review 5

32 It U.J. WN.KEII

movements are forced to identify the interconnections between the struc­ tures and processes that mold people's everyday lives. tn bringing so many

, experiences and histories from different circumstances to bear on the con­ nections that are recreating the way people live, social movements not only tell us where the most important changes are occurring-and where they are li1ost dangerous-but also make us more sensitive to the future trajcc­ lories these changes and dangers may bring, as well as the possibilities these trajec.:toriesdL'iclose.

f< 6. Y.w.J/e,...,., o,._,_cJo-rld, ;vt,v,vt,Jo-rfcy I ,

/] ,,_._.,/c/;,..r; LIII.A.A te-~ (='....,b ,,...,/u.+-,, I 'if!,

R, 8- J· CHAPTER THREE

Structures

A WORLD OF CONNECTIONS

If contemporary thinking about human affairs is now characterized by ch,d· lenge.s to a universalist view of! ii.story and the a.ssenion of a plurality of his· tories,it is also important to pursue the argu1nemin the opposite <lirectlo11. For the Inescapable fact remains thm, whatever the variety of historical e,­ periences that inform contemporary political practices, we do live in " world of global structures. These are the structures that make the scenario< I/ of No World or Two Worlds so plausible. Although the easy evolutioni.<1 lll)ths of universal History must be rejected in favor of a greater openness to the conversation between prolif crating hi!-itorics, it is also 11l'tess:1ryto l'( i1lll' to terms with those concrete historical structures that have made us all pa,·· ticipants in a world of global connections.

The precise character of these connections is dilTicult to specif)'. Differ· ent theoretical and ideologic:tl perspectives have tended to privilege par­ ticular structures and processes rather tl1an others. This tendency has been particularly strong among academic and technical analysts guided by the highly specialized concepts and languages of modern social research. A very high premium has been placed on anal)tical skills that enable scholars w examine narrowly denned phenomena with great care and precision.

Ana!)~ical concepLs have been denned particularly sharply In tltc case of two of the most obviously important structures in the modern world: tlte system of states and the world econom)'. Although it may be fairly obvious in general terms that these rwo broad structures are in fact very closely interre· lated, attempts to understand them in anv detail te.1d to focus primaril)' on one or the otl1er. Each has been said by different groups of scholars to be tlte primary determinant of the possibilities open before us.

// The structure of the contemporary states system has depended ulti fl mate!)• on the legitimacy of war. 111is is perhaps the greatest Irony of the

European political tradition. The great search for legitimate authority a11<I progres~ive enlightened civilization within states pre.sumed the lnevitabilit) of bloody conflict between st:tte~. With nuclear weapons, this fundamenta contradiction has become almost unmanageable ancJ certainly ethic;tll1 intolerable,

Economic processes have brought all states imo varying degn:es " intPrl"Pl:itinn.c;hir,::i:nc.le\•en interdependence. But the cfaims of u11ivers: 1

•34 R U. J.WALKER progress and development that emanate from the centers of economic power and privilege turn bitterly sour in view of the huge disparities in the well-being of peoples in different societies and classes. 111e possibility of nuclear annihilation may be the foremost concern for some people. For others, annihilation is a present reality. Poverty is deadly. l11e contradiction between processes bringing all states into a universalizing world economy a1KIthosel,ri11gi11gunevendevelopment, marginalization, andexclusion is not new in principle, hut is now more insistent than ever.

Both sets of contradictions-and they are far from simple, far from sugge,c;tingany necessary nr desirable resolution-are made more compli­ c:ned and 111ore dangerous by powerful new technologies. 11:trdheaded

, analysts tend to point to these contradictions with an airofinevitabilit)i lnter­ national competition, they say, is a permanent feature of the modern human condition, whether concerning the game of power politics between states, the logic of the world economy, or the dynamics of technological innova­ tion. In fact, these supposedly permanent features of the human condition :ire the product of historical processes, and they are always subject to

change. Such analysts are also prone to treat these structures as cold, remote,

and abstract, as huge determining forces beyond the reach of ordinary people. In fact, they are the historical products of very concrete human ac­ tivities. They depend on people going about their normal everyday tasks. They absorb muscle and sweat, contemplation, emotion, creativity, and cor­ ruption. People may be caught up in huge structural transformations over which they have little direct control. llut structures are produced and repro­ duced by the practices and rituals of everyday life. l11ey may seem natur:tl or inevitable, abstract and remote, but they depend on people doing things, or ""l doing things, 011 the way people organize themselves collectively, own things, produce things, talk, think, pursue routines, and treat each other. Challenges to these structures depend on a clear recognition of this insight.

Moreover, not only is it all too easy to treat the states system and the world economy ,LScompletely separate, but it is also tempting to treat either or both of these as the only sites of real power. The immediate crises of mod­ ern life do often occur as economic and political necessity. Other aspects of human existence-those that are usually forced into the elu.c;tlc category of culture-are often treated as secondary, as determined by the needs of econ­ omy and state. Yet, it is becoming more and more obvious that the workings of neither the states syste111 or the world economy can be easily separated from cultural process~s. Some of the most pressing modern problems­ .suchas racism, sexism, or abuse of the environment-involve enormou~ly complex interactions between processes that are conventionally labeled as politic:tl

1 ~conrnnic,:indcultural.

In :my case, it is in ter111s of cultural practices-of ways in which people

=======================================---"'-"H"'-U-"C1:..:lc:'ito:;E::.:S_--'.IS

come to understand and participate in the world-that people comprehend how the world might be changed. Far from being largely irrelevant to con­ siderations of power, as so many analyst.shave supposed, cultural processe.s have always been central to the way power is constructed, legitimized, and transformed.

Whether one begins with the states system or the world economi; with new technologies or with cultural processes, it is becoming clearer than ever that account.s of contemporary global stnictures that try to treat any of these In isolation are necessarily misleading. In thi.s chapter, I ,vill pre.sent each of these starting points in turn in order to sketch a broad context in which to examine the w:tycritical ~ocial movements respond in practil'e both to a world of prolifer:tting histories and to em~rging patterns of rno­ nection that defy conventional analitical anti ideological categories.

TIIE STATES SYSTEM

Systems of states are relative!)· rare in human experience. The modern st:lles system was slow to crystallize. ILs origins go back to Renaissance lt:tly a11Ll the changing economic, technologic:tl, and soci:tl ch:tnf\eS that allowed f,,r the effective autonomy of city-states. With the 1reaty of Westphalia of !6·i8, this principle of autonomy was formalized in an agreement that wars ,vou Id only be fought over tbe secular interest.I of competing states, not over the universalist claims of religious c.Joctrine. With the nineteenth century came a fusion-often ragge<l an<l incomplete--of nationalism and the territorial jurisdiction of states. Only sit1ce decoloni1,1tion h,ts the swtes .sy.stem he­

I come the primary political structure everywhere. The most important thing about the states system is its fragment:t1io11.

This is wlt:ll distinguishes it from a11 empire, in which authority lsstructuretl in " hierarchical mnnner from " single center. Interpreted positiveli: the states system provides considerable diversity in the arrangement of human affairs. It allows for a freedom from centralized hierarchical control. It en­ cour,1ges the emergence of di!Terent social and cultural tradition.s within relatively secure territori:tl areas. It permits the kind of division of labor a11Ll economic competition that Is often claimed to be important for material progress and has certainly been cruclnl for the creation of the modern world econom)~

I, Most significant, it embodies a fundamental contrast between life inside and outside the state. A1 early Europern1 comment:ttors such as M:tchi:tl"ell i ,ind llob!)e!; argued, within the st.1te it becomes pos.sible to live the "good life"': to become a citizen; to establish society, community, culture, and 11:1 lion; to trade off obligations with freedoms. Between states, on the otliet

(, lt:111d,any over:1rchl11g sense of a community of people :is people is e.s.s,•11

36 •It 11.J. WAI.KEH tially aba1H.l(>1u.:d. this point that the imerpretation turns sharply nega­lt is :1L tive. In fric.:t,internatio11alpolitics is conventionally seen as a realm ofwnrs, rorce, and violence; of deviousness, intrigue, and <liplonrn.C}1i anti of power politics unfettered by considerations of justice and legitimacy. It is not neces­

// sary to glance hack very far or very often to see how this negative interpreta­ ,tion can be very rl'rsu:isive.

Evenso, a conceplion of an u1Klerl}1ing community somehow holding thi.s system together has rarely disappeared entirely. Some have tried to pre­ serve a sense of a sl ,ared natural law. Some have appealed to the essentially "La\i,,a03l"q~ture of all peoples. Others have predicted the eventual integntt· ing potemial of co111merceand economic life. For the most part, relation~ hetwee11"states have 1;;:;;',organized by all kinds of pragmatic and fragile acrnmmodation.s. There have been customs and rules, unspoken agree­ ments, and codified laws. There have been vague principles about balanclng power again.st power in order to preserve order. The "great powers" have been expected ~s,P.l,'!Y..~central role in organizing the system as a whole-to ti 1eir own advantage, ,f c~1ere has even been the emer~ence of regu· larized d~SMl.lllak[llJUl(OCedures, from internation;( org.uiJ;.affons like the-- llniled - 01 the most powerful states toNations l<> meetings of heads F. semiformal policy C<><>rdinating bodies concerned with financial and trade matters. Some analysts have gone so far as to call this a "sociecy of states," implying that all is not purely anarchical and that, despitetl1e'lncipienl threat of a resort to force, some kind of order is possible.

/ / Even so, wlwever may be said in favor of the states system, the resort to force and war has remained one of its central features. And although it is possible to .see some continuity in the underlying competitive logic of the states sysle1n since tl1e seventeenthcentury, industriali7.a.tion, technologies of mass destructi<>n, and the growth ofa world economy have fundamentally altered the dyn:1111ics <>finterstate interaction and the character of contempo· rary warfare. It is now fairly obvious to most people who examine the work­ ings of the modern states system that our capacity to live with both the logic of this system and with modern nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons Is

\} exceedinglyprecari(n1s. To begin wich, although the resort to war has been formally delegitl·

mated, war retains a central place in contemporary political life. The accom· rnodations worked out under the rubric of nuclear deterrence reflect an understanding th.1t the swtes system can no longer rely on war ac;a mechanism of system change. Deterrence theory, with its emphasis on the threat of "mut11al assured destruction," has involved an attempt to keep the system going without actually engaging in overt warfare. But these accom­ m<>dations have always been rather fragile. Deterrence theory Itself has not been a particularly go<>d guide to the way weapons are actually deployed. New technologies threaten to replace the deterrence principles of war

STRL1C1llllES .\"• ;1voida11c.:ewith tho:,;e of war fighting. Nucle:1r ~\'ar between superpnwers may have been delegitimized, but competition berween them h:ts persis­ tently erupted in the form of conventional wars all over the world. Aud political elites susceptible to extremes of self-righteousness, as •;veil as the usual tendency for things that can go wrong to gowro!1g at the most inoppor­ tune moment, and we arrive ~Itour present chilling w~1lt7.ahmg tl1e precipice ,,r.self.:111ni11ilation.

l7 Moreover, the principle of sovereign equality among states ha.s always been something of,a fiction. Inequality berween states has been justified on the grmmd.s that it allows the larger states to preser\'e "order" in the system a~a wht>le. Yet, following :t long trm.lition, the contempclrary superptl\,·ers lwve often behaved less out of any sense of responsibility for m:1intaini11g:, rea..•mnahle degree of international order thnn out of the unilateral pur.c.uit of their own supremaC)c The very scale of their pov.·er means that the mml­ ern states system also contains a good deal of the logic of empire, as the inhabitanLs of Nicaragua and Afghanistan, among others, are disco"ering yet again.111us, the logic of the modern states system brings not only the prom­ ise of war between states but also the ongoing domination of strong st:ites over weaker ones.

Whatever may be said in favor of the states system as our primary politi­ cal structure, we now find a remarkable convergence of people "·ho, from quite different backgrounds, raise their voices in horror. Some draw atten­ tion to the divergence berween the codes of conduct traditionally associated with tl1e "society of states" and the way states In fact behave. Some focu.s more speciflc:tlly on the destabilization of nuclear deterrence through technologicJI innovations. Others stress the fundamental it1comp:ttibilit)' between a system that assumes both ~var and the domination of the strong over the weak to be legitimate and forms of milit:trization that take politirnl struggle and war into a realm of muwal extermination.

//. Questions of war and peace remain central to those who ~x:1111inethe workings of the modern states system, But although the poss1btlmes of Ill<· clear war in particular remain the most spectacular concern, understanding the states system is no less important for understanding problems of en­ vironmental degradation or the abuse of human rights. On the one hand, the states system depends on the principle of sovereign territorial jurisdic­ tion, whereas ecological processes tend to ignore territorial borders. On the other hand, the logic of the stmes system poses problems of national sen, r­ ity, and national security is perhaps the easiest rmionale available to any re­ gime wishing to engage in internal repression or establish more effectil'l' curl1son clemocracy.

f r-or all these rea~ons, many people have identified the states sy.stem :is I I the primary problem that now confronts us, It is easy to see why better op­ tions are sought in attempts to replace the fragmentatio11 that is the prim:tr,·

---,3H It U -J. WAI.KEH characteristic of the states system with some form of integration or global con1111t111ity.In this comext, peace ha!icome to be understood primarily­ ;111d.si111plistically-a.s tl1e absence of war, and the absence of war li;cs come to be understood primarily in terms of the centralization of authority.

The m:1jor deh:ttes on this issue have been framed as a choice between such a ce111r:tliz:tti< ll1-tlinll1gh the United Natlon.s, international l:t,v, and so un-or renewed attempts to make the society of states more coherent through more effective ar111s control, better diplomacy, and so on. Fewer and fewer people believe that tinkering with the system is enough, and those who push for global centralization are confronted with the problem of identifying the concrete historical forces that could bring such centraliza­ tion about. States the111selves see111 unlikely to do so. The self-identified agents of History, whether in the guise of transnational corporations or superpowers, would seem all too likely to favor a centralization reminiscent of authoritarian e111pires. In a world of histories, solutions posed as the sim­ ple need to move from fr;,gmentation to integration seem quite inappro­ priate. And in any case, 111ostdebates on these themes have arisen out of an

// analysis tl1at treats the structure of the states system in isolation. They have largely ignored the relationship between the states system and the modern work.1economy

THE WORLD ECONOMY

Nineteenth-century thinkers could already see that the dynamic economic life set in motion with the transitions from feudalism to capitalism In Europe ,vould soon expand to create a world economy. World economy has now

/; hcrnme a reality. Even ifsnme States, like the Soviet Union and China, have not been drawn into it completely; even if states respond to It in many differ­ ent ways depending on internal social, political, and cultural arrangemenl~; even if there are a great many forms of economy in different states; and even if protectionism remains common, everyone is now affected by patterns of production, distribution, and exchange that are global In their scope.

The working.s orthe world economy are complex, often mysterious, and certainly subject to sharply divergent explanations. Yet tbree features stmd out no matter what political inclinations color the analysis: First, the development of the world economy has been very dynamic. There have been periods of rapid growth but also periods of severe crisis. The third quarter of this century, for example, was a time of unprecedented economic accumul:ttion. The severe malaise that followed still affects us. Periods of economic cri.sis :u·e .sometimes the result of cyclical downturns. More signifi­ cant, they are sometimes the result of fundamental contradictions between various pans of the system that can only be resolved by a restructuring of the

Sl'ltU<.:nJ·H-E-=s--w

1/ We are now living In just such a period of fundamental restructuring of the world economy. TI1e dominance of the United States, which "·as so im­ portant to the way the world economy became .structured after 1945, has heen challenged on many fronts. The economic center of gravity seems to be shifting geographically from the North Atlantic region to the Pacific Him. Information and communirntion arc replacing raw material., as t":1pit:tl :i.s­ sets. Above all, there are major changes in the International division of labor, as well as both an Increasing reliance on capital-intensive forms of produc­ tion and new patterns in the exploitation of cheap labor. TI1e consequences of all this are now clearly visible even in the world's most pro.sperous ~ocieties, particularly in high unemployment in regions that once thrived on heavy manufacturing.

// Second, the overall trajectory of this dynamic development ho.s been / toward greater and greater internationalization. This is what has made the

myth of History so powerful. Internationalization became particularly im­ portant in the post· 1945 era. The Yalta agreements may have symbolized the continuing importance of divisions between states-or at least between groups of states-but the agreements at llretton Woods symbolized a con­ certed attempt, led by the United States as the dominant power, to institute a world economy based on the principle of comparative advantage, a world of free trade with the dollar as an international medium of exchange and a management of "interdependence" by U.S.-dominated institutions such as the World !lank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This era saw an enormous extension of world trade and international Investment, the emergence of multinational corporations and international Institutions, greater Integration of the economies of many states, particularly the "'ealthv state.s of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the internationalization of the banking ind financial markets.

/~ The pattern of internationalization is undergdng substantial ch:mµe I'/ once again. New Information technologies link London, New )urk, ;md

Tokyo more rapidly than companies in any of these cities could communi­ cate only a few years ago. The "world car" has become a symbol of the "'ay production is becoming organized on a worldwide basis. The development of a global capital market has become particularly significant. World trade in goods and services in the late 1980s amounts to around $3 trillion a year, foreign-exchange transactions amount to $35 trillion, and turnover in Lon­ don's Eurodollar market, where major financial institutions borrow from each other, comes to about $75 trillion. Investments tend to be made more and more by nation rather than by industry. Although policy makers in the major economies can together control world money supply, they are de­ creasingly able to control money supply within their own countries.

/ Third, the growth of the world economy has been fundament:1lly t111- // even. Costs and benefits have been unequally shared. Owners of capital

h-,w~h,,rf 'l rPhtiw~ adv:lllt~m:e over the otvners of labor power. Capital h:1.s

41 -It II J WAI.Kl'H been increasingly concentrated. l luge disparities have resulted from the dynamics that are set in motion between "more-developed" and "less­ devcloped" ern1w111ies. There is undoubtedly much to be said for the achievements that have accompanied the recent periods of economic growth associ:tted with this internationalization of economic life. But un­ equal development puts all these achievements into serious question. Eco­ nomic: life in \X1estern societies is now dominated bymass unemployment, attacks on real w~1ges,the erosion of social services, and the abandonment of regions and peoples that do not fit into the new patterns of international production. The economies of socialist states are clearly in difficulty. The so­ called Third Work! is stricken with huge debts, falling commodity prices, mass unemployment, and increasing levels of povert}', even in societies ti.•here overall economic wealth is increasing.

The Two Worlds scenario has become especially plausible in this con­ // text. Whereas mi1hs of History and theories of development have assumed

that everyone will be climbing up the same ladder sooner or later-given the right sort of aid, institutions, and government policies-nationalists and theorists of imperblism, dependence, or the internationalizing of capital have stressed the divergence of possibilities available to those at the center of the world economy and those on its periphery

This divergence occurs both between and within states. Whether be­ cause of their relative position in the international division of labor, or of prncesses of unequal exchange between raw materials and manufactured goods, or of the tangled strings attached to foreign aid, IMF credit, and cor­ porate investments, poor states constantly find themselves at a relative disad­ vantage. They find it difficult, and for some perhaps even lmpo~sible, to es­ cape from a vicious cycle of poverty anc.l malc.levelopment.

Moreover, cml}' certain sectors of such states hecome tied to this interna­ tional econo111y.National economies become divided Into a modernizing urban sector, lx1sed at least initially on exports that make capital accumula­ tion possible, and a peripheral sector. The latter tends to be characterized partly by traditional ways of life and partly by the consequences of the im­ pact of the moderni,ing sector, as when cheap manufactures and capital­ intensive technologies destroy the basis for traditional economies and communities.

Contrary to the old theories of linear development, therefore, such con­ ceptions of the world economy refuse to attribute poverty and maldevelop­ ment to any innate backwardness of tradition and point instead to the way in llr which modernity itself, in the form of an inequalitarian world economy, sucks the energy :tnd resources out of poor societies, undermining their c:1- pacity to develop on their own terms. Moreover, because the political elites of such wcietics arc caught up in all the tensions that arc bound to arise in

STRLl(..illRES• sucl1 u dualistic economy, )'et have effective support only in the m<>dernizing sector, they tend to resort t<Jmore or less authoritarian or military fort11."i of rule. This is, in turn, reinforced by the possibility of foreign intet~·ention.

Of mur.se, it is possible to come up with versions of this analysis that are just as oversimplified as those found in the classic accounts of development as a serie."i of st:iges ~long the highway to modernity. In practice, c.liffere1ll states show different patterns, depending on existing traditions, class struc­ tures, political institutions, and so on. Some !-.tales have managed to bre:1k out of the cycle of dependent development. Even so, the divergence of opportunities remains a central characteristic of the contemporary world economy.

(/ The issue of international debt is particularly important in this respect. This is a problem that Is often framed in terms of the threat posed to interna­ tional banks by big debtors like Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. But from the point of view of those in debt, the situation of many small states is much more worrisome. For them debt is both a symbol of their vulnerability to the vag,1ries of the world market and an instrument readily available to the !Ml( the World Bank, and multilateral development banks in the imposition of loan conditions. In fact, for debtor countries In general, the dynamics of international finance are becoming more important than the dyt1amics uf production and trade.

// In the poorest of societies, the gulf between those people who are able // to participate in the world economy and those whose capaciry to survive has

been undermined through processes Introduced by the structural demands of the world economy seems to be widening. Declining industrial states like Britain, with such a sharp contrast between the Industrial rubble of its north and the affluence of Its south, exemplify the appearance of pnrallel patterns in whm l.s conventionally thought of as the Fir.st World. From fears about a

.. disappearing middle class in the United States to the savage immediacy "r mass starvation :tnd malnutrition among marginal peoples in so many societies, inequal!ty remains a central characteristic of the way hu111a11 beings live together.

It is perhaps in the context of the dynamics of the world economy that the possibilities before us remain most obscure.Just as, when considerinp the states system, it is easy to become obsessed with the Immediate threat ol war and to ignore its impact on, say, ecologies and human rights, so also it i, possible to be overwhelmed by poverty, unemployment, and so on, unde1 stood only In formal economic terms. But it is just as important to be con cerned about the quality of economic processes-about the nature :t11( meaning of work, for example, or the way basic needs are turned into rnn1 mercially stimulated desires through advertising and popular culture.

Further than this, analysis of the world econom)' is obvious!)' subject t,

It 11.J\X-11\LKEI{• complex and sharply contested arguments. Tensions run especially high be­

I lween those who stressthe beneficial consequencesofinternationaliz..1tion and those who point to the consequences of inequality. On the one hand, the conventional economic wisdom and policy emanating from the centers of economic power stress the need to extend and manage the latest phase of internationalization, a need wrapped in prrnnises of trickle-down for all. On the other hand, those who look at the fate of weaker states or peoples see that the univer.s:ilizing character of the world economy has brought n<>tde­ velopment am! equality for all but the present reality of poverty for millions and the promise of complete exclusion for those who are being made dis­ pensable to the functional needs of the world economy as a whole. Similar an:ilvses motivated tl1e socialist and nationalist movements of the past. But it see,;,s increasingly unclear to many socialists and nationalists alike, not to mention democrmic:1111·inspired liberals, just what response is appropriate [l()\\',

The problem of appropriate response is especially difficult given the changing relationships berween the state and the world economy. For most of this cernury, and for the most influential political ideologies, the state has

// been treated as an instrument capable of redressing at least the worst aspects /j of economic inequality anti alienation. W'hether as the nmion~state re~!c1·ng

the pre.~sures of colonialism and unuerdevelopment, the socialist state with its stress on collective ownership and centralized planning, the welfare state simultaneously acting to meet the needs of an expanding economy and to pn>\-·ident least a n1i11in1u111level of social services for everyone, or, indeed, the state as the essential agent of economic development and moderniza­ tion everywhere, the state has generally been regarded as an essentially

...,,.,,-pn>gressivefc1rce. Of course, states have always heen regarded with some suspicion in this

context, not least because <>fthe way they have advanced the interests of par­ ticular classes and elites. llut with the increasingly internationalized and capital-inten.sive nature of contemporary economic life, judgments about the essentially progressive character of states have become even more un­ certain. The nwrket, not the state, has been resurrected as the primary source of .c;ulutions to all economic problems. The welfare state has been

/ .seriously eroded. Inequality has become increasingly respectable. De­ mamls for law and order have become louder than demands for social jus- tice. The poor and marginali,ed are more and more likely to be castigated as s<>cial deviants and subjected to surveillance anu control.As the more pro­ gressive elements of states are gradually whittled away, the Idea of a national economy, !1Uhject to the sovereign authority anti control of state actors, be· comes more and more difncult to sustain. TI1e claim that It is possible to do

I' something about poverty and inequality by taking over state power becomes more and more illusory. .

STHUCTURES• TECHNOLOGIESAND POLITICAL ECONOMY

One of the rnain tlifficultie!-i in understanding what is,going on in the mod­ ern world is tl1e complexity of the relationships between the st:ites system and the world economy. This remains a serious challenge for contemporary scholarly analysis, Influenced as it is by traditions th:tt have treated politics and economics as separ:tte enterprises. It is especially important in trying t<> make sense of the modern state. The relationship is more dilTicult to dis­ entangle given the important role played by factors that are often amtlysed in noneconomic or political categories.

The role of technological innov-Jtion is particularly important in this re­ spect. The impact of new technologies on so many areas of human existence has even led to the elaboration of powerful theories of technological deter-

(/ minl.sm. Such theories must be resisted. Technologies arise from and enter back into very complex social, political, and economic processes. In the con­ text of the states system, they amplify dangers that arc already present in the structures of fragmentation and in superpower dominance. In the context of the world economy, they reproduce and intensify patterns of unequal de­ velopment that are central to the way the world economy is organized.

Nor is it very useful to see technology In terms of the classic choice be­ tween optimism and pessimism. Many of our modern technologies are mag­ nificent achievements. It also remains true that many of these technolog,e.s

/ are implicated In terrible barbarisms. What counts in the end Is not the // technology as such but the character of the social structures that channel / their energies into developing aiiJusing particular technologies. To take

examples from the field of health, the simple technologies of sewage treat­ ment and the provi.sion of adequ:tte food and shelter have had a far greater impact on hum:111 well-being then all the sophistications '.'f the anifki:tl heart. New technologies are :t won,-ing issue for those pursumg a just world peace, not because they determine ever,~hing, nor because advanced technologies are necessarily Inherently destructive in themselves, but be­ cause in their present forms they intensify the dangers already arising from other social processes.

Technological innovation has been particularly important in contempo­ rar,• military affairs. It has always been necessary to understand the conse­

- quences of specific technologies for the relationship between offense ,mt! defense. Keeping abreast of new technologie.s in this context has now be­ come a full-time and almost obsessive occupation.

The advent of nuclear weapons, for example, has undermined :111y reasonable calculation of a balance between ends and mean.sin warfare-al­ though old ways of thinking linger on among many :tll-too-influenti:tl groups. The basic premises of nucle:tr deterrence are undoubtedly flawed in principle, but even if they are accepted, 11ew technologies are rapidly put-

44 •

R BJ. WN.K!;H

ting l11em into ever more .serious question in practice. The requirements of "second-strike"c1pabilityor "mutual assured destruction," forex~tmple, are threatened both by the increasing accuracy of new missiles and by the sheer complexity of all 1he refinements that have been presumed necessary to keep dc1errence "credible." The proposals for a new regime of 'Star Wars,' or the Strategic Defense Initiative, (SDI), now intensify still further the con­ cern-felt among most analysts who are familiar with contemporary strategic affairs-that the whole regime of nuclear deterrence is becoming obsolete. Even politically conservative observers have concluded that many new technologies in this area reduce rather than enhance national security. There is no doubt at all on the part of many analystS that the security of people in general is decrea..c;ing in an unprecedented manner.

While the mind-boggling military technologies being deployed by the superpowers against each other occupy center stage, conventional weapons continue to become more and more deadly. Miniaturization proceeds apace. Biological and chemical weapons are still being developed, and the taboos :1gainst their use seem to be crumbling. Everywhere, it seems, the resolution of political differences is being conducted with lncre:Lsingly ex­ pensive and increasingly nasty technologies of destruction.

~ /,'/ Technological innovation is no less critical for contemporary trans- formations in economic life. ItS impact on the creation of new patterns of we:tlth are particularly significant. On tl1e one hand, new technologies can lead to greater productivity, quality, and profitability. On the other, they can make people and their skills redundant, increase the proportion of repeti· tive, \ow-paying jobs, and increase the relative advantage of management over labllr.

Such tendencies have been particularly important in the way states have responded 10 struc1ural crisis in the world economy. Throughout the 1970s a new international division of labor between North and Soutl1 appeared to be emerging between high-technology industries and advanced services, on the one hand, and assembly operations, low-skilled manufacturing, and ex­ traction of natural resources, on the other. As the consequences of the technologies involved became clearer, it became even more apparent that a simple North-South distinction obscured more tl1an It revealed. The very idea of a homogeneous Third World became particularly outmoded. States often lumped together under this label now participate in distinct and often contradictory processes. They are affected by and respond to new technologies in quite different ways.

The so-c:tllecl newly industrializing countries-such as Korea, Taiwan, 1 l"ng Kong, Singapore, and possibly Malaysia-have used technologies b"th as a way of modernizing industry and ,cs a product for the world mnr­ ket. Wi1h strong government direction, they have managed to shift from an

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-srnucruHES •Ii ness based on new indigenous technologies. Such countries are often touted as the new model that other "developing" societies could follow. );,t,

- on the whole, they stand by themselves. The major oil producers have ac­ cumulated great wealth, but wealth alone has not been sufficient to stitnu, late e!Tective lndustriali,;uion. Other countries, like Thailand, or the Philip­ pines, have been susceptible 10 dependent forms of industrializati"n organi,ed by multinational corporations on the b:LSisof cheap labor anc.l de­ plorable working conditions. These states have been able to benefit from the way new technologies permit the dispersed organiwtion of production around the world. But increased :1utomatlon also undermines the cost ad­ vantage of such locations, eventually reinforcing the position of already more technologically advanced economies. In such cases, technological de­ velopment seems to lead to economic dependenC)'.

Larger states-such as Bra,i!, Mexico, Argentina, China, and, to some extent, India-are able to envisage a process of technological moderniza­ tion aimed at both the domestic market and the world economr They can :tim to increase their competitive edge in the world economy through a com­ bination of technological modernization and cheap labor, as well as to ex­ tend their industrial capability on the basis of large domestic markets. Bui, in such cases, technological modernization largely remains dependent on the transfer of technology from the more technologically advanced economies. Thls process depends in turn on the multinationals, who are usually willing to make such transfers only in return for access to these large m:trkelCi.

I/ Thus, development Is again likely to involve greater dependenci•. At­ tempts to increase protectionism in order to develop Indigenous industrial strength are likely to result in a restriction of technology transfers. Opening up the market to multin:ttionals is likely to make ii difficult to increase itt· digenous indu.strial strength. In any case, the kind of technological mod­ erni?.:ltion currently necessary to compete in the world economy is unlikely to incre:1.se employment signiftcantli, It is more likely to increase the g:111 between those sectors that are integrated into the world economy and tho.se that are not.

The patterns of exclusion visible within the larger states are even more clearly apparent in the case of those societies that are being more or less bypassed by current technological transformations. This is true for mo.st of Africa. Modern technology may appear in the form of consumer electronic products, links to world communication systems within the cities, or even military hardware. But, for example, new agricultural technology tends to increase labor redundanci·, to turn agriculture from a domain of women 1,, (>Ile <Jf 111en, andlo acccler:11e M<l,"il S<>dl'ties :in· rural-urhanmigr:1ti<>11. ,"it1d1 already su!Tering from :t relative decline in commodity prices. The develop­ ment of new si·nthetic materials even makes some of those commodities oh-1

~-~,..,,-~-·--------·---------------- ·i6 It B. -J.WAI.KEH solescent. The ch~inces of entering the competition in new information technologies are remote. Consequently, a world of gleaming gadgeLs coe:dsL<;with :1 world of unemploymern misery, hunger, illness, and vio­1 lence, all of which are on the increase in the most disadvantaged parn of the world and, particularly, in the urban centers.

Emerging ted111ologies seem to enhance even further the contrast be· //twee~, l110.c;e :1n<l in the worlc.1econ­wl~o c_:m tho~e ~ho canno~ r:1nicip?te '/ om)'. rhey also 111d1cate the shift m power w,thm the mdustrialized parts of

the world from Europe and the eastern United States to the Pacific Basin. As new technologies help reshape both the location of economic power and new forms of inclusion and exclusion, the leading industrial states, panicu· larly the United States.Japan, and Europe, put more and more resources into eve11 more advanced technologies, knowing full well that control of them is vital ro their :ittemptsto maintain and improve their position as the wealthi­ est and most powerful states in the world.

# Whether in terms of military hardware or economic production,

technological innovation is a critical variable in the way the major structures of power are now being transformed. Yet beyond this are a number ofother 111<lrl!tn>uhlingquestitms.Someof theseconcerntheconsequencesof rely­ ing on technologies-such as nuclear power-whose social and environ· mental costs are already clearly enormous. The symbols of technological carn,ige are u.sually related to the atrocities of war, tl1e fields of Flanders, Dresden, Auschwit7., lliroshima, Nagasaki, and Kampuchea under Pol Pot. With Chernobyl ,111d llhop:il, such symbols come closer and closer to the inftastructures of everyday life.

Technologies now becoming available-particularly those Involving d;n:1prc>cessing, and, above all, biogenetic engineering­cclmn1unications, ,..;ci.:111certainto ra<.licdlytransform the conditionsof human existence in even more unpredictahle directions. The way technological innovations are s,, t ieu to the i111erxtio11 between the contemporary states system and world economy gives ample grounds to see them as threatening, whatever prom· ises they holu for a few

Beyond the problems associated with particular technologies, or the re· lat ions between technologies and the organization of production, lies the way that technology as such has become the dominant metaphor of our times, a metaphor foreclosing philosophical, aesthetic, ethical and political options. It is a metaphor in which the primary questions-What? Why? For whom?-are ignored in favor of the most instrumentally calculating ques·

tion-~lnw?

CULTURE, DIFFERENCE, POWER

Th<' nmhlt>ms of the svstem of states are usually understood to concern

STRL!C'I.Ullli."i - macy, negotiation, :ind arms control-<>r the likelihood of nucle,tr "''" if present trends continue. On the ,vhole, state elites tenu to believe that effec­ tive management is still possible. But millions of people, including milit,try experts, arms control specialists, :.tnd academic analysts, are convinced this belief is naive and myopic.

'lhese problems are serious enough, but in an important sense they arc# only symptoms of somethin dee ,er. The structure of the st:ites system is implicate in all kinds ot other pro lems, from a failure to cope with em· logical collapse to the abuse of human rights. Taken together, all these prob-

\.-' lems put into ,juestion the unc.Jerlying ethical, ~al, and political legiti­ macy of the state itself. Short·term concerns with particular missiles also raise very serious questions about how and why people live together in the way they do. After all, if one of the most basic justifications for the state has involved its ability to ensure the security needed to pJrsue a good life within its borders, the fragility of national security in a nuclear age puts the old dis­

lltinction between citizen and foreigner, us and them, onto very flimsy foundations indeecJ. Similarly, the primary problems of the world econom 'may be framed

in terms of mtempts to manage an increasingly comp ex set uf ~vorlthvide. processes, on the one hand, and the devastating effecls of uneven develop· ment, on the other. But much more is at stake than this, including the particu­ lar understanding of economics-the kind of work, production, distribu­ tion, and so on-that gives rise to the present form of world economy in the first place. Concerns about particular policy problems quickly give way to

,/ more basic questions about the ethical, cultural, and pojitlca1 chai;cter of c~italism, industrinlizadrn1imaterialism, a~modernity. a..

The same goes for problems posed in terms of technologies. Particul,ir technologies may bring obliter:tlion or redundancy, but the character of con­ tempura technolo •ies reflects all kinds of cultural and ethical values as

II"' we as f economi · ·ss · ·t interests. Techno ogies tl~- pend on processes involving science, education, an even aesthetics that are usually treated as somehow less important than the hard realities of guns and money. Even so, the adage that knowledge is power is particularly rele­ vant to the contemporary age. It is becoming more and more unreasonable to treat what are usually classified as "cultural" forces as any less important than the more easily identifiable dynamics of econolnf;lnu military st rat em·.

Concern with the seeming inevitability of the oppression of women b\' men almost everywhere is partict1larly important in this respect. Anai;:sl.s ,;f "patriarchy" is an even more contentious enterprise thnn the analysis of modern economic life. There are people who refuse to recognize the prob­ lem at all, or who accept it as a simple f.1ct of life. Tiiere are al.so tho.se s\'h<, see gender relations in general, and men in particular, as the source of all prnhlems. llttt the most serious difficult)' Is tlte gre,tt v:triCt)' of patri:trd1'11

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tio11s intertwine with the economic structures and cultural tr:t<litions of those societies. We are faced here less with any coherent theoretical account of patriarchy in general than with multiple descriptions of discriminations in different societies and with ongoing attempts to liberate the Interpreta­ tion of these descriptions from the conventional categories of economic and political analysis.

~/ For women, the world appears immediately as a realm uf"<lifference." 1/ And difference becomes an opportunity for all kinds of injustices and op­

pressions to uystallize. These occur as systematic physical abuse and dis­ figurement, as reduction to the status of chattel, as objectification to the .status of commodit}; or even as a vaguer sense of entrapment within routines, roles, and obligations over which women have little or no control.

There is the direct physical violence of rape, sexual abuse, and domestic battering. And there is indirect violence resulting from women's position within economic, social, and cultural processes. Women may occupy par­ ticularly oppressed roles within the production process or become caught up in new dem:tnds for migrant l:ibor or for tourist-based prostitution.1hey may be subjected to abuse because of social policies on abortion, contracep­ tion, and divorce. They may be the victims of cultural traditions involving dowries, veils, or machismo,as well as the violence of pornography and of the international ideal of desirable femininity.

Violence slides into rmtltiple discriminations. Property rights are usu­ ally monopolized by men. Women are effectively absent from the centers of power almost everywhere. Even supposedly progressive political parties and states usually preserve the patriarchal values of the states they seek to transform. Minority women usually find themselves subject to double dis­ crimln:ttion. And when push comes to shove, women often suffer dispropor­ ti(mately from additional privations.

Hecerlt feminist scholarship is particularly concerned with forms of (/ power that have remained largely invisible, obscured through the cultural

codes and socioeconomic practices through which oppression has become accepted as normal and common sense. In Western societies, for example, gender relations have cohered primarily around the fundamental division between public and private that runs through so much political, economic, social, and cultural life. Within the supposedly private realm, women are lo­ c:ued within the structures of the family and given the roles of mothering ,tnd housework. Such roles have conventionally been distinguished from "real" work but have been none the less important for economic activity as a whole.

Feminist scholar.ship shows that gender is itself an historical and social construct. Whereas "difference" may be partly determined by biology, it is ( f :rhund:tntl)• cle:11' th:u the actual articulation of difference-and oppres-

STRUCTURES -i9• sion-is a consequence not of some prec;ocialand essential human nature, but of specifiable social, economic, and cultural practices. Feminist scholar­ ship directs attention to the historical connections berween the construction of gender Identity and almost every other aspect of social life, from the eco­ nomic division of labor to religious symbolisms, received traditions of philosopltical antl political speculation, methodologies of scientific re­ search, pictorial representation in high art, and the commercializ:ition ()r :,;exuality in 111:1.o;s advertising. In this way,p:Hriarchy;1ppears not only as pat­ terns of violence and discrimination but also as the embodiment of entire ways of life, TI1e feminist critique of patriarchy thus becomes the indictment not only of political and economic structures but of civilizational values th:u have been assumed as given for centuries.

A questioning of the character of dominant cultural forms and \'alue.s is obviously not limited to the critique of patriarchy. Cultural politics are at the center of concern in many societies. As with History, so wtth Culture: It l\J.\ been subject to the presumption of universalization. Analysis of the rise of(iithe West and the world economy typically merges with the analysis of a dominant form of consciousness. The story is usuallr concerned ·with tllc etii'ergence of claims to oG·cctive kt owled •e and iromises of utilitarian dTi­ c!;.9c,ASc1encean tee 1110 Ogyhave eC:ome guarantors o trut 1 ant prog­ ress. In this sense, the rise of the West has become coextensive with the spread of modernity. And modernity has then been located at the far end of the line down which all societies are progressing. Thus the term "develop­ ment" h,ts become synonymous with the term "modernization." It has be­ come the opposite of "tradition," the antidote for m)ths, superstitions, and religions, the remedy for poverty and violence, and the presumed fate of all other cultures.

Modernity is now visible in all parts of the world, although as with the spread of the world econo1111•th:rt has heen its principle driving force, it h:r.s been a very uneven process. It has certain!)' not been benign in its co11.se· quences. Most obviously, the culture of modernity has been diffuse<.! glob­ ally not because it has any monopoly on access to truth, beauty, or goodness but because it has been an intrinsic part of the most powerful forces in re­ cent history. Whether understood as an extension of specifically Western cu 1- tural traditions, as a consequence of specifically capitalist forms of economic life, or even as a consequence of a particular form of patriarchy, the culture

I/ of nio~s:rnity Is not so much universal in any absolute sense as it Is an histori­~;lly dominant expressionof the,claim to universality. // In part, this dominance has been reflected in relations of inequality e,-

pressed in cultural forms. Racism is the primary issue here. As with p:ttri­ archy, the violence of raci:rloprression is often very difficult to disentangle from class conflict understood in more economic terms. The violence, ,f r:tc-

-rt 11.J \X1i\LKEH islll is usually obvious enough. South African ~tpartheicl is only the most brutal attempt to legitimize power and privilege thn,ugh the discrimina­ tions of color.

/J But straightforward racism slides into more sophisticated readings of // the..:;2.tll,i;,(il,Smorally inferior and, therefore, as legitimately subservient.

Much ha.s been matle in the past decade, for example, of the way in which Western scholarship about other societies has been infused with stereotypes ;111d:L"iSL11111)ti<>11sari.-;ing from an imperialist presumption of superiority. \Vlletl1er in terms of :1n11lropologies of the "primitive" and the "oriental" or propaganda about tl1e "enemy," racism may be as insiUiously invisible as it 1naybe overtly violent.

Similar t!1emesarise from the way that cultural interaction is organized globally. Whether we think of the way cultural forms are packaged and sent around the world to he consumed through television, or the way "news" Is constructed and distributed, or of the recent development of satellite com­ munications technology, cultural life is increasingly subject to forces that are at once global and expressions of the interests of the most powerful. This is precisely why the ,tppeals of the late 1970s for a New International Economic Order to redress the most glaring injustices of world trading patterns were accompanied by equally ignored appeals for a New World Information Order. In an era in which control over knowledge and Information Is becom­ ing increasingly crucial, the tension berween the claims of universallty­ "One World," or "global village"-and the realities of cultural imperialism and Jo.c;.sof control over one's own cultural identity is an ever more pressing item on the political agenda.

The primary res onse to processes of this son has been nationalism. N~1tio11a!ismis un ou te ly a very complex phenomenon, one thatcannot he grasped in cultural categories alone. But it can be understood at least

If panly as a counterpoint to the cosmopolitan pretensions of the dominant V p,~rs. Cultur:<i life-especially the appeal to lost traditions, the recovery

of histories, and the construction of alternative national identities-then be- comes channeled into resistance of the meanings and aspirations encour­ aged by the more powerfu I alien forces.

As a form of resistance, nationalism has always had serious problems. It has tended to be preempted by a particular class, or even by particular "na­ tions." Nationalism has often become a means of legitimizing a class rule that is not only organized within the institutions of the modern state but is clirected toward the very path of universal modernization that nationalism :ts a doctrine has claimed to be resisting. Moreover, nationalism has often involvecl an over-rom"nticized and dogmatic appropriation of local tradi­ tions. The claim that one's cultural identity is encapsulated in centuries-old tl'xts is 110111oreL'lliryingtll:111tile claim that all nonmodl'nl cultural tr:tdi-

S'l'Hl 1Cll ll{ES SI - tions are obsolete. Nmionalism h~t; often taken the fqrm of an excessi\'e ~,p­ peal to particularity as the appropriate response to ·m excessive appeal to the universality of dominant cultures. Most significant, nationalism has in­ volved the identification of particular cultural traditions with the political apparatus of the modem state itself. Culture here becomes less a matter of resistance or reassertion than the cooptation of particular values within the broader dynamics of the states system and the world economy.

Yet, if there is, on the one h:111<.1, skeptici.sm about stati.-;t co11.c;iderable nationalisms as the appropriate vehicle for resistance to dominant and power-laden cultural forces, there is, on the other, no less skepticism about the staying power of those cultural traditions that have been dominant for so long. This may not be immediately obvious from the rhetoric of political leaders. As a political force, the culture of moderni remains immen.sell'

1' powerful everywhere. Beneath the surface, 1owever, the internal critique of // that culture is now quite far adl'anced. /J At the heart of the culture of modernity lies an insistent dualism. An au­

r/ tonomous knowing subject is presumed to be gazing at an objecti\'e world to be known. Knowing is then linked to the possibility of control of the known. Whether one think.s of the great philosophical systems of l'l:lt", Descartes, or Kant; or of the heroic artist separated from but reproducing the world around him; or the political categories in v-•hich individuals arc somehow assumed to be completely autonomous from the society in ,vhich they live; or even the division berween the secular world of people 11\·ing in time and the sacred space of eternil); the resumption of a radical s lit bc­ rween human bein&,.and world is always m t 1e ackgroun . ln t 1e fore­ ground lies a culturai'life permeateil by debates about the relative claims of objectivity and subjectivity and the ever-present lure of utilitarian or instru· mental calculation.

// This underlying d~alism has been the unerring '..arget of,7ritique \\'ithi11 // the culture of modernny Itself. At the popular level, sctence may rema111 a

potent incantation supposedly offering protection from charlatans and .sub­ versives. But the actual conduct of much scientific research reveals a fund:t· mental re·ection of the dualistic cate ories cot s qJCted bv Galileo and New­ ton-the categories that have ecome the prevailing "common sense" of modernity.

Nor is it possible to avoid the darker side of modern it)• so readily visible In this century. From wars and extermination camps to impersonal bureau­ cracies, from the lonely isolation of the supposedly autonomous individu:tl to the transformation of human life into a procession of commodities to be bought and sold, there has been noshorwge of opportunities for skcpticistn about the progressive character of modernized life. And whether in terms ol pliilc,."iophy(>I"science,c>fsoci:1!tll<n1gh1(>r of :1es1l1etics,there has :tl.s<>hl'l'11

__________________ Sl I( ll.J WAI.KEie:_< _• no shortage of an empts to revitalize the cultural traditions that have been

// dominant for so long and to take them in more creative and emnncipatory / / directions.

It is important to recognize the complementarity between these two forms of cultural politics-that which results from the meeting of more­ puwerful and less-powerful cultures and that which is occurring within the dl1111i11a111culturl' itself Tl1is complementarity arbes not leastt,cc1usethey buth confront essentially the same process: the increasing grip of an in­ strumentalist, consumerist culture all over the world. This culture may have had its origins in a particular region, the West. But like the world economy, it has ceased to be the preserve of the West alone. This culture is well en­ trenched among elites everywhere. Its attractions are increasingly coexten­ sive with the attractions of the world economy. These attractions are offere<l universally but are a1tainable only on a very selective basis. And even as m­ tractions, they have now lost much of their former energy and glitter.

! Ideas about what it now means to belong to the human community have

been largely preempted by the claims of modernist universalism, on the one hand, and by 0_ationalism, on the other. Tensio7is°between these claims are presumecl to h,ive been resolved primarily through the political apparatus of the modern nation-state. Looking at the modern world from the standpoint of I listory, this resolution has seemed perfectly adequate. The plurality of states is presumed to satisfy the need for cultural diversity, whereas the participation of states in worldwide political and economic sys­ tems is presumed to satisfy the equally necessary participation of all people into a common community of humankind.

Yet the standpoint of I listory provides a view from the top down. This 'standpoint offers a powerful image of the cultural Jynamics ofwealthy

)/ societies and of the privileged elites of poorer societies. It is deeply rooted in ;111 unUerlying presumption of a necessary move from tradition to n10Jerni~: from undeveloped to developed, from parochial to universal. It is hi ind to both the intrinsic problems and the historically specific character of the cultural values that are presumed to be universal. It Is also blind to the great diversity of people's cultural experiences and aspirations visible bevond the world of increasingly homogenized elites.

· In fact, beyond the horizons of History lies an often perplexing vista of ,/ cultural politics. Nationalism retains considerable vitality, particularly in

postcolonial situmions'";,here it is not always easily coopted by modernizing elites. There has been a renewed emphasis on cultural and ethnic identities

I below the level of the state. It is clear that the map of nations is now much more complicated than the map of states. Claims to religious identity com- plicate matters .still further, not least in regions like the Middle East, Central America, or the l'hilippines, where political life is now particularly volatile. In many poorer .societies, there has been an increasing awareness of the

I

---------------------;,;';.,';;.l<"U;::G;:;tU"H'°"ES-- .s;

"modernity of tradition" and attempts to rethink the meaning of develop­ ment in the context of Indigenous \Stlues and practices. Even in the more affiuent states, concern with the way that the culture of modernity ha.s brought alienation and violence into societies that pride themselves on progress and enlightenment has become a central theme of modern politi· cal debate. In this context, the cbim.s of the nation-state to be able to resuh·c· tl1e cultural contradictions <Jfthe age seem increasingly tenuous.

The vista of cultural politics is particularly perplexing because the is· sues raised here under the category of "culture" feed back into issues raised in terms of political ::md ec<momic structures and technological innovation. Like "world economy," "states system," or "technology," the category of "cul­ ture" is just one ~vay of cutting into the confusing trajectories of the moUern ,vorld. All these terms presume that it is possible to .separate out disti net realms of human life. What has been said so far should indicate that such a presumption cannot be sustained.