finance
Advanced Managerial Finance
In Ji Jang
Raising Capital 2
Ch.20
Stages in the Financing Life Cycle • 1. Idea Stage
• 2. Private Equity Stage
• 3. Initial Public Offering (IPO) Stage
• 4. Seasoned Issuer Stage
• Let’s look at book value(BV), discounted cash flow (DCF) and market value (MV) balance sheets
Idea Stage • Entrepreneur has idea to spend $3 mil. on a project that will
earn $400K per year (discount rate 10%)
BV
0 0
DCF
0.4M/0.1 – 3M
= 1M 1M
MV
0 0
Private Equity Stage • VC puts on $3M for 80% of shares (800K shares)
• Post-money (after-the-money) valuation = 3/0.8 = 3.75M
• VC’s DCF value = 0.8 * 4M = 3.2 M
• Entrepreneur retains 20% of shares (200K shares) valued at (0.2*3.75)=0.75M and with DCF value of 0.8M (= 0.2*4M).
BV
3M 3M
DCF
0.4M/0.1
= 4M
Ent. 0.80M
VC 3.2M
MV
3.75M
VC 3M
Ent. 0.75M
IPO Stage • Need 100M for a project that generates $12.1mil. per year
• Sell 4M new shares to public at $25 per share
• VC has 800K shares worth 20M (=$25 * 800K) (16%)
• Entrepreneur has 200K share worth 5M (=$25*200K) (4%)
BV
103M 103M
DCF
125M (12.1+0.4)/0.1
= 125M
MV
125M Ent. 5M
VC. 20M
Public S/h
100M
Practice Problems • Question 3
Initial Public Offerings (IPO) • Why go public?
Need for new capital
Less reliance on individual banks or venture capital (VC)
Increase visibility (not many investors know about a private company)
Costs: Reporting requirement, legal liabilities, dispersed ownership etc.
• Basic Procedure
Pre-underwriting conferences
Registration statements filed/approval
Pricing the issue
Public offering & Sales
Market stabilization
IPO Underpricing • Average IPO during 1960 to 2014 rose 16.9% in the first day
• Money left on the table: Issuing firm receives less money than it should have
First day return: (Close price-Offer price)/Offer price
Money on the table: # of shares sold × (𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
• Possible explanations Underwriting risk: risk of being sued by investors
Asymmetric information (winner’s curse)
IPO Underpricing: Why? • Rational explanation:
Information asymmetry among investors (unequally informed investors )
Investor types Offer types
Informed good (oversubscribed)
Uninformed bad (winner’s curse)
Numerical Example • Good Offerings
• Good cash flow =$3/share
• R=10%
• Good price = $3/0.1 =$30
• 50% good offerings
• Bad Offerings
• Bad cash flow = $2/share
• R=10%
• Bad price = $2/0.1 =$20
• 50% bad offerings
If no one can distinguish between good from bad,
fair price = 0.5 *30 + 0.5*20 = $25
Underpricing • But, if there are informed and uninformed traders…
• Uninformed traders will end up with more shares in bad offerings (Winner’s Curse)
• Suppose, uninformed investors wind up with ¾ of bad offerings and ¼ of good offerings
• If they pay $25 their expected return is only 9%.
• Need to sell shares at $22.50 in order to give uninformed investors a 10% expected return.
3 1 (2) (3)
2.254 4 ( ) 9%
25 25 U
E R
+
= = =
Other explanations? • Many researchers attempt to understand why issuers are willing
to leave money on the table at IPO Rational explanations (information asymmetry) (e.g., Rock (1986))
To attract more investors (informed and uninformed), shares are underpriced
Behavioral explanations (Prospect theory) (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2002))
People hate losses more than the gain
Loss after a gain is different from loss after a loss