

origin. In other words, in the light of the extensive evidence of the existence and impact of racism and related exclusionary practices, the task that remains is to unravel the different forms and levels of determination, the articulations between racism, sexism, and nationalism and the exclusionary practices which are derived from these ideologies, in the context of the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production.

CONCLUSION

If racism brutalises and dehumanises its object, it also brutalises and dehumanises those who articulate it. Racism is therefore simultaneously a mediation between human beings similarly and differentially located in a class structure and a denial of their humanity, even if that denial is unequal by virtue of the relations of domination and subordination implicit in the mediation. It is therefore a problem for all who live in a social context where it is articulated and where it sustains exclusionary practices. As a phenomenon of mediation, all who are witness to it necessarily have a (sometimes specific) role in its identification, explanation, condemnation, and elimination.

1

Representations of the Other

INTRODUCTION

Migration, determined by the interrelation of production, trade and warfare, has been a precondition for the meeting of human individuals and groups over thousands of centuries. In the course of this interaction, imagery, beliefs and evaluations about the Other have been generated and reproduced amongst all the participants in the process in order to explain the appearance and behaviour of those with whom contact has been established and in order to formulate a strategy for interaction and reaction. The consequence has been the production of 'representations' (cf. Moscovici 1981, 1982, 1984) of the Other, images and beliefs which categorise people in terms of real or attributed differences when compared with Self. There is, therefore, a dialectic between Self and Other in which the attributed characteristics of Other refract contrasting characteristics of Self, and vice versa. The first intention of this chapter is to describe the content of these images, beliefs and evaluations which I shall collectively refer to as 'discourse' (Macdonell 1986: 1-4, Potter and Wetherell 1987: 7).

However, I am not concerned with all instances of interaction and discourse. For the reasons already stated, I focus specifically on representations generated within the western world about populations elsewhere, although this emphasis does not imply a denial that wherever groups have met, they have both responded with images, beliefs, and evaluations about the Other, and about the consequences of the presence of the Other (see Dickason 1984: 22-5). For example, within the Islamic world, there has been a representation of the populations that lived beyond its boundaries which focused specifically upon religion as the means to identify the Other (Lewis 1982: 64). Additionally, those populations with whom contact was established by European merchant capitalists, some of whom

were later colonised, represented the European merchants, soldiers and administrators in drawings, paintings and carvings, as well as in the written word, and on a variety of artefacts. Often these images were stereotypical or represented the Other in terms of their own physical and cultural norms (Volkenkundig Museum Nusantara 1986). Finally, European explorers and missionaries report the fascination and, often, fear expressed by certain groups in Africa on their first contact with a person of European origin. One particular feature of Europeans that was reported as exciting interest was their skin colour (Cole 1972: 64, Hibbert 1984: 48, 62, 89, 101, 146).

The consequences of the European presence were also articulated by those who were its object, and in a manner which reflected the different experience and mode of existence of the colonised. In this literary example, André Brink constructs the following evaluation 'thought' by a descendant of the African population enslaved by the Dutch settlers:

We of the Khoi, we never thought of these mountains and plains, these long grasslands and marshes as a wild place to be tamed. It was the Whites who called it wild and saw it filled with wild animals and wild people. To us it has always been friendly and tame. It has given us food and drink and shelter, even in the worst of droughts. It was only when the Whites moved in and started digging and breaking and shooting, and driving off the animals, that it really became wild. (Brink 1983: 21)

With this particular focus, my second intention is to demonstrate a shifting content and evaluation of the Other. Not all elements of representation change over time, but the combination of elements does not remain static. And although certain representations may be dominant in any one period, they do not necessarily remain unchallenged. Hence because imagery and belief change over time, it is necessary to chart the historicity of representations.

The recognition of this dynamic element in western representations of the Other is the prelude to understanding a significant transformation in the method of European representation. Thus, and third, I demonstrate the emergence of the use of scientific criteria to evaluate the Other. This epistemological break introduced new, universalistic criteria of measurement and assessment, and a measure of truth which led to a new status being attributed to western representations. It is now clear that these 'scientific' assessments of the Other were mistaken. However, many of the ideas that they give rise to have not been eradicated, but continue to structure common-sense discourse about the Other.

These objectives have to be set against a limit on the scope of what follows. I do not claim to offer a comprehensive analysis of western representations of

the Other, only significant instances which illustrate these stated objectives. Contact between what we now know as the populations of European nation states and people from other parts of the world has a history of some thousands of years and any systematic analysis would require a text longer, and very different, from what is offered here. Hence many of my examples are drawn from the history of British colonialism. Moreover, I terminate this analysis at the end of the Second World War, for reasons that will become apparent in chapter 2.

BEFORE EUROPEAN EXPANSION

Many writers concerned with the history of European representations of the Other either begin their analysis with the period of European expansions and colonisation of the Americas (for example, Sivaraman 1973), or devote only limited attention to it (see Cox 1970: 322-32). They focus on the discourse about the populations of Africa, and the Americas that Spanish, Portuguese, French, English and Dutch explorers and merchants generated but thereby they ignore the links with earlier representations. European explorers and traders of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not set out without expectations of the characteristics of the peoples they would meet. Rather, they occupied class positions in feudal societies which had a long tradition of imagining the Other, partly as a consequence of the experience of direct contact. Thus, for example, the African was represented in European thought long before European involvement in the slave trade (Walvin 1973: 2-7, Jordan 1968: 6, Walvin 1986: 69-72).

It should also be noted that earlier representations were created and reproduced in a politico-spatial context wherein Europe as it is known and exists today was absent. The economic and political domination of north west Europe is historically specific and, prior to the fifteenth century, the geographical region that is now Europe had been subject to a variety of invasions from Asia (Baudet 1976: 4) and the 'old continuous nations' of Europe were haltingly emergent rather than extant (Seton-Watson 1977: 21-87). The notion of Europe as an entity began to emerge only in the eighth century (Lewis 1982: 18) and, until at least the twelfth century, it was subordinate to the economic and politico-military power of the Islamic world, its populations being in practice colonised (Kaye 1985: 61). Indeed, it was because the Islamic world constituted a dominant force, motivated and legitimated by a view of history by which 'the Muslims were the bearers of God's truth with the sacred duty of bringing it to the rest of mankind' (Lewis 1982: 39), that a representation of Europe as a distinct entity expressed by the common religion of Christianity was to emerge.

Moreover, the European regions which achieved economic and politico-military significance prior to the fifteenth century were around the Mediterranean rather than in north west Europe. Before then, the regions that are now Italy and Greece established and maintained a dominant economic and cultural position, sustained partly by military means. These were class societies, built largely upon the use of slave labour (Finley 1980: 67-92), and the imperialistic activities of their ruling classes brought them into contact with other populations throughout Europe and parts of northern Africa. Contact and interaction occurred in different arenas. The most important were in connection with travel, trade and military activity. Travellers' accounts supplied information about populations which were identified as culturally and physically different, while trade and military activity (including the occupation of parts of Africa) ensured more extensive and direct forms of contact.

In the context of a growing knowledge of the geographical extent of human existence, there developed in Greco-Roman thought an idea of the unity of the human species. A conception of human diversity, spatially dispersed, but bound together by the possession of characteristics that distinguished human beings from both gods and animals, existed and was transformed in various ways over five centuries, although it did not seriously challenge the continuity of a complex of class and sexual divisions within Greco-Roman society (Baldry 1965: 24-5, 122, 198-203). Moreover, it did not eliminate a conception of the existence of 'barbarians' beyond the borders of Greco-Roman society. The barbarian as Other was seen to lack the capacities of intelligible speech and reason, capacities that were considered to be the quintessence of Greco-Roman culture, even though they were recognised as human beings (Baldry 1965: 21-2, 143).

In the light of the expansion of the Greco-Roman empire into Africa, and of the subsequent representations of Africans within European culture, it is relevant to enquire about the nature of the discourse about the African in this complexity of ideas. These were representations also grounded in the direct experience of an African presence in Mediterranean Europe. Africans captured in military conflict were enslaved like all other prisoners of war. Others became, in effect, mercenaries. Additionally, Africans travelled to and were resident in the Greco-Roman world for educational and for diplomatic and commercial purposes (Snowden 1970: 121-2, 186, 1983: 33). How were Africans represented within Greco-Roman societies in the light of this interaction?

First, Africans were identified using certain physical features, notably skin colour but also hair type and nose shape (Snowden 1970: 2-5, 1983: 7). In addition, there was a definitive colour symbolism within Greco-Roman culture, by which whiteness was positively evaluated and blackness

negatively evaluated. Blackness was associated with death and a conception of an underworld (Snowden 1983: 82-3). But the characterisation of Africans as having a black skin and the negative evaluation of blackness did not cohere to sustain either a negative stereotype or to constitute a legitimisation of slavery (Davis 1984: 33). Rather, and second, Africans were identified generally as human beings with the capacity for freedom and justice, piety and wisdom (although some conceptions included elements of idealisation and unreality). They were also respected as warriors and soldiers (Snowden 1970: 181, 1983: 55-9, 68). And although some writers associated beauty with whiteness, there was also a widely held assumption that the criteria of beauty were subjective. Indeed, other writers extolled blackness as beautiful (Snowden 1983: 63, 76).

Third, there was speculation about the origin of the phenotypical and cultural differences that were identified as signifying difference. The dominant explanation in the Greco-Roman world was environmental in nature, the argument being that human physical appearance and cultural variation were determined by climatic, topographical and hydrographical conditions (Baldry, 1965: 50). This argument was used to explain the whole range of phenotypical diversity that was known at that time. For example, concerning Africans, it was suggested that skin colour and hair type were the product of constant exposure to the hot sun (Snowden 1970: 172-3, 1983: 85-7).

In addition to the representations of the African as an *experienced* Other (in the sense that there was direct contact and interaction with certain African populations) there were also representations within Greco-Roman thought of an *imagined* Other (in the sense that the representations had, in fact, no empirical reality, although that was not how these representations were experienced at the time). That the boundary between the experienced and the imagined Other is an artificial one in the Greco-Roman frame of reference is made evident in the *Natural History* of Pliny the Elder; this text included a primarily (although not an exclusively) phenotypical typology of populations, many of which were given a particular spatial location in the world, mainly in Africa, India, and the region of the Caucasus. This typology included Ethiopians, although their spatial location was imprecise, and also *Cynocephali*, *Blenniæ*, *Anthropophagi*, *Sciopods*. These populations were attributed with various physiological and cultural characteristics: the *Cynocephali* were dog-headed humans and the *Sciopods* had a single, very large foot, while the *Anthropophagi* were represented as eaters of human flesh (Friedman 1981: 8-21).

This typology, and associated representations and explanations, was expanded and modified by other writers and passed into the subsequent medieval European literary tradition. Within this tradition, a causal relationship between physical appearance, moral character and spatial

location was asserted and, as in Greco-Roman thought, climate was considered to be a major independent determinant, but the three-fold climatic division of Greek thought was expanded (Friedman 1981: 52). Additional transformations occurred, the most significant being the religious meanings attributed to these representations. Within the Greco-Roman world, natural events considered to be indicators of God's intentions towards human beings were defined as *portenta* or *monstra*. Initially, *monstra* defined unusual individual or anomalous births, but its meaning was extended through the Middle Ages to include whole populations of people supposedly characterised by anomalous phenotypical characteristics, although the sense of divine warning remained (Friedman 1981: 108-16).

This premontory meaning was subsequently transformed into one of punishment as Christianity became the prism through which all knowledge about the world was refracted, and as a result of which a literal Biblical explanation for the material world predominated. Consequently, the problem was to explain the nature and origin of these *monstra* in a way that was consistent with the Biblical representation of history. Concerning their nature, the issue was whether or not they were human, a crucial matter which determined whether or not they could be the object of missionary activity and conversion (Friedman 1981: 178-80). It was also necessary to explain the origin of these *monstra*. One explanation advanced by medieval European writers was that they were part of God's creation plan, the purpose of which had yet to be revealed. Others argued that one or a group of Adam's descendants had induced God's wrath, as a result of which their descendants had been physically disfigured and exiled to the periphery of the world. This explanation accepted a single origin of humanity as set out in the Bible but accounted for the subsequent diversity in human form. While the latter remained a subordinate explanation for a long period, it received increasing expression and support during the course of the medieval period (Friedman 1981: 88-103) and came to play a major ideological role in the period of European expansion. The consequence was an association between the Other *qua monstrum* and sin.

We have seen that various human physical features (some imaginary) were signified as monstrous, one of which was skin colour. Western Christianity associated certain colours with a range of additional meanings, with the result that it embodied a colour symbolism mirroring that of the preceding classical world. A white/black contrast expressed a complex of additional meanings, similarly dichotomous, such as good/evil, pure/diabolical, spiritual/carnal and Christ/Satan (Bastide 1968: 36). Thus colour expressed a hierarchical, religious evaluation which attained a more widespread secular content within Western culture (Gergen 1968: 119), parallels with which can be drawn with the Islamic world (Lewis 1971, Davis 1984: 32-51). Where distinctions

between human beings were designated by reference to skin colour, this colour symbolism had a powerful evaluative implication. Monstrousness, sin, and blackness therefore constituted a rather different form of Trinity in European Christian culture in this period.

Thus, in medieval Europe, there was a discourse of the Other as a phenotypical and cultural deviant from a norm which was established by the represented characteristics of European writers. This Other took a plurality of monstrous forms, some of which were purely imaginary while others were derived, in part, from empirical observations of non-European peoples. Within late medieval European literature, a representation of the wild man emerged:

This creature possesses many of the features of earlier monstrous peoples – hairiness, nudity, the club or the branch – features that imply violence, lack of civilised arts, and want of a moral sense. The wild man is usually shown in a wooded setting, far from the abode of normal men. (Friedman 1981: 200, also Dickason 1984: 70-80)

In particular, the wild man was attributed with an aggressive and untamed sexuality, the female form being represented as a seductress of ordinary men (White 1972: 21-2). The wild man therefore represented the opposite of the ideal Christian life. 'He is desire incarnate, possessing the strength, wit and cunning to give full expression to all his lusts' (White 1972: 21). His condition was thought to be the result of the abolition of social convention and control, and an inevitable punishment for anyone who submitted to desire (White 1972: 30).

As far as the European feudal ruling classes were concerned, this image marked the boundary of the known and 'civilised' world, a boundary that in the medieval period encompassed Europe and parts of Africa and Asia. The arena within which this image circulated was later expanded by the search of several European feudal ruling classes for new trade routes and, thereby, the 'discovery' of the 'new world'. As a result, the content of the Plinian typology was increasingly challenged by the accumulation of observations arising from travellers' accounts of the populations that they had met. Neither merchants nor pilgrims reported the presence of *Sciopods* or *Cynocephali*, but a representation of the Other remained.

EUROPE AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Before the interests of the feudal monarchies and merchant capital of Western Europe combined in order to colonise the Americas from the fifteenth century onwards, the main focus of external interest (and concern) was the Middle

East, North Africa and India, collectively known as the Orient. Hence, Daniel has observed that 'Europe's idea of the "foreigner" was based for many formative centuries exclusively on the Arab world' (1975: 322). Thus, not only did Europeans create a discourse of an imagined Other at the edge of European civilisation, but they created a discourse of a real Other represented as a result of conflicting material and political interests with a population which came to mark the boundary of Europe, not only spatially but also in consciousness.

In an emergent, feudal Europe wherein class domination was secured partly by means of Christianity, there was a heightened consciousness of the existence of Islam as a theology and of the dominance of Islam in lands within and in close proximity to Europe during the period from the mid-seventh century to the sixteenth century. The consequence was a definition of Islam and the Islamic world as the source of theological and political difficulties for Europe (Southern 1962: 3, 13). Spatially, the sustained point of contact between Europe and the Islamic world was the Mediterranean region, notably in Spain, but commercial contact, through trade, also occurred elsewhere in the Mediterranean and beyond (Daniel 1975: 109, 220, 229). During the early part of this period, the primary contact was with the Arab world, but by the fourteenth century, the Islamic 'threat' was increasingly thought to lie with the rise of the Ottoman Turks, although the form taken by the representation of the Islamic Other did not change substantially (Daniel 1975: 314-17). The image of the wild Saracen was replaced by that of the wild Turk, but within Europe both groups were seen as Muslims, and the discourse of Other that was constructed took this as the central focus.

The European image of Islam, and those who practised it, achieved a significant degree of coherence in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, although a number of the key themes which recur over the centuries were evident much earlier (Daniel 1960: 275, 1975: 31-9). The Islamic Other was portrayed as barbaric, degenerate and tyrannical, and these alleged characteristics were considered to be rooted in the character of Islam as a supposedly false and heretic theology. The object of much of the attack was the prophet of Islam, Muhammad, who was represented as an imposter by claims that his life exemplified violence and sexuality (Daniel 1960: 78, 107). These were not portrayed as purely personal failings. It was argued that the theology that Muhammad created for his own ends embodied violence and sexuality, with the consequence that believers and followers of the theology inevitably behaved in similar ways. Thus Islam was portrayed as founded on, and as spreading itself by means of, aggression and war, and as permitting and encouraging polygamy, sodomy, and a general sexual laxity. It was argued that Islam reproduced the idea of the 'holy war' against all non-Muslims, in the course of which the latter would be either brutally murdered or enslaved,

and a notion of Paradise as a garden of sexual delights and passions (Daniel 1960: 123-5, 136-54, 1966: 5, 1975: 224, 243).

The equation of Islam with violence was sustained by a clerical agitation that culminated in the eleventh century in what became known in Europe as the Crusades. Islamic occupation of the Holy Land was considered to be illegitimate, and was therefore viewed as evidence of aggression (Lewis 1982: 22). Hence, war against the Saracen to regain the Holy Land was justified theologically in the name of the Christian God. Islamic resistance to the European armies was interpreted as further evidence of an inherent tendency towards violence and cruelty, while identical acts of war by Christians were seen as means by which God could be glorified (Daniel 1960: 109-13, 1975: 111-39). It was not until the late seventeenth century that the Islamic world ceased to be perceived within Europe as an external threat (Harsmeir 1985: 73).

In a context where the nature of the material world, and relations between people, were explained and structured through religion, European representations of the populations of other regions were organised necessarily in terms of religion. Thus, the representation of the Other was a consistent distortion of Islam, grounded in an alternative theology, Christianity. Christian literature about Islam set out to

establish that Muslim Arabs were different from Christian Europeans. This was expressed primarily in theological terms, because that is how the conformity of Europe was expressed. In a period when Europe was in a mood of aggression and expansion, its surplus energy created an attitude to its Arab and Arabic-speaking neighbours which was based, not on what the Arabs were like, but on what, for theological reasons, they ought to be like. (Daniel, 1975: 248)

The theological character of this representation of the Other was evident in the characterisation of Islam as the collective embodiment of, and the ultimate expression of, heresy.

In sum, 'Islam was seen as the negation of Christianity; Muhammad as an imposter, an evil sensualist, an Antichrist in alliance with the Devil. The Islamic world was seen as Anti-Europe, and was held in suspicion as such' (Kabani, 1986: 5). The Other was represented in thought structurally in terms of a binary opposition, the axis of which was religious, and in terms of content, as backward, inherently cruel and violent and irrationally sexual (Said 1985: 167, 188, Kabani, 1986: 6, 15, 41). The content of the representation within medieval Europe identified the Other as intrinsically different, a conception simultaneously expressive and a reinforcement of the 'Self/Other' duality.

EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND COLONISATION

By the fifteenth century, the centre of economic and political power in Europe had consolidated in the emergent nation states of the north and west of the continent (Kiernan 1972: 12-13, Wallerstein 1974). Trade, travel, and exploration were interdependent elements in an attempt by the feudal ruling classes to resolve a major economic crisis (Fox-Genovese and Genovese 1983: 10) and together, they widened the European contact with populations elsewhere in the world. This resulted in a major change in the structural context within which representations of the Other were generated and reproduced. Up to this point, the non-Islamic Other was beyond and outside the European arena. Moreover, in the case of the discourse about the Islamic Other, it was for a long time a representation generated in the context of European subordination to a greater economic and military force.

But once the emergent European city and nation states began to expand their material and political boundaries to incorporate other parts of the world within a system of international trade (Braudel 1984: 89-174), a system which was subsequently linked with colonial settlement, the populations they confronted in this exercise were within the arena of Europe in an economic and political sense, even though not spatially. And when colonisation became an objective, a class of Europeans began a new era of contact and interrelationship with indigenous populations, a contact that was increasingly structured by competition for land, the introduction of private property rights, the demand for a labour force, and the perceived obligation of conversion to Christianity. Collectively, these were all embodied in the discourse of 'civilisation'.

The Europeans who travelled in pursuit (individually or in some combination) of trade, military advantage, religious mission, and curiosity carried with them expectations about what and whom they might meet which were derived from extant verbal and written accounts of the Other (for example, Dickson 1984: 18, 80). They came therefore with their own intentions and objectives which influenced their representations of those populations with whom they came into contact, and with a discourse of the Other, a discourse that was both sustained and extensively reworked. Thus, when Columbus 'discovered' the 'new world', he reported finding 'savage' but not 'monstrous' people (Friedman 1981: 198). Representations based on the empiricism of direct experience permitted a transformation in the content of the representation of the Other, but the existence of the Other as a mirror of what the European was not remained largely, although not exclusively, unquestioned.

Travellers' accounts of their experiences were an increasingly significant source of representations from the sixteenth century because the development

of printing and the emergence of the book as a commodity (Febvre and Martin 1976: 180-97) permitted their wider, although still far from extensive circulation (Febvre and Martin 1976: 278-82). Travel books were published throughout Europe (Dickson 1984: 6-7) although they were most common and proved most popular in England (Curtin 1965: 10-14, Cole, 1972: 59-63). They were published for profit and, secondarily, to educate and entertain, and their intended 'mass' audience included the partially educated as well as the ruling class. Many were translations of texts published in other European languages, with the result that, for example, Iberian experiences and representations of Indian populations in the Caribbean and South America circulated in other European countries.

As representations of the Other, the travellers' sense of the normal served to identify the abnormal characteristics of the people with whom contact was established and of their mode of life. Hence, Curtin has observed regarding Africa 'the reporting often stressed precisely those aspects of African life that were most repellent to the West and tended to submerge the indications of a common humanity' (Curtin 1965: 23). A negative representation of the Other therefore served to define and legitimate what was considered to be the positive qualities of both author and reader.

One well-known English collection of travellers' reports from the period of European expansion is that edited by Richard Hakluyt (Febvre and Martin 1976: 281). It was first published in 1589-90 and a second enlarged edition, with the title *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, appeared between 1598 and 1600. This was a collection dedicated to the demonstration of English superiority at sea.

It cannot be denied, but as in all former ages, they have been men full of activity, stirrers abroad, and searchers of the most remote parts of the world, so in this most famous and peerless government of Her most excellent Majesty, her subjects, in compassing the vast globe of the world more than once, have excelled all the nations and people of the earth. (Hakluyt 1972: 33)

So how were the 'less excellent people of the earth' represented in these reports and other writings?

Non-European peoples were not represented in a homogenous manner, except in the most general sense of their being, by definition, less 'excellent' than the English. Those travellers who went east, into Russia and Central Asia, tended to describe the people that they met using the words 'barbarous', 'tyrant' or 'infidel' (Hakluyt 1972: 63, 80, 86, 123, 245). Rarely was any reference made to their physical appearance (see, for an exception, Hakluyt 1972: 101) and there were few remarks concerning their cultural practice. The

discourse of tyrant and infidel reproduced that of the Islamic world generated earlier within Europe, and signified religion as the means by which to establish a dialectic between Self and Other.

But the travellers who sailed to the Americas, to Africa and India remarked consistently on the skin colour (and other physical characteristics such as hair type) of the indigenous populations and, although not exclusively, on their semi- or complete nakedness (Jordan 1968: 4, Cole 1972: 64-5, also Sanders 1978: 211-25). For example, John Hawkins commented on the people of West Africa

The people of that part of Africa are tawny, having long hair without any apparel, saving before their privy members ... The 29 we came to Cape Verde. These people are all black, and are called negroes, without any apparel, saving before their privities: of stature goodly men. (Hakluyt 1972: 105-6)

Concerning the people he met on the South American mainland, he wrote

These Indians being of colour tawny like an olive, having every one of them both men and women hair all black, and no other colour, neither men nor women suffering any hair to grow in any part of their body, but daily pull it off as it groweth. They go all naked, the men covering no part of their body but their yard, upon the which they wear a gourd or piece of cane, made fast with a thread about their loins, leaving the other parts of their members uncovered, wherewith they take no shame. The women are also uncovered, saving with a cloth which they wear a hand-breadth, wherewith they cover their privities both before and behind. (Hakluyt 1972: 107-8)

Ralph Fitch represented the population of Ceylon as follows: 'Their women have a cloth bound about them from their middle to their knee: and all the rest is bare. All of them be black and but litle, both men and women' (Hakluyt 1972: 267).

The populations of these parts of the world also tended to be represented as savages and/or cannibals (Dickason 1984). John Hawkins described Dominica as 'an island of cannibals' (in Hakluyt 1972: 107) and Thomas Cavendish wrote of a population on the South American mainland: 'In this river there are great store of savages which we saw, and had conference with them: they were men eaters, and fed altogether upon raw flesh and other filthy food' (Hakluyt 1972: 279). James Lancaster described the inhabitants of the Cape of Good Hope as 'black savages very brutish' (in Hakluyt 1972: 361), a view endorsed by seventeenth century travellers who described them as

'beasts in the skins of men' and as being halfway between man and ape (Novak 1972: 188). Whilst seeking the Northwest Passage, Martin Frobisher made contact with the people living in the northern polar region. He described them as fierce and cruel, and provided a lengthy description of their appearance and cultural practices, including the following assertions:

They are men of a large corporature, and good proportion: their colour is not much unlike the sunburnt country man who laboureth daily in the sun for his living ... I think them rather anthropophagi, or devourers of man's flesh than otherwise: for that there is no flesh or fish which they find dead (smell if never so filthily) but they will eat it, as they find it without any other dressing. (Hakluyt 1972: 192-4)

The use of the term *anthropophagi* is an instance of the way in which Plinian categorisation shaped travellers' representations several centuries later and is consistent with the argument that the attribution of the cannibal label consistently occurs in Western representations of the Other (Arens 1979).

But references to savagery and cannibalism were not the only representations that accompanied the signification of skin colour and nakedness. Columbus distinguished between *cannibales* and *indios*; the latter he represented as exhibiting kindness and deference and as showing no evidence of bestiality (Sanders 1978: 93-4, 123-4). Francis Drake described the population of the island of Batjan in the Moluccas in the following manner:

The people of this island are comely in body and stature, and of a civil behaviour, just in dealing, and courteous to strangers. The men go naked, saving their heads and privities, every man having something or other hanging at their ears. The women are covered from the middle down to the foot, wearing a great number of bracelets upon their arms. (Hakluyt 1972: 186)

Two English travellers to Virginia described the Indians that they met as 'most gentle, loving and faithful, void of all guile and treason, and such as live after the manner of the golden age' (in Hakluyt 1972: 274). Indeed, some people described as savages were described as 'harmless', as was the indigenous population of Newfoundland by Sir Humphrey Gilbert (in Hakluyt 1972: 236).

After initial contact more complex representations, which included positively evaluated elements, were constructed in the course of colonisation. For example, a respect developed for certain aspects of the life of the North American Indian, including their perceived strength and agility, and their

hunting and fishing skills (Nash 1972: 68). In the case of the Carib Indians in the Caribbean, although they were represented as depraved by virtue of their alleged cannibalism, they were also attributed with the characteristics of courage and strength (Robe 1972: 45). For some observers, certain Indian populations were represented as a paradisiacal Other, as a population living in a condition of original harmony and egalitarianism, of absolute fulfilment (Baudet 1976: 26-8, 35-6). Thus the existence of non-Europeans was interpreted as a measure of the loss within Europe of an earlier 'golden age' or 'paradise' (cf. Popkin 1974: 129, Baudet 1976: 10-11). This discourse served to identify the observer as living in an unnatural, depraved condition, desirous of discovering the way to return to the ideal conditions that existed before the Fall. This supports the interpretation of those who have argued that the conception of the 'noble savage' existed long before Rousseau (Symcox 1972: 227-8, Baudet 1976: 11, Friedman 1981: 163-77, Dickason 1984: 59, 81).

But these positive representations have to be contextualised and it remains the case that the majority of descriptions in Hakluyt's collection of non-European peoples contain pejorative terms (cf. Friedman 1981: 164). In addition to the examples already cited, South American Indians were described as 'a warlike kind of people' and 'very ugly and terrible to behold' (Hakluyt 1972: 139). Indian Brahmins as 'a kind of crafty people, worse than the Jews' (1972: 259), the Javanese as 'heathen' (1972: 293), and the population of an island off the African coast as 'treacherous' (1972: 362). Hence, if there was no single representation, neither was there an equality of negative and positive meanings. The complexity of European representations was hierarchically ordered around the view that Europeans were superior by virtue of their 'civilisation' and achievements (of which world travel and trade were but one sign): the condition of the Other was represented as a proof of that interpretation.

In so far as the mythical nature of the Plinian and other categorisations was exposed by direct experience in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then that experience was neither universal nor uniform, and the consequent representations were multifaceted and therefore contested and contradictory. Nevertheless, these empirically based representations were not entirely novel for they contained transformations of earlier representations. For example, the images of the wild man and of monsters, with their long pedigree, both shaped and were reinvigorated by the European experience of contact with many of the indigenous populations of Africa, the Americas and even the polar regions (Friedman 1981: 203-4, Fyfe 1984: 137). The untamed aggression, sexuality, and bestiality of the 'mythical' wild man previously located in the forested edges of (and within) Europe were given a more precise and specific geographical location in the new world. Moreover, this incarnation of the wild

man was also distinguished by skin colour, permitting a conception of the Other as 'black' and therefore definitively distinct from the European who was 'white'.

In particular instances, the label *anthropophagi* was applied to certain groups, but in a new form. Columbus initiated the idea that those Indians who were named Caribs were, by custom, eaters of human flesh and, by a process of linguistic transformation, this name gave rise to the more familiar (in Western Europe) label 'cannibal'. Spanish explorers and colonisers in the Caribbean and Mexico increasingly applied the term to the peoples with whom they established contact, although in the written records of the period there is no first-hand witness account of the act of eating human flesh. The increasing utilisation of the term seems to correlate positively with indigenous resistance to the Spanish presence and practices of attempted military subjugation and the induction of indigenous peoples into unfree labour (Sanders 1978: 101, Arens 1979: 44-77).

Thus, direct contact and interaction with populations outside Europe was accompanied by a simultaneous reaffirmation and reconstruction of earlier representations (Walvin 1986: 72). With European discovery of what was Eurocentrically defined as the 'new world' (it was certainly not new to those populations who were living there), these representations increasingly refracted a new purpose as discovery was followed by settlement, and settlement by the introduction of systems of unfree labour (Miles 1987a) to exploit the natural resources initially for the benefit of the feudal ruling classes of Europe. Contact and interaction did not therefore occur in a neutral or equally balanced context. Rather, colonisation proceeded in a context of conflicting interests and unequal military resources, and was usually (although not universally) effected using various forms and degrees of direct force. The European classes involved in this process (re)constructed representations of these indigenous populations, both to legitimate their actions and in response to their experience of those populations. There was, as a consequence, a complex articulation between justification of class interests and strategies, and empirical observation in changing situations. The representations of the Other that resulted from this were neither absolutely homogeneous, nor static (for example, George 1958, Walvin 1986: 77), for the following reasons.

First, colonisation had neither a singular character nor a universal course. Bloody conflict, enforced labour and political subordination were common accompaniments of colonisation, as the examples of Central and North America and the Caribbean demonstrate (for example, Williams 1964: 3-29, Wolf 1982: 131-57), but other strategies were employed. In other contexts, mutually (although not equally) beneficial structures of accommodation and exchange predominated for at least certain periods of time, in the course of

which the indigenous modes of production and accompanying social relations were maintained in a modified form, as happened in New Zealand and Canada (for example, Oliver 1981: 172, Wolf 1982: 158-94). Where the colonised collected or produced use values which could serve as commodities (as in the case of the Canadian fur trade) or where the colonised responded to the European presence by producing use values for the colonisers (often in the form of food), and where the colonised possessed knowledge and skills to permit survival in what the European coloniser experienced as a hostile natural environment, relations of interdependence were established.

In such circumstances, hostile and negative European representations of the Other were discouraged and the colonisers, anxious to develop profitable exchange networks, ensured that they studied and understood the economic and social relations of those they met in the colonial situation, often to the point of adopting their conventions (see Trigger 1985: 195, 224-5, 298, 341-2). Additionally, colonisation was often initiated with the intention of incorporating the indigenous population into the 'civilisation' that the colonisers thought that they were creating. In the case of Australia, it was initially expected that the Aboriginal population would be a source of manual labour, and it was only when Aborigines resisted this that a different strategy of subordination and genocide was subsequently effected, with representations of the Other being reconstructed accordingly (Miles 1987a: 107, 189-91).

Second, colonisation was not without its political and ideological repercussions within the emergent European nation states. Both the principle and the particular practices of colonisation evinced political opposition, in the course of which contrary representations of the colonised Other were produced. Images of colonised populations therefore became the object of conflict, in the course of which the content of competing (although often overlapping) representations shifted. For example, from the late eighteenth century, both the use of enslaved African labour in the Caribbean and North America and the slave trade became the focus of a major campaign of opposition within Britain (see Bolt 1969, Temperley 1972, Anstey 1975, Davis 1984). This gave rise to a wide-ranging debate about the nature and capacities of African populations, in the course of which distinct representations of the African *qua* Other were articulated (for example, Davis 1984: 225-6), including abolitionist representations which implied that the African had the capacity to adopt Christianity and British marriage practices (Walvin 1986: 151-2), although the consequences of abolition were subsequently to be interpreted in largely negative terms (Walvin 1986: 84).

Given the temporal length and spatial extent of colonisation, in combination with these factors, it is impossible to offer a comprehensive analysis of the representation of the colonised Other here. There are reasons

to focus briefly on British representations of African populations (for representations of other colonised populations, see, for example, Kiernan 1972, Beare 1982). First, Africa was involved in many different phases of British colonialism over a period of four hundred years and therefore representations of the African populations constitute a central pillar of the British colonial heritage. Second, representations of the African as Other become increasingly interwoven with justifications for, as well as opposition to, the enslavement of the African in the Americas. This has led to the formulation of over-deterministic assertions to the effect that economic interests required a theory of inherent inferiority in order to justify African slavery (for example, Fryer 1984: 134), a functionalist assertion which raises important theoretical questions.

When evaluated in the light of the historical evidence, such claims are difficult to sustain in their rigorous form, not least because they fail to explain the development of earlier representations of Africans. Thus it is not that functionalist accounts are mistaken in any absolute way, but rather that they are incomplete by virtue of their simplistic, non-dialectical nature. Nevertheless, despite this specific focus upon representations of Africans, it should be noted that representations of other colonial Others exhibit both continuity and discontinuity with the former. For example, one striking continuity in British representations of the colonised Other is the attribution of excessive and unrestrained sexuality to a number of different colonised populations (for example, Kiernan 1972: 59, 255-60).

We have already seen that from the time of the earliest contacts between Europeans and Africans, European discourse noted African skin colour and nakedness in order to signify difference. It also noted that Africans were not Christian believers, and as a result they were represented as 'heathens' (see Jordan 1968: 20-1). Thus, this European discourse reflected back what the African was not in order to affirm difference and employed both phenotypical and cultural criteria: the African was defined as simultaneously physically and culturally different (Curtin, 1965: 30). A number of additional characteristics were attributed to the African during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and after, in the course of which the African was known to Europeans, and particularly the British, as a slave, both in the colonies and within Britain (Fryer 1984: 155, Walvin 1986: 80-2).

First, the African was represented as exhibiting a potent sexuality. African women were considered to be especially desirous of sexual intercourse while African men were thought to possess an unusually large penis and to be particularly virile and lusty (Jordan 1968: 151, 158-9, Fryer 1984: 140, 159). Second, in the light of the earlier representations of wildness and monstrosity, the African was attributed with a bestial character and there was much speculation about the origin and consequences of the supposed physical

similarities between Africans and apes, both of which were 'discovered' by Europeans at the same time in a common geographical location. Indeed, some Europeans suggested that sexual intercourse occurred between Africans and apes (Jordan 1968: 28-32, 238, Fryer 1984: 138). Third, the African was represented as possessing a specific character consisting of both positive and negative attributes. On the one hand, s/he was considered to be *lazy*, *superstitious*, *ferocious*, and a *coward*, and on the other to be *polite*, *noble*, and *respectful* of the elderly (Curtin 1965: 222-4, Barker 1978: 104). Fourth, the early charge of cannibalism was elaborated throughout the period under examination (Barker 1978: 129).

This emphasis upon physical and animalistic characteristics (but in combination with certain cultural attributes) was used to advance a conception of the African as living in a condition of *savagery*, a definition which placed the African far below the European on the European scale of human progress (Curtin 1965: 63-5, Walvin 1986: 77). In other words, the African was less civilised, a barbarian, by virtue of supposedly looking more like a beast and behaving in ways that approximated to the behaviour of beasts (Jordan 1968: 24-5, 97). Although for a majority of European opinion, this condition of barbarity and savagery was negatively evaluated, it was regarded by a significant minority, particularly during the eighteenth century, as expressive of a moral superiority because the African was thought to live a life that was more natural as a result of being closer to nature (Curtin 1965: 48-51, Fryer 1984: 145). Here we find the reproduction of the discourse of the noble savage.

There is no doubt that, in European eyes, the African was different. But was the difference sufficient to warrant designation as being non-human? And how was the difference explained? Concerning the former, prior to the late eighteenth century, it was rarely claimed that the African was less than human. Although the African was considered to be *bestial* and *savage*, European discourse also noted the existence of other characteristics that denoted a common status as a human being, including language (Curtin 1965: 35, Barker 1978: 47-50). This was buttressed by the centrality of Christianity, and specifically the Biblical explanation for the creation of humanity and the human presence on earth, to European thought (Barker 1978: 88). Throughout the eighteenth century the idea of the Great Chain of Being (Lovejoy 1936), the essence of the idea being that God had created all living things and had organised them into a hierarchy of existence, was used to order the natural and social world. Human beings were higher in this hierarchy than animals, and Africans (similarly created by God as human beings) shared this position with Europeans. But the centrality of the idea of hierarchy to the Great Chain of Being permitted the ranking of the different groups of human beings identified by European thought. Consequently, the African was both

different and lower on the scale relative to the European.

For most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the predominant explanation for the existence of the African as a different sort of human being drew upon environmentalist arguments (Barker 1978: 79) which had a long history. The physical appearance of the African, and specifically the colour of the African's skin, increased in significance as a sign of differentiation (Jordan 1968: 216-17, 512), as therefore did the debate about its origin and purpose. The Christian belief in common origin implied that the African's skin colour had been acquired after God's creation of the human species, but by the late eighteenth century the claim that blackness was the result of God's curse was no longer considered satisfactory and the argument that climate was the key determinant increased in significance (Jordan 1968: 525). Specifically it was argued that the heat of the sun in tropical regions either burnt the skin, or caused it to change colour as protection against the heat. Additionally, some argued that once this transformation had occurred, blackness became an inherited characteristic (Curtin 1965: 40-1, Jordan 1968: 11, Barker 1978: 85).

Climate was believed to determine not only phenotypical features of the African but also cultural characteristics. For example, the attributed quality of laziness was also explained by reference to the heat of the sun. But climate was not considered to be the sole environmental determinant. Samuel Stanhope Smith, an American academic, published an essay in 1787 in which he argued that the human species had originated in Asia in a 'civilised' form and that subsequent migrations were followed by a 'degeneration' into the condition of savagery and by gradual alterations in physical appearance. The causes of these transformations were identified as climate, the state of society and habits of living. Smith placed considerable emphasis upon the latter two factors and this environmentalist argument continued to predominate in American and European discourse in the late eighteenth century (Jordan 1968: 487, 513-15, also Popkin 1974: 139, Barker 1978: 52, 79).

Environmentalist arguments implied that the characteristics attributed to the African were, in principle, subject to modification. If it was argued that the African was a savage, it could also be argued that it was a human condition that could be improved (Barker 1978: 99, also Curtin 1965: 66). Hence Stanhope Smith, for example, claimed that Africans in America were becoming more capable of instruction and that their physical appearance was undergoing modification (Jordan 1968: 515-16). Environmentalism therefore sustained strategies for the 'civilisation' of the African: heathenness and savagery were the consequences of circumstances that could be changed by interventions such as missionary work and plantation production (for example, Curtin 1965: 123-39, 259-86). The idea of the 'civilising mission' was of particular significance during the nineteenth century colonial expansion of Europe, especially into Africa (Kiernan 1972: 24).

science. These developments interacted with the emergence of the idea of 'race' in European thought, an idea that was taken up by scientific enquiry and increasingly attributed with a narrow and precise meaning, beginning in the late eighteenth century. As a result, the sense of difference embodied in European representations of the Other became interpreted as a difference of 'race', that is, as a primarily *biological* and *natural* difference which was inherent and unalterable. Moreover, the supposed difference was presented as scientific (that is, objective) fact. This discourse of 'race', although the product of 'scientific' activity, came to be widely reproduced throughout Europe, North America and the European colonies in the nineteenth century, becoming, *inter alia*, a component part of common-sense discourse at all levels of the class structure and a basic component of imperialist ideologies (for example, Biddiss 1979b, MacKenzie 1984).

The periodisation of this transformation is, however, more controversial. For example, Fryer argues that this pseudo-scientific ideology emerged orally in the seventeenth century and crystallised in a written form during the eighteenth century (1984: 134). In so arguing, he places much emphasis upon the writing of Edward Long, whose *History of Jamaica* was published in 1774. The argument of the book, according to Barker, was against the dominant view of the time, for the idea of 'race' as proposed by Long was rarely used during the slave trade era (Barker 1978: 42, 52, 164). Jordan has argued that the environmentalist explanation of the Other was becoming less popular only by the first decade of the nineteenth century (1968: 532) while Curtin has claimed that the idea of 'race', and its legitimisation by science, did not predominate before 1840 (1965: 29). For our purposes, the fact of the transformation is more important than the precise time at which it occurred.

The idea of 'race' emerged in the English language in the early sixteenth century (Banton 1987: 1) and was used initially largely to explicate European history and nation formation. As it appeared in historical writing, the idea of 'race' referred to those various groups which, collectively, constituted the populations of emergent nation states such as England and France, and which supposedly exhibited qualities which were subsequently transformed into national symbols. The discourse of 'race' therefore played a central role in the creation of myths of national origin (Barzun 1938: 28-50, Poliakov 1974: 1-8), the significance of which will be explored in chapter 3. For example, in the English case, the Anglo-Saxons were defined as a 'race' of people who, from a very early date, formed a significant part of the English population but whose political superiority was diminished by the Norman conquest in 1066. The events of the English civil war in the mid-seventeenth century could then be interpreted as the struggle by the Anglo-Saxon 'race' to reassert their traditions of liberty and democracy against the domination of a Norman monarchy (Poliakov 1974: 37-53, Horsman 1981: 9-24, MacDougall, 1982).

dominant discourse about African characteristics and their implications for the economic role that many Africans were to play in the Americas. The acquisition and exploitation of African labour under conditions of slavery was justified, first, by the claim that the 'race' of Africans was biologically suited to tropical conditions, unlike Europeans (Curtin 1961: 104, 1965: 116, Barker 1978: 61). The logic of this claim implied that this suitability could be acquired, although this was less readily accepted by Europeans concerning themselves, a degree of ambiguity concerning the consistency of racialism as an explanation for the hypothesised differences between Africans and Africans. This ambiguity was partially removed in the eighteenth century with the emergence of the discourse of 'race'. Second, it was by the argument that the provision of labour power offered the opportunity to escape from the condition of savagery. Entry into the 'civilised' world of production therefore permitted Africans to take a step down the 'progress' towards 'civilisation', placing them in the first instance in a position similar to that of the European poor (Kiernan 1972: 1978: 68, 151-2, 160, 198, also chapter 4).

certainly up to the end of the eighteenth century, the predominant presentation of the African explicitly or implicitly conceded that the 'race' of Africans was biologically suited to slavery. Such arguments were advanced by the late eighteenth century, but they had only a limited influence (Barker 1978: 52, but see Walvin 1986: 73-9). However, the predominant view was that the African was a human being, part of the same 'race' as Europeans, and exhibited characteristics subject to environmental variation. The African was nevertheless defined as an inferior human being, a status which was ascribed to him or her on the basis of the 'race' of the African as Other signified phenotypical and cultural differences as evidence of this inferiority and the attributed condition of slavery. The sense of Otherness was increasingly, although not grounded in skin colour (Curtin 1965: 39, Jordan 1968: 7), and the attribution of a number of other negatively evaluated characteristics to the African.

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widespread agreement amongst historians that a major factor in the development of the 'race' of the Other as a result of the interaction of culture and the growth, and increasing hegemony, of

In this usage, 'race' meant lineage or common descent, and identified a population with a common origin and history, but not a population with a fixed biological character (Banton 1977: 16-17, also 1980: 24-7, 1987: 1-27, Guillaumin 1980: 46).

The idea of 'race' took on a new meaning with the development of science and its application to the natural world and, subsequently and more narrowly, to the social world from the late eighteenth century (Banton 1987: 28-64). From this time, 'race' increasingly came to refer to a biological type of human being, and science purported to demonstrate not only the number and characteristics of each 'race', but also a hierarchical relationship between them. Thus it was claimed that all human beings, and therefore every single individual, either belonged to a 'race' or was a product of several 'races', and therefore exhibited the characteristics of that 'race' or those 'races'. Moreover, science purported to demonstrate that the biological characteristics of each 'race' determined a range of psychological and social capacities of each group, by which they could be ranked.

Thus, stated in its most extreme form, 'race' determined economic and cultural characteristics and development (cf. Barzun 1938: 19-21, Banton 1977: 47). This was a discourse of 'race' that may be described as an instance of biological determinism (cf. Gould 1984: 20, Rose *et al.* 1984: 3-15). Thereby, the Other was represented as a biologically distinct entity, as a 'race' apart, whose capacities and achievements were fixed by natural and unalterable conditions which were common to that collectivity. There is now a considerable literature on the ideological career of the idea of 'race' (such as Gossett, 1965, Banton 1977, 1987, Stepan, 1982) and here I draw attention only to those aspects relevant to this general survey of representations of the Other and to the subsequent argument.

First, the scientific assertion of the existence of different biologically-constituted 'races' led eventually to a clash with religious epistemology and religious discourse about the nature and development of the world and the human species. As we have seen, Biblical interpretation suggested that the human species was a divine creation and that all human beings, past and present, were descended from Adam and Eve, implying some ultimate homogeneity of the human species. One method of resolving this problem without questioning the legitimacy of Biblical explanation was to claim that God had responded to the commission of human sin by damnation, and that the descendants of those damned were marked by distinctive features (such as a black skin). Another, with an equally long pedigree, placed less emphasis on divine intervention, maintaining that environmental factors (such as the influence of the sun) had modified the original and single biological form represented by Adam and Eve, creating a number of different types which had subsequently become permanently established by hereditary

means. Using this latter argument, many 'race' scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were able to claim that their explanation for 'differentiation' was consistent with Christian theology.

But in the late eighteenth century, scientific analysis revived an objection which had been articulated in the late sixteenth century in Hakluyt's collection of travel writings (see Sanders 1978: 223-4). The counter-claim was that phenotypical features designated as evidence for the existence of 'race' not change when members of 'races' moved to different geographical locations and were subjected to different environmental conditions. The of Africans forcibly moved to, and enslaved within, the United States often cited to support this view, as was the experience of Europeans resident in the tropical colonies. Both instances were interpreted in such a way as to conclude that the environmental factors, including climate, were incapable of altering the physical features of 'race'. The implication was that disavowing 'races' of human beings had always existed and that the hierarchy of inferiority and superiority was therefore natural, inevitable and unalterable. This assault on environmentalism led to a more fundamental conflict between Christian theology (Stepan 1960: 69, 169, Haller 1971: 69-79, Stepan 1982: 36-46). The conclusions to which it gave rise were accorded even greater legitimacy as science occupied an increasingly ascendant position in the nineteenth century. By the middle of the nineteenth century this theory of polygenesis was dominant, and many of its key assumptions survived into the post-Darwinian era (Stocking 1968: 39, 45-6, 55).

Second, the scientific discourse of 'race' did not replace earlier conceptions of the Other. Ideas of savagery, barbarism, and civilisation predetermined the space that the idea of 'race' occupied but were themselves reconstituted by it. Thus, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (Nelson 1982: 111-12), extant imagery was refracted through the representational prism of 'race', with the result that environmentalism as an explanation for the sense of difference declined in importance. For example, the idea of civilisation emerged in the later part of the eighteenth century. It was a capacity or achievement that was initially considered to be attainable by all human beings, including those thought to be the most savage peoples, e.g. the 'Negro' or African 'race', a product of a small brain, and civilisation became an attribute of large-brained 'white' people (Stocking 1968: 35-7, 121-2).

Third, the generation and reproduction of the idea of 'race' was a European and North American phenomenon (for example, Gossett 1965). M

scientific writers contributed, and they drew upon and criticised each other's work, seeking new methods of measurement and solutions to emergent anomalies. The writings of the British theorists, Lord Kames and Charles White, were critically reviewed in the United States by Samuel Stanhope Smith in a book, *Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species*, published in 1787 (Fredrickson 1972: 72). The science of phrenology originated in the work of Franz Joseph Gall and Johan Gaspar Spurzheim in Germany and was developed by George Combe in Scotland (Gossett 1965: 71-2). In turn, George Combe was a friend of Samuel George Morton, an American who published *Crania Americana* in 1839 and *Crania Aegyptiaca* in 1844 (Gould 1984: 50-69). The cephalic index (a measurement of skulls which involved dividing the length of the skull by the breadth) was invented by Anders Retzius in Sweden (Gossett 1965: 76) and was a stimulus to a significant proportion of the work (much of which was critical) of Paul Broca in Paris (Gould 1984: 98-100).

F. Tiedeman, a German anatomist, measured brains in order to establish differences between 'races', his results stimulating a critical reply from Josiah Clark Nott in the United States (Gossett 1965: 77). Louis Agassiz was a Swiss naturalist who was influenced by Georges Cuvier (himself a French anatomist) and who migrated to the United States in 1846 where he collaborated with Josiah Nott and George Gliddon (Stanton 1960). These two had a major impact on 'race' theory with their book *Types of Mankind*, first published in 1854, which appeared in at least nine editions before the end of the century (Gossett 1965: 65, Banton 1977: 50-2). Thus the increasingly international character of the scientific enterprise was demonstrated by, and facilitated the formulation of, the discourse of 'race'. The consequences were that, as a form of human classification, the scientific idea of 'race' had a widespread circulation, and that all its proponents represented various Others (Africans, North American Indians, Indians) as instances of different and inferior 'races'.

Fourth, although the interrelated ideas of biological type and hierarchy remained a constant feature of the discourse of 'race', the forms of classification and the content of attribution and determination changed over time. For most of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 'race' classifications were based upon the phenotypical characteristics of skin colour, hair type, and nose shape, but there was an increasing emphasis upon the dimensions of the skull (Benedict 1983: 22). The latter figured prominently in investigations from the early nineteenth century (Curtin 1965: 366), and considerable effort was expended in assessing, for example, cranial capacity, facial angle and cranial index. Indeed, there was much debate about the relative validity of these different measures. The science of 'race' therefore underwent a complex evolution. In part, this complexity was a

function of the essential error of the idea. As each attempt at classification broke down under the weight of logical inconsistency and empirical evidence, a new classification was formulated. But it was also a function of increasing sophistication of measurement (Stocking 1968: 57).

For example, in Germany in the late eighteenth century, Peter Camper claimed to distinguish between 'races' by facial angle, the angle that a line drawn from the chin to the top of the forehead forms with a horizontal line at the base of the chin. He drew the most extreme contrast between 'Greeks' and 'Negroes' (Gossett 1965: 69-70). Somewhat different arguments, but leading to the same conclusion, were advanced by phrenology, the science of the mind, the central claim of which was that the brain was divided into a number of sections, each of which was the basis of a different faculty. It was argued that each 'race' was distinguished by a distinct variation in size and interrelation of these different sections, and not by the weight of the brain or capacity of the skull (Stepan 1982: 21-8). Combe claimed, for example,

The HINDOOS are remarkable for want of force of character ... Power of mental manifestation bears a proportion to the size of the central organs, and the Hindoo head is small, and the European large, in precise conformity with the different mental characters ... The Hindoo brain indicates a manifest deficiency in the organs of Combativeness and Destructiveness; while, in the European, these parts are amply developed. The Hindoo is cunning, timid and proud; and in him Secretiveness, Cautionness and Self-Esteem are large in proportion to the organs last mentioned. (Combe 1830: 605-6)

As Fryer expressed it succinctly, on this basis 'phrenology justified empire-building' (1984: 171).

Samuel Morton measured differences between 'races' by filling skulls with mustard seed or lead shot, from which he derived a measure of cranial capacity. He claimed to demonstrate significant differences in cranial capacity between five different 'races' (Caucasian, Mongolian, Malay, American, and Ethiopian) although in his final conclusions, these 'races' were further subdivided into 'families' (see Gould 1984: 54-5). Morton's craniometry was a major influence upon Nott and Gliddon (see Stanton 1960, Gould 1984: 30-72) who assumed that there was a correlation between increasing cranial capacity and a higher level of innate intelligence. Louis Gratiolet offered evidence that the coronal suture of the skull closes, thereby arresting the growth of the brain, at different times for different 'races'. He concluded that this closure occurred earlier amongst 'Negroes' than amongst 'Whites' (Gossett 1965: 75, Gould 1984: 98). The problems are most evident in the increasing complexity of the measurement systems evolved by Paul Broca in

his attempt to identify a phenotypical feature that would systematically and consistently demonstrate the existence of a hierarchy of 'races' (Gossett 1965: 76, Gould 1984: 82-107).

Fifth, the scientific notion of 'race' had a universal application. Not only did those who formulated the idea consider themselves to be members of a 'race' but they also identified a hierarchy of 'races' within Europe. Efforts were made in the late nineteenth century, for example, to identify the different 'races' of which the British population was composed, using hair and eye colour and skull measurements (Beddoe 1885). Concerning Europe as a whole, various classifications were devised, the most common being a distinction between Teutonic (or Nordic), Mediterranean, and Alpine 'races' (Ripley 1900: 103-30). In the USA, this classification was combined with an argument that human intelligence was a fixed and hereditary characteristic in order, as we shall see below, to produce a hierarchy of acceptable and unacceptable immigrants (Kamin 1977: 30-51, Gould 1984: 146-233).

Within Europe, representations of the Other as an inferior 'race' focused, amongst others, on the Irish (Curtis 1968, 1971) and Jews (Mosse 1978). This was sustained partly by claiming a biological superiority for the Nordic 'race'. In Germany, Günther (1970) interpreted European history in a book titled *The Racial Elements of European History* (first published in 1927) using the scientific idea of 'race' to refer to human groups with distinct and measurable physical and mental characteristics. He identified the Nordic 'race' as especially creative, with a need for conquest, a special aptitude for military science and a low crime rate, and he feared social decay in Europe as a result of 'the running dry of the blood of the ... Nordic race' (1970: 198). Portentously, he stated that 'the question put to us is whether we have courage enough to make ready for future generations a world cleansing itself racially and eugenically' (1970: 267). Günther was only one of a large number of German (and other European) scholars (and political activists) who employed the scientific discourse of 'race' to assert simultaneously the superiority of the Nordic 'race' and the inferiority of Jews (Mosse 1978: 77-93, 113-27).

Sixth, the scientific conception of 'race' has now been shown to be mistaken, although a number of scientists continue to this day to assert the key ideas in various forms. The exposure of the error had a long genesis which began with the work of Charles Darwin and finished with the emergence of population genetics. The first important step was the formulation of the theory of evolution which questioned in principle the validity of the idea of fixed and permanent biological species. However, when the human species was located in evolutionary theory in Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the idea of 'race' was retained, the argument being that each 'race' could be ranked on an evolutionary scale. Thus, what came to be known as Social Darwinism (Jones 1980, Clark 1984, 1988) asserted that there was a struggle

for survival amongst the different human 'races', in the course of which those with lesser intelligence or capacity for 'civilisation' would eventually disappear, their elimination being evidence of their natural inability to evolve. Thus, rather than leading to the rejection of the idea of discrete biological 'races', evolutionary theory was developed initially in a way which endorsed this conception, and the classifiers of the human species (notably the physical anthropologists) continued to produce their typologies (Haller 1971: 121-52, Banton 1977: 89-100, Stepan 1982: 47-110).

A further decisive development was the articulation of the statistical limitations of phenotypical measurement by those who continued to defend the utility of such measurement. The work of Boas in the early twentieth century is particularly important because he also demonstrated the influence of the social environment on physiological features by use of the cephalic index (for example, 1940: 60-75). Boas, then, asserted the existence of biological 'races' but rejected the argument that they were fixed, because of evidence that phenotypical features such as head form did respond to environmental influences (Stocking 1968: 170-80). He also argued that although the world's population could be divided into a number of 'races' using various phenotypical criteria, each such category contained within it a range of variation that overlapped with the variation of any other category. He said, moreover, 'With regard to many characteristics of this kind, we find that the difference between the averages of different races is insignificant as compared to the range of variability that occurs within each race' (Boas 1940: 42). It follows from this that although it may be the case that two populations can be shown to have a different average height, it does not follow that any two individuals selected from these two populations will demonstrate the same difference. In other words, groups differences do not correspond to individual differences (cf. Stocking 1968: 192-3).

The full implications of Darwin's evolutionary theory could only be explored with the emergence of the science of genetics which identified the biological basis of evolutionary processes. Genetics shifted attention partly away from phenotypical differences such as skin colour and analysed biological features which were not evident to the naked eye and which, in a complex interaction with the environment, determined biological changes in the human species. It was generally concluded after the Second World War that the scientific conception of 'race' grounded in the idea of fixed typologies and based upon certain phenotypical features such as skin colour and skull shape does not have any significant scientific meaning or utility. Moreover, it was concluded that there is no causal relationship between physical or genetic characteristics and cultural characteristics. In a phrase, genetics demonstrated that 'race', as defined by scientists from the late eighteenth century, had no scientifically verifiable referent (Boyd 1950, Montagu 1964, 1972).

This has not, however, prevented the continuing use of the term in scientific and everyday language. Concerning the scientific community, some physical anthropologists have continued to assert a 'race' classification using phenotypical features in spite of the genetic and other contrary evidence (for example, Hooton 1947) and the famous UNESCO statements on the nature of 'race' gave some varying, but heavily qualified, approval to this approach (see Montagu 1972: 9, 142, 150). On the other hand, many geneticists have argued that populations can be better distinguished from each other by identifying different frequencies of variable genes, although they acknowledge that the point at which it is decided to distinguish between populations is determined arbitrarily (Boyd 1950: 202-7, Bodmer 1972: 90). They argue that these populations, distinguished not by phenotypical features but by genetic frequencies, should be labelled 'races'. In the light of these different conceptions, and of the claims by other scientists that the 'race' idea has no scientific value at all, it is difficult to identify any utility in continuing to use the term scientifically (cf. Montagu 1972: 63, Jones 1981, see Miles 1982: 18-19).

Concerning the latter, in many different contexts, people have continued to identify the Other by reference to phenotypical features (especially skin colour) which therefore serve as indicative of a significant difference. Moreover, they have continued to use the idea of 'race' to label that difference. As a result, certain sorts of social relations are defined as 'race relations', as social relations between people of different 'races'. Indeed, states legislate to regulate 'race relations', with the result that the reality of 'race' is apparently legitimated in law (Guillamin 1980). Thus the idea of 'race' has continued to be used in common-sense discourse to identify the Other in many societies, but largely without the sanction of science.

CONCLUSION

The discussion of discourse and representation in this chapter has been detached to a large extent (although not completely) from its political and economic context; consequently, the nature, determinants and consequences of European and North American representations of the Other have not been discussed explicitly. The intention, and result, has been largely descriptive and historical. In order to go on to discuss these matters, it is necessary to summarise the conclusions that should be drawn from the empirical, historical material outlined in this chapter.

First, the process of representing the Other entails a dialectic of representational inclusion and exclusion. By attributing a population with certain characteristics in order to categorise and differentiate it as an Other, those who do so also establish criteria by which they themselves are

represented. In the act of defining Africans as 'black' and 'savages', and thereby excluding them from their world, Europeans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were representing themselves as 'white' and 'civilised'. Moreover, by using the discourse of 'race' to exclude and inferiorise, that same discourse, but with inverted meanings, served to include and superiorise: if the population of Africa was represented as a 'race', then the population of Europe is simultaneously represented as a 'race', albeit a supposedly superior one. Hence, the act of representational exclusion is simultaneously an act of inclusion, whether or not Self is explicitly identified in the discourse.

Second, for the European, the Other has not been created exclusively in the colonial context. Representations of the Other have taken as their subject not only the populations of, for example, Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and the Americas but also the populations of different parts of Europe, as well as insurrectionary and colonising populations, notably from North Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, the Other has been created not only externally to the nation state but also within, most notably in the case of the Jews. Consequently, debate about the nature and origin of representations of the Other cannot be confined to the analysis of European colonialism (although this is not to claim that the colonial experience is of no relevance to understanding the nature and origin of European representations of the Other).

Third, representations of the Other are holistically neither static nor unitary. They have undergone transformation over time, in response to changing circumstances, including the economic and political position of those producing and reproducing the representations. The characteristics attributed to the Other, the evaluation of those characteristics, and the explanations offered for difference, have therefore been altered, although again rarely in a holistic manner. Thus, in the case of the European representation of the African, while skin colour has remained a constant distinguishing feature, representations of savagery and bestiality have been historically variable. Indeed, the evaluative content of European representations has not been consistently negative, and we have seen examples where the qualities identified and attributed have been largely positively evaluated. Moreover, those people who constitute the object of representation, who are created as the Other, also change over time. For example, for a long period of time in European history, the primary Other was found in the Islamic world rather than central and southern Africa.

Hence, when analysing representations of the Other, it is necessary to be alert to the class position of those producing and reproducing them, and to their dynamic and heterogeneous nature, as well as to their more constant features. The analytical implication is that one cannot assume the existence of a simple process of representational reproduction whereby contemporary representations are inherited from the past. Rather, contemporary

representations are always the product of historical legacy and active transformation in the light of prevailing circumstances, including the pattern of class relations.

Fourth, for the European, as well as for other populations, somatic features, and particularly skin colour, have been used to represent the Other long before European colonisation. However, exteriorisation by reference to blackness has not consistently correlated with the attribution of additional, negatively evaluated characteristics, and hence the representation of the African within the Greco-Roman world during the third and second centuries BC differs in a number of important respects from that created and reproduced in north west Europe from the seventeenth century. Moreover, representations of the Other have not been based on somatic characteristics alone. Cultural characteristics have also been used, and sometimes to the virtual exclusion of phenotypical features: European representations of the Islamic world extensively utilised images of barbarism and sexuality in the context of a Christian/heaven dichotomy.

Fifth, the development of the discourse of 'race', and its subsequent incorporation into the discourse of science did not entail a complete break with earlier representations of the Other and therefore the creation of completely new means of representational inclusion and exclusion. Within Europe, scientific discourse, and its application to the human species took place in a context of an existing pattern of representation and interiorisation which it incorporated and theorised by new criteria of secularised validity. Because the emergence of science did not displace these earlier hierarchies of inferiority, including those which used somatic differences to identify the Other, analyses of the representations of the Other which focus exclusively on the career of the discourse of 'race' arbitrarily detach that history from its roots.

This is not to minimise the transformation entailed in the gradual epistemological shift from religion to science as the criterion by which to measure and evaluate the nature of the social and material world. This transformation was highly significant in so far as it permitted and rationalised a method of inquiry which sought to investigate a level of reality which lay below that revealed by immediate and unmediated observation, and to advance explanations which were not confined to references to 'divine will'. Nevertheless, the development of science did not, by itself, guarantee accuracy and veracity, partly because the agenda for scientific investigation was shaped by a variety of additional interests and by a particular pattern of international economic and political relations.