Topic: No Wires Attached: Reversing Cultural Limitations Imposed on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilots
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RE_08_Proposal_Final_OutGoing.docxProposal
Working Title:
No Wires Attached: Reversing Cultural Limitations Imposed on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilots
Research Question:
How can the Air Force foster a positive culture that embraces RPAs and RPA operators in order to ensure they are used to their full potential?
Research Argument:
The United States Air Force (USAF) must reverse negative perceptions of RPAs in preparation for future conflict. <claim> RPAs have been invaluable during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), conducting constant missions to provide persistent surveillance, long-loiter ability, Close Air Support (CAS), Time Sensitive Targeting (TST), and the prosecution of High Valued Individuals (HVI) in a timely and effective manner.<reason> However, RPA crews suffer from limited appreciation within the broader strike community1, with the exception of Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in 2011, wherein expertly conducted Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR) missions were the workhorses for U.S. and Coalition fighters. <acknowledgement> Despite making invaluable contributions, RPA operators are categorized as second-class citizens in the flying community. This cultural stigma can be seen in performance reports ranking them below that of their fighter pilot brethren.2 <evidence> Cultural integration of RPA crews into the USAF’s strike community is achievable, but requires the service to take action in several key areas. Among them are: mutual education, training standards, observation of doctrine, and most importantly joint exercising without limitations. Correcting these limitations gives the USAF an opportunity to remedy current issues plaguing the RPA community. A 2011 report filed by the USAF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) identified antiquated, poorly designed Operator Control Stations (OCS)3 that have been piecemealed together, without the benefit of modernization, from as far back as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) campaign over Bosnia and Herzegovina. <evidence> Finally, correcting perceptions about this group of airpower practitioners ultimately requires recasting the services terminology and focus away from the means (manned vs. remote) and toward the effects airpower generates.
Problem Background and Significance:
The USAF’s own projections anticipate a quickly evolving operational environment that by 2038 will require a much more sophisticated use of remote and autonomous systems to achieve mission objectives and balance risk appropriately.4 Future RPAs would be able to defeat enemy radar, carry out multiple mission sets, and use onboard sensors to prevent collision.5 Experts such as General Norman Schwartz, former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, believes the future of the USAF lies within unmanned assets, due to technology outpacing the capabilities of human beings6, such as interface devices that have reached their logical limits. <warrant> Unfortunately, fundamental issue of peer acceptance and conventional views regarding “humans in the cockpit” as somehow essential to the services identity have the potential to stall tactical advancement of RPAs. A 2014 Air Force Magazine article featuring Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense, noted that the USAF could only think in terms of “high-tech air-to-air combat and strategic bombing against major nation-states”7, and they seemed to envision the way those missions would be executed as exclusively one with people physically in the cockpit. As such, Gates felt that the USAF was not acting in the best interest of joint forces on the ground in combat zones.8
Perennially dismissed as merely video game operators, RPA pilots have faced an uphill battle since the beginning of the GWOT.9 Some critics have called RPA operators “less than true pilots”, and argue that “the very idea of a pilotless aircraft is dishonorable”.10 The root of the problem is a cultural gap between generations of traditional pilots and the modern generation of RPA operators that endure a different kind of stress. This failure is illustrated by the perception of one’s value. Pilots do not believe that the stress of, for example, flying an F-105 over Vietnam translates to what RPA pilots are facing today.11 This perception could be part of the reason why RPA pilots are fighting such an uphill battle, when compared to traditional pilots in the USAF. However, practical experience showed time and again that there is no psychological distance between the actions of the aircraft and its operators. For example, Creech Air Force Base has implemented a program wherein a full time psychologist is assigned to its wing. Crews are required to make contact after any kinetic activity, in an effort to mitigate stresses related to combat.
Many publications have identified problems in the RPA community. A 2011 report written by the USAF SAB identified pitfalls in the USAF RPA program that include, limited communications systems, training, crew selection, and sub-standard Ground Control Stations (GCS). Moreover, a 2014 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlighted recruitment, development, and retention issues preventing the RPA enterprise from flourishing, potentially compromising a significant strategic air asset. Additionally, Air Force Magazine featured a report in 2014 highlighting former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in which he summarizes “next-war-itis” struggles he encountered with USAF senior leadership. Gates explained the unquenchable thirst USAF senior leadership bore for conventional weapons, such as next generation fighters and bombers, dismissing the urgent requirement for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. In a recent (2015) Air & Space Power Journal article, Captain Michael Byrnes illuminated the negative cultural atmosphere RPA pilots are being forced to contend with, claiming fighter pilots have an unfair advantage, when stacked against their RPA counterparts for promotion. However, although these articles and reports identify cultural issues facing the RPA community, none of them address issues or solutions relating to the lack of synergy with regards to the USAF strike community and RPAs.
This research will identify key limitations within the USAF strike community that hinder necessary RPA advancement. Not only will these findings become a force multiplier for the broader USAF strike community, it will serve as a playbook for the entire Department of Defense (DOD). By providing an accurate sight-picture of gaps in the utilization of RPAs, and recommending solutions to remedy those issues, sister branches of service will be able to apply lessons learned from the experience and apply it to similar weapons platforms. Moreover, this research will provide senior leadership the necessary documentation of limitations affecting a significant weapon system within the USAF. The identification of these limitations, and the remedy for them, has the potential to foster tactical progress for current and future RPA operations.
Sources:
The content of this proposal will be addressed by using primary, secondary, and tertiary sources. Primary sources will include a 2014 report written by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) emphasizing substandard promotion rates for RPA pilots. The USAF RPA Vector 2013-2038, illustrates the vision of RPAs, and their significance to the future of the USAF. Moreover, a 2015 report by Captain Michael Byrnes casts light on current RPA struggles within the USAF. Other primary sources include a 2011 report written by the USAF Scientific Advisory Board, highlighting lackluster promotion rates and sub-standard mission essential equipment. Subject Matter Experts (SME) from the USAF Weapons School and previous Air University published articles on RPA concepts round out primary sources. Secondary sources include articles from Air Force Magazine, featuring former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, joint reports written by foreign military officers and unclassified USAF Weapon School white papers. Tertiary sources will be collected using open source news media, and articles written about RPAs.
This research paper will use a problem/solution framework in order to identify and correct current cultural limitations imposed on RPA pilots in USAF. The research will begin by providing a history of USAF RPA program and its earliest contributions. Then, the discussion will examine why the program was intensified during the GWOT, emphasizing the need for a robust RPA enterprise, and how cultural limitations impacted RPA operations. The research will focus on tactical successes in theatres other than Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), illustrating the effectiveness of RPA operators in Operation Unified Protector (OUP). These examples will provide scope as well as insight into the necessity to fully embrace today’s RPA pilots. Based on analysis of historical tactical performance and the significant impact RPAs have made to modern warfare, a solution to eliminate future cultural limitations will be provided by the author.
Section I. Introduction
· Research Question
· Problem Background and Significance
· Thesis
Section II. Background
· RPA History
· Inception of The RPA program
· Overview of ISR
· Weaponizing RPAs
· Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
· Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
· Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
· Close Air Support (CAS)
· Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)
· High Value Targets (HVTs)
· Operation Unified Protector (OUP)
· Air Interdiction (AI)
· Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR)
· Successes and Significant Contributions
Section III. Problem and Key Issues Facing RPA pilots
· Generational Gap Between Current Pilots and Senior Leadership
· Cultural Perspective
· Senior Leadership Qualifications Focus on Manned Assets
· Cultural Bias Toward Manned Assets
· Emphasis on Recapitalization F-35 / F-22 / KC-46 / LRS-B
· Promotion Rates
· Understanding / Perception
· Specific Mission Sets Performed by RPA Operators
· Education of Larger Force
· Training
· Informing Operators of Applicable Peripheral Weapon Systems The Capabilities of RPAs, How it Maximizes Their Potential
· Teaching Applicable Platforms RPA Tactics Techniques Procedures (TTPs)
Section IV. Recommendations to Dismantle Cultural Barriers
· Controlled Tours
· Not Bottom Third From MAJCOMS / Training
· 3 Years For Fighter Pilots (In Lieu of ALO) and Back to Primary Major Weapon System (MWS)
· Senior Leadership Perspective
· Qualification in RPAs
· Acknowledgement of RPA Pilot Achievement
· Awards and Decorations in Line With Manned Assets
· Air Medals For Exceptional Performance
· Training
· Extensive Training of Applicable Manned Assets
· Dedicated Training Block During B-Course With RPA’s
· Full Integration With Fighters and Bombers During Exercises
· Full Range of Capabilities without Tactical Limitation
· Briefing / Debriefing Jointly
· Finding Alignment Points
· Higher Standards In line with Fighters
· Moving Forward
· Elimination of MQ-1B
· Persistent Attack Model
· MQ-9 Legitimate Attack Asset
· Operate Doctrinally
· Not as Slave or Servant Assets
Section V. Conclusions
· Overcoming Cultural Stigmas Placed on RPA Operators
· Avoiding the “Bad Guy” Stigma ?
· Creating Mutual Respect Working Together
Annotated Bibliography:
Byrnes, Michael W. “Dark Horizon: Airpower Revolution on a Razor’s Edge”, Air & Space Power Journal, September – October 2015. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/2015-Sep-Oct/F-Byrnes.pdf. (accessed 10 Dec 15)
Captain Michael Byrnes is an Instructor Pilot at the RPA school house, Holloman Air Force Base (AFB). Byrnes has acquired over 2,000 hours flying both the MQ-1B and MQ-9 Reaper during combat support missions around the globe. In his article he addresses the unfair treatment of RPA pilots when stacked against fighter pilots in Officer Performance Reports (OPRs), leadership opportunities, and promotions. Byrnes’ article will be used to substantiate claims that the USAF does not recognize RPA pilots as equals when being compared to traditional Air Force Pilots.
Byrnes, Michael W. “Nightfall: Machine Autonomy in Air-to-Air Combat”, Air & Space Power Journal, May – June 2014. http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/article.asp?id=203. (accessed 10 Dec 15)
Captain Michael Byrnes again uses his experience and foresight to examine the future of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as they relate to air-to-air combat and air superiority. Byrnes discusses John Boyd’s observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) theory of problem solving, as the basis for future UAVs. Byrnes asserts that in the very near future UAV technology will be such that OODA loop processes will overcome that of a human’s ability in virtually every aspect of air-to-air combat, making human-inhabited platforms mostly obsolete with the exception of potentially “quarterbacking” at the edge of the fight utilizing 5th generation fighters. Additionally, Byrnes presents the argument that aviators are susceptible to a predisposition that one perceives airplanes as a machine whose purpose is to fly, rather than one that is developed to fly in order to serve a purpose. The inability to remove oneself from this ideology poses a major roadblock to the air superiority mission of the USAF. Byrnes’ articles are excellent secondary sources to illustrate the potential for RPA / UAV technology if allowed to flourish in a culture that embraces such technology.
Government Accountability Office. Air Force: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Unmanned Aerial System Pilots. April 2014. GAO-14-316.
The GAO report from April 2014 is a recent document that highlights the demand for RPAs and their crews. The report indicates that RPA crews have been at surge levels since 2007, and they are facing a crisis in the way of manning, promotion rates, and quality of life. The GAO report goes on to illustrate a human capital strategy that has been mismanaged, as well as training and personnel requirements that have not been met. The GAO report will be used as a source from which to pull data regarding promotion rates, RPA crew ratios, and quality of life issues.
Haider, Major Andre, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments. The Joint Air Power Competence Centre. September 2014. https://www.japcc.org/portfolio/remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-in-contested-environments-a-vulnerability-analysis/. (accessed 18 Nov 15).
Major Andre Haider of the German Army constructed a report in September of 2014 on the operation of RPAs within the contested degraded environment. Although the RPA has had limitations during these conflicts, they have operated with success in Iraq and Libya. Additionally, Major Haider’s findings provide an excellent road-map for future RPA considerations. Major Haider’s primary focus for his research revolves around RPA limitations in contested / degraded environments. However, the portions of his research that will be used revolve around the history of RPAs in various conflicts. Major Haider provides insight into Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, as well as the beginning of RPA operations in the Balkans 1995-96.
Jean, Grace V. “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Fuel Demand for Satellite Bandwidth.” National Defense Magazine, July 2011. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/July/Pages/RemotelyPilotedAircraftFuelsDemandforSatelliteBandwidth.aspx. (accessed 18 Nov 15)
Grace Jean is an author for National Defense Magazine. In her 2011 article Remotely Piloted Aircraft Fuel Demand for Satellite Bandwidth, she points out one of the biggest limiting factors in the RPA business, datalink. Datalink is the life blood of RPA operations. A deployed Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) is required for start, taxi, and takeoff for virtually all RPAs. This portion of the mission uses Line of Sight (LOS) C-band datalink, provided by Ground Data Terminals (GDT). However, after takeoff the aircraft is passed to the Mission Coordination Element (MCE) stateside. The aircraft is controlled by Ku satellite data during the MCE portion of the mission. This data, like home networks, can become saturated if the system is tasked too highly. Datalink bandwidth is one of the biggest limiting factors for the RPA enterprise. Additionally, Jean provides a glimpse into future RPA acquisition, claiming by 2020 the U.S. government will be operating nearly 800 satellite communications-enabled unmanned systems, Predators and Reapers accounting for the majority. The article looks into commercial satellite options via private companies to solve the datalink issue. This article will be used to show technological limiting factors of RPA advancement.
Blair, Maj David J., Helms, Capt Nick. “The Swarm, the Cloud, and the Importance of Getting There First”, Air & Space Power Journal, July – August 2013. http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/digital/pdf/articles/Jul-Aug-2013/F-Blair.pdf. (accessed 10 Dec 15).
Major David J. Blair is a MQ-1B instructor pilot and an AC-130 pilot. Additionally he was the 3rd Special Operations Squadron’s assistant operations officer. Major Blair is also a PhD candidate at Georgetown University. Captain Nick Helms is a test pilot and the assistant director of operations for Detachment 3, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Grey Butte Field, California. Captain Helms is responsible for testing and evaluating medium-altitude remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). Blair and Helms paint a picture wherein the RPA is the focal point of air superiority. Through the use of “mothership” tactics, swarms of UAVs, coupled with robust datalink technology, overpower enemy Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADs) of the future. However, more importantly they open the door to a cultural piece that demands RPA integration happen sooner than later. The general consensus seems to be RPAs are being held back by a culture that still views them in the “Wright Flyer” category. RPAs suffer from a service where the operators are outcasts, trying to find their place among traditional aviators. Blair and Helms indicate that a “head held low” identity hampers synergies formed with peripheral manned assets, limiting effectiveness and growth. Their article will substantiate claims that RPA pilots are not held as equals to that of their manned asset colleagues. Furthermore, it will be used as a vehicle to illustrate how the USAF will eventually suffer if this culture does not change.
Menthe, Lance, Myron Hura, and Carl Rhodes. The Effectiveness of Remotely Piloted Aircraft in a Permissive Hunter-Killer Scenario. RAND Corporation, 2014. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR276/RAND_RR276.pdf. (accessed 17 Dec 15).
The RAND Project Air Force (PAF) is a division of the RAND Corporation. It is the USAF’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. In this 2014 Study the RAND Corp identified traits that would be desirable for follow-on RPAs. The study was conducted using the MQ-1B Predator and MQ-9 Reaper. Part of overcoming cultural roadblocks is correcting perceptions that may be rooted in an organization. For example, the RAND Corp identifies the MQ-9 with the hunter-killer mission. However, the point is made that this is not a specific mission, but rather a class of missions in which the aircraft hunts for and, ultimately kills a specific individual or ground target. One of the principal concepts of breaking down cultural barriers is the idea that the RPA is simply a “persistent stare” platform, but rather a “persistent attack” platform. This change in notion yields an ideology that the RPA is a primary weapon system, equal, and in some cases superior, to its manned counterpart. The RAND Corporations case study on the hunter-killer scenario moves forward the notion that “effects” based results have impact on overcoming cultural stigmas, by showing others the direct impact, and lethality of the weapons system.
Michaels, Jim. “Drones Change ‘Top Gun’ Culture of Air Force,” USA Today, 1 December 2012. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/30/drone-wars/1737991/. (accessed 2 Dec 15).
This USA Today article shows how the USAF is moving toward the acceptance of RPA operators at the USAF Weapons School. The article provides insight for the requirement of full RPA integration as a viable weapons platform both by itself, as well as with manned assets. The article also attempts to overturn stigmas attached to RPA pilots. However, a portion of the article confirms that former fighter pilots do not recognize RPA pilots as equals, even discounting the amount of stress they feel during missions. This article will be used to advance the requirement of full integration and its benefits. To a lesser degree it will used to convey the thoughts and feelings of a different generation.
No Author. USAF RPA Vector Vision and Enabling Concepts 2013-2038. 2013. http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPAVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts2013-2038.pdf. (accessed 22 Nov 15)
The USAF RPA Vector 2013-2038 illustrates the current vision of the RPA community, as well as moving into the future. The report outlines current operations, strategic enterprise vision, and enabling concepts. The RPA Vector also highlights current and future capabilities by accentuating the flexibility and versatility of RPAs over the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). Additionally, the report shares the successes of RPAs in contested environments such as Iraq and Libya. Furthermore, the report paints a picture of future requirements for the RPA enterprise, including upgraded sensor applications, communication systems, as well as full system integration and ground control stations architecture. The contents of this report will be used as a primary source, conveying the requirement for advancement in virtually all aspects of RPA utilization in order to propel them onto the next level of tactical significance.
Pappalardo, Joe. “The Future For UAVs in the U.S. Air Force”. Popular Mechanics, 25 February 2010. http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a5383/4347306/. (accessed 11 Nov 15)
Joe Pappalardo is a writer for Popular Mechanics. Pappalardo wrote his article “The Future For UAVs in the U.S. Air Force” in 2010. His article mixes new advancements in the world of unmanned assets, such as weapons on target without human interaction, otherwise known as Man In The Loop (MITL), with outdated ideologies such as refusal to accept RPAs as a way into the future. Pappalardo’s article indicates that the USAF has squandered decade’s worth of opportunities that could have lead Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) advancement since the 1970’s. Additionally, Pappalardo highlights the USAF’s reluctance to embrace RPA technology since its birth in 1947, quoting one Air Force official as saying “How can you be a tiger sitting behind a console?” Pappalardo’s article will be used to bridge the gap between antiquated ideologies of the past and bring new technology to the forefront. This will likely serve as a tertiary research source.
Schogol, Jeff. “ACC adding thousands of airmen to fly, sustain drones”. Air Force Times, 10 December 2015. http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2015/12/10/acc-adding-thousands-airmen-fly-sustain-drones/77116006/. (accessed 10 Dec 15)
Jeff Schogol is a staff writer for the Air Force Times. Schogol writes an article, used as a tertiary resource data, showing a potential manning increase for RPA operators. According to Gen “Hawk” Carlise “our RPA enterprise was born in combat and recently surpassed 20 years of service, many of which was executed at surge levels”. Additionally, the article states that Carlisle himself listened for nearly four hours in October of 2015 as RPA crews suggested ways to fix major problems within the enterprise. Some of the problems highlighted in the October meeting included crushing ops tempos and being treated as second-class airmen by fighter pilots. Schogol’s article will be an excellent addition to the research because it is a timely and effective source that proves RPA crews still feel the sting of cultural stigmas attached to their career field.
Swarts, Phillip. “F-35 Helmet Costs $400,000 – 4 Times That of Predecessor.” Air Force Times, 26 October 2015. (accessed 4 Nov 15).
Phillip Swarts is a staff writer for the Air Force Times. Swarts’ article about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) illustrates the amount of time and money dedicated to manned assets by the USAF. His article highlights the USAF’s bias toward manned fighters with regards to Research & Design. By estimating the cost of each JSF helmet at a staggering $400,000 and a total price tag of $1 billion for all helmets scheduled to be purchased, Swarts’ article will supplement the claim made that RPA pilots have been shorted in the area of adequately equipping the force in order to maximize potential.
Tirpak, John A. “Gates Versus The Air Force”, Air Force Magazine, March 2014. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2014/March%202014/0314gates.aspx. (accessed 3 Dec 15)
John Tirpak is an Executive Editor for Air Force Magazine who wrote the article “Gates Versus the Air Force”. In his article, Tirpak recounts an interview with former Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) T. Michael Moseley. Tirpak brings to light the adversarial relationship between Moseley and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates. In his article Tirpak uses passages and quotes from Gates’ memoirs, titled Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. The article provides a clear picture of the USAF’s focus on air-to-air assets, and strategic bombers. The article also highlights the USAF’s unwillingness to ramp up Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), in the form of RPAs. This article will be used as a source to provide evidence of the USAF’s reluctance to fully embrace RPA’s for favor of traditional manned assets.
Zacharias, Greg. Maybury, Mark. Operating Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft for Irregular Warfare. April 2011. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. SAB-TR-10-03.
In the USAF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) 10-03 report, a key finding determined that current RPA operations fail to maximize potential due to the use of outdated and poorly designed Operator Control Stations (OCS). The SAB found that the OCSs were inconsistent with accepted systems engineering practices, Human System Integration (HIS), and closed architectures that fail to take advantage of “best in breed” component solutions. Additionally, the SAB investigation uncovers OCSs that have been largely unchanged from initial engineering prototypes, dating back 10-15 years, for all RPAs operating in the USAF’s inventory. The SAB’s findings will be used to show lack of acceptance of RPA systems through the neglect of modernization and acquisition.
End Notes:
1. W.J. Hennigan. “Air Force Proposes $3-Billion Plan to Vastly Expand its Drone Program”, Los Angeles Times, 10 December 2015. http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-drone-pilots-20151210-story.html.
2. Michael W. Byrnes. “Dark Horizon: Airpower Revolution on a Razor’s Edge”, Air & Space Power Journal, September – October 2015. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/2015-Sep-Oct/F-Byrnes.pdf. 38.
3. Greg Zacharias, Maybury, Mark. “Operating Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft for Irregular Warfare”. April 2011. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. SAB-TR-10-03. 29.
4. No Author. USAF RPA Vector Vision and Enabling Concepts 2013-2038. 2013. http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPAVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts2013-2038.pdf. 30.
5. Joe Pappalardo. “The Future For UAVs in the U.S. Air Force”. Popular Mechanics, 25 February 2010.
6. Ibid., no page number.
7. John A. Tirpak. “Gates Versus The Air Force”, Air Force Magazine, March 2014. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2014/March%202014/0314gates.aspx.
8. Ibid., no page number.
9. Jim Michaels. “Drones Change “Top Gun” Culture of Air Force,” USA Today, 1 December 2012. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/30/drone-wars/1737991/.
10. Ibid., no page number.
11. Ibid., no page number.
