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The Nonproliferation Review

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Radiological-weapons threats: case studies from the extreme right

BreAnne K. Fleer

To cite this article: BreAnne K. Fleer (2020) Radiological-weapons threats: case studies from the extreme right, The Nonproliferation Review, 27:1-3, 225-242, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1775987

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1775987

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Radiological-weapons threats: case studies from the extreme right BreAnne K. Fleer

ABSTRACT Violence by far-right extremists has risen globally and domestically in recent years. While most media and academic attention has focused on mass shootings and other deadly conventional attacks, far-right non-state actors have also considered developing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Some far-right extremists have suggested using radiological devices, often referred to as “weapons of mass disruption,” as one means to achieve their ideological goals. Although radiological plots and successful attacks have rarely occurred, the presence of unsecured radioactive sources across the United States augments the danger of this type of terrorism. To explore dimensions of the radiological-weapons threat posed by domestic far-right extremists, this paper studies three illustrative cases of possible radiological-weapons pursuit since 2008, aiming to identify lessons from these incidents. An in-depth examination of the cases reveals foremost that some actors successfully acquired materials needed for a radiological weapon without triggering intervention by authorities. Additionally, although the individuals did not plot in large, hierarchical groups, they had links to other people and organizations that shared their far-right views and allegedly discussed their plans with others. While broad generalizations cannot be made from three cases, these incidents provide concrete examples of the far-right radiological-weapons threat and context for understanding how far-right extremists view the role of CBRN weapons.

KEYWORDS terrorism; radiological weapons; dirty bombs; far- right extremism

Far-right extremist violence has been increasing in the United States and other Western countries. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2019, between 2013 and 2018, “the total number of far-right incidents has risen 320 per cent.”1 The Index reports that the number of far-right terrorist incidents reached a fifty-year high of fifty-six attacks in the West in 2017, compared with only 6.5 attacks each year on average between 1995, the year of the Oklahoma City bombing, and 2010.2 Major incidents within the last decade have occurred in regions from Europe to Oceania to North America.3 In the United States alone, thirty-one attacks took place in 2017, according to a 2018 brief by

© 2020 Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

CONTACT BreAnne K. Fleer [email protected]

1 Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism,” Sydney, November 2019, p. 46, <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf>.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 44.

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the Center for Strategic and International Studies.4 Although American far-right parami- litary activity and organizing extends far into the past, particularly in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and in reaction to the social changes of the 1960s, recent far-right attacks generating substantial concerns have included the June 2015 Charleston Church shooting that killed nine people, the vehicle attack at the August 2017 Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally which killed one person, the October 2018 Pittsburgh Tree of Life synagogue shooting that took the lives of eleven people, and many other instances of violence.5 The attacker in the August 2019 shooting in El Paso, Texas, which killed twenty-three people, apparently posted a virulently anti-immigrant manifesto online before the attack.6

Tactically, far-right terrorism tends to employ conventional weapons such as firearms and conventional explosives. Mass-shooting attacks, for example, have come to increasing prominence in recent years.7 The New York Times attributed seventeen “active-shooter attacks” in the United States since 2011 to individuals linked to “white extremism,” the highest number of attacks (five) occurring in 2018 and approximately half of the attacks (nine) occurring between November 2017 and August 2019.8 The potential for vio- lence is not confined to conventional means, however. The February 2019 case of Coast Guard Lieutenant Christopher P. Hasson, who identified as a white nationalist and alleg- edly expressed interest in creating a plague, serves as a recent example of far-right con- sideration of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks.9 Given rising numbers of violent incidents, the prospect of a far-right CBRN threat must also be studied.

Certain trends of far-right extremist plotting can contextualize the potential CBRN threat posed by these individuals and groups. As opposed to some jihadist groups and other terrorist organizations that operate transnationally, far-right extremists often launch domestic attacks and plot alone. A 2018 study by Noémie Bouhana and colleagues found that 95.6 percent of a set of forty-five “right-wing extremist individuals” who had planned or conducted attacks since 1990 sought to carry out an attack in the country in which they grew up.10 The individualized and domestic nature of many far-right extremist activities means that any CBRN-weapons development would probably rely on resources found within the country or region of the planned attack.

One type of CBRN attack that may be difficult to detect and prevent within the United States is radiological terrorism. Analysts and media reports have raised questions about the possibility of non-state actors building and detonating a “dirty bomb,” a type of

4 Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States,” Center for International and Strategic Studies, November 7, 2018, <www.csis.org/analysis/rise-far-right-extremism-united-states>.

5 Kathleen Belew, Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); Jones, “The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States.”

6 Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, “El Paso Shooting Suspect’s Manifesto Echoes Trump’s Language,” New York Times, August 4, 2019, <www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/us/politics/trump-mass-shootings.html?module=inline>. The death toll of the shooting has been updated to twenty-three.

7 Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2019,” pp. 49–50. 8 Weiyi Cai, Troy Griggs, Jason Kao, Juliette Love, and Joe Ward, “White Extremist Ideology Drives Many Deadly Shoot- ings,” New York Times, August 4, 2019, <www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/04/us/white-extremist-active-shooter. html>.

9 United States v. Christopher Paul Hasson, GLS-19-63 at 1-4 (US District Court for the District of Maryland), Motion for Detention Pending Trial, Robert K. Hur, February 19, 2019, <www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mdd. 445784/gov.uscourts.mdd.445784.9.0_9.pdf>.

10 Noémie Bouhana, Emily Corner, Paul Gill, and Bart Schuurman, “Background and Preparatory Behaviours of Right-Wing Extremist Lone Actors: A Comparative Study,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 12, No. 6 (2018), pp. 151, 153–54, <www. universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2018/issue-6/a10-bouhana-et-al. pdf>.

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radiological dispersal device (RDD) that combines conventional explosives and radio- active materials. Regardless of specific radiological weapon type, the problem of unse- cured radioactive materials suitable for a destructive or deadly device makes this category of CBRN terrorism dangerous and perhaps hard to stop in advance. Numerous reports draw attention to the difficulty of regulating radioactive sources and substances, even in major industrialized countries such as the United States.11 A similar issue exists with respect to some toxic industrial chemicals that could be used in chemical attacks and other industrial materials such as ammonium-nitrate fertilizer, which have been used in explosive devices.12 Indeed, radioactive materials have many industrial and medical applications, including “industrial radiography, radiation therapy, university research, and natural resource exploration,” as well as usage in nuclear power plants and research reactors.13 While US governmental agencies take steps to license, account for, and sometimes dispose of radioactive sources, even extensive regulation does not preclude materials falling into the hands of individuals unauthorized to handle them.14 The 2019 Global Incidents and Trafficking Database found 172 world- wide “incidents involving loss of regulatory control” over radioactive materials in 2019, 120 of which occurred in North America.15 Of all the cases, 38 percent involved a loss of materials, 31 percent involved theft, and 52 percent occurred while material was in transport.16 The vulnerability of radioactive materials to theft or other forms of acquisition by would-be attackers makes radiological terrorism a clear threat.

Despite the potential ease of access to materials for a radiological weapon, very few attacks or serious plots have actually occurred. The 2006 assassination of former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Alexander Litvinenko, which used polo- nium-210 allegedly added to a pot of tea, has been described as “likely the first provable act of radiological terror.”17 Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, insights into the potential threat from non-state actors have focused on the potential for jihadist groups like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State to use radiological weapons in areas where they operate or even in the United States. Al-Qaeda leadership has directly expressed the group’s desire to obtain nuclear and radiological weapons, and at least one alleged plot was uncovered in the United States.18 While both the Litvinenko assassination

11 James M. Acton, M. Brooke Rogers, and Peter D. Zimmerman, “Beyond the Dirty Bomb: Re-thinking Radiological Terror,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2007), p. 154, <www.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564760>; National Research Council, Com- mittee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, “Nuclear and Radiological Threats,” in Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2002), pp. 48, 51, <www.nap.edu/read/10415/chapter/4>.

12 Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Transportation Research Board and National Research Council, Terrorism and the Chemical Infrastructure: Protecting People and Reducing Vulnerabilities (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006), <www.doi.org/10. 17226/11597>; Dana A. Shea, Linda-Jo Schierow, and Scott D. Szymendera, “Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, July 31, 2013, <https://fas. org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43070.pdf >.

13 National Research Council, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, “Nuclear and Radiological Threats,” p. 48.

14 Ibid., p. 48. 15 Sam Meyer, Jakob Lengacher, and Jaewon Oh, “CNS Global Incidents and Trafficking Database: 2019 Annual Report,”

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, forthcoming. 16 Ibid., p. 8. 17 Acton et al., “Beyond the Dirty Bomb,” p. 151; New York Times, “Key Findings from the Litvinenko Report,” January 21,

2016, <www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/21/world/europe/22litvinenko-report-findings.html>. 18 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wheling, The Four Faces of

Nuclear Terorrism (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 31, 260.

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and radiological threats by al-Qaeda involved transnational actors with access to exten- sive resources, the rise in violence by domestic far-right extremists has caused additional alarm. One article published in August 2019 in Foreign Policy directly addresses the threat of white supremacists creating a dirty bomb, pointing to lapses in security for dangerous radioactive sources and the prevalence of these materials in the United States.19

Given an increase in the number of attacks by far-right extremists, the security vul- nerability of radioactive materials, and the pursuit—if not successful use—of radiologi- cal weapons by other extremist actors, it is important to investigate the radiological- weapons risk posed by far-right would-be terrorists. Several questions may be asked, including the extent of interest in such attacks among far-right actors, their degree of progress in realizing any potential plans, and the reasons why no incidents have occurred. It is also necessary to evaluate the risk of far-right radiological terrorism com- pared with other threats. This article thus seeks to expand on previous research to ascer- tain what can be learned from a study of several prominent cases about the nature and level of radiological-weapons threat posed by far-right extremists. First, this article pre- sents definitions of key terms and a review of relevant literature on radiological weapons, far-right extremist ideologies, and far-right CBRN terrorism. Next, it examines each of three cases of possible or attempted radiological-weapons development by far-right extremists in the United States since the 2008 election of President Barack Obama. Finally, it analyzes similarities and differences among cases, draws some preliminary conclusions about the level of threat of far-right extremism using radiological weapons, and suggests areas for future research.

Definitions and prior research

Before exploring the proposed research question, it is necessary to define key concepts and the scope of the article. “Radiological weapons” are defined here as devices that use radio- active material or radiation to cause harm to their targets. This article includes two types of radiological weapons under this definition, based on The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism by Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter: radiological dispersal devices (RDDs), which typically involve conventional explosives laced with radioactive material to form a “dirty bomb” but can include any devices that spread radioactive material; and radiation emission devices (REDs), which do not contain explosives but “emanate radiation over a localized area.”20 Radiological weapons must be distinguished from nuclear weapons, which use fissile materials that can undergo a nuclear fission or fusion reaction to create a massive release of energy. Extremists may seek to steal and detonate a nuclear weapon from a country’s arsenal or produce an improvised nuclear device (IND)—a rudi- mentary device using fissile material to create a nuclear explosion—but these weapons are nuclear weapons and thus differ from radiological weapons.21 Additionally, extremists can seek to use radiation in other harmful ways, such as by directly attacking a nuclear facility or by sabotaging a nuclear power plant or research reactor and causing the release of

19 Will Cathcart and Joseph A. Epstein, “White Supremacists Want a Dirty Bomb,” Foreign Policy, August 16, 2019, <https:// foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/16/white-supremacists-want-a-nuclear-weapon/>.

20 Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 259. 21 Ibid., p. 3.

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radiation into the atmosphere.22 Nuclear weapons and nuclear sabotage, although serious threats, are not the focus of this article.

This article bases the definition of “far-right CBRN terrorism” on the definition pre- sented by Daniel Koehler and Peter Popella: “the use or threat thereof of CBRN agents by far-right actors for the purpose of intimidating or killing ideologically defined enemies.”23 “Far-right actors,” as Koehler and Popella indicate, can include a variety of groups and individuals that support a white supremacist ideology, such as neo-Nazis, the Christian Identity movement, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), racist skinheads, and others, among whom “the unifying ideological element … is essentially apocalyptic racism.”24 White supremacists believe that white people are inherently superior to, and should dominate, members of other racial groups.25 Instead of confining analysis to a specific set of far-right actors that follow particular ideological or religious variations, this article looks into the radiological-weapons threat from any far-right extremists. When referring to “extremism,” this article adopts the definition used by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START): “any set of beliefs that challenge the legitimacy of the state and/or authorize the use of unlawful behavior to achieve political and/or religious goals.”26

Various studies have noted the potential for far-right extremists to pursue and develop radiological weapons, providing a compelling reason why this particular threat deserves further research. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, published in 2004, suggests that far-right extremists could seek radiological weapons in the United States and points to the relatively low level of “financial and technical resources” needed for any non-state actor to build a device or conduct an attack.27

In 2017, Miles A. Pomper and Gabrielle Tarini went further, identifying jihadists and the far right as the two most likely non-state actors to pursue nuclear weapons, noting that these groups “have the longest and most documented interest in nuclear and radiological, as well as chemical and biological, weapons.”28 Indeed, at least two major pieces of far-right extremist literature, the Anders Breivik manifesto and The Turner Diaries, discuss radiological weapons and their utility to violent white supre- macists. Breivik, a Norwegian far-right extremist who killed seventy-seven people in a bombing and shooting attack on July 22, 2011, extensively discussed radiological and other CBRN weapons in his 1,500-page manifesto, pointing to the ease of obtain- ing radioisotopes and their strategic use, not to maximize the number of people killed, but to cause “devastating ideological, physiological and economical damage” to his

22 National Research Council, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, “Nuclear and Radiological Threats,” pp. 41–48.

23 Daniel Koehler and Peter Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West: Characteristics of Plots and Perpetrators for Future Threat Assessment,” Terrorism and Political Vio- lence (2018), p. 3, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1500365>.

24 Ibid. 25 Anti-Defamation League, “Defining Extremism: A Glossary of White Supremacist Terms, Movements and Philosophies,”

ADL Center on Extremism, <www.adl.org/education/resources/glossary-terms/defining-extremism-white-supremacy>; Pete Simi, Steven Windisch, and Karyn Sporer, “Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far-Right Terrorists,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, College Park, MD, November 2016, pp. 6–7, <www. start.umd.edu/pubs/START_RecruitmentRadicalizationAmongUSFarRightTerrorists_Nov2016.pdf>.

26 Simi et al., “Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far-Right Terrorists,” p. 128. 27 Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 269. 28 Miles A. Pomper and Gabrielle Tarini, “Nuclear Terrorism—Threat or Not?” AIP Conference Proceedings, Vol. 1898, No. 1

(2017), p. 10, <https://doi.org/10.1063/1.5009230>.

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enemies.29 White supremacists with apocalyptic views who seek the collapse of society and the government may be inclined to use radiological weapons for these purposes, since, as Pomper and Tarini note, RDDs are treated as “weapons of mass disruption” instead of weapons of mass destruction.30 Furthermore, The Turner Diaries, William Pierce’s 1978 story dubbed the “bible of the racist right” by the FBI and found in the vehicle of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh on the day of his attack, discusses radiological-weapons plots to destroy infrastructure and achieve white world domination.31 With readily available far-right extremist literature encouraging radiological-weapons development and far-right extremist motives aligning with the strategic purposes of radiological weapons, there appears to be a demonstrated interest in this particular CBRN attack type. Recent cases of domestic radiological-weapons pursuit provide a window into this threat.

Recent research has shown that far-right extremists have indeed sought or attempted to use CBRN weapons, including radiological weapons. The 2018 article by Koehler and Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Ter- rorism Efforts in the West: Characteristics of Plots and Perpetrators for Future Threat Assessment,” reviews thirty-one far-right CBRN incidents in the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa between March 1970 and May 2017.32 Of those inci- dents, which include use of CBRN weapons, efforts to obtain CBRNmaterials, consideration or threats of CBRN use, and hoaxes, most involved ricin, cyanide, anthrax, or other chemical or biological substances.33 Four of the thirty-one incidents, or approximately 13 percent of the cases, were radiological, although one was a hoax.34 Key findings included:

. The majority of all cases involved lone actors.

. The most common ideologies were neo-Nazism and non-religious white supremacism.

. A large number of involved individuals had white-collar backgrounds.

. The vast majority of involved individuals were male, with an average age of 42 years.

. Attack plans or device designs lent themselves to indiscriminate targeting.

. Most CBRN agents involved were relatively easy to acquire.35

These insights into far-right CBRN incidents contextualize the radiological-weapons inci- dents this article seeks to analyze.

Methodology

To understand how far-right extremists have pursued radiological weapons, this article analyzes a set of three American cases included in at least one CBRN terrorism database.

29 CNN, “Norway Terror Attacks Fast Facts,” July 3, 2019, <www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/world/europe/norway-terror- attacks/index.html>; Charles P. Blair, Kelsey Gregg, and Jonathan Garbose, “Norway’s Anders Brevik: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Politics of Cultural Despair,” Federation of American Scientists, July 27, 2011, <https://fas. org/blogs/security/2011/07/norways-anders-breivik-weapons-of-mass-destruction-and-politics-of-cultural-despair/ #_ftn1>.

30 Pomper and Tarini, “Nuclear Terrorism,” p. 2. 31 Blair et al., “Norway’s Anders Brevik: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Politics of Cultural Despair.” 32 Koehler and Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the

West: Characteristics of Plots and Perpetrators for Future Threat Assessment,” p. 14. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., pp. 2, 15–18.

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All three cases are included in the 2018 article by Koehler and Popella on far-right CBRN terrorism.36 START’s Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries Database (RANNSAD), which lists forty-five worldwide radiological and nuclear incidents between 1974 and 2008, outlines one of the studied cases.37 The Monterey WMD Terror- ism Database (WMDTD) of seventy-one worldwide radiological incidents between 1974 and 2004 was also consulted but did not include any of the relevant cases.38 Each case is analyzed using a combination of publicly available press articles and releases, court documents, and reports from nongovernmental organizations.

Studied cases

All three cases took place in the United States, enacted by Americans. The individuals involved in two cases obtained radioactive materials and explosive precursors that could be used in an RDD, and those involved in a third case attempted to construct an RED. None was successful in building a radiological weapon.

Case 1: “Atomwaffen Division” and the 2017 discovery of radioactive material and explosives

On January 9, 2018, Brandon Clint Russell, the twenty-two-year-old founder of the neo-Nazi group “Atomwaffen,” received a five-year federal prison sentence “for possessing an unregistered destructive device and for unlawful storage of explosive material.”39 In addition to discovering the explosive hexamethylene triperoxide diamine, several explosive precursors, electric matches, empty ammunition casings, and fuses that could serve as detonators, the authorities found radioactive thorium and americium and two Geiger counters at his Tampa residence.40 Russell was in the “53rd Brigade Special Troops Battalion of Florida’s Army National Guard” when he was arrested, according to media reporting.41

The situation unfolded when, in May 2017, Devon Arthurs, who lived with Russell, allegedly shot and killed their other two roommates.42 Arthurs explained to the authorities that he, Russell, and the two others had been neo-Nazis but that Arthurs had converted to Islam.43 Although Arthurs provided inconsistent motives for the shooting and was ruled

36 Koehler and Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West.”

37 Gary Ackerman, Charles Blair, and Maranda Sorrells, Radiological and Nuclear Non-state Adversaries Database (RANNSAD) (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2009), <https://doi.org/ 10.7910/DVN/SCGOJE>.

38 Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program, “Monterey WMD Terrorism Database,” <http://wmddb.miis. edu>.

39 US Department of Justice, “Neo-Nazi Leader Sentenced to Five Years in Federal Prison for Explosives Charges,” January 9, 2018, <www.justice.gov/opa/pr/neo-nazi-leader-sentenced-five-years-federal-prison-explosives-charges>.

40 A.C. Thompson, “An Atomwaffen Member Sketched a Map to Take the Neo-Nazis Down. What Path Officials Took Is a Mystery,” ProPublica, November 20, 2018, <www.propublica.org/article/an-atomwaffen-member-sketched-a-map-to- take-the-neo-nazis-down-what-path-officials-took-is-a-mystery>; United States v. Brandon Russell, 8:17-mj-1362-TBM at 3-4 (US District Court for the Middle District of Florida), Criminal Complaint and Affidavit, Timothy A. Swanson, May 20, 2017, <www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/press-release/file/968111/download>.

41 A.C. Thompson, Ali Winston, and Jake Hanrahan, “Ranks of Notorious Hate Group Include Active-Duty Military,” ProPu- blica, May 3, 2018, <www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-hate-group-active-duty-military>.

42 Russell, 8:17-mj-1362-TBM at 2–3. 43 Ibid., p. 3.

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“mentally incompetent to stand trial,” according to ProPublica, he told the authorities that Atomwaffen members were planning to bomb targets such as “power lines, nuclear reac- tors, [and] synagogues.”44 Arthurs also indicated that Russell went online and made threats in neo-Nazi chat rooms “to kill people and bomb infrastructure.”45 According to ProPublica, Russell had an “obsession” with nuclear weapons; he studied nuclear physics in college and “posted instructions online for building improvised nuclear reac- tors.”46 Russell stated to the authorities that the explosives found at his apartment were for a University of South Florida engineering club.47 Authorities found The Turner Diaries, Mein Kampf, and a displayed photograph of McVeigh at Russell’s residence.48

In 2018, ProPublica estimated that Atomwaffen—which means “atomic weapons” in German—had approximately eighty members operating through armed cells across the United States and Canada.49 Many of its members had served in these two countries’mili- taries.50 The group originated on an online fascist forum called “Iron March,” which had over 1,600 members and connections in the United States and Europe before it ceased to exist in 2017.51 Russell apparently used such online platforms to praise figures such as Breivik, Hitler, and school shooters.52 Members of Atomwaffen have been associated with additional killings and crimes, including alleged assaults at the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally in August 2017.53 The group has also posted recruitment flyers on American college campuses, conducted weapons training exercises, and held “hate camps” such as a three-day gathering in the Nevada desert in January 2018.54 The group’s ideology is described by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) as national socialism and accelerationism, which involves the belief “that violence, depravity and degeneracy are the only sure way to establish order in their dystopian and apocalyptic vision of the world,” with the goal of “civilizational collapse.”55 In March 2020, the group allegedly disbanded.56

It is unclear how Russell obtained explosives and radioactive sources. No further infor- mation is present in publicly available court documents regarding the thorium and amer- icium, except that bomb technicians’ pagers detected the material inside the residence.57

Thorium is considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency to be an “indirect- use material” in terms of potential nuclear-weapons applications, with a significant

44 Thompson, “An Atomwaffen Member Sketched a Map to Take the Neo-Nazis Down.” 45 Russell, 8:17-mj-1362-TBM at 3. 46 Thompson, “An Atomwaffen Member Sketched a Map to Take the Neo-Nazis Down.” 47 Russell, 8:17-mj-1362-TBM at 5. 48 Thompson, “An Atomwaffen Member Sketched a Map to Take the Neo-Nazis Down.” 49 A.C. Thompson, Ali Winston, and Jake Hanrahan, “Inside Atomwaffen as It Celebrates a Member for Allegedly Killing a

Gay Jewish College Student,” ProPublica, February 23, 2018, <www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-inside- white-hate-group>.

50 Thompson et al., “Ranks of Notorious Hate Group Include Active-Duty Military”; Ben Makuch and Mack Lamoureux, “Neo-Nazis Want Canadian Military Training,” VICE, October 22, 2018, <www.vice.com/en_ca/article/a3pppz/neo- nazis-want-canadian-military-training>.

51 Southern Poverty Law Center, “Atomwaffen Division,” <www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/ atomwaffen-division>.

52 Thompson, “An Atomwaffen Member Sketched a Map to Take the Neo-Nazis Down.” 53 Thompson et al., “Ranks of Notorious Hate Group Include Active-Duty Military.” 54 Southern Poverty Law Center, “Atomwaffen Division”; Thompson et al., “Inside Atomwaffen as It Celebrates a Member

for Allegedly Killing a Gay Jewish College Student.” 55 Southern Poverty Law Center, “Atomwaffen Division.” 56 Bridge Initiative, “Factsheet: Atomwaffen Division,” October 10, 2019, Georgetown University, <https://bridge.

georgetown.edu/research/factsheet-atomwaffen-division-awd/>. 57 Russell, 8:17-mj-1362-TBM at 4.

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quantity of 20 tons needed to develop a nuclear weapon.58 Thus, it would be nearly impossible for a domestic terrorist to use thorium to construct a nuclear weapon. Amer- icium is commonly found in smoke detectors, but the 2010 report by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force classified americium-241 as one of sixteen radionuclides of principal security concern for its potential RDD applications.59 Court documents do not indicate how much thorium and americium Russell possessed or whether it was in a form and of a radioac- tivity level conducive for use in radiological weapons. Russell was not prosecuted or charged for possession of the radioactive sources.60 However, Koehler and Popella classify Russell’s successful acquisition of these materials as a radiological incident.61 They note that, while thorium and americium emit alpha particles and thus “possess only low pen- etration power,” these materials can be dangerous to humans if inhaled or stuck as splin- ters in skin.62 On the other hand, radioactive materials that emit beta or gamma radiation pose more of a threat for use in radiological weapons, as they can cause internal and exter- nal damage just through exposure; gamma-emitters such as cobalt-60 or iridium-192 are considered to present the highest risk to human health.63

Case 2: “Hiroshima on a light switch”: 2013 KKK member’s RED plot against Muslims and others

On December 19, 2016, Glendon Scott Crawford, who claimed to be a member of the United Northern and Southern Knights of the KKK, became the first person sentenced for a radiological-weapons plot in the United States.64 The sixty-six-page affidavit details how Crawford, who faced thirty years in jail and “lifetime supervised release,” extensively attempted to acquire and build an RED in upstate New York with the assist- ance of “co-conspirator” Eric J. Feight.65 Feight also faced prison time for supporting Crawford’s activities but was not charged under the 2004 “dirty bomb” statute.66

Crawford made substantial progress toward completing his RED, but the authorities monitored his activities and intervened before a real device could be finished and oper- ational. Crawford’s RED, which he described as “Hiroshima on a light switch,” would

58 International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safeguards Glossary,” International Nuclear Verification Series, No. 3 (2001), p. 23, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf>.

59 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “The 2010 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report, Report to the President and the U.S. Congress under Public Law 109-58, the Energy Policy Act of 2005,” US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, August 11, 2010, pp. 9, 11, <www.nrc.gov/security/byproduct/2010-task-force-report. pdf>.

60 Since these materials are commonly found in small trace amounts in consumer products—thorium, for instance, is often used in cat litter, and americium in smoke detectors—it can be assumed that the amounts detected in Russell’s apartment were probably of insignificant quantities so as not to warrant a charge of illegal possession of radioactive materials.

61 Koehler and Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West.”

62 Ibid., p. 18. 63 Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 267. 64 US Department of Justice, “New York Man Sentenced to 30 Years for Plot to Kill Muslims,” December 19, 2016, <www.

justice.gov/opa/pr/new-york-man-sentenced-30-years-plot-kill-muslims>; United States v. Glendon Scott Crawford and Eric J. Feight, 1:13-mj-312-CFH at 7 (US District Court for the Northern District of New York), Criminal Complaint and Affidavit, Geoffrey Kent, June 17, 2013, <www.courtlistener.com/docket/4612830/1/united-states-v-feight/>.

65 US Department of Justice, “New York Man Sentenced to 30 Years for Plot to Kill Muslims”; Crawford and Feight, 1:13-mj- 312-CFH.

66 US Department of Justice, “New York Man Sentenced to 30 Years for Plot to Kill Muslims.”

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be a “mobile, remotely-operated, radiation emitting device capable of killing human targets silently and from a distance with lethal doses of radiation,” according to the affidavit.67 Targets for the device included Muslims and government officials, and Craw- ford had looked up or mentioned specific locations such as mosques, an Islamic commu- nity center, the White House, and the New York Governor’s Mansion.68 In the development process, Crawford and Feight constructed a “remote initiation device,” and Crawford sought financing for a “sufficiently powerful x-ray system” that would provide the radiation for the device.69 Among the contacted organizations were the KKK, a synagogue, and another Jewish organization.70 Authorities were notified of Craw- ford’s activities, and undercover law enforcement individuals posed as points of contact in “two separate groups with the apparent means and ability” to procure the x-ray system.71

Ultimately, the authorities provided Crawford with the system but ensured it was not harmful, and arrested both Crawford and Feight after assembly.72

Crawford and Feight had backgrounds that gave them knowledge of certain technologies that could be used in an RED. According to the affidavit, Crawford, aged fifty-two when he was sentenced in 2016, worked as an industrial mechanic at General Electric in Schenectady, New York, and Feight, aged fifty-seven when he was sentenced in 2015, was a contractor with “mechanical and engineering skills.”73 The Guardian reported that Crawford had served in the US Navy.74 Both Crawford and Feight were married with three children each and expressed strong statements of anger toward President Barack Obama.75

Differing views have been presented as to the extent of threat posed by Crawford’s planned device. Koehler and Popella call it “scifi-esque” and “technically unfeasible,” but the affidavit cites “experts” who believed the weaponized device would be both “lethal” and “functioning.”76 Regardless of the potential destructiveness of a completed RED, the early warning to authorities about Crawford’s activities and subsequent under- cover work ensured that Crawford and Feight would not obtain the necessary, functioning x-ray equipment for the device.

Case 3: 2008 “dirty bomb” instructions and a neo-Nazi’s uranium and thorium

On December 9, 2008, the authorities found explosive precursors, radioactive materials, and instructions on how to build an RDD at the Maine residence of neo-Nazi James

67 Crawford and Feight, 1:13-mj-312-CFH at 2, 9. 68 Ibid., p. 3; US Department of Justice, “New York Man Sentenced to 30 Years for Plot to Kill Muslims.” 69 Crawford and Feight, 1:13-mj-312-CFH at 2–3. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., p. 3. 72 US Department of Justice, “New York Man Sentenced to 30 Years for Plot to Kill Muslims.” 73 Ibid.; Robert Gavin, “Judge Gives 30-Year Sentence to Crawford in Death-Ray Case,” Times Union, December 19, 2016,

<www.timesunion.com/local/article/Life-sentence-possible-in-X-ray-terror-case-10805529.php>; Crawford and Feight, 1:13-mj-312-CFH at 4.

74 Reuters, “White Supremacist Gets 30 Years Prison for His Plot to Kill Muslims and Obama,” December 19, 2016, <www. theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/19/death-ray-plot-muslims-obama-glendon-scott-crawford-new-york>.

75 Gavin, “Judge Gives 30-Year Sentence to Crawford in Death-Ray Case”; United States v. Eric J. Feight, 1:14-cr-00012-GLS (GLS) at 7 (US District Court for the Northern District of New York), Plea Agreement, Richard S. Hartunian, January 22, 2014, <www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nynd.97017.24.0.pdf>; United States v. Eric J. Feight, 1:14 cr-00012- GLS at 3 (US District Court for the Northern District of New York), Sentencing Memorandum, Peter J. Moschetti, Jr., November 23, 2015, <www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nynd.97017/gov.uscourts.nynd.97017.47.0.pdf>.

76 Koehler and Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West,” p. 18; Crawford and Feight, 1:13-mj-312-CFH at 4.

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G. Cummings, who had been fatally shot by his wife, according to an FBI field intelligence report initially leaked to WikiLeaks and later published on the SPLC website.77 According to the report, the radioactive materials included four “small” jars of depleted uranium-238 and two jars of thorium-232.78 Five of the six jars were labeled, and all four of the uranium jars showed the name of an American company that “sold the depleted uranium online.”79

The authorities additionally found “literature on constructing ‘dirty bombs’; information referring to cesium-137, strontium-90, and cobalt-60; and possible evidence linking [Cummings] to white supremacist groups” including a completed National Socialist Movement (NSM) application form.80

Cummings, aged twenty-nine at his death, had a history of abusiveness despite his lack of criminal record in Maine, where he had lived for slightly over a year.81 Cummings was married with a nine-year-old daughter, and his wife, Amber Cummings, said after the shoot- ing that she had endured “years of mental, physical, and sexual abuse,” according to the language used in the FBI report.82 Bangor Daily News reported that an individual who had done house-painting work for the family described Cummings’s “controlling personal- ity,” “verbally abusive” behavior toward his wife, and “love of guns and his fascination for Hitler,” in the words of the article.83 The FBI report noted his wife’s mention of Cummings’s strong negative reaction to Obama’s election, his “contact with white supremacist group(s),” and his discussion of “dirty bombs.”84 Cummings apparently inherited millions of dollars from his father James B. Cummings, whose trust fund’s annual income was $10 million.85

It is unclear how Cummings became interested in the NSM and whether he had con- tacts within this specific organization. Apparently Cummings told his wife to log onto “different Web sites and chat rooms to further his beliefs,” indicating potential online engagement with fellow white supremacists.86 The NSM, according to the SPLC, origi- nated with the American Nazi Party created in 1959 and became the largest American neo-Nazi organization.87 NSM members can maintain their membership in other racist groups, and the organization “had 61 chapters in 35 states” by 2009.88 The group

77 David Holthouse, “Slain Neo-Nazi, Angry over Obama Victory, Reportedly Prepared ‘Dirty Bomb’ Components,” Southern Poverty Law Center, February 11, 2009, <www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2009/02/11/slain-neo-nazi-angry-over-obama- victory-reportedly-prepared-‘dirty-bomb’-components>.

78 US Federal Bureau of Investigations, “9 December 2008 Discovery of Radiological Dispersal Device Components, Litera- ture, and Radioactive Material at the Maine Residence of an Identified Deceased U.S. Person,” FBI Intelligence Infor- mation Report 4 218 1563 09, December 9, 2008, <www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/blog/wp-content/uploads/ 2009/02/fbi_maine021109.pdf>.

79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Abigail Curtis, “Cummings Had Violent History,” Bangor Daily News, February 12, 2009, <https://bangordailynews.com/

2009/02/12/news/cummings-had-violent-history/>; Walter Griffin, “Report: ‘Dirty Bomb’ Parts Found in Slain Man’s Home,” Bangor Daily News, February 10, 2009, <https://bangordailynews.com/2009/02/10/politics/report-dirty- bomb-parts-found-in-slain-mans-home/>.

82 Griffin, “Report: ‘Dirty Bomb’ Parts Found in Slain Man’s Home”; FBI, “9 December 2008 Discovery of Radiological Dis- persal Device Components, Literature, and Radioactive Material at the Maine Residence of an Identified Deceased U.S. Person.”

83 Griffin, “Report: ‘Dirty Bomb’ Parts Found in Slain Man’s Home.” 84 FBI, “9 December 2008 Discovery of Radiological Dispersal Device Components, Literature, and Radioactive Material at

the Maine Residence of an Identified Deceased U.S. Person.” 85 Ibid.; Holthouse, “Slain Neo-Nazi, Angry over Obama Victory, Reportedly Prepared ‘Dirty Bomb’ Components.” 86 Walter Griffin, “Belfast Woman Accused of Shooting Husband Changes Plea,” Bangor Daily News, March 26, 2009,

<https://bangordailynews.com/2009/03/26/news/belfast-woman-accused-of-shooting-husband-changes-plea/>. 87 Southern Poverty Law Center, “National Socialist Movement,” <www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/

national-socialist-movement>. 88 Ibid.

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employs the tactic of protesting openly wearing Nazi symbols and attire and participated in the 2017 Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally.89 In early 2019, black civil-rights activist James Hart Stern became president of the organization and signaled his intent to disman- tle it, according to the Washington Post.90

Authorities have expressed concern about the RDD threat given the materials Cum- mings possessed. In addition to discovering the radioactive materials at Cummings’s residence, law enforcement also found “four one-gallon containers of 35 percent hydrogen peroxide,” which is an explosive precursor, “lithium metal, thermite, alumi- num powder, beryllium, boron, black iron oxide, and magnesium ribbon,” according to the FBI report.91 The report noted that the lithium metal, thermite, and aluminum could “sensitize and amplify the effects of explosives.”92 RANNSAD explains that the “FBI reports confirm that the combined materials could have produced an RDD.”93

However, a statement by Maine Public Safety Commissioner Anne Jordan indicated she was informed by federal authorities that “the items seized could be purchased legally and that there was not sufficient quantity or quality to pose an immediate threat or hazard to the health and safety of the public.”94 The 2010 NRC Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report classified neither depleted uranium nor thorium-232 as among the radionuclides of highest concern in terms of RDD threats.95 Furthermore, Cummings would have needed to stockpile 20 tons of depleted uranium to reach a significant quantity—as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency—for this indirect-use material for nuclear, as opposed to radio- logical, weapons purposes.96 Koehler and Popella nevertheless include this as a radio- logical incident.97

Analysis

These three cases, which represent the key instances of potential American far-right extre- mist pursuit of radiological weapons as identified in the open-source literature, provide insight into the backgrounds, affiliations, and motives of extremist actors as well as the role of authorities and level of threat. The fortunately low number of cases means it is difficult to make any generalizations about far-right radiological-weapons pursuit in the United States, as any such generalizations risk mischaracterizing the would-be perpetra- tors and the threat. However, it is valuable to compare and contrast the cases and analyze information these incidents can provide.

89 Ibid. 90 Katie Mettler, “How a Black Man Says He ‘Outsmarted’ a Neo-Nazi Group and Became Their New Leader,” Washington

Post, March 2, 2019, <www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2019/03/01/how-black-man-outsmarted-neo-nazi-group- became-their-new-leader/?noredirect=on>.

91 FBI, “9 December 2008 Discovery of Radiological Dispersal Device Components, Literature, and Radioactive Material at the Maine Residence of an Identified Deceased U.S. Person.”

92 Ibid. 93 Ackerman et al., “Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries Database (RANNSAD).” 94 Bangor Daily News, “Officials Say ‘Dirty Bomb’ Materials No Threat,” February 11, 2009, <https://bangordailynews.com/

2009/02/11/news/officials-say-dirty-bomb-materials-no-threat/>. 95 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “The 2010 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report, Report to

the President and the U.S. Congress under Public Law 109-58, the Energy Policy Act of 2005,” p. 11. 96 International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safeguards Glossary,” p. 23. 97 Koehler and Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the

West.”

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Individual backgrounds

Despite difficulties in generalization or quantitative comparison, it is instructive to examine the similarities and differences in the backgrounds of the four individuals involved in the cases. Regarding demographic background, all the individuals involved were white males, but their ages differed greatly from young to middle-aged: Russell was twenty-two, Cummings was twenty-nine, Crawford fifty-two, and Feight fifty- seven. The latter three were married with at least one child. Though the individuals had different careers or employment backgrounds, Russell and Crawford both served or had served in the military. Additionally, Russell and Crawford allegedly discussed targeting specific groups for which they expressed hatred, which included these groups’ places of worship, and Crawford, Feight, and Cummings expressed outrage at Obama’s election. Regarding far-right literature, Russell appeared the most interested, possessing The Turner Diaries and Mein Kampf, but it is possible that other actors engaged with these materials at some point.

One potential similarity involves a lack of violent criminal history, although this was not the case for all individuals. Russell, Crawford, and Feight apparently lacked a violent criminal record. Cummings, though without criminal history in the state where he lived at the time of his arrest, was linked to past cases of assault in his home state, according to a sheriff’s office there.98 Individuals without a history of criminal aggression who begin plotting attacks could pose difficulties for law enforcement in efforts to identify would-be terrorist threats.

At least two individuals had an interest in conventional weapons. Authorities found firearms and ammunition in Russell’s bedroom in addition to the explosive materials at his residence.99 When Russell was initially released after questioning, he purchased an assault rifle, a hunting rifle, and ammunition, which authorities discovered upon his arrest the next day.100 Cummings, too, apparently had a “love of guns” that a house painter heard him discussing.101 Reporting indicates that he and his wife both slept with loaded firearms tucked under their pillows.102 On the other hand, Feight allegedly “never owned a gun,” according to his sentencing memorandum, and it is unclear whether Crawford ever did.103 Regardless, these cases illustrate that far-right individuals potentially pursuing radiological weapons may maintain an interest in conventional weapons as well.

Far-right networks

Recent research has shed light on far-right organizing tactics and networks, in particular the “leaderless resistance” doctrine developed by Louis Beam, which he used to advocate for individual actors and cells to “operate independently of each other, and never report to

98 Curtis, “Cummings Had Violent History.” 99 Russell, 8:17-mj-1362-TBM at 4.

100 Thompson, “An Atomwaffen Member Sketched a Map to Take the Neo-Nazis Down”; US Department of Justice, “Neo- Nazi Leader Sentenced to Five Years in Federal Prison for Explosives Charges.”

101 Griffin, “Report: ‘Dirty Bomb’ Parts Found in Slain Man’s Home.” 102 Kealan Oliver, “Amber Cummings Avoids Prison for Killing Nazi Husband While He Slept,” CBS News, January 11, 2010,

<www.cbsnews.com/news/amber-cummings-avoids-prison-for-killing-nazi-husband-while-he-slept/>. 103 Feight, 1:14 cr-00012-GLS Sentencing Memorandum at 5.

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a central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction.”104 While this doctrine often lends to “lone-wolf” attacks, not all individuals have plotted entirely alone, as demonstrated by the case of Crawford and Feight.105 In fact, all of the individuals allegedly discussed their extremist views or plans with friends or family members and had direct or indirect links to fellow members of the far right. Although Feight apparently did not have prior connections to far-right groups, he assisted KKK member Crawford in his RED plot. Russell, as a founding member of Atomwaffen, was connected to other far-right extre- mists, and Cummings apparently filled out an application to join the NSM. Thus, all of the individuals were connected in some way to larger white-supremacist organizations.

Online engagement with far-right extremist networks was an aspect shared by more than one case. Russell and Cummings both visited chat rooms to discuss their views, according to those close to them, and Russell allegedly used these fora to make violent threats and praise past attackers. It is unclear, however, whether the individuals involved gained any information about CBRN materials and weapons from these far-right online discussions and contacts. Russell reportedly posted information about nuclear reactors online, but ProPublica does not identify the forum or site he used. Reporting does not indicate whether Crawford engaged in online chat room discussions with fellow members of the far right, but he seemed more wary of internet communication, at one point in his plot expressing his belief that people were reading his emails.106 Nonetheless, interactions with other individuals who shared far-right ideologies constituted a common- ality across cases.

The role of authorities

A comparison of the cases of Russell, Crawford and Feight, and Cummings shows that the role of law-enforcement or federal authorities in investigating potential far-right radiologi- cal-weapons plots or incidents can differ dramatically depending on the situation. Court documents indicate that Russell’s and Cummings’s explosives and radioactive materials were only discovered incidentally after shootings at their respective residences, whereas Crawford’s RED plot was actively tracked by the FBI for over a year and prevented. There exist a myriad of potential explanations for this apparent disparity; perhaps Craw- ford’s actions simply raised more alarm amongst those whom he asked for assistance while Russell’s and Cummings’s bomb material stockpiling remained under the radar. Regard- less of possible causes, based on the cases of Russell and Cummings, it is conceivable that more instances of far-right radiological-weapons development may remain undetected.

Level of threat

It is difficult to judge the level of radiological-weapons threat posed by the far right, par- ticularly from only a few cases. However, several conclusions can be drawn. Most impor- tantly, actors who considered acquiring both explosives and radioactive materials succeeded in doing so without consequent intervention by authorities. The ability in

104 Jones, “The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States.” 105 Ibid. 106 Crawford and Feight, 1:13-mj-312-CFH at 23-24.

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some cases to legally purchase less-dangerous quantities and isotopes of radioactive material, such as the depleted uranium and thorium found at Cummings’s residence, means that construction of an RDD with these materials is a possibility for extremists. Although the most accessible radioactive materials are not necessarily the most deadly or destructive for use in a radiological weapon, any completed assembly or use of a device could pose a psychological threat by stoking fears of radiation.107 An attack invol- ving the same types and quantities of materials as were acquired by Russell or Cummings might not create mass destruction, but it could further the extremist goals of generating chaos among the public and damaging infrastructure. In addition, the potential for an “insider” threat from a far-right extremist with authorization to handle higher-risk sources of radioactive material has generated concern.108 Based on the alarming number of instances of loss and theft of radioactive sources each year in North America alone, it is also conceivable that a would-be terrorist could illegally obtain more harmful materials without police detection. The important takeaway is that Amer- ican far-right individuals have already overcome the challenge of acquiring a radiological agent without immediately drawing the attention of the authorities, and there exist other potential ways of doing so.

Given the patterns of far-right extremist terrorism in the United States, particularly the role and prevalence of lone-actor strategies and attacks, it seems that the lack of rigid hier- archical organization has not prevented actors from seeking CBRN capabilities, including radiological weapons. As Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson noted in 2013, while lone actors and autonomous cells in general “may be less ambitious” than actors in “large, formal organizations,” they might pose more of a danger in some respects because “they intend to be more successful in their radiological weapon… pursuits.”109

Thus, although integration in a formal, structured terrorist group could confer some tech- nical, financial, or other benefits for would-be far-right radiological terrorists, individuals and small groups of determined far-right extremists still pose a radiological threat from an organizational perspective. Furthermore, the fact that many far-right extremist actors in the United States have adopted a lone-wolf strategy does not mean they lack organiz- ational connections. Additional research on lone-actor terrorists corroborates this trend: compared with lone actors in general, far-right extremist lone actors were more likely to have both contacts and “formal ties to radical, extremist or terrorist groups.”110 Victor Asal and colleagues have found a statistically significant association between a terrorist group’s “alliance embeddedness,” or “[c]onnectivity to others that are in turn also highly connected,” and CBRN weapons pursuit.111 Therefore, the presence of strong networks and extensive connections between various extremist groups and actors could be associated with a greater CBRN threat. While there is no publicly available evidence that extremists in the three studied cases directly gained information about

107 Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 27. 108 Cathcart and Epstein, “White Supremacists Want a Dirty Bomb.” 109 Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson, “An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Auton-

omous Cells,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2014), p. 240, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014. 849945>.

110 Bouhana et al., “Background and Preparatory Behaviours of Right-Wing Extremist Lone Actors,” pp. 158, 160. 111 Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors

and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2012), pp. 236, 243, 245, <https://doi. org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.648156>.

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radiological weapons from other far-right actors, other would-be terrorists could use this type of information sharing, particularly as domestic far-right links evolve. Future research could investigate whether, and how, information about CBRN weapons—in this case radiological weapons—is shared between individual extremists or small cells. Either way, far-right networks, as discussed in the three cases, may enable a more potent radio- logical-weapons threat.

It is important to note that the three studied cases by no means confine the far-right radiological threat to RDDs or REDs in the United States. Threats can come in the form of hoaxes or nuclear power plant sabotage, and geographically the far right maintains a strong presence in Europe and other parts of the world. For example, in a 1996 video, the American neo-Nazi group “Aryan Republic Army” claimed to possess an explosive device containing “yellowcake plutonium residue,” a fictitious substance.112 Even hoaxes present a threat, as they can generate fear and divert resources.113 In Eastern Europe, unsecured radioactive sources could pose a danger in the hands of various neo-Nazi groups or far- right paramilitaries. According to the Monterey WMDTD, citing reporting by Der Spiegel, in 1995 a Russian individual sought to sell radioactive material to neo-Nazis in Germany.114 More recently, the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant in Eastern Ukraine was near the site of a May 2014 confrontation involving pro-Ukrainian, far-right “Right Sector” paramilitaries, who allegedly claimed pro-Russian actors were working in the plant.115 These additional incidents illustrate the multifaceted nature of the far-right radiological threat.

There are limits to the inferences that may be drawn from these case studies. First, as previously stated, the number of cases is far too small to make generalizations of the sort that would be supported by statistical analysis. Observations about these three incidents cannot be assumed to be valid for all or most potential far-right radiological threats. Second, the three cases are not necessarily an exhaustive catalogue of far-right radiologi- cal-weapons pursuit. Only incidents in the United States have been considered here, but far-right extremists may have sought or developed radiological weapons elsewhere. Fur- thermore, even in the United States, other cases simply may not be documented in the public domain. Third, these cases involve plots and potential preliminary planning to con- struct radiological weapons, not actual use of radiological weapons. The cases thus do not imply that attacks were inevitable or that the actors would have successfully built or used radiological devices. Finally, the radiological-weapons threat should not be overstated. The vast majority of far-right extremist violence is carried out by conventional means, such as firearms, incendiaries, and explosives, as opposed to CBRN weapons. Even among

112 Pomper and Tarini, “Nuclear Terrorism,” p. 11; Koehler and Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiologi- cal, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West,” p. 6.

113 Nicole A. Tishler, “Fake Terrorism: Examining Terrorist Groups’ Resort to Hoaxing as a Mode of Attack,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2018), pp. 3–4, <www.jstor.org/stable/26482975>.

114 Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program, “Monterey WMD Terrorism Database,” Incident No. 817; Der Spiegel, “Gefährliche Giftmischer” [Dangerous poisoners], No. 27 (1995), <www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-9200358. html>.

115 Oliver Carroll, “Ukraine Turns off Reactor at Its Most Powerful Nuclear Plant after ‘Accident,’” The Independent, December 28, 2014, <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-turns-off-reactor-at-nuclear-plant-after-accident- 9947540.html>; Arthur Neslen, “Nuclear Waste Stored in ‘Shocking’Way 120 Miles from Ukrainian Front Line,” The Guar- dian, May 13, 2015, <www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/06/nuclear-waste-stored-in-shocking-way-120- miles-from-ukraine-front-line>.

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American far-right CBRN incidents, radiological plots represent a minority of cases.116

Easy access to firearms in the United States in particular probably makes these weapons a more appealing choice for far-right extremists than radiological devices, which require the acquisition of dangerous radioactive material. Nevertheless, these few cases do indicate that American far-right extremists can obtain the necessary materials for a radiological weapon, and that this possibility, however small, presents a danger.

Conclusion

An exploration of three recent radiological cases in the United States shows that far-right extremists are among the non-state actors that pose a potential radiological-weapons threat. Although the radiological threat is by no means the greatest danger from non- state actors, it is important to consider that far-right actors have sought to, and could in the future, construct radiological devices that could contaminate infrastructure and inflict psychological terror. In order to complete and use such devices, far-right extremists would need both the incentive to conduct a radiological attack and the know-how and materials to build a functioning weapon.117 While some extremists have demonstrated the required motivation, barriers include avoiding detection, acquiring radioactive materials in a sufficient quantity and with a high enough radioactivity level to cause damage when weaponized, and developing the knowledge necessary to build the device. Fortunately, far-right extremist actors have not succeeded in detonating a dirty bomb or employing another type of RDD or RED, but looking into the cases of those who have actively sought to acquire materials used in these weapons provides crucial insight into the role of extremists’ backgrounds, law-enforcement intervention, and other aspects of the threat.

These three cases offer some preliminary answers to the questions posed at the begin- ning of this article regarding the level of far-right-extremist interest in radiological weapons, their progress in building such devices, the reasons why no attacks have occurred, and a comparison of this with other threats. Some key far-right literature suggests that terrorists should seek radiological weapons, and a few members of the far right have indeed explored this weapon type and obtained the materials necessary for rudi- mentary devices. Ultimately, the authorities found the components, but only by happen- stance in two of the cases. While American far-right extremists lack the extensive transnational and hierarchical organization of a jihadist group such as al-Qaeda, they have demonstrated the required motivation to conduct radiological attacks and made pro- gress toward that aim. Even a single successful radiological attack could cause immense medical, psychological, and economic damage.

These cases point to further questions about broader, global far-right-extremist threats. First, it would be informative to analyze the role of authorities in detecting and preventing far-right CBRN plots. Far-right extremists have also sought chemical and biological weapons, and a closer examination of the presence, stage in the weapons-development process, and extent of authorities’ intervention in past cases across all CBRN types

116 Jones, “The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States”; Koehler and Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Bio- logical, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West.”

117 Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 268–69.

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could offer insights about strategies to counter threats. If far-right would-be terrorists have succeeded in obtaining other dangerous agents and explosives undetected, it could point to the need for stronger regulation of hazardous substances and more attention to the far- right threat.

Additionally, the radiological-weapons threat raises an important question about far- right terrorist strategy, specifically the connections between choices of weapons and choices of targets. It appears that far-right extremists have considered radiological weapons both as an indiscriminate attack type aimed to stoke fear and destroy infrastruc- ture and as a tactic to target specific religious or other demographic groups. It would be useful to more closely examine far-right extremists’ choice of weapons and targets to deduce possible patterns and clarify the level of threat posed by each CBRN category, as well as different conventional weapons.

Finally, the role of far-right radicalization literature should be considered, particularly since prominent extremist texts such as The Turner Diaries and the Breivik manifesto refer directly to CBRN weapons. Future studies could ask who reads far-right literature, how literature and technical weapons manuals or instructions might be shared across far- right networks, and how many far-right attackers, whether with conventional or CBRN weapons, have consumed extremist literature.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank supervisor Sam Meyer of the James Martin Center for Nonproli- feration Studies for providing thoughtful guidance during the writing of this article. The author would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the Nonproliferation Review editors for their helpful suggestions.

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