Term paper of Asia: Chiang kai-shek in the Shanghai massacre

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The Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei

Author(s): So Wai Chor

Source: Modern China , Apr., 2002, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Apr., 2002), pp. 213-252

Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3181354

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https://www.jstor.org/stable/3181354

The Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy, 1932-1937

The Roles of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei

SO WAI CHOR

Open University of Hong Kong

From the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the Nanjing government's agenda was dominated by relations with Japan and conflict with the communists. To deal with the dual threat, Chiang Kai-shek formulated

the policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" (xian annei, hou rangwai). Hence, suppressing the communists would take precedence over resisting Japan. The wisdom of this approach was widely contested in the party, the government, and the country at

large. It was branded by its critics a policy of "nonresistance" (bu dikang) toward Japan. But Chiang had the staunch support of Wang Jingwei, the veteran and influential party leader who had formed a political alliance with him in January 1932. They stayed the course despite mounting opposition. Their cooperation in dealing with the Japanese threat gradually dissolved only after Wang withdrew to Europe to recuperate after an assassination attempt in November 1935.

In China and in the West, this political alliance forged between Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek has conventionally been por- trayed as joining two unequal partners. Chiang's contemporaries often recollected that the real power of the Nanjing government was in the hands of Chiang (Jiang Tingfu, 1984: 149; He Lian, 1988: 112-15; Chen Gongbo, 1979: 326-30). This assessment has been readily

AUTHOR'S NOTE: The research for this article was supported by a research grant from the President's Advisory Committee on Research and Development of the Open University of Hong Kong.

MODERN CHINA, Vol. 28 No. 2, April 2002 213-252 ? 2002 Sage Publications

213

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214 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

accepted by historians of different persuasions. In the historiography of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Guomindang govern- ment under Chiang has usually been characterized as a "dictatorship" or even vilified as "fascist in nature" (Zhang Tongxin, 1988: 29, 50; Ma Zhendu and Qi Rugao, 1998: 39; Yan Ruping and Zheng Zemin, 1992: 5). Western scholars have also often described Chiang as a "dic- tator" or an "authoritarian leader"; more commonly, he is depicted as having "a dominant voice" in the Guomindang government (Eastman, 1974: 179, 278, 280; Coble, 1991: 6; Kirby, 1984: 165; Tien, 1972: 3, 26). Similarly, historians in Taiwan have perceived Chiang, after the Northern Expedition, as the leader of the party and the country. His decisive role in key decisions has not been in dispute (Li Yunhan, 1979, 1997; Li Shoukong, 1975; Chen Cungong, 1984). Wang was reduced to the instrumental role of implementing Chiang's wishes in the Nanjing government. In this context, China's policy toward Japan has always been seen as largely shaped by Chiang Kai-shek (Coble, 1991: 6; Sun, 1993: 26; Li Yunhan, 1987: 47, 1997: 52; Zhang Tongxin, 1988: 29, 50).

The publication in recent decades of voluminous archival materi- als, memoirs, and diaries of key officials in the PRC and Taiwan is now

making possible closer scrutiny of Chiang's power in making policy toward Japan, particularly his political relationship with Wang. Draw-

ing on these sources, in this article, I analyze the roles of Chiang and Wang in formulating that policy and argue that their relationship was

more complex than has been hitherto depicted. An institutional factor

augmented Wang's role. Although no key decisions were made with- out the participation of Chiang Kai-shek, Wang's position in the Cen- tral Political Council of the Guomindang enabled him to influence policy making, at least as far as Japan was concerned. Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek needed Wang Jingwei's political support to ensure that the party and the government would accept the policy toward Japan. An analysis of their actions in major Sino-Japanese incidents in the 1930s indicates that Chiang treated Wang as a necessary partner in

tackling this issue. He was prepared to defer to Wang's decisions and left the day-to-day negotiations with the Japanese largely in Wang's hands. It can be said that they jointly directed the policy toward Japan between 1932 and 1935.

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 215

The study also shows that Chiang was willing to keep his differ- ences with Wang Jingwei hidden behind a facade of political unity. It is received opinion that Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek were in complete accord in seeking accommodation with Japan (Boyle, 1972: 31;Bunker, 1972: 13; Coble, 1991:58, 180; see also Cai Dejin, 1988: 199-200; Liu Weikai, 1995:186-87). Their common view of the Japa- nese threat explains why the two leaders could cooperate in formulat- ing a joint policy. Yet the present inquiry highlights the fundamental differences in their thinking on the issue. A pessimistic streak always

underlay Wang's attitude toward a war with Japan, most obviously in his judgment that foreign powers would never come to the aid of China

in a Sino-Japanese war. More significantly, Wang was stubbornly opposed to any alliance with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet Union. In contrast, although Chiang was a die-hard anti- communist, he was too much a political realist to forgo a possible alli- ance with the Soviets-and even with his deadly enemy the CCP-in a war with Japan. And unlike Wang, Chiang did not completely lose hope of obtaining support from the West. Chiang let these hidden dif-

ferences become visible only after Wang's departure for Europe, when he took direct control of government policy toward Japan.

In examining Sino-Japanese relations in the 1930s, Chinese histori- ans often focus on whether the policy of "first internal pacification" was justified or was essentially "nonresistance" at all costs. The ques- tion has obvious political implications, as the answer contains a judg- ment about Guomindang rule in the Republican period. Taiwanese historians understandably have evaluated the policy sympathetically, as a calculated response to Japanese encroachments that was well suited to the reality of the time (Li Yunhan, 1987: 42-60, 162-70; Chen

Cungong, 1984: 467-69, 481; Jiang Yongjing, 1995: 53-56). Histo- rians in the PRC have invariably condemned Chiang's Japan policy as simply nonresistance (Zhang Tongxin, 1988: 17-33), only recently taking a new critical look at this period of history (Waldron, 1996). Their descriptions are now recognizing Chiang's anti-Japanese goal and the "progressive" side of his nationalism (Xue Yu, 1995: 84-85; Yang Shubiao and Yin Tie, 1994: 307-12; Li Yibin, 1989: 105; Huang Ming and Li Shicheng, 1995: 95; Xiao Hua, 1995: 72-73, 77-78). Western scholars have paid more attention to the long-term effects on

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216 MODERN CHINA/APRIL 2002

Guomindang rule of the "first pacification" policy. They usually con- tend that the policy cost the government popular support and alienated

it from the powerful forces of Chinese nationalism (Clubb, 1964: 196- 97; Bianco, 1971: 148; Eastman, 1974: 246; Coble, 1991: 375-80).

The present study attempts to take a broader view, both delineating

the foundation of the policy of "first internal pacification" by which Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei would go to war against Japan and examining that policy in the context of the other options enter- tained by Chiang at the time. A fuller understanding of the Japan pol-

icy requires understanding Chiang Kai-shek's attitude toward the Soviet Union and the CCP. To deal with the Japanese threat, Chiang, an unswerving realist, had fashioned and kept in his hands until the last possible moment a series of integrally related policy options.

POLICY-MAKING MECHANISMS AND POWER RELATIONSHIPS:

THE CRUCIAL POSITION OF WANG JINGWEI

To ascertain the relative roles of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei in formulating policy toward Japan, we need first to under- stand the policy-making mechanism in place in the early 1930s. When Chiang and Wang formed an alliance in January 1932, they took up formal positions in the government that suggest a kind of division of labor between the two. From January 1932 to December 1935, Wang Jingwei served as president of the Executive Yuan, and from August 1933, he took over from Luo Wengan-an independent-minded and vehemently anti-Japanese political figure-the post of foreign minis- ter (Coble, 1991: 137-38; Cai Dejin, 1988: 217). Wang was officially responsible for the executive arm of the government, specifically the handling of foreign affairs. During this period, Chiang held no signifi- cant post in the executive branch, merely serving as a member of the 33-man National Government Council (guomin zhengfu weiyuanhui). His power lay in the military: he was chairman of the National Mili- tary Affairs Commission (junshi weiyuanhui), which was the supreme military body in the central government (SLXB, 118-20, 396-97,400- 401). Lin Bosheng, Wang Jingwei's close follower and later a key member in his collaboration government during the Sino-Japanese War, observed at the time that the two leaders had different areas of

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So /THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 217

responsibilities-political affairs came under Wang's purview, mili- tary affairs under Chiang's (Lin Bosheng, 1935: Al 1; see also Zhang Tongxin, 1988: 17).

Formally, ultimate policy-making power rested not with the Execu-

tive Yuan but with the National Congress of the Guomindang, repre- sented by the Central Executive Committee (zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui) when the Congress was in recess. In a party plenum held in December 1931, both Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei were elected to the 72-member Central Executive Committee as well as its

9-member Standing Committee. Under the Central Executive Com- mittee was a Central Political Council (zhongyang zhengzhi huiyi), whose members were drawn from the Central Executive Committee

and the party's disciplinary body, the 24-member Central Supervisory

Committee (zhongyang jiancha weiyuanhui). A 3-man Standing Committee of the Political Council was also set up: its members were Wang Jingwei, Chiang Kai-shek, and Hu Hanmin, another party vet- eran. By late 1932, the membership was expanded to include the entire

Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee (DHQHZL, 2.119, 129-30, 183-84). A number of special committees (zhuanmen weiyuanhui) were also established under the Political Council to deal with specific policy matters, including a Foreign Affairs Committee (waijiao weiyuanhui) focused on foreign policy. In theory, the Politi- cal Council was responsible to the Central Executive Committee, but in practice it made all governmental policy, domestic and foreign. By its own regulations, the council's decisions were sent not to the Execu-

tive Committee but directly to the Executive Yuan of the national gov-

ernment for implementation (DHQHZL, 1.991-93, 2.119, 129-30; Chen Zhimai, 1937: 624; 1945: 102).

The Military Affairs Commission was the national government's highest authority on military affairs. As its chairman, Chiang Kai-shek

wielded direct authority over the army, with sole responsibility for

"military operations" (junling). Regarding military funding, educa- tion, appointments, and the like, the chairman, with the approval of the Military Affairs Commission, could issue orders to be implemented by various government bodies. As president of the Executive Yuan, Wang Jingwei had the right to attend meetings of the commission (Zhou Meihua, 1996: 1.42, 57-58, 61; Kong Qingtai, 1998: 307-8).

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218 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

In early 1933, Chiang Kai-shek set up within the Military Affairs Commission an Office of Personal Attendants (shicong shi), which was responsible for handling confidential party, government, diplo- matic, intelligence, and military information (Chen Bulei, 1962: 77; Ju Yiqiao, 1988: 16-21; Kong Qingtai, 1998: 321-22). Chiang staffed the office with his trusted advisers. In addition, under the commission

he established a number of "bandit suppression headquarters" (jiaofei zongsiling bu) and "field headquarters" (xingying) to direct military campaigns against the communists in various provinces, including Nanchang, Hankou, Chongqing, and Xi'an (Guo Qingyou, 1990: 1212-26; Zhou Meihua, 1996: 1.7-8). All provincial military, admin- istrative, and civil affairs were brought under the control of these headquarters. Thus, as commander in chief, Chiang actually had authority over military and civil affairs in these provinces (SLXB, 398-99; Kong Qingtai, 1998: 311-14). Hence, the Military Affairs Commission and its chairman had more power than their titles sug- gest. Chiang played a particularly vital role in shaping the country's approach to Japan, for no policy could be effective without the support

of the army.

Chen Gongbo, a loyal follower of Wang Jingwei since 1925 and a member of the Executive Committee and Political Council as well as

minister of industry in the early 1930s, had good opportunities to observe at close hand the power relationship between Chiang Kai- shek and Wang Jingwei, and he saw it as unequal. Although Wang was president of the Executive Yuan, he had little influence in the govern-

ment. In deference to Chiang Kai-shek, Wang kept a discreet distance from military affairs, although, as already noted, he could attend meet-

ings of the Military Affairs Commission. He was also excluded from deliberations on major financial matters by two successive ministers of finance, T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen) and H. H. Kung (Kong Xianxi), both brothers-in-law of Chiang. And in foreign affairs, Wang was hampered by a lack of information, as Chiang Kai-shek did not offer to share his intelligence. The power of the Executive Yuan over regional governments was even more circumscribed, particularly in those provinces under the administration of Chiang's bandit sup- pression headquarters. According to Chen, the Executive Yuan sim- ply had no power except in trivial matters. And party affairs, he pointed out, were dominated by Chiang's proteges, Chen Guofu and

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 219

Chen Lifu. Wang Jingwei could hardly have any say there (Chen Gongbo, 1979: 326-30).

High party and government officials who served under Chiang Kai-

shek also recalled that the Military Affairs Commission wielded the ultimate decision-making power. He Lian, who was appointed by Chiang to work briefly (October-December 1936) in the Office of Per- sonal Attendants of the Military Affairs Commission, noted in his memoirs that that office in fact controlled party, government, and mili-

tary affairs. According to He, the Executive Yuan was always kept on the sidelines by the Office of Personal Attendants, which controlled the flow of all important official communications. All key government

appointments were made by Chiang, before the Executive Yuan delib- erated (He Lian, 1988: 112-15; see also Liu, 1956: 78-79). Jiang Tingfu, the undersecretary of the Executive Yuan in late 1935 and Chi- nese ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1937, drew similar

conclusions from his experience with the Nanjing government, describing Chiang's military headquarters at Nanchang as the real capital of China (Jiang Tingfu, 1984: 149). Ju Yiqiao and Qiu Zong- ding, both of whom worked for years as personal attendants at the Mil-

itary Affairs Commission, recalled late in life that through that com-

mission and its Office of Personal Attendants, Chiang Kai-shek exercised power over the party, the government, and the military (Ju

Yiqiao, 1988: 14-16; Qiu Zongding, 1996: 932-33). Even at the time, Qian Duansheng, a scholar-publicist, noted in the Independent Critic (Duli pinglun) the influential public opinion journal that Chiang was the party's most powerful leader, whose authority exceeded that of the

Political Council (Qian Duansheng, 1935: 6-8). However, Wang Jingwei did have room to maneuver. As foreign

minister, he was vested with the power to handle negotiations with for-

eign countries (SLXB, 233-34) and was publicly perceived to be responsible for the government's foreign policy. But his position in the

Political Council was more important to his role in formulating for- eign policy. As we have seen, the Political Council in practice had the power to shape all policy, and Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek specifically endorsed its authority over foreign affairs when they struck their political alliance (Jiang Zuobin, 1990: 411). Under the Political Council, a Foreign Affairs Committee was set up to deal spe- cifically with Japan. High-ranking party and government officials-

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220 MODERN CHINA/APRIL 2002

including the president of the Executive Yuan-were appointed to the committee, and Jiang Zuobin, then the envoy to Japan, served as its chairman (SSJY, January-June 1932: 160-61; Chen Zhimai, 1937: 624; 1945: 1.102). In that forum, Wang's unrivaled seniority and per- sonal prestige in the party gave his views much weight (Qian Duansheng, 1935: 8).

Wang's influence was further strengthened when a Defense Com- mittee (guofang weiyuanhui) was established under the Political Council in February 1933. The Defense Committee consisted of presi- dents of the various yuans and government ministers as well as mili- tary leaders, and the president of the Executive Yuan was designated as its chairman. The Defense Committee gradually replaced the For- eign Affairs Committee, which by early 1934 was no longer the power

center for formulating foreign policy. The Defense Committee con- veyed its decisions directly to the government for implementation; it was required only to report back through its chairman to the Political Council afterward. It thus formally had ultimate authority to set for-

eign policy. As its chairman, Wang occupied a crucial position in shaping the policy toward Japan (SSJY, January-June 1933: 203-4, 235-36; Chen Zhimai, 1937: 624; 1945: 1.102; Shenbao, 20 February 1933, 6 and 25 February 1933: 10).

Wang Jingwei's crucial role in the Political Council and the Defense Committee was made all the more conspicuous by the fre-

quent absence from Nanjing of Chiang Kai-shek, who was preoccu- pied with fighting communists in Jiangxi. At the height of the Fifth Extermination Campaign, Chiang was so busy pursuing the remnants of the communist forces in the southwest of China that he did not set

foot in Nanjing from January to August 1935 (Zhongyang ribao, 20 August 1935: 1.2). Wang often had to travel between Nanjing and the field headquarters in Nanchang and Lushan to consult with Chiang on important policy matters (SSJY, January-June 1932: 900-902; SSJY, January-June 1933: 890).

Chiang's long absences from Nanjing made it imperative for him to rely on a party official with sufficient prestige and stature to steer the Political Council onto the desirable track. The only other Guomindang leader who enjoyed as high standing in the party as Wang was Hu Hanmin. But Hu became estranged from Chiang in Feb- ruary 1931 when he was put under house arrest on Chiang's orders

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 221

over a dispute on the pace of developing a constitution. After Hu was released, he sided with the militarists in Guangdong and Guangxi, who

set up an autonomous Southwest Political Affairs Council as Nanjing's rival. The unpopular Japan policy was always their main target of criti- cism (Zhongguo qingnian junren she, 1934: 562-74, 616-28, 669-85; Cheng Tiangu, 1978: 223, 279). With a divided party and restive regional militarists, contemporaries observed that Chiang lacked the clout to manage the government single-handedly; he needed Wang to strengthen its popular support (SSJY, January-June 1932: 775).

As already noted, Wang's official positions-president of the Ex- ecutive Yuan and foreign minister-meant that he bore public respon- sibility for foreign policy, making him the frequent target of criticism

from domestic opposition forces. Chiang could thus discreetly dis- tance himself from the Japan policy and concentrate on his campaign against the communists. Political expediency made Chiang willing to give Wang real influence, and Wang himself was fully conscious of the political leverage he enjoyed. When Chen Gongbo urged him to resign from the Nanjing government to avoid being blamed for the highly unpopular Japan policy, Wang refused, telling his follower that

his opinion on foreign policy still carried weight with Chiang Kai- shek (Chen Gongbo, 1979: 332-36). The partnership between the two leaders that formed was necessary to both.

NEGOTIATING WITH JAPAN, 1932-1935: CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND WANG JINGWEI AS POLICY MAKERS

To ascertain the roles played by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei in setting policy toward Japan, the present study focuses on four major Sino-Japanese incidents of the 1930s, each eventually resolved by a signed agreement between the two countries: the Shang-

hai Truce (1932), the Tanggu Truce (1933), the Ho-Umezu Agree- ment (1935), and the Qin-Doihara Agreement (1935), respectively. As they parleyed over these agreements, Chinese negotiators were in constant communication with Wang and Chiang. A substantial part of this cable traffic has been published in the PRC and Taiwan. These cables as well as memoirs bring into relief the nature of the partnership and how each leader shaped these agreements with Japan. Wang

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222 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

played no less an important role than Chiang in this policy-making process.

THE SHANGHAI TRUCE

After the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in September 1931, the Japanese marine forces were tempted to flex their muscles in Shang- hai, where anti-Japanese feelings ran high. On 18 January 1932, a scuffle broke out between Chinese workers and Japanese Nichiren monks in a factory in Chapei in Shanghai; one monk was killed and several were injured. Japanese ultranationalist groups and the Kwantung Army demanded that anti-Japanese disturbances be sup- pressed. The Japanese marine forces landed in Chapei, Shanghai, on 28 January 1932 and immediately came into conflict with local Chi- nese troops, the Nineteenth Route Army (Coble, 1991: 39-43; Shimada, 1984: 305-10).

Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei quickly agreed on how to deal with the crisis. On 29 January, Chiang personally set down a two- pronged strategy: China should be prepared to actively resist and to negotiate with Japan at the same time. And if Japan impinged on China's administrative and territorial integrity, the country would fight to the end (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 431). Chiang's approach was shared by Wang, who described his own policy as "on the one hand resist, on the other hand negotiate" (Lin Bosheng, 1937: 1.11, 16; GMWX, 1965: 36.1557-59, 1570-72). Accordingly, on 29 January, the Execu- tive Yuan under Wang agreed that the government policy toward Japan

would be "resist and negotiate" (DAZLHB, waijiao 2: 665-66). The Nineteenth Route Army put up stiff opposition to the Japanese

troops, and its commander, General Cai Tingjie, soon became a national hero. Envious of the popular support for General Cai, Chiang Kai-shek sent reinforcements, his own Fifth Army, to the front near

Shanghai. However, questions arose at the time about Chiang's deter- mination to fight Japan (Coble, 1991: 50-56). Those suspicions were not groundless. Sources now available clearly indicate that Chiang did not intend to wage a full-scale war. In fact, he instructed Foreign Min- ister Luo Wengan, his military protege General He Yinqin, and the for- mer commander of the Nineteenth Route Army, Chen Mingshu, to

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 223

seek a truce with Japan after putting on a good show of fighting in Shanghai (DAZLHB, waijiao 2: 682).

Wang Jingwei backed Chiang's peace offer to Japan. In a telegram to Shanghai's mayor, Wu Tiecheng, and military leaders of the Nine- teenth Route Army, Wang stipulated that if Japanese armies did not push forward, a restoration of peace should be sought earnestly (GMWX, 1965: 36.1574-75). By late February, after consulting with Chiang Kai-shek, He Yingqin, and other Guomindang leaders, he had drafted the conditions for a truce in Shanghai and instructed the For-

eign Ministry to follow it up with Japan (Yu Zidao, 1994: 99-106, 159-

62, 294-305; Jin Zhaiji, 1992: 67). Britain and the United States were concerned about the safety of the International Settlement in Shang- hai, and as early as 29 January, their diplomats had brought the war- ring parties together to negotiate a truce. Their efforts were rewarded

with a breakthrough in early March when Japan, faced with resistance

from the Chinese armies as well as mounting pressure from the West-

ern powers and the League of Nations, declared a cease-fire (Nish, 1993: 104-6, 114; Shimada, 1984: 314-17). Serious negotiations between China and Japan then took place in the British consulate in Shanghai, under the aegis of the Western powers, from 24 March 1932 to 5 May 1932.

From February to April 1932, Wang Jingwei stayed mainly in Luoyang, where the seat of the government had been moved in response to the threat posed by the Japanese troops in Shanghai. He presided over the convening of a party plenum and a national emer- gency conference, while Chiang Kai-shek busied himself with the war. But Wang was also crucial in shaping the settlement of the Shang-

hai Incident. He frequently traveled between Luoyang and Nanjing to oversee the day-to-day negotiations with Japan. General He Yingqin and Foreign Minister Luo Wengan were assigned to stay in Nanjing to keep in close touch with the Chinese negotiating team in Shanghai, and hectic cable traffic between Luoyang, Nanjing, and Shanghai kept Wang abreast of developments (DAZLHB, waijiao 2: 671-72, 696- 751; SSJY, January-June 1932: 245, 295, 395, 477, 536, 623-24). Behind the scenes, Chiang Kai-shek spent much time in Nanjing, not only directing troop deployment (SSJY, January-June 1932: 264; ZYSLCB, 1.1: 445-518) but also formulating China's bargaining position.

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224 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek regularly met each other throughout the negotiations with Japan (SSJY, January-June 1932; 264, 283, 295,477,623). They laid down the official position that the talks should be confined to the immediate military matter and that "political issues" such as the status of Manchuria should not be dis-

cussed. Both believed that including the latter could drag out the nego-

tiations indefinitely; they wished to settle only the local fighting in Shanghai (DAZLHB, waijiao 2: 758-60; ZYSLCB, 1.1: 545, 535; Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.483-84). They also met the British minister to China, Miles Lampson, in person to sort out the details for the with- drawal of Japanese troops from Shanghai (Cai Dejin and Wang Sheng, 1993: 174; Yu Zidao, 1994: 324). In the final stage of negotiations, Wang had to use his clout to bring the Political Council to accept the truce with Japan; on 5 May, China and Japan finally signed the Shang- hai Truce (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 538; SSJY, January-June 1932: 771-72). In these negotiations, Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek clearly agreed on how to handle the crisis; they were the key policy makers and vital

partners in working out a policy toward Japan.

THE TANGGU TRUCE

The Shanghai Truce did not, of course, put an end to Japanese expansionism in China. The Japanese Kwantung Army entertained plans to enter North China to improve its position in Manchuria (Shimada, 1983: 11, 30). A crisis arose in January 1933 when those troops seized Shanhaiguan, a strategic pass in the Great Wall, and occupied Rehe, the province adjacent to Manchuria. General Zhang Xueliang, the militarist in Manchuria, took the blame for the loss of Rehe and resigned from his position as acting chairman of the Beiping Branch of the Military Affairs Commission. Chiang then named Gen- eral He Yingqin to take Zhang's place, thereby strengthening his hold on the military in North China. He also obtained Wang Jingwei's sup- port to establish a Beiping Political Affairs Council under the Execu- tive Yuan, which was given the task of resolving the conflict with Japan. Huang Fu, a trusted old friend and Chiang's sworn brother, was appointed as chairman of this newly established council on 4 May (HYQ, 1.297; Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.543).

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 225

By that time, the Japanese army had pushed southward, and a local

war had broken out along the Great Wall from Hebei to Chahar (Chen

Shisong, Li Quanzhong, and Long Tai, 1992: 112-38; Coble, 1991: 90-98). In late March, the news media reported that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei had met and were in total agreement on how to deal

with the Japanese threat. Nanjing's policy, Wang stated in public, was to resist Japanese aggression at every turn and at the same time to open

negotiations with Tokyo (SSJY, January-June 1932:521-25,611,712; Cai and Wang, 1993: 188-91). Wang and Chiang thus personally gave the green light to attempts to sound out the Japanese government on a

possible settlement of the crisis. In April, General He Yingqin asked the chancellor of Beijing University, Jiang Menglin, to approach the British minister in Beiping, Miles Lampson, about mediating the Sino-Japanese conflict (Shimada, 1983: 36-38, 44-46; HYQ, 1.285- 93). Yet after the May 15 Incident of 1932, when Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was killed in attacks staged by young naval and army officers, Japan had no clear voice making its policy on China. The Jap-

anese Kwantung Army and the Tientsin garrison, while not always taking orders from army leaders in Tokyo, had no definite plans for North China (Shimada, 1983: 27-52, 75; Crowley, 1966: 172-80). This uncertainty on the Japanese side posed a major difficulty for these early attempts at mediation.

A new round of negotiations resumed in Beijing when Huang Fu took up the chairmanship of the Beiping Political Affairs Council on 17 May 1933. He and He Yingqin took charge of the talks with Japan, and it was Wang Jingwei, more than Chiang Kai-shek, who directed the day-to-day negotiations. On 21 and 22 May, Wang, who was in Nanjing, personally sent two important telegrams to He and Huang, laying down the Guomindang's basic position; he authorized them to act at their discretion in dealing with the Japanese negotiators. On his

own initiative, Wang instructed Huang Fu that China could accept any Japanese condition for a cease-fire except recognizing Manchukuo and ceding Manchuria. To allay fears that any understanding with Japan would draw vehement domestic criticism, Wang assured Huang that he himself would bear the responsibility for such a decision. Wang also asked Huang to discuss the matter with He as well as the other trusted military and civilian advisers of Chiang Kai-shek (Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.555-59).

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226 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

On May 22, the Japanese armies, in order to consolidate their new territorial gains in North China, decided to approach the Chinese side to discuss a cease-fire (Shimada, 1983: 52-54). Huang Fu readily seized on the Japanese offer for talks. Relying on the terms laid down

by Wang Jingwei, on 23 May, Huang accepted the Japanese condi- tions for a truce, which in the main demanded that Chinese troops withdraw southward to Beiping and Tianjin. He Yingqin and Huang Fu then telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, recom- mending the acceptance of these terms. Huang further cabled Chiang that the Japanese conditions did not violate Wang's instructions (Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.559-61; HYQ, 1.314-18).

Although Chiang was in Jiangxi conducting the anticommunist campaign, cable records indicate that he was in constant communica- tion with Wang Jingwei in Nanjing and He Yingqin in Beiping. For sit-

uations not requiring on-the-spot decisions, Wang often consulted Chiang before sending instructions to He (HYQ, 1.295-96). On Huang Fu's agreement with the Japanese, Chiang took a tough stand, insisting that any agreement with Japan should not be in writing, for

fear that it would provoke domestic opposition against him (Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.562-63; HYQ, 1.324, 328, 330). In response, Wang took a trip to Jiangxi to meet with him, and a consensus was reached between the two leaders. On 28 May, Wang Jingwei telegraphed He Yingqin and Huang Fu that they should try their best to avoid signing a

written agreement with Japan. If they failed at that, Wang instructed

them to abide by the terms previously set by the Defense Committee:

(1) the agreement should be military, not "political"; (2) no conces- sions should be made to Japan regarding any occupied territories north

of the Great Wall; and (3) any agreement should first be approved by the central authorities. Shortly thereafter, Chiang Kai-shek also informed He and Huang that he had come to accept their terms and hoped they would follow the decisions of the Defense Committee regarding an agreement with Japan (Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.566,568; HYQ, 1.334,339-40). On 31 May, China and Japan signed the Tanggu Truce, and a demilitarized zone was established along the Great Wall in North China.

Criticism of the Tanggu Truce, particularly of He Yingqin and Huang Fu, soon emerged. Perceiving that opposition in the party might block the truce, Chiang Kai-shek threw his weight behind the

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 227

agreement and urged the Party Central to accept it (HYQ, 1.343-44). On 2 June, Wang addressed the whole nation by telegram, explaining that the truce was only a military agreement ending armed conflict between China and Japan and not a political agreement compromising Chinese sovereignty. On the next day, Wang argued the case for the Tanggu Truce before the Political Council and persuaded the council to approve it. The close cooperation between Wang and Chiang ensured the acceptance of the truce by the party (HYQ, 1.348; Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.572-73).

THE HE-UMEZU AGREEMENT

In May 1935, the Japanese armies exploited two incidents in Hebei to extract concessions from the Chinese authorities in North China.

Japanese armies alleged that a group of "anti-Japanese" guerrilla forces north of the Beiping municipal area, headed by Sun Yongqin, was supported by the Chinese authorities. On this pretext, Japanese armies entered Chinese territories to pursue Sun's forces (Shimada, 1983: 102-3). Coincidentally, two pro-Japanese newspaper editors, Hu Enpu and Bai Yuyuan, were assassinated in the Japanese settle- ment of Tianjin in early May. Substantial evidence suggests that the Japanese intelligence service had a hand in the murders, but the Japa-

nese army blamed the Chinese side, and the Japanese North China Garrison at Tianjin exploited the incident to the fullest (Shimada, 1983: 103-7; Coble, 1991: 201).

On 29 May, the chief of staff of the Japanese Tianjin Garrison, Col-

onel Sakai Takashi, and the Japanese military attache in Beiping, Takahashi Tan, met He Yingqin to settle the dispute. He Yingqin quickly informed Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Jingwei, and Huang Fu of the Japanese demands and their military threats aimed at Beiping and Tianjin. As an urgent decision was required, Wang acted alone: he advised He to satisfy some of the Japanese demands by asking Yu Xuezhong, the governor of Hebei, to resign and by replacing some officials in Tianjin. Wang also instructed Jiang Zuobin, the Chinese ambassador in Tokyo, to approach Foreign Minister Hirota Koki to settle the matter (HYQ, 1.396-401, 404). At this time, Chiang Kai- shek was in Chongqing conducting his extermination campaign against the communists. When he learned of the crisis, he asked

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228 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

General Zhang Xueliang to advise Yu Xuezhong, formerly Zhang's subordinate, to transfer his military headquarters from Beiping to Baoding and then resign. On 1 June, Chiang told Wang, He, and Huang that he was ready to accept Sakai and Takahashi's demands (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 674-76).

On 4 June, He Yingqin met Sakai and Takahashi and agreed to dis- miss Yu Xuezhong and other officials involved in the incidents. He also promised to investigate the murders of Hu and Bai, suppress the Sun Yongqin forces, and end the activities of the Guomindang branch in Tianjin. But the Japanese negotiators came back with more demands; on 9 June, Sakai and Takahashi insisted that the anti-Japa- nese movement be suppressed, that all the Guomindang's branches in Hebei be abolished, and that Yu Xuezhong's as well as Nanjing's army withdraw from Hebei. As He Yingqin waited for instructions from Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek, Wang persuaded the Political Council to accept the Japanese demands (HYQ, 1.401-3,407-11). But Chiang, fearing that these actions would provoke anti-Japanese senti- ment in the country and especially heighten opposition from regional militarists in Guangdong and Guangxi, demanded that Nanjing's armies not withdraw (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 679-80, 678). At this critical juncture, Wang made it clear that he supported the decision to pull out

Nanjing's armies despite Chiang's wishes. He Yingqin sided with Wang and telegraphed Chiang that if the Nanjing armies did not with- draw, Japan would seize Beiping and Tianjin. In the end, Chiang came around to He and Wang's view, endorsing the withdrawal of Nanjing's armies (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 681, 683).

On 11 June, when the Japanese further insisted that He Yingqin sign a memorandum acceding to the implementation of the listed Jap- anese demands, both Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek instructed He not to put anything in writing (HYQ, 1.413-14). But the Japanese did not relent. For three weeks, regular consultations took place between Wang Jingwei and He Yingqin, and they finally won a com- promise: He would write not a formal memorandum but a short letter stating that Sakai's demands would be carried out in due course. On 6 July, He sent Umezu Yoshijiso, the Japanese commander of the Tianjin Garrison, such a letter, popularly known as the He-Umezu Agreement (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 692).

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 229

Throughout the whole incident, Chiang Kai-shek communicated daily from Sichuan with Wang in Nanjing and He in Beiping by cables (HYQ, 1.435). Although he did not direct the negotiations himself, Chiang's critical role in framing and endorsing the final settlement with Japan is undisputed. But because Chiang was now increasingly preoccupied with the extermination campaigns against the commu- nists, Wang's room to maneuver in the day-to-day negotiations with Japan expanded; at critical junctures, he made decisions before asking Chiang to endorse them.

THE QIN-DOIHARA AGREEMENT

While the Japanese Tianjin Garrison Command pushed forward with its plan in North China, its rival, the Kwantung Army, competed with it to extract concessions from Chinese authorities in Chahar. On 5

June 1935, four Japanese special agents traveling from Dolonor to

Zhangjiakou were detained by Chinese soldiers at Zhangbei because they carried no passports. Song Zheyuan, the governor of Chahar, feared provoking Japan and soon ordered the release of the Japanese

agents. Yet the Kwantung Army claimed that a year previously, Song had agreed that Japanese citizens in transit through Zhangbei would not be required to carry passports. They demanded an apology from Song, the punishment of those responsible for causing the incident, and a guarantee that no similar incidents would occur in the future. On

12 June, Qin Dechun, the head of the Civil Affairs Department of Hebei province, came to Beiping to discuss with He Yingqin what became known as the Zhangbei Incident (Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.877, 880; Li Yunhan, 1978: 83-85).

On 13 June, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed He Yingqin from Chongqing, instructing him to ask Song Zheyuan to settle the dispute with the Japanese as soon as possible. Chiang also requested that He consult Wang Jingwei about finalizing the settlement (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 684-85; HYQ, 1.415-16). Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army pressed the demand that Song be dismissed. On 17 June, He Yingqin asked military leaders in North China to force Song to resign. In Nanjing at the time, He soon reached an understanding with Wang Jingwei and Huang Fu over the affair. The following day, Wang's Executive Yuan decided to give in to Japanese demands and decreed that Song be

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230 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

replaced by Qin Dechun as governor of Chahar. He Yingqin obtained Chiang's approval for all the personnel changes and troop transfers in North China (HYQ, 1.417-22). On 22 June, the Kwantung Army sent

a special service agent, Doihara Kenji, to present the Japanese condi- tions for ending the crisis. Song's army was required to withdraw to the southwest of Chaharer. Furthermore, the demilitarized zone was to

be extended, all anti-Japanese organizations were to be disbanded in Chahar, and those responsible for the Zhangbei Incident were to be punished. On 23 June, the Political Council under Wang Jingwei entrusted the Chahar provincial government with the task of settling the dispute with the Kwantung Army (Li Yunhan, 1978: 87). On the same day, formal negotiations between Qin and Doihara took place. He Yingqin maintained regular cable communication with Qin and, together with Wang, directed the negotiations from Nanjing. On 27 June, Qin Dechun, acting in accordance with the instructions of the Political Council, agreed to the Japanese conditions and concluded the Qin-Doihara Agreement (HYQ, 1.427-33; Qin Dechun, 1981: 35-36).

This review of four major Sino-Japanese incidents makes it clear that both Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei had the final authority in

making policy concerning Japan. A division of labor existed between the two leaders. While Chiang concentrated on fighting the commu- nists, Wang handled details of negotiations with Japan. Guidelines on the terms of various agreements were often worked out by the Political

Council, directed by Wang, and the Chinese frontline negotiators. On certain critical occasions in parleys over the Tanggu Truce and He- Umezu Agreement, Wang could not wait for Chiang's endorsement and acted on his own to accept the Japanese terms (Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.555-59; ZYSLCB, 1.1: 674). The cable traffic between key makers of foreign policy indicates that Chiang always showed defer- ence to Wang's decisions. The close cooperation between the two leaders enabled them to win the Political Council's support for their decisions.

To be sure, despite Chiang's military preoccupations, his hold on policy toward Japan never relaxed. He was fully informed of every development in Sino-Japanese relations, as he communicated fre- quently with Wang Jingwei in Nanjing and with Chinese frontline negotiators such as Huang Fu and He Yingqin in North China. In negotiating the Tanggu Truce, Wang regularly traveled to Lushan,

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 231

Jiangxi, to consult Chiang on policy matters. Chiang's endorsement of the terms of agreements was always sought by Wang and Chinese negotiators; without it, no resolution of disputes with Japan could con-

ceivably be reached. In sum, effective implementation of the Japan policy depended on the cooperation of both leaders.

Chiang needed Wang's political support as much as Wang needed Chiang's. In August 1935, when Wang Jingwei threatened to resign in response to an impeachment proposal by the Control Yuan as well as intense opposition to his weak-kneed Japan policy within the Central Political Council, Chiang Kai-shek had to leave Sichuan and come back to Nanjing to personally persuade Wang not to resign from the government. Only after Chiang openly showed his support did Wang agree to stay on (Cai Dejin, 1988: 226-28; Zhang Tongxin, 1988: 360- 68). Chiang was always wise enough not to push his authority over Wang, lest he upset the delicate power balance between them. His def- erence to Wang ensured that the two men were close partners in shap- ing the policy toward Japan.

THE POLICY OF "FIRST INTERNAL PACIFICATION, THEN EXTERNAL RESISTANCE":

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS

THINKING BEHIND THE JAPAN POLICY: THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT

The close partnership between Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek in handling Japan was built on a common perception of the threat the

nation posed. After the Shanghai War in early 1932, the policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" became the corner- stone of China's approach to Japan (Chiang Kai-shek, 1992: 54). Such a policy hinged on Chiang's belief that the communist threat was a "disease of the vital organs" (xinfu zhi huan). This idea was spelled out in his speech at the "Bandit Suppression" conference at Lushan on 18 June 1932 (Qin Xiaoyi, 1984a: 10.620) and further elaborated in many of his speeches at government and army gatherings. Chiang declared that "Japan is not qualified (bupei) to be our enemy; our present enemy is the red bandits." Once the communists were destroyed, he envis- aged no difficulties in dealing with the Japanese (Qin Xiaoyi, 1984a:

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232 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

10.679). He cited the example of the late Ming dynasty, which was undermined by internal rebellions before being defeated by the Qing troops, to support his thinking (ZYSLCB, 1.3: 35).

Chiang Kai-shek's reluctance to fight the Japanese also stemmed from his belief that China was too weak to engage in such a war. Dur-

ing the Manchurian Incident and the Shanghai War, Chiang publicly stated that Japan would overrun major cities and coastal regions of China in just a few days if full-scale war broke out (ZYSLCB, 1.3: 317). He repeated the same defeatist theme when he addressed the Officers' Training Corps at Lushan in July 1934, painting a picture of how formidable the Japanese armed forces were at the time. Only those who were ignorant of China's current situation, Chiang main- tained, would declare war on Japan (ZYSLCB, 1.3: 106-13).

Chiang's approach to Japan has often been construed by his critics as "nonresistance." But Chiang's diaries, writings, and speeches indi- cate that he felt deeply humiliated by Japan's pressing demands of and

encroachments on China (see, e.g., Qin Xiaoyi, 1984a: 12.197-98; Jindai Zhongguo she, 1995: 18-26). During the Manchurian Incident and the Shanghai War, Chiang noted in his diaries that if Japan forced

China into a corner, then war would be the only way out. His core prin-

ciple was to defend the "administrative and territorial integrity" of China against Japanese expansionism (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 275-76, 431). Thus, while he entered into several agreements with Japan between 1933 and 1935 that undoubtedly infringed on China's sovereignty in North China, he drew the line in two areas. The first was China's sov-

ereignty over Manchuria. In numerous public statements as well as instructions to Chinese negotiators shaping treaty terms with Japan, Chiang always emphasized that China would not sign away Manchu- ria. If Japan intended to improve relations with China, it had to give up the occupied territories and return the northeastern provinces (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 647-48, 1.3: 634; Shen Yunlong, 1976: 2.482, 492, 563, 567).

The second point over which Chiang refused to compromise with Japan was the territorial integrity of North China around the Beiping- Tianjin region. According to the confidential documents now made available by the Presidential Office of Chiang Kai-shek, at the height of the war along the Great Wall, in a single day-23 May 1933- Chiang sent four cables to General He Yingqin and other army com-

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So / THE GUOMINDANG 'S JAPAN POLICY 233

manders in North China reiterating that they should defend the Beiping-Tianjin region to the last man. If the government forces with-

drew from Beiping, he stated, it would spell the destruction of the party and the country (SSJY, January-June 1932: 869-71; ZYSLCB, 1.1: 642-43). Chiang was fully aware of the region's financial and logistic importance. General He and Huang Fu had warned Chiang that if it fell to the Japanese, the 200,000 troops in North China would

be cut off from provisions and funds worth 7 million yuan a month. Any withdrawal from the Beiping-Tianjin region would also damage the international image of the Chinese government (HYQ, 1.316; ZYSLCB, 1.1: 645-46).

Chiang's determination not to lose North China was also reflected in his conversations with William C. Bullitt, the American ambassa- dor to Moscow, who happened to be in Nanjing in November 1934. Chiang told Bullitt that he intended to declare war and resist with all his forces if the Japanese advanced into North China or Inner Mongo- lia (Bullitt, 1972: 100). The strategic importance of North China was further underlined during the 1936 talks held between the Chinese for-

eign minister, Zhang Qun, and the Japanese ambassador to China, Kawagoe Shigeru. In these meetings, Chiang laid down the condition that Japan respect China's administrative integrity in North China. Anything less would indicate that Tokyo had no intention of improv- ing relations with Nanjing (ZYSLCB, 1.3: 675, 680, 688). When the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out on 7 July 1937 and Japan seized Beiping and Tianjin, Chiang considered it the last straw and went to war with Japan.

Wang Jingwei shared Chiang Kai-shek's views on Japan. In fact, at the time he described himself and Chiang as "of one heart" in their management of the issue (Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, 1984: 178). Like Chiang, Wang was acutely aware of China's military, eco- nomic, and social backwardness vis-a-vis Japan and regarded launch- ing a war against Japan as irresponsible. He readily agreed with Chiang that the threat posed by the communists was a "disease of the vital organs" (Lin Bosheng, 1937: 1.7, 9-16, 81). Wang thus had no diffi- culty in bringing himself to embrace the policy of "first internal pacifi- cation, then external resistance."

But Wang, like Chiang, was not completely averse to resisting Japan. Indeed, as already noted, during the Shanghai War, Wang charac-

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234 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

terized his policy toward Japan as "on the one hand resist and on the other hand negotiate." Confronted by continuing Japanese encroach- ments, Wang advocated that the government should limit its accom- modation with the Japanese and never concede the territories lost to Japan (Shen Yiyun, 1980: 2.484, 492, 494, 563-64; GMWX, 1965: 36.1597-98). Furthermore, he fully realized the strategic importance

of the Beiping-Tianjin region to the territorial integrity of North China. He confided to Hu Shi, a noted Chinese intellectual, that he

would do his utmost to defend the region and North China (Lin Bosheng, 1937: 1.46; Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan, 1983: 211). Dur- ing the war along the Great Wall in May 1933, Wang cabled General He Yingqin that China should not abandon Beiping and Tianjin if the Japanese armies invaded the region; such abandonment would dam- age China's international standing. In fact, the Defense Committee under Wang's direction had decided to defend the Beiping-Tianjin region at all costs (SSJY, January-June 1933: 869; see also Shen Jinding, 1974: 71).

Wang and Chiang thus based their Japan policy on the same foun- dation. Their thinking was so similar that the leaders agreed to issue three joint policy statements in 1933 and 1934 in which they pro- claimed to the whole country that exterminating the communist move-

ment was the most urgent task faced by the Nanjing government (Lin

Bosheng, 1937: 1.81-83, 136-38, 194-99). The perception in Wang's camp was that Wang and Chiang shared a mutual understanding on Nanjing's Japan policy (Lin Bosheng, 1935: All; Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, 1984: 178-79).

THE JAPAN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION:

TWO DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS

Aside from their common perception of the Japanese threat, how- ever, Chiang Kai-shek must have gradually realized that he and Wang Jingwei otherwise had fundamentally different views on foreign affairs. The two leaders in fact held incompatible stances on China's relations with Moscow and had different opinions concerning the prospects of Western aid to China in its struggle with Japan as well as the effectiveness of the policy of reconciliation with Japan. Step by step, Chiang reoriented China's Japan policy in the direction of seeking

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 235

closer ties with Moscow without abandoning the attempt at a reconcil-

iation with Tokyo, whereas Wang single-mindedly insisted that China had to rely on itself in the struggle with Japan while eagerly seeking accommodation.

Chiang Kai-shek's thinking on these issues was succinctly outlined in his two speeches on diplomacy to the officer corps at Nanchang in March 1934 (Qin Xiaoyi, 1984a: 12.95-99,101-4). He saw both Japan and Russia as China's enemies, for they tried to subjugate China with their superior military forces (Qin Xiaoyi, 1984a: 12.95). Neverthe- less, as we will see, he was enough of a realist not to give up on the pos-

sibility of an alliance with Russia and a peaceful settlement with Japan. He thought that China's only possible help in the international arena might come from Britain and the United States. During the Manchurian crisis and the Shanghai War, Chiang appealed to the League of Nations and to the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty for help and mediation in constraining Japan (ZYSLCB, 1.1: 280-81, 291, 297-98, 431, 432-33).

Japan, Chiang pointed out, had formulated a dual policy of expan- sion-a continental policy of appropriating land in the north and a maritime policy of venturing into the south. It was on a collision course with the Soviet Union as well as with Britain and the United

States. Nevertheless, Chiang thought it unlikely that Britain at that moment would be willing to confront Japan, which, he realized, it probably wanted to use to contain Soviet expansion in East Asia. And a war between Japan and Russia was more likely than between Amer- ica and Japan, for he perceived that the rivalry between Japan and Rus-

sia in East Asia had intensified after Japan's occupation of Manchuria and extension of its influence into Mongolia. Although a war between Russia and Japan was not imminent, as Russia was not yet militarily prepared and Japan was too diplomatically isolated to undertake a risky foreign policy (Qin Xiaoyi, 1984a: 12.95-97), Chiang clearly cherished the hope that such a conflict would break out before Japan engaged in all-out war with China.

Chiang thought that Japan had targeted America and Russia rather than China as its enemies simply because a full-scale war between China and Japan would not serve its national interests (ZYSLCB, 1.3: 109; Jindai Zhongguo she, 1995: 21). Moreover, Chiang entertained the hope that London and Washington or even Moscow would not sit

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236 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

on the fence if the feared Sino-Japanese war broke out. He rightly pointed out that the China problem was inextricably bound up with the

political, economic, and even strategic interests of Britain and the United States (Qin Xiaoyi, 1984a: 12.97; ZYSLCB, 1.3: 615-16, 632). As time went by, even though Chiang realized that the kind of pressure the West was willing to exert on Japan could not effectively constrain Tokyo's encroachments (ZYSLCB, 1.3: 621-22), he did not alter his belief that Western interests were tied with China's.'

Wang Jingwei did not leave a systematic record of his analysis of the international situation of the 1930s; his thinking on the subject is scattered in his speeches and writings. When he assumed the presi- dency of the Executive Yuan in January 1932, Wang relied on the League of Nations and the treaty system to force Japan to change its course of action (Lin Bosheng, 1937: 1.1-7, 19-20). He even seriously entertained the idea that a nonaggression pact with both Soviet Russia and Japan would solve the problems faced by China. But Moscow's unenthusiastic response scuttled his scheme (Sun, 1993: 30-31). His foreign policy objectives were aptly delineated in a personal letter to Hu Shi in which Wang confided that he aimed at enabling China to assume a role similar to that of Belgium in World War I-that is, defended by the Great Powers after fighting broke out (Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan, 1983: 220-21). But after his brief stay in Europe from late 1932 to early 1933,2 Wang realized that the idea was unreal- istic: the League was a powerless organization, Britain and France were not willing to help China, and the United States was more inter- ested in isolating itself than participating in world affairs (Chen Gongbo, 1979: 332). In his judgment, China simply could not put itself in Belgium's position (Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan, 1983: 228- 29; Lin Bosheng, 1937: 1.217-18). Wang's pessimism about China's diplomatic situation deepened as time went by. By early 1935, he believed that London and Washington would not join in countering Japanese expansion and that Moscow would avoid provoking Tokyo because it did not face any imminent threat from Japan. Virtually unaided, China had to deal with Japan, whose expansionist ambitions, he predicted, would eventually destroy peace in East Asia (Lin Bosheng, 1935: A13-A14). This perception explains why Wang was so eager to seek accommodation with Japan.

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 237

Both Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei continued their attempts at reconciliation with Japan right up to the outbreak of full-scale war

in 1937. In January 1935, when Japan's Foreign Minister Hirota Koki made a speech in the Diet signaling Japan's readiness to improve rela- tions with China, Chiang and Wang asked Wang Chonghui, a justice of the International Court at the Hague, to pay a visit to Japan to gauge

the opinion of the Japanese government (WJSLCB, 15-16; HBSB, 97- 101, 108-10). Following these gestures, the two countries agreed in May to elevate their diplomatic missions to the ambassadorial rank (Shimada, 1983: 96). Chiang and Wang then authorized Jiang Zuobin, the Chinese ambassador to Japan, to further explore the prospects of reconciliation with Japan. In a meeting with Hirota in September, Jiang proposed a wide-ranging set of trade-offs, includ- ing an offer to shelve the Manchurian issue if Tokyo renounced all recent agreements giving it claim to North China (WJSLCB, 16-17, 31-32; HBSB, 272-73).

This bold proposal was cold-shouldered by the Japanese military. On 7 October, relying on the decision of the Ministries of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Affairs, Hirota himself put forward a proposal to China, known as the "Hirota Three Principles," as the preconditions for improving relations between the two countries (Shimada, 1983: 130-32). The three principles were (1) an agreement not to call on Western powers to restrain Japan, (2) a de facto recognition of Manchukuo, and (3) an anticommunist alliance with Japan (WJSLCB, 17-20, 32-33). While Nanjing and Tokyo were sounding out each other on a reconciliation, on 1 November, Wang was wounded in an assassi- nation attempt and had to go to Europe to recuperate.

Various sources indicate that Wang was more eager than Chiang to

seek accommodation with Japan. In June 1933, Wang Shijie, then minister of education and an associate of Wang's, observed that Wang Jingwei wanted China and Japan to work together for "coexistence and co-prosperity." Within the Guomindang, Wang was perceived as the more conciliatory of the two (Wang Shijie, 1990: 69-70), and in Japanese and Soviet diplomatic circles, Wang was regarded as very much "pro-Japanese" (HBSB, 108, 111; FRUS, 420; Haslam, 1992: 45). When an anti-Comintern alliance was being discussed by Japan, Germany, and Italy in late 1935, Wang advocated China's joining the

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238 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

alliance. However, Wang's departure for Europe ensured that the idea would not be pursued further (Fox, 1982: 183-86; Wang Jingwei,

1942?; Jiang Yongjing, 1998: 68-69). While Wang did not completely give up his hope of joining the anti-Comintern alliance, Chiang Kai- shek the realist had already decided that China should seek closer ties with Moscow.

The Guomindang had severed official contact with the Soviet Union after the alliance with the CCP collapsed during the Northern Expedition. But fear of Japanese domination in northeastern Asia after the Manchurian Incident brought the two countries together, and

on 12 December 1932, they announced the resumption of diplomatic relations (Cheng, 1957: 183; Yan Huiqing, 1982: 180-81, 1996: 706). Although initially Wang Jingwei was keen on reestablishing relations with Moscow (SSJY, July-December 1932: 135), his worries about the harm that could result soon overtook him. He was aware that a

closer diplomatic relationship with Russia might alienate Western powers and even motivate them to ally with Japan to contain China. In

the worst case, a Sino-Soviet rapprochement might provoke Japan into attacking China (Lin Bosheng, 1937: 1.20-22; Wang Zhen, 1993: 20; FRUS, 6-7). Moreover, Soviet support for the CCP and Soviet involvement in Xinjiang politics convinced Wang that Moscow was an unreliable partner (FRUS, 6-7; Chen Gongbo, 1979: 332; Gu Weijun, 1985: 373). The Soviet-proposed sale of the Chinese Eastern Railways to Tokyo put a damper on the idea that Moscow could be relied on as a counterforce to Japan in Manchuria (Cheng, 1957: 185- 86; Wu Xiangxiang, 1954: 379-84). Hence, Wang did not respond to the suggestion from Yan Huiqing, the Chinese ambassador to Mos- cow, that China forge relations with Russia (Yan Huiqing, 1982: 191, 213; 1996: 779). In February 1934, Wang went so far as to plan to end secret Sino-Soviet talks on a nonaggression pact, begun in mid-1933, because he did not want to provoke Japan. This prompted Yan Huiqing to describing Wang's attitude as "negative, passive, and escapist" (Yan Huiqing, 1996: 794). It is not surprising to find that Soviet Ambassa- dor to China Dmitrii Bogomolov openly expressed dissatisfaction to Chinese officials about Wang's attitude toward his country (Yan Huiqing, 1996: 817, 834).

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 239

But Chiang Kai-shek was too skillful and pragmatic a politician not to realize how the weight of the Soviet Union could shift the balance in

the struggle between China and Japan. As the Japanese threat in North

China intensified, Chiang began to explore the possibility of cooperat- ing with the Russians. An encouraging signal came from the Russian side in March 1934, when senior Soviet officials told a Chinese mili- tary delegation in Moscow of their desire for Sino-Soviet cooperation and even indicated that in a war with Japan, Russia would drive Japan

out of Manchuria and return it to China (Huang Fu papers, box 20, cited in Sun, 1993: 70). Three months later, Chiang Kai-shek invited Ambassador Bogomolov to breakfast. Chiang told Bogomolov that China regarded Soviet Russia as a friendly neighbor and would like the relations between the two countries to improve (the exchanges between Chiang and Bogomolov were cited in Wang Zhen, 1993: 35- 36; see also Yan Huiqing, 1996: 819).

Shortly thereafter, Chiang personally entrusted Jiang Tingfu, a Chi- nese scholar, with a secret mission: to sound out the Russians on the

possibility of cooperation. In October 1934, Jiang was assured by the Soviet deputy foreign commissar, Boris Stomonyakov, that Moscow would like to strengthen and develop its relationship with China (Wang Zhen, 1993: 37-39; Jiang Tingfu, 1984: 153; ZSWJ, 210-14). The atmosphere between the two countries seemed to improve when

Yan Huiqing, who was then in Nanjing, was sent back to Moscow to forge better relations with the Russians. There were also cultural exchanges, which culminated in a well-publicized visit to the Soviet Union by a famous Chinese opera star, Mei Lanfang, and his troupe (Luo Zhigang, 1999: 69-70; Yan Huiqing, 1982: 200; 1996: 868-69, 877-80). In July 1935, Chiang's brother-in-law Kong Xiangxi, then vice president of the Executive Yuan and minister of finance, sug- gested to Bogomolov a "mutual aid" treaty between the two countries.

In October, Chiang talked with Bogomolov in Nanjing and hinted at concluding a secret military alliance with Russia (ZSWJ, 219-21). It is not known whether Wang Jingwei was privy to Chiang's private thoughts about furthering relations with the Soviet Union.3 What is clear is that differences in how the two leaders perceived the Soviet factor in the Sino-Japanese relations had emerged.

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240 MODERN CHINA/APRIL 2002

THE PARTING OF THE WAYS

THE REORIENTATION OF THE JAPAN POLICY:

THE ABSENCE OF WANG FROM NANJING

On 1 November 1935, a serious attempt was made on Wang Jingwei's life. The would-be assassin, Sun Fengming, who soon died of his own wounds, told the police that he shot Wang because of Wang's weak-kneed policy toward Japan. Further investigation revealed that Sun was linked to a news agency connected with the Nineteenth Route Army. Wang was hospitalized, resigned from his official posts, and in February 1936 went to Europe to recuperate. The

assassination attempt inadvertently brought about the end of the Wang-Chiang alliance, and Chiang Kai-shek had to cope single- handedly with the Japan issue (Coble, 1991: 253-56; Cai Dejin, 1988: 228, 232). Chiang assumed the presidency of the Executive Yuan and appointed Zhang Qun, his trusted expert on Japanese affairs, as for- eign minister (DHQHZL, 2.390; Zhang Qun, 1980: 48). He person- ally initiated three major policies to deal with the Japanese issue, attempting to intensify the effort to reach an understanding with Japan, forge a military alliance with the Soviet Union even without the

participation of the Western powers, and hold open the possibility of reconciling with the CCP. The last two policy initiatives, especially reconciliation with the CCP, were never favored by Wang Jingwei. With Wang in Europe, Chiang could reorient his policy toward Japan and avoid a direct confrontation with his former partner.

In his speech to the party's Fifth Congress on 19 November 1935, Chiang Kai-shek indicated that he would continue to seek an accom- modation with Japan (ZYSLCB, 1.3: 657-59). A "fundamental adjustment" (genben tiaozheng) of Sino-Japanese relations through direct talks with Tokyo was the hallmark of the new policy toward Japan. From late 1935 to late 1936, Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Qun met a number of times with successive Japanese ambassadors to seek progress in Sino-Japanese relations (ZYSLCB, 6.2: 82-84; Zhang Qun, 1980: 51-54). However, all these encounters ended in deadlock: Nanjing was not prepared to give in to the Japanese demand for an alli- ance against the communists, while Tokyo was unwilling to commit itself to guaranteeing the administrative integrity of North China.

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 241

Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army did not let up in its push into North China and Mongolia. It supported the Mongolian independence movement in the Chinese province of Suiyuan, and skirmishes broke out between the Chinese army and the Japanese-sponsored Mongo- lian army (Zhang Qun, 1980: 56-82; Shimada, 1983: 204-24). By this time, Chiang was fed up with Japan's intransigent stand and sensed that war was inevitable (ZYSLCB, 1.3: 674, 679).

While Chiang Kai-shek was actively seeking an understanding with Japan, his secret contacts with Moscow continued (Chen, 1994: 121-23). A diplomatic breakthrough seemed on the horizon in December 1935, when Ambassador Bogomolov told Chiang that Moscow had consented to discuss a mutual aid agreement allying Russia and China against Japan (ZSWJ, 224-25). Yet at this critical juncture, Chiang still had his sights on a possible agreement with Japan; he had not yet made up his mind to throw in his lot with Mos-

cow alone. He also entertained the thought that the Soviets could coerce the CCP to come to terms with the Nanjing government. In the

end, Moscow declined to comply with Chiang's wishes because it wanted to keep open its policy options toward Nanjing and Tokyo (Garver, 1991: 146, 173-74). The Russians suspected that Chiang would use the Sino-Soviet talks as a lever to press Japan to reach an understanding with Nanjing. They were anxious about the real inten- tions behind Nanjing's negotiations with Japan and demanded that Chiang form a united front with the CCP first (ZSWJ, 227-29). Before both sides could resolve their differences, in March 1936, Moscow publicly announced that it had signed a mutual aid agreement with Mongolia. This strengthened Moscow's position vis-a-vis Japanese influence in Mongolia, but it alienated the Nanjing government. Because China had long regarded Mongolia as part of its territories, Nanjing protested Moscow's action. Suspicions about Soviet motives deepened, and in May the secret Sino-Soviet discussions ended with- out producing an agreement (Wu Xiangxiang, 1954: 393; Luo Zhigang, 1999: 92-95; ZSWJ, 229-31).

After mid-1936, the prospects of a Sino-Japanese accommodation also faded quickly, and Chiang finally decided to actively forge an alli- ance with Moscow. Jiang Tingfu was appointed Chinese ambassador to Moscow in June 1936, with a mission of strengthening Sino-Soviet relations (Jiang Tingfu, 1984: 182-83, 191-96). Jiang held numerous

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242 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

meetings in Moscow with Russian officials such as Stomonyakov and Bogomolov (Zhongguo dier lishi dang'an guan, 1989: 20-30, 19). At the same time, the Nanjing government also maintained regular con- tact with the Russian ambassador, Bogomolov, and proposed forming a military alliance with the Soviets (ZSWJ, 235-40; Wang Zhen, 1993: 51-53, 65).4 But the Sino-Japanese War, which broke out on 7 July 1937, suspended these efforts before they bore any fruit.

Behind these hectic diplomatic maneuvers, Chiang Kai-shek clan- destinely sent feelers to the CCP, seeking negotiations. Chiang real- ized that his initiative toward the Soviet Union would fail unless he

reached some understanding with the CCP (ZSWJ, 233). In December 1935, Bogomolov had indicated to Chiang that if the Guomindang did not form a united front with the CCP, China would be incapable of fighting the Japanese (ZSWJ, 226-27; Zhongguo dier lishi dang'an guan, 1989: 30). From late 1935 onward, with Chiang's approval, sev- eral secret meetings were held with Chinese communists in Moscow, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (Yang Kuisong, 1992: 1-26; Deng Wenyi, 1973: 2.26, 70). Meanwhile, Chiang's attempts to rein in the commu- nists were unrelenting. In the negotiations with the CCP in Shanghai in November 1936, he set down stringent demands, including the reor-

ganization of the Red Army under the supervision of his government.

And the extermination campaign against the communist base area in Shaanxi was vigorously carried on (Yang Kuisong, 1992: 24-26). On the eve of the Xi'an Incident, Chiang had succeeded in weaving a series of policy options to deal with the Japanese encroachments.

THE XI'AN INCIDENT AND AFTER:

WANG JINGWEI'S ROLE IN THE JAPAN POLICY

Much scholarly work has been done on the Xi'an Incident of 12 December 1936. In brief, on that day, Chiang Kai-shek, who was in Xi' an to oversee the military campaigns against the communists, was detained by General Zhang Xueliang in an attempt to force Chiang to go to war against Japan. Behind-the-scenes negotiations led to the release of Chiang on 25 December. After the incident, Chiang began to work seriously to persuade the communists to take the govern- ment's side against Japan. Negotiations were conducted with the com- munist representative, Zhou Enlai; eventually, on 22-23 September

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 243

1937, both the CCP and the Guomindang declared that they would cooperate in the war against the Japanese (Yang Kuisong, 1992: 47- 59).

Wang Jingwei did not support the Guomindang's decision to form this new alliance. His attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek's new policy initiatives regarding Moscow and the CCP was made clear in a number of informal discussions he held in Genoa with four leading Chinese diplomats in Europe: Li Pingheng, the representative to the Interna- tional Labor Organization in Geneva, and Gu Weijun, Cheng Tianfang, and Guo Taiqi, the ambassadors to France, Germany, and Britain, respectively. In these meetings, Wang stated that the commu-

nists were not a lesser evil than Japan. During the Shanghai fighting in

1932 and the battle at the Great Wall in 1933, Wang recalled, the CCP always exploited the situation for its own interests, attacking the gov-

ernment forces in Jiangxi. In his view, China could successfully engage in a war against Japan only if the communists were suppressed

and the country unified. At the same time, Wang did not want to accept

the Japanese offer to join forces with China in a common front against

the communists. He believed that Nanjing could suppress the commu- nists on its own, even as the Japanese military threat mounted. Only by

being self-reliant could China survive (Gu Weijun, 1985: 2.371-75; Cheng Tianfang, 1964: 37-38).

Wang's reservations about seeking an alliance with the Soviet

Union were just as strong. In the meetings in Genoa, Gu Weijun and Kuo Taiqi pointed out to him that after Germany and Japan signed their anticommunist pact, Britain, the United States, and France as well as Russia had become more willing to band together to maintain world peace. China, they argued, should cooperate closely with those countries to constrain Japan. In particular, Kuo and Gu proposed that China should obtain Soviet aid and cooperation against Japan. But Wang did not believe that the four powers would go to war against Japan over the China issue. Experience since the Manchurian Incident showed that Japan would disregard any condemnations from Western powers that were not backed by force. Forging an alliance with the Soviet Union alone, Wang warned, would have disastrous conse- quences for China (Cheng Tianfang, 1964: 38; Gu Weijun, 1985: 373- 75). Wang came away from the Genoa meetings with his reservations about the motives of the Russians and the CCP undiminished.

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244 MODERN CHINA /APRIL 2002

When Wang Jingwei arrived at Shanghai on 14 January 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had already been released by Zhang Xueliang. Wang assumed the chairmanship of the Central Political Council, to which he had been elected by a plenary meeting of the party's Fifth Congress

on 7 December 1935 (Qin Xiaoyi, 1984b: 322). But he did not resume the presidency of the Executive Yuan, which was publicly responsible for the Japan policy. This is probably a sign that neither leader intended to return to their previous relationship of sharing power. Wang in fact did not take up again the critical role he had played in for-

mulating policy toward Japan before he left for Europe. Moreover, he

had every reason to stay away from Chiang Kai-shek's inner circle of foreign policy advisers, for he had grave doubts about the new orienta- tion toward the Soviet Union and the CCP. He believed that the policy toward Japan had changed fundamentally since the Xi'an Incident (Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, 1984: 178-79). Although in public Wang did not discuss his reservations about an alliance with Russia, he made very clear his disillusionment with foreign aid, beseeching the country to rely on itself as it worked for national survival (Lin Bosheng, 1937: 2.8-9). And he openly declared to Chiang and the party his opposition to the alliance with the CCP, likening the attempt

at cooperating with the communists to "drinking poison to quench thirst" (yinzhen zhi ke) (Lin Bosheng, 1937: 2.10-11, 30-37, 40-41; Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, 1984: 95, 179). On the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek had obvi- ously parted ways over how to manage the policy toward Japan.

THE ROLES OF CHIANG AND WANG

IN THE MAKING OF THE JAPAN POLICY

In the formulation of Nanjing's policy toward Japan during 1932 to

1935, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei clearly had a close partner- ship. Their relationship and their roles in the policy-making process were more complex than has often been depicted. Institutionally speaking, the Political Council and its Defense Committee had the power to confer legitimacy on policies toward Japan. Wang, having unrivaled seniority on the Standing Committee of the Political Coun- cil as well as being the president of the council's Defense Committee,

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 245

played a critical role in persuading the council to approve any settle- ments reached. With the support of Wang, Chiang strengthened his influence over the Political Council and its Defense Committee;

moreover, Wang often shielded Chiang from criticisms of the unpopu-

lar Japan policies. As president of the Executive Yuan and as foreign minister, Wang bore official responsibility for them; thus, he was the

main target of attack.

In the actual negotiations leading to the various agreements with Japan, Wang and Chiang worked together closely. They obviously were active behind the scenes in fashioning the Shanghai Truce, the Tanggu Truce, the He-Umezu Agreement, and the Qin-Doihara Agreement. And as Chiang's involvement in the military campaigns against the communist forces retreating to Shaanxi escalated, Wang's discretionary power in the day-to-day negotiations with Japan expanded; on a few critical occasions, Wang had to act without con- sulting Chiang. Chiang deferred to these decisions, as he realized that such deference was the price attached to Wang's support. To under- stand the formulation of China's Japan policy between 1932 and 1935, we need a more nuanced view of the nature of Chiang's power.

Although Wang and Chiang shared many assumptions about the proper way of handling the issue of Japan, there were at the same time

significant hidden differences in their thinking. Wang Jingwei's assessment of China's place in the international arena always con- tained a streak of pessimism. He virtually lost hope of obtaining West-

ern support against the Japanese. Yet his dogmatic anticommunist view precluded him from seeing the CCP or even Moscow as an ally in a war with Japan. In contrast, Chiang Kai-shek always kept his policy options open. As he adopted the policy of "first internal pacification,"

from 1934 onward Chiang also actively sought an alliance with the Soviet Union against Japan. At the same time, he did not relent in his

efforts to seek an understanding with Japan. Chiang's Japan policy thus rested largely on exploiting the triangular relationship between Nanjing, Moscow, and Tokyo.

When Chiang's actions are viewed in this light, it is clear that behind the facade of "first internal pacification, then external resis- tance," he had succeeded in constructing a series of integrally related policies toward Japan. When Wang returned to China in early 1937, Chiang had already embarked on the course of seeking a military

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246 MODERN CHINA/APRIL 2002

alliance with Moscow and reconciling with the CCP to jointly fight against Japan. Wang no longer played a crucial role in making policy related to Japan, as he had strong reservations about Chiang's new pol-

icy initiatives. And because the Nanjing government had already taken steps to ally with the CCP, Chiang felt that he could win suffi- cient political support for his Japan policy without bringing Wang back into his inner circle. After the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Wang's lack of faith in the alliance with Moscow and the Chinese communists made him feel more desperate about China's efforts to resist Japan. Eventually, he made the fateful decision to explore peace terms with Japan on his own and defected to the Japanese side in December 1938.

NOTES

1. It is interesting to note that Chiang did not mention Germany's role in the diplomatic arena

in the Far East, although evidently he admired Germany and desired that China learn from it.

Germany's relations with China were undoubtedly close, especially in the area of military train-

ing (Kirby, 1984: 3-4,145-85,228-29; Wakeman, 1997; MaZhendu and Qi Rugao, 1998: 20-39, 50-80, 161-274; Liu, 1956: 60-70,74-75,90-102). However, probably because Germany's mili- tary and political role in the Far East was greatly reduced after the Versailles Treaty, Chiang did

not give much thought to Germany when analyzing the international scene and the security order

in the region. The possibility of a German-Japanese anticommunist alliance probably made Ger-

many less likely as a diplomatic partner to China. 2. In August 1932, Wang Jingwei resigned as president of the Executive Yuan in protest

against General Zhang Xueliang, the regional militarist in Manchuria, who demanded funding from the Nanjing government but did not put up a fight against Japanese aggression. He with-

drew to Europe from November 1932 to February 1933. But as Japan continued its encroach- ment and occupied Shanhaiguan, a strategic pass at the Great Wall, Wang returned to China in

March 1933 to assist Chiang Kai-shek in dealing with the Japanese threat (Cai Dejin and Wang

Sheng, 1993: 180-87; Coble, 1991: 61-66, 97-98). 3. According to Wang Jingwei, he was not informed by Chiang Kai-shek when Chiang sent

Chen Lifu to Europe in December 1935 to secretly contact Soviet officials (Wang Jingwei, 1942?). Also, in July 1941, Tang Liangli, the deputy foreign minister of Wang Jingwei's wartime

collaboration government in Nanjing, in a public speech to correspondents from the Axis pow- ers, recalled that Chiang Kai-shek had never revealed to Wang Jiangwei's group his secret nego- tiations with the Soviet Union before the Sino-Japanese War (see Waijiao gongbao, 21 July 1941: 12).

4. Negotiations with the Soviet Union dragged on until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. One of the main obstacles was Chiang Kai-shek's desire to form a military alli-

ance with Russia and not, as the Soviets proposed, to sign a nonaggression pact (ZYSLCB, 1.3: 109, 1.1: 616; Jindai Zhongguo she, 1995: 21; ZSWJ, 231). The Russians viewed a military alli- ance with China as highly risky. Bogomolov told Chen Lifu frankly that such an agreement

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So / THE GUOMINDANG'S JAPAN POLICY 247

would force the Soviet Union to assist China if a war broke out between China and Japan, while

Japan could ally with Germany to invade the Soviet Union (Chen, 1994: 123). The Russians

obviously did not think highly of China's military strength. They wished to stay out of the Sino-

Japanese War and would not do anything to provoke Japan into attacking them.

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So Wai Chor is an associate professor at the School of Arts and Social Sciences, the Open

University of Hong Kong. He is the author ofThe Kuomintang Left in the National Revo-

lution (Oxford, 1991). His current research interest is on the Wang Jingwei collaboration

regime.

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Contents

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Issue Table of Contents

Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Apr., 2002) pp. 147-274

Front Matter
Elites and Agencies: Forging Labor Policy at China's Central Level [pp. 147-176]
Building and Funding a Warlord Regime: The Experience of Chen Jitang in Guangdong, 1929-1936 [pp. 177-212]
The Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei [pp. 213-252]
Review Article

Review: untitled [pp. 253-274]

Back Matter