

The truth is that there are no races. . . . The evil that is done is done by the concept and by—yet impossible—assumptions as to its application. What we miss through our obsession . . . is, simply, reality.
(Appiah 1995, 75)

Over a century ago, W.E.B. Du Bois in *The Souls of Black Folk* proclaimed one of his most cited dictums: "The problem of the 20th Century is the problem of the color line" (1989, 10). In this book we echo his sentiment, but with a radical twist. The problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of "race"—an ideology that has served well to successfully obscure and disguise class interests behind the smokescreen of multiculturalism, diversity, difference, and more recently, whiteness. Whether the terms of analysis are "race," "racial identity," "race consciousness," or "political race," the category of "race" and its many derivatives function as the lynchpin of racism, which "forbids its objects to be other than members of a race" (Fields 2001, 49). As Barbara Fields has noted with respect to African Americans:

Afro-Americans themselves have fought successively for different ways of naming themselves as people. . . . Each name, once accepted into the general public vocabulary, has simply become a variant word for Afro-Americans' race. A sense of peoplehood, nationhood, or comradeship in struggle may be available to others; but, for persons of African descent, all reduces to race, a life sentence for them and their issue in perpetuity. (50)

To radically shift directions and speak "against race," as Paul Gilroy (2000) suggests, or "after race" as we attempt to do here, is to uncompromisingly refuse to accept or legitimate any longer the perpetual racialized demarcations of "race" (Guinier and Torres 2002) or "problem" (Du Bois 1989) populations. Our intention is to contest the notion that the color of a person's skin, and all it has historically come to signify within the sociological, political, or popular imagination, should continue to function as such. We seek to shatter dubious claims that essentialize the responses of populations, whether they exist as objects or subjects of racism; and by so doing, acknowledge the complexity of the world in which we negotiate our daily existence today.

To be clear, we are not arguing in the tradition of the color-blind conservatives or political pundits who would have us believe that the structures and practices that have formidably embedded racism as a way of life for centuries in the United States and around the world have been undone and that the problem of racism has been ameliorated. Our position, in fact, is diametrically opposed to this argument. Instead, the political force of

our analysis is anchored in the centrality of "race" as an ideology and racism as a powerful, structuring, hegemonic force in the world today. We argue that we must disconnect from "race" as it has been constructed in the past, and contend fully with the impact of "race" as ideology on the lives of all people—but most importantly on the lives of those who have been enslaved, colonized, or marked for genocide in the course of world history.

Situating the Debate

We have arrived at this position after ten long years of debate and research into the extremely murky, contradictory, and disturbing literature in the field. During this time, a variety of questions have informed our work, questions that the reader will find repeatedly reflected or inferred in the collection of interpretive essays included in this book. Some of these questions include: How has the notion of "race" changed over time? What analytical value or utility does the concept of "race" have in our struggle against racism and economic inequality? What value do contemporary notions of "race" have in our efforts to dismantle the external material structures of oppression that sustain racialized inequalities? Should we jettison the concept of "race" but continue to study racism? Can racism exist without "races"? Does the concept of "race" have any real referent in the social world beyond its link to racism as an ideology? What is the relationship between changing class formations and racialized inequalities? What are the problematics of "white supremacy" arguments in the antiracist struggle for economic democracy? To what extent do remaining black-white dichotomous perceptions of "race relations" render other racialized populations invisible? Is the black-white paradigm of "race relations" able to grasp the new patterns of conflict or racialized inequalities within a changing political economy? What are the implications of questioning the "race relations" paradigm? How can we arrive at a more precise and specific concept with which to analyze both the historical and contemporary social realities and material conditions of racialized inequalities? What new strategies might help us dissolve the historical barriers that interfere with the establishment of antiracist solidarity across populations with quite different histories of integration into the U.S. body politic?

The posing of these difficult questions should not be interpreted to mean that white-on-black racism is not a significant and necessary area of study. Rather, we believe that breaking with the black-white racism problematic can open up new research possibilities in comparative studies of racialized inequalities that could potentially reinvestigate our political efforts to ameliorate human suffering. As we attempt to address different aspects of these questions in this book, we want to state explicitly that our critique of the race problematic goes beyond positing that biological "races" do not exist or the claim that the concept of "race" is socially and culturally constructed. Despite the proverbial caveat of "social construction," the analytical and descriptive (or discursive) categories of "race" lead to some serious theoretical problems, as we suggest in the following chapters. Thus, we contend that the everyday use of "race" for symbolic or political purposes must be uprooted, along with outdated biological assertions. In so doing, our attention will be focused on how best to conceptualize multiple racisms and racialized formations within the context of demographic shifts, changing capitalist class relations, and global socioeconomic dislocations.

The debate over such questions is not new. European and Australian, as well as American social scientists such as Collette Guillaumin, Robert Miles, Paul Gilroy, Stuart Hall, Kenan

Malik, Etienne Balibar, Michael Omi, Howard Winant, Stephen Castles, David Theo Goldberg, Stephen Small, Anthony Appiah, William Julius Wilson, Barbara Fields, and others have been examining questions such as these since the 1980s. Most notable among them is Robert Miles, a British sociologist, who in 1982 first blew open the debate on the analytical utility of "race" as a suitable construct for the sociological analysis of human populations. Miles called into question the "race relations" paradigm that had dominated the field since the 1960s. Importantly, his efforts have assisted Marxist scholars in recovering class analysis as a significant analytical tool in the examination of racism at a time when postmodern theories began to severely curtail and erode the analytical power of this approach in scholarly examinations of culture. In addition, Miles has pointed to the need for scholars to engage the historical specificity, rather than to adhere to a view of singularity, in theorizing racism. He has argued that historically specific racisms possess their own "effectivity" and, as such, could operate as a constitutive (determinant) force in shaping the ideology of the time. Two decades later, this critique remains compelling and instructive but conspicuously missing as we navigate through the contemporary debate.

Along with the writings in the study of "race" and racism, the work of Ellen Meiksins Wood has been significant to our understanding of contemporary capitalism (with its unrelenting project of modernization) and its impact on the de-democratization of public life within nation-states. Wood's (1995) efforts to rethink democracy without capitalism constitute a powerful treatise that unapologetically points to capitalism as the most engulfing system of social relations in the history of humankind. Wood insists that we recognize power as unrelentingly anchored in external material conditions and remain ever cognizant of the social impact of the mode of production upon workers, in this country and abroad. That is, we cannot ignore the increasing significance of class and the specificity of capitalism as a system of social and political relations of power, particularly in light of current struggles to contend with the virulent particularities of globalized racisms. The failure to engage the political economy and its impact on class formations—inherent in all contemporary expressions of racism—is a severe shortcoming in many of the scholarly treatments of "race" during the last fifty years. Moreover, we need greater specificity in the language we use to talk about the complexities of class, the economy, and social power in contemporary formations of racialized inequalities.

The Idea of "Race"

The research on contemporary racism points to an arresting dilemma. Social scientists seem befuddled in their efforts to extend their analysis beyond the traditional "racial" classifications sustained by the idea of "race." This can be briefly articulated in the following manner. "Race" has no scientific basis, yet racial categorization certainly foregrounds social structure and action. The majority of people in this country continue to believe that they belong to a specific race, and this has an impact on the way they conceive of their social identity. Hence, it can be said that for many racism functions to define both self and other. This is apparent in racialized discourses of hierarchy, in which members of dominant groups assert their superiority over other groups, and in racialized discourses of solidarity, in which subordinated groups assert their unity and rights. As such, "race" may not be a biological fact, but it certainly is a social reality" (Castles 1996, 22)—a social reality kept alive by the relentless use of "race" to construct meaning within both academic and popular culture.

The history of "race" as ideology is equally puzzling. In early writings, categories used to define people were both similar to and different from the way we conceptualize "race" today. For example, it was not unusual for English writers to refer to the Irish as an inferior "race." However, their judgments were not necessarily linked to biological determinism but rather to cultural or social determinants, such as nationality or religion. It was not until the legacy of Darwin seeped into the popular imagination that the belief in "race" as a genetic predisposition of social behavior flourished. The concept of "race" has always been linked to either social or genetic constructions of inferiority or superiority assigned to particular populations, depending on the term's historical usage and reference. The ideology of "race" and its use, whether as a construct in the interest of genocide and colonialism or in the interest of political resistance, has always engendered the seeds of essentialism. So, if "race" is "real," it is only "because we have acted as if certain people, at certain points in time, were inferior based on innate or essentialized characteristics" (Lee, Mountain, and Koenig 2001, 40). Hence, the circularity of "race" logic leaves little possibility outside the realm of determinism. The power that ratifies "race" thinking is, wittingly or unwittingly, grounded in the notion that "race," whether biological or cultural, is immutable—indivisible from the essential character of individuals.

Although today "race" is generally linked to phenotypic characteristics, there is a strong consensus among evolutionary biologists and genetic anthropologists that "biologically identifiable human races do not exist; *Homo sapiens* constitute a single species, and have been so since their evolution in Africa and throughout their migration around the world" (Lee, Mountain, and Koenig 2001, 39). This perspective is similar to that which existed prior to the eighteenth century, when the notion that there were distinct populations whose differences were grounded in biology did not exist. For the Greeks, for example, the term "barbarian" was tied to how civilized a people were considered to be (generally based on language rather than genetics). So how did all this begin?

George Fredrickson (2002), writing on the history of racism, identifies the anticipatory moment of modern racism with the "treatment of Jewish converts to Christianity in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spain. *Conversos* were identified and discriminated against because of the belief held by Christians that the impurity of their blood made them incapable of experiencing a true conversion" (31). Fredrickson argues that the racism inherent in the quasi-religious, Spanish doctrine of *limpeza de sangre*, referring to purity of blood, set the stage for the spread of racism to the New World:

To the extent that it was enforced represented the stigmatization of an entire ethnic group on the basis of deficiencies that allegedly could not be eradicated by conversion or assimilation. Inherited social status was nothing new; the concept of "noble blood" had long meant that the offspring of certain families were born with a claim to high status. But when the status of large numbers of people was depressed purely and simply because of their derivation from a designated *ethnos*, a line had been crossed that gave "race" a new and more comprehensive significance. (33)

Hence, religious notions, steeped in an ideology of "race," played a significant role in the exportation of racism into the Americas, where domination by the superior "race" was perceived as "inevitable and desirable, because it was thought to lead to human progress" (Castles 1996, 21).

The emergence of "race" as ideology can also be traced to the rise of nationalism. Efforts by nation-states to extend or deny rights of citizenship contingent on "race" or "ethnicity" were not uncommon, even within so-called democratic republics. Here, national

mythology about those with "the biological unfitness for full citizenship" (Fredrickson 2002, 68) served to sanction exclusionary practices, despite the fact that all people shared "the historical process of migration and intermingling" (Castles 1996, 21). Herein is contained the logic behind what Valle and Torres (2000) term "the policing of race," a condition that results in official policies and practices by the nation-state designed to exclude or curtail the rights of racialized populations. In Germany, the Nazi regime took the logic of "race" to its pinnacle, rendering Jewish and Gypsy populations a threat to the state, thus rationalizing and justifying their demise. This example disrupts the notion that racism occurs only within the context of black-white relations. Instead, Castles (1996) argues that economic exploitation has always been central to the emergence of racism. Whether it incorporated slavery or indentured servitude, racialized systems of labor were perpetrated in Europe against immigrants, including Irish, Jewish, and Polish workers, as well as against indigenous populations around the world.

In the midst of the "scientific" penchant of the eighteenth century, Carolus Linnaeus developed one of the first topologies to actually categorize human beings into four distinct subspecies: *americanus*, *asiaticus*, *africanus*, and *europaeus*. Linnaeus's classification, allegedly neutral and scientific, included not only physical features but also behavioral characteristics, hierarchically arranged in accordance with the prevailing social values and the political-economic interests of the times. The predictable result is the current ideological configuration of "race" used to both explain and control social behavior.

Etienne Balibar's (2003) work on racism is useful in understanding the ideological justifications that historically have accompanied the exclusion and domination of racialized populations—a phenomenon heavily fueled by the tensions of internal migration in the current era of globalization.

[R]acism describes in an abstract idealizing manner "types of humanity," and . . . makes extensive use of classifications which allow all individuals and groups to imagine answers for the most immediate existential questions, such as imposition of identities and the permanence of violence between nations, ethnic or religious communities. (3)

Balibar also points to the impact of "symbolic projections and mediations" (in particular, stereotypes and prejudices linked to divine-humanity or bestial-animality) in the construction of racialized formations. "Racial" classification becomes associated with a distinction between the "properly human" and its imaginary (animal-like) "other." Such projections and mediations, Balibar argues, are inscribed with modernity's expansionist rationality—a quasi-humanist conception that suggests that differences and inequalities are the result of unequal access and social exclusion from cultural, political, or intellectual life but also implies that these differences and inequalities represent normal patterns given the level of "humanity" or "animality" attributed to particular populations. James Baldwin in "A Talk to Teachers" (1988) links this phenomenon of racialization to the political economy and its impact on African Americans.

The point of all this is that Black men were brought here as a source of cheap labor. They were indispensable to the economy. In order to justify the fact that men were treated as though they were animals, the white republic had to brainwash itself into believing that they were indeed animals and deserved to be treated like animals. (7)

Lee, Mountain, and Koenig (2001) note, "the taxonomy of race has always been and continues to be primarily political" (43). Since politics and economics actually constitute

one sphere, it is more precise to say that the ideology of "race" continues to be primarily about political economy. Thus, historians of "race" and racism argue that the idea of immutable, biologically determined "races" is a direct outcome of exploration and colonialism, which furnished the "scientific" justification for the economic exploitation, slavery, and even genocide of those groups perceived as subhuman.

Racialized Constructions

The veiled history of racialized taxonomy continues to be at work today, under the auspices of the national census system. Since its inception in 1790, the U.S. Census Bureau has gathered information on "race." Criteria utilized over the years have included nationality, tribal affiliation, as well as indicators of "blood" (i.e., mulatto, quadroon, octoroon). This eventually resulted in the current framework mandated by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—a framework inspired by an ideology of "race."

[This] framework of identifying race focused on lineage and implicitly defined "whiteness" by a standard of genetic "purity," despite physiological markers that may give the appearance of whiteness or blackness. This rule, although no longer embraced officially by the government, reflects a belief in the biological basis for group differences that continues to characterize racial thinking in the United States.

(Lee, Mountain, and Koenig 2001, 43)

In the twentieth century, the U.S. Census Bureau utilized twenty-six distinct classification designs for measuring "race." By the year 2000, all non-European groups had been collapsed into four (nonwhite) categories and two ethnicities, including the category "some other race." In a separate question, all respondents were also asked to identify their "ethnicity." As has been documented by the research related to the 2000 census, respondents often experienced confusion in distinguishing between "race" and ethnicity.

Stephen Castles (1996) argues, "racism chooses its targets according to its own perverse inner logic, rather than on the basis of some fixed hierarchical taxonomy" (28). In response to this inner logic, the state continues to preserve a vested interest in the control and management of diverse populations. Through its power to legislate "race relations"—the social relations between people of different "races"—the reality of "race" is legitimated by law (Guillaumin 1980). To illustrate this point, Manning Marable (2000) cites the emergence of the term "Hispanic":

The U.S. government's decision in 1971 to create a new "ethnic," but not "racial," category of "Hispanic" on its census form is the best recent example of state manipulation of the politics of difference. The designation of "Hispanic" was imposed on more than fifteen million citizens and resident aliens who had very different nationalities, racial-ethnic identities, cultures, social organizations, and political histories. (84)

Such machinations by the state to regulate "identities" both fuel and ignite a foundational belief in the unexamined assumption that "race" (or ethnicity) equals "identity." Consequently, the strangest political bedfellows result—white right-wing conservatives in bed with black or Chicano nationalists in bed with Latino politicians—all of whom would readily refute any perspective that sought to eliminate "race" as an explanatory category of analysis. Giroty (2000) argues that for those mired in the immutable belief in "race" as identity, "the idea that priceless, essential identities are in perpetual danger from the

difference outside them and that their precious purity is always at risk from the impressive power of heteroculture has certainly supplied the pivot for some unlikely political alliances" (221). The results of such alliances have been well evidenced, for instance, in educational struggles related to standardized testing and charter school initiatives or public policy debates concerning welfare rights, abortion rights, gun control, or gay and lesbian civil rights.

"Race" today continues to exist as part of a commonsense discourse that encompasses the accumulated and often contradictory assumptions used by people to decipher and contend with the complex world around us. This is why the influence of past ideologies and practices makes itself known and felt, directly and indirectly, through the racialized discourse of the media, political officials, and popular culture, even in ostensibly democratic societies. For recent examples, we need only recall the racialized discourse of the Bush administration to justify military action against Afghanistan and Iraq, economic blockades in Venezuela, and threats with weapons of mass destruction against North Korea. From the halls of Congress, we need only summon reports on the segregationist assertions of former majority whip Trent Lott and the racialized justifications of Howard Coble for the use of severe "security" measures to "protect" Japanese citizens during World War II. And even on the pages of *Vanity Fair* (February 2003), Dame Edna (pseudonym for Barry Humphries) is given license, in the spirit of satirical humor, to express racialized wisdom. To "Torn Romantic from Palm Beach," who is agonizing over whether to learn Spanish or French, Dame Edna responds:

Forget Spanish. There's nothing in that language worth reading except Don Quixote, and a quick listen to the CD of Man of La Mancha will take care of that. There was a poet named Garcia Lorea, but I'd leave him on the intellectual back burner if I were you. As for everyone's speaking it, what twaddle! Who speaks it that you are really desperate to talk to? The help? Your leaf blower? Study French or German, where there are at least a few books worth reading, or, if you're American, try English.

These examples illustrate how the power of racialized discourse "allows elite groups to claim enlightened and meritocratic views, while applying racist definitions of social reality" (Castles 1996, 30). Such forms of racialized discourse effectively perpetuate what Miles (1989) terms racialization—an ideological process of "delineation of group boundaries and of allocation of persons within those boundaries by primary reference to (supposedly) inherent and/or biological (usually phenotypical) characteristics" (74). The use of racialization here encompasses a "dialectical process of signification where those characteristics that are ascribed to define the Other, necessarily elicit a definition of the Self by the same criterion" (75).¹

It is the process of racialization, with its reified commonsense notions of "race," that sustains the study of "race relations," an approach that has dominated the field for almost half a century. As a consequence of the "race relations" paradigm, U.S. society became further entrenched in the language of "race" as destiny, with an implicit dictum that membership in particular "races" enacted social processes rather than ideology. This approach has effectively fueled the racialization of politics, through which political discourses of many kinds are structured by attaching deterministic meaning to social constructs of physical and cultural characteristics. The outcome is the racialization of all social and political relations, infusing every conflict of interest with an ethnic dimension, so that racism becomes a way of expressing group interests (Ball and Solomos 1990). Fields (2001), an acerbic critic of "race relations," describes its impact on the engagement of the "Negro problem."

The ideological formation of race relations skirted the considerable difficulty of stating the Negro problem within the forms of a purportedly democratic polity and with respect to persons who were nominally citizens in that polity enjoying full political rights. Race relations so suited the liberal thought of the time, and has been so well able to accommodate the internal twists of liberal and neo-liberal thought since, that it remains a vital part of the prevailing public language today. It lingers on to cozen scholars who, instead of investigating it as an ideological device, accept it ingenuously as an empirical datum. (54)

While we argue against attributing explanatory or descriptive value to "race," we do not mean to suggest that races have no social reality—they do. This fiction of "race" is produced in the real world, thus serving to legitimate it and give it conceptual meaning and social life. At its core, the effort to transmute the concept of "race" into an objective reality is limited and, as Appiah (cited in Postal 2002) concludes, a morally dangerous proposition. Hence, there is no need for a distinct (critical) theory of "race"; instead, what is required is an earnest endeavor to theorize the specious concept with its illusory status out of existence and renew our commitment to the interrogation of racism as an ideology of social exclusion (Miles and Brown 2003).

In other words, if "race" is real, it is so only because it has been rendered meaningful by the actions and beliefs of the powerful, who retain the myth in order to protect their own political-economic interests. "Race" as a social construct of resistance comes into play only later, as racialized populations and their advocates embrace the concept in reverse to struggle against material conditions of domination and exploitation. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the essentialism inherent in the original epistemological intent of "race" is preserved. At its core, the effort to transmute the concept of "race" into an emancipatory category is a limited and unwise undertaking. Thus, it is high time we disrupt the continued use of a dubious concept that cannot help but render our theorizing ambiguous and problematic.

In its simplest terms, this ambiguity is most visible in the inconsistency with which the term "race" is applied—sometimes meaning ethnicity, at other times referring to culture or ancestry. More often than not, "terms used for race are seldom defined and race is frequently employed in a routine and uncritical manner to represent ill-defined social and cultural factors" (Williams 1994). This explains why in all the writings on "race" there is so little substantive theorizing about the construct itself. The category of "race" is thus clearly steeped in an ideology of exclusion, domination, exploitation, even genocide, why should we continue to make sense of people's lives based on the legacy of a pseudoscientific distortion from a previous era? Is not racism—as an ideology that exists within a structure of class differentiation and exploitation—rather than "race," the concept that merits our attention, particularly in these perilous times of global upheaval?

Theorizing Racism

Racism has been defined in a variety of ways, but certain points are central to our conceptualization of the term. First, racism is not the result of individual pathology; instead, it is an ideological set of practices and discourses embedded in the project of modernity and capitalist expansion. Second, racism is linked to racialization, a process by which populations are categorized and ranked on the basis of phenotypical traits or cultural signifiers. Economic and political power is implicated because of its explicit (or implicit) purpose of

legitimizing the exploitation or exclusion of racialized groups. And third, there is no one generic form, but rather multiple, diverse, and historically specific racisms that may vary in intensity, but constitute part and parcel of the larger phenomenon (Goldberg 1993; Castles 1996).

Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) argue that in order to make our studies of racism more specific we must distinguish between two forms of racism. The first refers to those racisms whose primary intent is the exclusion and extermination of racialized populations deemed a threat. The second, termed "*inferiorization*," is found in modern situations of migrant labor where labor rights are denied, forcing immigrant workers to take menial jobs and low entry positions that all others are unwilling to accept. Generally speaking, these two forms of racism "exist side by side and are linked to class interests. The ruling class is more likely to be interested in the racism of exploitation, while workers may favor exclusion" (Castles 1996, 26). This should come as no surprise, given that economic and political relations have been constructed in concert with the ideology of racism.

The reduction of racism to white racism against nonwhites is usually linked to post-1945 anticolonial and civil rights movements. However, Miles (1989) traces the roots of this process to early colonial life.

[T]here is a universal dimension to [the] process of spatial segregation in so far as every ruling class usually organises its life in a distinct spatial location, separated from the lives of those whose labour power is exploited. The specificity lies in the conscious and strategic institutionalisation of a particular representational construction, that is, racism. The ideology of racism was used to not only select certain people to fill certain positions in the structure of class relations but class relations were themselves structured in a particular manner to create a large proportion of Africans as suppliers of cheap labour. (111)

This explanation sheds light on the evolution of racism against ethnic minority workers in Europe and against indigenous populations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The multiplicity of racisms currently expressed on the international stage in the face of globalization counters singular black-white notions of racism, so prevalent in the United States. Within U.S. cities, changing demographic profiles associated with a rapidly increasing immigrant population also expose the limits of a black-white paradigm. In its place, more complex configurations of racialized populations are evolving, as "the phenotypical, color-based categories of differences that only a generation ago appeared rigid and fixed are being restructured and reconfigured against the background of globalized capitalism and neo-liberal government policies worldwide" (Marable 2000, 9). But such change is slow and uneven; and newly arrived immigrants often find themselves confusingly initiated into the rigidity of black-white racialized relations. Nevertheless, Fields (2001) argues that

the real issue is not how immigrants became white or black, but how persons not born and bred to it, whatever their ancestry, become oriented in the American world of black and white. When the dichotomy was not completely irrelevant in the immigrants' place of origin (as for most European immigrants), it would have been overlaid with other pairs—peasant/landlord, villager/chieftain, native/colonial, illiterate/educated, indigene/evolvee, black/brown (or colored)—that fundamentally distinguished it from the stark opposition that prevailed in the United States. (52)

Given the complexity of our times, Castles (1996) rightly suggests that any study of racism requires an interdisciplinary approach in order to arrive at a more precise understanding of the different economic, political, and cultural factors which engender its existence.

Theories of racism must be sufficiently comprehensive as to take into account the great diversity among and between populations "without losing sight of their essential unity" (20), anchored in the fact that we are all human beings belonging to one species that descended from Africa. Hence, we must develop theories that can negotiate both the commonality and plurality of racisms, anchored, as Goldberg (1993) suggests, in the "historical alterations and discontinuities" (41) that give rise to their ideological formations and their explicit social practices. Theories of racism must also grapple with the development of strategies and counterpractices for dismantling the hegemonic structures that give rise to its consequences.

As we have suggested, scholars have tended to study "race" rather than racism. New scholarly texts on "race" are released daily, particularly in England, Australia, and the United States. Everywhere scholars seem eager to address "race" with its myriad of racial identities—including whiteness. Indeed, even the media has discovered the currency of "race." For example, on September 18, 2000, *Newsweek* published a special report entitled "Redefining Race in America." On the cover was a photographic collage of a variety of dismembered phenotypic representations, including hair, eyes, lips, and skin color. One of the feature stories, "The New Faces of Race," included a variety of photographs depicting "a gallery of native-born Americans." All those depicted were captioned with no less than three (racial, ethnic, national) labels to connote racial identities. In the text, reference was made to thirty census categories—a scheme that, as suggested earlier, is far more attached to the racialized constructions of the ivory tower and government officials than to what is actually taking place on the streets. Consequently, official labels obscure rather than illuminate the social and political experiences and realities of racialized populations in the United States (Oboler 1995).

This then begs the question as to why so many scholars (and politicians) are willing to speak of "race" as a reified, commonsense category of analysis in the construction of social theories and the development of public policy. Why do class analysis or challenges to capitalism—an overarching material force linked to the survival (or destruction) of people worldwide—not receive the level of treatment and regard accorded to the study of "race"? In today's virtual reality where capital transits the globe at lightning speed, there seems to be little tolerance for serious scholarly or political interrogations of capitalism as an ideology of modernity run amuck. Even many scholars of multiculturalism who solemnly proclaim that the purpose of their work is social justice have failed to critically examine capitalism.

Forthright analyses of racism, as not only one of the most effective hegemonic forces of our time in sustaining the interests of capitalist exploitation and domination but also as the progenitor of one of the greatest fallacies of history—the idea that "races" truly exist—are few and far between. Could it be that scholars worldwide find themselves so deeply entrenched or implicated that close analysis would find us all mired in contradiction, while supporting the very system responsible for so much human suffering in the first place? In response Fields (2001) contrasts the "homier and more tractable notion" of "race" with racism.

Racism . . . unsettles fundamental instincts of American academic professionals who consider themselves liberal, leftist, or progressive. It is an act of peremptory, hostile, and supremely—often fatally—consequential identification that unceremoniously overrides its objects' sense of themselves. Racism thus unseats both identity and agency, if identity means sense of "self" and agency anything beyond conscious, goal directed activity, however trivial and ineffectual. The targets of racism do not "make" racism, nor are they free to "negotiate" the obstacles it places

in their way. Even as racism exposes the hollowness of agency and identity, it violates the two-sides-to-every-story expectation of symmetry that Americans are peculiarly attached to. There is no voluntary and affirmative side to racism as far as its victims are concerned, and it has no respect for symmetry at all. That is why well-meaning scholars are more apt to speak of race than racism. (48)

This insight calls to mind the problematics of identity politics grounded in the simple and compelling premise that members of particular groups share a greater commonality than those considered outsiders. Although this may sometimes be the case, identity politics always hangs on the edge of essentialism, particularly when social (if not phenotypical) traits are generated as proof of both trustworthiness and political solidarity. Gilroy (2000) cautions against the myth of "short-cut solidarity" that such an approach engenders, particularly when identity and class are decoupled and the promise of identity politics falls flat on its face. Community interests easily become "diverted into middle class campaigns for affirmation, assimilation and 'a piece of the pie'" (Anner 1996, 9), while working-class and poor people see little improvement in the quality of their lives.

Moreover, when questions of identity and agency consistently displace questions of economic and social power, the structures of inequality are cleverly masked and it becomes difficult to change them. It is precisely this irreparable flaw of identity politics that drives Wood (1995) to challenge its validity. "The 'politics of identity' . . . purports to be both more fine-tuned in its sensitivity to the complexity of human experience and more inclusive in its emancipatory sweep than the old politics of socialism. . . . But the 'politics of identity' reveals its limitations, both theoretical and political, the moment we try to situate class differences within its democratic vision" (258).

Wood's critique allows us to segue to the methodological shortcomings of the intersectionality arguments, with its oft-repeated recitation of "race, class, and gender." While we agree with those who argue that racism, sexism, and class oppression are interrelated and intrinsic to modernity, we categorically disagree that a host of oppressions should be afforded equal analytical explanatory power while the unrivaled force of capitalism in the world today is ignored. Both racism and sexism are most certainly implicated in the hegemonic forces that result in class domination. However, it is the *material* domination and exploitation of populations, in the interest of perpetuating a deeply entrenched capitalist system of world domination, which serves as the impetus for the construction of social formations of inequality. It is this reality that prompts Wood (1995) to ask: "Is it possible to imagine class difference without exploitation and domination?" Her response echoes our own critique of the intersectionality argument.

The "difference" that constitutes class as an "identity" is, by definition, a relationship of inequality and power, in a way that sexual or cultural "difference" need not be. A truly democratic society can celebrate diversities of life styles, culture or sexual preference; but in what sense would it be "democratic" to celebrate class difference? If a conception of freedom or equality adapted to sexual and cultural differences is intended to extend the reach of human liberation, can the same be said of a conception of freedom or equality that accommodates class difference? (258; emphasis in original)

Such a critique of the intersectionality argument also raises concerns related to the manner in which scholars define the constitutive force of racism, an issue seldom addressed with any specificity in the literature on "race." So, are we to accept phylogenetic or socially constructed notions of "race" as eternal and, possibly, even as a precondition without which humankind could not evolve (Toynbee 1899 and Keith 1931, cited in Barot and Bird 2001)?

Or should we see racism as a complex ideological apparatus of domination intricately linked to the conservation of power and control over resources and material wealth?

Relatedly, should we accept sexism as a pathology originating in the essentialized misogynist beliefs of men? Or is it a historical outgrowth of both patriarchal conquest and modernity, in the interest of dominance over material resources and the public institutions that govern their control? We are not arguing here against the notion that all forms of oppression are connected and act upon populations simultaneously. Instead, we argue that class, gender, sexuality, and racism do not have the same meaning or constitutive power—a highly significant issue for potentially reshaping political action in the coming years.

At the very least, class equality means something different and requires different conditions from sexual or racial equality. In particular, the abolition of class inequality would by definition mean the end of capitalism. But is the same necessarily true about the abolition of sexual or racial inequality? Sexual and racial inequalities . . . are not in principle incompatible with capitalism. The disappearance of class inequalities, on the other hand, is by definition incompatible with capitalism. At the same time, although class exploitation is constitutive of capitalism as sexual or racial inequality are not, capitalism subjects all social relations to its requirement. (Wood 1995, 259)

Racism and the Political Economy

Important to our understanding of racism, then, is the manner in which class and capitalism are inextricably linked in ways that do not apply to other categories of oppression. This perspective points to the social and political apparatus of the state that functions systematically to retain widespread control and governance over material wealth and resources. This apparatus operates in conjunction with those ideologies (whether cultural, political, class, gendered, sexual, or racialized) that preserve the hegemony of the modern capitalist state, engendering its capacity to appropriate even revolutionary projects and strip them of their transformative potential.

Such has been the fate of multiculturalism which, falling prey to both the politics of identity and state appropriation, became an effective vehicle for further depoliticizing progressive efforts against inequality rooted in the civil rights era of the 1960s and 1970s. Notwithstanding its original emancipatory intent, the politics of multiculturalism was from its inception flawed by its adherence to the language of "race relations." Moreover, the well-meaning celebrations of difference and the hard-fought battles for representation by a variety of identity movements failed to generate any real or lasting structural change. Thus, liberal proposals such as affirmative action, for instance, more often than not served the interests of the more privileged. In the final analysis, multiculturalism became an effective mechanism of the state, used to manage and preserve racialized class divisions, while in the marketplace the new multiplicity of identities generated new products for consumption. Arun Kundnani (2002) describes the fate of multiculturalism in terms of black culture in England.

Multiculturalism now meant taking black culture off the streets—where it has been politicised and turned into a rebellion against the state—and putting it in the council chamber, in the classroom and on the television, where it could be institutionalized, managed and reified. Black culture was thus turned from a living movement into an object of passive contemplation, something to be "celebrated" rather than acted on. Multiculturalism became an ideology of conservatism, of preserving the status quo intact, in the face of a real desire to move forward.

As post-modern theories of "hybridity" became popular in academia, cultural difference came to be seen as an end in itself, rather than an expression of revolt, and the concept of culture became a straitjacket, hindering rather than helping the fight against [racism] and class oppressions. (2)

Large metropolitan areas across the United States have experienced similar events. Most notable in the 1990s was the aforementioned uprising in South Central Los Angeles, where the language of "race relations" coupled with a politics of difference dominated the course of the media. Sidestepped were the underlying class tensions, associated with the way in which "globalization, economic restructuring, and automation had transformed the Los Angeles industrial landscape" (Valle and Torres 2000, 61). Instead, the sensationalism of racialized images and "race relations" rhetoric prevailed for days, nonstop, on major television networks.

What was successfully camouflaged in Los Angeles was the fact that racism is not about cultural differences; it is about political economy. By converting racism into a conflict of cultural differences, whether it was between blacks and Latinos, or Latinos and Koreans, or blacks and whites, the commonsense notion of "race" was effectively preserved in Los Angeles and the inequality of class relations normalized. Thus people are socialized to perceive "race" as a matter of cultural (and often individual) differences, when in truth what generally passes under the guise of "race" are deeply entrenched racialized class relations. In the process, the political economy of racism, embedded in capitalism, effectively divides oppressed communities, leaving much of the world's population vulnerable to economic exploitation.

There are many who argue that the prevalent emphasis on cultural differences during the 1980s has brought with it a new wave of racism, unfettered by the old baggage of biological determinism. Balibar (1991), for instance, argues that this "new racism" is actually "racism without race" (23), an ideology that utilizes the covert belief in immutable human differences to assert the impossibility of coexistence. Meanwhile, class concerns are masked, while "the power of the dominant group to proclaim and manage hierarchies of acceptable and unacceptable difference" (Castles 1996, 29) shapes the rhetoric of community development, public policy debates, and global economic interests. In the same vein, Teun van Dijk (1993) argues that the dominance of the "new racism" on the global stage has remained unchanged. "This undeniable progress has only softened the style of dominance of . . . Western nations. Far from abolished are the deeply entrenched economic, social and cultural remnants of past oppression and inequality; the modern prejudices about minorities; the economic and military power or the cultural hegemony of white over black, north over south, majorities over minorities" (cited in Castles 1996, 30).

Undoubtedly, the globalization of the political economy, or rather the *universalization of capital* (Wood 1998), raises new and complex questions related to the changing nature of racism and class formations. However, we do not subscribe to the notion that the process of globalization reflects a grand epochal shift. As Wood argues, what we are seeing is not a major shift in the logic of capitalism but rather "the consequences of capitalism as a comprehensive system . . . capitalism reaching maturity" (47). Historically, then, globalization must be understood within the context of modernization—the process of European colonial expansionism since the fifteenth century. In his writings on the racisms of globalization, Castles (1996) links the Western project of modernity to racism:

Modernity implies increasingly integrated capitalist production and distribution systems, linked to secular cultures based on the principles of rationality. Modernity has meant colonization of

the rest of the world, not only in the direct sense of political control, but also through diffusion of Western cultural values. Racism—as an ideology which justified European domination—has always been part of modernity. (19)

In agreement, we assert that the constitutive force of most contemporary racisms is closely aligned with labor transformations, systematically initiated by the economic expansionism of globalization. Castles (1996) provides a variety of examples to illustrate this point. These include: the oppression of indigenous peoples as legacies of colonialism; the decolonization and formation of new nation-states which frequently have resulted in the exploitation or exclusion of minority workers; violent struggles linked to the processes of globalization which have resulted in the movement of refugee populations within and outside their countries, resulting in the impoverishment and denial of human rights; the recruitment of migrant labor for the labor market, forcing wages down, with tensions ignited by the racialized conflict between native and immigrant workers; and the racism against old and new minorities which is contributing to the growing complexity of inter-ethnic relations in urban centers and leading to new types of conflict and politicization, particularly on issues linked to culture and ethnicity.

Hence, the economic profiteering of transnational corporations, best illustrated by the Enron scandal,² has taken place on the backs of workers everywhere. Previously well-paying jobs in this country have been transferred to regions where cheap labor and little regulation enhances the profit margin of global enterprises. In cities such as Los Angeles, this phenomenon has given rise to high unemployment or underemployment, particularly among African American and Latino workers. The "global city" is now a place where jobs are few and immigration and poverty are high, while urban capital is heavily invested in complex international markets, eroding the political power of urban workers. Consequently, the cityscape continues to reflect previous segregation patterns of class and ethnicity, but in more complex and conflictual ways (Sassen 2001; Davis 1990; Valle and Torres 2000). In the large urban metropolis, the majority of the population is divested of any real opportunities for participation and decision-making, intensifying exclusionary practices. Yet, even in the midst of such entrenched inequalities, communities continue to seek out ways in which to launch antiracist struggles that might potentially impact the quality of their lives. Hence, we cannot ignore the myriad of popular movements that embrace antiracism as a key component of their organizing platform.

There is no question that to recognize racism as a central part of the social and political life of the capitalist state implies the need for radical change—change that would, undoubtedly, portend major shifts in the existing structures of inequality and asymmetrical relations of power. However, since the 1970s, antiracist advocates have blatantly ignored the centrality of class relations in the evolution and persistence of racism in U.S. society. Unwittingly, this neglect has led to the eruption of new racisms worldwide, as provincial attitudes prevailed. Absorbed with doing battle with what many deemed "economic determinism," antiracist advocates lost sight of the unfettered movement of capitalist interests around the globe as they attended to issues of identity and representation. Additionally, this approach prevented the formulation of a more substantive and comparative analysis of racism at the end of the twentieth century.

At this juncture, it seems important to say a few words regarding our approach to the study of racism, which we suspect will be characterized by some as privileging class or simply as economic determinism. If this is all that the reader gleams from our analysis, we certainly do not wish to debate the point; for we make no apologies for the centrality of

our critique of capitalism and class formations in our analysis of racism. Furthermore, as we have repeatedly stated, we do not argue against the notion that "race" is a social construction or that all relations of inequality merit examination. As such, our criticism of the black-white problematic is not intended to marginalize the study of white-on-black racism, but rather to recognize the existence of multiple modalities of racism.

However, instead of falling in line with cultural studies or postmodern renditions of power, we concur with Joanne Naiman that we must rescue the concept of power from its diffused and unmeasurable position, everywhere and nowhere, back to where it holds the promise of collective political action. That is to say, where power is perceived as centered in the external, material world, rather than simply in people's heads. We firmly believe that this task is imperative to any political project that claims to counter racism in the world today. As Naiman (1996) argues:

In any society where private property and social classes exist, those who own the means of production will dominate. This is most obvious in the economic sphere, where those who own the productive units can decide what to produce, how to produce it, where to produce it, and so on. But the power of ownership goes far beyond mere economic control, and those who own the means of production also come to have power in the political and ideological spheres as well. Indeed, no owning class could maintain its position for long if it did not effectively control all three spheres within a society. (18)

Our work is in concert with those who seek to reclaim the power of working people—who, while less powerful than the owning class, are not powerless. The power of working-class people is embodied in the unequivocal fact that without their labor the capitalist class could not survive. In addition, workers are empowered through their sheer numbers. These are the qualities that along with important characteristics of organization make the working class central to our struggle against racism and for social change. In our view, this has nothing to do with privileging class over other oppressions. Instead, it represents our evolving assessment of structural power, both actual and potential, of different groups within society—and the growing recognition that no matter how one wishes to theorize "race" and racism, all forms of oppression are ultimately linked to the exploitation and domination of both natural resources and human populations.

As we continue to advance our arguments for a historical materialist approach to the study of racism, we find ourselves especially attentive to new political ideas and emancipatory visions that can advance the struggle for social justice, human rights, and economic democracy. One such possibility is the work currently being developed by U.S. scholars in the area of cultural citizenship. Cultural citizenship, initially advanced by Renato Rosaldo (1994), attempts to engage difficult and often conflicting questions of citizenship with respect to culture, identity, and political participation. Importantly, it seeks to understand differences significant to people along a continuum, in the hope of disrupting the racialized discourse of the "Other." As such, cultural citizenship as a political strategy seeks not only to establish a collectivity in which no one is left outside the system, but also to extend the rights of first-class citizenship to all people. Key to the concept is a critical universalism that fundamentally respects the particularities of populations while working to dismantle structures of inequality that interfere with the exercise of human rights. There is no doubt that many questions still remain to be answered, particularly about the manner in which cultural citizenship can "overcome the limitations of the state and embrace the body of human rights in the context of globalization, transnational movements, and localism" (Delgado-Moreira 1997, 2). But for the moment, it offers in its theoretical infancy a

political promise—one that will need to forthrightly challenge capitalism and the ideology of "race" if it is to gain any currency within a world of overwhelming capital excesses and racialized inequalities.

In 1982, Robert Miles courageously did the unthinkable by challenging the utility of "race" in his efforts to construct an effective politics of antiracism. In 1996, Kenan Malik argued, in *The Meaning of Race*, that rather than embracing difference, we should strive to transcend "race" and embrace a human universality that contends with the particularities and differences of our existence. Paul Gilroy (2000) echoes both Miles and Malik, as he proposes a radical humanist project "against race" so that we may free ourselves of its bondage. Along with Miles, Gilroy, and Malik, we now call for a movement "after race," anchored in the radical proposition that we not distinct "races" but rather, as Renato Rosaldo (1994) posits, cultural citizens—entitled to live in a world where economic, political, and cultural democracy is the birthright of all people, not the thievery of a few.

Notes

1. For a thoughtful critique of the concept of racialization, see Rohit Batra and John Bird (2001), "Racialization: The Genealogy and Critique of a Concept," in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24(6) (4 July):601–18.
2. In December 2001, Enron, the transnational energy giant with \$62 billion in assets, filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S. corporate history. Enron, the seventh-largest U.S. company, employing 21,000 workers in more than forty countries, lied about its profits and stands accused of a variety of study investment dealings and concealments of debt through false accounting. The Enron scandal, in which the life savings and retirement funds of tens of thousands of workers vanished while Enron executives lined their pockets, came to the public's attention when the company's link with President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, among other Washington officials, was publicly unveiled—Enron contributed millions of dollars to finance the 2004 Bush-Cheney presidential election campaign. Enron's deep financial roots on Capitol Hill served to insulate the company from government attempts to regulate its business dealings.

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Toward a Critical Race Theory of Education

Gloria Ladson-Billings and William F. Tate IV

This article asserts that despite the silence of race in U.S. society, as a topic of scholarly inquiry, it remains untheorized. The article argues for a critical race theoretical perspective in education analogous to that of critical race theory in legal scholarship by developing three propositions: (1) race continues to be significant in the United States; (2) U.S. society is based on property rights rather than human rights; and (3) the intersection of race and property creates an analytical tool for understanding inequity. The article concludes with a look at the limitations of the current multicultural paradigm.

The presentation of truth in new forms provokes resistance, confounding those committed to accepted measures for determining the quality and validity of statements made and conclusions reached, and making it difficult for them to respond and adjudicate what is acceptable.

Derrick Bell,
Faces at the Bottom of the Well

I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in common. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence bequeathed by your fathers, not by me . . .

Frederick Douglass,
My Bondage and My Freedom

In 1991 social activist and education critic Jonathan Kozol delineated the great inequities that exist between the schooling experiences of white middle-class students and those of poor African-American and Latino students. And, while Kozol's graphic descriptions may prompt some to question how it is possible that we allow these "savage inequalities," this article suggests that these inequalities are a logical and predictable result of a racialized society in which discussions of race and racism continue to be muted and marginalized.¹

In this article we attempt to theorize race and use it as an analytic tool for understanding school inequity.² We begin with a set of propositions about race and property and their intersections. We situate our discussion in an explication of critical race theory and attempt to move beyond the boundaries of the educational research literature to include arguments and new perspectives from law and the social sciences. In doing so, we acknowledge and are indebted to a number of scholars whose work crosses disciplinary boundaries.³ We conclude by exploring the tensions between our conceptualization of a critical race theory in education and the educational reform movement identified as multicultural education.

Our discussion of social inequality in general, and school inequality in particular, is based on three central propositions:⁴

1. Race continues to be a significant factor in determining inequality in the United States.
2. U.S. society is based on property rights.
3. The intersection of race and property creates an analytic tool through which we can understand social (and, consequently, school) inequality.

In this section we expand on these propositions and provide supporting "meta-propositions" to make clear our line of reasoning and relevant application to educational or school settings.

Race as Factor in Inequality

The first proposition—that race continues to be a significant factor in determining inequality in the United States—is easily documented in the statistical and demographic data. Hacker's look at educational and life chances such as high school dropout rates, suspension rates, and incarceration rates echoes earlier statistics of the Children's Defense Fund.⁵ However, in what we now call the postmodern era, some scholars question the usefulness of race as a category.

Omi and Winant argue that popular notions of race as either an ideological construct or an objective condition have epistemological limitations.⁶ Thinking of race strictly as an ideological construct denies the reality of a racialized society and its impact on "raced" people in their everyday lives. On the other hand, thinking of race solely as an objective condition denies the problematic aspects of race—how do we decide who fits into which racial classifications? How do we categorize racial mixtures? Indeed, the world of biology has found the concept of race virtually useless. Geneticist Cavalli-Sforza asserts that "human populations are sometimes known as ethnic groups, or 'races.' . . . They are hard to define in a way that is both rigorous and useful because human beings group themselves in a bewildering array of sets, some of them overlapping, all of them in a state of flux."⁷

Nonetheless, even when the concept of race fails to "make sense," we continue to employ it. According to Nobel Laureate Toni Morrison:

Race has become metaphorical—a way of referring to and disguising forces, events, classes, and expressions of social decay and economic division far more threatening to the body politic than biological "race" ever was.

Expensively kept, economically unsound, a spurious and useless political asset in election campaigns, racism is as healthy today as it was during the Enlightenment. It seems that it has a utility far beyond economy, beyond the sequestering of classes from one another, and has assumed a metaphorical life so completely embedded in daily discourse that it is perhaps more necessary and more on display than ever before.⁸

Despite the problematic nature of race, we offer as a first meta-proposition that race, unlike gender and class, remains untheorized.⁹ Over the past few decades theoretical and epistemological considerations of gender have proliferated.¹⁰ Though the field continues to struggle for legitimacy in academe, interest in and publications about feminist theories abound. At the same time, Marxist and Neo-Marxist formulations about class continue to

merit consideration as theoretical models for understanding social inequality.¹¹ We recognize the importance of both gender- and class-based analyses while at the same time pointing to their shortcomings vis-à-vis race. Roediger points out that "the main body of writing by White Marxists in the United States has both 'naturalized' whiteness and oversimplified race."¹²

Omi and Winant have done significant work in providing a sociological explanation of race in the United States. They argue that the paradigms of race have been conflated with notions of ethnicity, class, and nation because

theories of race—of its meaning, its transformations, the significance of racial events—have never been a top priority in social science. In the U.S., although the "founding fathers" of American sociology . . . were explicitly concerned with the state of domestic race relations, racial theory remained one of the least developed fields of sociological inquiry.¹³

To mount a viable challenge to the dominant paradigm of ethnicity (i.e., we are all ethnic and, consequently, must assimilate and rise socially the same way European Americans have), Omi and Winant offer a racial formation theory that they define as "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed. . . . [It] is a process of historically situated projects in which human bodies and social structures are represented and organized." Further, they link "racial formation to the evolution of hegemony, the way in which society is organized and ruled." Their analysis suggests that "race is a matter of both social structure and cultural representation."¹⁴

By arguing that race remains untheorized, we are not suggesting that other scholars have not looked carefully at race as a powerful tool for explaining social inequality; but that the intellectual salience of this theorizing has not been systematically employed in the analysis of educational inequality. Thus, like Omi and Winant, we are attempting to uncover or decipher the social-structural and cultural significance of race in education. Our work owes an intellectual debt to both Carter G. Woodson and W.E.B. Du Bois, who, although marginalized by the mainstream academic community, used race as a theoretical lens for assessing social inequality.¹⁵

Both Woodson and Du Bois presented cogent arguments for considering race as the central construct for understanding inequality. In many ways our work is an attempt to build on the foundation laid by these scholars.¹⁶ Briefly, Woodson, as far back as 1916, began to establish the legitimacy of race (and, in particular, African Americans) as a subject of scholarly inquiry.¹⁷ As founder of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History and editor of its *Journal of Negro History*, Woodson revolutionized the thinking about African Americans from that of pathology and inferiority to a mult textured analysis of the uniqueness of African Americans and their situation in the United States. His most notable publication, *The Miseducation of the Negro*, identified the school's role in structuring inequality and demotivating African-American students:

The same educational process which inspires and stimulates the oppressor with the thought that he is everything and has accomplished everything worthwhile, depresses and crushes at the same time the spark of genius in the Negro by making him feel that his race does not amount to much and never will measure up to the standards of other peoples.¹⁸

Du Bois, perhaps better known among mainstream scholars, profoundly impacted the thinking of many identified as "other" by naming a "double consciousness" felt by African Americans. According to Du Bois, the African American "ever feels his two-ness—an

American, A Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings."¹⁸ In a current biography of Du Bois, Lewis details the intellectual impact of this concept:

It was a revolutionary concept. It was not just revolutionary; the concept of the divided self was profoundly mystical, for Du Bois invested this double consciousness with a capacity to see Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian—sevenfold son after the Egyptian, and in this American world, "an intuitive faculty (prelogical, in a sense) enabling him/her to see and say things about American society that possessed a heightened moral validity. Because he dwelt equally in the mind and heart of his oppressor as in his own beset psyche, the African American embraced a vision of the commonweal at its best."¹⁹

As a prophetic foreshadowing of the centrality of race in U.S. society, Du Bois reminded us that "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line."²⁰

The second meta-proposition that we use to support the proposition that race continues to be significant in explaining inequity in the United States is that class- and gender-based explanations are not powerful enough to explain all of the difference (or variance) in school experience and performance. Although both class and gender can and do intersect race, as stand-alone variables they do not explain all of the educational achievement differences apparent between whites and students of color. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that even when we hold constant for class, middle-class African-American students do not achieve at the same level as their white counterparts.²¹ Although Oakes reports that "in academic tracking, . . . poor and minority students are most likely to be placed at the lowest levels of the school's sorting system,"²² we are less clear as to which factor—race or class—is causal. Perhaps the larger question of the impact of race on social class is the more relevant one. Space limitations do not permit us to examine that question. Issues of gender bias also figure in inequitable schooling.²⁴ Females receive less attention from teachers, are counseled away from or out of advanced mathematics and science courses, and although they receive better grades than their male counterparts, their grades do not translate into advantages in college admission and/or the work place.²⁵

But examination of class and gender, taken alone or together, do not account for the extraordinarily high rates of school dropout, suspension, expulsion, and failure among African-American and Latino males.²⁶ In the case of suspension, Majors and Billson argue that many African-American males are suspended or expelled from school for what they termed "non-contact violations"—wearing banned items of clothing such as hats and jackets, or wearing these items in an "unauthorized" manner, such as backwards or inside out.²⁷

The point we strive to make with this meta-proposition is not that class and gender are insignificant, but rather, as West suggests, that "race matters," and, as Smith insists, "blackness matters in more detailed ways."²⁸

The Property Issue

Our second proposition, that U.S. society is based on property rights, is best explicated by examining legal scholarship and interpretations of rights. To develop this proposition it is important to situate it in the context of critical race theory. Monaghan reports that "critical race legal scholarship developed in the 1970s, in part because minority scholars thought they were being overlooked in critical legal studies, a better-known movement that

examines the way law encodes cultural norms."²⁹ However, Delgado argues that despite the diversity contained within the critical race movement, there are some shared features:

an assumption that racism is not a series of isolated acts, but is endemic in American life, deeply ingrained legally, culturally, and even psychologically;
a call for a reinterpretation of civil-rights law "in light of its ineffectuality, showing that laws to remedy racial injustices are often undermined before they can fulfill their promise";
a challenge to the "traditional claims of legal neutrality, objectivity, color-blindness, and meritocracy as camouflage for the self-interest of dominant groups in American society";
an insistence on subjectivity and the reformulation of legal doctrine to reflect the perspectives of those who have experienced and been victimized by racism firsthand;
the use of stories or first-person accounts.³⁰

In our analysis we add another aspect to this critical paradigm that disentangles democracy and capitalism. Many discussions of democracy conflate it with capitalism despite the fact that it is possible to have a democratic government with an economic system other than capitalism. Discussing the two ideologies as if they were one masks the pernicious effects of capitalism on those who are relegated to its lowest ranks. Traditional civil rights approaches to solving inequality have depended on the "rightness" of democracy while ignoring the structural inequality of capitalism.³¹ However, democracy in the U.S. context was built on capitalism.

In the early years of the republic only capitalists enjoyed the franchise. Two hundred years later when civil rights leaders of the 1950s and 1960s built their pleas for social justice on an appeal to civil and human rights, they were ignoring the fact that the society was based on property rights.³² An example from the 1600s underscores the centrality of property in the Americas from the beginning of European settlement:

When the Pilgrims came to New England they too were coming not to vacant land but to territory inhabited by tribes of Indians. The governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Winthrop, created the excuse to take Indian land by declaring the area legally a "vacuum." The Indians, he said, had not "subdued" the land, and therefore had only a "natural" right to it, but not a "civil right." A "natural right" did not have legal standing.³³

Bell examined the events leading up to the Constitution's development and concluded that there exists a tension between property rights and human rights.³⁴ This tension was greatly exacerbated by the presence of African peoples as slaves in America. The purpose of the government was to protect the main object of society—property. The slave status of most African Americans (as well as women and children) resulted in their being objectified as property. And, a government constructed to protect the rights of property owners lacked the incentive to secure human rights for the African American.³⁵

According to Bell "the concept of individual rights, unconnected to property rights, was totally foreign to these men of property; and thus, despite two decades of civil rights gains, most Blacks remain disadvantaged and deprived because of their race."³⁶

The grand narrative of U.S. history is replete with tensions and struggles over property—in its various forms. From the removal of Indians (and later Japanese Americans) from the land, to military conquest of the Mexicans,³⁷ to the construction of Africans as property,³⁸ the ability to define, possess, and own property has been a central feature of power in America. We do not suggest that other nations have not fought over and defined themselves by property and landownership.³⁹ However, the contradiction of a reified symbolic individual juxtaposed to the reality of "real estate" means that emphasis on the

centrality of property can be disguised. Thus, we talk about the importance of the individual, individual rights, and civil rights while social benefits accrue largely to property owners.⁴⁰

Property relates to education in explicit and implicit ways. Recurring discussions about property tax relief indicate that more affluent communities (which have higher property values, hence higher tax assessments) resent paying for a public school system whose clientele is largely non-white and poor.⁴¹ In the simplest of equations, those with "better" property are entitled to "better" schools. Kozol illustrates the disparities: "Average expenditures per pupil in the city of New York in 1987 were some \$5,500. In the highest spending suburbs of New York (Great Neck or Manhasset, for example, on Long Island) funding levels rose above \$11,000, with the highest districts in the state at \$15,000."⁴²

But the property differences manifest themselves in other ways. For example, curriculum represents a form of "intellectual property."⁴³ The quality and quantity of the curriculum varies with the "property values" of the school. The use of a critical race story⁴⁴ appropriately represents this notion:

The teenage son of one of the authors of this article was preparing to attend high school. A friend had a youngster of similar age who also was preparing to enter high school. The boys excitedly poured over course offerings in their respective schools' catalogues. One boy was planning on attending school in an upper-middle-class white community. The other would be attending school in an urban, largely African-American district. The difference between the course offerings as specified in the catalogues was striking. The boy attending the white, middle-class school had his choice of many foreign languages—Spanish, French, German, Latin, Greek, Italian, Chinese, and Japanese. His mathematics offerings included algebra, geometry, trigonometry, calculus, statistics, general math, and business math. The science department at this school offered biology, chemistry, physics, geology, science in society, biochemistry, and general science. The other boy's curriculum choices were not nearly as broad. His foreign language choices were Spanish and French. His mathematics choices were general math, business math, and algebra (there were no geometry or trig classes offered). His science choices were general science, life science, biology, and physical science. The differences in electives were even more pronounced, with the affluent school offering courses such as Film as Literature, Asian Studies, computer programming, and journalism. Very few elective courses were offered at the African-American school, which had no band, orchestra, or school newspaper.

The availability of "rich" (or enriched) intellectual property delimits what is now called "opportunity to learn"⁴⁵—the presumption that along with providing educational "standards"⁴⁶ that detail what students should know and be able to do, they must have the material resources that support their learning. Thus, intellectual property must be understood by "real" property, that is, science labs, computers and other state-of-the-art technologies, appropriately certified and prepared teachers. Of course, Kozol demonstrated that schools that serve poor students of color are unlikely to have access to these resources and, consequently, students will have little or no opportunity to learn despite the attempt to mandate educational standards.⁴⁷

Critical Race Theory and Education

With this notion of property rights as a defining feature of the society, we proceed to describe the ways that the features of critical race theory mentioned in the previous section can be applied to our understanding of educational inequality.

Racism as Endemic and Deeply Ingrained in American Life

If racism were merely isolated, unrelated, individual acts, we would expect to see at least a few examples of educational excellence and equity together in the nation's public schools. Instead, those places where African Americans do experience educational success tend to be outside of the public schools.⁴⁸ While some might argue that poor children, regardless of race, do worse in school, and that the high proportion of African-American poor contributes to their dismal school performance, we argue that the cause of their poverty in conjunction with the condition of their schools and schooling is institutional and structural racism. Thus, when we speak of racism we refer to Wellman's definition of "culturally sanctioned beliefs which, regardless of the intentions involved, defend the advantages Whites have because of the subordinated positions of racial minorities." We must therefore contend with the "problem facing White people [of coming] to grips with the demands made by Blacks and Whites while at the same time avoiding the possibility of institutional change and reorganization that might affect them."⁴⁹

A Reinterpretation of Ineffective Civil Rights Law

In the case of education, the civil rights decision that best exemplifies our position is the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*. While having the utmost respect for the work of Thurgood Marshall and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) legal defense team in arguing the *Brown* decision, with forty years of hindsight we recognize some serious shortcomings in that strategy. Today, students of color are more segregated than ever before.⁵⁰ Although African Americans represent 12 percent of the national population, they are the majority in twenty-one of the twenty-two largest (urban) school districts.⁵¹ Instead of providing more and better educational opportunities, school desegregation has meant increased white flight along with a loss of African-American teaching and administrative positions.⁵² In explaining the double-edged sword of civil rights legislation, Crenshaw argued that

the civil rights community . . . must come to terms with the fact that antidiscrimination discourse is fundamentally ambiguous and can accommodate conservative as well as liberal views of race and equality. This dilemma suggests that the civil rights constituency cannot afford to view antidiscrimination doctrine as a permanent pronouncement of society's commitment to ending racial subordination. Rather, antidiscrimination law represents an ongoing ideological struggle in which occasional winners harness the moral, coercive, consensual power of law. Nonetheless, the victories it offers can be ephemeral and the risks of engagement substantial.⁵³

An example of Crenshaw's point about the ambiguity of civil rights legislation was demonstrated in a high school district in Northern California.⁵⁴ Of the five high schools in the district, one was located in a predominantly African-American community. To entice white students to attend that school, the district funded a number of inducements including free camping and skiing trips. While the trips were available to all of the students, they were attended largely by the white students, who already owned the expensive camping and skiing equipment. However, these inducements were not enough to continuously attract white students. As enrollment began to fall, the district decided to close a school. Not surprisingly, the school in the African-American community was closed and all

of its students had to be (and continue to be) based to the four white schools in the district.

Lomotey and Staley's examination of Buffalo's "model" desegregation program revealed that African-American and Latino students continued to be poorly served by the school system. The academic achievement of African-American and Latino students failed to improve while their suspension, expulsion, and dropout rates continued to rise. On the other hand, the desegregation plan provided special magnet programs and extended day care of which whites were able to take advantage. What then, made Buffalo a model school desegregation program? In short, the benefits that whites derived from school desegregation and their seeming support of the district's desegregation program.⁵⁶ Thus, a model desegregation program becomes defined as one that ensures that whites are happy (and do not leave the system altogether) regardless of whether African-American and other students of color achieve or remain.

Challenging Claims of Neutrality, Objectivity, Color-blindness, and Meritocracy

A theme of "naming one's own reality" or "voice" is entrenched in the work of critical race theorists. Many critical race theorists argue that the form and substance of scholarship are closely connected.⁵⁶ These scholars use parables, chronicles, stories, counterstories, poetry, fiction, and revisionist histories to illustrate the false necessity and irony of much of current civil rights doctrine. Delgado suggests that there are at least three reasons for naming one's own reality in legal discourse:

1. Much of reality is socially constructed.
2. Stories provide members of outgroups a vehicle for psychic self-preservation.
3. The exchange of stories from teller to listener can help overcome ethnocentrism and the subconscious conviction of viewing the world in one way.⁵⁷

The first reason for naming one's own reality is to demonstrate how political and moral analysis is conducted in legal scholarship. Many mainstream legal scholars embrace universalism over particularity.⁵⁸ According to Williams, "theoretical legal understanding" is characterized, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, by the acceptance of transcendent, acontextual, universal legal truths or procedures.⁵⁹ For instance, some legal scholars might contend that the tort of fraud has always existed and that it is a component belonging to the universal system of right and wrong. This view tends to discount anything that is nontranscendent (historical), or contextual (socially constructed), or nonuniversal (specific) with the unscholarly labels of "emotional," "literary," "personal," or "false."⁶⁰

In contrast, critical race theorists argue that political and moral analysis is situational—"truths only exist for this person in this predicament at this time in history."⁶⁰ For the critical race theorist, social reality is constructed by the formulation and the exchange of stories about individual situations.⁶¹ These stories serve as interpretive structures by which we impose order on experience and it on us.⁶²

A second reason for the naming-one's-own-reality theme of critical race theory is the psychic preservation of marginalized groups. A factor contributing to the demoralization of marginalized groups is self-condemnation.⁶³ Members of minority groups internalize the stereotypical images that certain elements of society have constructed in order to maintain their power.⁶⁴ Historically, storytelling has been a kind of medicine to heal the wounds

of pain caused by racial oppression.⁶⁵ The story of one's condition leads to the realization of how one came to be oppressed and subjugated and allows one to stop inflicting mental violence on oneself.

Finally, naming one's own reality with stories can affect the oppressor. Most oppression does not seem like oppression to the perpetrator.⁶⁶ Delgado argues that the dominant group justifies its power with stories—stock explanations—that construct reality in ways to maintain their privilege.⁶⁷ Thus, oppression is rationalized, causing little self-examination by the oppressor. Stories by people of color can catalyze the necessary cognitive conflict to jar subconscious racism.

The "voice" component of critical race theory provides a way to communicate the experience and realities of the oppressed, a first step on the road to justice. As we attempt to make linkages between critical race theory and education, we contend that the voice of people of color is required for a complete analysis of the educational system. Delpit argues that one of the tragedies of education is the way in which the dialogue of people of color has been silenced. An example from her conversation with an African-American graduate student illustrates this point:

There comes a moment in every class when we have to discuss "The Black Issue" and what's appropriate education for Black children. I tell you, I'm tired of arguing with those White people, because they won't listen. Well, I don't know if they really don't listen or if they just don't believe you. It seems like if you can't quote Vygotsky or something, then you don't have any validity to speak about your own kids. Anyway, I'm not bothering with it anymore, now I'm just in it for a grade.⁶⁸

A growing number of education scholars of color are raising critical questions about the way that research is being conducted in communities of color.⁶⁹ Thus, without authentic voices of people of color (as teachers, parents, administrators, students, and community members) it is doubtful that we can say or know anything useful about education in their communities.

The Intersection of Race and Property

In the previous sections of this article we argued that race is still a significant factor in determining inequity in the United States and that the society is based on property rights rather than on human rights. In this section we discuss the intersection of race and property as a central construct in understanding a critical race theoretical approach to education.

Harris argues that "slavery linked the privilege of Whites to the subordination of Blacks through a legal regime that attempted the conversion of Blacks into objects of property. Similarly, the settlement and seizure of Native American land supported White privilege through a system of property rights in land in which the 'race' of the Native Americans rendered their first possession right invisible and justified conquest." But, more pernicious and long lasting then the victimization of people of color is the construction of whiteness as the ultimate property. "Possession—the act necessary to lay the basis for rights in property—was defined to include only the cultural practices of Whites. This definition laid the foundation for the idea that whiteness—that which Whites alone possess—is valuable and is property."⁷⁰

Because of space constraints, it is not possible to fully explicate Harris's thorough analysis

of whiteness as property. However, it is important to delineate what she terms the "property functions of whiteness," which include: (1) rights of disposition; (2) rights to use and enjoyment; (3) reputation and status property; and (4) the absolute right to exclude. How these rights apply to education is germane to our discussion.

Rights of disposition. Because property rights are described as fully alienable, that is, transferable, it is difficult to see how whiteness can be construed as property.⁷¹ However, alienability of certain property is limited (e.g., entitlements, government licenses, professional degrees or licenses held by one party and financed by the labor of the other in the context of divorce). Thus, whiteness when conferred on certain student performances is alienable.⁷² When students are rewarded only for conformity to perceived "white norms" or sanctioned for cultural practices (e.g., dress, speech patterns, unauthorized conceptions of knowledge), white property is being rendered alienable.

Rights to use and enjoyment. Legally, whites can use and enjoy the privileges of whiteness. As McIntosh has explicitly demonstrated, whiteness allows for specific social, cultural, and economic privileges.⁷³ Fuller further asserts that whiteness is both performative and pleasurable.⁷⁴ In the school setting, whiteness allows for extensive use of school property. Kozol's description of the material differences in two New York City schools can be interpreted as the difference between those who possess the right to use and enjoy what schools can offer and those who do not:

The [white] school serves 825 children in the kindergarten through sixth grade. This is approximately half the student population crowded into [black] P.S. 79, where 1,550 children fill a space intended for 1,000, and a great deal smaller than the 1,300 children packed into the former skating rink.⁷⁵

This right of use and enjoyment is also reflected in the structure of the curriculum, also described by Kozol:

The curriculum [the white school] follows "emphasizes critical thinking, reasoning and logic." The planetarium, for instance, is employed not simply for the study of the universe as it exists. "Children also are designing their own galaxies," the teacher says. . . .

In my [Kozol's] notes: "Six girls, four boys. Nine White, one Chinese. I am glad they have this class. But what about the others? Aren't there ten Black children in the school who could enjoy this also?"⁷⁶

Reputation and status property. The concept of reputation as property is regularly demonstrated in legal cases of libel and slander. Thus, to damage someone's reputation is to damage some aspect of his or her personal property. In the case of race, to call a white person "black" is to defame him or her.⁷⁷ In the case of schooling, to identify a school or program as nonwhite in any way is to diminish its reputation or status. For example, despite the prestige of foreign language learning, bilingual education as practiced in the United States as a nonwhite form of second language learning has lower status.⁷⁸ The term *urban*, the root word of *urbane*, has come to mean black. Thus, urban schools (located in the urbane, sophisticated cities) lack the status and reputation of suburban (white) schools and when urban students move to or are bused to suburban schools, these schools lose their reputation.⁷⁹

The absolute right to exclude. Whiteness is constructed in this society as the absence of the "contaminating" influence of blackness. Thus, "one drop of black blood" constructs one as black, regardless of phenotypic markers.⁸⁰ In schooling, the absolute right to exclude was demonstrated initially by denying blacks access to schooling altogether. Later, it was

demonstrated by the creation and maintenance of separate schools. More recently it has been demonstrated by white flight and the growing insistence on vouchers, public funding of private schools, and schools of choice.⁸¹ Within schools, absolute right to exclude is demonstrated by resegregation via tracking,⁸² the institution of "gifted" programs, honors programs, and advanced placement classes. So complete is this exclusion that black students often come to the university in the role of intruders—who have been granted special permission to be there.

In this section we have attempted to draw parallels between the critical race legal theory notion of whiteness as property and educational inequity. In the final section we relate some of the intellectual/theoretical tensions that exist between critical race theory and multicultural education.

The Limits of the Multicultural Paradigm

Throughout this article we have argued the need for a critical race theoretical perspective to cast a new gaze on the persistent problems of racism in schooling. We have argued the need for this perspective because of the failure of scholars to theorize race. We have drawn parallels between the way critical race legal scholars understand their position vis-à-vis traditional legal scholarship and the ways critical race theory applied to education offers a way to rethink traditional educational scholarship. We also have referred to the tensions that exist between traditional civil rights legislation and critical race legal theory. In this section we identify a necessary tension between critical race theory in education and what we term the multicultural paradigm.

Multicultural education has been conceptualized as a reform movement designed to effect change in the "school and other educational institutions so that students from diverse racial, ethnic, and other social-class groups will experience educational equality."⁸³ In more recent years, multicultural education has expanded to include issues of gender, ability, and sexual orientation. Although one could argue for an early history of the "multicultural education movement" as far back as the 1880s when George Washington Williams wrote his history of African Americans, much of the current multicultural education practice seems more appropriately rooted in the intergroup education movement of the 1950s, which was designed to help African Americans and other "unmeltable" ethnics become a part of America's melting pot.⁸⁴ Their goals were primarily assimilationist through the reduction of prejudice. However, after the civil rights unrest and growing self-awareness of African Americans in the 1960s, the desire to assimilate was supplanted by the reclamation of an "authentic black personality" that did not rely on the acceptance by or standards of white America. This new vision was evidenced in the academy in the form of first, black studies and later, when other groups made similar liberating moves, ethnic studies.⁸⁵

Current practical demonstrations of multicultural education in schools often reduce it to trivial examples and artifacts of cultures such as eating ethnic or cultural foods, singing songs or dancing, reading folktales, and other less than scholarly pursuits of the fundamentally different conceptions of knowledge or quests for social justice.⁸⁶ At the university level, much of the concern over multicultural education has been over curriculum inclusion.⁸⁷ However, another level of debate emerged over what became known as "multiculturalism."

Somewhat different from multicultural education in that it does not represent a particular educational reform or scholarly tradition, multiculturalism came to be viewed

as a political philosophy of "many cultures" existing together in an atmosphere of respect and tolerance.⁸⁸ Thus, outside of the classroom multiculturalism represented the attempt to bring both students and faculty from a variety of cultures into the school (or academy) environment. Today, the term is used interchangeably with the ever-expanding "diversity" a term used to explain all types of "difference"—racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, ability, gender, sexual orientation. Thus, popular music, clothes, media, books, and so forth, reflect a growing awareness of diversity and/or multiculturalism. Less often discussed are the growing tensions that exist between and among various groups that gather under the umbrella of multiculturalism—that is, the interests of groups can be competing or their perspectives can be at odds.⁸⁹ We assert that the ever-expanding multicultural paradigm follows the traditions of liberalism—allowing a proliferation of difference. Unfortunately, the tensions between and among these differences is rarely interrogated, presuming a "unity of difference"—that is, that all difference is both analogous and equivalent.⁹⁰

To make parallel the analogy between critical race legal theory and traditional civil rights law with that of critical race theory in education and multicultural education we need to restate the point that critical race legal theorists have "doubts about the foundation of moderate/incremental civil rights law."⁹¹ The foundation of civil rights law has been in human rights rather than in property rights. Thus, without disrespect to the pioneers of civil rights law, critical race legal scholars document the ways in which civil rights law is regularly subverted to benefit whites.⁹²

We argue that the current multicultural paradigm functions in a manner similar to civil rights law. Instead of creating radically new paradigms that ensure justice, multicultural reforms are routinely "sucked back into the system" and just as traditional civil rights law is based on a foundation of human rights, the current multicultural paradigm is mired in liberal ideology that offers no radical change in the current order.⁹³ Thus, critical race theory in education, like its antecedent in legal scholarship, is a radical critique of both the status quo and the purported reforms.

We make this observation of the limits of the current multicultural paradigm not to disparage the scholarly efforts and sacrifices of many of its proponents, but to underscore the difficulty (indeed, impossibility) of maintaining the spirit and intent of justice for the oppressed while simultaneously permitting the hegemonic rule of the oppressor.⁹⁴ Thus, as critical race theory scholars we unabashedly reject a paradigm that attempts to be everything to everyone and consequently becomes nothing for anyone, allowing the status quo to prevail. Instead, we align our scholarship and activism with the philosophy of Marcus Garvey, who believed that the black man was universally oppressed on racial grounds, and that any program of emancipation would have to be built around the question of race first.⁹⁵ In his own words, Garvey speaks to us clearly and unequivocally:

In a world of wolves one should go armed, and one of the most powerful defensive weapons within the reach of Negroes is the practice of race first in all parts of the world.⁹⁶

Notes

- Jonathan Kozol, *Savage Inequalities* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1991). For further discussion of our inability to articulate issues of race and racism see Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Cornel West, "Learning to Talk of Race," *New York Times Magazine*, August 2, 1992, pp. 24, 26; and Beverly Daniel Tatum, "Talking about Race: Learning about Racism: The Application of Racial Identity Development Theory in the Classroom," *Harvard Educational Review* 62 (1992): 1-24.

- Throughout this article the term *race* is used to define the polar opposites of "conceptual whiteness" and "conceptual blackness" (Joyce King, "Perceiving Reality in a New Way: Rethinking the Black/white Duality of our Time" [Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, April 1991]). We do not mean to reserve the sense of "otherness" for African Americans; rather, our discussion attempts to illuminate how discussions of race in the United States position everyone as either "white" or "nonwhite." Thus, despite the use of African-American legal and educational exemplars, we include other groups who have been constructed at various times in their history as nonwhite or black. Readers should note that some of the leading legal scholars in the critical race legal theory movement are of Latino and Asian-American as well as African-American heritage.
- See, for example, Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought* (New York: Routledge, 1991); Joyce King and Carolyn Mitchell, *Black Mothers to Sons: Justifying African American Literature and Social Practice* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990); and Patricia Williams, *The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
- These propositions are not hierarchical. Rather, they can be envisioned as sides of an equilateral triangle, each equal and each central to the construction of the overall theory.
- Andrew Hacker, *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992); and Marian Wright Edelman, *Families in Peril: An Agenda for Social Change* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
- Michael Omi and Howard Winant, "On the Theoretical Concept of Race," in *Race, Identity and Representation in Education*, ed. C. McCarthy and W. Cichlow (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 3-10.
- Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, "Genes, People and Languages," *Scientific American*, November 1991, p. 104.
- Morrison, *Playing in the Dark*, p. 63.
- This assertion was made forcefully by the participants of the Institute NHI (No Humans Involved) at a symposium entitled "The Two Reservations: Western Thought, the Color Line, and the Crisis of the Negro Intellectual Revisited," sponsored by the Department of African and Afro-American Studies at Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., March 3-5, 1994.
- See, for example, Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Simone DeBeauvoir, *The Second Sex* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961); Vivian Gornick, "Women as Outsiders," in *Women in Sexist Society*, ed. V. Gornick and B. Moran (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 70-84; Nancy Hartsock, "Feminist Theory and the Development of Revolutionary Strategy," *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*, ed. Z. Eisenstein (London and New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979); and Alison Jaggar, *Feminist Theory and Human Nature* (Sussex, England: Harvester Press, 1983).
- See, for example, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Martin Carnoy, *Education and Cultural Imperialism* (New York: McKay, 1974); Michael W. Apple, "Redefining Inequality: Authoritarian Populism and the Conservative Restoration," *Teachers College Record* 90 (1988): 167-84; and Philip Wexler, *Social Analysis and Education: After the New Sociology* (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987).
- David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 6.
- Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1990s*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 9.
- Ibid.*, p. 36.
- Carter G. Woodson, *The Miseducation of the Negro* (Washington, D.C.: Association Press, 1933); and W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folks* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989; first published in 1903).
- Our decision to focus on Woodson and Du Bois is not intended to diminish the import of the scores of African-American scholars who also emerged during their time such as George E. Haynes, Charles S. Johnson, E. Franklin Frazier, Abram Harris, Sadie T. Alexander, Robert C. Weaver, Rayford Logan, Allison Davis, Dorothy Porter, and Benjamin Quarles. We highlight Woodson and Du Bois as early seminal thinkers about issues of race and racism.
- See John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom*, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988).
- Woodson, *The Miseducation of the Negro*, p. xiii.
- Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folks*, p. 3. Other people of color, feminists, and gay and lesbian theorists all have appropriated Du Bois's notion of double consciousness to explain their estrangement from mainstream patriarchal, masculinist U.S. culture.
- David Levering Lewis, *W.E.B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race, 1868-1919* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), p. 281.
- Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folks*, p. 1.
- See, for example, Lorene Cary, *Black Ice* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991); and Jeannie Oakes, *Keeping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
- Oakes, *Keeping Track*, p. 67.
- American Association of University Women, *How Schools Stereotype Girls: A Study of Major Findings on Gender and Education* (Washington, D.C.: Author and National Education Association, 1992).
- Myra Sadker, David Sadker, and Susan Klein, "The Issue of Gender in Elementary and Secondary Education," in

- Review of *Educational Research in Education*, vol. 19, ed. G. Cerant (Washington, D.C.: American Educational Research Association, 1991), pp. 269-334.
26. Hacker, *Two Nations*, puts the dropout rate for African-American males in some large cities at close to 50 percent.
27. Robert Majors and Janet Billson, *Cool Pose: The Dilemmas of Black Manhood in America* (New York: Lexington Books, 1992).
28. Cornel West, *Race Matters* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); and David Lionel Smith, "Let Our People Go," *Black Scholar* (1993): 75-76.
29. Peter Monaghan, "Critical Race Theory," *Questions the Role of Legal Doctrine in Racial Inequality*, *Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 23, 1993, pp. A7, A9.
30. Delgado, cited in Monaghan, "Critical Race Theory." Quotations are from p. A7. For a more detailed explication of the first item in the list, see Bell, *Faces at the Bottom of the Well*.
31. Manning Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America* (Boston: South End Press, 1983).
32. Derrick Bell, *And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
33. Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 13.
34. Bell, *And We Are Not Saved*.
35. William Tate, Gloria Ladson-Billings, and Carl Grant, "The Brown Decision Revisited: Mathematizing Social Problems," *Educational Policy* 7 (1993): 255-75.
36. Bell, *And We Are Not Saved*, p. 239.
37. Ronald Takaki, *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America* (Boston: Little Brown, 1993).
38. Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom*.
39. Clearly, an analysis of worldwide tensions reinforces the importance of land to a people—Israel and the Palestinians, Iraq and Kuwait, the former Soviet bloc, Hitler and the Third Reich, all represent some of the struggles over land.
40. Even at a time when there is increased public sentiment for reducing the federal deficit, the one source of tax relief that no president or member of Congress would ever consider is that of denying home (property) owners their tax benefits.
41. See, for example, Howard Wainer, "Does Spending Money on Education Help?" *Educational Researcher* 22 (1993): 22-24; or Paul Houston, "School Vouchers: The Latest California Joke," *Phi Delta Kappan* 75 (1993): 61-66.
42. Korol, *Savage Inequalities*, pp. 83-84.
43. This notion of "intellectual property" came into popular use when television talk show host David Letterman moved from NBC to CBS. NBC claimed that certain routines and jokes used by Letterman were the intellectual property of the network and, as such, could not be used by Letterman without permission.
44. Richard Delgado, "When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?" *Virginia Law Review* 76 (1990): 95-111.
45. See, for example, Florio-Ruane Stevens, *Opportunity to Learn: Issues of Equity for Poor and Minority Students* (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics, 1993); idem, "Applying an Opportunity-to-Learn Conceptual Framework to the Investigation of the Effects of Teaching Practices via Secondary Analyses of Multiple-case-study Summary Data," *The Journal of Negro Education* 62 (1993): 232-46; and Linda Winfield and Michael D. Woodard, "Assessment, Equity, Diversity in Reforming America's Schools," *Educational Policy* 8 (1994): 3-27.
46. The standards debate is too long and detailed to be discussed here. For a more detailed discussion of standards see, for example, Michael W. Apple, "Do the Standards Go Far Enough? Power, Policy, and Practices in Mathematics Education," *Journal for Research in Mathematics Education* 23 (1992): 412-31; and National Council of Education Standards and Testing, *Raising Standards for American Education: A Report to Congress, the Secretary of Education, the National Goals Panel, and the American People* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992).
47. Korol, *Savage Inequalities*.
48. Some urban Catholic schools, black independent schools, and historically black colleges and universities have demonstrated the educability of African-American students. As of this writing we have no data on the success of urban districts such as Detroit or Milwaukee that are attempting what is termed "African Centered" or "African education." See also Mwilimu J. Shujaa, Ed., *Too Much Schooling: Too Little Education: A Paradox of Black Life in White Societies* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1994).
49. David Wellman, *Portraits of White Racism* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Quotations are from pp. xviii and 42.
50. See, for example, Gary Orfield, "School Desegregation in the 1980s," *Equity and Choice*, February 1988, p. 25; Derrick Bell, "Learning from Our Losses: Is School Desegregation Still Feasible in the 1980s?" *Phi Delta Kappan* 64 (April 1983): 575; Willis D. Hawley, "Why It Is Hard to Believe in Desegregation," *Equity and Choice*, February 1988, pp. 9-15; and Janet Ward Schofield, *Black and White in School: Trust, Tension, or Tolerance?* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1989).
51. James Banks, "Teaching Multicultural Literacy to Teachers," *Teaching Education* 4 (1991): 135-44.
52. See Karl Tauber, "Desegregation of Public School Districts: Persistence and Change," *Phi Delta Kappan* 72 (1990): 18-24; and H.L. Basinger, "When Whites Flee," *New York Times Magazine*, May 29, 1994, pp. 26-33, 43.

- 30, 53-54, 56. On loss of professional positions, see Sabrina King, "The Limited Presence of African American Teachers," *Review of Educational Research* 63 (1993): 115-49; and Jacqueline Irvine, "An Analysis of the Problem of Disappearing Black Educators," *Elementary School Journal* 88 (1988): 303-13.
53. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, "Race Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law," *Harvard Law Review* 101 (1988): 1331-87.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 1335.
55. Kofi Lomotey and John Stanley, "The Education of African Americans in Buffalo Public Schools" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Boston, 1990).
56. Richard Delgado, "Storytelling for Opponents and Others: A Plea for Narrative," *Michigan Law Review* 87 (1989): 2411-41.
57. See Richard Delgado et al., "Symposium: Legal Storytelling," *Michigan Law Review* 87 (1989): 2073. On consciousness, see Joyce E. King, "Dysconscious Racism: Ideology, Identity and the Miseducation of Teachers," *Journal of Negro Education* 60 (1991): 135. King defines dysconsciousness as "an uncritical habit of mind (including perceptions, attitudes, assumptions, and beliefs) that justifies inequity and exploitation by accepting the existing order of things as given. . . . Dysconscious racism is a form of racism that tacitly accepts dominant White norms and privileges. It is not the absence of consciousness (that is, not unconsciousness) but an impaired consciousness or distorted way of thinking about race as compared to, for example, critical consciousness." These notions of universalism prevail in much of social science research, including educational research.
58. Williams, *Aldermay of Race and Rights*.
59. Richard Delgado, "Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause," *Vanderbilt Law Review* 44 (1991): 11.
60. For example, see Williams, *Aldermay of Race and Rights*; Bell, *Faces at the Bottom of the Well*; and Mari Matsuda, "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," *Michigan Law Review* 87 (1989): 2320-81.
61. Delgado, "Storytelling."
62. *Ibid.*
63. For example, see Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment."
64. Delgado, "Storytelling."
65. Charles Lawrence, "The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism," *Stanford Law Review* 39 (1987): 317-88.
67. Delgado et al., "Symposium."
68. Lisa Delpt, "The Silenced Dialogue: Power and Pedagogy in Educating Other People's Children," *Harvard Educational Review* 58 (1988): 280.
69. At the 1994 annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association in New Orleans, two sessions entitled "Private Lives, Public Voices: Ethics of Research in Communities of Color" were convened to discuss the continued exploitation of people of color. According to one scholar of color, our communities have become "data plantations."
70. Cheryl I. Harris, "Whiteness as Property," *Harvard Law Review* 106 (1993): 1721.
71. See Margaret Radin, "Market Inalienability," *Harvard Law Review* 100 (1987): 1849-906.
72. See Signithia Fordham and John Ogburn, "Black Student School Success: Coping with the Burden of 'Acting White,'" *The Urban Review* 18 (1986): 1-31.
73. Peggy McIntosh, "White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack," *Independent School*, Winter, 1990, pp. 31-36.
74. Laurie Fuller, "Whiteness as Performance" (Unpublished preliminary examination paper, University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1994).
75. Korol, *Savage Inequalities*, p. 93.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 96; emphasis added.
77. Harris, "Whiteness as Property," p. 1735.
78. David Spenser, "Transitional Bilingual Education and the Socialization of Immigrants," *Harvard Educational Review* 58 (1988): 133-53.
79. H.G. Basinger, "When Whites Flee," *New York Times Magazine*, May 29, 1994, pp. 26-33, 43, 50, 53-54, 56.
80. Derrick Bell, *Race Racism, and American Law* (Boston: Little Brown, 1980).
81. We assert that the current movement toward African-centered (or Africanist) schools is not equivalent to the racial exclusion of vouchers, or choice programs. Indeed, African-centeredness has become a logical response of a community to schools that have been abandoned by whites, have been stripped of material resources, and have demonstrated a lack of commitment to African-American academic achievement.
82. Oakes, *Keeping Track*.
83. James A. Banks, "Multicultural Education: Historical Development, Dimensions, and Practice," in *Review of Research in Education*, vol. 19, ed. L. Darling-Hammond (Washington, D.C.: American Educational Research Association, 1993), p. 3.
84. George Washington Williams, *History of the Negro Race in America from 1619-1880: Negroes as Slaves, as Soldiers, and as Citizens* (2 vols.) (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1882-1883). On the intergroup education movement, see, for example, L.A. Cook and E. Cook, *Intergroup Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954); and

H.G. Trager and M.R. Yarrow, *They Learn What They Live: Prejudice in Young Children* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952).

85. See, for example, Vincent Harding, *Beyond Chaos: Black History and the Search for a New Land* (Black Paper No. 2) (Atlanta: Institute of the Black World, August 1970); J. Blasingame, ed., *New Perspectives in Black Studies* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971); James A. Banks, ed., *Teaching Ethnic Studies* (Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1973); and Geneva Gay, "Ethnic Minority Studies: How Widespread? How Successful?" *Educational Leadership* 29 (1971): 108-12.

86. Banks, "Multicultural Education."

87. In 1988 at Stanford University the inclusion of literature from women and people of color in the Western Civilization core course resulted in a heated debate. The university's faculty senate approved this inclusion in a course called Cultures, Ideas, and Values. The controversy was further heightened when then Secretary of Education William Bennett came to the campus to denounce this decision.

88. In the "Book Notes" section of the *Harvard Educational Review* 64 (1994): 345-47, Jane Dawgian Tchaicha reviews Donald Macedo's *Literatures of Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) and includes two quotes, one from noted conservative Patrick Buchanan and another from Macedo on multiculturalism. According to Buchanan, "Our Judeo-Christian values are going to be preserved, and our Western heritage is going to be handed down to future generations, not dumped into some landfill called multiculturalism" (quoted in Tchaicha, p. 345). Macedo asserts that "the real issue isn't Western culture versus multiculturalism, the fundamental issue is the recognition of humanity in us and in others" (quoted in Tchaicha, p. 347).

89. In New York City, controversy over the inclusion of gay and lesbian issues in the curriculum caused vitriolic debate among racial and ethnic groups who opposed their issues being linked to or compared with homosexuals. Some ethnic group members asserted that homosexuals were not a "culture" while gay and lesbian spokespeople argued that these group members were homophobic.

90. Shirley Torres-Medina, "Issues of Power: Constructing the Meaning of Linguistic Difference in First Grade Classrooms" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994).

91. Richard Delgado, "Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing about Race," *Columbia Law Review* 91 (1991): 1547-60.

92. See Bell, *And We Are Not Saved*.

93. See Cameron McCarthy, "After the Canon: Knowledge and Ideological Representation in the Multicultural Discourse on Curriculum Reform," in *Race, Identity and Representation*, ed. C. McCarthy and W. Cichlow (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 290; and Michael Olneck, "Terms of Inclusion: Has Multiculturalism Redefined Equality in American Education?" *American Journal of Education* 101 (1993): 234-60.

94. We are particularly cognizant of the hard-fought battles in the academy waged and won by scholars such as James Banks, Carlos Correa, Geneva Gay, Carl Grant, and others.

95. Tony Martin, *Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association* (Dover, Mass.: The Majority Press, 1976).

96. Marcus Garvey, cited in *ibid.*, p. 22.

American Indian Geographies of Identity and Power: At the Crossroads of Indígena and Mestizaje

Sandy Marie Anglías Grande

Until Indians resolve for themselves a comfortable modern identity that can be used to energize reservation institutions, radical changes will not be of much assistance.
(Deloria & Lytle, 1984, p. 266)

Our struggle at the moment is to continue to survive and work toward a time when we can replace the need for being preoccupied with survival with a more responsible and peaceful way of living within communities and with the ever-changing landscape that will ever be our only home.

(Warrior, 1995, p. 126)

Broadly speaking, this article focuses on the intersection between dominant modes of critical pedagogy¹ and American Indian intellectualism.² At present, critical theories are often indiscriminately employed to explain the sociopolitical conditions of all marginalized peoples. As a result, many Indigenous scholars view the current liberatory project as simply the latest in a long line of political endeavors that fails to consider American Indians as a unique population.³ Thus, while critical pedagogy may have propelled mainstream educational theory and practice along the path of social justice, I argue that it has muted and thus marginalized the distinctive concerns of American Indian intellectualism and education. As such, I argue further that the particular history of imperialism enacted upon Indigenous peoples requires a reevaluation of dominant views of democracy and social justice, and of the universal validity of such emancipatory projects—including critical pedagogy. It is not that critical pedagogy is irrelevant to Indigenous peoples, as they clearly experience oppression, but rather that the deep structures of the "pedagogy of oppression" fail to consider American Indians as a categorically different population, virtually incomparable to other minority groups. To assert this is not to advocate any kind of hierarchy of oppression but merely to call attention to the fundamental difference of what it means to be a sovereign and tribal people within the geopolitical confines of the United States.

Previous examinations of the potential for critical theory to inform Indigenous pedagogy (Grande, 1997, 2000) expose significant tensions in their deep theoretical structures. For instance, insofar as critical theorists retain "democracy" as the central struggle concept of liberation, they fail to recognize Indigenous peoples' historical battles to resist absorption into the "democratic imaginary"⁴—and their contemporary struggles to retain tribal sovereignty. In fact, it could be argued that the forces of "democracy" have done more to imperil American Indian nations than they have to sustain them (e.g., the extension of democracy in the form of civil rights and citizenship has acted as a powerful if not lethal colonizing force when imposed on the intricate tribal, clan, and kinship systems of traditional Native communities).

Compounding the tensions between American Indian intellectualism and critical pedagogy is the fact that American Indian scholars have, by and large, resisted engagement with critical theory,⁵ and concentrated instead on the production of historical monographs, ethnographic studies, tribally centered curricula, and site-based research. Such a focus seems from the fact that most American Indian scholars feel compelled to address the political urgencies of their own communities, against which engagement in abstract theory appears to be a luxury and privilege of the academic elite. While I recognize the need for practically based research, I argue that the ever-increasing global encroachment on American Indian lands, resources, cultures, and communities points to the equally urgent need to build political coalitions and formulate transcendent theories of liberation. Moreover, while individual tribal needs are in fact great, I believe that, unless the boundaries of coalition are expanded to include non-Indian communities, Indian nations will remain vulnerable to whims of the existing social order.

The combined effect of internal neglect and external resistance to critical pedagogy has pushed American Indian intellectualism to the margins of critical discourse. This reality raises a series of important questions that help form the basis of this discussion:

1. Insofar as critical theory remains disconnected from the work of American Indian scholars, how do its language and epistemic frames serve as homogenizing agents when interfaced with the conceptual and analytical categories persistent within American Indian educational history and intellectualism?
2. How has the resistance of American Indian intellectuals to critical theory contributed to the general lack of analyses on the impact of racism (and, for that matter, other "isms") within American Indian communities?
3. How have the marginalization of critical scholarship and the concomitant fascination with cultural/literary forms of American Indian writing contributed to the preoccupation with parochial questions of identity and authenticity? And, how have these obsessions about identity concealed the social-political realities facing American Indian communities?

While the above questions provide the foundation for a broad discussion of the intersection of critical theory and American Indian intellectualism, I submit that the main source of tension is embedded in their competing notions of identity—one rooted in Western definitions of the civil society and the other in the traditional structures of tribal society.

In terms of identity, critical theorists aim to explode the concretized categories of race, class, gender, and sexuality and to claim the intersections—the borderlands—as the space to create a new culture—*una cultura mestiza*—in which the only normative standard is hybridity and all subjects are constructed as inherently transgressive.⁶ Though American Indian intellectuals support the notion of hybridity, they remain skeptical of the new *mestiza* as a possible continuation of the colonialist project to fuse Indians into the national model of the democratic citizen. There is, in other words, an undercurrent to the postcolonial lexicon of *mestizaje* that seems to undermine the formation of "a comfortable modern American Indian identity" (Deloria & Lytle, 1984, p. 266). More specifically, I argue that the contemporary pressures of ethnic fraud, corporate commodification, and culture loss render the critical notion of "transgressive" identity highly problematic for Indigenous peoples. As such, the primary argument is that critical efforts to promote *mestizaje* as the basis of a new cultural democracy does not fully consider

Indigenous struggles to sustain the cultural and political integrity of American Indian communities.

That being said, it is important to note that American Indian critical studies are perceived by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars as a "dangerous discourse" equally threatening to the fields of critical pedagogy and American Indian intellectualism.⁷ After all, American Indian critical studies would compel "Whitestream" advocates of critical theory to ask how their knowledge and practices may have contributed and remained blind to the continued exploitation of Indigenous peoples. Specifically, it would require a deeper recognition that these are not postcolonial times, that "globalization" is simply the new metaphor for imperialism, and that current constructions of democracy continue to presume the eventual absorption of Indigenous peoples. For American Indian intellectuals, the infusion of critical studies would require a movement away from the safety of unified, essentialized, and idealized constructions of American Indianness toward more complicated readings of American Indian formations of power and identity, particularly those that take into account the existence of internal oppression. Specifically, it would compel American Indian intellectuals to confront the taboo subjects of racism, sexism, and homophobia within American Indian communities.

Ultimately, however, this article is not a call for American Indian scholars to simply join the conversation of critical theorists. Rather, it is an initiation of an Indigenous conversation that can, in turn, engage in dialectical contestation with the dominant modes of critical theory. In this way, I hope that the development of an Indigenous theory of liberation can itself be a politically transformative practice, one that works to transgress tribal divisions and move toward the development of a transcendent theory of American Indian sovereignty and self-determination. With this in mind, my discussion of the central tension between critical pedagogy and American Indian intellectualism unfolds in four parts. Part one examines formations of identity that have emerged from the dominant modes of critical discourse, paying special attention to the notion of transgression, and the construction of *mestizaje* as a counter-discourse of subjectivity. Part two examines American Indian formations of identity and the external forces that work to threaten these formations, namely ethnic fraud, cultural encroachment, corporate commodification, and culture loss. Part three examines the intersection between American Indian identity and *mestizaje*, as well as other models of hybridity generated by American Indian and other scholars of color. The article concludes with a call for the development of a new Red Pedagogy,⁸ or one that is historically grounded in American Indian intellectualism, politically centered in issues of sovereignty and tribal self-determination, and inspired by the religious and spiritual⁹ traditions of American Indian peoples.

Part I. Identity, Subjectivity and Critical Theory: *Mestizaje* and the New Cultural Democracy

"Critical pedagogy is the term used to describe what emerges when critical theory encounters education" (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1997, p. 24). Rather than offer prescriptions, critical pedagogy draws from the structural critique of critical theory, extending an analysis of school as a site of reproduction, resistance, and social transformation. It examines the ways that power and domination inform the processes and procedures of schooling and works to expose the sorting and selecting functions of the institution. As it has evolved into its current form(s), critical pedagogy has emerged as both a rhetoric and a

social movement. Critical educators continue to advocate an increasingly sophisticated critique of the social, economic, and political barriers to social justice, as well as to crusade for the transformation of schools to reflect the imperatives of democracy.

Critical scholars have, over time, provided a sustained critique of the forces of power and domination and their relation to the pedagogical (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1997). As defined here, "the pedagogical" refers to the production of identity or the way one learns to see oneself in relation to the world. Identity is thus situated as one of the core struggle concepts of critical pedagogy, where the formation of self serves as the basis for analyses of race, class, gender, and sexuality and their relationship to the questions of democracy, justice, and community.

By positioning identity in the foreground of their theories, critical scholars have fueled as many theories of identity as they have varieties of critical pedagogy. While there are differences between and among these formulations, critical constructions of identity are distinct from both liberal and conservative theories of identity. Such theories are viewed as problematic by critical scholars because of their use of "essentialist" or reductionistic analyses of difference (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1997; McCarthy & Crichtlow, 1993; McLaren, 1997). "Essentialist" analysis refers to the treatment of racial and social groups as if they were stable and homogeneous entities, or as if members of each group possessed "some innate and invariant set of characteristics setting them apart from each other and from 'Whites'" (McCarthy & Crichtlow, 1993, p. xviii). Critical scholars argue that essentialism not only undertheorizes race but can also result in a gross misreading of the nature of difference, opening the door for the proliferation of deeply cynical theories of racial superiority, such as Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's *The Bell Curve* (1994). While conservatives typically invoke essentialist theories, critical scholars acknowledge that some forms of left-essentialism operate in the contemporary landscape to similarly divisive ends.¹⁰

In response to the undertheorizing of race by both the Left and the Right, critical theorists advocate a theory of difference that is firmly rooted in the "power-sensitive discourses of power, democracy, social justice and historical memory" (McLaren & Giroux, 1997, p. 17). In so doing, they replace the comparatively static notion of identity as a relatively fixed entity that one embodies with the more fluid concept of subjectivity—an entity that one actively and continually constructs. Subjectivity works to underscore the contingency of identity and the understanding that "individuals consist of a decentered flux of subject positions highly dependent on discourse, social structure, repetition, memory, and affective investment" (McLaren & Giroux, 1997, p. 25). In other words, one's "identity" is historically situated and socially constructed, rather than predetermined by biological or other *prima facie* indicators.

In addition to calling attention to the relational aspects of identity, the critical notion of subjectivity advances a more complex analysis of cultural and racial identity. It shifts race from a passive product of biological endowment to an active "product of human work" (Said, 1993, p. xix). Critical scholars argue that the rupture of previously rigid racial categories reveals contested spaces or borderlands where cultures collide, creating the space to explore new notions of identity in the resulting contradictions, nuances, and discontinuities they introduce into the terrain of racial identity. Thus, where essentialist scholars examine race, class, gender, and sexuality as discrete categories, critical scholars focus on the spaces of intersection between and among these categories.

The emergence of subjectivity as a socially constructed entity spanned a whole new language about identity. Border cultures, border-crossers, *mestiza* (Anzald a, 1987;

Delgado Bernal, 1998); *Xicanisma* (Castillo, 1995); postcolonial hybridities, cyborg identities (Haraway, 1991); and *mestizaje* (Darder, Torres, & Guti rrez, 1997; McLaren & Sleeter, 1995; Valle & Torres, 1995) are just some of the emergent concepts formulated to explain and bring language to the experience of multiplicity, relationality, and transgression as they relate to identity. Moreover, critical scholars contend that the development of transgressive subjectivity not only works to resist essentialist constructions of identity but also acts to counter the hegemonic notion of Whiteness as the normative standard for all subjects. Such efforts represent the hope and possibility of critical pedagogy as they seek to construct a critical democracy that includes multiple cultures, languages, and voices. Critical pedagogy thus serves both to challenge the existing sociocultural and economic relations of exploitation and to strengthen collective work toward peace and social justice, thereby creating a more equitable democratic order and, by definition, more equitable educational institutions.

From Mestizaje to Mestiza back to Mestizaje

The critical notion of *mestizaje* (Darder, Torres, & Guti rrez, 1997; McLaren & Sleeter, 1995; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1997; Valle & Torres, 1995) is arguably among the most widely embraced models of multisubjectivity. Historically speaking, the counterdiscourse of *mestizaje* is rooted in the Latin American subjectivity of the *mestizo*—literally, a person of mixed ancestry, especially of American Indian, European, and African backgrounds (Delgado Bernal, 1998). *Mestizaje* is the Latin American term for cultural ambiguity, representative of "the continent's unfinished business of cultural hybridization" (Valle & Torres, 1995, p. 141). With regard to this history, Latin American scholars Victor Valle and Rodolfo Torres write:

In Latin America the genetic and cultural dialogue between the descendants of Europe, Africa, Asia, and the hemisphere's indigenous populations has been expressed in discourses reflecting and responding to a host of concrete national circumstances. In some cases, *mestizaje* has risen to the level of a truly critical counter-discourse of revolutionary aspirations, while at other times it has been co-opted by the state (p. 141).

Thus, it could be argued that the political project of *mestizaje* originated in Latin America, where the cluster of Spanish, Indian, and Afro-Caribbean peoples were ostensibly "fused" through the violence of genocide into the national model of the *mestizo*.

In the northern hemisphere, Chicana scholar Gloria Anzald a's seminal text *Borderlands, la Frontera: The New Mestiza* (1987) reinscribed the cultural terrain with the language and embodiment of *mestiza* consciousness. Since the book's publication, *mestiza* has come to embody a new feminist Chicana consciousness that "straddles cultures, races, languages, nations, sexualities, and spiritualities" and the experience of "living with ambivalence while balancing opposing powers" (Delgado Bernal, 1998, p. 561). Anzald a (1987) states, "The new *mestiza* copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity. She learns to be an Indian in Mexican culture [and] to be Mexican from an Anglo point of view" (p. 79). From this base, a variety of Chicana and other border feminisms have emerged, centered on the social histories and epistemologies of women of color.

More recently, the intellectual left, particularly critical scholars, has incorporated the spirit of the Chicana *mestiza* in its own search for a viable model of subjectivity. It

embraces the emergent discourse of *mestizaje* and its emphasis on the way in which all cultures change in relation to one another as the postcolonial antidote to imperialist notions of racial purity (di Leonardo, 1991). This radically inclusive construct "willfully blurs political, racial, [and] cultural borders in order to better adapt to the world as it is actually constructed" (Valle & Torres, 1995, p. 149) and embodies the *mestizo's* demonstrated refusal to prefer one language, one national heritage, or one culture at the expense of others. Leading critical scholar Peter McLaren (1997) summarily articulates *mestizaje* as "the embodiment of a transcultural, transnational subject, a self-reflexive entity capable of rupturing the facile legitimization of 'authentic' national identities through [the] articulation of a subject who is conjunctural, who is a relational part of an ongoing negotiated connection to the larger society, and who is interpolated by multiple subject positionings" (p. 12). In other words, *mestizaje* crosses all imposed cultural, linguistic, and national borders, refusing all "natural" or transcendent claims that "by definition attempt to escape from any type of historical and normative grounding" (McLaren & Giroux, 1997, p. 117). Ultimately, the critical notion of *mestizaje* is itself multifunctional, for it signifies a strategic response to the decline of the imperial West, facilitates the decentring of Whiteness, and undermines the myth of the democratic nation-state based on borders and exclusions (Valle & Torres, 1995).

Insofar as the notion of *mestizaje* disrupts the discourse of jingoistic nationalism, it is indeed crucial to the project of liberation. As McLaren notes, "Educators would do well to consider Gloria Anzald a's (1987) project of creating *mestizaje* theories that create new categories of identity for those left out or pushed out of existing ones" (McLaren, 1997, p. 537). In so doing, however, "care must be taken not to equate hybridity with equality" (McLaren, 1997, p. 46).¹¹ As Coco Fusco notes, "The postcolonial celebration of hybridity has (too often) been interpreted as the sign that no further concern about the politics of representation and cultural exchange is needed. With ease, we lapse back into the integrationist rhetoric of the 1960's" (Fusco, 1995, p. 46). These words caution us not to lose sight—in the wake of transgressing borders and building postnational coalitions—of the unique challenges presented to particular groups in their distinct struggles for social justice. In taking this admonition seriously, the following discussion moves into an examination of American Indian tribal identity and some of the current pressures facing Indian communities that, I argue, render the notion of *mestizaje* somewhat problematic. The question remains whether the construction of a transgressive subjectivity—*mestizaje*—can be reconciled with the pressures of identity appropriation, cultural commodification, culture loss, and, perhaps more importantly, with Indigenous imperatives of self-determination and sovereignty.

Part II. The Formation of Indigena: American Indian Geographies of Power and Identity

Whitestream America has never really understood what it means to be Indian and even less about what it means to be tribal. Such ignorance has deep historical roots and wide political implications of not understanding what it means to be tribal, since the U.S. government determined long ago that to be "tribal" runs deeply counter to the notion of democracy and the proliferation of (individual) civil rights. Throughout the centuries, uncompromising belief in this tenet of democratic order provided the ideological foundation for numerous expurgatory campaigns against Indigenous peoples. The Civilization

Act of 1819, the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the Dawes Allotment Act of 1886, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 are just a few of the legal mechanisms imposed to "further democracy" and concomitantly erode traditional tribal structures.

Although five centuries of continuous contact may have extinguished the traditional societies of the precontact era, modern American Indian communities still resemble traditional societies enough that, "given a choice between Indian society and non-Indian society, most Indians feel comfortable with their own institutions, lands and traditions" (Deloria & Lytle, 1983, p. xi). Despite such significant differences, tribal America remains curiously difficult to articulate. Vine Deloria Jr., one of the preeminent American Indian scholars, has written over eighteen books and one hundred articles defining the political, spiritual, cultural, and intellectual dimensions of American Indian life. His expansive body of work serves as testimony to the difficulty and complexity of defining tribal life and suggests the impossibility of encompassing the multiple dimensions of Indianness in a single article. To do so would not only minimize Deloria's and other scholars' work, but also presume that centuries of ancestral knowledge could be transcribed into a single literary form. Similarly, to tease out, list, name, and assign primacy to a particular subset of defining characteristics of Indianness would not only serve to objectify and oversimplify the diversity of Native cultures, but would also force what is fundamentally traditional, spatial, and interconnected into the modern, temporal, and epistemic frames of Western knowledge. Accordingly, the following is merely a sample of existing legal, prima facie indicators of what it means to be American Indian in U.S. society, rather than some mythic view of a unified Indigenous culture or an objectified view of Indian "identity".

Sovereignty vs. Democracy: American Indians have been engaged in a centuries-long struggle to have what is legally theirs recognized (i.e., land, sovereignty, treaty rights). As such, Indigenous peoples have not, like other marginalized groups, been fighting for inclusion in the democratic imaginary but, rather, for the right to remain distinct, sovereign, and tribal peoples.

Treaty Rights: These rights articulate the unique status of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations." A dizzying array of tribal, federal, and state laws, policies, and treaties creates a political maze that keeps the legal status of most tribes in a constant state of flux. Treaties are negotiated and renegotiated in a process that typically reduces tribal rights and erodes traditional structures (Deloria & Lytle, 1984; Fricio, 1998).

Dual Citizenship: The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 extends the rights of full citizenship to American Indians born within the territorial United States, insofar as such status does not infringe upon the rights to tribal and other property. It is a dual citizenship wherein American Indians do not lose civil rights because of their status as tribal members and individual tribal members are not denied tribal rights because of their American citizenship (Deloria & Lytle, 1984).¹²

Federal Recognition: Federal law mandates that American Indians prove that they have continued to exist over time as stable, *prima facie* entities to retain federal recognition as tribes. Acknowledgment of tribal existence by the Department of the Interior is critical, as it is a prerequisite to the protection, services, and benefits of the federal government available to Indian tribes by virtue of their status as tribes. Therefore, a tribe's existence is contingent upon its ability to prove its existence over time, to provide evidence of shared cultural patterns, and to prove "persistent existence of a named, collective Indian identity" (USD, Bureau of Indian Affairs, n.d., 83.7).

Economic Dependency: American Indians continue to exist as nations within a nation wherein the relationship between the U.S. government and Indian tribes is not the fictive "government to government" relationship described in U.S. documents, but, rather, one that positions tribes as fundamentally dependent.¹³

Reservations: Roughly two-thirds of American Indians continue either to live on or to remain significantly tied to their reservations and, as such, remain predominantly "tribally oriented" as opposed to generically Indian (Joe & Miller, 1997).

The aggregate of the above indicators positions American Indians in a wholly unique and paradoxical relationship to the United States. These indicators further illuminate the inherent contradictions of modern American Indian existence and point to the gross insufficiency of models that treat American Indians as simply another ethnic minority group. Moreover, the paradox of having to prove "authenticity" to gain legitimacy as a "recognized" tribe and of simultaneously having to negotiate a postmodern world in which all claims to authenticity and legitimacy are dismissed as essentialist (if not racist) conscripts American Indians to a gravely dangerous and precarious space. This reality of Indian existence not only deeply problematizes various postmodern theories' insistence that we move beyond concretized categories, but also reveals their colonizing impulse.¹⁴

In addition to the (legal) *prima facie* indicators of American Indianness, there are external forces that further impede and complicate the landscape of American Indian identity. More specifically, the forces of ethnic fraud, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification work in tandem to call into question the ostensibly liberatory effects of transgression. Such forces pressure Indian communities to define American Indian subjectivity in stable, *prima facie* measures. In other words, the forces of colonialism and imperialism deeply problematize the postmodern notion of transgression in terms of its abandonment of totality and its emphasis on pluralism and discontinuity. As Steven Best (1989) points out, where critical scholars rightly deconstruct essentialist and repressive wholes, they fail to see how crippling the valorization of difference, fragmentation, and agnostics can be. For the American Indian community, the "crippling" effects have been significant. In particular, the struggle to define "comfortable modern American Indian identities" becomes deeply complicated, enmeshed in the impossible paradox of having to respond to the growing pluralism within their own communities and thus the need to define more fluid constructions of Indianness, while also recognizing that the pressures of identity appropriation, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification require more restrictive constructions of Indianness. In order to better understand the significance of this paradox, the forces of ethnic fraud, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification are discussed in greater detail.

Identity Appropriation

In *post-Dances with Wolves America*, it has become increasingly popular to be American Indian. Joane Nagel, a sociologist and expert in the politics of ethnicity, attests that between 1960 and 1990 the number of Americans reporting "American Indian" as their racial category in the U.S. Census more than tripled. Researchers attribute this growth to the practice of "ethnic switching," where individuals previously identifying themselves as "non-Indian," now claim "Indian" as their racial affiliation. She identifies three factors promoting ethnic switching: changes in federal Indian policy; changes in American ethnic politics; and American Indian political activism (Nagel, 1995). Those seminal changes in federal policy referred to by Nagel are the Indian relocation policies of the 1960s and 1970s that led to the creation of urban Indian populations, and the various land-claims settlement of the 1980s, which also led to increases in certain tribal populations.¹⁵ The changes

in ethnic politics emanate from the civil rights and Red Power movements that made American Indian identification "a more attractive ethnic option" (Nagel, 1995, p. 956). According to Nagel, these factors helped to raise American Indian ethnic consciousness and encouraged individuals to claim or reclaim their Native American ancestry.

While she makes strong arguments for the three factors she identifies, Nagel ignores the possibility that part of the resurgence may also be due to increasing incidents of identity appropriation, or *ethnic fraud*. Ethnic fraud is the term used to describe the phenomenon of Whiteman individuals who, in spite of growing up far removed from any discernible American Indian community, claim an Indian identity based on the discovery of residuals of Indian blood in their distant ancestries. There is nothing categorically wrong with "discovering" one's ancestral background, but when such claims are opportunistically used to cash in on scholarships, set-aside programs, and other affirmative economic incentives, it becomes highly problematic. Furthermore, there is evidence that such "new Indians" discard their new-found identities as soon as they no longer serve them. For example, studies conducted at UCLA in 1988-1989 and 1993 reveal that of the enrolled 179 American Indian students, 125 did not or could not provide adequate documentation of their tribal affiliation, and that, on average, less than 15 percent of American Indian students were enrolled in federally recognized tribes (Machamer, 1997). More importantly, a significant number of students chose to identify as American Indian only to relinquish this identification by the time of graduation, suggesting that, economic incentives aside, "new Indians" chose to reclaim their Whiteness (Machamer, 1997). Such practices indicate that it is not only popular but profitable to be "Indian" in postmodern America.

In addition to outright identity fraud, American Indian communities also endure the more superficial but equally problematic phenomena of ethnic "voyageing." The seasonal influx of tour buses, church groups, and do-gooders discharges a veritable wave of Whiteness into reservation communities. Armed with their own constructions of Indianness, Whiteman individuals appropriate and try on various elements of Native culture and, in the name of religion, multiculturalism, environmentalism, and radicalism, voyeuristically tour reservation communities like cultural predators loose in Indian theme parks. During these visits, they acquire the usual assemblage of trinkets and souvenirs, and afterwards exit dysconscious¹⁶ of the fact that their adventures have conscripted Native culture as fashion, Indian as exotic, and the sacred as entertainment. While there is a measure of complicity on the part of some American Indians who sell their culture, the overlay of colonialism situates these practices more as products of lost culture, lost economic vitality, and a lost sense of being than as crass indicators of Indian capitalism.

All told, the practice of identity appropriation is believed to have become so widespread that some American Indian organizations have felt compelled to devise statements and enact policies against its proliferation.¹⁷ Even the federal government has recognized the occurrence and ill effects of ethnic fraud. The Indian Arts and Crafts Act, for example, stipulates that all products must be marketed truthfully regarding the Indian heritage and tribal affiliation of the artist or craftsman. Though this act does more to protect consumers against the purchase of "fraudulent" merchandise, it also protects American Indian artisans from unfair competition by "fraudulent Indian" profiteers.

While such tactics appear to be reasonable in theory, in practice they require the employment of equally problematic essentialist ideology. In other words, in the same moment that particular groups work to determine who is and who is not Indian, they also define fixed parameters of authenticity, reducing the question of Indianness to quantifiable variables and objectified models of culture. It is also difficult to reconcile such

contemporary measures with the historical memory that quantifying Indianness is a *temp*nant of the Dawes Allotment Act (1887),¹⁸ in which the U.S. government first introduced blood quantum policies and tribal rolls, and the knowledge that, regardless of how they are defined, measures of authenticity will conjure the same political divisiveness they always have. Finally, insofar as compliance with ethnic fraud policies requires the formation of an Indian Identity Police,¹⁹ enforcement also becomes a dubious enterprise, inviting increased scrutiny from outside agencies.

Cultural Encroachment

The fact that nearly two-thirds of American Indians remain closely tied to their reservations not only points to the continued significance of land in the formation of American Indian identity, but also suggests that a large portion of the Indian population remains fairly segregated from the rest of the nation. Clearly, "Indian Country" persists as both a metaphorical and literal place, undoubtedly shaping the subjectivities of all those who call it home. In other words, living in a physically circumscribed space where literal borders distinguish "us" from "them" must, by definition, shape American Indian consciousness and emergent views of identity and difference. More specifically, the relationship between American Indian communities and the predominantly White border towns not only shapes the ways Indians perceive and construct Whites, but also significantly influences their own views of American Indian identity.

Thus, although reservations exist as a vestige of forced removal, colonialist domination, and Whiteman greed, they have also come to serve as protective barriers and defensive perimeters between cultural integrity and wholesale assimilation. They also serve to distinguish American Indians as the only peoples with federally recognized land claims, demarcating the borders of the only domestic sovereign nations. Though the power of this domestic-dependent-nation status is continually challenged in federal courts, Indians have retained a significant portion of their plenary powers, such as the right to establish tribal courts, tribal governments, and tribal police forces. Ultimately, however, the notion of self-government remains a bit of a farce, since most tribes remain entrenched in untenable relationships with the U.S. government and most reservation economies can only maintain stability with the infusion of outside capital (Deloria & Lytle, 1984).

The dependency on outside capital generates a subordinating effect, leaving American Indians at the virtual mercy of venture capitalists and Whiteman do-gooders. As a result, most reservation communities are overrun by emissaries of White justice, private entrepreneurs, and New Age liberals seeking to forge lucrative careers from predatory practices. Bivouacked in internal and external compounds, enterprising members of the Whiteman wield power and broker services by day, and by night retreat back into the comforts of their bourgeois border towns. As a result, most of the businessmen, teachers, principals, doctors, and health-care providers in reservation communities are White, and most of the laborers, minimum-wagers, underemployed, and unemployed are American Indian.

In spite of the pressures of cultural encroachment, reservation communities continue to work toward becoming sites of political contestation and empowerment. They are learning to survive the dangers of imperialistic forces by employing both proactive strategies that emphasize education, empowerment, and self-determination, and defensive tactics that

protect against unfettered economic and political encroachment. Thus, whatever else reservation borders may or may not signify, they serve as potent geographic filters of all that is non-Indian—literal dividing lines between the real and metaphorical spaces differentiating Indian Country from the rest of Whiteman America.

Corporate Commodification

The forces of both ethnic fraud and cultural encroachment operate to create a climate ripe for the corporate commodification of American Indianness. While this commodification takes many forms, it is perhaps most visible in the marketing of Indian narratives, particularly publishing, in which literary/cultural forms of Indian intellectualism have been historically favored over critical forms.

For instance, Indigenous scholar Elizabeth Cook-Lynn (1998) questions why the same editors and agents who solicit her "life story" also routinely reject her scholarly work. She writes, "While I may have a reasonable understanding why a state-run university press would not want to publish research that has little good to say about America's relationship to tribes, . . . I am at a loss to explain why anyone would be more interested in my life story (which for one thing is quite unremarkable)" (p. 121). The explanation, of course, is that the marketable narrative is that which subscribes to the Whiteman notion of Indian as romantic figure, and not Indian as scholar and social critic. Such a predisposition works to favor not only cultural/literary forms of American Indian intellectualism over critical forms, but also the work of "fraudulent" Indians over that of "legitimate" American Indian scholars. Cook-Lynn (1998) argues that, just as the rights to our land remain in the hands of the Whiteman government, the rights to our stories remain in non-Indian enclaves. Deloria (1998) similarly contends that what passes in the academic world as legitimate scholarship on American Indians is often the product of average scholars (often White) advocating a predetermined anti-Indian agenda²⁰ and "fraudulent" Indians. That such work has been allowed to corner the market raises the question of who controls access to the intellectual property of American Indian peoples. Deloria himself asks, "Who is it that has made such people as Adolph Hungry Wolf, Janake Highwater, Joseph Epes Brown, Su Bear, Rolling Thunder, Wallace Black Elk, John Redtail Friesoul, Lynn Andrews, and Dhyani Ywahoo the spokespeople of American Indians?" (p. 79). He responds by naming Whiteman America as both patron and peddler of the Hollywood Indian. He writes, "They [the fraudulent Indians] represent the intense desire of Whites to create in their own minds an Indian they want to believe in" (p. 79).

As such, the market is flooded with tragic stories of lost cultures, intimate narratives of "frontier life," and quasi-historic accounts of the Native Americans' plight. Such stories are told and retold as part of America's dark and distant past, a bygone era of misguided faith where cultural genocide is depicted as an egregious but perhaps unavoidable consequence of the country's manifest destiny toward democracy. While I would never argue that stories depicting the truth of Native peoples' tragic experiences (e.g., Indian boarding schools, the Trail of Tears) do not deserve a central place in the telling of American history, such accounts become problematic in the wider context of Whiteman consumption of Indian history.

Why are these stories the ones most often presented as the prime-time programs in the commodified literary network of Indian history? What is gained by focusing on these particular aspects of White domination and Indian subjugation? I argue that such stories

serve several purposes, none of which contributes to the emancipatory project of American Indians. First, by propagating the romantic image of American Indians and concomitantly marginalizing the work of Indigenous intellectuals and social critics, Whiteman publishers maintain control over the epistemic frames that define Indians, and thus over the fund of available knowledge on American Indians. Second, such control is underwritten by the understanding that American Indian intellectualism exists as a threat to the myth of the ever-evolving democratization of Indian-White relations, and to the notion that cultural genocide is a remnant of America's dark and distant past. Third, the often oversimplified accounts of Indian history, framed in good-v-bad-guy terms, allow the consumer to fault rogue groups of dogmatic missionaries and wayward military officers for the slow but steady erosion of Indigenous life, thereby distancing themselves and mainstream government from the ongoing project of cultural genocide. Finally, the focus on Indian history allows the Whiteman to avoid issues facing American Indians in the twenty-first century. As a result, Indians as a modern people remain invisible, allowing a wide array of distorted myths to flourish as contemporary reality—for example, that all the "real" Indians are extinct, that the surviving Indians are all alcoholic-drug addicts who have forsaken traditional ways to become budding capitalists, gaming entrepreneurs, and casino owners—and find their way into public discourse. At the same time these images are circulated, the intensive, ongoing court battles over land, natural resources, and federal recognition are ignored, fueling the great lie of twenty-first century democracy—that America's "Indian problem" has long been solved.

Discussion

The forces of identity appropriation, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification pressure American Indian communities to employ essentialist tactics and construct relatively fixed notions of identity, and to render the concepts of fluidity and transgression highly problematic. It is evident from the examples above that the notion of fluid boundaries has never worked to the advantage of Indigenous peoples: federal agencies have invoked the language of fluid or unstable identities as the rationale for dismantling the structures of tribal life and creating greater dependency on the U.S. government; Whiteman America has seized its message to declare open season on Indians, thereby appropriating Native lands, culture, spiritual practices, history, and literature; and Whiteman academics have now employed the language of postmodern fluidity to unwittingly transmute centuries of war between Indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue" (Valle & Torres, 1995, p. 141). Thus, in spite of its aspirations to social justice, the notion of a new cultural democracy based on the ideal of *mestizaje* represents a rather ominous threat to American Indian communities.

In addition, the undercurrent of fluidity and sense of displacement that permeates, if not defines, *mestizaje* runs contrary to American Indian sensibilities of connection to place, land, and the Earth itself. Consider, for example, the following statement on the nature of critical subjectivity by Peter McLaren:

The struggle for critical subjectivity is the struggle to occupy a space of hope—a liminal space, an intimation of the anti-structure, of what lives in the in-between zone of undecidability—in which one can work toward a praxis of redemption. . . . A sense of atopy has always been with me, a resplendent placelessness, a feeling of living in germinal formlessness. . . . I cannot

find words to express what this border identity means to me. All I have are what Georges Basille (1988) calls *mots glissants* (slippery words). (1997, pp. 13–14)

McLaren speaks passionately and directly about the crisis of modern society and the need for a "praxis of redemption." As he perceives it, the very possibility of redemption is situated in our willingness not only to accept but to flourish in the "liminal" spaces, border identities, and postcolonial hybridities that are inherent in postmodern life and subjectivity. In fact, McLaren perceives the fostering of a "resplendent placelessness" itself as the gateway to a more just, democratic society.

While American Indian intellectuals also seek to embrace the notion of transcendent subjectivities, they seek a notion of transcendence that remains rooted in historical place and the sacred connection to land. Consider, for example, the following commentary by Deloria (1992) on the centrality of place and land in the construction of American Indian subjectivity:

Recognizing the sacredness of lands on which previous generations have lived and died is the foundation of all other sentiment. Instead of denying this dimension of our emotional lives, we should be setting aside additional places that have transcendent meaning. Sacred sites that higher spiritual powers have chosen for manifestation enable us to focus our concerns on the specific form of our lives. . . . Sacred places are the foundation of all other beliefs and practices because they represent the presence of the sacred in our lives. They properly inform us that we are not larger than nature and that we have responsibilities to the rest of the natural world that transcend our own personal desires and wishes. This lesson must be learned by each generation. (pp. 278, 281)

Gross misunderstanding of this connection between American Indian subjectivity and land, and, more importantly, between sovereignty and land has been the source of numerous injustices in Indian country. For instance, I believe there was little understanding on the part of government officials that passage of the Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978) would open a Pandora's box of discord over land, setting up an intractable conflict between property rights and religious freedom. American Indians, on the other hand, viewed the act as an invitation to return to their sacred sites, several of which were on government lands and were being damaged by commercial use. As a result, a flurry of lawsuits alleging mismanagement and destruction of sacred sites was filed by numerous tribes. Similarly, corporations, tourists, and even rock climbers filed suits accusing land managers of unlawfully restricting access to public places by implementing policies that violate the constitutional separation between church and state. All of this is to point out that the critical project of *mestizaje* continues to operate on the same assumption made by the U.S. government in this instance, that in a democratic society, human subjectivity—and liberation for that matter—is conceived of as inherently rights-based as opposed to land-based.

To be fair, I believe that both American Indian intellectuals and critical theorists share a similar vision—a time, place, and space free of the compulsions of Whiteman, global capitalism and the racism, sexism, and xenophobia it engenders. But where critical scholars ground their vision in Western conceptions of democracy and justice that presume a "liberated" self, American Indian intellectuals ground their vision in conceptions of sovereignty that presume a sacred connection to place and land. Thus, to a large degree, the seemingly liberatory constructs of fluidity, mobility, and transgression are perceived not only as the language of critical subjectivity, but also as part of the fundamental lexicon of Western imperialism. Deloria (1999) writes:

Although the loss of land must be seen as a political and economic disaster of the first magnitude, the real exile of the tribes occurred with the destruction of ceremonial life (associated with the loss of land) and the failure or inability of white society to offer a sensible and cohesive alternative to the traditions which Indians remembered. People became disoriented with respect to the world in which they lived. They could not practice their old ways, and the new ways which they were expected to learn were in a constant state of change because they were not a cohesive view of the world but simply adjustments which whites were making to the technology they had invented. (p. 247)

In summary, insofar as American Indian identities continue to be defined and shaped in interdependence with place, the transgressive *mestizaje* functions as a potentially homogenizing force that presumes the continued exile of tribal peoples and their enduring absorption into the American "democratic" Whiteman. The notion of *mestizaje* as absorption is particularly problematic for the Indigenous peoples of Central and South America, where the myth of the *mestizaje* (belief that the continent's original cultures and inhabitants no longer exist) has been used for centuries to force the integration of Indigenous communities into the national *mestizo* model (Van Cott, 1994). According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1992), the myth of *mestizaje* has provided the ideological pretext for numerous South American governmental laws and policies expressly designed to strengthen the nation-state through incorporation of all "non-national" (read "Indigenous") elements into the mainstream. Thus, what Valle and Torres (1995) previously describe as "the continent's unfinished business of cultural hybridization" (p. 141), Indigenous peoples view as the continent's long and bloody battle to absorb their existence into the master narrative of the *mestizo*.

While critical scholars do construct a very different kind of democratic solidarity that disrupts the sociopolitical and economic hegemony of the dominant culture around a transformed notion of *mestizaje* (one committed to the destabilization of the isolationist narratives of nationalism and cultural chauvinism), I argue that any liberatory project that does not begin with a clear understanding of the difference of American Indians will, in the end, work to undermine tribal life. Moreover, there is a potential danger that the ostensibly "new" cultural democracy based upon the radical *mestizaje* will continue to mute tribal differences and erase distinctive Indian identities. Therefore, as the physical and metaphysical borders of the postmodern world become increasingly fluid, the desire of American Indian communities to protect geographic borders and employ "essentialist" tactics also increases. Though such tactics may be viewed by critical scholars as highly problematic, they are viewed by American Indian intellectuals as a last line of defense against the steady erosion of tribal culture, political sovereignty, Native resources, and Native lands.

The tensions described above indicate the dire need for an Indigenous, revolutionary theory that maintains the distinctiveness of American Indians as tribal peoples of sovereign nations (border patrolling) and also encourages the building of coalitions and political solidarity (border crossing). In contrast to critical scholars McLaren and Kris Gutierrez (1997), who admonish educators to develop a concept of unity and difference as political mobilization rather than cultural authenticity, I urge American Indian intellectuals to develop a language that operates at the crossroads of unity and difference and defines this space in terms of political mobilization and cultural authenticity, thus expressing both the interdependence and distinctiveness of tribal peoples.

Part III. *Mestizaje* Revisited: Critical Indigena and a New Red Pedagogy

To their credit, Whiteman critical scholars recognize the potential for their own subjectivities and locations of privilege to infiltrate the critical discourse, limiting it in ways they cannot see or anticipate. McLaren (1997) writes, "An individual cannot say he or she has achieved critical pedagogy if he or she stops struggling to attain it. Only sincere discontent and dissatisfaction with the limited effort we exercise in the name of social justice can assure us that we really have the faith in a dialogical commitment to others and otherness" (p. 13). It is perhaps this commitment to self-reflexivity and an ever-evolving pedagogy that represents critical pedagogy's greatest strength. Indeed, critical scholars from other marginalized groups such as Gloria Anzald a, Hazel Carby, Antonia Darder, Dolores Delgado Bernal, Kris Gutierrez, bell hooks, Rudy Mattai, Cameron McCarthy, Enrique Muriillo, Frances V. Rains, and Sofia Villenas have seized upon its openness, transmuting critical theories to fit their own constructions of culturally relevant praxis. Currently, American Indian scholars are also investigating ways to import the message of critical pedagogy without wholesale adoption of its means. While addressing the impact of racism, sexism, and globalization on American Indian communities, some American Indian intellectuals share underlying principles of *mestizaje* like reflexivity, hybridity, and multiplicity. However, this notion of a transgressive *mestizaje* may ultimately undermine American Indian subjectivity. Recognizing the common ground of struggle is an important first step in working to define the ways that critical pedagogy can inform Indigenous praxis.

The following discussion excerpts work by American Indian and other scholars of color who have taken the next step: to define locally and culturally relevant praxis based on a broader critical foundation. I contend that such work represents the possibility and future of both American Indian intellectualism and critical pedagogy.

Voices from the Margin

As might be expected, Latino, Latino, African American, and feminist riffs on Whiteman critical pedagogy speak more directly to the concerns of American Indian intellectuals. In particular, other scholars of color have recognized that the experience of oppression often requires the assertion of hyperauthenticity, and thus have worked to refine critical theorists' hard line against essentialism. For instance, though Chicano scholar Enrique Muriillo (1997) rejects the notion of essentialism as a means of recalibrating the balance of power, he employs the term *strategic essentialism* to describe the contradictory experience of many scholars of color caught between the different legitimizing forces of the academy and their own communities. There are times, for example, when scholars of color feel compelled to perform a heightened professional or scholarly identity when seeking legitimacy in the academy, and other times when they feel compelled to perform a hyperauthentic or racialized self to gain or retain legitimacy within their own communities. Muriillo's notion of "strategic essentialism" is useful in describing the experience of American Indian intellectuals working to balance the fluidity of the postmodern world with the more stable obligations of their tribal communities. In more concrete terms, this means that, as American Indian scholars work to construct and advocate more complex understandings of American Indian identity, such efforts remain haunted by the knowledge that any failure to continually define and authenticate Indianness in stable and quantifiable terms may result in the loss of everything from school funding to tribal recognition. Within this

context, strategic essentialism refers not only to choosing multiple subjectivities where power is located in the self, but also to negotiating between chosen and imposed identities where power continues to be located in the oppressor.

Similar to Muri s's variation on the notion of strategic essentialism, Delgado Bernal (1998) defines a culturally relevant theory of knowledge that brings discussions of power and identity into the realm of epistemology. She argues for a model of identity-based epistemology and develops the notion of "cultural intuition" to validate the centrality of cultural knowledge in the processes of research and in the development of a culture's intellectual history. Specifically, Delgado Bernal employs the notion of cultural intuition to legitimate her unique viewpoint as a Chicana researcher conducting research within the Chicana community.²¹ Though similar to Anselmi Strauss and Juliet Corbin's concept of "theoretical sensitivity" (1990), Delgado Bernal's paradigm extends the realm of cultural intuition to include collective experience and community memory and to stress the importance of participants' inclusion in the research process, particularly in data analysis. She writes, "While I do not argue for an essentialist notion of who is capable of conducting research with various populations based on personal experiences, I do believe that many Chicana scholars achieve a sense of cultural intuition that is different from other scholars" (p. 567). This insightful articulation of the value and power of cultural intuition brings voice and, more importantly, language to the struggles of Chicano and other scholars of color seeking validation, power, and equity in the domain of academic research. Moreover, the notion of cultural intuition buttresses arguments already made by American Indian scholars on behalf of their own communities; specifically, for the right to speak in their own voices, define their own realities, and develop their own intellectual histories.

Voices from Indian Country

While it is important and beneficial to observe the insights of other critical pedagogies, it is crucial to look to one's own intellectual history and sources of cultural intuition in the development of Indigenous theories and praxis. In this effort, the challenge to American Indian scholars is not merely to "resurrect" these histories and sources of cultural intuition, but to construct meaningful bridges and points of intersection between American Indian intellectualism and Whiteman critical pedagogies.

To this end, while American Indian scholars have, by and large, resisted direct engagement with critical theory, many have begun to theorize their own constructions of Indigenous knowledge and American Indian identity.²² As a collective effort, such work provides increasingly complex views of American Indian history; of the promise and failures of education; of the struggles for language, agency, and sovereignty; and of the need for political and sociocultural coalitions. Their writings strive to achieve interplay between the past, present, and future, and hide the faultline between continuity, resistance, and possibility.

What follows is a sampling of such works, chosen because of their particular relevance to the topic of American Indian identity and identity formation. The selected scholars differ in their methods and approaches, but they share a thematic undercurrent that includes the interplay of coalition, agency, tradition, and identity; the transformation of curriculum and pedagogy; the retention and reinvigoration of Indigenous languages; the intersection of religion and spirituality; and the quest for sovereignty. While each domain

merits extensive discussion, such an effort goes beyond the limits of this work. However, insofar as American Indian "identity" is formulated as an aggregate of the above struggles, they will be discussed interdependently with the understanding that, especially for American Indians, religion/spirituality and sovereignty are inextricably woven into the struggles for identity, education, and language, and vice versa.

The Interplay of Coalition, Agency, and Identity

In the first draft of the final report of the Indian Nations at Risk Task Force, Indigenous scholar and activist Michael Charleston (1994) writes of the importance of coalition and its central role in the development of effective American Indian schools and Indian-centered curricula. Rather than the abstract language of critical pedagogy, however, Charleston invokes the Lakota tradition of the Ghost Dance as a metaphor of the need for healing through community, ceremony, sacrifice, and tradition.²³ He writes:

The new Ghost Dance calls Native and non-Native peoples to join together and take action. It calls us to be responsible for the future of our tribes. It calls us to protect, revive and restore our cultures, our Native languages, our religions and values. It calls us to heal our people, our families, our tribes, and our societies. It calls for harmony and respect among all relations of creation. It offers a future of co-existence of tribal societies with other American societies . . . indeed domination, oppression and bigotry are exactly what we are overcoming in the new Ghost Dance as we seek to establish harmony and coexistence of tribes with other societies in the modern world. (p. 28)

This spirit of coalition reflects the growing desire among American Indians to work together and form alliances with Native and non-Native forces in a mutual quest for American Indian sovereignty and self-determination. Though Charleston's rendition of coalition reflects the spirit of *mestizaje*—that is, the blurring of political, racial, and cultural borders in the service of social justice—he carefully relegates such coalition to the realm of sociopolitical action. In other words, the new Ghost Dance calls to Indian and non-Indian peoples to take collective action against U.S. policies that continue the project of colonization and cultural genocide. It is thus not a call for the embodiment, in critical-theoretical terms, of a transnational, transnational subject that calls into question the very notion of authentic identities (McLaren, 1997), but rather a metaphor for collective political action.

This is not to say that Charleston or other American Indian scholars do not support the notion that identity is constructed through multiple, intersecting, and contradictory elements. Rather, they remain wary of constructionist understandings of identity that, in the process of providing a corrective to static notions of culture, ignore the real possibility of culture loss—that is, the real existing threat of cultural genocide of Indigenous peoples. Hale (2000) is worth quoting at length:

When (cultural) transformation is conflated with loss . . . the collective trauma is obscured and the brute historical fact of ethnicicide is softened. The culprits in this erasure are the Indians' . . . enemies, but even more centrally . . . elites who embraced classic nineteenth century liberalism cast in the idiom of *mestizaje*. A homogeneous and individualized notion of citizenship could not be compatible with the rights of Indian communities whose collective histories and identities stood opposed to the dominant *mestizo* culture. Just beneath the alluring promises to Indians who would accept these individual rights of citizenship was incomprehension, invisibility, and punishing racism for those who would not. (p. 269)

Again, though the contemporary critical project of *mestizaje* is in many ways antithetical to the Latin American one, both projects ignore the "brute historical fact of *ethnocide*" and the invisibility of Indians within the broader democratic project. In contradistinction to the critical notion of *mestizaje*, American Indian scholars seek understandings of identity that not only reflect the multiple and contradictory aspects of contemporary experience, but also maintain a sense of American Indians as historically placed, sovereign peoples. For them, sovereignty is not a political ideology but a way of life (Warrior, 1995). As Charleston (1994) writes, "Our tribes are at a very critical point in our history again. We can stand by and wait for our children and grandchildren to be assimilated into mainstream American society as proud ethnic descendants of extinct tribal peoples. . . . Or, we can protect our tribes, as our ancestors did, and ensure a future for our children and grandchildren as tribal people" (p. 28).

Though it may seem from the above that American Indian intellectuals advocate exclusionary rather than coalitionary tactics, impulses toward isolationism need to be understood in the context of unrelenting threats of cultural appropriation and culture loss. Within this context, it is actually remarkable that American Indian tribal communities remain open and working to define the balance between cultural tradition, cultural shift, and cultural transformation.

Identity Formation and American Indian Tradition(s)

Indigenous scholar Devon Mihesuah (1998) examines the notion of "tradition" in the formation of American Indian identity. Acknowledging that, while traditions are important to maintain, they have always been fluid, she writes:

An Indian who speaks her tribal language and participates in tribal religious ceremonies is often considered traditional, but that term is applicable only within the context of this decade, because changes are she wears jeans, drives a car and watches television—very "untraditional" things to do. Plains Indians who rode horses in the 1860's are considered traditional today, but they were not the same as their traditional ancestors of the early 1500's who had never seen a horse. (p. 30)

While contemporary life requires most Indians to negotiate or "transgress" between a multitude of subject positions (i.e., one who is Navajo may also be Catholic, gay, and live in an off-reservation urban center), such movement remains historically embedded and geographically placed. Moreover, the various and competing subjectivities remain tied through memory, ceremony, ritual, and obligation to a traditional identity type that operates not as a measure of authenticity, but rather of cultural continuity and survival. For example, current understanding of a traditional Navajo (Din ) woman is that she lives in a hogan, speaks her language, participates in ceremonies, maintains a subsistence lifestyle, nurtures strong clan and kinship ties, serves as a vast repository of cultural and tribal history, participates in tribal governance, wears long hair wrapped in traditional cotton cloth, dresses in long skirts and velvet blouses, and dons the silver jewelry of her family to reside as matriarch of the clan. Such individuals, along with their male counterparts, are typically held in high esteem and are granted a great deal of respect and social power. While the Din  recognize this identity as only one among many accepted as "authentically" Din , it forms the essence of their tribal identity, serves as the repository of their ancestral knowledge, and roots them as a historically embedded and geographically placed people.

The struggle for American Indian subjectivity is, in part, a struggle to protect this essence and the right of Indigenous peoples to live in accordance with their traditional ways. In other words, regardless of how any individual American Indian may choose to live his or her life as an Indian person, most experience a deep sense of responsibility and obligation to protect the rights of those choosing to live in the ways of their ancestors. The struggle for identity thus also becomes the struggle to negotiate effectively the line between fetishizing traditional identities and recognizing their importance to the continuation of American Indians as distinctive tribal peoples. Insofar as American Indian traditional identities remain tethered to "traditional" practices (such as ceremony) and such practices remain interconnected with the land, the struggle for identity becomes inextricably linked with political struggles for sovereignty and the ongoing battle against cultural encroachment and capitalist desire to control Native land, resources, traditions, and languages. So, while American Indians join the struggle against the kind of essentialism that recognizes only one way of being, they also work to retain a vast constellation of distinct traditions that serve as the defining characteristics of "traditional" ways of being. As Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle (1983) note, this allegiance to traditional knowledge has protected American Indians from annihilation or its modern counterpart, categoric absorption into the democratic mainstream.

The Transformation of Curriculum and Pedagogy

There is a growing body of work by Indigenous scholars that examines the intersection between the experiences of formal education and tribal culture. Recently, such work has moved away from comparatively simplistic analyses of "learning style" or curriculum content into deeper examination of the interplay between power, difference, opportunity, and institutional structure (see, for example, Deyhle & Swisher, 1997; Haig-Brown & Archibald, 1996; Hermes, 1998; Lipka, 1994; Pewewardy, 1998). Though such work builds upon the efforts of other scholars of color seeking to define culturally relevant pedagogies (Delpit, 1995; Fordham & Ogbu, 1986; Ladson-Billings, 1995; Trueba, 1988; Watahomigie & McCarty, 1994, for example), American Indian scholars rebuff the undercurrent of democratic inclusion and empowerment that undergirds this work, choosing instead to employ sovereignty as the central struggle in defining relevant praxis.²⁴

For example, in her work with Lac Courte Ojibwe (LCO) reservation schools, Indigenous scholar Mary Hermes (1995, 1998) struggles to define a "culturally based curriculum" where both "culture" and "curriculum" are viewed as fluid, "living" constructs that develop in and through relationship. In her own words, Hermes shifts the research question from "What is the role of culture in knowledge acquisition?" to "What is the role of the school as a site of cultural production?" She argues that research focused on the first question often results in essentialized definitions of culture and the subsequent generation of curricular dichotomies distinguishing "academic" curricula from "cultural" curricula. Instead she seeks answers to the more complicated question, "How can we frame our teaching in an Ojibwe epistemology without representing Ojibwe as a static culture?" (Hermes, 2000). Hermes's question represents a paradigm shift, one that decenters the insertion of a static notion of "culture" into "knowledge" and recenters cultural production as an outcome of the schooling process. In practical terms, such a shift means that community interests not only informed but directed her research methods and outcomes. In her work with Ojibwe schools, she implores educators of American Indian students to

recognize culture in the classroom at a deeper level than simply adding content or naming learning styles. She writes:

I am proposing that we begin to view culture as a complex web of relationships, not just material practices, and enact this in our schools in a way that is central to the curriculum. This could mean, for example, directly teaching tribal history, or simply inviting elders and community members into the school, regardless of the historical knowledge they bring. (p. 389)

Although Hermes is clearly committed to defining a liberatory praxis based upon a transformative understanding of Ojibwe identity, a goal reminiscent of critical pedagogies, she remains equally committed to the project of American Indian self-determination and sovereignty. Thus, as she advocates an understanding of identity that reflects the fluidity of mestizaje, she also seeks to define a curriculum that remains grounded in the unfolding relationships of tribalness.

In summary, although the development of culturally relevant pedagogy is an objective shared by many marginalized groups, the goal of such efforts for most non-Indian minorities is to ensure inclusion in the democratic imaginary, while the goal for American Indian scholars and educators is to disrupt and impede absorption into that democracy and continue the struggle to remain distinctive, tribal, and sovereign peoples.

The Retention and Reinvigoration of Indigenous Languages

For many American Indian communities, language retention and renewal efforts signify ground zero in the struggle for American Indian sovereignty. Like other aspects of Indigenous experience, there is no single state or uniform condition of Native languages. Some are vibrant like Quechua, which has over one million speakers, and others, like Passamaquoddy, are threatened with extinction. Although ways of speaking and thinking about language shift and language loss may vary within a single community by age, family, life history, gender, and social role, there is a shared sensibility among American Indian peoples that language is inherently tied to cultural continuity—particularly religious and ceremonial continuity—and therefore remains at the core of American Indian identity formation (Anderson, 1998).

Therefore, while many would eschew the oft-implicit and "essentialistic" construction of language fluency as a marker of cultural authenticity, there is virtual consensus among American Indian peoples that language loss is tantamount to cultural eradication. Language, in other words, is viewed as a carrier of culture and culture as a carrier of language so that shifts in one reverberate in the other. As such, most tribes work hard to maintain their language through a variety of means, including school, ceremony, community, and family. However, as the traditional structures of community and family erode under the pressures of Whiteman encroachment, tribal members increasingly look to schools to serve as sites of American Indian cultural production and reproduction.

In this effort, American Indian educators looking to develop a critical language of American Indian self-determination and intellectual sovereignty are finding that their own Native languages are replete with metaphors of existence that speak to the lived experience of multiplicity, to the sense of interconnection, and to the understanding that American Indians live not only in relationship with each other, but also with the land. In Quechua, for example, the word for being, person, and Andean person is all the same, *Runa*. This

root term has the potential to incorporate the many subcategories of beingness while retaining the same basic reference group, as in *llaqtarina* (inhabitants of the village) and *quallartina* (foreigner; literally, naked, peeled). It can be used passively as in *yuyay runa* (one who is knowing or understanding), actively as in *runayachikk* (that which cultivates a person), or reflexively as in *runaman tukuy* (to complete oneself). Hence, the construct speaks to both the group and the individual and distinguishes in-group from out-group while maintaining the fundamental connection between them. Therefore, it is not a static category or limitation to the sense of Runa as the becoming self (Sklar, 1994). Border crossing and the idea of a shifting identity is, thus, neither new nor revolutionary to this Indigenous community, but rather the way of life of Quechua peoples for over five hundred years.

Conclusion

The work outlined above suggests that while American Indian scholars share many of the same concerns as mainstream critical scholars' development of critical agency, construction of political coalition, and transformation through praxis, they reject the construction of the radical mestizaje and work instead to balance their community's needs to both cross and patrol borders of identity and location. They also retain as the central and common goal the perseverance of American Indians as distinctive and sovereign peoples.

Defining that balance is perhaps the quintessential struggle of American Indian peoples today. It is a deeply complicated and contradictory struggle that reflects the colonialist past and portends an uncertain future. In short, American Indians face an identity paradox. At the same time that pressures to respond to internal crises of identity formation—including racism, sexism, and homophobia—require more fluid constructions of Indianness, pressures to respond to external threats to identity formation—cultural encroachment, ethnic fraud, corporate commodification, and culture loss—require more restrictive constructions of Indianness. Hence, as American Indian intellectuals struggle to awaken Indian communities to the "challenges and cultural politics of (their) own ever-burgeoning multiculturalism" (Vizenor, 1999, p. 3), they must also work to ground the ever-changing present in the historical memories of the past while searching for links to an American Indian future.

Though, as I have demonstrated, there is good reason to remain cautious of the constructs that emerge from dominant Whiteman discourses, there is also much to be learned from engagement with such discourse. As Indigenous scholar Robert Allen Warrior (1995) notes, American Indian intellectuals have remained caught in "a dance of dependence between, on the one hand, abandoning ourselves to the intellectual strategies and categories of white, European thought and, on the other hand, declaring we need nothing outside of ourselves and our cultures in order to understand the world and our place in it" (p. 123). He observes that only when American Indian intellectuals remove themselves from this dichotomy that "much becomes possible" (p. 124).

To this end, I argue that critical scholars need to broaden their own theoretical scopes to consider the different and, at times, competing moral visions of American Indian peoples. Critical engagement with the intellectual histories of Indigenous peoples could only serve to inform discussions of revolutionary theory and praxis. Specifically, such histories call into question the ongoing assumption of conservative and radical ideologies that democracy, as presently constructed in liberal, capitalist terms, presumes the continued

absorption or colonization of Indigenous peoples. American Indian scholars also need to enter the critical dialogue and help reimagine the political terrain surrounding identity. They need to create the intellectual space for the struggle for sovereignty and for their efforts to renegotiate the relationship between sovereign American Indian tribal nations and the current democratic order. The challenge to Indigenous scholars is to define the same kind of balance between cultural integrity and critical resistance in their own quest for American Indian intellectual sovereignty. As Warrior (1995) notes, just "as many of the poets find their work continuous with but not circumscribed by Native traditions of story-telling or ceremonial chanting, we can find the work of (critical studies) continuous with Native traditions of deliberation and decision making. Holding these various factors (sovereignty, tradition, community, process and so on) in tension while attempting to understand the role of critics in an American Indian future is of crucial importance" (p. 118).

Ultimately, I am confident that American Indian and non-Indian critical scholars devoted to the remapping of the political project can together define a common ground of struggle and construct an insurgent but poetic moral vision of liberty, sovereignty, and social justice. It is my hope that this discussion will also serve as the foundation for a new critical theory of Indigenous identity and the development of a new Red Pedagogy.

Notes

1. The term *critical pedagogy* will be used interchangeably with *critical theory* to refer to the diverse body of critical educational theories (i.e., postcolonial, feminist, postmodern, multicultural, and Marxist) that advocate an increasingly sophisticated critique of the social, economic, and political barriers to social justice, as well as crusade for the transformation of schools to reflect the imperatives of democracy. The totality of these theories are viewed by critical scholars as the foundation of liberatory discourse and the political project of liberation. *Project* refers to a collectivity of critique and action or solidarity.
2. For the purposes of this article, American Indian intellectualism is distinguished from purely literary or cultural forms of writing, and refers to intellectual activity that engages in substantive critical analysis from an Indigenous perspective.
3. I use the term *American Indians* to refer to the tribal peoples of North America and *Indigenous peoples* as a more inclusive term to relate to global Indigenous peoples.
4. *Democratic imaginary* refers to the notion that democracy is a never-ending project and continuous pursuit—an imagined concept.
5. The comprehensive literature reviews of Robert Allen Warrior (1995), *Tribal Secrets: Recovering American Indian Intellectual Traditions*, and of Donna Doyle and Karen Swisher (1997), "Research in American Indian and Alaska Native Education: From Assimilation to Self-Determination," provide adequate evidence of the lack of participation of American Indian scholars within the broader field of critical studies.
6. In the critical discourse the notion of transgressive identity takes the postmodern notion of identity as a highly fluid construct with intersections among the perceived stable categories of race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender—a step further by indicating that even within categories there is "transgression" or strategies of resistance that work to destabilize identity. In other words, it is not only that the categories of race, class, gender, and sexuality intersect but also that the categories (e.g., Lesbian, African American, upper class) themselves are highly contested spaces. Moreover, "transgression" is viewed as an inherently subversive and destabilizing construct, where there is constant resistance to any fixed notion of identity.
7. By "dangerous discourse" I mean that American Indian critical studies is viewed in the same spirit that Black feminism was once perceived by Whiteman feminists and African American intellectuals. (Adapting from the feminist notion of "malestream," critical scholar Claude Denis [1997] defines Whiteman as the idea that, while American society is not White in sociodemographic terms, it remains principally and fundamentally structured on the basis of White, Anglo-European experience.)
8. Though Marxist-feminist scholar Teresa Ebert employs the term *Red Pedagogy* to refer to her own work toward revitalizing the Marxist critique in feminist discourse, I use the term as a historical reference to such empowering

metaphors as "Red Power" and the "Great Red Road." Moreover, in the spirit of such venerable Indian scholars and activists as Vine Deloria and Winona LaDuke, I reappropriate the signifier *Red* as a contemporary metaphor of the ongoing political project of Indigenous peoples to retain sovereignty and establish self-determination. I would like to be clear that the terms *spiritual* and *spirituality* in this text do not refer to New Age constructions of some mythic pan-Indian spirituality but rather to the historical presence and persistence within Indigenous belief systems of life forces beyond human rationality.

For example, various race-centric theories and certain forms of feminism. Joe Kinchloe and Shirley Steinberg (1997) state that "left essentialists tend to focus attention on one form of oppression as elemental, as taking precedence over all modes of subjugation. Certain radical feminists view gender as a central form of oppression, certain ethnic study scholars privilege race, while orthodox Marxists focus on class" (p. 22).

Similarly, Cameron McCarthy (1988, 1995), John Ogbu (1978), Chandra Mohanty (1989), and Henry Giroux (1992)—among others—caution against equating hybridity with equality.

The very "protection" typically proffered by citizenship rights (i.e., civil liberties) has often worked to erode traditional structures of tribal life, sometimes pitting Indian against Indian and tribe against tribe. For a more complete discussion of the difference between that which is civic and that which is tribal, see Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle's *The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty*, or Claude Denis's *We Are Not You: First Nations and Canadian Modernity*.

As presently constructed, tribal governments retain many powers of nations, some powers greater than those of states, and some governing powers greater than local non-Indian municipalities (Deloria & Lytle, 1984). In spite of their "sovereign" status, Indian tribes currently rely on the federal government for their operating funds, for the right to interpret and renegotiate their own treaty rights, and for access to the natural resources on their own reservation.

By "colonizing impulse" I mean the inherent perhaps unconscious impulse to include or conscript Indigenous (tribal) people into the "democratic project."

For example, in Maine, with the setting of land claims in the 1970s Carter administration, many people of varying Indian blood quantum "returned" to the reservation since they had a place to call home. The same thing has happened with the Pequot in Connecticut.

Joyce King (1991) defines *dysonomic racism* as an uncritical habit of mind, a form of racism that tacitly accepts white norms and privileges. She contends that such unintended racism does not reflect the absence of consciousness, but rather an impaired or distorted way of thinking about race.

For example, in response to the growing phenomenon of "ethnic fraud," the Association of American Indian and Alaska Native Professors has issued a position statement urging colleges and universities to follow specific guidelines in their considerations of admissions, scholarships, and hiring practices. Those guidelines are as follows: 1) Require documentation of enrollment in a state or federally recognized nation/tribe, with preference given to those who meet this criterion; 2) Establish a case-by-case review process for those unable to meet the first criterion; 3) Include American Indian/Alaska Native faculty in the selection process; 4) Require a statement from the applicant that demonstrates past and future commitment to American Indian/Alaska Native concerns; 5) Require higher education administrators to attend workshops on tribal sovereignty and meet with local tribal officials; and 6) Advertise vacancies at all levels on a broad scale and in tribal publications. Contrary to the backlash that this statement received, the association does not promote "policing," nor do they employ exclusionary tactics within their own organization. Instead relying on self-disclosure.

The Dawes Allotment Act (1887) authorized the president of the United States to allot any reservation according to the following formula: 1) To each head of family, one quarter section; 2) To each single person over 18, one eighth section; 3) To each orphan under eighteen, one eighth section; 4) To each other single person under eighteen, born prior to the date of the order, one sixteenth section (Deloria & Lytle, 1983). In order to allot the land, however, government officials required an efficient method by which to determine who was a "legitimate" member of a given community, which resulted in the beginning of widespread use of tribal rolls and blood-quantum policies.

The term *Indian Identity Police* is used by M. Annette James Guerrero (1996).

Deloria (1984) includes among such scholars James Clifton, Sam Gill, Elisabeth Tooker, Alice Kahoe, Richard deMille, and Stephen Faura.

Dolores Delgado Bernal (1998) identifies four sources of cultural intuition that together provide the epistemological framework for her analysis of Chicana experience: personal experience, knowledge of existing (academic) literature, professional experience, and the analytical research process itself.

See, for example, Elizabeth Cook-Lynn (1998), Michael Charleston (1994, 1998); Vine Deloria (1992, 1998); M. Annette James Guerrero (1996); Mary Hermes (1998); K. Tsianina Lomawaima (1994); Devon Mihesuah (1998); Frances Rains (1998, 1999); Karen Swisher (1998); Gerald Vizenor (1999); Robert Warrior (1995).

The Ghost Dance was started in 1890 by Chief Big Foot and his band of Lakota as a means of declaring that the Creator would prevent the total destruction of Native people, alleviate their suffering, and return the people to pre-war days of happiness.

24. The Freirean notion of praxis is best understood as action and reflection upon the world in order to change it or simply as intentional action.

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