter, my feet felt cold because of lack of circulation and hurt if they got too near the k’ang and were struck by warm air currents. Four of the toes were curled in like so many dead caterpillars; no outsider would ever have believed that they belonged to a human being. It took two years to achieve the three-inch model. My toenails pressed against the flesh like thin paper. The heavily creased plantar couldn’t be scratched when it itched or soothed when it ached. My shanks were thin, my feet became humped, ugly, and odoriferous; how I envied the natural-footed!

Source: Quoted in Howard S. Levy, Chinese Footbinding: The History of a Curious Erotic Custom. New York: Walton Rawls, 1967, pp. 26–28

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for the larger group. A Confucian proverb encouraged mothers to oversee both protracted struggles: “If you care for your son, care not that he suffers in his studies. If you care for your daughter, care not that she suffers in her feet” (Blake 1994). As boys suffered to join in the authoring of the world, girls suf- fered to submit to it.

The custom of foot binding may have begun among dancers during the Song dynasty. In one of the earliest references, eleventh-century writer Su Shi (Su Shih) found a dancer’s bound feet objects of wonder and wanted to hold them in his hand to get a better look. The foot was deformed to feed male erotic fancy; it took years of “painful, bloody, and terrifying labor [to make] the brute nature of her feet materialize into an object of beauty, mystery, and discipline” (Blake 1994:688). A man longed to touch the “golden lotus” of his lover; sexual play included kissing and nibbling on the curved toe; he might wash her feet or sip wine from her three-inch slipper. He rhapsodized over them as “bamboo shoots in winter.”

The girl’s ordeal finished about the time she reached puberty and thus was a prelude to sexual maturation. It was thought to enhance fertility by concentrating blood in the upper legs and pelvis, working like pruning of trees to concentrate the sap for production of fruit. Soon she was ready for mar- riage in a family of good standing, and it was this essential goal of making a

This photograph from 1874 depicts a servant in a rich house, whose tiny “golden lotuses” may be seen beneath her robe. A three-inch foot was achieved only with years of painful binding of the feet of young girls, which resulted in breaking the arch and the loss of several toes. Beautiful handmade slippers were worn by women who could barely walk. The custom began among elite women who were not expected to work but gradually spread to the servant and peasant classes.

In the fourteenth or fifteenth century, a military officer died and was buried in his uniform. His concubine was strangled, her forehead was bashed in, and she was buried with him in the same coffin. He was in his 60s and she in her 20s. She had “golden lotuses,” and this unusual photograph allows a view of the skeletal changes wrought by the binding of feet.

good match that impelled a woman to inflict such pain on her daughter. It was not overtly the eroticism of the bound foot but the virtue of a disciplined daughter that Neo-Confucianism valued. Women were so severely crippled by foot binding that they could barely walk; it served much the same function as purdah in India, keeping women invisible inside the family compound and their virtue incontestable.

The practice that began as a trademark of dancers, something like the Western ballerina’s painfully acquired grace on a single point, was by 1900 practiced among all classes of Chinese, even spreading among farm families where, although women’s labor was needed, her feet were bound anyway as a sign of beauty and virtue and in the hopes of improving her marriage pros- pects, forcing her to a lifetime of painful hobbling as she swept her courtyard, carried rice and babies, spun, embroidered, and wove. In one study of 1,736 women in 515 families in a network of rural villages north of the Yellow River,

99.2 percent of women born before 1890 had bound feet. In Southern China, on the other hand, foot binding was actively resisted by peasants as impractical and pretentious. Further, non-Han women, including Mongols, Manchus, and the migratory Hakka (kejia), never adopted the practice.

However, it would be misleading to focus so heavily on these customs that we miss other aspects of women’s lives in traditional China. While it may be true that obedience, self-sacrifice, and purity were emphasized by neo-Confu- cians and that submission to male authority was both idealized and demanded, recent scholars have looked beyond these restricting social structures to the accomplishments of women artists, poets, and writers within them. The Con- fucian literati were not guilty of ignoring women’s contributions, either, but praised them among themselves and included them in their many voluminous catalogs of poetry and art.

Members of the literati who served in the government or at least prepared for official careers often did educate their daughters, even though those young

women were not eligible for the examinations and the government careers that were their purpose. Chinese culture valued the private life spent in scholarly or artistic pursuit for both men and women; a bureaucrat dreamed of retiring to become a private man of letters, even while women were potentially born to this life. In the field of painting, the work of amateurs was considered superior to professional painting, which meant that women could become accom- plished artists and gain fame by the same route as the scholar-official who painted, wrote poetry, or did calligraphy.

After the sixteenth century there were rising female literacy rates and women both wrote and enjoyed novels, poetry, and plays. Susan Mann docu- ments a lengthy debate in the late eighteenth century on what women should learn, and why. Some women were writing poetry admired by men who were attracted to female sensuality. “Whether in the palace or in pleasure boats, whether at courier outposts or in the heart of the court, women’s talents were mainly devoted to singing and dancing, all to please men,” complained one critic (Mann 1994:31). But many other women poets were writing about their own lives as gentry women; the subject of death in childbirth, from illness, and by suicide recurs in women’s writings in the eighteenth century. Mature women plumbed emotions born of empty marriages and cloistered lives. There was a “poetry of desire” that lifted women from their actual lives to imagined lives. Even very young women and girls earned fame as poets and lived writers’ lives. The poet Jin Yi brought her inkstone and brushes into her marriage as part of her dowry and within a few days turned the bedroom into a study.

Women of literati households formed poetry and painting societies, such as the Banana Garden Poetry Society formed in the early Qing in Hangzhou by Gu Yurui. They were painters as well as poets; Xu Can, one member, painted female figures, images of the goddess Guanyin, flowers, and plants. Ju Qing, a member of a famous painting family in nineteenth-century Guang- dong, captured a mood of tranquility and leisure in “Lady with Fan.”

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