Essay

Anger Theory and Management: A Historical Analysis Author(s): Simon Kemp and K. T. Strongman Source: The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 108, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 397-417 Published by: University of Illinois Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1422897 Accessed: 19-04-2018 07:28 UTC

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History of Psychology RAND B. EVANS, EDITOR

East Carolina University

Anger theory and management: A historical analysis SIMON KEMP AND K. T. STRONGMAN

University of Canterbury, New Zealand

Ancient and medieval views on anger-its desirability, causes, and control- are reviewed and compared with modern accounts. Although some differ- ences emerge, for example with respect to women's anger, the modern accounts bear a marked resemblance to the older ones. There is also an

early concern with the practice of anger management.

Anger and its control have been issues of practical and theoretical significance in Western culture for some time. In this article, we first outline ancient and medieval theories of anger and its control, then examine modern accounts, and finally consider what is new and old in modern thinking about anger.

Ancient and medieval attitudes to anger The Roman physician Claudius Galen, in his book The Diagnosis

and Cure of the Soul's Passions, remarks:

When I was still a young man ..., I watched a man eagerly trying to open a door. When things did not work out as he would have them, I saw him bite the key, kick the door, blaspheme, glare wildly like a madman, and all but foam at the mouth like a wild boar. When I saw

this, I conceived such a hatred for anger that I was never thereafter seen behaving in an unseemly manner because of it.

(Galen, 180'/1963, p. 38)

One gets the impression from the writings of Galen (180/1963) and Seneca (45/1928) that the exhibition of uncontrolled rage, par- ticularly toward slaves, was fairly common in imperial Roman society. For instance, Galen writes of his father's friends bruising tendons because of striking slaves in the teeth, and Seneca cites with admiration Plato's refusal to beat one of his slaves when the philosopher was angry with him.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY Fall 1995, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 397-417 ? 1995 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

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Both writers regarded rage with loathing, and refer to it as a kind of madness (e.g., Galen, 180/1963, p. 42; Seneca, 45/1928, p. 107). Seneca goes on to describe in detail the appearance and actions of an angry man, remarking that "it is an ugly and horrible picture of distorted and swollen frenzy-you cannot tell whether this vice is more execrable or more hideous" (p. 109).

Although ancient philosophers seem generally to have shown hos- tility to anger, there was some disagreement as to the value of the emotion. The Stoics, as exemplified by Seneca, regarded it as worthless even for war: The disciplined Roman army regularly defeats the fury of the Germans (Seneca, 45/1928, p. 133). In sporting contests, it is a mistake to become angry (p. 199), and in response to personal injury, "the only relief for great misfortunes is to bear them and submit to their coercion" (p. 297). If the misfortune is unbearable, then suicide should be preferred to rage.

Aristotle, on the other hand, regarded the emotion as having some value, holding that anger, which arises from perceived injustice, is useful for preventing injustice, and that the opposite of anger is a kind of insensibility. As with the other emotions, "good temper is a mean" (Aristotle, 350 B.C./1931, Nicomachean Ethics, 25b).

The difference between these two viewpoints, although real, should not obscure the points of similarity. Both Aristotle and Seneca were hostile to spontaneous, uncontrolled fits of anger, and although Ar- istotle condemned the opposite of anger, he readily conceded that its namelessness arose from its being uncommon (Aristotle, 350 B.C./ 1931, Nicomachean Ethics, 8a). Moreover, they agreed on both the possibility and value of controlling the emotion.

The Christian writers of the later Roman Empire and Middle Ages echoed the general theme of hostility to anger, although sometimes allowing, like Aristotle, for exceptions in certain cases. Saint John Chrysostom (390/1967), for example, also stressed the virtues of temperance in dealing with slaves, and Roger Bacon in his Opus Majus (1266/1962) quotes lengthy extracts from Seneca. In the popular twelfth-century work The Secret of Secrets, written in the form of advice from Aristotle to the young Alexander, the latter was informed that a king should have pity, refrain from wrath, act only after advice, and generally govern himself (Manzalaoui, 1977, p. 36).

The unknown author of the early fourteenth-century Ratis Raving followed Aristotle in advocating the doctrine of the mean. He warns that anger can bring on melancholy, and advocates that vengeance should be left until the blood is cool (Lumby, 1870). The twelfth- century poet Chretien de Troyes (1180/1982) also makes the point that vengeance should sometimes be postponed, partly because it may

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not always be possible to avenge an insult immediately. In Perceval, the hero's essential nobility is underlined by his postponing but even- tually extracting revenge from Sir Kay for striking one of the queen's maids.

In general, medieval saintly admonition and practice was on the side of restraint. For example, Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (1140/ 1981) compared anger to a dragon and advocated the virtues of meekness and magnanimity. However, as Lorens d'Orleans (1279/ 1942) remarked, there is a kind of anger that good holy men have, which arises from their hatred of evil and is used to combat it. William

of St. Thierry (1140/1977) divided anger into two types: beastly (undesirable) anger and rational anger. The latter manifested itself as zeal or discipline. As a minor example, Adam of Eynsham (1212/ 1985), the biographer of Saint Hugh of Lincoln, records that if chil- dren crowded the saint and his attendants tried to drive them off

with force, Saint Hugh was angered and indeed sometimes struck the attendants.

The foregoing will serve to indicate the widespread condemnation of unrestrained anger by ancient and medieval writers. Perhaps of more psychological interest are the topics of the next two sections: first, the psychological theory of anger and how its control is possible, and second, advice on how to control anger.

Ancient and medieval theories of anger According to Aristotle (350 B.C./1931, De Anima), human behavior

resulted from the interaction of psychological faculties, common to animals and people, that were located in bodily organs and those possessed only by humans that did not reside in bodily organs. The common faculties were nutrition, appetite, sensation (which included some cognitive abilities such as imagination and memory), and loco- motion. Emotions, which were also thought to be motivating powers, constituted the appetite. The uniquely human faculties, collectively known as the mind, were reason and the will. The mind could override

the appetites: "[T]hose who successfully resist temptation have ap- petite and desire and yet follow mind and refuse to enact that for which they have appetite" (Aristotle, 350 B.C./1 931, De Anima, 433a).

Broadly speaking, Aristotle's basic conception of the faculties of the human soul and their interrelationship provided a common framework for later writers. This influence was felt even when, as in the case of Nemesius (400/1955), an early Christian writer who was influenced by Neoplatonic and Stoic thinking, the definition of soul itself was debated. Generally, in fact, important differences in psychological, and particularly cognitive, theories (e.g., Bowman, 1973; Kemp, 1990)

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KEMP AND STRONGMAN

in the period of the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages do not seem to have produced major theoretical differences with respect to emo- tions and their possible control. On the contrary, the "consensus theory" of the psychology of anger was elaborated by these later thinkers.

Many (e.g., Aquinas, 1273/1964; Avicenna, 1020/1968; Galen, 180/1963; Nemesius, 400/1955) considered the appetitive powers to be divided into two classes: the affective or concupiscent emotions (Lat. virtus concupiscibilis), which were simple reactions to pleasurable or aversive objects, and the spirited or irascible emotions (Lat. virtus irascibilis), which involved striving to obtain a pleasurable outcome or avoid an aversive one in conditions of difficulty. According to Avicenna (1020/1968), passionate desire was the strongest of the concupiscent, and anger the strongest of the irascible emotions.

Physiologically, anger was often held to accompany the heating of blood and vital spirits around the heart (e.g., Aquinas, 1273/1964; Seneca, 45/1928). Because people were believed to differ in their temperaments-the mix of qualities or humors each contained (e.g., Avicenna, 1020/1968; Seneca, 45/1928; Siegel, 1973)-differences in susceptibility to anger were also predicted. So, for example, both Aristotle (350 B.C./1931, Nicomachean Ethics) and Seneca (45/1928) distinguish the hot-tempered, whose anger was quick to arise but also quick to subside, from the sullen. Seneca also subscribed to the belief (also found elsewhere, e.g., Manzalaoui, 1977) that red-haired and red-faced people are hot-tempered because of excessive hot and dry humors. Another common medieval belief was that people who were prone to anger had an excess of yellow bile or choler (e.g., Bartholo- maeus Anglicus, 1260/1975). Although differences in liability to anger could be and often were

traced to differences in temperament or circumstances (e.g., Seneca, 45/1928), acts of will, either at the time of the anger-provoking incident or exerted in previous more or less similar incidents, were thought to be more important causal factors, both from a psychological and an ethical standpoint. Indeed, the presumed involvement of the mind in the emotion of anger was both important and complex. Aristotle (350 B.C./1931, Rhetoric, 1378a) defined anger as "an im-

pulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspic- uous slight directed without justification towards what concerns one- self or what concerns one's friends." Seneca (45/1928, p. 113) re- garded anger as the desire to exact punishment. The essential point about both definitions is that anger is predicated on complex thought processes: What, for example, is a conspicuous slight? In consequence, both writers regarded anger as requiring input from the mind as well

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as from sensations; Seneca argued that animals cannot be angry, be- cause they lack reason, which is required. Medieval philosophers (e.g., Aquinas, 1273/1964; Avicenna, 1020/1968; Bacon 1266/1962) also made this point.

If mind is required for anger, then clearly the will, which is part of the mind, can influence whether or not one becomes angry. An obvious way, discussed by Seneca (45/1928), is that one can question and perhaps redefine whether or not one has been slighted by someone else. Similarly, as Aquinas (1273/1964) pointed out, so long as one is not surprised by an event or a perception, one can choose whether and for how long one perceives or contemplates it.

The idea that anger can be controlled by the will and that people are not at the mercy of physiological or external processes was echoed by Christian thinkers. A central theme of Christian thought, reflected for example in the consistent hostility of the Church to deterministic astrology (e.g., Augustine, 426/1972; Origen, 218/1936), was that humans had free will and were responsible for their behavior and the eternal consequences of it. This viewpoint and its application to the control of anger was succinctly summarized by Nemesius who, after conceding that some individuals have a difficult temperament or have had a more difficult upbringing, went on to state:

When soul, therefore, yields to physical temperament and gives way to lust or anger... the evil so constituted is voluntary. For a soul that does not yield to faulty temperament, but corrects and overcomes it, chang- ing it rather than being changed by it, succeeds in establishing for itself wholesome dispositions, by gentle training and a helpful diet. So, from considering those that go about things in the right way, it can be seen that those who do not, sin voluntarily. For it lies with us whether we concur with our faults of temperament or work against them and master them. And when the man in the street puts up the excuse that his faulty temperament is the cause of his passions, he does not attribute vice to man's choice but to necessity, and caps that by alleging that the ac- quisition of the virtues does not lie with us either; an assertion which is monstrous.

(Nemesius, 400/1955, pp. 416-417)

As the preceding passage implies, the mind should not only control behavior by willpower at the time one is angered but also acquire the habit of self-control by correct training. A similar point is made by Galen (180/1963, p. 38): "A man cannot free himself from the habit of anger as soon as he resolves to do so, but he can keep in check the unseemly manifestations of his passion. If he will do this frequently, he will then discover that he is less prone to anger than he formerly was."

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The psychological possibility of acquiring such a habit seems to have been widely recognized, either implicitly or explicitly, in the Middle Ages. For example, Peter Abelard (1135/1971) considered that being irascible or ready for anger was a mental vice, distinct from sin but clearly undesirable.

Saint Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae (1273/1964) dis- cussed habits (Lat. habitus) which are acquired by the mind and dispose people to virtue or evil. These habits are usually acquired gradually, and form a kind of memory of the mind. A similar view of habits is found in the writings of Duns Scotus (1260-1308), although their views on will and virtue are otherwise rather different. Duns Scotus

remarks that "by its frequently elicited acts, the will can produce a certain correct aptitude inclining it towards similar acts, and that aptitude is what I call a virtue" (Wolter, 1986, p. 327).

Discussing the issue of how these habits may be weakened, Aquinas notes that a morally virtuous disposition enables someone to moderate his actions and feelings. But if this disposition is not exercised, many feelings and actions will arise which are not virtuous, under the in- fluence of some emotion or external force. Then virtue itself will be

lost or weakened (Aquinas, 1273/1964, 1.2.53.3). Similarly, Duns Scotus remarks that vicious habits are not cured by a single right act (Wolter, 1986). The concept of habit, incidentally, was of some theo- logical significance because, after death, the virtue or otherwise of the immortal mind is determined by the kinds of habit that have been formed in one's life (e.g., Aquinas, 1273/1964).

Despite the strength of the idea of individual responsibility for one's actions, it was frequently conceded that people could be overmastered by a passion such as anger. In such cases they were held to be insane, and not in control of their actions. This might come about through illness or even demonic possession (e.g., Aquinas 1273/1964; Hilde- gard of Bingen, 1155/1957). This exception to the rule of individual responsibility also held legally in many countries. For example, Brac- ton, writing on the laws of thirteenth-century England, mentions in several places that people who are insane (Lat.furiosus) or of unsound mind cannot be held accountable for their actions, because they are incapable of intention or understanding (Bracton, 1260/1968, Vol. 2, pp. 384, 424; Vol. 4, p. 308).

Children were often considered alongside the insane in not being fully accountable for their actions (e.g., Bracton, 1260/1968, Vol. 2, p. 384), and were sometimes thought unusually prone to anger (e.g., Bacon, 1266/1962; Seneca, 45/1928). More interesting and perhaps unexpected, however, is that some ancient and medieval writers also considered women to be more prone to anger than men (e.g., Bacon,

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1266/1962; Seneca, 45/1928). Galen does not draw a general point, but did contrast the restrained behavior of his father with his mother's

proneness to anger, which extended to biting her handmaidens (Galen, 180/1963, p. 57). The medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides (1198/1966) suggests that women and children are more prone to emotional displays generally, not on constitutional grounds, but be- cause they have not been educated in ethics and morals.

On the other hand, ancient and medieval writers rarely refer to women's anger at all, perhaps because the works of these writers were not primarily intended for women. One exception is Geoffroy de la Tour-Landry's book (1375/1868), which consists of instructions to his daughters. He recommends that wives refrain from quarreling and return provocation from their husbands with meekness. One instructive example is of a woman whose husband regularly brought other women home. Notwithstanding this provocation, she always responded mildly, and eventually her husband reformed his ways (de la Tour-Landry, 1375/1868, pp. 23-24). Although de la Tour-Landry does advise meekness, he does not seem to have regarded anger as a particularly feminine vice and devotes much more space to advising his daughters against vanity and uncharitableness.

Controlling anger The preceding section showed that ancient and medieval psychology

recognized that people not only should control the expression of anger in most situations, but also could learn gradual mastery over this or other emotions. At least sporadic efforts were made to describe how one might go about achieving such control.

Seneca's advice, contained largely in the third book of his De Ira (45/1928), covers the questions of how to avoid becoming angry in the first place, how to cease being angry, and how to deal with it in others. He is careful to point out that different techniques may be used, depending on the individual and the strength of one's anger.

Anger may be avoided in the first place "if we repeatedly set before ourselves its many faults" (Seneca, 45/1928, p. 265). Additionally, some specific things should be avoided, including being too busy (especially with tasks beyond one's powers), anger-provoking people, and unnecessary hunger or thirst. Soothing music, on the other hand, is beneficial.

To guard against growing anger, Seneca advises one to check speech and impulses and be aware of particular sources of personal irritation. In dealing with other people, one should not be too inquisitive: It is not always soothing to hear and see everything. When someone ap- pears to slight you, you should be at first reluctant to believe this,

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and should wait to hear the full story. You should also put yourself in the place of the other person, trying to understand his motives and any extenuating factors, such as age or illness.

Seneca gives a number of examples of how people have controlled their anger in trying circumstances, and suggests these examples be borne in mind: You should ask friends to watch over your behavior and to help, for example, by not serving too much wine. Also rec- ommended is the daily exercise of asking: "What bad habit have you cured today? What fault have you resisted? In what respect are you better?" (Seneca, 45/1928, p. 341).

When dealing with the anger of others, it is wise to do nothing quickly. Being angry in return is likely to make matters worse, and often some kind of deception is necessary when talking to angry people.

Some of Seneca's advice is repeated by later writers. Galen (180/ 1963), for example, also suggests that daily self-inquisition is useful. Galen's main practical advice, however, is to find someone else to act as a guide and teacher in controlling one's passions, and he considers at length how such a guide should be selected. Maimonides (1190/ 1912) also took this approach, suggesting that someone given to un- controllable passion should seek out a philosopher in the same way that someone suffering from physical illness seeks out a physician (or in the same way that someone today might seek out a therapist).

Bacon (1266/1962) repeats many of Seneca's anecdotes at length, but only summarizes most of the practical advice. Indeed, though many medieval books of instruction dwell on the evils of anger and the virtues of temperance, exhortation and example are the most frequently recommended remedies. For example, John Mirk's (1146/ 1868) Instructions for Parish Priests recommends that the angry man should consider how angels flee before him and fiends run toward him to burn him with hellfire.

On the other hand, the lives of the saints often portrayed examples not only of self-control in anger-provoking situations but also of how saints cleverly defused the anger of others. Saint Anselm, when dealing with the difficult character of Osbern, "began with a certain holy guile to flatter the boy with kindly blandishments" (Eadmer, 1100/ 1962, p. 16). Saint Hugh of Lincoln, confronting Henry II when the king was speechless with anger, was able to turn his anger to laughter with a well-chosen piece of wit (Adam of Eynsham, 1212/1985).

As a rule, those who wrote about controlling anger seem to have had few illusions as to the ease or speed of the task. "Each of us," says Galen (180/1963, pp. 37, 41), "needs almost a lifetime of training to become a perfect man.... Even if you should not become much

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better, be satisfied if in the first year you have advanced and shown some measure of improvement." Another point of agreement is that the process should start in childhood because children are more malle- able (e.g., Chrysostom, 390/1967; Eadmer, 1100/1962; Seneca, 45/ 1928).

Seneca recommends that children should be trained early, but in such a way as not to blunt their spirit. So humiliation and servility should be avoided, and care should be taken that they are not beaten by playmates nor permitted to become angry with them. They should not be pampered or indulged. "He will not withstand rebuffs who has never been denied anything, whose tears have always been wiped away by an anxious mother, who has been allowed to have his own way with his tutor" (Seneca, 45/1928, p. 205). It is also very important that the child's requests should not be granted when he is angry.

Chrysostom (390/1967) also considers how Christian parents should teach self-control to their children. Boys should be trained "from earliest childhood to be patient when they suffer wrongs themselves, but, if they see another being wronged, to sally forth courageously" (Chrysostom, 390/1967, p. 113). The training is the responsibility of the father, but the entire household can help. For example, the family slaves are to be permitted, on occasion, to provoke the child, so that he can learn to control his anger. If the child becomes angry he should be reminded to control himself; if he strikes a slave, he should be punished. Clearly, this was a very powerful regimen for conditioning the child.

More recent attitudes to anger It is a large leap from the middle ages to the present, and as we

will show below, the work of Stearns (1992, 1993) will prove of assistance in making it. First, though, the aim of the second half of this article is to provide an overview of recent ideas on anger and its control, as expressed by psychologists. At the outset, it is interesting to note that despite the ubiquity of anger in everyday affairs and despite a proliferation of theory and empirical research on emotion in the last 20 years, psychologists do not, in general, have much to say about anger.2

Theories of anger A standard, uncomplicated analysis of anger is made by Izard (1991),

who lists the following causes of anger: restraint, the blocking or interrupting of goal-directed activity, aversive stimulation, being mis- led or unjustly hurt, and moral indignation. He views it as an emotion that interacts with disgust and contempt, and as adaptive. Anger

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mobilizes energy and can be justified as an appropriate defense against assertiveness.

Izard states, "Anger is an important emotion. It is often undesirable and typically avoided in so far as possible" (1991, p. 209). He also suggests that not expressing anger could result in health problems. Although, in Izard's view, anger is not the only cause of aggression, "Appropriate expression of justified anger may even strengthen the relationship between the angry person and the person who is the target of the anger" (p. 209). He also maintains that control over anger can inhibit fear.

A similar concentration on the causes of anger (and joy, sadness, and fear) is made in an extensive cross-cultural study by Scherer, Wallbott, and Summerfield (1986). Across a number of European cultures, the investigators identify the following antecedents of anger: the failure of friends, the failure of strangers, inappropriate rewards, the failure of relatives, inconvenience, and the failure to reach goals. In the particular context of personal relationships, they point to unjust treatment, the violation of norms, and damage to property. Scherer et al.'s antecedents are in accord with Izard's causes.

Lazarus's (1991) approach to anger is fuller than that of most emotion theorists and is expressed very much in terms of his cognitive- motivational-relational view of emotion and coping processes. He char- acterizes anger, like the other negative emotions, as resulting from harm, loss, or threat, but with any blame for these being attributed to someone. For the angry person, the implication is that whoever caused the harm, loss, or threat could have exercised control and not done it, if he or she had so wished.

More particularly, Lazarus argues that a matter of general impor- tance to people is the preservation of their ego identity. Any assault on this will prompt anger, a reaction which is to an extent dependent on personality and on one's recent history of being demeaned. In Lazarus's terms, adult human anger is spurred by "a demeaning offence against me and mine," and in this context, even a simple frustration can imply being demeaned. However, anger "can be trans- formed readily by cognitive (or emotion-focused) coping processes" (1991, p. 221).

At the heart of Lazarus's theory of emotion is the process of ap- praisal (Lazarus sees cognition as being a necessary part of emotion, e.g., 1982, 1984) which he always characterizes as being both primary and secondary. With respect to the primary appraisal of anger, there must be a relevant goal at stake, an incongruence involved with respect to reaching that goal, and concern with the preservation of self-esteem against assault.

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If these conditions are met and the primary appraisal which leads to anger is made, then according to Lazarus (1982) secondary ap- praisals follow. For example, blame is apportioned. If this is to an external agent, then anger will result; if it is self-directed, then so will the anger be. As Izard (1991) also suggests, Lazarus argues that for anger to occur, one must believe that whoever is blameworthy was capable of control (i.e., of not doing whatever was done) but chose not to exercise it.

As Lazarus sees it, anger also involves the appraisal that the best way of dealing with the offense is to attack. Moreover, if one has the expectation that there is a good possibility that attack will provide a successful way of coping, then anger is more likely to result.

Lazarus also has some interesting comments about the implications of anger and its control. He observes that anger is often inhibited, particularly if it seems that its expression might produce a strong retaliation. He argues that expressed anger can be both useful and dangerous, but uncontrolled anger may be both counterproductive and physically unhealthy. He also points to the existence of many types of extreme, lasting, or recurrent anger, or the inability to express anger at all, any of which may be pathological. Of course, whether or not these manifestations are regarded as pathological will depend on the time, the place, and the culture.

The fullest and most far-reaching consideration of anger (and aggression) by a psychologist in recent years has been made by Averill (1982) who takes a firm social constructionist standpoint. His simple starting point is that anger is antisocial, unpleasant, negative, and very common.

For the present purposes, it is of interest to note that Averill in part takes a historical view. He summarizes early accounts of anger that characterize it as complex and often irrational, although not noncog- nitive. At the interpersonal level, he argues that it has been viewed as involving a violation of socially accepted conduct and as having the aim of exacting revenge or at least punishing the perpetrator. Typically, biological factors (such as the basic animal nature of human beings) have been adduced to account for a lack of control over anger. So it has been the aim of society to attempt to make rules for the experience and the expression of anger in order to maximize the gains it can bring and minimize its costs.

Taking up the point that (in Western society) anger is very common, Averill points out that its main target is a loved one, a friend, or an acquaintance. Its aim is often to change whatever conditions have brought it about. Always, there is a perceived wrong, something that

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was done either purposely or through negligence. In other words, the cause of anger is either an unjustified act or an avoidable accident.

Averill characterizes many ways to express anger, but argues that we tend to dwell on the more dramatic of these, mainly involving physical aggression. In fact, though, as Averill points out, physical aggression as an expression of anger is relatively rare. More often than not, in Western society, anger is dealt with by talking things over or seeing the conflict as a series of problems that can be solved. Many episodes of anger are seen by people as having beneficial outcomes, even though the experience of anger might have been unpleasant.

Averill also considers the time course of anger, again believing this to be dependent on cultural standards. For example, in Western society a crime of passion must not last "too long." Each society has its norms of the upper and lower limits to define the duration of anger. He also observes that at least in American society men and women become angry equally often, although the manner in which anger is expressed depends, among other things, on gender. These points are debatable and will be taken up again later.

Having cleared some conceptual undergrowth, Averill offers an inclusive definition of anger as

a conflictive emotion that, on the biological level, is related to aggressive systems and, even more important, to the capacities for co-operative social living, symbolization and reflective self-awareness; that, on the psychological level, is aimed at the correction of some appraised wrong; and that, on the sociocultural level, functions to uphold accepted standards of conduct.3 (Averill, 1982, p. 317, italics in original)

In this definition, although Averill links anger with aggression bio- logically, he is nevertheless casting it very much as a socially con- structed syndrome or a mixture of transitory social roles.

Averill takes the biological aspects of these considerations further in arguing that not all aggression is biologically based and that some biological aspects of anger are nonaggressive. He characterizes hu- mans as "by nature" rule following--"by nature" implies biologically. Averill also suggests that by nature we become upset when rules are broken and that one result of this is anger. So, in Averill's terms, although anger is highly symbolic and is socially constructed, it has biological roots.

Because rules are integral to emotion, Averill deems it important to describe the rules that apply to anger. These rules involve appraisal (concerning the instigation, the target, and the aim of anger); behavior (concerning overt expression, physiological arousal, and subjective experience); prognostication (concerning sequence and duration); and attribution (concerning events and self).

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Some of the rules of anger are constitutive and some are regulative. It is the constitutive rules that typify a social constructionist view. Other (biological) views assume that some emotions preexist and can therefore only be regulated by rules, rather than also constituted by them.

Averill has little to say directly about the control of anger. He does point out that, as a social construction, anger can often go awry. When this happens anger could, and perhaps should, be eliminated, although this is hard to achieve. He ends by suggesting that a balance is desirable so that anger can be understood and used by the individual, rather than simply being praised or condemned.

Gender and anger

In one of the few feminist analyses of emotion, Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault, and Benton (1992) characterize Averill's exposition as a particularly male view. From a woman's perspective, they place the stress differently, arguing to begin with that anger involves moral judgments about rightness and justice, and is sometimes socially ac- ceptable and sometimes not.

From their experiential analysis of women's anger, Crawford and her colleagues suggest that anger is related to fear; it is a response to something to be feared and is connected with being hurt. Anger in women is expected to be restrained, and if it is not then women exhibiting anger are seen as emotional or hysterical. Whereas men's anger is potentially violent, women's anger is associated with bursting into tears, something which then becomes misinterpreted as being hurt or depressed rather than enraged. In fact, from the woman's perspective, crying indicates the strength of the anger, and is not a replacement for it. The tears are demonstrating feelings of being a victim, that is, of being annoyed or aggrieved, yet are often seen (by men) as being anger out of a woman's control.

Crawford et al. also point out that women's anger is often not allowed to be expressed, it being common to tease women by ridiculing them for expressing their anger. But this suppression of anger is not control; in fact, suppression sometimes serves to make anger more extreme.

Matters become even more complex than this. Contrary to the case for men, women are condemned both for expressing anger too strongly or for suppressing it too much. This, from a woman's perspective, is quite different from the situation for men, who are permitted (en- couraged?) to express their anger. Moreover, women's anger is usually not violent. In spite of women's anger being nonviolent, anger is

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commonly linked to aggression because men generally dominate women and often find women's anger unintelligible.

There are clear differences in power between women and men, a matter which is also relevant to anger. Averill (1982) notes that anger and aggression is often directed toward inferiors. If one has power, anger helps one keep it; anger empowers. All of which is considered valid in our society. By contrast, anger from powerlessness (the wom- an's lot) is seen as more out of control, more passionate, and more ineffectual. It is accompanied by feelings of unjust victimization and is directed against those in power (men), and often provokes the powerful and empowering type of anger in return.

Anger control As part of his significant series of analyses of the recent history of

emotion, Stearns (1992) also considers its control. In Victorian times, anger was seen as destructive and damaging, something to be con- trolled; its display by women was regarded as decidedly unfeminine. This was very much the view in the domestic sphere. By contrast, anger was seen as necessary to men to give them a useful edge in the sphere of business and politics. Men were expected to control their anger, but were also seen as wimpish if they never became angry.

These gender differences naturally impinged on child-rearing prac- tices, with girls being taught to be calm and placid and boys to channel their anger. So, for boys, anger was supposed not to be suppressed, but rather they had to be taught circumstances in which the use of anger was appropriate-managing anger by boxing for example.

The question of training boys to channel their anger was evidently complex, because it was not meant to give an excuse for angry out- bursts. However, even the extreme parental discipline of boys' anger was to make sure that anger was aimed appropriately rather than eliminated altogether. It was frequently assumed though that girls would not be angry at all. Women were taught that any expression of anger by them would go against both their sex and against proper family life.

In the twentieth century a new set of standards began to develop. For instance, anger for men in the workplace became more and more limited, being seen as something that inhibited work rather than providing a spur for it. So, managers would not only be in control of their own anger but also ready to train those whom they managed; all of which also applied to women.

Among others, Stearns (1992) cites Dale Carnegie's exhortations to stay cool and never to use anger in such a way that circumstances become intractable. He and others applied such suggestions equally

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to both sexes. As Stearns characterizes it, the movement in the 1940s and 1950s to reduce anger in the workplace also helped to cut down different expectations about emotion in the two sexes. At the same time the child-rearing manuals stopped advocating the channeling of anger away from the family. Instead, parents were encouraged to have their children recognize angry impulses and talk them through.

Stearns argues, unlike Crawford et al. (1992), that the pressures in the twentieth century have been away from Victorian gender differ- ences and in the direction of uniformity. He lists a number of factors that interact to bring this about. For instance, there have been cultural tensions because anger is seen as bad and yet still allowed in the workplace. Then again, anger should not be expressed at home but may be useful at work.

Moreover, the family became less important in the control of emo- tion. Similarly, the middle-class workplace was changing so much that those in charge thought that new emotional standards should prevail. Also, both in the workplace and socially, there has been far more intermingling between the sexes in this century than in the last. For these reasons, men have become less and less likely to express emotion openly. However, it should be pointed out, as Stearns does in passing, that changes in the standards underlying the expression of anger do not necessarily mean that there will also be changes in experience. We will return to this point.

In recent years, there has been a large discrepancy between practice and theory in anger control; practice has been rife and theory has been sparse. Much of Stearns's (1992) work, described already, has to do with changes in ideas about the control of anger between the last century and the present. He continues this (1993) by pointing to child-rearing manuals in the United States in the 1940s which ex- plained why an anger-free personality is so important to the workplace. This viewpoint contrasts strongly with the previous emphasis on chan- neled anger (for men). The newer approach was endorsed by fears that intense anger (and fear, etc.) was bad for the health.

In the last few decades, the aim in Western culture has been for

people to manage their anger. "People" here refers particularly to men, who, doubtless as a hangover from Victorian times, are seen as being prone to break out in uncontrolled angry displays. This is seen as less of a problem for women who, by implication, either do not experience such angry impulses, or have learned to control (suppress) them.

There has been a proliferation of anger-management groups, where men have been "put in touch with their emotions" and taught to deal with their anger in nonaggressive ways. Such groups permeate society,

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from prisons to Workers Educational Association courses, from in- dustry to the sportsfield. However, this development has received scant mention in psychological texts.

Recent ideas on anger control seem to have arisen from a flurry of books and papers by Novaco in the mid-1970s (e.g., Novaco, 1975). These appear to have been used to implement large numbers of programs of anger control without the benefit of much in the way of further research, either into their aims or their efficacy.

Novaco (1975) viewed anger as an emotional response to provo- cation, a response that occurs in three modalities -cognitive, somatic- affective, and behavioral. Thus, there are appraisals, tension and ag- itations, and withdrawal and antagonism. Management of anger is then based on group discussion of the problems involved in the anger. Encouraged is a self-exploration of the situations that lead to anger, followed by an imagery-based reliving of recent angry experiences. The therapists suggest that the angry feelings the clients are expe- riencing are influenced by their own thoughts and offer clients an account of the functions of anger.

This is all followed by so-called stress inoculation. In this, clients are taught relaxation skills to control their arousal and various cog- nitive controls to exercise on their attention, thoughts, images, and feelings. They are taught to see the provocation and the anger itself as occurring in a series of stages, each of which can be dealt with.

In general, then, recent anger-management techniques (largely for men) have been based on education, training, and application. Mean- while, in a plethora of similar courses, women have been encouraged in assertiveness training, a matter in which there appears to be an equal dearth of academic or scientific writing. Although assertiveness does not equate with anger, any more than aggression does, it is clearly related to it.

These movements, promulgated by professional practitioners, may be seen as taking the two sexes into a middle ground of anger, a final casting off of the shackles of Victorian gender differences. Men are encouraged to engage in more public displays of tears, and women are counseled that it is not only good to be assertive, but even to become angry. Thus, there may even be a reversal of roles repre- senting a change in the balance of power.

Comparisons and conclusions

A tricky problem concerns the scientific status of the ancient and medieval thinking about anger that we have outlined. In particular, is it more properly compared with modern academic theories or with

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folk psychology? That often little is known of the source of the earlier accounts exacerbates this problem.

What becomes apparent when undertaking a comparative historical exercise of the present sort is the importance of comparing like with like, or the importance of noting what voice is being listened to. Consider the early writings on anger. Did these philosophers and scientists base their descriptions on observations they had made of others? Or observations of themselves? Or reports made by others to them of their experiences?

The earlier accounts certainly did not involve the experimental or even empirical testing of hypothetical constructs. On the other hand, it is clear for example from Galen's remarks of his mother's behavior, or from Seneca's discussion of the role of anger in war, or even from anecdotes about the medieval saints that intelligent observation of people's behavior was an important ingredient. Another ingredient, particularly in the Middle Ages, was previous well-regarded theories, especially those of Aristotle and Seneca. Both of these ingredients, of course, link these older theories with those of modern science. In fact, other than our present-day use of an occasional questionnaire, the measurement of anger nowadays is scarcely more sophisticated than it was in Aristotle's time.

It is quite probable that the ultimate origin of some of the early theorizing lies in folk psychology, but it is also true that some earlier writers diverge quite sharply from the received beliefs about anger of many of their contemporaries. For example, it is clear from Seneca's account that his total rejection of anger differs markedly from both the beliefs and practices of most of his contemporaries. Also com- pelling in this regard is Nemesius's scorn, based largely on theoretical considerations, for the popular view of people being out of control and not responsible for their actions. On the whole, then, it seems that ancient and medieval accounts of anger (like those of medieval cognition, e.g., Kemp & Fletcher, 1993) cannot be considered simply as either science in its strictest modern sense or as folk psychology.

These matters are also pertinent to a comparison of the views of Stearns (1992) on the development of gender differences in anger from Victorian to contemporary times with those of Crawford et al. (1992) on the present. They both take the folk psychological approach, but use different sources. Stearns uses parent and home manuals, and workplace guides and manuals. Crawford et al. use recent techniques from feminist methodology that record the emotional memories of a group of women.

The two approaches produced very different results. Stearns's anal- yses point to a coming together of the genders with respect to the

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experience of anger. Crawford et al. demonstrate clear and funda- mental differences between women's and men's anger. Stearns studied the institutionalizing into Western writing of the prescription for change and the prescription for control. Crawford et al. elucidated women's actual experiences. Like is not quite being compared with like.

How do these ways of looking at things fit in with the more common techniques of psychologists and other scientists, who represent, after all, the modern variety of the early philosophers who produced psy- chological theories. The general answer to this is that it is difficult to say. There has to be a closer rapprochement between theory from psychological science and folk psychology before matters become clearer.

Leaving aside questions of scientific status, we find surprisingly few changes in our concepts about anger in more than 2,000 years. Our understanding of anger is not that much more advanced than that of Aristotle in 350 B.C. Aristotle and Seneca resemble Lazarus in ac-

cording an integral place to what would now be called cognitive factors in their accounts of anger. In particular, the same concern with the role of appraisal emerges in these earlier writings as in the works of Lazarus and Averill.

The cognitive element in anger is a key factor in conceptualizations of its control in the older theory as well as in contemporary anger- management practice. It might also be noted that both the ancient and modern techniques of anger management require both work and attention to specific details, especially of anger-provoking situations, on the part of the angry client who wishes to reform.

One difference between the earlier and more recent accounts of

anger is that the former were not concerned with possible harmful effects of its suppression. Another lies in the area of gender. For whatever reason, gender differences in anger do not seem to have been of much concern for the earlier theorists, and certainly were not a matter for much discussion. By contrast, they have been very important to contemporary Western society in practice, and are now also being addressed in theory.

Finally, it should be said that perhaps it is not surprising that our knowledge of anger and its control has developed little in two mil- lennia. Anger might have a core biological and temperamental base, but in practice we are buffeted about from time to time in its expres- sion, channeling, suppression, and maybe even its experience by those who seek to say what is appropriate for our society. If this is so, then perhaps those psychologists who take a social constructionist approach have most to offer in the historical comparative study of topics such as anger. They appear to represent the best compromise between

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science and folk theory, and as such are perhaps the modern equivalent of the early thinkers.

Notes

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Simon Kemp or K. T. Strongman, Department of Psychology, University of Can- terbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand. E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]. Received for publication November 22, 1993; revision received January 26, 1994.

1. The first date given in this reference, as in those following, denotes the approximate date when the work was first written, not the date it was first printed.

2. The material drawn on here is from the last decade or so. For many years before that, psychologists confused (and in some cases equated) anger and aggression, much being written about aggression while anger received scant mention. It was as if the two were almost synonymous. That this is not so is by now obvious: Anger can have many outcomes other than aggres- sion and aggression can have many causes and concomitants other than anger.

3. It is interesting to note that a comparison of this definition with Ar- istotle's reveals that things have changed relatively little in well over 2,000 years.

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