Compare the differences in the US foreign policy to Guatemala between the Bush II and Trump administrations.
Michelle_Michy
R44812.pdf
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America: Policy Issues for Congress
Updated November 12, 2019
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44812
Congressional Research Service
SUMMARY
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress Central America has received renewed attention from U.S. policymakers over the past
few years as the region has remained a major transit corridor for illicit drugs and has
surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular migration to the United States. These
narcotics and migrant flows are the latest symptoms of deep-rooted challenges in several
countries in the region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial
systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. The U.S. government has worked more closely with
partners in Central America to address those challenges since 2014, making some tentative progress. The region is
now at serious risk of backsliding, however, as the Trump Administration has begun to withdraw U.S. diplomatic
pressure and foreign aid while some Central American officials have begun to undermine anti-corruption
campaigns and other structural reforms.
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America The Obama Administration determined it was in the national security interests of the United States to work with Central
American governments to improve conditions in the region. With congressional support, it launched a new U.S. Strategy for
Engagement in Central America and significantly increased aid to the region. The strategy took a more comprehensive
approach than previous U.S. initiatives in Central America, based on the premise that efforts to promote prosperity, improve
security, and strengthen governance are mutually reinforcing and of equal importance. The strategy focused primarily on the
“Northern Triangle” countries of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), which face the greatest
challenges, but it also provided a framework for U.S. engagement with Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama.
Although the Trump Administration initially maintained the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, it has
suspended most aid for the Northern Triangle since March 2019 due to the continued northward flow of migrants and
asylum-seekers from the region. The Administration has withheld some assistance appropriated for the Northern Triangle in
FY2017, reprogrammed nearly all assistance appropriated for the Northern Triangle in FY2018, and has yet to disburse most
of the assistance appropriated for the Northern Triangle in FY2019. This aid suspension has forced U.S. agencies to begin
closing down projects and canceling planned activities. The Trump Administration’s FY2020 budget proposal—released
prior to the aid suspension—requested $445 million for Central America, including at least $180 million for the Northern
Triangle.
Congressional Action Congress has taken an active role in shaping U.S. policy toward Central America. It has appropriated nearly $2.6 billion for
the region over the past four years, including $527.6 million in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6).
Congress also has placed strict conditions on the aid, requiring the Northern Triangle governments to address a range of
concerns—including border security, corruption, and human rights—to receive assistance.
The 116th Congress could play a crucial role in determining the direction of U.S. policy in the region as it responds to the
Administration’s aid suspension. Two authorization bills, H.R. 2615 and S. 1445, would authorize $577 million and $1.5
billion of assistance, respectively, for certain activities in Central America in FY2020. S. 1445 also would prohibit the
Administration from reprograming any assistance appropriated for the Northern Triangle nations since FY2016. A
consolidated appropriations bill, H.R. 2740 (H.Rept. 116-78), passed by the House in June 2019, would appropriate $540.9
million for Central America in FY2020. The FY2020 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
S. 2583 (S.Rept. 116-126), introduced in September 2019, would provide “not less than” $515 million for Central America in
FY2020. Both appropriations bills also would strengthen the funding directives for aid appropriated for Central America in
FY2019. Since Congress has yet to enact either measure, a continuing resolution (P.L. 116-59) is currently funding foreign
assistance programs at the FY2019 level until November 21, 2019.
R44812
November 12, 2019
Peter J. Meyer Specialist in Latin American Affairs
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America .......................................................................... 3
Background and Formulation .................................................................................................... 3 Three Lines of Action ................................................................................................................ 6
Promoting Prosperity and Regional Integration .................................................................. 6 Strengthening Governance .................................................................................................. 8 Improving Security ........................................................................................................... 10
Congressional Funding ............................................................................................................ 12 Conditions on Assistance ........................................................................................................ 14 Relationship to the Alliance for Prosperity ............................................................................. 16 Preliminary Results ................................................................................................................. 18
Policy Issues for Congress............................................................................................................. 19
Suspension of U.S. Assistance to the Northern Triangle ......................................................... 20 Political Will in Central America ............................................................................................ 23 Aid Conditionality ................................................................................................................... 25 Implications of Other U.S. Policy Changes ............................................................................ 27
Immigration ...................................................................................................................... 27 Trade ................................................................................................................................. 29 Drug Control ..................................................................................................................... 30
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 31
Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Apprehensions of Northern Triangle Nationals at the Southwest Border:
FY2012-FY2019 .......................................................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. Map of Central America ................................................................................................... 3
Figure 3. Central America Strategy Objectives and Lines of Action .............................................. 6
Figure 4. Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America by Foreign
Assistance Account: FY2016-FY2019 ....................................................................................... 14
Figure 5. U.S. Assistance to Central America: FY1946-FY2017 .................................................. 24
Figure 6. Remittances to Central America: 2018 .......................................................................... 28
Figure 7. Central American Exports to the United States: 2018.................................................... 29
Tables
Table 1. Central America Background Information ........................................................................ 4
Table 2. Central America Socioeconomic Indicators ...................................................................... 7
Table 3. Central America Democracy and Governance Indicators .................................................. 9
Table 4. Central America Security Indicators ................................................................................. 11
Table 5. Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America by Country:
FY2016-FY2020 ........................................................................................................................ 13
Table 6. Alliance for Prosperity Funding by Country: 2016-2019 ................................................ 17
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service
Table A-1. FY2016 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America .............. 33
Table A-2. FY2017 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America .............. 34
Table A-3. FY2018 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America .............. 35
Table A-4. FY2019 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America .............. 36
Table A-5. FY2020 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America .............. 36
Appendixes
Appendix. Appropriations for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America by
Country and Foreign Assistance Account: FY2016-FY2020 ..................................................... 33
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 37
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 1
Introduction Instability in Central America—particularly the “Northern Triangle” nations of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras—is one of the most pressing challenges for U.S. policy in the Western
Hemisphere. These countries are struggling with widespread insecurity, fragile political and
judicial systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. The inability of the Northern
Triangle governments to address those challenges effectively has had far-reaching implications
for the United States. Transnational criminal organizations have taken advantage of the situation,
utilizing the region to traffic approximately 90% of cocaine destined for the United States, among
other illicit activities. 1 The region has also become a significant source of mixed migration flows
of asylum-seekers and economic migrants to the United States. 2 In FY2019, U.S. authorities
apprehended nearly 608,000 unauthorized migrants from the Northern Triangle at the southwest
border; 81% of those apprehended were families or unaccompanied minors, many of whom were
seeking asylum (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. U.S. Apprehensions of Northern Triangle Nationals at the Southwest
Border: FY2012-FY2019
Sources: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide
Apprehensions by Citizenship and Sector in FY2007-FY2018;” and “U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border
Apprehensions by Sector Fiscal Year 2019,” press release, October 29, 2019.
Notes: Unaccompanied children = children under 18 years old without a parent or legal guardian at the time of
apprehension. Family units = total number of individuals (children under 18 years old, parents, or legal guardians)
apprehended with a family member.
1 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2017 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2017. The State Department did not
include updated estimates in its 2018 or 2019 reports.
2 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, by
Peter J. Meyer and Maureen Taft-Morales.
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 2
The Obama Administration determined that it was “in the national security interests of the United
States” to work with Central American governments to improve security, strengthen governance,
and promote economic prosperity in the region. 3 Accordingly, the Obama Administration
launched a new, whole-of-government U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and
requested significant increases in foreign assistance to implement the strategy, primarily through
the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Congress has
appropriated nearly $2.6 billion in aid for the region since FY2016 but has required the Northern
Triangle governments to address a series of concerns prior to receiving U.S. support.
The Trump Administration initially maintained the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America while adjusting the initiative to place more emphasis on preventing illegal immigration,
combating transnational crime, and generating export and investment opportunities for U.S.
businesses. 4 The Administration also sought to scale back U.S. assistance to Central America.
Congress has rejected some of the Administration’s proposed reductions, but annual
appropriations for the region have declined by nearly 30% since FY2016 (see Table 5, below).
The future of the Central America strategy is now in question, however, as the Trump
Administration has suspended most U.S. foreign assistance programs in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras since March 2019. The suspension came after more than a year of threats from
President Trump to cut off assistance to the Northern Triangle due to the continued northward
flow of migrants and asylum-seekers from the region. Some Members of Congress have objected
to the Administration’s policy shift and have introduced legislation that would restrict the
Administration’s ability to transfer funds away from the region. The decisions made by the 116 th
Congress could play a crucial role in determining the direction of U.S. policy toward Central
America in the coming years.
This report examines the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, including its
formulation, objectives, funding, and relationship to the Alliance for Prosperity initiative put
forward by the Northern Triangle governments. The report also analyzes the preliminary results
of the strategy and several policy issues that the 116 th Congress may assess as it considers the
future of U.S. policy in Central America. These issues include the potential effects of suspending
U.S. assistance to the Northern Triangle; the extent to which Central American governments are
addressing their domestic challenges; the utility of conditions placed on assistance; and how
changes in U.S. immigration, trade, and drug control policies could affect the region.
3 White House, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, March 16, 2015, at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/central_america_strategy.pdf.
4 U.S. Department of State, Report to Update the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, August 8, 2017, at
https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00N7FB.pdf.
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 3
Figure 2. Map of Central America
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Graphics.
Note: The “Northern Triangle” countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) are pictured in orange.
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
Background and Formulation
Central America is a diverse region that includes the Northern Triangle nations of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, which are facing acute economic, governance, and security
challenges; the former British colony of Belize, which is stable politically but faces a difficult
economic and security situation; Nicaragua, which has comparatively low levels of crime but a de
facto single-party government and high levels of poverty; and Costa Rica and Panama, which
have comparatively prosperous economies and strong institutions but face growing security
challenges (see Table 1). 5 Given the geographic proximity of the region (see Figure 2), the
5 For more information, see CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS Report R42580,
Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. Relations; CRS Report RL34027, Honduras:
Background and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF10908, Costa Rica: An Overview; and CRS In Focus IF10430,
Panama: An Overview.
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United States has historically maintained close ties to Central America and played a prominent
role in the region’s political and economic development. It has also provided assistance to Central
American nations designed to counter perceived threats to the United States, ranging from Soviet
influence during the Cold War to illicit narcotics and irregular migration today.
Table 1. Central America Background Information
People Geography Economy Leadership
Population
(2018 est.)
Land Area
(sq. km.)
Gross Domestic
Product
(GDP, 2018 est.)
Head of Government
Belize 0.4 million 22,806 $1.9 billion Prime Minister Dean Barrow
Costa Rica 5.0 million 51,060 $60.5 billion President Carlos Alvarado
El Salvador 6.4 million 20,721 $26.1 billion President Nayib Bukele
Guatemala 16.8 million 107,159 $78.5 billion President Jimmy Morales
Honduras 9.2 million 111,890 $23.8 billion President Juan Orlando
Hernández
Nicaragua 6.3 million 119,990 $13.1 billion President Daniel Ortega
Panama 4.1 million 74,340 $65.1 billion President Laurentino Cortizo
Sources: Population estimates from U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018, March 2019; land area data from Central
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2019; GDP estimates from International Monetary Fund (IMF), World
Economic Outlook Database October 2019, October 11, 2019.
Note: President-elect Alejandro Giammattei of Guatemala is scheduled to take office on January 14, 2020.
The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America is the latest in a series of U.S. efforts over
the past 20 years designed to produce sustained improvements in living conditions in the region.
During the Administration of President George W. Bush, U.S. policy toward Central America
primarily focused on boosting economic growth through increased trade. The George W. Bush
Administration negotiated the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and the U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement. 6 It also awarded
Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador $851 million of Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) aid intended to improve productivity and connect individuals to markets. 7
U.S. policy toward Central America shifted significantly near the end of the George W. Bush
Administration to address escalating levels of crime and violence in the region. The George W.
Bush Administration launched a security assistance package for Mexico and Central America
known as the Mérida Initiative in FY2008, and the Obama Administration rebranded the Central
America portion of the aid package as the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)
in FY2010. Congress appropriated nearly $1.2 billion in aid between FY2008 and FY2015 to
6 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10394, Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by M. Angeles Villarreal.
7 Honduras received a five-year, $215 million compact in June 2005; it was later reduced to $205 million as a result of
a 2009 coup. Nicaragua received a five-year, $175 million compact in July 2005; it was later reduced to $113.5 million
as a result of disputed 2008 municipal elections. El Salvador received a $461 million compact in November 2006; the
Obama Administration awarded the country a second five-year compact, worth $277 million, in September 2013. For
more information on the Millennium Challenge Corporation, see CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge
Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown.
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provide Central American partners with equipment, training, and technical assistance to improve
narcotics interdiction and disrupt criminal networks; strengthen the capacities of Central
American law enforcement and justice sector institutions; and support community-based crime
and violence prevention efforts in the region. 8
By the beginning of President Obama’s second term, the Administration had concluded that
although the resources provided through MCC, CARSI, and other U.S. initiatives had
“contributed to localized gains and proof-of-concept policy examples,” they had “not yielded
sustained, broad-based improvements” in Central America. 9 As a result, the Obama
Administration had already begun to develop a new strategy for U.S. policy in Central America
when an unexpected surge of unaccompanied minors and families from the Northern Triangle
began to arrive at the U.S. border in 2014. The new strategy was approved by the National
Security Council in August 2014 and became technically binding on all U.S. agencies in
September 2014. 10
Congress directed the Trump Administration to review and revise the strategy,
but the updated version, released in August 2017, maintains the objectives and sub-objectives that
the Obama Administration approved in 2014. 11
The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America is intended to take a broader, more
comprehensive approach than previous U.S. initiatives in the region. Its stated objective is “the
evolution of an economically integrated Central America that is fully democratic; provides
economic opportunities to its people; enjoys more accountable, transparent, and effective
institutions; and ensures a safe environment for its citizens.” 12
Whereas other U.S. efforts over the
past 20 years generally emphasized a single objective, such as economic growth or crime
reduction, the current strategy is based on the premise that prosperity, security, and governance
are “mutually reinforcing and of equal importance.” 13
The current strategy also prioritizes interagency coordination more than previous initiatives.
Many analysts criticized CARSI as a collection of “stove-piped” programs, with each U.S.
agency implementing its own activities and pursuing its own objectives, which sometimes
conflicted with those of other agencies, international donors, or regional partners. 14
The U.S.
Strategy for Engagement is a whole-of-government effort that provides an overarching
framework for all U.S. government interactions in Central America. While U.S. agencies continue
to carry out a wide range of programs, the strategy is intended to ensure their efforts—and the
messages they deliver to partners in the region—are coordinated. The strategy also seeks to
combine U.S. resources with those of other donors and ensure that Central American
governments are committed to carrying out complementary reforms.
8 For background information on the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), see CRS Report R41731,
Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare
Ribando Seelke.
9 White House, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, March 16, 2015.
10 CRS interview with State Department official, October 2016.
11 U.S. Department of State, Report to Update the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, August 8, 2017.
12 Ibid.
13 White House, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, March 16, 2015.
14 See, for example, Eric L. Olson et al., Crime and Violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policy
Responses Are Helping, Hurting, and Can Be Improved, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Reports
on the Americas #34, December 2014.
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Three Lines of Action
To achieve its objectives, the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America supports activities
grouped under three overarching lines of action:
1. promoting prosperity and regional integration,
2. strengthening governance, and
3. improving security (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Central America Strategy Objectives and Lines of Action
Source: U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America—Results Architecture,”
September 7, 2016. Adapted by CRS Graphics.
Promoting Prosperity and Regional Integration
With the exceptions of Costa Rica and Panama, the countries of Central America are among the
poorest in the Western Hemisphere. Land ownership and economic power have historically been
concentrated in the hands of a small group of elites, leaving behind a legacy of extreme inequality
that has been exacerbated by gender discrimination and the social exclusion of ethnic minorities.
Although the adoption of market-oriented economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s produced
greater macroeconomic stability and facilitated the diversification of Central America’s once
predominantly agricultural economies, the economic gains have not translated into improved
living conditions for many of the region’s residents. Central America is the midst of a
demographic shift in which the working age population, as a proportion of the total population,
has grown significantly and is expected to continue growing in the coming decades. Although this
presents a window of opportunity to boost economic growth, the region is failing to generate
sufficient employment to absorb the growing labor supply (see Table 2).
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Table 2. Central America Socioeconomic Indicators
Per Capita
Income
Poverty Economic
Growth Rate
Youth
Disconnection
GDP per Capita
(2018 est.)
% of Population
Living in Poverty
(2017 est.)a
Annual % Growth
in GDP
(2018 est.)
% of Youth Aged
15-24 not in
Employment,
Education, or
Training (2018
est.)
Belize $4,862 Not available 3.0 27.3
Costa Rica $12,039 15.1 2.6 19.4
El Salvador $3,922 37.8 2.5 27.2
Guatemala $4,545 50.5a 3.1 26.6
Honduras $2,524 53.2a 3.7 27.8
Nicaragua $2,031 46.3a -3.8 13.2
Panama $15,643 16.7 3.7 16.0
Sources: Per capita income and economic growth data from the IMF, World Economic Outlook Database October
2019, October 11, 2019; poverty data from ECLAC, CEPALSTAT Database, accessed November 2019; youth
disconnection data from the International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT, accessed November 2019.
a. ECLAC considers a household below the poverty line if it is unable to satisfy the basic needs of its members. Data from 2016 for Honduras and 2014 for Guatemala and Nicaragua.
The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America seeks to address these challenges through a
variety of actions designed to promote prosperity and regional integration. The strategy aims to
facilitate increased trade by helping the region take advantage of the opportunities provided by
CAFTA-DR and other trade agreements. For example, USAID has sought to strengthen the
capacities of regional organizations, including the Central America Integration System, 15
to
analyze, formulate, and implement regional trade policies. 16
Likewise, the Department of
Commerce has provided training and technical assistance intended to improve customs and
border management and facilitate trade. 17
The strategy also seeks to diversify and connect electric grids in Central America to bring down
the region’s high electricity costs, which are a drag on economic growth. For example, the State
Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources has sought to strengthen the Central American power
market and regional transmission system and enhance sustainable energy financing mechanisms
to increase energy trade and attract investment in energy infrastructure. 18
Similarly, USAID has
worked with regional governments to develop uniform procurement processes and transmission
rights as well as regulations to facilitate investment in renewable power generation projects. 19
15 The Central American Integration System is an international organization created in 1991 by the nations of Central
America to foster regional integration. Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and
the Dominican Republic are member states of the organization.
16 USAID, “Program Narrative: Central America Regional,” CN #151, July 20, 2018, pp. 3-4.
17 Department of State, “Congressional Notification 17-058—State Western Hemisphere Regional: Central America
Strategy Interagency Solicitation Process,” April 4, 2017.
18 Ibid.
19 USAID, “Regional Program Narrative: Central America Regional,” CN #14, October 14, 2016, p. 4.
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Other activities carried out under the Central America strategy aim to reduce poverty in the region
and to help those living below the poverty line meet their basic needs. In Honduras, for example,
USAID has supported a multifaceted food security program designed to reduce extreme poverty
and chronic malnutrition by helping subsistence farmers diversify their crops and increase
household incomes. The program introduced farmers to new crops, technologies, and sanitary
processes intended to increase agricultural productivity, improve farming practices and natural
resource management, and boost exports. 20
Facilitating access to quality education is another way in which the strategy seeks to promote
prosperity in Central America. For example, USAID has funded basic education programs in
Nicaragua, including efforts to improve teacher training and student reading performance. 21
In El
Salvador, USAID has sought to develop partnerships between academia and the private sector
and to better link tertiary education with labor-market needs. Among other activities, USAID has
supported career centers, internship programs, and academic programs in key economic sectors. 22
Finally, the Central America strategy seeks to build resiliency to external shocks, such as the
drought and coffee fungus outbreak that have devastated rural communities in recent years. For
instance, USAID has worked with communities in the Western Highlands of Guatemala to reduce
the region’s vulnerability to climate change. USAID has supported efforts to increase access to
climate information to inform community decisions, strengthen government capacity to address
climate risks, and disseminate agricultural practices that are resilient to climate impacts. 23
Strengthening Governance
A legacy of conflict and authoritarian rule has inhibited the development of strong democratic
institutions in most of Central America. The countries of the region, with the exception of Costa
Rica and Belize, did not establish their current civilian democratic regimes until the 1980s and
1990s, after decades of political repression and protracted civil conflicts. 24
Although every
Central American country now holds regular elections, several have been controversial, and other
elements of democracy, such as the separation of powers, remain only partially institutionalized.
Moreover, failures to reform and dedicate sufficient resources to the public sector have left many
Central American governments weak and susceptible to corruption. As governments in the region
have become embroiled in scandals and have struggled to address citizens’ concerns effectively,
popular support for democracy has declined (see Table 3).
The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America seeks to strengthen governance in the
region in a variety of ways. It calls for the professionalization of Central American civil services
to improve the technical competence of government employees, depoliticize government
institutions, and ensure continuity across administrations. In El Salvador, for example, USAID
has supported civil society efforts to advocate for civil service reforms and the implementation of
merit-based systems. 25
20 USAID, “Country Narrative: Honduras,” CN #97, April 10, 2018, pp. 5-6.
21 USAID, “Country Narrative: Nicaragua,” April 10, 2018, pp. 2-3.
22 USAID, “Country Narrative: El Salvador,” CN #96, April 10, 2018, pp. 5-6.
23 USAID, “USAID/Guatemala Country Fact Sheet,” July 2018, p. 12.
24 Costa Rica has maintained civilian democratic rule since the end of a 1948 civil war. Belize, which obtained its
independence from the United Kingdom in 1981, had a much different historical trajectory than its neighbors.
25 USAID, “Country Narrative: El Salvador,” CN #96, April 10, 2018, p. 3.
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Table 3. Central America Democracy and Governance Indicators
Political Rights
and Civil Liberties
Government
Effectiveness
Public-Sector
Corruption
Satisfaction with
Democracy
Freedom House
Score and
Classification;
0-100, Least Free
to Most Free
(2018)
Percentile Rank
Globally; 0-100,
Least Effective to
Most Effective
(2017)
Perceptions;
0-100, Highly
Corrupt to Very
Clean (2018)
% of Population
Satisfied with
How Democracy
Works in Their
Country (2018/19)
Belize 86, Free 30 Not available Not available
Costa Rica 91, Free 68 56 46
El Salvador 67, Free 37 35 37
Guatemala 53, Partly Free 24 27 41
Honduras 46, Partly Free 28 29 36
Nicaragua 32, Not Free 19 25 46
Panama 84, Free 52 37 26
Sources: Political rights and civil liberties data from Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019, February 4,
2019; government effectiveness data from World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, accessed November
2019; corruption data from Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, January 29, 2019;
democracy satisfaction data from Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, Pulse of Democracy in the Americas:
Results from the 2019 AmericasBarometer Study, Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project,
October 15, 2019.
The strategy also seeks to improve Central American governments’ capacities to raise revenues
while ensuring public resources are managed responsibly. For example, the Department of the
Treasury has provided technical assistance to Guatemala’s Ministry of Finance intended to
improve treasury management operations and develop an investment policy to ensure financial
resources are used efficiently and transparently. 26
At the same time, USAID has trained
Guatemalan civil society organizations about transparency laws to strengthen the organizations’
capacities to hold the government accountable. 27
Other activities are designed to ensure governments in the region uphold democratic values and
practices, including respect for human rights. For example, USAID has supported independent
media as well as civil society organizations working to promote and defend democracy in
Nicaragua. 28
The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)
works throughout the region to support human rights defenders and civil society organizations
that face threats and attacks as a result of their work. DRL assistance seeks to help individuals
avoid or mitigate threats, withstand attacks, and continue advocacy efforts domestically and
internationally. 29
26 Department of State, “Congressional Notification 17-084—State Western Hemisphere Regional: Central America
Strategy Interagency Solicitation Process,” May 16, 2017.
27 USAID, “Country Narrative: Guatemala,” CN #152, July 20, 2018, p. 4.
28 “Nicaragua’s Ortega Ejects IACHR Missions,” Latin News Daily, December 20, 2018; and USAID, “Country
Narrative: Nicaragua,” April 10, 2018, pp. 1-2.
29 Department of State, “Congressional Notification 17-058—State Western Hemisphere Regional: Central America
Strategy Interagency Solicitation Process,” April 4, 2017.
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Finally, the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America seeks to improve governance in the
region by advancing justice sector reforms designed to decrease impunity. The State
Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has provided
training and technical assistance to prosecutors, judges, and other justice sector actors on issues
such as case management and justice sector administration. INL has also provided specialized
training and equipment designed to strengthen forensic capabilities, internal affairs offices, and
investigative skills in the region. Moreover, INL has partially funded the operations of
international anti-corruption commissions that assist local prosecutors in the investigation and
prosecution of complex corruption cases. 30
Improving Security
Violence has long plagued Central America, and Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
continue to have some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Common crime is also
widespread. A number of interrelated factors have contributed to the poor security situation,
including high levels of poverty, fragmented families, and a lack of legitimate employment
opportunities, which leave many youth in the region susceptible to recruitment by gangs or other
criminal organizations. In addition, the region serves as an important drug-trafficking corridor
due to its location between cocaine-producing countries in South America and consumers in the
United States. Heavily armed and well-financed transnational criminal organizations have sought
to secure trafficking routes through Central America by battling one another and local affiliates
and seeking to intimidate and infiltrate government institutions. Security forces and other justice
sector institutions in the region generally lack the personnel, equipment, and training necessary to
respond to these threats and have struggled with systemic corruption. As a result, most crimes are
committed with impunity (see Table 4).
The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America aims to improve security in the region in a
number of ways, including through the professionalization of civilian police forces. For example,
INL has engaged in a variety of activities designed to improve the quality and strengthen the
capacity of the Honduran National Police. Among other activities, INL has supported efforts to
vet police officers, improve police academy curricula and training, and enhance police
engagement with civil society. 31
U.S. assistance has also funded regional efforts to employ
intelligence-led policing, such as the expansion of the comparative statistics (COMPSTAT)
model, which allows real-time mapping and analysis of criminal activity. 32
The strategy also expands crime and violence prevention efforts. USAID and INL have adopted a
“place-based” approach that integrates their respective prevention and law enforcement
interventions in the most violent Central American communities. USAID interventions have
included primary prevention programs that work with communities to create safe spaces for
families and young people, secondary prevention programs that identify the youth most at risk of
engaging in violent behavior and provide them and their families with behavior-change
counseling, and tertiary prevention programs that seek to reintegrate juvenile offenders into
30 See, for examples, U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 18-117—State Western Hemisphere
Regional: Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), Honduras,” May 16, 2018; and “Congressional
Notification 18-079—State Western Hemisphere Regional: Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI),
Guatemala,” April 23, 2018.
31 U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 18-117—State Western Hemisphere Regional: Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), Honduras,” May 16, 2018, pp. 4-5.
32 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2018 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2018.
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society. 33
INL has funded primary prevention programs intended to reduce gang affiliation and
increase job prospects for inmates who are eligible for early release. It also has supported the
development of “model police precincts,” which are designed to build local confidence in law
enforcement by converting police forces into community-based, service-oriented organizations. 34
Table 4. Central America Security Indicators
Homicide Rate Crime Victimization Rule of Law
Murders per 100,000
Residents (2018)
% of Population
Reporting They Were
the Victim of a Crime
in the Past Year
(2018/19)
Percentile Rank
Globally; 0-100,
Weakest to Strongest
(2018)
Belize 36 Not available 20
Costa Rica 12 22 69
El Salvador 51 21 20
Guatemala 22 20 13
Honduras 41 19 16
Nicaragua Not available 18 15
Panama 10 22 52
Sources: Homicide rates from Chris Dalby and Camilo Carranza “Insight Crime’s 2018 Homicide Round-Up,”
Insight Crime, January 22, 2019; and Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, Observatorio de la Violencia,
Boletín Enero a Diciembre 2018, no. 52, March 2019; crime victimization data from Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and
Noam Lupu, Pulse of Democracy in the Americas: Results from the 2019 AmericasBarometer Study, Vanderbilt
University, Latin American Public Opinion Project, October 15, 2019.
Note: The homicide rate is not available for Nicaragua, where government repression led to more than 300
deaths in 2018 according to human rights organizations. In 2017, Nicaragua registered 431 total murders and a
homicide rate of 7 per 100,000.
The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America also continues long-standing U.S.
assistance designed to professionalize regional armed forces. The strategy aims to encourage
Central American militaries to transition out of internal law enforcement roles, strengthen
regional defense cooperation, and enhance respect for human rights and civilian control of the
military. 35
U.S. support for regional militaries also aims to increase their capabilities and
strengthen military-to-military relationships. Central American armed forces personnel have
received training on topics such as intelligence, defense acquisition, and search and rescue
planning at military institutions in the United States. 36
In addition, the strategy seeks to reduce the influence of organized crime and gangs. Some U.S.
assistance is designed to extend the reach of the region’s security forces. For example, the U.S.
government has helped Panama’s national border service deploy tactical mobility vehicles and
33 USAID, “Congressional Notification: Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI),” CN #134, June 22,
2018.
34 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 18-101—State Western Hemisphere
Regional: Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), El Salvador,” May 9, 2019, p. 4.
35 U.S. Department of State, Report to Update the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, August 8, 2017.
36 U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 18-163,” June 26, 2018.
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sustain fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to protect its maritime and land borders. 37
INL has used
other U.S. assistance to maintain specialized law enforcement units that are vetted by, and work
with, U.S. personnel to investigate and disrupt the operations of transnational gangs and
organized crime networks. 38
Congressional Funding
Congress has appropriated nearly $2.6 billion for efforts under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement
in Central America. This figure includes $750 million in FY2016, $684.8 million in FY2017, an
estimated $614.5 million in FY2018, and an estimated $527.6 million in FY2019 (see Table 5
and the Appendix). 39
The State Department and USAID have allocated the vast majority of the
aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, including at least 76% of the funding appropriated
in FY2016 and FY2017. 40
Some of the aid Congress appropriated will never be delivered to the
region, however, since the Trump Administration reprogramed more than $400 million of
FY2018 assistance for the Northern Triangle to other countries around the world (see
“Suspension of U.S. Assistance to the Northern Triangle,” below).
Prior to the aid suspension, the Trump Administration requested $445 million to continue
implementing the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America in FY2020. If enacted, aid to
the region would decline by 16% compared to the FY2019 estimate. Nevertheless, assistance
would remain above the pre-strategy average of $376 million between FY2010 and FY2014. 41
The Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, Defense, State, Foreign Operations, and
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2020 (H.R. 2740, H.Rept. 116-78), passed
by the House in June 2019, would appropriate “not less than” $540.85 million for Central
America. The FY2020 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, S.
2583 (S.Rept. 116-126), introduced in September 2019, would provide “not less than” $515
million for Central America in FY2020. Since Congress has yet to enact either measure, a
continuing resolution (P.L. 116-59) is currently funding foreign assistance programs at the
FY2019 level until November 21, 2019.
To date, Congress has appropriated all funds for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America to the State Department and USAID, with the exception of $2 million appropriated to
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in FY2016 and two $10 million transfers designated
for the Inter-American Foundation in FY2018 and FY2019. Nevertheless, many other U.S.
agencies are carrying out programs intended to advance the objectives of the strategy using their
own resources and/or funds transferred from the State Department and USAID. The other
agencies involved include the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.
37 U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 18-295,” September 11, 2018.
38 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 18-101—State Western Hemisphere
Regional: Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), El Salvador,” May 9, 2018.
39 Previous versions of this report included slightly larger appropriations figures due to the inclusion of humanitarian
food assistance (P.L. 480 Title II) for Guatemala.
40 CRS analysis of State Department and USAID Congressional Notifications for FY2016 and FY2017; and U.S.
Department of State, “Estimated FY 2017 and 2018 Levels for Northern Triangle Assistance,” document provided to
Congress, June 2019.
41 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2012-FY2016.
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Table 5. Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
by Country: FY2016-FY2020
(appropriations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2016 FY2017
FY2018
(estimate)a
FY2019
(estimate)b
FY2020
(request)
% Change
2018-2020
Belize 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.0b 0.2 -83%
Costa Rica 1.8 5.7 5.7 8.2c 0.4 -93%
El Salvador 67.9 72.8 57.7a 0.0b 45.7 -21%
Guatemala 127.5 125.5 108.5a 13.0b 69.4 -36%
Honduras 98.3 95.3 79.7a 0.0b 65.8 -18%
Nicaragua 10.0 9.7 10.0 0.0b 6.0 -40%
Panama 3.3 3.3 3.1 0.5b 1.2 -61%
CARSI 348.5 329.2 319.2a 290.0c 250.3 -22%
Other Regional
Assistance
91.4 42.1 29.5a 215.9b 6.0 -80%
Total 750.0 684.8 614.5 527.6 445.0 -28%
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2020,
available at https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and H.Rept. 116-9.
Notes: CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative. “Other Regional Assistance” includes assistance
appropriated or requested for the entire Central American region through funding accounts such as the State
Department’s Western Hemisphere Regional program, USAID’s Central America Regional program, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Inter-American Foundation. The State Department does not
consider health assistance provided through USAID’s Central America Regional program to be part of the
strategy.
a. The Trump Administration reprogrammed approximately $400 million of bilateral and regional aid that it had previously allocated to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Revised allocations are not yet available.
b. For FY2019, Congress appropriated most assistance for Central America as regional aid, giving the State Department flexibility in allocating the resources among the seven nations of the isthmus. Country-by-
country allocations are not yet available.
c. H.Rept. 116-9 stipulates that $32.5 million of CARSI assistance is to be allocated to Costa Rica.
Although many of the activities supported by the Central America strategy are not new, higher
levels of assistance have allowed the U.S. government to significantly scale up programs focused
on prosperity and governance and expand ongoing security efforts. For FY2016-FY2019,
Congress allocated funding for the Central America strategy in the following manner:
40% was appropriated through the Development Assistance account, which is designed to foster sustainable, broad-based economic progress and social stability
by supporting long-term projects in areas such as democracy promotion,
economic reform, agriculture, education, and environmental protection.
33% was appropriated through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, with the funds roughly evenly divided between programs
to support law enforcement and programs designed to strengthen other justice
sector institutions.
20% was appropriated through the Economic Support Fund account, which funds USAID crime and violence prevention programs as well as efforts to promote
economic reform and other more traditional development projects.
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5% was appropriated through the Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training accounts, which provide equipment and
personnel training to regional militaries (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America by
Foreign Assistance Account: FY2016-FY2019
Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for
Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2020, available at https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-
affairs-budgets/; and H.Rept. 116-9.
Notes: “Other” includes funding appropriated through the Global Health Programs account (2%); the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (0.1%); and the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related
programs account (0.1%).
Conditions on Assistance
Congress has placed strict conditions on assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in
each of the foreign aid appropriations measures enacted since FY2016 in an attempt to bolster
political will in the region and improve the effectiveness of U.S. programs. For example, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) stipulated that 25% of the “assistance for
the central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras” could not be obligated until
the Secretary of State certified that each government was
informing its citizens of the dangers of the journey to the southwest border of the United States;
combating human smuggling and trafficking;
improving border security, including preventing illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking, and trafficking of illicit drugs and other contraband;
and
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cooperating with U.S. government agencies and other governments in the region to facilitate the return, repatriation, and reintegration of illegal migrants arriving
at the southwest border of the United States who do not qualify for asylum,
consistent with international law.
The State Department certified that all three countries met those conditions in FY2016, FY2017,
and FY2018, issuing the most recent certifications in August 2018. 42
The act also stipulated that another 50% of the “assistance for the central governments of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras” could not be obligated until the Secretary of State certified
the each government was
working cooperatively with an autonomous, publicly accountable entity to provide oversight of the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern
Triangle in Central America; 43
combating corruption, including investigating and prosecuting current and former government officials credibly alleged to be corrupt;
implementing reforms, policies, and programs to improve transparency and strengthen public institutions, including increasing the capacity and
independence of the judiciary and the Office of the Attorney General;
implementing a policy to ensure that local communities, civil society organizations (including indigenous and other marginalized groups), and local
governments are consulted in the design, and participate in the implementation
and evaluation of, activities of the [Alliance for Prosperity] that affect such
communities, organizations, and governments;
countering the activities of criminal gangs, drug traffickers, and organized crime;
investigating and prosecuting in the civilian justice system government personnel, including military and police personnel, who are credibly alleged to
have violated human rights, and ensuring that such personnel are cooperating in
such cases;
cooperating with commissions against corruption and impunity and with regional human rights entities;
supporting programs to reduce poverty, expand education and vocational training for at-risk youth, create jobs, and promote equitable economic growth,
particularly in areas contributing to large numbers of migrants;
implementing a plan that includes goals, benchmarks, and timelines to create a professional, accountable civilian police force and end the role of the military in
internal policing, and make such plan available to the Department of State;
protecting the right of political opposition parties, journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders, and other civil society activists to operate without
interference;
increasing government revenues, including by implementing tax reforms and strengthening customs agencies; and
42 U.S. Department of State, Certification Pursuant to Section 7045(a)(3)(A) of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018 (Div. K, P.L. 115-141), August 11, 2018.
43 The Alliance for Prosperity is a complementary initiative developed by the Northern Triangle governments. For more
information, see “Relationship to the Alliance for Prosperity,” below.
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resolving commercial disputes, including the confiscation of real property, between United States entities and such government.
The State Department issued certifications related to those conditions for all three countries in
FY2016 and FY2017. It did not issue certifications for any of the countries for FY2018.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) maintained all 16 of those conditions,
with some slight variations in wording. However, it consolidated the two separate certification
requirements attached to 75% of assistance for the central governments into a single certification
requirement attached to 50% of assistance for the central governments. 44
The State Department
has not issued any certifications for FY2019.
For FY2020, H.R. 2740 (H.Rept. 116-78) would once again tie 50% of aid to the central
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to the 16 conditions enacted in prior
years. S. 2583 (S.Rept. 116-126), by contrast, would tie 100% of aid to those governments to a
pared-down list of five conditions.
Relationship to the Alliance for Prosperity
Many observers have confused the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America with the
Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, which was drafted with technical
assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and announced by the Salvadoran,
Guatemalan, and Honduran governments in September 2014. Originally envisioned as a five-
year, $22 billion initiative, the Alliance for Prosperity aims to accelerate structural changes in the
Northern Triangle that would create incentives for people to remain in their own countries. It
includes four primary objectives and strategic actions to achieve them:
1. Stimulate the productive sector, by supporting strategic sectors (such as textiles, agro-industry, light manufacturing, and tourism); creating special
economic zones to attract new investment; modernizing and expanding
infrastructure; deepening regional trade and energy integration; and supporting
the development of micro, small, and medium enterprises and their integration
into regional production chains.
2. Develop human capital, by improving access to, and the quality of, education and vocational training; expanding access to health care and adequate nutrition;
expanding social protection systems, including conditional cash transfer
programs for the most vulnerable; and strengthening protection and reintegration
mechanisms for migrants.
3. Improve public safety and access to justice, by investing in violence prevention programs; ensuring schools are safe spaces; furthering the
professionalization of the police, including through the adoption of community
policing practices; enhancing the capacity of investigators and prosecutors; and
strengthening prison systems.
4. Strengthen institutions and promote transparency, by improving tax administration and revenue collection; professionalizing human resources;
strengthening government procurement processes; and increasing budget
transparency and access to public information. 45
44 See Section 7045(a)(1) of P.L. 116-6.
45 Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, Plan of the Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern
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The Northern Triangle governments collectively allocated approximately $7.2 billion for the
Alliance for Prosperity from 2016 to 2018 (see Table 6). They also budgeted $2.8 billion for the
initiative in 2019, though final allocations may be lower given that planned funding significantly
exceeded actual funding in prior years. The resources allocated to the initiative have included
government revenues as well as loans from the IDB and other international financial institutions.
About 39% of the funds budgeted for the Alliance for Prosperity have been dedicated to
developing human capital, 36% to stimulating the productive sector, 19% to improving public
security and access to justice, and 7% to strengthening institutions and promoting transparency. 46
Some analysts argue that the Alliance for Prosperity should focus more on the region’s most
pressing challenges, such as reducing the size of the informal economy, and that the funds
allocated to the plan could be better targeted toward the communities most in need of support. 47
Table 6. Alliance for Prosperity Funding by Country: 2016-2019
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
2016 2017 2018
2019
(planned) Total
El Salvador 869 562 532 498 2,461
Guatemala 492 646 1,265 1,313 3,716
Honduras 965 910 981 952 3,808
Total 2,326 2,118 2,778 2,763 9,985
Source: “Montos Presupuestados y Ejecutados Alineados al PAPTN,” document provided to CRS by the Inter-
American Development Bank, June 2019.
Note: 2018 data for Honduras reflects planned funding rather than final allocations.
Although the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and the Alliance for Prosperity
have broadly similar objectives and fund complementary efforts, they prioritize different
activities. Whereas the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America is designed to advance
U.S. interests in all seven nations of the isthmus, the Alliance for Prosperity represents the
agendas of the three Northern Triangle governments. For example, the U.S. Strategy for
Engagement in Central America devotes significant funding to efforts intended to strengthen the
capacity of civil society groups, which—to date—have played relatively minor roles in the
Alliance for Prosperity. Similarly, the Alliance for Prosperity has partially focused on large-scale
infrastructure projects, which are not funded by the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America. 48
Triangle: Progress in 2015 and the Plan in 2016, September 2015; and Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the
Northern Triangle: A Road Map, September 2014, at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=
39224238.
46 “Montos Presupuestados y Ejecutados Alineados al PAPTN,” document provided to CRS by the Inter-American
Development Bank, June 2019.
47 See, for example, Manuel Orozco, “One Step Forward for Central America: The Plan for the Alliance for
Prosperity,” Inter-American Dialogue, March 16, 2016.
48 Section 7045(a)(4)(B) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) states, “None of the funds
appropriated by this Act that are made available for assistance for countries in Central America may be made available
for direct government-to-government assistance or for major infrastructure projects.”
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Preliminary Results
Although the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America was adopted more than five years
ago and Congress first appropriated funding for the strategy nearly four years ago, it is too early
to assess the full impact of the initiative. Due to delays in the budget process, certification
requirements, and congressional holds, approximately 80% of the funding for the Central
America strategy that Congress appropriated for FY2016 was obligated (i.e., agencies entered
into contracts or submitted purchase orders for goods or services) from March to September
2017. 49
Consequently, implementation of the strategy has been under way for about 2½ years.
The State Department and USAID selected 39 performance indicators to track progress toward
each sub-objective of the strategy. Some of the metrics measure outputs, such as the number of
civilian police trained by U.S. personnel, and others measure outcomes, such as the percentage of
citizens in the region who trust the police. In FY2018, U.S. agencies reportedly met or exceeded
their targets on 14 indicators while falling short on eight. INL apparently did not establish targets
for the other 17 indicators. 50
The State Department’s most recent monitoring and evaluation
report, issued in May 2019, does not include any targets for FY2019 since the Administration had
suspended foreign assistance programs in the Northern Triangle (see “Suspension of U.S.
Assistance to the Northern Triangle,” below).
Many activities funded by the Central America strategy build upon previous U.S. assistance
efforts that have proven successful. For example, USAID is expanding its community-based
crime and violence prevention programs throughout the region. A three-year impact evaluation,
published in 2014, found that communities where such programs were implemented reported
19% fewer robberies, 51% fewer extortion attempts, and 51% fewer murders than would have
otherwise been expected based on trends in similar communities. 51
USAID is also scaling up rural
development efforts in the Northern Triangle. Since 2011, the agency’s agriculture programs have
reportedly lifted approximately 90,000 Hondurans out of extreme poverty, leading the Honduran
government to invest $56 million to replicate the model. 52
Although country-level indicators measure factors outside the control of the U.S. government, the
State Department and USAID assert that U.S. programs can contribute to nationwide
improvements over the longer term. 53
The most recent statistics available suggest the Northern
Triangle nations, which have received the vast majority of U.S. assistance, have achieved mixed
results in recent years.
49 U.S. Department of State, Report to Update the United States Strategy for Engagement in Central America Plan for
Monitoring and Evaluation, September 7, 2017, at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/275613.pdf.
50 U.S. Department of State, Progress Report for the United States Strategy for Central America’s Plan for Monitoring
and Evaluation, May 2019, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/FY-2019-Central-America-Strategy-
Progress-Report.pdf. (Hereinafter: U.S. Department of State, May 2019).
51 Susan Berk-Seligson et al., Impact Evaluation of USAID’s Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention
Approach in Central America: Regional Report for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama, Vanderbilt
University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), October 2014, p. 12. For further discussion of the study’s
findings, see David Rosnick, Alexander Main, and Laura Jung, Have US-Funded CARSI Programs Reduced Crime and
Violence in Central America?, Center for Economic and Policy Research, September 2016; and LAPOP’s Response to
David Rosnick, Alexander Main, and Laura Jung, LAPOP, September 16, 2016.
52 USAID, “Addressing the Drivers of Illegal Immigration: USAID Results in the Northern Triangle,” August 31, 2018,
at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1862/USAID_NT_Results_FINAL_08.31.2018.pdf.
53 U.S. Department of State, May 2019.
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Security conditions have improved in some respects, as homicide rates declined by 51% in El Salvador, 27% in Guatemala, and 32% in Honduras from 2015 to
2018. 54
Nevertheless, many individuals continue to feel insecure, and the
percentage of individuals reporting they were victims of crime increased in all
three Northern Triangle nations between 2014 and 2018. 55
Economic growth has remained steady since 2014, averaging 2.3% per year in El Salvador, 3.5% in Guatemala, and 3.9% in Honduras.
56 However, the stable
macroeconomic situation has not translated into better living conditions for many
residents. The poverty rate has declined by nearly seven percentage points in El
Salvador, but it appears relatively unchanged in Guatemala and Honduras. 57
Attorneys general in all three Northern Triangle countries, with some international support, have taken on high-profile corruption cases that have
implicated presidents, cabinet ministers, and legislators. Those efforts to improve
governance could be undermined or even reversed, though, as they face
considerable opposition from political and economic elites in the region. 58
Moreover, Freedom House has documented erosions in political rights and/or
civil liberties in all three Northern Triangle nations since 2014. 59
The Trump Administration argues that the increase in apprehensions of Central American
migrants and asylum-seekers at the U.S. border in FY2019 is evidence that the U.S. Strategy for
Engagement in Central America “has not been effective.” 60
Although Administration officials
acknowledge U.S. foreign aid programs have been “producing the results [they] were intended to
produce,” they maintain, “the only metric that matters is the question of what the migration
situation looks like on the southern border.” 61
There is evidence, however, that some aid programs
also have reduced migration. In Honduras, for example, beneficiaries of a USAID agriculture and
food security program migrated at half the rate of the surrounding community in 2018. 62
Policy Issues for Congress Congress may examine a number of policy issues as it deliberates on potential changes to the U.S.
Strategy for Engagement in Central America and future appropriations for the initiative. These
54 U.S. Department of State, May 2019, Attachment 3, p. 1; Diálogos, Informe Annual sobre la Violencia Homicida en
Guatemala, Año 2018, April 22, 2019; and Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, Observatorio de la
Violencia, “Muertos por Homicidio; Enero a Diciembre 2018, Datos Preliminares,” 2019.
55 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, Pulse of Democracy in the Americas: Results from the 2019
AmericasBarometer Study, Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project, October 15, 2019.
56 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database October 2019, October 11, 2019; and ECLAC, CEPALSTAT Database,
accessed November 2019.
57 U.S. Department of State, May 2019, Attachment 3, p. 3.
58 See, for example, Jeff Ernst and Elisabeth Malkin, “In a Corruption Battle in Honduras, the Elites Hit Back,” New
York Times, July 1, 2018; “El Salvador’s Top Cop Pursues Politicians; Now Some Want Him Gone,” Reuters,
December 20, 2018; and Héctor Silva Ávalos and Parker Asmann, “5 Takeaways from CICIG, Guatemala’s Anti-
Corruption Experiment,” Insight Crime, September 5, 2019.
59 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015, January 28, 2015; and Freedom in the World 2019, February 4, 2019.
60 “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on State Department Fiscal 2020 Budget Request,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, April 10, 2019.
61 “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Policy in Mexico and Central America,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, September 25, 2019.
62 USAID Honduras, “Migration Success Stories at USAID/Honduras,” document provided to CRS, August 2019.
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issues include the potential effects of suspending U.S. assistance to the Northern Triangle; the
extent to which Central American governments are demonstrating the political will to undertake
domestic reforms; the utility of the conditions placed on assistance to Central America; and how
changes in U.S. immigration, trade, and drug control policies could affect U.S. objectives in the
region.
Suspension of U.S. Assistance to the Northern Triangle
In March 2019, the Trump Administration suspended most U.S. foreign assistance to El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras due to the continued northward flow of migrants and asylum-seekers
from the Northern Triangle. Since then, the State Department has reportedly reprogrammed $404
million (82%) of the $490 million of FY2018 assistance that it had planned to provide to the
Northern Triangle, sending the funds to Venezuela and a variety of other nations. 63
It allocated the
remaining $86 million of FY2018 assistance to previously awarded grants and contracts as well
as DOJ and DHS programs intended to counter transnational crime and improve border security. 64
The State Department also was withholding approximately $164 million (26%) of the $620
million of FY2017 assistance that it previously had obligated for programs in the Northern
Triangle. 65
In October 2019, however, the State Department announced it would resume “targeted
U.S. foreign assistance funding” for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 66
That decision
reportedly will release about $143 million of FY2017 aid to carry out joint security efforts,
promote economic growth, strengthen the rule of law and good governance, and help Northern
Triangle governments strengthen their asylum systems. 67
It remains unclear whether the Administration intends to continue withholding assistance
appropriated in FY2019 or revise its FY2020 budget proposal, which requested $445 million for
Central America, including at least $180 million for the Northern Triangle. The Administration
reportedly intends to launch a new economic development plan in 2020, but it has released few
details thus far. 68
The aid suspension has forced USAID and INL to begin closing down projects and canceling
planned activities. In June 2019, for example, USAID implementing partners laid off 140
agricultural technicians that had been assisting 125,000 poor and food insecure Hondurans in the
midst of the drought-affected harvest season. 69
Without additional funding, many more projects in
63 Ibid; “Central America’s ‘Poorest of the Poor’ Hit Hard by U.S. Aid Cuts: Charities,” Reuters, October 3, 2019;
USAID, “Congressional Notification: Venezuela,” CN #157, July 11, 2019; USAID, “Congressional Notification:
USAID/Africa Regional,” CN #206, August 30, 2019; and USAID, “Congressional Notification: South America
Regional,” CN #210, August 30, 2019.
64 Morgan Ortagus, Department Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing,” June 17, 2019.
65 The $620 million total includes $97 million of non-strategy funds that support activities in the Northern Triangle.
U.S. Department of State, “Estimated FY 2017 and 2018 Levels for Northern Triangle Assistance,” document provided
to Congress, June 2019.
66 Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, “United States Resumes Targeted U.S. Foreign Assistance for El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,” press statement, October 16, 2019.
67 Ibid; CRS communication with USAID official, October 2019; and Nick Miroff, “President Trump Says He will
Unfreeze Security Aid to Central American Countries,” Washington Post, October 16, 2019.
68 “EEUU Suspende Plan de Alianza para la Prosperidad y Trabaja en Uno Nuevo,” El Heraldo (Honduras) October 8,
2019; and “Estados Unidos Dejará de Ver al Triángulo Norte como un Bloque,” Diario de Hoy (El Salvador), October
8, 2019.
69 USAID Honduras, “Overview of how Loss of FY’18 Funds has affected USAID/Honduras Activities,” document
provided to CRS, August 2019.
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the Northern Triangle will end prematurely by the end of 2019. Those include a project to
generate economic opportunities for youth in El Salvador, a project to improve urban security
conditions in Guatemala, and a regional project to protect human rights defenders. 70
In Honduras,
the total number of beneficiaries of USAID projects fell from 1.5 million in March 2019 to 1.1
million in September 2019. Without new funding, USAID estimates that the number of
Hondurans receiving some type of USAID support will fall to 700 million by December 2019 and
18,000 by December 2020. 71
The USAID missions in El Salvador and Guatemala would likely
face similar declines.
Since the aid suspension was announced, all three Northern Triangle governments have
demonstrated a willingness to continue working with the United States to reduce irregular
migration. They have signed several cooperation agreements with the Trump Administration,
including agreements that could require some asylum-seekers to apply for protection in the
Northern Triangle rather than in the United States. 72
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
Kevin McAleenan asserts that the agreements are intended to provide “access to protection to
those who need it, as close to home as possible” while limiting the ability of migrant smugglers
“to profit off false promises and to exploit those individuals seeking to come to our border.” 73
Critics argue that the Northern Triangle countries are not safe for their own citizens, let alone
potential refugees. 74
Although the prospect of losing aid appears to have led the Northern Triangle governments to
bolster their efforts to address U.S. concerns, the Administration’s abrupt policy change could
lead some officials to question the reliability of the United States and begin to seek out other
international partners. The president of the Salvadoran Congress, for example, reportedly
responded to the aid suspension by noting that China was offering to cooperate with the country. 75
An extended suspension of U.S. assistance could provide incentives for the region to further
diversify its foreign and trade relationships.
The aid suspension is unlikely to have a major impact on economies in the region, especially if it
is short-lived. In 2017, U.S. assistance was equivalent to about 0.3% of GDP in Guatemala, 0.5%
of GDP in El Salvador, and 0.8% of GDP in Honduras. 76
Nevertheless, the suspension could have
much larger effects in the marginalized communities where U.S. development efforts are
concentrated. In September 2019, for example, Catholic Relief Services was forced to close a
USAID-funded food security program that had been assisting nearly 30,000 people in
70 Untitled USAID document provided to CRS, September 2019.
71 USAID Honduras, “Migration Briefing,” document provided to CRS, August 2019.
72 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of
Guatemala on Cooperation Regarding the Examination of Protection Claims, July 26, 2019; Agreement between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of El Salvador for Cooperation in the
Examination of Protection Claims, September 20, 2019; and Agreement between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Republic of Honduras for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims,
September 25, 2019.
73 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Transcript: Press Conference in Yuma, AZ on August 8, 2019,” August 9,
2019.
74 See, for example, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “U.S.-Honduras ‘Safe’ Third Country
Negotiations Show the Grave Cruelty of the Trump Administration’s Migration Efforts,” press release, September 12,
2019.
75 Carlos Mario Marquez, “Preocupación en Centroamérica por anuncio de Trump de Suspender Ayuda,” Agence
France Presse, April 1, 2019.
76 USAID, Foreign Aid Explorer: The official Record of U.S. Foreign Aid, accessed June 2019; and International
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database April 2019, April 9, 2019.
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Guatemala’s eastern dry corridor, including acutely malnourished children. 77
Aid organizations
argue that the loss of U.S. support could accelerate out-migration from such areas. 78
The suspension of U.S. assistance also could jeopardize recent improvements in security
conditions in the Northern Triangle. Although the Administration has continued to support
specialized security force units established by U.S. agencies to support joint law enforcement
operations, it has withdrawn funding for other security assistance programs, such as community
policing initiatives, crime and violence prevention programs, and efforts to strengthen security
and justice sector institutions. Homicide rates are reportedly increasing once again in some
neighborhoods in Honduras from which USAID withdrew due a lack of funds. 79
In addition to those socioeconomic and security concerns, the Northern Triangle is at serious risk
of backsliding with respect to governance and rule of law. U.S. assistance has offered crucial
technical and diplomatic support to prosecutors combating high-level corruption, allowing them
to take on unprecedented cases in recent years. Their tentative progress has generated fierce
backlash from political and economic elites who benefit from the status quo. 80
An extended
suspension of U.S. assistance could undercut U.S. allies within the Northern Triangle
governments and empower the sectors most resistant to change.
Congress appears to have provided the President with significant authority—in annual
appropriations legislation (P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 116-6) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended (22 U.S.C. §§2151 et seq.)—to reprogram assistance away from the Northern
Triangle. If Congress thinks the Administration is using that authority in ways that do not reflect
congressional intent, it could enact legislation to restrict the Administration’s ability to transfer or
reprogram assistance. For example, the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, Defense,
State, Foreign Operations, and Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2020 (H.R.
2740, H.Rept. 116-78), passed by the House in June 2019, would appropriate “not less than”
$540.85 million for Central America and strengthen the funding directives for FY2017, FY2018,
and FY2019 foreign aid appropriations for the region. Similarly, the FY2020 State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S. 2583, S.Rept. 116-126), introduced in
the Senate, would direct that “not less than” $525 million appropriated in FY2019 be made
available for the region. The Central America Reform and Enforcement Act (S. 1445, Schumer),
introduced in May 2019, would go further, prohibiting the reprogramming of any assistance
appropriated for the Northern Triangle nations since FY2016.
Congress also could consider a foreign assistance authorization for Central America to guide aid
levels and priorities and reassure partners in the region that the United States is committed to a
long-term effort. S. 1445 would require the Secretary of State to develop a new five-year
interagency strategy to advance reforms in Central America and would authorize $1.5 billion in
FY2020 to carry out certain activities in support of the new strategy. The United States-Northern
Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (H.R. 2615, Engel), which the House passed in July 2019,
77 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security and
Trade, Assessing the Impact of Cutting Foreign Assistance to Central America, Written Testimony of Rick Jones,
Senior Technical Advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean, Catholic Relief Services, 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
September 25, 2019.
78 “U.S. Aid Cuts to Central America May Backfire, Fueling Migration North: Charities,” Reuters, April 2, 2019.
79 CRS meeting with USAID officials, August 2019.
80 Jeff Ernst and Elisabeth Malkin, “In a Corruption Battle in Honduras, the Elites Hit Back,” New York Times, July 1,
2018; “El Salvador’s Top Cop Pursues Politicians; Now Some Want Him Gone,” Reuters, December 20, 2018; and
Héctor Silva Ávalos and Parker Asmann, “5 Takeaways from CICIG, Guatemala’s Anti-Corruption Experiment,”
Insight Crime, September 5, 2019.
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would authorize $577 million for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America in
FY2020, including “not less than” $490 million for the Northern Triangle. The measure would
also require the State Department, in coordination with other agencies, to develop five-year
strategies to support inclusive economic growth, combat corruption, strengthen democratic
institutions, and improve security conditions in the Northern Triangle.
Political Will in Central America
Although many analysts assert that Central American nations will require external support to
address their challenges, they also contend that significant improvements in the region ultimately
will depend on Central American leaders carrying out substantial internal reforms. 81
That
contention is supported by multiple studies conducted over the past decade, which have found
that aid recipients’ domestic political institutions play a crucial role in determining the relative
effectiveness of foreign aid. 82
Some scholars argue that this conclusion is also supported by the
region’s history:
How did Costa Rica do so much better by its citizens than its four northern neighbors since
1950? The answer, we contend, stems from the political will of Costa Rican leaders. Even
though they shared the same disadvantageous economic context of the rest of Central
America, Costa Rica’s leaders adopted and kept democracy, abolished the armed forces,
moderated income inequality, and invested in education and health over the long haul. The
leaders of the other nations did not make these choices, at least not consistently enough to
do the job.83
One of the underlying assumptions of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America is
that “Central American governments will continue to demonstrate leadership and contribute
significant resources to address challenges” if they are supported by international partners. 84
Such
political will cannot be taken for granted, however, given that previous U.S. efforts to ramp up
assistance to Central America—including substantial increases in development aid during the
1960s under President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress and massive aid flows in the
1980s during the Central American conflicts (see Figure 5)—were not always matched by far-
reaching domestic reforms in the region. 85
81 See, for example, Roger Noriega, “How to Turn Off the Latin Refugee Flood at the Source,” New York Post,
February 24, 2017; and Adriana Beltrán, “Children and Families Fleeing Violence in Central America,” Washington
Office on Latin America (WOLA), February 21, 2017.
82 Jonathan Glennie and Andy Sumner, The $138.5 Billion Question: When Does Foreign Aid Work (and When Doesn't
It)?, Center for Global Development, CGD Policy Paper 049, November 2014, pp. 35-42.
83 John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America: Global Forces,
Rebellion, and Change, 6th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015), pp. 23-24.
84 White House, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, March 16, 2015.
85 See, for example, Eduardo Frei Montalva, “The Alliance that Lost its Way,” Foreign Affairs, April 1967; and U.S.
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Caribbean Basin: Economic and Security Issues, committee print, Central
America: Continuing U.S. Concerns, study paper prepared by Nina M. Serafino of the Congressional Research Service,
102nd Cong., 2nd sess., January 1993, S.Prt. 102-110 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993).
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Figure 5. U.S. Assistance to Central America: FY1946-FY2017
(obligations in billions of constant 2017 U.S. dollars)
Source: CRS presentation of data from USAID, Foreign Aid Explorer: The Official Record of U.S. Foreign Aid, at
https://explorer.usaid.gov/data.
Note: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies.
Over the past few years, Central American governments have demonstrated varying levels of
commitment to internal reform. As discussed previously, the three Northern Triangle governments
worked together to develop the Alliance for Prosperity, which includes numerous policy
commitments. At the same time, tax collection has remained relatively flat in the region, leaving
governments without the resources necessary to address chronic poverty or other challenges. 86
Moreover, some elected officials in the Northern Triangle have sought to undermine anti-
corruption efforts. For example, Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales refused to renew the
mandate of the U.N.-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG by
its Spanish acronym), forcing it to end operations in September 2019. Similarly, Honduran
President Juan Orlando Hernández has thus far refused to renew the mandate of the Organization
of American States (OAS)-backed Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity
in Honduras (MACCIH by its Spanish acronym), which expires in January 2020.
Congress could consider a number of actions to support reform efforts in the region. In addition
to placing legislative conditions on aid, which is discussed in the following section (see “Aid
Conditionality”), Congress could continue to offer vocal and financial support to individuals and
institutions committed to change. For example, H.Rept. 116-9, notes that the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), “supports efforts to strengthen the rule of law by
combating corruption and impunity in Central America” by providing $6 million for CICIG, $5
million for MACCIH, and $20 million for the attorneys general of El Salvador, Guatemala and
86 Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales, Perfiles Marcofiscales de Centroamérica: Por Una Política Fiscal
para la Democracia y el Desarrollo, No.11, April 2019, p. 27.
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Honduras. The report also states that “the Secretary of State should consider the capacity, record,
and commitment to the rule of law of each office” when allocating funds.
Congress could also continue to call attention to individuals in the region who seek to subvert
reform efforts. For example, a reporting requirement in S.Rept. 115-282, made binding by the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), required the Secretary of State to produce an
assessment of grand corruption in the Northern Triangle. The report was required to include a list
of senior Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran officials known, or credibly alleged, to have
committed or facilitated such corruption and a description of steps taken to impose sanctions
pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328). The report,
issued in May 2019, lists more than 60 current and former officials. It also notes that between
January and April 2019, the State Department used its various sanctions authorities to revoke the
visas of 85 individuals from the Northern Triangle suspected of corrupt acts. 87
Congress could put additional pressure on corrupt individuals and attempt to deter others by
enacting legislation to establish new economic sanctions regimes or by recommending sanctions
pursuant to existing law. For example, the Guatemala Rule of Law Accountability Act (H.R.
1630, Torres) would direct the President to impose targeted sanctions (asset blocking and visa
restrictions) against any current or former Guatemalan official who has knowingly (1) committed
or facilitated significant corruption; (2) obstructed Guatemalan investigations or prosecutions of
such corruption; (3) misused U.S. equipment provided to the Guatemalan military or police to
combat drug trafficking or secure the border; (4) disobeyed rulings of the Guatemalan
constitutional court; or (5) impeded or interfered with the work of any U.S. government agency or
any institution that receives contributions from the U.S. government, including CICIG. Similarly,
the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (H.R. 2615, Engel) would direct
the President to impose targeted sanctions against any person the President determines to be
engaged in an act of significant corruption that affects a Northern Triangle country, including
corruption related to government contracts, bribery and extortion, or the facilitation or transfer of
the proceeds of corruption.
Aid Conditionality
As noted previously, Congress has placed strict conditions on foreign aid for Central America in
an attempt to bolster political will in the region and ensure U.S. assistance is used as effectively
as possible (see “Conditions on Assistance”). Although U.S. officials acknowledge that aid
restrictions give them leverage with partner governments, some argue that recent appropriations
measures have included too many conditions and have withheld too much aid. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), requires the State Department to withhold 50% of
“assistance for the central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras” until the
Secretary of State certifies that those governments are addressing 16 different issues of
congressional concern. Some U.S. officials contend that Congress should focus on a few top
priorities given the limited capacities of the Northern Triangle governments. Along those lines,
the FY2020 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, S. 2583
(S.Rept. 116-126) would require the Northern Triangle governments to meet five key conditions.
U.S. officials also argue that by subjecting “assistance for the central governments” to
withholding requirements, Congress effectively prevents U.S. agencies from carrying out some
programs that would advance U.S. interests and help the governments meet the conditions. For
example, the State Department is required to withhold U.S. assistance to support police reform
87 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Corruption in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, May 2019,
available at https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/US-CentAm-Corruption-List.pdf.
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efforts until it can certify that each government is “creating a professional, accountable civilian
police force and ending the role of the military in internal policing.” Similarly, the State
Department is required to withhold U.S. assistance to strengthen tax collection agencies until it
can certify that each government is “implementing tax reforms.” 88
Congress could prevent such
unintended consequences by waiving withholding requirements for certain types of assistance.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), for example, states that the withholding
requirements on assistance for the central governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala
“shall not apply to funds appropriated” for CICIG, MACCIH, humanitarian assistance, or food
security programs. 89
Additionally, U.S. officials note that withholding requirements have contributed to delays in the
implementation of the Central America strategy. In FY2016, the first year Congress approved
funding for the strategy, Congress enacted full-year appropriations legislation on December 18,
2015. The State Department did not issue the final certification (for Honduras), however, until
September 30, 2016—the last day of the fiscal year. Due to the certification requirements, as well
as delays in the budget process and congressional holds, most aid did not begin to be delivered to
the region until mid-2017. Although U.S. agencies obligated some aid not subject to the
withholding requirements at earlier dates, they were hesitant to commit resources to specific
activities until they knew whether they would have access to the remaining funding. Similar
delays have occurred during the past three fiscal years.
Nevertheless, some Members of Congress and civil society organizations have occasionally
criticized the State Department for issuing certifications too quickly, particularly with regard to
human rights conditions. For example, on November 28, 2017, the State Department certified that
Honduras had met the conditions necessary to receive assistance appropriated for FY2017,
including by taking effective steps to “protect the right of political opposition parties, journalists,
trade unionists, human rights defenders, and other civil society activists to operate without
interference.” 90
The State Department issued the certification two days into Honduras’s disputed
presidential election, and just days before the Honduran government declared a state of
emergency to suspend certain constitutional rights and human rights organizations began to
document the use of excessive force by security forces to disperse opposition protests. 91
Human
rights groups and some Members of Congress criticized the certification, with one Honduran
union leader reportedly declaring, “They’re practically giving carte blanche so they can violate
human rights in this country under the umbrella of the United States.” 92
Studies of aid conditionality have found that conditions generally fail to alter aid recipients’
behavior when recipients think donors are unlikely to follow through on their threats to withhold
aid. 93
Members of Congress who are concerned that the State Department is issuing certifications
too quickly and thereby weakening the effectiveness of human rights conditions could seek
88 See Section 7045(a)(1)(M) and (O) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6).
89 See Section 7045(a)(4)(A) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6).
90 U.S. Department of State, Certification Pursuant to Section 7045(a)(4)(B) of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (Div. J, P.L. 115-31), November 28, 2017.
91 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Violations in the Context of the 2017 Elections in
Honduras, March 12, 2018.
92 Christopher Sherman, Garance Burke, and Martha Mendoza, “Trump Administration Praises Honduras Amid
Election Crisis,” Associated Press, December 7, 2017.
93 Andrew Mold, Policy Ownership and Aid Conditionality in the Light of the Financial Crisis: A Critical Review,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Centre Studies, 2009; Melissa G. Dalton,
Smart Conditions: A Strategic Framework for Leveraging Security Assistance, Center for Strategic & International
Studies, July 2016.
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changes to the certification process. For example, Congress could set more specific and/or
measureable criteria for the Northern Triangle governments to meet prior to receiving assistance.
The Berta Cáceres Human Rights in Honduras Act (H.R. 1945, H. Johnson) would suspend all
U.S. security assistance to Honduras and direct U.S. representatives at multilateral development
banks to oppose all loans for Honduran security forces until the State Department certifies that
Honduras has effectively investigated and prosecuted a series of specific human rights abuses and
satisfied several other conditions.
Implications of Other U.S. Policy Changes
Given Central America’s geographic proximity and close migration and commercial ties to the
United States, changes in U.S. immigration, trade, and drug control policies can have far-reaching
effects in the region. As Congress considers the future of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in
Central America, it also may evaluate how changes to other U.S. policies might support or hinder
the strategy’s objectives.
Immigration
Central American nations have strong migration ties to the United States. In 2017, an estimated
3.3 million individuals born in Central America were living in the United States, including more
than 1.3 million Salvadorans; 924,000 Guatemalans; 603,000 Hondurans; and 252,000
Nicaraguans. 94
Those immigrant populations play crucial roles in Central American economies.
Remittances from Central American migrants abroad—the vast majority (79%) of whom live in
the United States 95
—totaled nearly $22 billion in 2018 and were equivalent to 11% of GDP in
Nicaragua, 12% of GDP in Guatemala, 20% of GDP in Honduras, and nearly 21% of GDP in El
Salvador (see Figure 6, below).
Many Central Americans reside in the United States in an unauthorized status, however, and are
therefore at risk of being removed (deported) from the country. The Pew Research Center
estimates that nearly 1.9 million (about 58%) of the Central Americans residing in the United
States in 2017 were unauthorized. 96
In FY2018, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) removed nearly 96,000 Central Americans, including approximately 50,000 Guatemalans,
29,000 Hondurans, and 15,000 Salvadorans. 97
The Trump Administration’s immigration policies could accelerate removals from the United
States. Since September 2017, for example, the Administration has terminated Temporary
Protected Status (TPS), which provides relief from removal, for approximately 4,500 Nicaraguans
and 81,000 Hondurans who have lived in the United States since 1998 and 252,000 Salvadorans
who have lived in the United States since 2001. TPS was scheduled to expire on January 5, 2019,
for Nicaraguans, and on September 9, 2019, for Salvadorans, but it remains in place pending the
resolution of a lawsuit challenging the Administration’s termination decision. A lawsuit has also
94 U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, accessed by CRS on American Factfinder
Website, June 2019.
95 Although most Central American migrants reside in the United States, about 45% of Nicaraguan migrants reside in
Costa Rica. U.N. Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migrant Stock: The
2017 Revision, December 2017.
96 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Mexicans Decline to Less than Half the U.S. Unauthorized Immigration
Population for the First Time, Pew Research Center, June 12, 2019.
97 U.S. Immigration and Enforcement (ICE), Fiscal Year 2018 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report,
December 14, 2018, pp. 17-18.
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temporarily halted the termination of TPS for Hondurans, scheduled for January 5, 2020. 98
Although some individuals may be able to obtain another lawful status, the remainder would be
subject to removal once TPS expires. In June 2019, the House passed the American Dream and
Promise Act of 2019 (H.R. 6, Roybal-Allard), which would provide a path toward permanent
resident status for some TPS holders.
Figure 6. Remittances to Central America: 2018
Sources: CRS, using remittance data from each nation’s central bank and GDP data from IMF, World Economic
Outlook Database April 2019, April 9, 2019.
Central American officials are concerned that increased deportations could aggravate social
tensions and fuel instability in the region. Although deportees could bring new skills and financial
resources back to their countries of origin, they could also displace local workers competing for
scarce employment opportunities. 99
In addition, increased deportations could exacerbate poverty,
as some 3.5 million households in the region reportedly depend on remittances for more than half
of their household income. 100
During the 1990s, U.S. deportations played a key role in the spread
of gang violence in Central America. Consequently, many observers are concerned that a new
wave of deportations could exacerbate security challenges in the region. 101
Although most Central
Americans at risk of deportation today have no connections to gangs, deported youth could
become vulnerable to gang recruitment. 102
If deportations accelerate, Congress could help mitigate the impact on the region (and potentially
reduce the likelihood of repeat migration) by appropriating increased assistance for reintegration
98 For more information on TPS, see CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues,
by Jill H. Wilson, and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10215, Federal District Court Enjoins the Department of Homeland
Security from Terminating Temporary Protected Status, by Hillel R. Smith.
99 “El Salvador: Assessing the Economic Impact of TPS Termination,” Latin American Economy & Business, February
2018.
100 “Trends in Central American Migration,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, August 2018.
101 Joshua Partlow, “Dread in El Salvador as Gang Members Return,” Washington Post, May 23, 2017.
102 Micaela Sciatschi, “By Deporting 200,000 Salvadorans, Trump may be Boosting Gang Recruitment,” Washington
Post, February 12, 2018.
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efforts. From October 2013 to April 2018, USAID provided approximately $27 million to the
International Organization for Migration to provide short-term assistance to migrants returning to
the Northern Triangle and support deportees’ reintegration into their communities of origin. 103
Trade
Most Central American nations have close commercial ties to the United States, and they have
become more integrated into U.S. supply chains since the adoption of CAFTA-DR. In 2018, U.S.
merchandise trade with the seven nations of Central America totaled nearly $51.5 billion.
Although Central America accounts for a small portion (1.2%) of total U.S. trade, the United
States is a major market for Central American goods. 104
In 2018, the value of merchandise exports
to the United States was equivalent to about 10% of GDP in El Salvador, 12% of GDP in Belize,
20% of GDP in Honduras, and 27% of GDP in Nicaragua (see Figure 7, below).
Figure 7. Central American Exports to the United States: 2018
Sources: CRS, using U.S. import data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, as presented by Global Trade
Atlas, accessed June 2019; and GDP data from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database April 2019, April 9, 2019.
Given the economic importance of access to the U.S. market, Central American nations have
closely tracked recent developments in U.S. trade policy. Some in the region were relieved by
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed
trade agreement among 12 Asia-Pacific countries. 105
The agreement would have allowed Vietnam
and other nations to export apparel to the United States duty-free, which could have eliminated
much of the competitive advantage now enjoyed by Central American apparel producers. 106
The
103 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Central America: USAID Assists Migrants Returning to their Home
Countries, but Effectiveness of Reintegration Efforts Remains to be Determined, GAO-19-62, November 2018,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695371.pdf.
104 U.S. Department of Commerce data, as presented by Global Trade Atlas, accessed June 2019.
105 For more information on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and U.S. withdrawal from the agreement, see CRS In
Focus IF10000, TPP: Overview and Current Status, by Brock R. Williams and Ian F. Fergusson.
106 CRS Report R44610, U.S. Textile Manufacturing and the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, by
Michaela D. Platzer.
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Salvadoran government and the Central American-Dominican Republic Apparel and Textile
Council estimated that the first year of TPP implementation would have led to a 15%-18%
contraction in industrial employment in the CAFTA-DR region. 107
If the United States enters into
a similar trade agreement in the future, Congress could consider granting Central American
nations trade preferences equal to those included in the new agreement to ameliorate the shock to
economies in the region. 108
In October 2017, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer reportedly asserted that the Trump
Administration intends to modernize trade agreements throughout Latin America. 109
Central
American leaders think the Administration is unlikely to prioritize the renegotiation of CAFTA-
DR or the U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement, however, since President Trump has focused
primarily on reducing U.S. trade deficits and the United States ran a $10.3 billion trade surplus
with Central America in 2018. 110
Nevertheless, other potential changes to trade policy, such as
imposing tariffs on imports, could be detrimental to Central American economies. In 2017, the
IDB estimated that if the United States increased the average tariff for imports from Central
America by 20% of their value, the region’s GDP would decline by 2.2-4.4 percentage points. 111
Drug Control
Although illicit drug production and consumption remain relatively limited in Central America, 112
the region is seriously affected by the drug trade due to its location between cocaine producers in
South America and consumers in the United States. In 2017, the State Department reported that
about 90% of cocaine trafficked to the United States transits through Central America, along with
unknown quantities of opiates, cannabis, and methamphetamine. 113
The criminal groups that
move cocaine through the region receive immense profits; in 2016, a security analyst estimated
that trafficking generated $700 million per year in Honduras and similar amounts in Guatemala
and El Salvador. 114
Violence in the region has escalated as rival criminal organizations have
fought for control over the lucrative drug trade and gangs have battled to control local
distribution. The illicit funds produced by drug trafficking have also fostered corruption and
impunity in Central America as criminal organizations have financed political campaigns and
107 U.S. International Trade Commission, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy
and on Specific Industry Sectors, May 2016, p. 270.
108 Eric Farnsworth, “How the TPP Could Disrupt U.S. Aid Plans in Central America,” World Politics Review, August
24, 2015.
109 “Lighthizer Says a Slew of Latin American Free Trade Deals must be ‘Modernized’ after NAFTA,” Inside U.S.
Trade, October 3, 2018.
110 “Central American Leaders Confident Trump Won’t Revoke CAFTA,” Agence France Presse, January 25, 2017;
and U.S. Department of Commerce data, as presented by Global Trade Atlas, accessed June 2019.
111 Inter-American Development Bank, Running Out of Tailwinds: Opportunities to Foster Inclusive Growth in Central
America and the Dominican Republic, 2017, p. 80.
112 According to State Department estimates, about 310 hectares of opium poppy were under cultivation in Guatemala
in 2016 (most recent year available), with the potential to produce 7 metric tons of heroin. In comparison, Mexico had
an estimated production potential of 685 metric tons of heroin in 2017. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2019 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I:
Drug and Chemical Control, March 2019, pp. 23-25.
113 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2017 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2017. The State Department did not
include updated estimates in its 2018 or 2019 reports.
114 Steven Dudley, “How Drug Trafficking Operates, Corrupts in Central America,” Insight Crime, July 6, 2016.
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parties; distorted markets by channeling proceeds into legitimate and illegitimate businesses; and
bribed security forces, prosecutors, and judges. 115
Upon the launch of the Mérida Initiative in 2008, the George W. Bush Administration pledged to
reduce drug demand in the United States as part of its “shared responsibility” to address the
challenges posed by transnational crime. 116
The Trump Administration, like the Obama
Administration before it, has reiterated that pledge, asserting that the United States “recognizes its
responsibility to address the demand for illegal drugs.” 117
Between FY2009 and FY2019, U.S.
expenditures on drug demand reduction efforts (i.e., prevention and treatment) increased from
$9.2 billion to $17.3 billion and the portion of the U.S. drug control budget dedicated to demand
reduction increased from 37% to 52%. 118
The estimated number of individuals aged 12 or older
currently using (past month use of) cocaine declined from about 1.9 million in 2008 to 1.4 million
in 2011. It has climbed significantly since then, however, exceeding 1.9 million in 2018. 119
Legislative measures to expand or improve the effectiveness of programs to reduce cocaine and
other illicit drug consumption in the United States would complement efforts under the Central
America strategy and would maintain the sense of “shared responsibility” that has guided U.S.
relations with the region over the past decade. The 116 th
Congress could build on measures
adopted during the 115 th Congress to address substance abuse and treatment, such as the Support
for Patients and Communities Act (P.L. 115-271). 120
The 116 th Congress could also engage in a
broader reassessment of U.S. drug control policy. It may draw on the work of the recently
launched Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, authorized by the Department of State
Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114-323), which is charged with conducting a
comprehensive review of U.S. counternarcotics policies in the region.
Outlook Congress has appropriated nearly $2.6 billion of foreign aid since FY2016 to promote prosperity,
strengthen governance, and improve security in Central America. Those are difficult, long-term
endeavors, however, and U.S. efforts are about 2½ years into implementation. Although Central
American nations have made some tentative progress in addressing long-standing challenges, the
region is at serious risk of backsliding. Political and economic elites that benefit from the status
quo are working to undermine anti-corruption efforts, and the Trump Administration has begun to
withdraw the diplomatic pressure and foreign aid that had provided incentives for structural
reforms. Necessary changes to achieve success in the medium and long terms likely would
include stronger governing institutions, increased tax collection, more opportunities for young
115 Ibid.
116 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative: A New Paradigm for
Security Cooperation,” October 22, 2007.
117 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “United States Key Deliverables for the June 15-16, 2017
Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America,” press release, June 16, 2017.
118 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control Budget, FY2018 Funding Highlights,
May 2017, p. 19; and ONDCP, National Drug Control Budget, FY2020 Funding Highlights, March 2019, p. 14. These
figures may not be strictly comparable due to a change in how Medicaid benefit outlays for substance use treatment are
estimated. Moreover, there is considerable debate over whether the National Drug Control Budget captures the full
scope of U.S. counter-drug activities.
119 ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, Data Supplement, 2016, p.19., Department of Health and Human
Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from 2018 National Survey on Drug
Use and Health: Detailed Tables, August 2019.
120 For more information, see CRS Report R45423, Public Health and Other Related Provisions in P.L 115-271, the
SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, coordinated by Elayne J. Heisler and Johnathan H. Duff.
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people, and extensive international donor support over an extended period. Absent such efforts,
conditions are likely to remain poor in several Central American countries, contributing to
political and social instability that—as demonstrated by recent migration flows—is likely to
affect the United States.
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Appendix. Appropriations for the U.S. Strategy for
Engagement in Central America by Country and
Foreign Assistance Account: FY2016-FY2020
Table A-1. FY2016 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
(appropriations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
DA GHP ESF INCLE NADR IMET FMF OPIC Total
Belize — — — — — 0.2 1.0 — 1.2
Costa Rica — — — — — 0.4 1.4 — 1.8
El Salvador 65.0 — — — — 1.0 1.9 — 67.9
Guatemala 112.0 13.0 — — — 0.8 1.7 — 127.5
Honduras 93.0 — — — — 0.8 4.5 — 98.3
Nicaragua 10.0 — — — — — — — 10.0
Panama — — — — 0.5 0.7 2.1 — 3.3
CARSI — — 126.5 222.0 — — — — 348.5
Other Regional Programs 19.4 — 57.0 — — — 13.0 2.0 91.4
Total 299.4 13.0 183.5 222.0 0.5 3.9 25.7 2.0 750.0
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2018, May 23, 2017.
Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; GHP = Global Health
Programs; ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement;
NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; OPIC = Overseas Private Investment Corporation; and
CARSI=Central America Regional Security Initiative.
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Table A-2. FY2017 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
(appropriations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
DA GHP ESF INCLE NADR IMET FMF Total
Belize — — — — — 0.2 1.0 1.2
Costa Rica — — — — — 0.7 5.0 5.7
El Salvador 70.0 — — — — 0.9 1.9 72.8
Guatemala 110.0 13.0 — — — 0.8 1.7 125.5
Honduras 90.0 — — — — 0.8 4.5 95.3
Nicaragua 9.5 — — — — 0.1 — 9.7
Panama — — — — 0.5 0.8 2.0 3.3
CARSI — — 104.2 225.0 — — — 329.2
Other Regional Programs 17.6 — 12.0 — — — 12.5 42.1
Total 297.2 13.0 116.2 225.0 0.5 4.2 28.6 684.8
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year
2019, March 14, 2018.
Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; GHP = Global Health
Programs; ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement;
NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; and CARSI=Central America Regional Security
Initiative.
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Table A-3. FY2018 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
(estimated appropriations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
DA GHP ESF INCLE NADR IMET FMF Total
Belize — — — — — 0.1 1.0 1.1
Costa Rica — — — — — 0.7 5.0 5.7
El Salvador 55.0 — — — — 0.7 1.9 57.7a
Guatemala 93.0 13.0 — — — 0.7 1.7 108.5a
Honduras 75.0 — — — — 0.7 4.0 79.7a
Nicaragua 10.0 — — — — — — 10.0
Panama — — — — 0.5 0.6 2.0 3.1
CARSI — — 104.2 215.0 — — — 319.2a
Other Regional Programs 17.0 — — — — — 12.5 29.5a
Total 250.0 13.0 104.2 215.0 0.5 3.6 28.1 614.5a
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2020, May 2019; and “Explanatory
Statement Submitted by Mr. Frelinghuysen, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the
House Amendment to Senate Amendment on H.R. 1625,” Congressional Record, vol. 164, no. 50—book III
(March 22, 2018), p. H2851.
Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; GHP = Global Health
Programs; ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement;
NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; and CARSI=Central America Regional Security
Initiative.
a. The Trump Administration reprogrammed approximately $400 million of bilateral and regional aid that it had previously allocated to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Revised allocations are not yet available.
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress
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Table A-4. FY2019 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
(estimated appropriations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
DA GHP ESF INCLE NADR IMET FMF Total
Belize — — — — — — — —
Costa Rica — — — — — 0.7 7.5 8.2b
El Salvador — — — — — — — —
Guatemala — 13.0 — — — — — 13.0
Honduras — — — — — — — —
Nicaragua — — — — — — — —
Panama — — — — 0.5 — — 0.5
CARSI — — 100.0 190.0b — — — 290.0
Other Regional Programs 190.0a — — — — 3.4a 22.5a 215.9
Total 190.0 13.0 100.0 190.0 0.5 4.1 30.0 527.6
Source: H.Rept. 116-9.
Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; GHP = Global Health
Programs; ESF = Economic Support Fund; P.L. 480 = Food for Peace/Food Aid; INCLE = International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs;
IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; and CARSI=Central
America Regional Security Initiative.
a. Congress appropriated most FY2019 assistance for Central America as regional aid, giving the State Department flexibility in allocating the resources among the seven nations of the isthmus.
b. H.Rept. 116-9 stipulates that $32.5 million of CARSI INCLE assistance is to be allocated to Costa Rica.
Table A-5. FY2020 Funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
(requested appropriations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
ESDF GHP INCLE NADR IMET FMF Total
Belize — — — — 0.2 — 0.2
Costa Rica — — — — 0.4 — 0.4
El Salvador 45.0 — — — 0.7 — 45.7
Guatemala 65.7 3.0 — — 0.8 — 69.4
Honduras 65.0 — — — 0.8 — 65.8
Nicaragua 6.0 — — — — — 6.0
Panama — — — 0.5 0.7 — 1.2
CARSI 95.0 — 155.3 — — — 250.3
Other Regional Programs — — — — — 6.0 6.0
Total 276.7 3.0 155.3 0.5 3.5 6.0 445.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2020, May 2019; and State Department briefing, May 2019.
Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. ESDF = Economic Support and Development Fund; GHP
= Global Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR =
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and
Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; and CARSI=Central America Regional Security Initiative.
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service R44812 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED 37
Author Information
Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
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- 2019-11-12T13:45:02-0500
