Review 5

32 It U

.J. W N

.K E

II

m ovem

ents are forced to identify the interconnections betw een the struc-

tures and processes that m old people's everyday lives. tn bringing so m

any , experiences and histories from

different circum stances to bear on the con-

nections that are recreating the w ay people live, social m

ovem ents not only

tell us w here the m

ost im portant changes are occurring-and

w here they

are li1ost dangerous-but also m

ake us m ore sensitive to the future trajcc-

lories these changes and dangers m ay bring, as w

ell as the possibilities these trajec.:toriesdL'iclose.

f< 6. Y.w .J/e,...,., o,._,_cJo-rld,

;vt,v,vt,Jo-rfcy I

,

/] ,,_._.,/c/;,..r; LI II.A

.A

te-~ (='....,b ,,...,/u.+-,,

I 'if!,

R , 8-J·

C H

A PT

E R

T

H R

E E

Structures

A W

O R

L D

O F

C O

N N

E C

T IO

N S

If contem porary thinking about hum

an affairs is now characterized by ch,d·

lenge.s to a universalist view of! ii.story and the a.ssenion of a plurality of his·

tories,it is also im portant to pursue the argu1nem

in the opposite <lirectlo11. For the Inescapable fact rem

ains thm , w

hatever the variety of historical e,- periences

that inform contem

porary political practices,

w e do live in "

w orld of global structures. T

hese are the structures that m ake the scenario<

I/ of N o W

orld or T w

o W orlds so plausible. A

lthough the easy evolutioni.< 1 lll)ths of universal H

istory m ust be rejected in favor of a greater openness to

the conversation betw een prolif crating hi!-itorics, it is also 11l'tess:1ryto l'( i1lll'

to term s w

ith those concrete historical structures that have m

ade us all pa,·· ticipants in a w

orld of global connections. T

he precise character of these connections is dilT

icult to specif)'. D iffer·

ent theoretical and ideologic:tl perspectives have tended

to privilege par-

ticular structures and processes rather tl1an others. T his tendency has been

particularly strong am ong academ

ic and technical analysts guided

by the highly specialized concepts and languages of m

odern social research. A

very high prem

ium

has been placed on anal)tical skills that enable scholars w

exam ine narrow

ly denned phenom

ena w ith great care and precision.

A na!)~ical concepL

s have been denned particularly

sharply In tltc case

of tw o of the m

ost obviously im portant structures

in the m odern

w orld: tlte

system of states and the w

orld econom )'. A

lthough it m ay be fairly obvious in

general term s that these rw

o broad structures are in fact very closely interre· lated, attem

pts to understand them

in anv detail te.1d to focus prim aril)' on

one or the otl1er. E ach has been said by different groups of scholars to be tlte

prim ary determ

inant of the possibilities open before us.

// T

he structure of the contem

porary states system

has depended

ulti fl

m ate!)• on the legitim

acy of w ar. 111is is perhaps

the greatest Irony of the

E uropean political tradition. T

he great search for legitim

ate authority

a11<I progres~ive enlightened

civilization w ithin states pre.sum

ed the lnevitabilit) of bloody conflict betw

een st:tte~. W ith nuclear w

eapons, this fundam

enta contradiction

has becom e

alm ost unm

anageable ancJ certainly

ethic;tll1 intolerable,

E conom

ic processes have brought all states

im o

varying degn:es "

intP rl"P

l:itinn.c;hir, ::i:nc.le\•en interdependence. B

ut the cfaim s of u11ivers: 1

•34 R U. J.W A

LK E

R

progress and developm ent that em

anate from the centers of econom

ic pow

er and privilege turn bitterly sour in view of the huge disparities in the

w ell-being of peoples

in different societies and classes. 111e possibility of nuclear annihilation

m ay be the forem

ost concern for som

e people. For others, annihilation

is a present reality. Poverty is deadly. l11e contradiction betw

een processes bringing all states into a universalizing w orld econom

y a1K

Ithosel,ri11gi11gunevendevelopm ent, marginalization, and

exclusion is not new

in principle, hut is now m

ore insistent than ever. B

oth sets of contradictions-and they are far from

sim ple, far from

sugge,c;tingany necessary nr desirable resolution-are

m ade m

ore com pli-

c:ned and 111ore dangerous by pow

erful new

technologies. 11:trdheaded

, analysts tend to point to these contradictions w ith an airofinevitabilit)i lnter-

national com petition, they say, is a perm

anent feature of the m odern hum

an condition, w

hether concerning the gam e of pow

er politics betw een states,

the logic of the w orld econom

y, or the dynam ics of technological

innova- tion. In fact, these supposedly perm

anent features of the hum

an condition :ire the product

of historical processes, and they are alw

ays subject to

change. Such analysts are also prone to treat these structures as cold, rem

ote, and abstract, as huge determ

ining forces beyond

the reach of ordinary people. In fact, they are the historical products of very concrete hum

an ac- tivities. T

hey depend on people going about their norm

al everyday tasks. T

hey absorb m uscle and sw

eat, contem plation, em

otion, creativity, and cor- ruption. People m

ay be caught up in huge structural transform ations over

w hich they have little direct control. llut structures are produced and repro-

duced by the practices and rituals of everyday life. l11ey m ay seem

natur:tl or inevitable, abstract and rem

ote, but they depend on people doing things, or ""l

doing things, 011the w ay people organize them

selves collectively, ow n

things, produce things, talk, think, pursue

routines, and treat each other. C

hallenges to these structures depend on a clear recognition of this insight. M

oreover, not only is it all too easy to treat the states system and the

w orld econom

y ,L Scom

pletely separate, but it is also tem pting to treat either

or both of these as the only sites of real pow er. T

he im m

ediate crises of m od-

ern life do often occur as econom ic and political necessity. O

ther aspects of hum

an existence-those that are usually forced into the elu.c;tlc category of

culture-are often treated as secondary, as determ

ined by the needs of econ-

om y and state. Y

et, it is becom ing m

ore and m ore obvious that the w

orkings of neither the states syste111 or the w

orld econom y can be easily separated

from cultural process~s. Som

e of the m ost pressing m

odern problem

s- .suchas racism

, sexism , or abuse of the environm

ent-involve enorm ou~ly

com plex interactions betw

een processes that are conventionally labeled as politic:tl1 ~conrnnic,:indcultural.

In :m y case, it is in ter111s of cultural practices-of

w ays in w

hich people

=======================================---"'-"H "'-U

-"C 1:..:lc:'ito:;E

::.:S_--'.IS

com e to understand

and participate in the w orld-that

people com prehend

how the w

orld m ight be changed. Far from

being largely irrelevant to con- siderations of pow

er, as so m any analyst.shave supposed,

cultural processe.s have alw

ays been central to the w ay pow

er is constructed, legitim

ized, and

transform ed.

W hether one begins w

ith the states system or the w

orld econom i;

w ith

new technologies

or w ith cultural processes,

it is becom ing

clearer than

ever that account.s of contem porary

global stnictures that try to treat any of

these In isolation are necessarily m isleading.

In thi.s chapter, I ,vill pre.sent each of these starting points in turn in order

to sketch a broad context in

w hich to exam

ine the w :tycritical ~ocial m

ovem ents respond in practil'e

both to a w orld of prolifer:tting histories and to em

~rging patterns of rno-

nection that defy conventional analitical anti ideological categories.

T IIE

ST A

T E

S SY ST

E M

System s of states are relative!)· rare in hum

an experience. T

he m odern

st:lles system

w as slow

to crystallize. IL s origins go back to R

enaissance lt:tly a11L

l the changing econom

ic, technologic:tl, and soci:tl ch:tnf\eS that allow ed f,,r

the effective autonom y of city-states. W

ith the 1reaty of W estphalia of !6·i8,

this principle of autonom y w

as form alized in an agreem

ent that w

ars ,vou Id only be fought over tbe secular interest.I of com

peting states, not over the

universalist claim s of religious c.Joctrine. With the nineteenth century cam

e a fusion-often

ragge<l an<l incom plete--of

nationalism and the territorial

jurisdiction of states. O

nly sit1ce decoloni1,1tion h,ts the sw

tes .sy.stem he-

I com

e the prim ary political structure everyw

here. T

he m ost im

portant thing about the states system is its fragm

ent:t1io11. T

his is w lt:ll distinguishes

it from a11 em

pire, in w

hich authority lsstructuretl in " hierarchical

m nnner from

" single center.

Interpreted positiveli:

the states system

provides considerable diversity in the arrangem

ent of hum

an affairs. It allow

s for a freedom from

centralized hierarchical

control. It en-

cour,1ges the em ergence

of di!T erent social and

cultural tradition.s w

ithin relatively secure territori:tl areas. It perm

its the kind of division of labor a11L l

econom ic

com petition

that Is often claim ed

to be im

portant for m

aterial progress and has certainly been cruclnl for the creation of the m

odern w

orld econom

)~

I, M

ost significant, it em bodies a fundam

ental contrast betw

een life inside

and outside the state. A 1 early E

uropern1 com m

ent:ttors such as M

:tchi:tl"ell i ,ind llob!)e!; argued, w

ithin the st.1te it becom es

pos.sible to live the "good life"': to becom

e a citizen; to establish society, com

m unity,

culture, and

11:1

lion; to trade off obligations w ith freedom

s. B

etw een

states, on the otliet (,

lt:111d,any over:1rchl11g sense of a com m

unity of people

:is people is e.s.s,•11

36 •It 11.J. W A

I.K E

H

tially aba1H .l(>1u.:d.

this point that the im erpretation turns sharply nega-

lt is :1L tive. In fric.:t,internatio11alpolitics is conventionally seen as a realm

ofw nrs,

rorce, and violence; of deviousness, intrigue, and <liplonrn.C }

1i anti of pow er

politics unfettered byconsiderations of justice and legitim

acy. It is not neces- //

sary to glance hack very far or very often to see how this negative interpreta-

,tion can be very rl'rsu:isive. E

venso, a conceplion of an u1K lerl} 1ing com

m unity som

ehow holding

thi.s system together has rarely disappeared entirely. Som

e have tried to pre- serve a sense of a sl ,ared natural law

. Som e have appealed to the essentially

"L a\i,,a03l"q~ture of all peoples. O

thers have predicted the eventual integntt· ing potem

ial of co111m erceand econom

ic life. For the m ost part, relation~

hetw ee11"states have 1;;:;;',organized

by all kinds of pragm atic and fragile

acrnm m

odation.s. T here

have been custom

s and rules, unspoken agree-

m ents, and codified law

s. T here have been vague principles about balanclng

pow er again.st pow

er in order to preserve order. T he "great pow

ers" have

been expected ~s,P.l,'!Y ..~central

role in organizing the system as a w

hole-to ti 1eir ow

n advantage, ,f c~1ere has even been the em

er~ence of regu· larized d~SM

l.lllak[llJU l(O

C edures,

from internation;( org.uiJ;.affons like

the-- llniled

- 01 the m

ost pow erful

states to N

ations l<> m eetings of heads

F .

sem iform

al policy C <><>rdinating

bodies concerned w ith financial and trade

m atters. Som

e analysts have gone so far as to call this a "sociecy of states," im

plying that all is not purely anarchical and that, despitetl1e'lncipienl threat of a resort to force, som

e kind of order is possible. / /

E ven so, w

lw ever m

ay be said in favor of the states system , the resort to

force and w ar has rem

ained one of its central features. A nd although

it is possible to .see som

e continuity in the underlying com petitive logic of the

states sysle1n since tl1e seventeenthcentury, industriali7.a.tion, technologies

of m ass destructi<>n, and the grow

th ofa w orld econom

y have fundam entally

altered the dyn:1111ics <>finterstate interaction and the character of contem

po· rary w

arfare. It is now fairly obvious to m

ost people w ho exam

ine the w ork-

ings of the m odern states system

that our capacity to live w ith both the logic

of this system and w

ith m odern nuclear, chem

ical, or biological w eapons

Is \}

exceedinglyprecari(n1s. T

o begin w ich, although the resort to w

ar has been form ally delegitl·

m ated, w

ar retains a central place in contem porary political life. T

he accom ·

rnodations worked out under the rubric of nuclear deterrence reflect an understanding th.1t the sw

tes system can no longer rely on w

ar ac;a m

echanism of system

change. D eterrence

theory, w ith its em

phasis on the threat of "m

ut11al assured destruction," has involved an attem pt to keep the

system going w

ithout actually engaging in overt w arfare. B

ut these accom -

m <>dations have alw

ays been rather fragile. D eterrence theory Itself has not

been a particularly go<>d guide to the w ay w

eapons are actually deployed. N

ew technologies

threaten to replace

the deterrence principles

of w ar

ST R

L 1C

1llllE S

.\" •

;1voida11c.:e w

ith tho:,;e of w ar fighting. N

ucle:1r ~\'ar betw een superpnw

ers m

ay have been delegitim ized,

but com petition

berw een

them

h:ts persis- tently erupted

in the form of conventional

w ars all over

the w orld.

A ud

political elites susceptible to extrem

es of self-righteousness,

as •;veil as the usual tendency for things that can go w

rong to gow ro!1g at the m

ost inoppor- tune m

om ent, and w

e arrive ~Itour present chilling w ~1lt7.ahm

g tl1e precipice ,,r.self.:111ni11ilation.

l7 M

oreover, the principle of sovereign equality am ong states ha.s alw

ays been som

ething of,a fiction. Inequality berw een states has been justified on

the grm m

d.s that it allow s the larger states to preser\'e

"order" in the system

a~a w

ht>le. Yet, follow ing :t long trm

.lition, the contem pclrary superptl\,·ers

lw ve often behaved less out of any sense of responsibility for m

:1intaini11g:, rea..•m

nahle degree of international order thnn out of the unilateral pur.c.uit of their ow

n suprem aC

)c T he very scale of their pov.·er m

eans that the m

m l-

ern states system also contains a good deal of the logic of em

pire, as the

inhabitanL s of N

icaragua and A fghanistan, am

ong others, are disco"ering yet

again.111us, the logic of the m odern states system

brings not only the prom -

ise of w ar betw

een states but also the ongoing dom

ination of strong st:ites

over w eaker ones.

W hatever m

ay be said in favor of the states system as our prim

ary politi- cal structure, w

e now find a rem

arkable convergence

of people "·ho, from

quite different backgrounds,

raise their voices in horror. Som e draw

atten- tion to the divergence berw

een the codes of conduct traditionally associated

w ith tl1e "society of states" and the w

ay states In fact behave. Som

e focu.s m

ore speciflc:tlly on

the destabilization

of nuclear deterrence

through technologicJI

innovations. O

thers stress the fundam

ental it1com

p:ttibilit)' betw

een a system that assum

es both ~var and the dom ination of the strong

over the w eak to be legitim

ate and form s of m

ilit:trization that take politirnl

struggle and w ar into a realm

of m uw

al exterm ination.

//. Q

uestions of w ar and peace rem

ain central to those w ho ~x:1111inethe

w orkings of the m

odern states system

, B ut although

the poss1btlm es of Ill<·

clear w ar in particular rem

ain the m ost spectacular

concern, understanding

the states system is no less im

portant for understanding

problem s

of en- vironm

ental degradation

or the abuse of hum an

rights. O n the one hand,

the states system depends

on the principle of sovereign territorial

jurisdic- tion, w

hereas ecological processes tend to ignore territorial borders.

O n the

other hand, the logic of the stm es system

poses problem s

of national sen, r- ity, and national security is perhaps the easiest rm

ionale available to any re- gim

e w ishing to engage in internal repression

or establish m

ore effectil'l'

curl1son clem ocracy.

f r-or all these rea~ons, m

any people have identified the states sy.stem

:is I I

the prim ary problem

that now

confronts us, It is easy to see w hy better op-

tions are sought in attem pts to replace the fragm

entatio11 that is the prim :tr,·

--- ,3H

It U

-J.W A

I.K E

H

characteristic of the states system w

ith som e form

of integration or global con1111t111ity.

In this com ext, peace ha!icom

e to be understood prim arily-

;111d.si111plistically-a.s tl1e absence of w ar, and the absence of w

ar li;cs com e

to be understood prim

arily in term s of the centralization of authority.

T he m

:1jor deh:ttes on this issue have been fram ed as a choice betw

een such a ce111r:tliz:tti<

ll1-tlinll1gh the U

nited N atlon.s, international l:t,v, and so

un-or renew

ed attem

pts to m

ake the society of states m ore

coherent through m

ore effective ar111s control, better diplom acy, and so on. Few

er and few

er people believe that tinkering w

ith the system is enough,

and those w

ho push for global centralization are confronted w ith the problem

of identifying the concrete historical forces that could bring such centraliza- tion about. States the111selves see111 unlikely to do so. T

he self-identified agents of H

istory, w hether

in the guise of transnational corporations

or superpow

ers, w ould seem

all too likely to favor a centralization rem iniscent

of authoritarian e111pires. In a w orld of histories, solutions posed as the sim

- ple need to m

ove from fr;,gm

entation to integration seem quite inappro-

priate. A nd in any case, 111ostdebates on these them

es have arisen out of an //

analysis tl1at treats the structure of the states system in isolation. T

hey have largely ignored the relationship betw

een the states system and the m

odern w

ork.1econom y

T H

E W

O R

L D

E C

O N

O M

Y

N ineteenth-century thinkers could already see that the dynam

ic econom ic

life set in m otion w

ith the transitions from feudalism

to capitalism In E

urope ,vould soon expand

to create a w orld econom

y. W orld econom

y has now

/; hcrnm

e a reality. E ven ifsnm

e States, like the Soviet U nion and C

hina, have not been draw

n into it com pletely; even if states respond to It in m

any differ- ent w

ays depending on internal social, political, and cultural arrangem enl~;

even if there are a great m any form

s of econom y in different states; and even

if protectionism rem

ains com m

on, everyone is now affected by patterns of

production, distribution, and exchange that are global In their scope. T

he w orking.s orthe w

orld econom y are com

plex, often m ysterious,

and certainly subject to sharply divergent explanations. Y et tbree features

stm d out no m

atter w hat political inclinations color the analysis: First, the

developm ent of the w

orld econom y has been very dynam

ic. T here have

been periods of rapid grow th but also periods

of severe crisis. T he third

quarter of this century, for exam ple, w

as a tim e of unprecedented

econom ic

accum ul:ttion. T

he severe m alaise that follow

ed still affects us. Periods of econom

ic cri.sis :u·e .som etim

es the result of cyclical dow nturns. M

ore signifi- cant, they are som

etim es the result of fundam

ental contradictions betw

een various pans of the system

that can only be resolved by a restructuring of the

S l'ltU

<.:nJ·H -E

-=s--w

1/ W

e are now living In just such a period of fundam

ental restructuring

of the w

orld econom y. T

I1e dom inance

of the U nited States, w

hich "·as so im -

portant to the w ay the w

orld econom y becam

e .structured

after 1945, has heen challenged

on m any fronts. T

he econom ic

center of gravity seem s to

be shifting geographically from

the N orth A

tlantic region to the Pacific H im

. Inform

ation and com

m unirntion

arc replacing raw

m aterial., as t":1pit:tl :i.s-

sets. A bove all, there are m

ajor changes in the International division of labor, as w

ell as both an Increasing reliance on capital-intensive form

s of produc- tion and new

patterns in the exploitation of cheap labor. T

I1e consequences of all this are now

clearly visible even in the

w orld's

m ost

pro.sperous ~ocieties, particularly in high unem

ploym ent in regions that once thrived

on heavy m anufacturing.

// Second, the overall trajectory of this dynam

ic developm ent

ho.s been /

tow ard greater

and greater internationalization. T

his is w hat has m

ade the m

yth of H istory so pow

erful. Internationalization becam

e particularly

im -

portant in the post· 1945 era. T he Y

alta agreem ents

m ay have sym

bolized the

continuing im

portance of divisions betw

een states-or

at least betw een

groups of states-but the agreem

ents at llretton W

oods sym bolized

a con- certed attem

pt, led by the U nited States as the dom

inant pow

er, to institute a w

orld econom y based on the principle of com

parative advantage, a w

orld of free trade w

ith the dollar as an international m

edium

of exchange and a m

anagem ent

of "interdependence" by U

.S.-dom inated

institutions such as

the W orld !lank and the International M

onetary Fund (IM F). T

his era saw an

enorm ous

extension of w

orld trade

and international

Investm ent,

the em

ergence of m

ultinational corporations

and international

Institutions, greater Integration of the econom

ies of m any states, particularly the "'ealthv

state.s of the O rganization

for E conom

ic C

ooperation and

D evelopm

ent (O

E C

D ), and the internationalization

of the banking ind financial m

arkets. /~

T he pattern

of internationalization is undergdng

substantial ch:m

µe I'/

once again. N

ew Inform

ation technologies

link L ondon,

N ew

)urk, ;m

d T

okyo m ore rapidly than com

panies in any of these cities could com

m uni-

cate only a few years ago. T

he "w orld car" has becom

e a sym

bol of the "'ay production

is becom ing organized on a w

orldw ide

basis. T he developm

ent of a global capital m

arket has becom e particularly significant. W

orld trade in goods and services in the late 1980s am

ounts to around

$3 trillion a year, foreign-exchange

transactions am ount

to $35 trillion, and turnover in L

on- don's

E urodollar

m arket, w

here m

ajor financial institutions borrow

from

each other, com

es to about $75 trillion. Investm ents

tend to be m ade m

ore and m

ore by nation rather than by industry. A lthough policy m

akers in the m

ajor econom ies

can together control

w orld

m oney supply, they are de-

creasingly able to control m oney supply w

ithin their ow n countries.

/ T

hird, the grow th of the w

orld econom y

has been fundam

ent:1lly t111- //

even. C osts and benefits have been

unequally shared.

O w

ners of capital

h-,w ~h,,rf

'l rP htiw

~ adv:lllt~m :e over the otvners of labor pow

er. C apital h:1.s

41 -It II J W

A I.K

l'H

been increasingly concentrated. l luge disparities have resulted from the

dynam ics

that are set in m otion

betw een

"m ore-developed"

and "less-

devcloped" ern1w

111ies. There is undoubtedly

m uch to be said

for the achievem

ents that

have accom panied

the recent

periods of econom

ic grow

th associ:tted w ith this internationalization

of econom ic life. B

ut un- equal developm

ent puts all these achievem

ents into serious question. E co-

nom ic: life in \X 1estern societies is now

dom inated bym

ass unem ploym

ent, attacks on real w

~1ges,the erosion of social services, and the abandonm ent

of regions and peoples that do not fit into the new patterns of international

production. T he econom

ies of socialist states are clearly in difficulty. The so- called T

hird W ork! is stricken w

ith huge debts, falling com m

odity prices, m

ass unem ploym

ent, and increasing levels of povert}', even in societies ti.•here overall econom

ic w ealth is increasing.

T he T

w o W

orlds scenario has becom e especially plausible in this con-

// text. W

hereas m i1hs of H

istory and theories of developm ent have assum

ed that everyone w

ill be clim bing up the sam

e ladder sooner or later-given the right sort of aid, institutions, and governm

ent policies-nationalists and

theorists of im perblism

, dependence,

or the internationalizing of capital have stressed the divergence of possibilities available to those at the center of the w

orld econom y and those on its periphery

T his divergence occurs both betw

een and w ithin states. W

hether be- cause of their relative position in the international division of labor, or of prncesses of unequal exchange betw

een raw

m aterials and m

anufactured goods, or of the tangled strings attached to foreign aid, IM

F credit, and cor- porate investm

ents, poor states constantly find them selves at a relative disad-

vantage. T hey find it difficult, and for som

e perhaps even lm po~sible, to es-

cape from a vicious cycle of poverty anc.l m

alc.levelopm ent.

M oreover, cm

l}' certain sectors of such states hecom e tied to this interna-

tional econo111y.National econom ies becom

e divided Into a m odernizing

urban sector, lx1sed at least initially on exports that m ake capital accum

ula- tion possible, and a peripheral sector. T

he latter tends to be characterized partly by traditional w

ays of life and partly by the consequences of the im

- pact of the m

oderni,ing sector, as w

hen cheap m anufactures and capital-

intensive technologies destroy the

basis for traditional econom ies

and com

m unities.

C ontrary to the old theories of linear developm

ent, therefore, such con- ceptions of the w

orld econom y refuse to attribute poverty and m

aldevelop- m

ent to any innate backw ardness of tradition and point instead to the w

ay in llr which m

odernity itself, in the form of an inequalitarian w

orld econom y,

sucks the energy :tnd resources out of poor societies, underm ining

their c:1- pacity to develop on their ow

n term s. M

oreover, because the political elites of such w

cietics arc caught up in all the tensions that arc bound to arise in

ST R L l(..illR

E S

• sucl1 u dualistic econom

y, )'et have effective support only in the m <>dernizing

sector, they tend to resortt<Jm ore or less authoritarian or m

ilitary fort11."i of

rule. T his is, in turn, reinforced by the possibility of foreign intet~·ention.

O f m

ur.se, it is possible to com e up w

ith versions of this analysis that are just as oversim

plified as those found in the classic accounts of developm ent

as a serie."i of st:iges ~long the highw ay to m

odernity. In practice, c.liffere1ll states show

different patterns, depending on existing traditions,

class struc- tures, political institutions, and so on. S

om e !-.tales have m

anaged to bre:1k out of the cycle of dependent

developm ent.

E ven so, the divergence

of opportunities

rem ains a central characteristic

of the contem porary

w orld

econom y.

(/ T

he issue of international debt is particularly im portant

in this respect. T

his is a problem that Is often fram

ed in term s of the threat posed to interna-

tional banks by big debtors like M exico, B

razil, and A rgentina. B

ut from the

point of view of those in debt, the situation

of m any sm

all states is m uch

m ore w

orrisom e. For them

debt is both a sym bol of their vulnerability

to the vag,1ries of the w

orld m arket and an instrum

ent readily available to the

!M l( the W

orld B ank, and m

ultilateral developm ent

banks in the im position

of loan conditions. In fact, for debtor countries In general,

the dynam ics of

international finance are becom

ing m

ore im portant

than the dyt1am ics uf

production and trade.

// In the poorest of societies, the gulf betw

een those people w ho are able

// to participate in the w

orld econom y and those w

hose capaciry to survive has been underm

ined through processes Introduced by the structural dem

ands of the w

orld econom y seem

s to be w idening. D

eclining industrial states like B

ritain, w ith such a sharp contrast betw

een the Industrial rubble of its north and the affluence of Its south, exem

plify the appearance of pnrallel patterns

in w hm

l.s conventionally thought of as the Fir.st W orld. From

fears about a ..

disappearing m

iddle class in the U nited States to the savage im

m ediacy "r

m ass starvation :tnd m

alnutrition am

ong m

arginal peoples

in so m

any societies,

inequal!ty rem ains

a central characteristic

of the w

ay hu111a11 beings live together.

It is perhaps in the context of the dynam ics of the w

orld econom y that

the possibilities before us rem ain m

ost obscure.Just as, w

hen considerinp the states system

, it is easy to becom e obsessed w

ith the Im m

ediate threat ol w

ar and to ignore its im pact on, say, ecologies and hum

an rights, so also it i, possible to be overw

helm ed

by poverty, unem ploym

ent, and so on, unde1

stood only In form al econom

ic term s. B

ut it is just as im portant

to be con cerned

about the quality of econom ic

processes-about the

nature :t11(

m eaning of w

ork, for exam ple, or the w

ay basic needs are turned into rnn1

m ercially stim

ulated desires through advertising and popular culture.

Further than this, analysis of the w orld econom

)' is obvious!)' subject t,

It 11.J\X - 11\LK

E I{

• com

plex and sharply contested argum ents. T

ensions run especially high be- I

lw een those w

ho stressthe beneficial consequencesofinternationaliz..1tion and those w

ho point to the consequences of inequality. O

n the one hand, the conventional econom

ic w isdom

and policy em anating from

the centers of econom

ic pow er stress the need to extend and m

anage the latest phase of internationalization, a need w

rapped in prrnnises of trickle-dow n for all. O

n the other hand, those w

ho look at the fate of w eaker states or peoples see

that the univer.s:ilizing character of the w orld econom

y has brought n<>tde-

velopm ent am

! equality for all but the present reality of poverty for m illions

and the prom ise of com

plete exclusion for those w

ho are being m ade dis-

pensable to the functional needs of the w orld econom

y as a w hole. Sim

ilar an:ilvses m

otivated tl1e socialist and nationalist m ovem

ents of the past. B ut it

see,;,s increasingly unclear to m any socialists and nationalists alike, not to

m ention dem

ocrm ic:1111·inspired liberals, just w

hat response is appropriate [l()\\', T

he problem of appropriate

response is especially difficult given the

changing relationships berw een the state and the w

orld econom y. For m

ost of this cernury, and for the m

ost influential political ideologies, the state has //

been treated as an instrum ent capable of redressing at least the w

orst aspects /j

of econom ic inequality anti alienation. W

'hether as the nm ion~state re~!c1·ng

the pre.~sures of colonialism and unuerdevelopm

ent, the socialist state w

ith its stress on collective ow

nership and centralized planning, the w elfare state

sim ultaneously acting to m

eet the needs of an expanding econom y and to

pn>\-·ident least a n1i11in1u111level of social services for everyone, or, indeed, the state as the essential agent of econom

ic developm ent

and m oderniza-

tion everyw here, the state has generally been regarded

as an essentially ...,,.,,-pn>gressivefc1rce.

O f course, states have alw

ays heen regarded w ith som

e suspicion in this context, not least because <>fthe w

ay they have advanced the interests of par- ticular classes and elites. llut w

ith the increasingly internationalized and

capital-inten.sive nature of contem porary

econom ic

life, judgm ents

about the essentially progressive character of states have becom

e even m ore un-

certain. T he nw

rket, not the state, has been resurrected

as the prim ary

source of .c;ulutions to all econom ic problem

s. The w elfare state has been

/ .seriously eroded.

Inequality has becom

e increasingly

respectable. D

e- m

am ls for law

and order have becom e louder than dem

ands for social jus-

tice. T he poor and m

arginali,ed are m

ore and m ore likely to be castigated

as s<>cial deviants and subjected to surveillance anu control.A s the m

ore pro- gressive elem

ents of states are gradually w hittled aw

ay, the Idea of a national econom

y, !1U hject

to the sovereign authority anti control of state actors, be· com

es m ore and m

ore difncult to sustain. T I1e claim

that It is possible to do

I' som ething about poverty and inequality by taking over state pow

er becom es

m ore and m

ore illusory. .

S TH

U C

TU R

E S

• T

E C

H N

O L

O G

IE SA

N D

P O

L IT

IC A

L EC

O N

O M

Y

O ne of the rnain tlifficultie!-i in understanding w

hat is,going on in the m od-

ern w orld is tl1e com

plexity of the relationships betw

een the st:ites system

and the w

orld econom y. T

his rem ains a serious challenge

for contem porary

scholarly analysis, Influenced as it is by traditions th:tt have treated politics

and econom ics as separ:tte enterprises. It is especially im

portant in trying t<

>

m ake sense of the m

odern state. T

he relationship is m

ore dilT

icult to dis- entangle given the im

portant role played by factors that are often am tlysed

in noneconom ic

or political categories. T

he role of technological innov-Jtion is particularly im

portant in this re-

spect. T he im

pact of new technologies on so m

any areas of hum an existence

has even led to the elaboration of pow

erful theories of technological

deter- (/

m inl.sm

. Such theories m

ust be resisted. T echnologies

arise from and enter

back into very com plex social, political, and econom

ic processes.

In the con- text of the states system

, they am plify dangers that arc already present

in the structures of fragm

entation and in superpow

er dom

inance. In the context

of the w orld econom

y, they reproduce and intensify patterns of unequal de- velopm

ent that are central to the w ay the w

orld econom y

is organized. N

or is it very useful to see technology In term s of the classic choice be-

tw een optim

ism and pessim

ism . M

any of our m odern

technologies are m

ag- nificent achievem

ents. It also rem

ains true that m any of these technolog,e.s

/ are im

plicated In terrible

barbarism s. W

hat counts in the end

Is not the //

technology as such but the character of the social structures that channel

/ their energies

into developing aiiJusing particular technologies.

T o take

exam ples from

the field of health, the sim ple technologies

of sew age treat-

m ent and the provi.sion of adequ:tte food and shelter

have had a far greater im

pact on hum :111 well-being

then all the sophistications '.'f the anifki:tl

heart. N ew

technologies are :t w

on,-ing issue for those pursum g

a just w orld

peace, not

because they determ

ine ever,~hing,

nor because

advanced technologies

are necessarily Inherently destructive in them

selves, but be-

cause in their present form

s they intensify the dangers already arising from

other social processes.

T echnological innovation has been particularly

im portant

in contem po-

rar,• m ilitary affairs. It has alw

ays been necessary to understand

the conse- -

quences of specific technologies

for the relationship betw

een offense ,m

t! defense. K

eeping abreast of new technologie.s

in this context has now

be- com

e a full-tim e and alm

ost obsessive occupation. T

he advent of nuclear

w eapons,

for exam ple,

has underm ined

:111y reasonable calculation of a balance betw

een ends and m ean.sin w

arfare-al- though

old w

ays of thinking linger

on am

ong m

any :tll-too-influenti:tl

groups. T he basic prem

ises of nucle:tr deterrence

are undoubtedly flaw

ed in principle, but even if they are accepted, 11ew

technologies are rapidly put-

44 •RBJ. W N

.K !;H

ting l11em into ever m

ore .serious question in practice. The requirem ents of

"second-strike"c1pabilityor "m utual assured destruction," forex~tm

ple, are threatened both by the increasing accuracy of new

m issiles and by the sheer

com plexity of all 1he refinem

ents that have been presum ed

necessary to keep dc1errence "credible." T

he proposals for a new regim

e of 'Star W ars,'

or the Strategic D efense Initiative, (SD

I), now intensify still further the con-

cern-felt am

ong m

ost analysts w

ho are

fam iliar w

ith contem

porary strategic affairs-that

the w hole regim

e of nuclear deterrence is becom

ing obsolete. E

ven politically conservative observers have concluded that m any

new technologies in this area reduce rather than enhance national security.

T here is no doubt at all on the part of m

any analystS that the security of people in general is decrea..c;ing

in an unprecedented m anner.

W hile the m

ind-boggling m ilitary technologies being deployed by the

superpow ers against each other occupy center stage, conventional w

eapons continue

to becom e

m ore

and m ore

deadly. M iniaturization proceeds

apace. B iological and chem

ical w eapons are still being developed, and the

taboos :1gainst their use seem to be crum

bling. E veryw

here, it seem s, the

resolution of political differences is being conducted w ith lncre:L

singly ex- pensive and increasingly nasty technologies of destruction.

/,'/ T

echnological innovation is no less critical for contem porary

trans- form

ations in econom ic life. ItS im

pact on the creation of new patterns of

w e:tlth are particularly significant. O

n tl1e one hand, new technologies

can lead to greater productivity, quality, and profitability. O

n the other, they can m

ake people and their skills redundant, increase the proportion of repeti·

tive, \ow -paying jobs, and increase the relative advantage of m

anagem ent

over labllr. Such tendencies have been particularly im

portant in the w ay states have

responded 10 struc1ural crisis in the w orld econom

y. T hroughout the 1970s

a new international division of labor betw

een N orth and Soutl1 appeared to

be em erging betw

een high-technology industries and advanced services, on the one hand, and assem

bly operations, low -skilled m

anufacturing, and ex- traction of natural resources, on the other. A

s the consequences of the

technologies involved becam e clearer, it becam

e even m ore apparent that a

sim ple N

orth-South distinction obscured m

ore tl1an It revealed. T he very

idea of a hom ogeneous T

hird W orld becam

e particularly outm oded.

States often lum

ped together under this label now participate in distinct and often

contradictory processes.

T hey

are affected

by and

respond to

new

technologies in quite different w ays.

T he so-c:tllecl new

ly industrializing countries-such as K

orea, T aiw

an, 1 l"ng

K ong, Singapore, and possibly M

alaysia-have used technologies

b"th as a w ay of m

odernizing industry and ,cs a product for the w orld m

nr- ket. W

i1h strong governm ent direction, they have m

anaged to shift from an

' -

.... ,,,_,

...... ;,,,.,('

tn '" .. w

rf)rn'l.'-ofindu.'itriat com netitive~

- srnucruH E

S •Ii

ness based

on new

indigenous technologies.

Such countries are

often touted as the new

m odel that other "developing" societies could follow

. );,t, -

on the w hole, they stand by them

selves. T he m

ajor oil producers have ac-

cum ulated great w

ealth, but w ealth alone has not been sufficient to stitnu,

late e!T ective lndustriali,;uion. O

ther countries, like T

hailand, or the Philip- pines,

have been

susceptible 10 dependent

form s

of industrializati"n

organi,ed by m

ultinational corporations on the b:L

Sisof cheap labor anc.l de- plorable w

orking conditions. T hese states have been able to benefit from

the w

ay new technologies perm

it the dispersed organiw

tion of production

around the w

orld. B ut increased :1utom

atlon also underm ines

the cost ad- vantage of such locations, eventually

reinforcing the position

of already m

ore technologically advanced econom ies.

In such cases, technological de-

velopm ent seem

s to lead to econom ic dependenC

)'. L

arger states-such as B

ra,i!, M exico, A

rgentina, C hina, and, to som

e extent, India-are

able to envisage a process of technological

m oderniza-

tion aim ed at both the dom

estic m arket and the w

orld econom r

T hey can

:tim to increase their com

petitive edge in the w orld econom

y through a com -

bination of technological m odernization

and cheap labor, as w ell as to ex-

tend their industrial capability on the basis of large dom estic

m arkets. B

ui, in such cases, technological m

odernization largely rem

ains dependent on

the transfer

of technology

from

the m

ore technologically

advanced econom

ies. T

hls process depends in turn on the m

ultinationals, w

ho are usually w

illing to m ake such transfers only in return for access to these large

m :trkelC

i. I/

T hus, developm

ent Is again likely to

involve greater dependenci•. A

t- tem

pts to increase protectionism

in order to develop Indigenous industrial

strength are likely to result in a restriction of technology transfers. O pening

up the m arket to m

ultin:ttionals is likely to m ake ii difficult to increase itt·

digenous indu.strial strength.

In any case, the kind of technological m

od- erni?.:ltion currently necessary to com

pete in the w

orld econom y is unlikely

to incre:1.se em ploym

ent signiftcantli, It is m ore

likely to increase the g:111

betw een those sectors that are integrated into the w

orld econom y and tho.se

that are not. T

he patterns of exclusion visible w ithin the larger states are even m

ore clearly apparent

in the case of those societies that are being

m ore

or less bypassed by current technological transform

ations. T

his is true for m o.st of

A frica. M

odern technology m ay appear

in the form of consum

er electronic

products, links to w

orld com m

unication system

s w ithin the cities, or even

m ilitary hardw

are. B ut, for exam

ple, new agricultural

technology tends to

increase labor redundanci·, to turn agriculture from

a dom ain

of w om

en 1,,

(>Ile <Jf 111en, and lo acccler:11e

M <l,"il

S <>dl'ties :in·

rural-urhanm igr:1ti<>11.

,"it1d1 already su!T

ering from :t relative decline in com

m odity

prices. T he develop-

m ent of new

si·nthetic m aterials even m

akes som e of those com

m odities

oh- 1

~-~,..,,-~-·--------·---------------- ·i6

It B . -J.W

A I.K

E H

solescent. The ch~inces of entering the com

petition in new inform

ation technologies

are rem

ote. C

onsequently, a w

orld of gleam

ing gadgeL

s coe:dsL<;with :1 w

orld of unem ploym

ern m isery, hunger, illness, and vio-

1

lence, all of w hich are on the increase in the m

ost disadvantaged parn of the w

orld and, particularly, in the urban centers. E

m erging ted111ologies seem

to enhance even further the contrast be· //tw

ee~, l110.c;e

:1n<l in the w

orlc.1econ- w

l~o c_:m

tho~e ~ho canno~ r:1nicip?te '/

om )'. rhey also 111d1cate

the shift m pow

er w ,thm

the m dustrialized parts of

the w orld from

E urope and the eastern U

nited States to the Pacific B asin. A

s new

technologies help reshape both the location of econom

ic pow er and

new form

s of inclusion and exclusion, the leading industrial states, panicu· larly the U

nited States.Japan, and E urope, put m

ore and m ore resources into

eve11 more advanced technologies, know ing full w

ell that control of them is

vital ro their :ittem ptsto m

aintain and im prove their position as the w

ealthi- est and m

ost pow erful states in the w

orld.

# W

hether in term

s of

m ilitary hardw

are or

econom ic

production, technological innovation is a critical variable in the w

ay the m ajor structures

of pow er are now

being transform ed. Y

et beyond this are a num ber

ofother 111<lrl!tn>uhlingquestitm

s.S om

eoftheseconcerntheconsequencesof rely- ing on technologies-such

as nuclear pow er-w

hose social and environ·

m ental costs are already clearly enorm

ous. T he sym

bols of technological carn,ige are u.sually related to the atrocities of w

ar, tl1e fields of Flanders, D

resden, A uschw

it7., lliroshim a,

N agasaki, and K

am puchea under

Pol Pot. W

ith C hernobyl ,111d llhop:il, such sym

bols com e closer and closer to the

inftastructures of everyday life. T

echnologies now

becom ing

available-particularly those

Involving d;n:1prc>cessing,

and, above all, biogenetic engineering- cclm

n1unications, ,..;ci.:111

certain to ra<.licdlytransform

the conditionsof hum an existence in

even m ore unpredictahle directions. T

he w ay technological innovations are

s,, t ieu to the i111erxtio11 betw een the contem

porary states system and w

orld econom

y gives am ple grounds to see them

as threatening, w hatever prom

· ises they holu for a few

B

eyond the problem s associated w

ith particular technologies, or the re· lat ions betw

een technologies and the organization of production, lies the

w ay that technology as such has becom

e the dom

inant m etaphor

of our tim

es, a m etaphor foreclosing philosophical, aesthetic, ethical and political

options. It is a m etaphor in w

hich the prim ary questions-W

hat? W

hy? For w

hom ?-are

ignored in favor of the m ost instrum

entally calculating ques· tion-~lnw

?

C U

L T

U R

E , DIFFE

R E

N C

E , PO

W E

R

Th<' nm hlt>m

s of the svstem of states are usually understood to concern

S TR

L!C 'I.U

llli."i -

m acy, negotiation,

:ind arm s control-<>r

the likelihood of nucle,tr

"''" if

present trends continue. O n the ,vhole, state elites tenu to believe that effec-

tive m anagem

ent is still possible. B

ut m illions of people, including

m ilit,try

experts, arm s control specialists, :.tnd academ

ic analysts, are convinced this belief is naive and m

yopic. 'lhese problem

s are serious enough, but in an im portant

sense they arc #

only sym ptom

s of som ethin

dee ,er. T he structure

of the st:ites system is

im plicate

in all kinds ot other pro lem

s, from a failure to cope w

ith em ·

logical collapse to the abuse of hum an rights. T

aken together, all these prob- \.-'

lem s put into ,juestion

the unc.Jerlying ethical, ~al, and political legiti-

m acy of the state itself. Short·term

concerns

w ith particular

m issiles also

raise very serious questions about how and w

hy people live together

in the w

ay they do. A fter all, if one of the m

ost basic justifications for the state has involved its ability to ensure the security needed

to pJrsue a good life w

ithin its borders, the fragility of national security in a nuclear age puts the old dis-

ll tinction betw

een citizen

and foreigner,

us and them

, onto

very flim

sy foundations indeecJ.

Sim ilarly, the prim

ary problem s of the w

orld econom

'm ay be fram

ed in term

s of m tem

pts to m anage an increasingly com

p ex set uf ~vorlthvide. processes, on the one hand, and the devastating effecls of uneven

develop· m

ent, on the other. B ut m

uch m ore isat stake than this, including the particu-

lar understanding of econom

ics-the kind of w

ork, production, distribu-

tion, and so on-that gives rise to the present form

of w orld econom

y in the first place. C

oncerns about particular policy problem s

quickly give w ay to

,/ m

ore basic questions about the ethical, cultural, and pojitlca1 chai;cter

of c~italism

, industrinlizadrn1im aterialism

, a~m odernity.

a.. T

he sam e goes for problem

s posed in term

s of technologies. Particul,ir

technologies m ay bring obliter:tlion or redundancy, but the character of con-

tem pura

technolo •ies reflects all kinds of cultural

and ethical values as II"'

w e

as f econom

i · ·ss

· ·t interests.

T echno

ogies tl~- pend on processes involving science, education, an

even aesthetics that are usually treated as som

ehow

less im portant than the hard

realities of guns

and m oney. E

ven so, the adage that know ledge

is pow er

is particularly rele-

vant to the contem porary

age. It is becom ing m

ore and m ore

unreasonable to treat w

hat are usually classified as "cultural" forces as any less im portant

than the m ore easily identifiable dynam

ics of econolnf;lnu m ilitary st rat em

·. C

oncern w ith the seem

ing inevitability of the oppression of w

om en

b\' m

en alm ost everyw

here is partict1larly im

portant in this respect. A nai;:sl.s ,;f

"patriarchy" is an even m ore contentious

enterprise thnn the analysis of

m odern econom

ic life. T

here are people w ho refuse to recognize

the prob- lem

at all, or w ho accept it as a sim

ple f.1ct of life. T iiere are al.so tho.se s\'h<,

see gender relations

in general, and m en in particular,

as the source of all

prnhlem s. llttt the m

ost serious difficult)' Is tlte gre,tt v:triC t)' of patri:trd1'11

· • .. ,1:rr,,,.,.,,,

,,,_,,:,.,1,.,. ,,.~,1,1 .. ,. ,.,_,.,,

.. !,.v ..,.,,,.,.

1, .. ,...,1.,;,,h ,.,,,.,,lu.-

, . .,J,,

•/4H H. U .J.\X

'A LK

E H

tio11s intertw ine w

ith the econom ic structures and cultural tr:t<litions of

those societies. W e are faced here less w

ith any coherent theoretical account of patriarchy in general than w

ith m ultiple descriptions

of discrim inations

in different societies and w ith ongoing attem

pts to liberate the Interpreta- tion of these descriptions from

the conventional categories of econom ic and

political analysis. ~/

For w om

en, the w orld appears im

m ediately as a realm

uf"<lifference." 1/ A

nd difference becom es an opportunity for all kinds of injustices and op-

pressions to uystallize. T

hese occur as system atic physical abuse and dis-

figurem ent, as reduction

to the status of chattel, as objectification to the

.status of com m

odit}; or even as a vaguer sense of entrapm ent w

ithin routines, roles, and obligations over w

hich w om

en have little or no control. T

here is the direct physical violence of rape, sexual abuse, and dom estic

battering. A nd there

is indirect violence resulting from w

om en's

position w

ithin econom ic,

social, and cultural processes. W om

en m ay occupy par-

ticularly oppressed roles w

ithin the production process or becom

e caught

up in new dem

:tnds for m igrant l:ibor or for tourist-based prostitution.1hey

m ay be subjected to abuse because of social policies on abortion, contracep-

tion, and divorce. T hey m

ay be the victim s of cultural traditions

involving dow

ries, veils, or m achism

o,as w ell as the violence of pornography

and of the international

ideal of desirable fem ininity.

V iolence slides into rm

tltiple discrim inations.

Property rights are usu- ally m

onopolized by m

en. W om

en are effectively absent from the centers of

pow er alm

ost everyw

here. E

ven supposedly progressive

political parties and states usually preserve the patriarchal values of the states they seek to transform

. M inority w

om en usually find them

selves subject to double dis-

crim ln:ttion. A

nd w hen push com

es to shove, w om

en often suffer dispropor- ti(m

ately from additional privations.

H ecerlt fem

inist scholarship is particularly

concerned w

ith form s of

(/ pow

er that have rem ained

largely invisible, obscured through

the cultural codes and socioeconom

ic practices through w

hich oppression has becom

e accepted as norm

al and com m

on sense. In W estern societies, for exam

ple, gender relations have cohered prim

arily around the fundam

ental division

betw een public and private that runs through so m

uch political, econom ic,

social, and cultural life. W ithin the supposedly private realm

, w om

en are lo- c:ued w

ithin the structures of the fam ily and given the roles of m

othering ,tnd housew

ork. Such roles have conventionally been distinguished

from

"real" w ork but have been none the less im

portant for econom ic

activity as a w

hole. Fem

inist scholar.ship show s that gender is itself an historical and social

construct. W hereas "difference" m

ay be partly determ ined

by biology, it is ( f :rhund:tntl)• cle:11' th:u the actual articulation

of difference-and oppres-

S TR

U C

TU R

E S

-i9

• sion-is

a consequence not of som e prec;ocialand essential hum

an nature, but of specifiable social, econom

ic, and cultural practices. Fem inist scholar-

ship directs attention to the historical connections berw

een the construction of gender

Identity and alm ost every other aspect of social life, from

the eco- nom

ic division

of labor to religious sym

bolism s,

received traditions

of philosopltical

antl political

speculation, m

ethodologies of scientific

re- search, pictorial representation in high art, and the com

m ercializ:ition ()r

:,;exuality in 111:1.o;s advertising. In this w

ay,p:H riarchy;1ppears not only as pat-

terns of violence and discrim ination but also as the em

bodim ent of entire

w ays of life, T

I1e fem inist critique of patriarchy thus becom

es the indictm

ent not only of political and econom

ic structures but of civilizational values th:u

have been assum ed as given for centuries.

A questioning

of the character of dom inant

cultural form s and \'alue.s is

obviously not lim ited to the critique of patriarchy. C

ultural politics are at the center of concern

in m any societies. A

s w ith H

istory, so w tth C

ulture: It l\J.\ been subject to the presum

ption of universalization.

A nalysis of the rise of

(iithe W est and the w

orld econom

y typically m

erges w

ith the analysis of a dom

inant form of consciousness. The story is usuallr concerned ·w

ith tllc etii'ergence of claim

s to oG ·cctive kt ow

led •e and irom

ises of utilitarian dTi-

c!;.9c,A S

c1encean tee 1110 O

gyhave eC

:om e guarantors o

trut 1 ant prog- ress. In this sense, the rise of the W

est has becom e

coextensive w

ith the spread of m

odernity. A nd m

odernity has then been

located at the far end of the line dow

n w hich all societies are progressing.

T hus the term

"develop- m

ent" h,ts becom e

synonym ous w

ith the term "m

odernization." It has be-

com e the opposite

of "tradition," the antidote for m

)ths, superstitions, and

religions, the rem edy for poverty and violence, and the presum

ed fate of all

other cultures. M

odernity is now visible in all parts of the w

orld, although as w

ith the spread of the w

orld econo1111•th:rt has heen its principle driving force, it h:r.s

been a very uneven process. It has certain!)' not been

benign in its co11.se·

quences. M

ost obviously, the culture of m odernity

has been diffuse<.! glob-

ally not because it has any m onopoly on access to truth, beauty, or goodness

but because it has been an intrinsic part of the m

ost pow erful

forces in re- cent history. W

hether understood as an extension

of specifically W estern cu 1-

tural traditions, as a consequence of specifically capitalist form

s of econom ic

life, or even as a consequence of a particular

form of patriarchy, the culture

I/ of nio~s:rnity Is not so m

uch universal in any absolute sense as it Is an histori-

~;lly dom

inant expression of the,claim

to universality. //

In part, this dom inance

has been reflected in relations

of inequality e,-

pressed in cultural form

s. R acism

is the prim ary

issue here. A s w

ith p:ttri- archy, the violence of raci:rloprression

is often very difficult to disentangle from

class conflict understood in m

ore econom ic

term s. T

he violence, ,f r:tc-

-rt 11.J \X 1i\LK

E H

islll is usually obvious enough. S outh A

frican ~tpartheicl is only the m ost

brutal attem pt

to legitim ize pow

er and privilege thn,ugh

the discrim ina-

tions of color. /J

B ut straightforw

ard racism

slides into m ore sophisticated

readings of //

the..:;2.tll,i;,( il,Sm orally inferior and, therefore, as legitim

ately subservient. M

uch ha.s been m atle in the past decade, for exam

ple, of the w ay in w

hich W

estern scholarship about other societies has been infused w ith stereotypes

;111d:L"iS L11111)ti<>11s

ari.-;ing from an im

perialist presum ption of superiority.

\V lletl1er in term

s of :1n11lropologies of the "prim

itive" and the "oriental" or propaganda about tl1e "enem

y," racism m

ay be as insiU iously invisible as it

1naybe overtly violent. S

im ilar t!1em

esarise from the w

ay that cultural interaction is organized globally. W

hether w e think of the w

ay cultural form s are packaged and sent

around the w orld to he consum

ed through television, or the w

ay "new s" Is

constructed and distributed, or of the recent developm ent of satellite com

- m

unications technology, cultural life is increasingly subject to forces that are at once global and expressions of the interests of the m

ost pow erful. T

his is precisely w

hy the ,tppeals of the late 1970s for a N ew

International E conom

ic O

rder to redress the m ost glaring injustices of w

orld trading patterns w ere

accom panied

by equally ignored appeals

for a N ew

W orld Inform

ation O

rder. In an era in w hich control over know

ledge and Inform ation Is becom

- ing increasingly crucial, the tension

berw een

the claim s of universallty-

"O ne W

orld," or "global village"-and the realities of cultural im

perialism

and Jo.c;.s of control over one's ow

n cultural identity is an ever m ore pressing

item on the political agenda. T

he prim ary res onse to processes

of this son has been nationalism

. N

~1tio11a!ismis un ou te ly a very com

plex phenom enon, one thatcannot

he grasped in cultural categories alone. B

ut it can be understood at least

If panly as a counterpoint to the cosm

opolitan pretensions

of the dom inant

V p,~rs.

C ultur:<i life-especially

the appeal to lost traditions, the recovery of histories, and the construction of alternative national identities-then

be- com

es channeled into resistance of the m eanings and aspirations encour-

aged by the m

ore pow erfu I alien forces.

A s a form

of resistance, nationalism has alw

ays had serious problem s.

It has tended to be preem

pted by a particular class, or even by particular "na-

tions." N ationalism

has often becom e

a m eans of legitim

izing a class rule that is not only organized w

ithin the institutions of the m odern

state but is clirected tow

ard the very path of universal m odernization

that nationalism

:ts a doctrine has claim

ed to be resisting. M oreover, nationalism

has often

involvecl an over-rom "nticized and dogm

atic appropriation of local tradi-

tions. T he claim

that one's cultural identity is encapsulated in centuries-old tl'xts is 110111oreL'lliryingtll:111tile claim

that all nonm odl'nl cultural tr:tdi-

S 'l'H

l 1C ll ll{E

S

SI -

tions are obsolete. N m

ionalism h~t; often taken the fqrm

of an excessi\'e ~,p- peal to particularity as the appropriate

response to ·m

excessive appeal

to the universality of dom

inant cultures. M

ost significant, nationalism

has in-

volved the identification of particular

cultural traditions

w ith the political

apparatus of the m odem

state itself. C

ulture here becom es

less a m atter of

resistance or reassertion than the cooptation

of particular values w

ithin the broader

dynam ics of the states system

and the w orld econom

y. Y

et,if there is, on the one h:111<.1, skeptici.sm

about stati.-;t co11.c;iderable

nationalism s

as the appropriate

vehicle for resistance

to dom inant

and pow

er-laden cultural forces, there is, on the other, no less skepticism

about the staying pow

er of those cultural traditions that have been dom inant for

so long. T his m

ay not be im m

ediately obvious from the rhetoric

of political leaders. A

s a political force, the culture of m

oderni rem

ains im

m en.sell'

1' pow erful everyw

here. B eneath the surface, 1ow

ever, the internal critique of //

that culture is now quite far adl'anced.

/J A

t the heart of the culture of m odernity

lies an insistent dualism

. A n au-

r/ tonom

ous know

ing subject is presum ed

to be gazing at an objecti\'e w orld

to be know n. K

now ing is then

linked to the possibility

of control of the

know n. W

hether one

think.s of the great philosophical

system s

of l'l:lt", D

escartes, or K ant; or of the heroic artist separated

from but reproducing

the w orld around

him ; or the political categories

in v-•hich individuals arc

som ehow

assum ed to be com

pletely autonom ous

from the society in ,vhich

they live; or even the division berw een the secular w

orld of people 11\·ing in

tim e and the sacred space of eternil); the

resum ption

of a radical s lit bc-

rw een hum

an bein& ,.and w

orld is alw

ays m t 1e

ackgroun . ln t 1e fore-

ground lies a culturai'life perm

eateil by debates about the relative claim

s of objectivity and subjectivity and the ever-present

lure of utilitarian or instru·

m ental calculation.

// T

his underlying d~alism has been the unerring

'..arget of,7 ritique \\'ithi11 //

the culture of m odernny

Itself. A t the popular

level, sctence

m ay rem

a111 a potent incantation supposedly

offering protection from

charlatans and .sub-

versives. B ut the actual conduct of m

uch scientific research reveals a fund:t·

m ental re·ection of the dualistic cate ories cot s qJC

ted bv G alileo and N

ew -

ton-the categories

that have ecom

e the prevailing

"com m

on sense" of

m odernity.

N or is it possible to avoid the darker side of m

odern it)• so readily visible In this century. From

w ars and exterm

ination cam

ps to im personal

bureau- cracies, from

the lonely isolation of the supposedly autonom

ous individu:tl

to the transform ation

of hum an life into a procession

of com m

odities to be

bought and sold, there has been noshorw ge

of opportunities for skcpticistn

about the progressive character of m odernized

life. A nd w

hether in term

s ol pliilc,."iophy(>I"science,c>fsoci:1!tll<n1gh1(>r of :1es1l1etics,there has :tl.s<>hl'l'11

__________________ Sl

I( ll.J W A

I.K E

ie:_< _

• no shortage of an em

pts to revitalize the cultural traditions that have been //

dom inant for so long and to take them

in m ore creative and em

nncipatory / /

directions. It is im

portant to recognize the com plem

entarity betw een these tw

o form

s of cultural politics-that w

hich results from the m

eeting of m ore-

puw erful and less-pow

erful cultures and that w hich is occurring w

ithin the dl1111i11a111culturl' itself Tl1is com

plem entarity arbes

not leastt,cc1usethey buth confront essentially the sam

e process: the increasing grip of an in- strum

entalist, consum erist culture all over the w

orld. This culture m ay have

had its origins in a particular region, the W est. B

ut like the w orld econom

y, it has ceased to be the preserve of the W

est alone. T his culture is w

ell en- trenched am

ong elites everyw here. Its attractions are increasingly coexten-

sive w ith the attractions of the w

orld econom y. These attractions are offere<l

universally but are a1tainable only on a very selective basis. A nd even as m

- tractions, they have now

lost m uch of their form

er energy and glitter.

! Ideas about w

hat it now m

eans to belong to the hum an com

m unity have

been largely preem pted by the claim

s of m odernist universalism

, on the one hand, and by 0_ationalism

, on the other. T ensio7is°betw

een these claim s are

presum ecl to h,ive been resolved prim

arily through the political apparatus of the m

odern nation-state. L ooking at the m

odern w

orld from

the standpoint of I listory, this resolution has seem

ed perfectly adequate. T he

plurality of states is presum ed to satisfy the need for cultural diversity,

w hereas the participation of states in w

orldw ide political and econom

ic sys- tem

s is presum ed to satisfy the equally necessary participation of all people

into a com m

on com m

unity of hum ankind.

Y et the standpoint of I listory provides a view

from the top dow

n. T his

'standpoint offers a pow erful im

age of the cultural Jynam ics ofw

ealthy )/

societies and of the privileged elites of poorer societies. It is deeply rooted in

;111 unU erlying presum

ption of a necessary m ove from

tradition to n10Jerni~: from

undeveloped to developed, from parochial to universal. It

is hi ind to both the intrinsic problem s and the historically specific character

of the cultural values that are presum ed to be universal. It Is also blind to the

great diversity of people's cultural experiences and aspirations visible bevond the w

orld of increasingly hom ogenized elites.

· In fact, beyond the horizons of H istory lies an often perplexing vista of

,/ cultural politics. N

ationalism retains considerable vitality, particularly in

postcolonial situm ions'";,here it is not alw

ays easily coopted by m odernizing

elites. T here has been a renew

ed em phasis on cultural and ethnic identities

I below

the level of the state. It is clear that the m ap of nations is now

m uch

m ore com

plicated than the m ap of states. C

laim s to religious identity com

- plicate m

atters .still further, not least in regions like the M iddle E

ast, C entral

A m

erica, or the l'hilippines, w here political life is now

particularly volatile. In m

any poorer .societies, there has been an increasing aw areness of the

I

---------------------;,;';.,';;.l<"U ;::G

;:;tU "H

'°"E S--

.s;

"m odernity of tradition" and attem

pts to rethink the m eaning of develop-

m ent in the context of Indigenous \Stlues and practices. E

ven in the m ore

affiuent states, concern w ith the w

ay that the culture of m odernity ha.s

brought alienation and violence into societies that pride them selves on

progress and enlightenm ent has becom

e a central them e of m

odern politi· cal debate. In this context, the cbim

.s of the nation-state to be able to resuh·c· tl1e cultural contradictions <Jfthe age seem

increasingly tenuous. T

he vista of cultural politics is particularly perplexing because the is· sues raised here under the category of "culture" feed back into issues raised in term

s of political ::m d ec<m

om ic structures and technological innovation.

L ike "w

orld econom y," "states system

," or "technology," the category of "cul- ture" is just one ~vay of cutting into the confusing trajectories of the m

oU ern

,vorld. A ll these term

s presum e that it is possible to .separate out disti net

realm s of hum

an life. W hat has been said so far should indicate that such a

presum ption cannot be sustained.