

CHAPTER 10

Radical Deportation

Alien Tales from Lodi
and San Francisco

On June 7, 2005, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested two Pakistani American men, twenty-two-year-old Hamid Hayat, and his father, Umer Hayat, an ice cream truck driver, for allegedly funding and organizing a terrorist cell in Lodi, California. The initial federal affidavit released to the media alleged that Hamid Hayat, who was a U.S.-born citizen, had attended a terrorist training camp in northeast Pakistan in 2003 and had returned to the United States two years later intending to attack "hospitals and large food stores" (Holstege, Marcucci, and Drucker 2005). Hamid Hayat had initially been detained in South Korea on his way back to the United States but was ultimately cleared and allowed to reenter.¹

The arrests and allegations created a national media blitz and panic mongering about terrorist sleeper cells in the Central Valley of California, focusing on the small agricultural town of Lodi, about forty miles south of Sacramento. With a population of approximately sixty thousand and known for little other than winemaking and fruit packing, Lodi was suddenly thrust into the national spotlight. Coincidentally, this sensationalized discovery of Muslim terrorists lurking among vineyards and orchards broke just as President George W. Bush was pushing for the renewal of the USA PATRIOT ACT, amid increasing criticism of the erosion of civil liberties and frustration with the lack of tangible breakthroughs in the War on Terror—including the inability to capture the elusive Osama bin Laden or any of the major al-Qaeda operatives.

In this context, the Lodi case clearly had the potential to ratchet up public fear of terrorism and to provide renewed justification for the government's policies of surveillance, detention, and deportation, particularly those targeting Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians.² Yet the government affidavit eventually filed in the federal court in Sacramento contained none of the original allegations about sensational terrorist plots, and the two men were charged only with lying to federal investigators about the son's alleged links to al-Qaeda training camps. Three other men in Lodi, two Muslim imams and the son of one of the imams, were also arrested, but only for suspected immigration violations. The FBI also interrogated numerous members of the Pakistani community in Lodi and raided several homes. As it became apparent that the FBI had no tangible evidence that Hamid Hayat was linked to a terrorist group, government prosecutors began downplaying the seriousness of the threat the men posed, admitting that none of the five men had plans to bomb targets in California or anywhere else. "We did not find these guys in the middle of executing an attack. That did not happen," said McGregor Scott, U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of California (Holstege, Marcucci, and Drucker 2005).

Yet the damage had already been done by the lurid stories that fueled a hysteria over terrorist threats and a general suspicion of Muslim immigrants, particularly Arab and South Asian males. Why did the FBI seize these men in Lodi, and how did Hamid Hayat, a twenty-two-year-old cherry packer, become the object of intense government scrutiny? As the story unfolded over the following weeks and months, it became apparent that the answers were tied to another figure who slowly emerged from the background: a Pakistani man in his late twenties, Nasim Khan. Khan had befriended the Hayats and the imams and had stayed at their homes after moving to Lodi, helping them with computers and spending time with their sons, in particular. Khan vanished just after their arrests, but it was soon revealed that he was an FBI informant who had infiltrated the community and had been spying on Lodi residents and recording their conversations for three years; Khan had been paid \$250,000 by the FBI by the time the case came to trial (Cockburn 2006). Fifty tapes of conversations in Urdu and Pashto, recorded by Khan, which included comments by Hamid Hayat about his identification with militant groups, were presented by the government as the basis of charges that the Hayats sought to attack the United States (Hood 2006; D. Thompson 2005). The case thus implied that verbal statements expressing militant dissent against the United States are a potential criminal offense, a crucial point that I will return to later.

The legal case made by the government tried to link these political statements made by Hamid Hayat to conversations in which Khan urged Hamid to attend a terrorist training camp. Khan was recorded telling Hamid that he wanted to attend a "jihadi camp" and suggesting that the young man accompany him to Pakistan (Mojaddidi 2006). When Hamid eventually went to Pakistan to get married, he received repeated phone calls from Khan, who urged him to attend a camp and verbally abused him when Hamid insisted that he had no desire to comply. According to Hamid Hayat's lawyer, Wazhma Mojaddidi, the FBI agents who received the tapes barely spoke Urdu or Pashto and relied on Khan, rather than on a translator, for interpretation. Over time, it was revealed that Khan, a permanent U.S. resident, had been convicted of burglary while living in Oregon and, while being interviewed by the FBI about money laundering, had pointed to the TV screen and declared, "I know that man" (Bulwa 2005; Mojaddidi 2006). That man happened to be Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second-in-command. Khan blithely announced that while he had been living in Lodi, California, Zawahiri had visited the mosque and walked around town (Cockburn 2006). This alone should have given the FBI agents pause, as terrorism experts later proved this claim false and asserted that there was no evidence that the al-Qaeda leader had visited the United States, let alone strolled around Lodi (Bulwa 2006a). Yet unlike the Hayats, Khan was not accused of lying to the FBI.

Khan was first asked by the FBI to inform on the two imams, who had come to the United States on religious-leader visas and were in Lodi to establish an Islamic school for the town's Muslim population. The FBI interrogated the imams after they were detained, but since they refused to admit to any involvement with terrorism, they were charged only with immigration violations (Mojaddidi 2006), and the focus of the investigation shifted to Hamid Hayat. The imams eventually decided to cut their losses and took voluntary departure, so they were never technically deported by the government. This occurred despite the fact that they were presumably the "masterminds" of the terrorist plot in which Hamid Hayat was involved.

DEPORTATION AND DEPORTABILITY

I argue that deportation, or the threat of deportation as in the case of the Hayats and countless other Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims targeted in the roundups after the events of September 11, 2001, is a strategy used

by the U.S. state that is fundamentally linked to neoliberal capitalism and imperial domination.³ Deportation is a euphemistic term for being kicked out of a country. In the United States, the expulsion of individuals by the state is also called "removal," which is more accurate but equally ambiguous and impersonal.⁴ The image of unwanted persons being sent by the government to their home countries assumes the "legality" of the process and the "illegality," or at least undesirability, of the deported persons. As such, deportation conjures up fear in those who potentially *could* be deported and evokes some degree of reassurance or acquiescence in those who believe that the nation is thus rid of persons who do not deserve to reside within its borders. Deportation connotes a moral judgment of worthiness and desirability that differentiates between "good" immigrants who are not deported and "bad" immigrants who are, but this line is not as fixed and self-evident as it appears in mainstream discourse about "illegal" immigrants and "un-American" dissidents, both of whom presumably pose a threat to the nation. However, there is a moral economy deeply embedded in deportation that constructs the virtue of citizenship and helps to continually reinscribe the borders of the nation.

The undeclared but arguably ongoing war on immigrants waged by the state, and intensified in the 1990s, has infused the public imagination with the specter of hordes of dark-skinned immigrants from alien backgrounds invading the nation by crossing its borders "illegally," by land, sea, and air, or living furtively within its borders in "illegal" status while leeching off the state's social services (Inda 2006). The official "War on Terror" has deployed a similar rhetoric to target Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians who are undocumented immigrants, as well as permanent residents and even citizens assumed to be threats to national security—a potential fifth column within the nation. Deportation of these immigrant bodies appears to function as a cleansing of unwanted bodies from the nation so that the national body politic is freed of contaminants (Peutz 2006). Underlying the moral panic about expelling these polluting bodies is a racist regime of governmentality that fuels xenophobic hysteria and paranoia about individuals and groups that are sullyng or destroying the nation. Like "deportation," the term "extraordinary rendition" is also a euphemism for expelling individuals who are presumably terrorist threats to their home countries, but in this case to be tortured without U.S. culpability, as in the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who was deported to Syria by the United States and later cleared of links to terrorist groups by the Canadian government, which issued a formal apology.⁵ In such cases, deportation becomes a strategy for outsourcing torture to cleanse the na-

tion from further guilt and to absolve the state from responsibility for its atrocities.

Deportation is generally taken for granted as a remedial device that the state has no choice but to use to maintain its integrity and security in response to unwanted pollutants. However, I argue that deportation is actually a constitutive logic of the imperial state and its drive to consolidate and impose neoliberal economic policies globally. Neoliberal capitalism, which was consolidated in the 1990s as the post-Cold War "Washington Consensus" imposing free trade and structural adjustment globally (Smith 2005, 144), envisions citizens as productive, self-reliant individuals who are free of the dependence created by the welfare state, and as consumers of social services that are increasingly privatized in the neoliberal state (Miller 1993). This privatization of citizenship has diminished the right of citizens to public goods and services, which are instead allocated according to individual "worthiness."⁶ The domestic regulation of labor and subjection of immigrants are tied to the U.S. state's policies of global military, political, and economic domination, which have historically relied on both direct and indirect methods of control (Harvey 2003; Mamdani 2004). U.S. imperialism is characterized by nebulous, nonterritorial forms of domination that do not resemble traditional forms of territorial colonialism and blur the boundaries of "formal" and "informal" empire (Ahmad 2004).⁷ U.S. imperialism has generally enforced its political projects through client states, with the help of complicit elites and covert or proxy wars (Magdoff 2003; Mamdani 2004), a situation that has changed somewhat after the events of September 11, 2001, with the U.S. war on Afghanistan and the direct occupation of Iraq. But U.S. empire continues to rely on the twin processes of foreign coercion and domestic repression (Smith 2005). Global imperial power and neoliberal capitalism go hand in hand, for "the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist" (Koshy 2003, 169), and repression is necessary to discipline citizens and crush dissent against imperial policies. U.S. foreign policy is linked to the "policing of domestic racial tensions" and the disciplining of subordinated populations through racial and class hierarchies at home (Pease 1993, 31).

The logic behind deportation is both economic and political, for it supports U.S. policies of neoliberal capitalism as well as of political domination and repression. Deportation, as it is used in the United States, is not an exceptional phenomenon in response to exigencies of infiltration or invasion but actually part of the normative regime of controlling and disciplining bodies (Ong 2006, 6). Deportation is a daily technology of

subjection for the regulation of citizens, migrants, and workers by a state in which repression and war, at home or overseas, are not a "state of exception" but the everyday state of emergency in U.S. empire (Agamben 2003/2005, 22; Hardt and Negri 2001, 17). The national consensus for U.S. foreign policies is strengthened through historical processes of scapegoating "outsiders" and conflating internal and external enemies that link the domestic and foreign fronts of U.S. imperialism (Støler 2006, 12). I argue here that deportation, too, links both the overseas and homeland arenas of imperial control.

DEPORTATION'S NEOLIBERAL LOGIC

Deportation is both an economic and a political strategy of the imperial state. In this chapter, I focus primarily on the political uses of deportation policy, but I want to note that the economic and political logics of deportation are distinct but ultimately overlapping, to ensure a docile workforce and target politically threatening dissent—goals that converge in some instances, as I will discuss later. Aihwa Ong observes that the neoliberal state relies on "a biopolitical mode of governing that centers on the capacity and potential of individuals and the population as living resources that may be harnessed and managed by governing regimes" (2006, 6). Immigration law regulates the flow of labor across national borders through immigrant visas and documents that determine who can enter and for how long, based on work and educational credentials. Deportation policy, which determines who must leave, works in tandem with this management of the entry of immigrant labor. Deportation is one of the "spatial practices that engage market forces" by controlling and recruiting certain pools of workers for the neoliberal state to ensure its competitiveness and productivity in the global economy (6). The threat of expulsion is necessary for regulating economic citizenship, for it disciplines immigrant labor and depresses wages. Deportation laws have historically performed this function since the 1888 deportation statute was promulgated to regulate the flow of "cheap" foreign (mainly Chinese) labor (B. Hing 2004, 209–10).

Furthermore, as Nicholas De Genova points out, it is "deportability, and not deportation per se," that is crucial for neoliberal capitalism: "The category 'illegal alien' is a profoundly useful and profitable one that effectively serves to create and sustain a legally vulnerable—and hence relatively tractable and thus 'cheap'—reserve of labor" (2002, 438–40). Deportation, or

specifically the legal production of the *category* of deportability, is an economic strategy of the neoliberal state, which requires the presence of noncitizen and undocumented labor. The heightened fear of deportation produced by the War on Terror ensures that wages will continue to be depressed and immigrant workers will be even more hesitant to organize collectively and more intensely subjected to economic exploitation. Yet the implications of this economic logic of deportation and deportability are rarely made explicit in state policies and legislation, unlike policies that openly target political dissenters for presumably posing a threat to national security. This makes it difficult to enact strategies of resistance that challenge the core of this logic rather than simply asserting that "good immigrants" are hardworking, productive, and deserve to stay. The politics of labor subordination, however, are only the most general feature of deportation as a political strategy, as will become clear through the cases discussed here.

Despite the increasing influence and visibility of transnational movements, the possibility of what some have called "postnational citizenship" (Soysal 1996) or "global citizenship" (Hardt and Negri 2001) remains ambiguous given that individual and collective rights still remain largely tied to territorially bounded nation-states (Shafir 2004). Political movements, too, continue to address their claims for immigrant and civil rights to the nation-state as the guarantor of rights. Immigrant rights organizing in the United States after September 11, 2001, has challenged the climate of xenophobia and repression, particularly with the mass-scale immigrant rights protests in 2006 in response to the proposed "immigration reform" bill, HR 3477. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants, the majority of whom were Latinos, marched in cities across the nation under slogans such as "No human being is illegal" (Allday, Zamora, and Rubenstein 2006). Yet the predominant focus of this movement—at least in its mainstream, U.S.-flag-waving manifestation—demonstrated that undocumented immigrants still appeal to the state for legalization of their status. This is understandable given the material reality of the state, but such demands still tend to reinforce the link between state sovereignty and citizenship. At the same time, as Ong argues, "The neoliberal exception thus pries open the seam of sovereignty and citizenship, generating successive degrees of insecurity for low-skilled citizens and migrants who will have to look beyond the state for the safeguarding of their rights" (2006, 19). Immigrants are forced to grapple with the limitations of rights as granted by the state and to consider other ways of responding to issues of deportation, an issue I will return to later. The question of what strategies immigrants

and others can use in forging a political movement to challenge the state disciplining of immigrant labor is tied to the political function of deportation policy, the second major component of the logic of deportation and the focal point of this chapter.

DEPORTATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TERROR

Deportation is a political instrument of the neoliberal "warfare state"—a heavily militarized state that wages perpetual war, overtly or covertly—that can be used to contain dissent and suppress political movements that challenge imperial policies. Especially after the passing of the Patriot Act in 2001, but also at other historical junctures, the threat of deportation, along with policies of surveillance and detention, has served as a device for repression and for intimidating critics of state policies. After the events of September 11, the actual as well as threatened deportation of Muslim, Arab, and South Asian immigrants has been used to instill fear in communities that have been targeted in the domestic War on Terror. Muslim families began experiencing the disappearances of their husbands, brothers, and sons, for none of the detainees were identified publicly, and the locations where they were held remained secret (Chang 2002, 69–87).

As part of the domestic War on Terror, at least 1,200 Muslim, Arab, and South Asian immigrant men were rounded up and detained within seven weeks in the immediate aftermath of September 11, none of them with any criminal charges, and some in high-security prisons (Cainkar and Maira 2006).⁸ By May 2003 the Department of Justice had also detained over 1,000 foreign nationals under the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, which prioritized the deportation of 6,000 Muslims and Arabs of the over 300,000 immigrants with outstanding deportation orders (Cole 2003, 25). The targeting of Muslim and Arab males highlights the gendered dimension and underlying anti-Arab racism of the War on Terror, whose public discourse relies on often hyper-Orientalist tropes of violent, fanatical Muslim and Arab men and oppressed, veiled Muslim and Arab women who can be rescued by the United States, through military intervention if necessary (see Sheikh 2003).

An interesting point to note that reveals the underlying political logic of deportation is that Pakistani immigrants were disproportionately targeted for detention and deportation, though there were no Pakistani nationals involved in the September 11 hijackings, and Pakistan has been a key ally to the United States. Nevertheless nearly 40 percent of the post-September

11 detainees were estimated to be Pakistani nationals (Schulhofer 2002, 11). Additionally, there were mass deportations of Pakistani nationals on chartered planes, some leaving in the middle of the night from New York state, that went unreported in the mainstream media (Ryan 2003, 16). Pakistanis in the United States became suspect because the U.S. government claimed it was clamping down on Islamist guerrilla networks linked to both al-Qaeda and the Taliban in northwest Pakistan, along the border with Afghanistan—ironically, the same area that provided the mujahedin whom the CIA armed and trained to fight its proxy war in Afghanistan in the 1980s (see Rashid 2000). The selective detention and deportation of Pakistani immigrants within and from the United States, largely due to immigration violations, was linked to increased pressure on Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to contain “militants” from “tribal” areas opposed to U.S. policies in the Middle East.⁹ This is one of many examples that illustrate how deportation links immigration issues with U.S. foreign policy (Hing 2006b).

Furthermore, the post-September 11 sweeps not only included Arab and Muslim immigrants but targeted other communities as well, particularly low-wage undocumented workers. For example, in November 2001 the government began requiring all airport screeners to be U.S. citizens and conducted a multiagency sweep of airports, named Operation Tarmac, that resulted in the detention and deportation of more than one thousand undocumented airport workers, mostly Latinos and Filipinos (Nguyen 2005, xx, 18). A point that is often overlooked in discussions of the War on Terror is that most of the Muslim and Arab males who were deported were low-wage undocumented workers. So while the targeted detentions and deportations had a chilling effect on political dissent among Muslim and Arab Americans, in particular, whose home countries and regions were being targeted by U.S. military incursions, it also served to make even more vulnerable a class of already exploited immigrant labor. The detention of Muslims and Arabs rounded up after September 11 shows most clearly the intertwining of the political and economic logic of deportation policy. Most of the detainees were deported for immigration violations, and except for one or two high-profile cases, none were found guilty of terrorism-related charges. Their detention and deportation were based on *political profiling* linked to the War on Terror, and though they were targeted for being Arab and Muslim and not specifically because of class, the mass warehousing and intimidation of this pool of low-wage labor had an economic effect. The economic and political work of deportation converges in this regime of discipline and punishment.

Deportation is accompanied by regimes of surveillance and detention that work in tandem as part of the disciplining technologies of the state. Surveillance has been conducted through FBI infiltration of political groups and Muslim communities and the use of "insider" informants, as I will discuss later, but also through FBI interviews of targeted populations, such as Iraqis during the buildup for the war on Iraq, and later Iranians (Cainkar 2004). The state created official policies for openly monitoring and collecting information on suspected populations after September 11. In June 2002 the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), commonly known as Special Registration, was established, requiring all male nationals over sixteen from twenty-four Muslim-majority countries (including Pakistan and Bangladesh), as well as from North Korea, to submit to photographing, fingerprinting, and interviews at federal immigration facilities.¹⁰ Over 80,000 men complied with Special Registration; many of these men, however, never returned home, as 2,870 men were detained and 13,799 were put into deportation proceedings (Nguyen 2005, xviii). After news broke of mass arrests of nearly a thousand Iranians complying with Special Registration in Southern California in December 2002 (52), some undocumented immigrants and those with pending immigration applications fled to the Canadian border and tried to apply for asylum (Ryan 2003), demonstrating that their fear of detention and deportation was linked to a fear of persecution in the United States based on religion and national origin.

The indirect but arguably intended outcome of the threat of deportation is that it creates terror and stifles dissent among those who consider themselves "deportable" as immigrants or suspect populations. Corey Robin argues that "fear does the work—or enhances the work—of repression," noting that the "effects of 'Fear, American Style,' " have been most evident in immigrant, Middle Eastern, and South Asian communities, as well as in the workplace, where "suppression of dissent" is evident since September 11, 2001, in countless examples of direct and indirect harassment and intimidation of those expressing views considered "unpatriotic" (2003, 48). Robin points out that repression works on two levels to silence dissent: on a state level, through agencies such as the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, but also on the level of civil society, where individuals internalize repression and censor themselves. This is the larger political problem and painful paradox created by the War on Terror, for the targeted communities that most need to mobilize collectively in response are also the ones who are, understandably, the most afraid of being punished for political speech, let alone political organizing. The broader

and ultimately more far-reaching effects of regimes of deportation and deportability on individuals who are not political activists, in the traditional sense, is an issue that has received less scholarly attention, but one that I argue is pressing in the era of the Patriot Act.

DEPORTING "ALIEN" IDEOLOGIES

It must be noted that deportation has long been used for repression and coercion by the imperial state, and so its normative character is rooted in historical precedent in the United States (see Kanstroom 2007). In fact, as Bill Hing points out, "The first deportation and expulsion provision was related to political ideology" (2004, 209). In 1798, anticipating war with France, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, which "made it a crime to criticize the government" and authorized the deportation of alien males over fourteen (Chang 2002, 22; see also R. Delgado 2003, 68). During World War I, the Espionage Act of 1917, drawing on nativist fears directed at anarchists and socialists, was passed to suppress dissent, as was the 1918 Anarchist Act targeting "subversive aliens" (B. Hing 2004). The infamous Palmer Raids of 1919–20 led to the rounding up of almost 3,000 foreign nationals for deportation, most of them workers and union members. During the Red Scare, Attorney General Mitchell Palmer created a "Radical Division" within the Department of Justice that, with the help of J. Edgar Hoover, employed spies to infiltrate labor unions (B. Hing 2004, 216–20). Conducted in a wartime climate of nativism and hysteria about foreign "subversives," the Palmer Raids are perhaps the historical event that most closely parallels the post-September 11 mass detentions and deportations initiated by Attorney General John Ashcroft, which now targeted Muslim and Arab men.

The anticommunist witch hunts of the 1940s and 1950s and the Smith Act of 1940 are infamous for driving the "second Red Scare" of the Cold War, but the targeting of political dissidents who were noncitizens persisted long after the McCarthy era. For example, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which contained "the most extensive ideological deportation and exclusion provisions" based on association with the Communist Party, was used by the FBI and the INS to arrest seven Palestinians and one Kenyan in Los Angeles in 1987 (Cole 2003, 131). The case of the "L.A. Eight" is important because it demonstrates that the political profiling of Arabs and Muslims did not begin only after the events of September 11, 2001, and those who have protested U.S. policy in the Middle East

have been targeted by the government at various moments since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.¹¹

The government charged that the affiliation of the L.A. Eight with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) implied that they advocated "world communism," still a deportable offense at the time (Cole and Dempsey 2002, 35–38). The L.A. Eight successfully challenged the government's targeting of political activism and its use of secret evidence, but though the government eventually dropped the charges of association with communism, it prosecuted the six noncitizens on immigration violations. The INS continued to seek the deportation of Khader Hamide and Michel Shehadeh, who were permanent residents, on grounds of providing "material support" to the PFLP, allegedly a "terrorist organization" (36–37). In this, the INS conducted an ideologically motivated deportation campaign based on government disapproval of the PFLP's political activity. The FBI's goal was admittedly "to identify key PFLP people in Southern California so that law enforcement agencies capable of disrupting the PFLP's activities through legal action can do so" (cited in Cole and Dempsey 2002, 38).

The political irony that must be noted here is that the FBI and INS charged these Palestinian activists with belonging to an organization that was not a threat to the United States but was opposed to the policies of the Israeli government and the occupation of Palestine. In charging the L.A. Eight on behalf of the Israeli government and trying to squash pro-Palestine organizing in the United States, the government was revealing its support for Israeli policies and its willingness to prosecute these activists for opposing a foreign government. The other troubling aspect of the L.A. Eight's fifteen-year battle in the courts to fight their deportation is that it occurred *after* the political persecution of the FBI's COINTELPRO program of the 1960s and 1970s had been brought to light and criticized for its surveillance, infiltration, and disruption of civil rights and antiwar organizing in the United States (Chang 2002, 29–32). David Cole points out that these ideologically motivated deportation campaigns targeting particular political groups and activists relied on immigration law because noncitizens tried in immigration courts have none of the rights afforded to citizens during a criminal trial (2003, 126–27). After September 11, 2001, the government reopened the case of the L.A. Eight under the provisions of the Patriot Act in an attempt to finally deport the remaining two Palestinian activists (Shehadeh 2007).¹² A similarly ideologically motivated campaign directed at activists opposing U.S.-backed regimes involved the government's surveillance of the Committee in Solidarity with

the People of El Salvador (CISPES) in the 1980s, a group of mostly U.S. citizens who opposed U.S. military aid to the repressive right-wing regime in El Salvador (Churchill 2006; Cole and Dempsey 2002, 22–23).¹³

There are two significant features of this historical pattern of state surveillance and political repression in the United States, according to Cole (2003, 85): first, “antialien sentiments and tactics” were generally used to target noncitizens, but this political repression eventually extended to citizens as well and broke down the sanctity of the citizen-noncitizen divide. The second point, as illustrated by the CISPES case, is that the end of the Cold War saw the substitution of “terrorism” for “communism” in the U.S. state’s cross hairs. The Reagan administration proposed legislation to make “support for terrorism” a crime in 1984,¹⁴ a measure later introduced in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) passed by the Clinton administration (Cole and Dempsey 2002, 29). What these two points together suggest is that political deportation in the United States has historically been aimed not just at individual activists or even organizations and activities but also at the suppression of ideologies viewed as threatening to state interests.¹⁵

Deportation is thus a device not just for removing and repressing “alien” or “radical” bodies and organizations but an instrument for eliminating or preempting the spread of radical ideas—radical because they are opposed to key U.S. policies of neoliberal economic expansion and global political domination. The word “alien” is problematic when applied to immigrant bodies, but it is revealing when applied to the actual target of deportation: the *ideas* that are deemed fundamentally alien to the imperial state. This is what we need to consider in reframing our understanding of the political work of deportation: targeting bodies, organizations, and also ideas.

Suppressing radical or alien ideas involves the targeting not just of radical activists and organizations but also of ordinary individuals who are assumed to be associated with political ideas or organizations that are deemed anti-American or who may at some point act on such ideas or at the behest of such organizations. This is the fundamental logic of the government’s War on Terror; yet much more attention has been paid to the state’s targeting of individuals or organizations who are publicly political, such as the L.A. Eight or CISPES. While this work is extremely important in exposing the often hidden political logic of detention and deportation (cf. Churchill 2006), little work has examined the wide impact of deportation policies or cases on those who are considered outside formal politics and on whom such policies have a less-publicized but equally important effect in terms of the political culture after September 11, 2001. Examining cases

of individuals who are not considered political activists in the traditionally defined sense also forces us to grapple with the broader meaning of politics and the nature of politicization, particularly in light of the state's assumptions about which groups of people are likely to be politicized or have political views that are considered threatening to the national security state's imperial policies in its global War on Terror.

LAW AS A WAR ZONE

It is important to note that the legal groundwork for targeting immigrants for deportation in the War on Terror was laid well before September 11, 2001, and that the Patriot Act actually extended provisions in the AEDPA and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, introduced under a Democratic administration. Kathleen Moore argues that the national anxiety about political, economic, and cultural threats to the nation from immigrants and aliens after the Cold War is a response to the ongoing and "heightened sense of insecurity required to maintain a restructured, wartime regulatory state after the primary security target disappears" (1999, 95). This manufactured sense of national insecurity that shores up the warfare state, even in peacetime, is reflected in U.S. law and has persisted well beyond the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as the foregoing examples demonstrate. Contrary to the notion that "the fate of justice during war is an aberration," Richard Delgado argues that the recurrent pattern of suspension of civil liberties and use of the law to execute U.S. government policies suggests that these are not "exceptions to an otherwise scrupulously fair system" but, in fact, "the rule, the most obvious, most visible case" (2003, 80). In Delgado's view, the law is embedded in, not outside, the social system and linked to a coercive state apparatus; it is a mechanism for framing the terms of conflict that it is presumably designed to mediate—for example, defining who is an enemy combatant and who deserves habeas corpus. Delgado suggests, like other critical legal theorists, that "all of law is a war zone" (80).

Furthermore, the targeting of noncitizens and citizens who embody "alien" ideologies in the War on Terror connects U.S. foreign policy concerns with domestic issues of immigration, criminalization, and incarceration. Deportation connects overseas wars with racial profiling and domestic assaults on civilian populations, revealing the links between the War on Terror, the unofficial but ongoing war on immigrants, and also the so-called War on Drugs (Nguyen 2005). The blurring of panics about

terrorists, immigrants, and young men of color is evident also in the war on gangs, which has used antiterrorist strategies to annually deport up to forty thousand alleged Latino gang members to Mexico and Central America for "aggravated felonies" since 1996.¹⁶ Anxieties about border security and presumed infiltration of terrorists through the U.S.-Mexico border show how "homeland insecurities" about immigration are linked to foreign-policy concerns about war and terrorism.

Detention is a necessary precursor to deportation, since all deportees are detained for varying lengths of time before they are deported. The process of detention connects Arab, Muslim, and South Asian detainees to other criminalized minority and immigrant populations who are overrepresented in the prison system (Cainkar and Maira 2006). Deportation is thus necessarily linked to the expanding U.S. prison-industrial complex, "a vast system of immigration prisons that had been detaining 150,000 people annually since the mid-1990s and now hold more than 200,000 people each year" (Nguyen 2005, 7). The INS, which has been restructured and now functions partly as the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), warehouses immigrants in local jails as well as privately run prisons. As Tram Nguyen observes, "this almost invisible system of warehousing—and "removal" or deportation—had been operating and growing quietly for years before September 11" (7).¹⁷ In *American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons*, Mark Dow documents the workings of the vast but largely "invisible" prison system run by the INS and its later incarnation as the DHS (2004, 11–12), where immigrant detainees have been abused, even tortured, by prison officials and held in secret detention.

For example, an infamous report of the Department of Justice's Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigated conditions at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn and Passaic County Jail in Paterson, New Jersey, where many of the post-September 11 detainees were held.¹⁸ Released in 2003, the OIG's report found three hundred videotapes documenting numerous incidents of cruel, inhumane, and degrading punishment, including prison guards slamming detainees into walls, smashing their faces into a T-shirt with an American flag, beating them and dragging them over floors and stairs, conducting unnecessary strip searches, leaving detainees naked for extended periods of time, and routinely subjecting them to verbal abuse, racist comments, and threats. This report became public before the torture of Iraqi detainees by the U.S. military in Abu Ghraib prison came to light, but it was barely noticed in the mainstream media and disappeared quickly without any of the public outrage provoked by

the Abu Ghraib scandal. This instance of domestic torture of detainees exemplifies what Dylan Rodríguez describes as the

illegal and unconstitutional abuses of state power, unabashed use of strategic and deadly violence, and development of invasive, terrorizing surveillance technologies [that] might be seen as the state's prototyping of the era's broadly revived (and significantly extrastate) domestic low-intensity warfare techniques against racially pathologized "activist" and "civilian" populations alike. (2006, 23)

This is a crucial point, for Rodríguez elucidates the ways in which distinctions between "activists" and "civilians" are in some ways less meaningful in defining populations selectively targeted by the state through technologies of surveillance, police brutality, incarceration, prison abuse, and legal warfare than are racialized categories of criminalization (see also Cainkar and Maira 2006).¹⁹ Rodríguez argues that "the prison regime has become an indispensable element of American statecraft, simultaneously a cornerstone of its militarized (local and global) ascendancy and spectacle of its extracted (or coerced) authority over targeted publics" (2006, 44).

The closely related processes of detention and deportation are part of everyday regimes of state control that link domestic and foreign policies, the two fronts of imperial domination. As Rodríguez suggests in the case of detainees, deportees too are targeted because of domestic and international politics, so that even if they are not traditionally political prisoners, they are constituted politically in their encounter with the state. Certainly there are cases of detention and deportation that involve political activists who are explicitly targeted because of their organizing activity, as in the case of the L.A. Eight and CISPES, among many others. However, a continuum exists between so-called political prisoners and detainees and deportees who are not traditional activists but are nonetheless subjects of a political process that targets populations selectively in accordance with wider political projects of intimidation and control. In fact, it is as a result of having to deal with detention or deportation at the hands of the government that many Arab, Muslim, and South Asian immigrants have become politicized, ironically, and it is the awareness of the larger scapegoating and profiling of these targeted communities that may, in fact, lead to a radicalization of their responses.

In this light, I offer the story of two South Asian immigrants, Hamid and Umer Hayat, targeted for deportation after September 11, to illustrate the work of deportation as a political, economic, and social technology of U.S. empire. This story also draws on my own experiences working on issues of

immigrant and civil rights in South Asian communities after September 11, 2001, in the San Francisco Bay Area and in the Boston area. While I focus on the case in Lodi, California, which received extensive national coverage, I also touch on a local story of deportations in the Bay Area that (like most other stories of immigrant deportations) hardly emerged in the mainstream media at all but suggests possibilities for framing a political response. While not all the South Asian immigrants in these cases were eventually deported, their stories show the range of experiences that South Asian immigrants have in their encounter with the state through the regime of deportation and how this encounter crystallizes the state's definition of the nature and locus of potentially radical politics.

LODI: ON CANNERY WORKERS, TERRORISTS, AND WIGS

The Lodi case involving Hamid and Umer Hayat is an excellent example of how the government's political logic of deportation targeted two South Asian Muslim men, who were by all accounts far removed from any organized political activity, on the assumption that radical political ideologies and anti-American sentiments were lurking among cannery workers in this sleepy little town. In fact, the premise of "sleeper cell" cases is that there are would-be terrorists in our midst who are by definition invisible and unknown, but potentially dangerous. The Lodi case was also based on a broader pattern of preemptive deportation and of framing individuals for political expressions and alleged intentions that has troubling implications for political dissent, as I will discuss later.

After I heard about the arrests of Hamid and Umer Hayat in June 2005, I visited Lodi with Veena Dubal, a law school student and member of the Bay Area-based Alliance for South Asians Taking Action (ASATA), in which I was also involved in doing immigrant and civil rights work. When we arrived in Lodi, we found that FBI agents were swarming all over the town and were continuing to monitor the mosque. Several Pakistani men were standing outside the mosque in the early evening, relaxing on the grass and chatting after work. They told us that the FBI had begun coming to Lodi immediately after September 11 and "making friends" with mosque members (Dubal and Maira 2005). One man, without looking around, described to us exactly where each federal agent's car was parked; we saw the three large SUVs with black-tinted windows, just yards from the mosque, where some young South Asian and Latino boys were playing basketball. One middle-aged Pakistani man said quietly, "Let them come

ask us questions. We have nothing to hide." While this resilience was inspiring, it also bespoke a certain resigned acceptance of the surveillance; others we spoke to were understandably concerned about the impact of the surveillance and racist backlash in Lodi on their children and families. One woman reported that her young child had been followed by the FBI while going to get ice cream. Several Pakistani men had been hauled off for questioning by the FBI without access to attorneys; a few had been detained. Others complained that they had been taken from their workplaces for interrogation and could not return because their coworkers became suspicious of them. The most shocking report was of an FBI raid on the home of one of the imams, which had been under close surveillance, when only three women and five children were inside. The agents broke down the front door and put a gun to the head of one of the women. Her eleven-year-old daughter passed out, but the FBI denied entry to medical personnel and refused to let her go to the hospital. This gross violation of human rights outraged even the local emergency care personnel but went unreported in most media coverage.

When meeting with members of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the ACLU who were providing legal support and civil rights information to the local community, we noticed a blue SUV driving around the motel where we had congregated. Undercover agents had been monitoring the legal team in their motel for days, and as we drove by, the man driving the SUV circled our car and took photographs from his window. When we tried to approach him, he fled, only to return later and take more photos. Strangely, the man was wearing a large Afro wig and dark glasses, a rather crude disguise that seemed surreal in the middle of Lodi. This was such a conspicuous cover that it confirmed that the principal purpose of the FBI surveillance was to intimidate the community.

Despite the support provided by civil rights activists from Sacramento and the Bay Area, it became apparent that one of the reasons that Lodi might have provided a convenient location for such intense FBI surveillance, not to mention the staging of the sleeper cell case itself, was the lack of political mobilization in the South Asian community in this rural area. The Pakistani community is a largely working-class population, numbering between 2,000 and 4,000, many of whom work at the local fruit-canning factory close to the mosque (Hua 2005). The community has lived in Lodi since the 1920s (Grudin 2005), and some men we spoke to said their ancestors had come to the United States as early as 1908 to work on the railroads, so it is a much older community than the upwardly

mobile South Asian population in the San Francisco Bay Area or other parts of California. Yet South Asians in Lodi are geographically and politically isolated from their compatriots in the major urban and suburban South Asian enclaves, and most do not speak English (Grudin 2005), so they are an easier target for surveillance and intimidation. Compared to the Bay Area, where there is a plethora of civil and immigrant rights organizations, Lodi had no South Asian or Asian American organizations to advocate for or educate the Pakistani community in civil and immigrant rights issues.

Hamid Hayat, like other men in Lodi, had opened his door to the FBI when they arrived at his home, three days after he returned from Pakistan. Without consulting a lawyer, he had agreed to repeated questioning and volunteered to drive to Sacramento to take a polygraph test. When he was told that he had failed the lie detector test, he was never shown the actual report by the FBI. However, given the FBI's intense desire to discover a terrorist plot, civil rights education would probably have been a thin shield. His attorney pointed out that both father and son were pressured into admitting that Hamid had attended a terrorist camp through the repeated interviews to which they were subjected and in a language they did not fully understand (Mojaddidi 2006). The FBI even showed Hamid photos of his own wedding in Pakistan as evidence, claiming that the Pakistani men with guns were terrorists, even though Hamid tried to explain that they were shooting blanks, as is the custom at weddings in Pakistan and the Middle East.

The Hayats were eventually brought to trial separately in spring 2006, and Hamid Hayat was found guilty of making false statements and providing "material support" for terrorism, facing up to thirty-nine years in prison (Bulwa 2006a). His father's trial ended in a hung jury, and Umer Hayat was charged only with lying to Customs upon returning to the United States; his terrorism charges were eventually dismissed, and he was sentenced to the 330 days in prison he had already served (Bulwa 2006a). By the time the jury reached a verdict, even the mainstream media acknowledged that the case basically rested on the use of preventive detention based on fear of an alleged plot rather than on evidence of actual terrorist activity and that the Hayat case was a much-needed victory for the Department of Justice given its lack of success in prosecuting terrorism cases. At the time of my writing this chapter, Hamid Hayat's attorney and the new co-counsel Dennis Riordan had filed a motion for a new trial, hoping to bring in evidence and testimonies that the government had denied them during the trial.

SURVEILLANCE, REPRESSION, AND RESISTANCE

The case also brought to light an important issue that began surfacing in the media: that of paid FBI informants infiltrating mosques and South Asian, Arab, and Muslim immigrant communities across the United States. A pattern emerged of informants framing suspects, usually young Muslim men critical of the War on Terror and angry about the U.S. occupation of Iraq and atrocities related to U.S. interventions in the Middle East, by provoking and recording statements of their desire to attack U.S. targets or, as in Hamid Hayat's case, simply supporting militant dissent against U.S. policies. As Paul Ehrlich observes, "If that was illegal, the jails would be filled. If every person in the Middle East and Asia who's displeased with the U.S.'s performance is a terrorist, then we have millions of them" (cited in Hood 2006). The corollary of what seems to be a strategy of "preemptive denunciation" is that Muslim and Arab Americans have become increasingly reluctant to express dissenting political views, even with others who are from the same communities, since the informants are generally Muslim or Arab themselves. The FBI has used informants to provoke declarations of dissent by Muslim Americans, so in a sense it seeks out and even desires to prosecute the potential for radical ideas or expressions of political dissent, which it then uses as examples of terrorist conspiracies and networks. This is the cruel irony at the heart of deportation's political logic in the current conjuncture: the state needs the existence of radical ideas and movements to justify its assault on civil liberties, and if they don't exist as visibly and tangibly as needed, it must call them into public being to prove the threat to national security. This is a complex issue that is not just about entrapment but about the twisted logic embedded in the War on Terror—a war that by definition *needs* terrorism.

Arab and Muslim American communities around the nation—particularly in places with significant concentrations of Arab and Muslim immigrants such as Brooklyn, New York—have become familiar with the "telltale signs" of informers, who "like to talk politics . . . have plenty of free time," and "live in the neighborhood" (Elliott 2006). The use of insider informants was publicized in the trial of Shawahar Siraj, a Pakistani man, in an alleged plot to blow up a New York subway station in 2004. An Egyptian informant who was spying on the Muslim community around the Brooklyn mosque had shown Siraj pictures of Muslims overseas being mistreated and offered explosives to Siraj, who was then found guilty

of the plot in 2006 (Rashbaum 2006). This strategy has prompted public debate and soul-searching within Muslim immigrant communities about whether the role of these informants, including imams and community leaders who enter into dialogues with the FBI, can be considered complicity with the government or benign cooperation with law enforcement. At the least, in many cases it has sown the seeds of distrust and division within communities that are not always politically mobilized and barely have the organizational resources to respond adequately to the post-September 11 crisis of civil rights.

The Lodi case brought attention to government strategies of infiltration and surveillance, but they also predictably heightened the sense of fear and suspicion within South Asian Muslim and Arab American communities. Arab American communities in general already have a collective memory of historical patterns of surveillance and often violent tactics of intimidation directed at Arab or pro-Palestine political organizations in the United States, such as the American Arab Anti-discrimination Committee (ADC).²⁰ The use of government informants, including religious leaders, has deepened the sense of vulnerability and distrust already permeating these communities after September 11, 2001, for it directed suspicion inward. The mosque and home were no longer safe havens free of state intrusion, since informants could be everywhere, as the Lodi case demonstrated, given that Nasim Khan worked with the imams and sometimes even slept over at their homes (Bulwa 2005). The state's penetration of the intimate corners of domains believed to be private made it apparent that the strategy of surveillance, detention, and deportation was not just about the policing of national borders or the border between citizens and noncitizens but about the dissolution of the boundary between state and community, and state and home, or perhaps the dissolution of a possibly unified community. The public sphere has enlarged to encompass all private spheres for Muslim Americans, even as the possibilities for open political discussion in the public sphere have diminished, if not disappeared for some.

Detentions and deportations after September 11, 2001, thus have a deep social impact and have led to the reconstitution and reorganizing of social relations for Muslim and Arab Americans, demonstrating how the political and economic technologies of subjection have a social logic as well (see Maira 2004). It is also evident that for some subjects, particularly Muslims and Arabs, the distinction between private and public has become meaningless in the realms where it has the most serious consequences. The intimacy of the state is heightened through practices of

surveillance, detention, and deportation, so that, ironically, knowledge of the full reach of the state's powers and familiarity with certain aspects of the law are often greatest in the segments of the population that are least protected by the state. This political education inflicted by the War on Terror is involuntary because of the state's regulation and collective punishment of communities that are forced to directly confront its power.

The painful—but perhaps intended—outcome of the fear and distrust sown in Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities by surveillance and deportation is the suppression of political organizing and the very collective organizing that these communities need to respond to the political crisis. The surveillance and infiltration of activist groups by the FBI affect antiwar and other movements as well, but noncitizens are obviously more vulnerable owing to the threat of deportation. Awareness of government informants and infiltration has also heightened fear of simply sharing information or political views, for all private spaces are experienced as public by Muslim Americans after September 11, 2001. The only statements that Muslim Americans feel secure making in this all-encompassing public space are denunciations of terrorism and insistence on Islam as a peace-loving, nonviolent religion. Steven Salaita calls this the “prerequisite to speaking” for Arabs and Muslims after September 11 and proposes an ethics of refusal of this disclaimer (2006, 51). He rightly observes that the use of the word “terrorism” is embedded in cultural prejudice about Arabs and Muslims and a decontextualized picture of violence that evades discussions of political grievances as well as state-sponsored violence. Invoking terrorism by denying it thus reinscribes this set of cultural and political assumptions about Arab, and Islamist, politics and cultures (Salaita 2006, 50–51; see also Puar and Rai 2002).

Even if Muslim commentators privately oppose U.S. policies in the War on Terror, many of them publicly perform the role of peace-loving “good Muslims” who are willing to be made into loyal citizens of the United States, as opposed to “bad Muslims” who critique the expansionist policies and imperial strategies of the United States under the guise of promoting democracy (Mamdani 2004, 15). There is obviously a concern about self-defense in this performance of good citizenship by Muslim and Arab Americans who feel that their political views are being monitored by the state and are afraid to openly express their dissent, and the “good Muslim” category is commonly invoked in legal cases and in the mainstream political arena as a defensive strategy. However, the deeper implications of this strategy are troubling in the longer term if it is a defense that remains within the terms set by the state in the War on Terror and refuses

to acknowledge the root causes of terrorism and opposition to the United States, in the Middle East and elsewhere. Those who are most vulnerable may not be in the position to challenge the dichotomy of "good" and "bad" Muslims and the fundamental premise of the War on Terror, but I would extend Salaita's point and suggest that there also needs to be a collective defense of the right to express dissent, even radical ideas.

The Lodi case also created other kinds of responses within local communities, given that the profiling of Muslims and Arabs was often based on confused identifications of Muslim and Arab. Sikhs, particularly turbaned Sikh men, were disproportionately targeted in the post-September 11 backlash and were among the men murdered immediately after the September 11 hijackings.²¹ After the Hayat arrests, CAIR conducted workshops on civil rights in the Lodi area in mosques and also in Sikh *gurudwaras* (temples). The Lodi case prompted racist paranoia about Muslim terrorists lurking in California, and it was also followed by racist graffiti on a *gurudwara* in Lodi in October 2005 (Ioffee 2005). There have also been racist incidents targeting Latinos and African Americans in the area, but what is interesting is that the Muslim American community in Lodi, sensitized to the issue of racial profiling, made public statements of solidarity with the Sikh community in the Central Valley. Some Lodi residents even became involved in antiracist projects in Lodi to combat hate crimes by fostering intercultural understanding. In my view, these efforts are laudable and necessary, but not sufficient, for they raise other questions about how to respond to racial profiling and what this term really means.

The liberal view that hate crimes can be addressed through cross-cultural understanding and multicultural education continues to evade the role of state-sanctioned racial profiling and political, not just cultural, processes of discrimination. Local responses to the profiling of Lodi's Muslims, as evident in stories in the mainstream media, generally reinscribed the pervasive Orientalist focus on Islam, gender, and youth that is part of the dominant discourse about the War on Terror. For example, media articles about Lodi's Muslim community focused on Pakistani American youth struggling with "the social pull" between "the many freedoms offered to Americans," particularly to young women, and the restrictions of conservative traditions in the Pakistani immigrant community (Giese 2005). These commentaries, and many other narratives about Muslim Americans after September 11, suggest that the conflict at the heart of the War on Terror is rooted in differences of culture and religion, a clash of cultures that pits Islam, if not the Middle East, against Western democracy

and modernity. Liberal multicultural narratives about Islam and the Middle East do not always fall into this trap of essentialized or Orientalized understandings, but even those that rightly condemn the racism and Islamophobia in the War on Terror do not generally critically consider its political context. Viewing post-September 11 racial profiling simply as a problem of domestic racism fails to acknowledge its link to the global dimensions of the War on Terror and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This is also true for responses to racial profiling within Muslim and Arab immigrant communities, but in some instances cultural empathy with other minorities has extended to a political solidarity based on a deeper understanding of U.S. racism and imperial power. Alliances have emerged or strengthened after September 11, 2001, in some instances between groups and political movements focused on civil and immigrant rights, incarceration, war, and occupation that link policies within the United States to interventions in the Middle East. These linkages formed in response to the state regime of surveillance, detention, and deportation point to new kinds of affiliations in the shifting racial and religious politics of post-September 11 America.

DEPORTING LA MIGRA

An example of these new alliances in response to deportation and detention, and their implications for political analysis and organizing, is the *Deporten a La Migra* (Deport the INS, now ICE) coalition in the Bay Area. The coalition includes a variety of Latino, Asian American, antiwar, immigrant rights, housing rights, and labor groups in San Francisco, such as members of La Raza Centro Legal, St. Peter's Housing Committee, Day Labor Program, Heads Up Collective, SRO Families United, Asian Pacific Islander Legal Outreach, and ASATA. I became involved in the coalition as a member of ASATA after an ICE raid on Hotel Sunrise, a residential hotel in the Mission District of San Francisco. On May 6, 2004, federal agents detained nine immigrant men, deporting seven Mexican immigrant workers and detaining two men of Indian origin, one of whom was eventually released and another who disappeared into the U.S. detention system. The raid violated the city's INS Raid Free Resolution supporting undocumented immigrants' right to live in San Francisco without fear of abuse and raids by federal immigration officials and also the city's sanctuary policy forbidding cooperation between the ICE and local law enforcement on deportation cases involving only immigration issues.

A few days after the raid, the coalition organized a press conference outside the Hotel Sunrise. Tenants at the hotel spoke about the impact of the ICE raids in terrorizing the community, and other speakers connected the raids to the broader context of the unofficial war on immigrants and the official War on Terror. One of the hotel tenants interrogated in the raid was involved with a tenants' rights campaign, and members of the coalition feared that the raid would have a chilling effect on this mobilization, but the immigrant activist spoke at the protest anyway. Members of the coalition spoke to the tenants about their legal rights as part of their ongoing educational campaign in immigrant communities. I and others in ASATA tried to track down the South Asian men who had disappeared and make sure they had legal representation. Significantly, the focus of the *Deporten a La Migra* campaign combined efforts to support the particular immigrants involved in the Sunrise raid with a larger critique of state policies related to the economic and political logics of immigration and deportation policy and the War on Terror.

This is just one of many instances of cross-ethnic alliances uniting immigrant rights, civil rights, labor, and other antiwar movements that emerged in response to post-September 11 deportations and detention. As I and others in the *Deporten a La Migra* coalition were trying to solve the mystery of the Sunrise raid, local Muslim, Arab, and South Asian American groups were working to monitor the increasingly secretive and unpublicized raids on Muslim immigrant homes and workplaces that are part of what I call the "Secret Registration," which took place outside the media spotlight that had focused on the Special Registration. A Filipino community support group, FOCUS, was engaged in a campaign to stop the deportation of Filipino American families from the Bay Area by organizing airport workers, women, and youth. Others in Cambodian, Vietnamese, Salvadoran, and Mexican immigrant communities across the nation were trying to address the "tidal wave" of deportations after a 1996 law made all noncitizens subject to deportation if they had previously been sentenced to more than a year in prison, regardless of the seriousness of the crime (B. Hing 2004, 230–31; Richard 2003). These campaigns inevitably give rise to debates about whether some immigrants are indeed more deportable than others. There are also many who belong to these communities, including Muslim, South Asian, and Arab Americans, who argue that those who have violated the law *should* be deported, distancing themselves from the "true" criminals or terrorists (Saliba, n.d.). The larger point that is overlooked in this distinction between "good" and "bad" immigrants is that there are certain communities that are inevitably targeted

for deportation on both counts, as dangerous criminals or terrorists and as immigrants, and that certain groups are overrepresented in detention and deportation for both these categories. Furthermore, the "good" versus "bad" immigrant dichotomy ignores the fundamental notion that deportability is itself a tool used to regulate immigrant labor and suppress political movements. The few examples discussed here point to the many campaigns that have attempted to resist the political repression and to challenge the religious, ethnic, and racial divisions fostered by the War on Terror.

CONCLUSION

Deportation is a technology used by the state not just to regulate its borders through the removal of individuals but to remove or suppress radical ideologies. As such, the theater of deportation is a site in which the state is itself ideologically constituted as well as contested, as movements and campaigns resisting deportation bring to light the political and economic functions of deportation. The political and economic logic of deportation often works in tandem, as I have shown, particularly in cases that simultaneously terrorize immigrant workers and (potential) critics of U.S. policy—disciplining labor as well as political dissent. Young Muslim and Arab American men who have been detained and deported after September 11, 2001, such as Hamid Hayat, have generally not been political activists in the traditional sense, but the state is aware that they are a source of critique of its policies in the Middle East, the major front in the War on Terror, and that their communities represent historical knowledge of the not so pretty face of U.S. imperial power. If deportees and detainees are constituted politically in their encounter with the state—even if they are not technically political deportees—their experiences of deportability also help construct the image and understanding of the state in the public sphere as coercive or democratic, racist or "tough on crime" and terrorism. As De Genova points out, the state is not a "fixed institutional matrix but rather . . . a site of struggle in itself" (2002, 428). This struggle, as I argue here, is ultimately a battle over the imperial state's desire to expand its military, economic, and political power and to crush dissent against its policies at home and abroad. Moreover, it is a battle over defining the very limits of politics itself.

Although the United States is now the lone global superpower, and its military and political domination is unrivaled, the imperial state is (in-

creasingly) intolerant of the possibility of dissenting views and movements within its borders (and even outside), betraying a sense of ideological insecurity in its repression and expulsion of "alien" ideas during this new cold war—which has replaced the threat of communism with the threat of Islamic terrorism to freedom (of market capitalism), democracy (under occupation), and the American way of life (as the best and only way). Bush's doctrine of preemptive war overseas is paralleled by the preemptive detention and deportation policies under the guise of homeland security, based on a similar doctrine of preempting terrorism as a pretext for repressing and regulating immigrants, workers, and dissidents. Other states also engage in these strategies in ways that are racist and xenophobic, but owing to the economic and military might of the United States, the lone superpower's waging of perpetual war, as well as its pivotal role in global immigration, makes its regime of deportation and the War on Terror a significant factor in shaping the global geography of removal and repression.²²

Immigrants and citizens respond to state practices of surveillance, detention, and deportation in ways that are not always predictable. Political movements and alliances have emerged that sometimes defy the categories established by the state to distinguish its policing processes focused on various communities. On the one hand, some Muslim immigrants who are afraid of deportation and subjected to surveillance, such as those in Lodi, are likely to assert that they are "good citizens" who believe in U.S. democracy and freedom, even as the limits of that freedom are tested on their own bodies (Saliba n.d.). Some participate in the reinscription of the image of the "Muslim" and "Arab terrorist" and the dichotomy of "good" and "bad" Muslims and Arabs as a prerequisite to acceptance into virtuous citizenship (Mamdani 2004). These are often strategies of self-defense for Arab, Muslim, and South Asian immigrants, for those who are not citizens, in particular, are justifiably concerned about publicly expressing political dissent.

Yet this self-censorship allows the deportation strategy to achieve precisely the effect it intends: inhibiting political dissent and suppressing collective mobilization. It is important for members of targeted communities to think strategically of ways to collectively resist this reinscription of the discourse about terrorism while protecting vulnerable individuals or segments of these communities. Some have resisted this performance of good citizenship and have challenged deportations, not just in the courts, where the law generally upholds the warfare state's need for national security, but also in the public sphere, highlighting the connections between

the economic disciplining and the political repression conducted through deportation, as was the case with the immigrants who protested the Sunrise raid.

However, collective responses from the targeted communities have also sometimes worked within the parameters outlined by the state in its War on Terror, attempting mainly to shield immigrants from excessive harassment or violations or, in some cases, cooperating with the government in its hunt for the "real terrorists." The issue of complicity with such surveillance is obviously a controversial one and gives rise to difficult debates within the community about the meanings of citizenship, loyalty, and betrayal. Yet other kinds of collective responses have challenged the government's premise in the War on Terror and, in some cases, gone even further, making links between the war(s) on immigrants, minorities, and the underprivileged at home and the war overseas—as was the case with the Deporten a La Migra coalition and groups that exposed the government's tactics in the Lodi case.

In naming the coalition Deporten a La Migra, the organizers were not just trying to use a clever phrase but also suggesting a larger political critique: that resistance needs to be focused not just on specific deportation policies and on preventing or challenging deportations that target specific individuals or groups but also on the agencies of the state itself that regulate and discipline populations and enforce imperial policies of coercion, violence, and intimidation. If deportation is a struggle about eradicating ideologies and not just removing individuals or organizations, then our resistance needs to work to end the imperial state's increasingly globalized regime of terror and repression by exposing the underlying political and economic logic of the War on Terror, refusing to fashion dissent to empire in terms framed by its own ideological conceits, and creating broader alliances among those who are targeted as immigrants, workers, and dissenters.

NOTES

I would like to thank Magid Shihade, Nicholas De Genova, and Nathalie Peutz for their thoughtful comments and helpful feedback, and Veena Dubal and members of Deporten a La Migra for their courage and astute analysis.

1. In an unusual case, Hayat's uncle and U.S.-born cousin were refused re-entry to the United States when returning from Pakistan in April 2006, as the trial was in progress, because they were on a no-fly list and were asked to submit to interrogation by the FBI without a lawyer present (Demian Bulwa, "Men OK'd to Return to the U.S. from Pakistan," *San Francisco Chronicle*,

September 13, 2006). The refusal of reentry to the United States, sometimes to citizens, is akin to a reverse deportation; even if only temporary in certain cases, it is part of the same process of regulating bodies in the name of national security.

2. While most of the persons targeted after September 11, 2001, in connection with the War on Terror were Muslim, many were non-Muslim Arabs and non-Muslim South Asians (including, in particular, Sikh American men). The men targeted for detention and deportation, however, were almost all either Muslim or Arab in origin. Yet the intensified racialization, even ethnicization, of the category "Muslim" since 2001 has occurred in the context of a prevailing discourse about a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West that shifts attention away from the ways in which this so-called racial profiling of Muslims by the U.S. state is actually linked to U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East and to historical anti-Arab racism. Thus most commentators and activists addressing post-September 11 state profiling have used some variant of the inclusive, though somewhat cumbersome, category "Muslim, Arab, and South Asian" rather than glossing them as "Muslim."

3. David Harvey has demonstrated how both neoliberalism and imperialism are clearly linked by showing how neoliberal economic principles of free-market enterprise and privatization were accompanied by a political project to "re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites," with the help of military intervention if necessary, as evident in the "first experiment with neoliberal state formation," the U.S.-backed coup against the socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile on September 11, 1973, and continuing with policies of structural adjustment and deregulation crystallized in the Reagan-Thatcher era (Harvey 2005, 19, 7).

4. The U.S. Congress changed the terminology of deportation to "removal" in 1996 (B. Hing 2004, 210).

5. At the time of this writing, the U.S. government still refuses to take Arar off its terrorist watch list and allow him entry into the country. Ian Austen, "Canada Reaches Settlement with Torture Victim," *New York Times*, January 26, 2007.

6. In reality, neoliberal capitalism shored up the wealth and power of economic elites, countering the threat of socialist policies and communist parties after World War II through a combination of political, military, and economic strategies to promote privatization (Harvey 2005).

7. U.S. imperial power uses different strategies of dominance: "control over international bodies (the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization), covert actions, global surveillance methods, direct military interventions, political machinations, and deadly economic sanctions of the sort used against Iraq" (Boggs 2003, 6).

8. In November 2001, as public criticism began to mount, the Department of Justice stopped releasing the numbers of persons detained in the post-September 11 sweeps, so although the official estimate was 1,182 detentions, a conservative estimate of detentions until May 2003 is at least 5,000 (Cole 2003, 25).

9. "Pakistan Fighting Terror in Its Own Interest, Not USA's," *Pakistan Link*, August 17, 2007, 1, 21; "Tribesmen Observe August 14 as 'Black Day,'" *Pakistan Link*, August 17, 2007, 17.
10. The Department of Homeland Security officially ended the program's re-registration component in December 2003 after protests by immigrant and civil rights groups and grassroots community organizations. Other aspects of the program remained in place, however, and the detentions and deportations continued (see Cainkar 2004).
11. For example, the FBI's extensive monitoring of the General Union of Palestinian Students on college campuses and at events around the country in the 1980s, with no objection from the Justice Department (Cole and Dempsey 2002, 35-48). See also Jordan Green, "Silencing Dissent," *ColorLines* 6, no. 2 (2003): 17-20.
12. In February 2007 an immigration court judge finally dismissed the government's twenty-year-old deportation proceedings against Khader Musa Hamide and Michel Shehadeh, the two remaining L.A. Eight defendants, as "an embarrassment to the rule of law." "A Shameful Prosecution," *New York Times*, February 14, 2007.
13. The FBI's extensive nationwide monitoring of CISPES was based on charges that they were supporting and funding the Salvadoran rebel group the FLMN and plotting terrorist attacks in the United States, although the investigation never found any evidence of this (Cole and Dempsey 2002, 22-23).
14. Legislative Initiatives to Curb Domestic and International Terrorism: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Congress (1984), note 29; cited in Cole and Dempsey 2002, 207.
15. For example, after years of FBI surveillance, John Lennon of the Beatles was targeted for deportation by the Nixon administration to sabotage his concert tour protesting the Vietnam War (B. Hing 2004, 226-28).
16. For example, Operation Community Shield was jointly undertaken by the FBI and Department of Homeland Security in 2005 to round up suspected Salvadoran gang members (Nguyen 2005, 87).
17. See Welch 2000 and Dow 2004 on the connections between immigration and incarceration in the United States.
18. *The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks*, Report by Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, April 2003, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detainees.pdf> (accessed February 20, 2007). See also Camille T. Taiara, "American Payback," *San Francisco Bay Guardian*, May 26, 2004, 19.
19. For example, Ward Churchill (2006) extensively documents cases of political prisoners who were detained for involvement with revolutionary movements in the United States and who were much more harshly sentenced, often on the basis of questionable evidence, than right-wing activists.

20. Bomb threats were made against Arab American organizations in Detroit in the mid-1980s, and the Anti-Defamation League was found guilty of surveilling ADC members (see Abraham 1994).

21. The first man murdered in a hate crime linked to the events of September 11, 2001, was Balbir Singh Sodhi, who was killed at a gas station he owned in Mesa, Arizona, on September 15, 2001 (Prashad 2003, 66).

22. The notion of "perpetual war" has been used to describe the military policies of preemptive and unilateral strikes advocated by the Bush regime, as documented in the Project for the New American Century's goals for the United States to "fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous theatre wars" to establish U.S. global domination (cited in Kellner 2003, 241).