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ReactionPaper3Guidelines.docxReaction Paper Guidelines
Reaction papers are a critical component of the conversation that will take place in this course. There will be a total of five different reaction papers throughout the course. Each of the five reaction papers will be approximately two pages in length. The text will be double-spaced and formatted using APA format. Students should clearly identify their topic and present their personal viewpoint or perspective; however, students must also present a factual basis for that viewpoint (as opposed to an opinion paper). All references supporting the factual basis must be properly cited to the original sources in accordance with APA guidelines.
Topic:
· PTSD as a defense
While you are primarily addressing the topic selected, you may want to discuss or expand on a topic presented in the textbook, a case dealing with the subject, or a current event from the news or Internet, and present your viewpoint or perspective on that item as it relates to the issue present in your chosen topic.
6-7bPost-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
LO10
Unfortunately, different kinds of casualties emerged, “invisible wounds” brought about by “multiple deployments per individual service member and exposure to difficult threats, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).” These invisible wounds took the form of mental health and cognitive impairments. The most frequent are post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) , depression, and traumatic brain injury (TBI), resulting from blasts or other head injuries.
Unfortunately, these conditions are often invisible to the eye. Unlike like the physical wounds of war that maim and disfigure, these conditions remain invisible to other service members, to family members, and to society in general. All three conditions affect mood, thoughts, and behavior; yet these wounds often go unrecognized and unacknowledged.
A telephone study involving 1,965 of the 1.64 million service members previously deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq found “substantial rates of mental health problems in the last 30 days”. (See Figure 6.1 on mental health and cognitive issues faced by Afghanistan and Iraq war vets.) Notice that the study’s authors Tanielian and Jaycox (2008) include major depression as one of the post-deployment mental health consequences, even though it’s often not considered a combat-related injury. They include it because their analyses suggest that it’s “highly associated with combat exposure.”
Figure 6.1Percent of Afghanistan/Iraq War Vets Suffering from PTSD, Depression, and Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI)
The authors conclude that, assuming their study represents the 1.64 million service members returning from Afghanistan and Iraq, as of October 2007, there were about 300,000 individuals suffering from PTSD or major depression and that 320,000 probably experienced TBI during their deployment. About a third have at least one of the three conditions, and about 5 percent suffer from all three.
Our interest here is how do these conditions lead to involvement with the criminal justice system, especially as an excuse for otherwise criminal conduct? In other words, when can defendants support the contention that “What I did was a crime, but under the circumstances I wasn’t responsible for committing it. It was my PTSD or major depression, or TBI that I can’t control.” In our next case excerpt, State v. Belew (2014), the Ohio Supreme Court rejected Jeffrey Belew’s PTSD defense.
Were his “Hidden Wounds” an Excuse for Shooting Police Officers?
Case
In State v. Belew (2014), Jeffrey Belew was convicted and sentenced to 27 years in prison.
State v. Belew 17 N.E.3d 515 (Ohio 2014)
Pfeifer, O'Donnell, Kennedy, and French, JJ., concur.
O’Connor, CJ., and Lanzinger and O'Neill, JJ., dissent.
History
Jeffrey Belew was convicted and sentenced to 27 years in prison. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. A majority of the Ohio Supreme Court let the conviction and sentence stand without opinion. But, one justice dissented, and wrote the following opinion.
LANZINGER, J. , dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to dismiss this case as having been improvidently accepted. Amici curiae in support of appellant, Jeffery Belew, filed two memoranda in support of jurisdiction asserting that this case involves a matter of great general interest and public importance and filed two supporting merit briefs. And although the state does not disagree with Belew’s proposition that “when credibly diagnosed, a trial court must consider combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder and other service-related disabilities as mitigation when imposing sentence on a military veteran,” it argues that the trial court here did properly consider those factors when sentencing him.
I believe that we should render an opinion on how post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) must be considered by a court when it sentences a military veteran. And just as important, we should clarify the standard that an appellate court must use in reviewing a sentence of this type. It is my position that only a full opinion by this court will clarify both the appellate court’s standard of review and the trial court’s need to support the record for a felony sentence.
Facts
On April 10, 2011 Belew fired at least four shots at police officers who were responding to a domestic-disturbance call in Oregon, Ohio. Belew’s shots struck an arriving police car twice, and he did not respond to commands to cease fire until he was wounded by shots fired by the officers. He was arrested and received hospital care.
Belew was indicted on April 20, 2011, for two counts of attempted aggravated murder of a law-enforcement officer and two counts of felonious assault, which were first-degree felonies under R.C. 2903.11(D)(1) because the shots were fired at peace officers. Each count contained specifications that he both displayed, brandished, indicated possession of, or used a firearm (R.C. 2941.145) and discharged his firearm at peace officers (R.C. 2941.1412). He entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) to all charges and specifications.
After plea negotiations, Belew changed his plea to guilty and the state dismissed certain counts and specifications. He was sentenced to 27 years in prison: two consecutive ten-year terms for each count of felonious assault to be served consecutively to two concurrent seven-year terms for the firearm specifications. He appealed his sentence to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the trial court appropriately weighed statutory factors in imposing his sentence. We then accepted a discretionary appeal.
The trial court in this case received the psychological reports and the presentence-investigation report into evidence. Psychologist Dr. Wayne Graves, who testified at the sentencing hearing, opined specifically about the diagnosis of PTSD, which resulted from Belew’s military service in Iraq, and about the consequences of PTSD. Defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney also spoke. Afterwards, the sentencing judge stated:
I have reviewed the presentence report that has been prepared, I’ve reread the report prepared by Dr. Charlene Cassel of the Court Diagnostic and Treatment Center, I’ve reread Dr. Wayne Graves’s report, I have read two letters from the Defendant’s mother, and I’ve listened very carefully to the testimony of Dr. Wayne Graves here today, as well as listened to what Counsel and Defendant has had to say, and I’ve balanced all of that information in sentencing this afternoon.
She then addressed the defendant directly:
Mr. Belew, you claim that you suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of being in the military and you provide that as an excuse for your actions. There is no excuse, Mr. Belew. I have to—I feel that I’m compelled because of my concerns of why you entered the military, to weigh that. And your words to Dr. Charlene Cassel were, I joined the Marines to see how many people I could kill. That’s, generally—if I’m not mistaken, people don’t join the military to see how many people they can kill. You were continually in trouble and constantly drunk and under the influence of alcohol and drugs, and you received a bad conduct discharge after being court martialed for stealing government property.
Turning to the offenses, the judge then stated:
These offenses are extremely serious, Mr. Belew, these officers could have been killed, because you intended to kill them. They responded to a call of a fight between you and your brother because you were in possession of a handgun and were extremely intoxicated. And you don’t remember what happened that night, as you said, because you were suffering from an alcohol blackout. And according to Dr. Charlene Cassel, people who are suffering alcohol blackouts do not do things that are uncharacteristic of things that they wouldn’t normally do. You shot at Officer Martin when he stopped his vehicle, you shot at him several times, and when the other two officers came to assist they gave several commands to you to stop and put down your weapon, but you continued to walk toward them with your gun pointed at them. And it was only after you were wounded that you stopped. You are lucky to be standing here today, Mr. Belew, because they very well could have killed you.
The judge next stated: “You do have a minimal criminal history.” However, she also stated, “because of your actions I believe you are a danger to this community.”
Belew did not receive a maximum 34-year sentence for the offenses and specifications for which he was convicted. The sentencing judge’s entry stated that the prison terms were ordered to be served consecutively because consecutive sentences were “necessary to fulfill the purposes of R.C. 2929.11,2 and not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct or the danger the offender poses” and that the “harm caused was great or unusual.” The record here did not allow the Sixth District Court of Appeals to clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings.
Although different judges may have weighed the statutory factors at issue here differently, the relevant statutes did not allow the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial judge. All findings of the trial judge have record support and the required findings were made. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. I respectfully dissent from the order that dismisses this case as improvidently accepted.
O’NEILL, J., dissenting.
The United States Marine Corps took a marginal recruit from an abusive family and turned him into a fighting machine. They sent him to Iraq to defend all of us, and in the process they turned him into a confused alcoholic with a clear diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and possibly a traumatic brain injury.
Once home, and still on active duty, he became a misfit alcoholic who was, essentially, no longer of any use to the Marine Corps. He was often drunk, did not obey orders, and most significantly, received no treatment whatsoever for the PTSD that he had sustained in the fog of war.
Not too surprisingly, on one drunken day while on active duty, he and a friend “borrowed” a Humvee and went on a joyride. They were quickly apprehended by the officer of the day, and from that point forward, it was clear that the Marines no longer needed the product they had created.
He was demoted and given a bad-conduct discharge for the Humvee incident. Significantly, his less-than-honorable discharge deprived him of the medical assistance from the federal Department of Veterans Affairs that he so desperately needed.
As a civilian he simply did not fit in, and, still suffering from untreated and undiagnosed PTSD, his antisocial behavior predictably escalated.
We are here today because of the tragic events that led to his conviction. It is without question, and well supported in the record, that this troubled throwaway from society wanted to commit “suicide by cop.” There is no other explanation for why an individual would open fire on two approaching, well-trained, well-armed police officers. He failed. Rather than dying, Belew received a nonfatal bullet to the chest—and not one of the officers was struck. He took responsibility for his actions and pled guilty to several offenses but received an aggregate sentence of 27 years in prison that was far harsher than it should have been.
Incredibly, the trial court and the court of appeals have locked onto the phrase “no excuse.” The trial court stated, “Mr. Belew, you claim that you suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of being in the military and you provide that as an excuse for your actions. There is no excuse, Mr. Belew.”
I would respectfully suggest that one trial court judge, three appellate court judges, and the majority of this court simply do not get it. PTSD is not an excuse. It is an explanation.
Mr. Belew’s disability was not an “excuse.” He was and is suffering from a well-known and definable disease, which was diagnosed by Dr. Wayne Graves, whose testimony was admitted into evidence without objection and presented in the sentencing hearing.
After the date of the trial court’s sentencing of Belew in this case, the General Assembly enacted the following language: “The sentencing court shall consider the offender’s military service record and whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or physical condition that is traceable to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United States.” R.C. 2929.12(F).
This case is clearly the poster child for implementation of the new statute, and today this court has the rare opportunity to lead with clarity. The record is before us. There is more at stake here than garden-variety excuses for criminal culpability. Belew was a marginal Marine recruit; he developed PTSD while on active duty; and he was turned out of the service with a bad-conduct discharge and little or no capacity to function safely in society.
Tragically, he is not the only member of the armed forces to arrive at this juncture. He has been diagnosed with PTSD as a result of his time in the Marine Corps—a condition that remains untreated. It is inexcusable that he cannot access federal benefits for his PTSD. We can and should do better. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing and decision that properly takes into consideration Belew’s military-service record and his diagnosis of PTSD. Anything else is unreasonable.
Since the 1970s, a range of syndromes has led to novel defenses in criminal law. Though there’s criticism because of a few notorious cases, some syndromes are taken seriously as excuses. Defendants rarely plead these excuses, and they rarely succeed when they do plead syndromes. Premenstrual symptom (PMS) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are examples of these syndromes.
